People vs.

Nangcas (2018)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA NANGCAS
G.R. No. 218806, June 13, 2018

MARTIRES, J.:

Facts: An Information was filed charging appellant for Violation of the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003", which
alleges that the accused, unlawfully recruit, transport four (4) women, three of them are minors, by taking advantage of
the vulnerability of said victims for the purpose of offering and selling said victims for forced labor, that is, by promising
them local employment (as househelpers in Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro City) with a monthly salary of PhP1,500.00
each and that they could go home every Sunday, but instead, said accused brought them to Marawi City and sold them for
PhP1,600.00 each to their great damage and prejudice.

Nangcas denied the allegations claiming that she had no idea that the employer would no longer be needing house helpers;
hence, with no money to pay for the fare, she had no other choice but to stay with Baby Abas in Marawi City.

Issue: Whether or not appellant’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling: Yes, appellant’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 4 of RA 9208 provides: It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the
pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified trafficking: (a) When the trafficked
person is a child;

In this case, Nangcas induced and coaxed the victims to go with her by promising the victims and their parents that their
daughters would be working within Cagayan De Oro City, with an enticing salary of P1,500.00 per month. In Marawi, the
victims were constrained to work with the intention to save money for their fare going back home; however, when they
asked for their salary they were told that it had already been given to Nangcas.

Ratio Decidendi: Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it to his legal injury.

Gist: This an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 9208.

G.R. NO. 211465, DECEMBER 03, 2014 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SHIRLEY A. CASIO

Facts

On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM) coordinated with coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons
engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. Several police officers were designated then as decoys, pretending to be tour
guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem St red light district.
Accused, Casio, noticed them and called their attention and offered if they’d like some girls. After the conversation, Casio
presented to the police officers two minors, AAA and BBB. After having settled the negotiation, they went to Queensland
Motel. The marked money was handed to Casio and the two minors were brought to another room in the custody of the
representatives of IJM and DSWD.
The accused however, contends that there was no valid entrapment instead she was instigated into committing the crime,
since the police did not conduct prior surveillance and did not even know who their subject was. She also denied being a
pimp and asserted that she was a laundrywoman. Also, AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute thus, it was her
decision to display herself to solicit customers.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the entrapment operation conducted was valid

2. Whether or not the accused shall be liable for the crime human trafficking

Ruling:

1. Yes there was a valid entrapment and it was recognized by courts. It was the accused-appellant who commenced the
transaction with the officers by calling their attention on whether they wanted girls and when the officers responded,
it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait while she would fetch the girls for their perusal. This shows that
accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated the transaction.

There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the
actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in
the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution

2. Yes. The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services were peddled
to the police who acted as decoys. AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled her services. AAA also stated that she
agreed to work as a prostitute because she needed money. Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and
as one who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses. Therefore, the accused is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 Anti Trafficking Act.

RA 9208, SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:

(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum,
the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude
or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when
the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in
persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph
CASE: Rustan Ang vs. CA and Irish Sagud (G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010)

Ponente: Abad, J.:S

FACTS:

Irish and Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became on-
and-off sweethearts. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner, whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

Rustan, however, got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the
woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow
managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave
her alone.

Irish, later on, received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and
with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was one of the
numbers that Rustan used.

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.

Irish filed a case of violation of R.A. No. 9262 against Rustan.

Rustan argued that he cannot be held liable under R.A. No. 9262. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against
women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,

(a) Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

Further, Section 3(e) provides that a dating relationship includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) Dating relationship refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Hence, Rustan claims that, being romantically involved, implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had
sexual relations. According to him, romance implies a sexual act. He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary
Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word romance used as a verb, i.e., to make
love; to make love to as in He romanced her.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the on-and-off variety (away-bati), their
romance cannot be regarded as having developed over time and on a continuing basis.

ISSUES:

a) Whether “dating relationship” exist even without sexual intercourse.

b) Whether the on and off relationship (away-bati) of Irish and Rustan can be considered as “dating relationship” as
contemplated by law.
RULING:

a) The dating relationship that the law contemplates can exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between
those involved.

The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb romance that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender
must have romanced the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun romance to describe a couples relationship, i.e., a
love affair.

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines dating relationship while
Section 3(f) defines sexual relations. The latter refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of
a common child. The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse
taking place between those involved.

b) An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean
that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.

THINGS DECIDED:

a) The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment under R.A. No. 9262 are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

b) The dating relationship that the law contemplates can exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between
those involved.

c) An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean
that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first
year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk,
he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who
testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use
of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists
and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the
case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome”
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were
presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman
syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered
women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three
phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between
the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer
must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of
Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient
evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to
kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is
the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided
must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites
of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -
- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not
arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon
appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by
the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful
act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8)
months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which
overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2)
mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as
appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she
is being held for some other lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Facts:

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and
of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-
respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and
extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by
the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the
equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social
institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of
judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision:

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised
in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of
the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO
exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the
law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot
be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a
mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance
of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
AAA v. BBB GR No. 212448, Jan 11, 2018 Jurisdiction, R. A. No. 9262, Psychological Abuse
JANUARY 15, 2020

FACTS:
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married in 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC and DDD.

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in September
of 2008.

AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. There were also allegations of virtual
abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. Worse, BBB supposedly started
having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok.

The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish
through his alleged marital infidelity.

AAA was able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB. However, BBB continued to evade the warrant of arrest.

In 2013, the Accused moved to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest.

The trial court granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and dismissed the case.

The trial court ruled:

“…considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts complained of him had occurred in Singapore,
dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.”

The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case was denied.

Hence, AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under
R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the
Philippines.

RULING:
As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal ease is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, threshing
out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial.

PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE

In Dinamling v. People, this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence under
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and their children
is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to
the woman’s child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as
follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman’s child or
children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.

xxxx

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the
victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect
caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party.

To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the
acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.

xxx

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the
psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.

It is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is
only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed.

The mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.

VENUE

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7
provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant.

While the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the
offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant.

Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as
transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another.

In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case.

Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where
the offense was in part committed.

We say that even if the alleged extra- marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed
abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
Domingo vs. Rayala
546 Scra 90

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment
against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her ears. Rayala
argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist, there must be a demand, request or
requirement of sexual favor.

Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.

Rulings:
Yes.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual
harassment in this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or
training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless
of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment
of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or

(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

Even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively
liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.” But it is not necessary
that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may
be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his
fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for
school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all
these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Felina Rosaldes v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
Bersamin, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner Felina Rosaldes, a public schoolteacher, was charged and found guilty of child abuse punished under RA
7610.

It appears from the records that seven-year-old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil, was hurriedly entering his
classroom when he accidentally bumped the knew of his teacher, herein petitioner, who was then asleep on a bamboo
sofa. Petitioner asked Michael to apologize, the latter, however, proceeded instead to his seat. Petitioner then pinched
Michael on his thigh, held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor causing him to hit a desk and, consequently,
losing his consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.

Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by Michael to maltreat or malign him
in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity and avers that her maltreatment is only an act of
discipline that she as a schoolteacher could reasonably do towards the development of the child.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of the crime of child abuse punishable under RA 7610

HELD:
YES, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of a violation of RA 7610. Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly
discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive.
The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse:

xxxx

(b) “Child abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual

or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such
as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured
child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in
his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual.
The physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going
to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had
to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child
abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.

Hence, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of the crime of child abuse punished under RA 7610.