Perpetua Abuan v Eustagio Garcia

Gr No L-20091

Facts

acquired by Laureano Abuan the homestead passed after his death, to his legal heirs, the plaintiff
herein. Consequently, the original certificate of title in his name was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No T-5486 was issued in their names. On August 7, 1953,
plaintiffs sold the parcel of land to defendants, the sale being evidenced by a public instrument
entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale"; and by virtue thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5906
was issued to defendants. Later, plaintiffs filed an action to recover the land, alleging that the
deed of absolute sale had been executed through fraud, without consideration. However, the case
was subsequently settled amicably, when the parties entered into an "Agreement" dated February
28, 1955, under the terms of which defendants paid P500.00 on that day as partial payment of
the purchase price of the land, and promised to pay the balance of P1500.00 on or before April
30, 1955, with a grace period of thirty days. Claiming that full payment had been effected only
sometime in May, 1955, plaintiffs instituted the present action on March 4, 1960. Defendants
moved to dismiss, on the ground that plaintiffs' right of action was already barred, because the
five-year redemption period had already expired.

Issue

Whether or not the five year period began to run May, 1955, upon full payment of the purchase
price

Held

The law speaks of "five years from date of conveyance". Conveyance means transfer of
ownership; it means the date when the title to the land is transferred from one person to
another. 2 The five-year should, therefore, be reckoned from the date that defendants acquired
ownership of the land. rt. 1477 of the New Civil Code provides that ownership of the thing sold
shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof; and Art 1496
points out that ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is
delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501. Under Art. 1498, when the
sale is made through a public instrument, — as in this case — the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred. It is clear, therefore, that defendants
acquired ownership to the land in question upon the execution of the deed of sale. The deed of
sale was executed on August 7, 1953, which was "superseded" by the Agreement of February 28,
1955, as to the terms and conditions of payment of the purchase price. The latter agreement did
not entirely abrogate the sale since it did not operate to revest the ownership of the land in
the plaintiffs
Perfecto Dy Jr v CA

GR No 92989

Facts

Wilfredo Dy bought a truck and tractor from Libra Finance Corporation. Both truck and tractor was also
mortgage to Libra as security for a loan and as such, they took possession of it. Brother of Wilfredo,
Perfecto Dy and sister Carol Dy-Seno requested Libra that they be allowed to buy the property and
assume the mortgage debt. Libra agreed to the request.Meanwhile, a collection suit was filed against
Wilfredo Dy by Gelac Trading Inc. On the strength of a writ of execution, the sheriff was able to obtain
the tractor on the premises of Libra. It was sold in a public auction in which Gelac Trading was the lone
bidder. Gelac subsequently sold it to one of their stockholders. The respondents claim that at the time
of the execution of the deed of sale, no constructive delivery was effected since the consummation of
the sale depended upon the clearance and encashment of the check which was issued in payment of the
subject tractor

Issue

WON the William Dy is still the owner of the tractor when it was obtained through the writ of execution.

Held

The tractor was not anymore in possession of William Dy when it was obtained by the sheriff because he
already sold it to his brother. William Dy has the right to sell his property even though it was mortgage
because in a mortgage, the mortgagor doesn’t part with the ownership over the property. He is allowed
to sell the property as long as there is consent from the mortgagee such as in this case. But even if there
is no consent given, the sale would still be valid without prejudice to the criminal action against the
mortgagor. When William Dy sold the tractor, he already transferred the ownership of it because NCC
states that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to
him or in any other manner signing an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to
the vendee. In the instant case, actual delivery of the subject tractor could not be made but there was
constructive delivery already upon the execution of a public instrument which in this case is a deed of
sale. The payment of the check was actually intended to extinguish the mortgage obligation.
Industrial Textie Manyfacturing Company v. LPJ Enterprises Inc

GR no. 66140

Facts

Sometime in October, 1970, Cesar Campos, a Vice-President of petitioner Industrial Textile

Manufacturing Company of the Philippines (or Itemcop, for brevity), asked Lauro Panganiban, Jr.,
President of respondent corporation, if he would like to cooperate in an experiment to develop
plastic cement bags. Panganiban acquiesced, principally because Itemcop is a sister corporation of
Atlas, respondent's major client. A few weeks later, Panganiban accompanied Paulino Ugarte,
another Vice-President of Itemcop, to the factory of respondent's supplier, Luzon Cement
Corporation in Norzagaray, Bulacan, to test fifty (50) pieces of plastic cement bags. The
experiment, however, was unsuccessful. The second batch of plastic bags subjected to trial was
likewise a failure.. Finally, with three hundred (300) "improved bags", the seepage was
substantially reduced. Ugarte then asked Panganiban to send 180 bags of cement to Atlas via
commercial shipping. etitioner delivered the above orders consecutively on January 12, February
27, March 19, and April 17, 1971 (p. 74, Rollo). Respondent, on the other hand, remitted the
amounts of P1,640.00, P2,480.00, and P13,230.00 on March 31, April 31, and May 3, 1971
respectively, thereby leaving a balance of P84,123.80 (p. 58, Ibid.). No other payments were
made, thus prompting A. Soriano y Cia of petitioner's Legal Department to send demand letters to
respondent corporation Thereafter, petitioner was asked to take back the unused plastic bags.
Considering however, that the bags were in the cement factory of respondent's supplier,
petitioner maintained that it was respondent's obligation to return the bags to them. Apparently,
this was not done and so petitioner demanded payment for the said bags.

Issue

whether or not respondent may be held liable for the 47,000 plastic bags which were not
actually used for packing cement as originally intended

Held:

SC hold that the transaction between respondent and petitioner constituted an absolute sale.
Accordingly, respondent is liable for the plastic bags delivered to it by petitioner. The provision in
the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code from which Article 1502 was taken,
clearly requires an express written agreement to make a sales contract either a "sale or return"
or a "sale on approval". Parol or extrinsic testimony could not be admitted for the purpose of
showing that an invoice or bill of sale that was complete in every aspect and purporting to
embody a sale without condition or restriction constituted a contract of sale or return. If the
purchaser desired to incorporate a stipulation securing to him the right of return, he should have
done so at the time the contract was made. On the other hand, the buyer cannot accept part
and reject the rest of the goods since this falls outside the normal intent of the parties in the
"on approval" situation
Teran v Villanueva Viuda de Rosia

56 Phil 677

Facts

On October 6, 1928, the parties in this case executed the deed of sale Exhibit A, whereby the
defendants sold to the plaintiff for P4,000 the parcel of land therein described as containing an
area of 34 hectares, 52 ares, and 43 centares. The plaintiff brought this action for rescission of
the contract, with damages, upon discovering that the parcel of land contained only about ten
hectares. This land, with the same area stated in the contract, was inherited by the defendants
from their late father, Mariano Villanueva; and the same area appears in the tax declaration
given to the plaintiff by an agent of the defendants, named Rafael Villanueva. The latter,
accompanied by the plaintiff, inspected the land. Villanueva pointed out some of the boundaries,
as they did not go over all of them. Without further investigating the area of the land, the
plaintiff agreed to purchase it for the sum of four thousand pesos, paying the amount and taking
possession thereof. The plaintiff alleges that after the 1928 harvest he discovered that the
boundaries pointed out to him by Rafael Villanueva were not the real ones, In view of these
facts, the plaintiff now seeks to rescind the contract on the ground that the property contains a
smaller area than that stated in the deed of sale. Evidently this is a sale of real estate with area
and boundaries given, for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure, provided for in
article 1471 of the Civil Code.

Issue

Whether or not plaintiff can rescind the deed of sale on the ground that the land he bought has a
smaller area than that stated therein.

Held

Manresa expresses himself in similar terms, saying that, "if the sale was made for a lump sum,
the cause of the contract is the thing sold, irrespective of area or quantity, the real estate as
dened by the stipulated boundaries, known in law as the cuerpo cierto. . . If all that is included
within the stipulated boundaries is not delivered, then the object of the contract, its cause so
far as the vendee is concerned, is not delivered: hence, he is entitled to rescind it. He may
however think (and of this there can be no judge but himself), that although he did not receive
the land within the stipulated boundaries, he would like to have it: hence, his right to enforce
the contract with the corresponding decrease in price as provided an article 1471.

.
Consolidated Rura Bank of Cagayn Valley v CA

Gr no. 132161

Facts

The Madrid brothers were the registered owners of Lot A situated in Isabela. Said lot was subdivided
into several lots. Rizal Madrid sold part of his share identified lot A-7 to Gamiao and Dayag by virtue of a
Deed of Sale, to which his brothers offered no objection as evidenced by their Joint Affidavit .The deed
of sale was not registered with the ORD of Isabela. However, Gamiao and Dayag declared the property
in their names on a Tax Declaration. Gamiao and Dayag sold the subject southern half of lot to Teodoro
dela Cruz, and the northern half to Hernandez.Thereupon, Teodoro dela Cruz and Hernandez took
possession of and cultivated the portions of the property respectively sold to them (Later Restituto
Hernandez donated the northern half to his daughter. The children of Teodoro dela Cruz continued
possession of the southern half after their father’s death. In a Deed of Sale the Madrid brothers
conveyed all their rights and interests over lot A-7 to Marquez which the former confirmed. The deed of
sale was registered with the ORD of Isabela. Subsequentltly, Marquez subdivided lot A-7 into eight (8)
lots. On the same date, Marquez and his spouse, Mercedita Mariana, mortgaged 4 lots to the
Consolidated Rural Bank, Inc. of Cagayan Valley (hereafter, CRB) to secure a loan. These deeds of real
estate mortgage were registered with the ORD. As Marquez defaulted in the payment of his loan, CRB
caused the foreclosure of the mortgages in its favor and the lots were sold to it as the highest
bidder.The Heirs-now respondents filed a case for reconveyance and damages for the southern portion
of Lot No. 7036-A (hereafter, the subject property) against Marquez and CRB. The RTC handed down a
decision in favor of Marquez. The Heirs interposed an appeal with the CA, which upheld the claim of the
Heirs. Hence, the instant CRB petition.

Issue

WON Art. 1544 of the Civil Code (double sale) applicable in this case

Held

NovThe petition is denied, and the decision as modified is affirmed. Like the lower court, the appellate
court resolved the present controversy by applying the rule on double sale provided in Article 1544 of
the Civil Code. They, however, arrived at different conclusions. The RTC made CRB and the other
defendants win, while the Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of the Heirs.Article 1544 of the
Civil Code reads, thus:

ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
The provision is not applicable in the present case. It contemplates a case of double or multiple sales by
a single vendor. It cannot be invoked where the two different contracts of sale are made by two
different persons, one of them not being the owner of the property sold. And even if the sale was made
by the same person, if the second sale was made when such person was no longer the owner of the
property, because it had been acquired by the first purchaser in full dominion, the second purchaser
cannot acquire any right.

In the case at bar, the subject property was not transferred to several purchasers by a single vendor. In
the first deed of sale, the vendors were Gamiao and Dayag whose right to the subject property
originated from their acquisition thereof from Rizal Madrid with the conformity of all the other Madrid
brothers. On the other hand, the vendors in the other or later deed were the Madrid brothers but at
that time they were no longer the owners since they had long before disposed of the property in favor
of Gamiao and Dayag.

In a situation where not all the requisites are present which would warrant the application of Art. 1544,
the principle of prior tempore, potior jure or simply “he who is first in time is preferred in right, should
apply.” The only essential requisite of this rule is priority in time; in other words, the only one who can
invoke this is the first vendee. Undisputedly, he is a purchaser in good faith because at the time he
bought the real property, there was still no sale to a second vendee. In the instant case, the sale to the
Heirs by Gamiao and Dayag, who first bought it from Rizal Madrid, was anterior to the sale by the
Madrid brothers to Marquez. The Heirs also had possessed the subject property first in time. Thus,
applying the principle, the Heirs, without a scintilla of doubt, have a superior right to the subject
property.

Moreover, it is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have¾nemo dat quod
non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can
acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally.53 In this case, since the Madrid brothers were
no longer the owners of the subject property at the time of the sale to Marquez, the latter did not
acquire any right to it.