People vs Mendoza

G.R. No. 123186

July 09, 1998
Puno, J.:

FACTS:
With the cloak of the night, accused Eric Mendoza and Angelito Balagtas entered in the house of the
victim, Andrelita Sto. Domingo, through the toilet’s grill-less window. Inside the house, Andrelita was
sleeping together with her three children in their bedroom.

Poking a knife at Andrelita’s neck after waking her, Balagtas ordered her to open the vault inside the
room. The two perpetrators took the cash and jewelry of the threatened victim.

Afterwards, Balagtas used a curtain band, which Mendoza gave to him, to tie the hands of the victim
then he gagged her with a torn t-shirt. Then the two men carried the victim to the bathroom wherein
Balagtas sexually abused her while keeping the knife pointed at her neck. Mendoza stood guard outside
the house while Balagtas was abusing the victim. Mendoza even peep through the window and watched
what was being done to the helpless victim by Balagtas.

The Regional Trial Court found Mendoza and Balagtas guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with rape. Only Mendoza appealed the decision and he claimed that he should only be held liable for the
crime of Robbery and not of the crime of Robbery with Rape considering that he did not rape the victim.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not a co-conspirator who did not rape the victim on the occasion of a robbery should
also be held liable for the special complex crime of Robbery with Rape?

HELD:
1. Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever rape is committed on the occasion of a robbery, all
those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of Robbery with Rape although not
all of them actually took part in the rape, but they knew of the occurrence of the rape performed by
their co-conspirator. Mendoza was aware that Balagtas raped the victim, hence, he is also liable for
the crime of Robbery with Rape even though he did not actually rape the victim.
Padua vs People
G.R. No. 168546
July 23, 2008
Quisumbing, J.:

FACTS:
Accused Michael Padua, 17 years old, was arrested during a buy-bust operation. The Regional Trial Court
found him guilty of violating Section 5 of RA 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for
selling dangerous drugs. Padua filed a Petition for Probation in the RTC alleging that he is a minor and a
first-time offender who desired to avail of the benefits of probation.

In the Post-Sentence Investigation Report, submitted by the Chief Probation and Parole Officer, it was
recommended that Padua be placed on probation on the grounds of minority: that his sentence should
be suspended and that he should be committed to an intervention program.

However, the RTC ruled that minority is not appreciated in the grant of probation because the matter
before the Court is about the application for probation by the accused and not the suspension of his
sentence. Moreover, the RTC denied the Petition for Probation on the ground that “any person
convicted of drug xxx pushing xxx, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law”, as stated
under Section 24 of RA 9165.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the denial of the Petition for Probation filed by a minor-offender constitutes a
violation to his rights as a minor as provided by the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act?

HELD:
1. No. The rights of children in conflict with the law to suspension of sentence and commitment to
intervention programs as provided by the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was not violated in the
case at bar because the said right pertains to “suspension of sentence” only and not to “probation.”
Since what is being decided upon in the case is the grant of probation, and not the suspension of
sentence, minority has no bearing in this case. Furthermore, the law is clear that any person
convicted of selling drugs, regardless of the penalty imposed, are disqualified to avail the privilege
granted by the Probation Law. Hence, the RTC ruled correctly to deny the Petition for Probation.
Lagrosa vs CA
G.R. No. 152044
July 3, 2003
Ynares-Santiago, J.:S

FACTS:
As a general rule under the Probation Law, “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.”

Lagrosa and Baguin argue that their case should be considered an exception to the general rule
mentioned above. They contend that they should be allowed to apply for probation even if they had
already appealed the judgment of conviction imposed upon them by the RTC because when the trial
court convicted them guilty of violating the Revised Forestry Code, the sentence imposed upon them
was to a maximum term of eight (8) years, which restricts them to avail probation. Lagrosa and Baguin
claimed that they only became eligible for probation after the CA lowered their sentence to a maximum
term of one year, eight months and twenty-one days, which is already within the coverage of the
Probation Law, and that this was the first opportunity for them to apply for probation. But to no avail,
their Petition for Probation was denied.

Furthermore, Lagrosa and Baguin also claimed that what prompted them to appeal to the CA the
decision of the RTC was the erroneous penalty imposed upon them by the latter court.

However, it should be noted that when Lagrosa and Baguin appealed their conviction to the CA, they
asserted (1) that the RTC erred in finding both of them guilty, and (2) if ever they are guilty, the RTC
erred in imposing the proper penalty.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong unprobationable penalty to a
probationable one constitutes a bar to the grant of the Petition for Probation?
2. Whether or not this case is an exception to the general rule which excludes an accused who has
appealed his conviction from the benefits of probation?

HELD:
1. No. As what has been suggested in the case of Francisco vs CA, if the appeal is solely for the purpose
of reducing the penalty to within the probationable limit, the accused-appellant should not be
barred from applying for probation.
2. No. Even though the petitioners claimed that what prompted them to appeal to the CA was the
erroneous penalty imposed upon them by RTC, such claim was belied by their acts when they
asserted two assignment of errors in their appeal, (1) that the RTC erred in finding both of them
guilty, and (2) if ever they are guilty, the RTC erred in imposing the proper penalty. Had the
petitioners raised only the improperness of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue in their
appeal, and no longer asserted their innocence, the SC would have been more sympathetic to them.
Unfortunately, their misrepresentation has led their own undoing. The SC denied the Petition for
Probation.