G.R. No.

L-19313                  January 19, 1962

DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, petitioner,
vs.
ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N.

BENGZON, C.J.:

Without prejudice to the subsequent promulgation of more extended opinion, the Court adopted
today, the following resolutions: .

On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad
interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath.

On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on
December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling
all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, (date when he,
Macapagal, had been proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962, President Macapagal
appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified
immediately.

On January 2, 1962, both appointed exercised the powers of their office, although Castillo informed
Aytona of his title thereto; and some unpleasantness developed in the premises of the Central Bank.
However, the next day and thereafter, Aytona was definitely prevented from holding office in the
Central Bank.

So, he instituted this proceeding which is practically, a quo warranto, challenging Castillo’s right to
exercise the powers of Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had
qualified for the post, and therefore, the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was
void, because the position was then occupied by him. Castillo replies that the appointment of
Aytona had been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal; and so, the real issue is
whether the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad
interim appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees had already qualified.

The record shows that President Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments— which was not
then in session—a communication dated December 29, 1961, submitting “for confirmation” ad
interim appointments of assistant director of lands, councilors, mayors, members of the provincial
boards, fiscals, justices of the peace, officers of the army, etc.; and the name of Dominador R. Aytona
as Governor of the Central Bank occupies number 45, between a justice of the peace and a colonel of
the Armed Forces.

Another communication of President Garcia bearing the same date, submitted a list of ad
interim appointments of Foreign Affairs officers, judges, fiscals, chiefs of police, justices of the peace,
mayors, councilors, etc. number 63 of which was that of Dominador R. Aytona for Governor of the
Philippines in the Boards of International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, etc.
A third communication likewise dated December 29, 1961, addressed to the Commission on
Appointments submitted for confirmation 124 names of persons appointed as judges of first
instance, members of provincial boards, and boards of government corporations, fiscals, justice of
the peace, even one associate justice of this Court occupying position No. 8 and two associate
justices of the Court of Appeals (9 and 10) between an assistant of the Solicitor-General’s Office, and
the chairman of the board of tax appeals of Pasay City, who in turn are followed by judges of first
instance, and inserted between the latter is the name of another associate justice of the Court of
Appeals.

There were other appointments thus submitted by President Garcia on that date, December 29,
1961. All in all, about three hundred fifty (350) “midnight” or “last minute” appointments.

In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these and other
reasons: (1) the outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new
President opportunity to consider names in the light of his new policies, which were approved by
the electorate in the last elections; (2) these scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall
within the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad
interim appointments; (3) the appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust, because they were
issued only upon the condition that the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a
recall or revocation by the incoming President, with the result that those deserving of promotion or
appointment who preferred to be named by the new President declined and were by-passed; and
(4) the abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a desire on
the part of the outgoing President merely subvert the policies of the incoming administration.

It is admitted that many of the persons mentioned in the communication to the Commission on
Appointments dated December 29, 1961, did not qualify. There is evidence that in the night of
December 29, there was a scramble in Malacañ an of candidates for positions trying to get their
written appointments or having such appointments changed to more convenient places, after some
last minute bargaining. There was unusual hurry in the issuance of the appointments — which
were not coursed through the Department Heads — and in the confusion, a woman appointed judge
was designated “Mr.” and a man was designated “Madam.” One appointee who got his appointment
and was required to qualify, resorted to the rush of asking permission to swear before a relative
official, and then never qualified.

We are informed, it is Malacañ an’s practice—which we find to be logical—to submit ad

interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason
for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted
for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malacañ an submitted its appointments on the same
day they were issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw
the possibility that the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his
predecessor. As a result, as already adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for
confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments.

Because of the haste and irregularities, some judges of first instance qualified for districts wherein
no vacancies existed, because the incumbents had not qualified for other districts to which they had
been supposedly transferred or promoted.

Referring specifically to judges who had not qualified, the course of conduct adopted by Former
Chief Justice Moran is cited. Being ambassador in Spain and desiring to return to this Court even as
associate justice, Moran was tendered an ad interim appointment thereto by President Quirino,
after the latter had lost the election to President Magsaysay, and before leaving the Presidency. Said
Ambassador declined to qualify being of the opinion that the matter should be left to the incoming
newly-elected President.

Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon of
December 30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of
President Macapagal, his was no more than a “care-taker” administration. He was duty bound to
prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts
which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for
debate had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent
President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential
prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and
so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for
the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the
issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours
before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as
an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all
vacant positions1 irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, he has benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises
a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous
consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason
such selection. Where, however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments that will consider
the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the appointment2and where the names
are to be submitted by successor, who may not wholly approve of the selections, the President
should be doubly careful in extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing
350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such “double care” which was required
and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the contention that these
appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the
Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.

Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves
that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such
“midnight” or “last-minute” appointments.

Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been
issued, it cannot be reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them
refer to mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an
outgoing Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the
authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation3 and if any circumstances
justify revocation, those described herein should fit the exception.

Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after
the appointee has qualified is the latter’s equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be
successfully set up in the present situation, considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried
maneuvers and other happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety
which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. The appointees, it might be argued,
wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant
consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the public service. Needless to say, there are instances
wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into
account.

WHEREFORE, the Court exercising its judgment and discretion in the matter, hereby dismiss the
action, without costs.

Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and De Leon, J.J., concur.