Double Jeopardy

1. In a case of a prosecution of an accused for estafa after his acquittal of the crime
of illegal recruitment, but which involves the same set of facts as the first case, can the
accused raise the defense of double jeopardy?
How about res adjudicata? (1994, #4)
Answer:
No. The accused cannot raise the defense of double jeopardy because the offenses
are of estafa and illegal recruitment are separate offenses even though they involve the
same set of facts.
Res adjudicata is not applicable in the case at bar.

2. For firing a machine gun which caused panic among the people present and
physical injuries to one, two separate information (one for serious public disturbance and
the other for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries) were filed against the
accused.
As he pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries, the accused was convicted and sentence accordingly.
Later, the accused sought to dismiss the charge of serious public disturbance on the
ground of double jeopardy.
Is there double jeopardy? Why? (1993, #6)
Answer:
No, because the protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A
single act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
one does not bar prosecution under the other.
In this case, the act of firing a machine gun violated two articles of the RPC.
Consequently, conviction for one does not bar prosecution for the other.

3. George was charged with falsification. On the date of initial trial, the fiscal moved
for postponement on the ground that the case had been assigned to a special prosecutor of
the DOJ who was out of town to attend to an urgent case, and who had wired him to request
for postponement. The fiscal manifested that he was not ready for trial because he was
unfamiliar with the case. The judge then asked the accused as well as his counsel whether
they were amenable to a postponement. Both George and his counsel insisted on a trial. The
judge ordered the case dismissed.
Upon learning thereof, the special prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court alleging that the dismissal was capricious and deprived the
Government of Due process. George opposed the petition, invoking double jeopardy.
a) Is double jeopardy a bar to the petition? Explain.

Answer:
No, because this is not an appeal by the prosecution asserting a dismissal to be
erroneous. It is a petition for certiorari which assails the order of dismissal an invalid and a
nullity because it was capricious and deprived the Government of due process. Considering
that this was the first motion for postponement of the trial filed by the fiscal and the ground
was meritorious, the judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering the case dismissed. If
there is no valid dismissal or termination of the case, there is no basis for invoking double
jeopardy.

b) Suppose that trial on the merits had in fact proceeded and the trial judge, finding
the evidence to be insufficient, dismissed the case, would your answer be the same?
Explain. (1988, # 16)

Answer:
No, because in such a case, the order of dismissal would be valid, even if erroneous,
and would be tantamount to an acquittal.

4. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of less serious physical injuries.
Before judgment, the fiscal moved that he be allowed to file a new information against the
accused for the graver crime of frustrated murder it appearing that the injuries were
inflicted with intent to kill. The defense objected upon the ground that the charge for less
serious physical injuries is included in the offense for frustrated murder and since he had
already pleaded to the lesser charge, the filing of a new information would constitute second
jeopardy. The prosecution replied that there would be no double jeopardy, as the complaint
will be dismissed upon the filing of the information for frustrated murder, pursuant to Sec.
11, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure relevant to situations when mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense. The fiscal argued that the fact of the
accused’ intent to kill was discovered by the prosecution and the complainant only during
the trial of the case.
a) Resolve the motion. Reasons.
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Answer:
Motion denied. The charge of less serious physical injuries is necessarily included in
the offense of frustrated murder and under Section 11 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the dismissal of the original case upon the filing of the new one can only
be done if the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged. In this case the accused
can be convicted of less serious physical injuries. Moreover, the dismissal of the original
complaint upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense can only be done
provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. In this case the accused would
be placed in double jeopardy.

b) Suppose the intent to kill is indicated in the affidavits of the witnesses for the
complainant which were the basis of the filing of the complaint, would your resolution be
different and if so, why? (1987, # 11)

Answer:
Motion denied. With more reason should the motion be denied if the intent to kill is
indicated in the affidavits which were the basis for the filing of the complaint, because not
only is the intent to kill not a new supervening fact, but it is not even a subsequently
discovered fact.
Alternative Answer:
1. Motion granted. While intent to kill is not a new supervening fact which
constitutes an exception to the rule on identity of offenses in double jeopardy, an
additional exception has been added in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
namely, when the facts constituting graver charge become known or were
discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information. In this
case, the intent to kill was discovered only during the trial of the case, and hence,
a new complaint may be filed for frustrated murder without placing the accused
in double jeopardy.
2. Motion denied. The resolution would be different, because in such case the intent
to kill would not fall under the additional exception of subsequently discovered
fact.

RM was charged with robbery in the RTC of Laguna. After the prosecution had rested its
case, the counsel for the accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. Can the prosecution appeal from said order of dismissal? Reasons. (1976, #3)
Answer:
No, because the order of dismissal is tantamount to an acquittal based on a
consideration of the evidence or merits of the case. Consequently, the prosecution may not
appeal as the appeal would place RM in double jeopardy.

The MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan conducted the PI of a case for estafa, after which the MTC
dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. May the Provincial Fiscal conduct a
reinvestigation of the case and file the corresponding information if he finds the evidence
sufficient to warrant the prosecution of the case? Reason. (1976, #7)
Answer:
Yes, because the dismissal of the case after a preliminary investigation for
insufficiency of evidence does not place the accused in jeopardy and does not bar a
subsequent prosecution after a proper preliminary investigation by the Provincial Fiscal.
(However, the action of the provincial fiscal may be reviewed and reversed by the SOJ under
PD 911)

Private respondent was accused of direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
After trial, respondent Court rendered a decision acquitting accused for failure of the
information to charge an offense, there being no allegation that the complainant was an
agent of a person in authority and that such fact was known to the accused. Will the filing of
a new information alleging that the complainant is a person in authority and that such fact is
known to the accused place him in double jeopardy? Reason. (1976, #7)
Answer:
The requisites of double jeopardy are as follows:
a) a court of competent jurisdiction
b) valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction
c) defendant has pleaded
d) identity of offenses charged
e) previous conviction or acquittal or dismissal or termination without express
consent of defendant.
Inasmuch as the information was insufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction because it did not alleged that the accused knew that the complainant was an
agent of a person in authority, the filing of a new information will not place the accused in
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double jeopardy. The acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for failure to
charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits.

In the trial of a HOMICIDE case, the fiscal was able to prove treachery and evident
premeditation without objection on the part of the defense. By reason thereof, the fiscal
moved to amend the Information invoking the provision of the Rules of Court which allows
amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence. He then filed an amended
Information changing homicide to that of murder which, however, was vehemently objected
to by the defense.
a) Resolve the merits of the fiscal’s motion to amend.
b) Suppose instead of allowing the amendment prayed for, the Judge dismissed the
case and ordered the filing of a new Information for MURDER, is the order legally
assailable? Reasons. (1985, #9)
Answer:
a) The fiscal’s motion to amend the information to conform to the evidence is denied.
Such an amendment is allowed only in civil cases. A substantial amendment of the
information is allowed only before the accused pleads.
b) Yes, the dismissal of the original information and the filing of a new one for murder
is proper if the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In this case the
accused would be placed in double jeopardy because homicide is necessarily included in
murder.

In that same less serious physical injury case, suppose BC upon arraignment pleaded GUILTY
and credited with the additional mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, was
sentenced to one month of arresto menor. After service of the penalty, however, the victim
died.
a) As the fiscal in charge of the case, what procedural steps will you undertake with
the victim’s death? Explain.
b) May BC set-up the defense of double jeopardy in any subsequent prosecution
brought about by the victim’s death. Discuss.(1985, #8)
Answer:
a) I would conduct a PI to determine if the death of the victim was due to the less
serious physical injuries inflicted upon him by BC. If such was the case, I would file an
information against BC for homicide.
b) No, because one of the exceptions to the defense of double jeopardy is that the
graver offenses developed due to the supervening fact arising from the same act
constituting the former charge. The subsequent death of the victim is such a new
supervening fact.
Upon arraignment, A pleaded not guilty to the charge of serious physical injuries. Ten days
later, the victim died. Hence, the fiscal moved for the amendment of the information so as
to charge the accused with the crime of homicide. The accused objected on the ground that
he had been put in jeopardy of being convicted of the crime of serious physical injuries; and
that another prosecution for homicide for the same act under an amended information
would constitute double jeopardy.
If you were the judge, how would you resolve the motion? Explain.(1984,#13)
Answer:
I would grant the fiscal’s motion for the amendment of the information.
The amendment will not put the accused in double jeopardy. The circumstance that
the victims death supervened the accused’’s plea of not guilty to the charge for serious
physical injuries takes the case out of the rule of identity. There was no possibility, no risk
that the accused could have been convicted under the original information of the crime of
homicide for that crime was inexistent at the time he pleaded not guilty to the charge of
serious physical injuries.
Another Answer:
I would grant the motion. The objection of A on the ground of double jeopardy is not
tenable, because the death of the victim after A had pleaded not guilty is a new supervening
fact for which A was responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together
with the facts existing at the time, constitute a new and distinct offense. Hence, A cannot be
said to be in double jeopardy if charged with the new offense. In other words, the rule of
identity of offenses as a requisite for double jeopardy does not apply when the second
offense was not yet in existence at the time of the first prosecution.

Two informations were filed in the municipal court against A – one for light threat
allegedly committed against B on 1 June 1972, and another for the theft of the watch of C
allegedly committed on 8 July 1972. Over the objection of the prosecution, the court ordered
the joint trial of the two cases. At the trial, the evidence presented was only in the case for
theft. After the trial, the court acquitted A in both cases.
1. Is the joint trial proper? Why?
2. Can A be prosecuted anew for light threat?(1975, #10)
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Answer:
a) The order of the court for a joint trial of the two cases is not proper. Under Sec.
15, Rule 119, charges for offenses founded on the same facts or which form or are
a part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character may, in the
discretion of the court, be tried jointly. Since the two offenses are entirely
different from one another and are not based on the same facts same or similar
character, joint trial is not in order. The charge of light threat is entirely differently
from the theft of the watch. They do not even belong to the same class of crimes
since the threat is a crime against personal liberty and security, while the theft is
a crime against property. Even the persons of the complainant are different.
Consequently, the court had no power to try the two cases.
b) A can still be prosecuted for light threats because the order of acquittal is not
valid insofar as the offense of the light threat is concerned. The court in acquitting
the accuse for the offense of light threat, for which he was never tried, acted with
abuse of discretion, equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction. It must not be lost
sight of that the State is equally entitled to due process in criminal cases and this
includes the right to be given an opportunity to present its evidence in support of
the charge. Where the right has been denied, the action of the court is a nullity.
As the SC has repeatedly held a capricious dismissal of an information deprives
the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its
day in court. For that reason, the dismissal or acquittal is without due process and
is therefore null and void. It is invalid for lack of fundamental pre-requisite, that is,
due process and consequently will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of
double jeopardy.