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Witness Name: Graham Smith

Statement No.: 1




I, GRAHAM SMITH, will say as follows:

, I make this statement in response to the Inquiry’s Rule 9 Request dated 11

March 2014. I have read this Request and I seek here to cover everything that
it raises to the best of my ability and recollection. I have also been provided
with and reviewed the following documents:

a. Witness statement provided to the Royal Military Police ("RMP"), dated 7

May 2008, in typed form [MOD013556];

b. Witness statement provided to the RMP, dated 7 October 2008, in typed

form [MOD014039];

c. Case file diary, CCRIO 64692/04 [MOD035838];

d. Case file diary, CCRIO 64695/04 [MOD035257];

e. Interim report authored by Captain Bowen, dated 6 September 2004

[MOD026899], and accompanying letter [MOD018770];

f. Operation ("Op") TELIC hand over certificate, CCRIO 64692/04


g. Outstanding actions sheet, dated 2 October 2004 [MOD034806];

h. Note of invitation to Camp Abu Naji in order to investigate compensation

claims, dated November 2004 [MOD022773];




Note to the Examination Magistrate in Majar AI-Kabir ("MAK"), dated 5

December 2004 [MOD018181 ];

j, Letter of request to arrange meeting with chief of police, dated 21

November 2004 [MOD026957];

k, Receipt of disc from Khuder Al-Sweady of footage from MAK hospital in

May 2004, dated 5 December 2004 [MOD022783];

Alleged attempted murder of coalition forces service police progress

report, dated 29 October 2004 [MOD026944];

m, Enquiry observations and directives relating to the Danny Boy

Investigation, CCRIO 64692/04, dated 10 December 2004

n, Shooting incident service police progress report, dated 5 January 2005


o, Furtherance of enquiry notes dated a) 9 December 2004 [MOD026960],

b) 9 December 2004 [MOD026961], c) 9 December 2004 [MOD026962]
and d) 11 December 2004 [MOD026963];

p, Alleged murder/mutilation service police investigation report, 14 March

2004 [MOD018788];

q, Shooting incident investigation summary and annexes, signed by

Sergeant Gledhill and dated 14 March 2005 [MOD018790];

r, Email to Captain Lewis, "RE: Iraqi interviews - Danny Boy 64692/04",

dated 7 May 2009 [MOD040793];

s, Witness statement of Abdel Ameer Ja’afar Sarout AI-Asma’ali, dated 1

December 2004, in typed [MOD012994] and handwritten [MOD012996]
fo rm;

Witness statement of Karam Yasseen Lahyat AI-Mozani, dated 4

December 2004, in typed [MOD012886] and handwritten [MOD012888]
fo rm;




U, Witness statement of Heter Mutashar Zaydan Shamkhy AI-Lami, dated 4

December 2014, in typed [MOD012483] and handwritten [MOD012485]
fo rm;

v. Witness statement of Karima Homam Mattar Lami, dated 5 December

2004, in typed [MOD012491] and handwritten [MOD012493] form;

w. Witness statement of Fatma Naeem Kareem, dated 6 December 2004,

in typed [MOD017125] and handwritten [MOD013086] form;

x. Witness statement of Khider Kareen Ashour AI-Sooaidy, dated 13

January 2005 [MOD013201];

y. Witness statement of Khider Kareen Ashour AI-Sooaidy, dated 26

January 2005 [MOD013208];

z. Witness statement of Assad Mozan Khlatty AI-Kaaby, dated 26 January

2005 [MOD025533];

aa. Witness statement of Kathim Jassin Kholoufy AI-Alaiawy, dated 25

January 2005 [MOD012574];

bb. Witness statement of Adel Saleh Majeed AI-Shawi, dated 26 January

2005 [MOD007805];

cc. Witness statement of Abbas Jawad Atiyah Al-lmarah, dated 27 January

2005 [MOD025526];

dd. Witness statement of Chaseb Gheilan Ne’meh AI-Majidi, dated 2

December 2004, in typed [MOD016862] and handwritten [MOD016864]
fo rm;

ee. Witness statement of Jasem Khalloofi Khreibet AI Alyawi AI-Jamindari,

dated 4 December 2004, in typed [MOD012566] and handwritten
[MOD012568] form;

ft. Witness statement of Miz’al Karim Ashoor AI-Suwai’di, dated 4

December 2004, in typed [MOD012537] and handwritten [MOD012528]
fo rm;




gg. Witness statement of Malek Moalla Khalleefa Al-lsmailie, dated 4

December 2004, in typed [MOD016973] and handwritten [MOD012935]
fo rm;

hh. Witness statement of Aziz Moa’bid Ali AI-Amshani, dated 5 December

2004, in typed [MOD012613] and handwritten [MOD012615] form;

ii. Witness statement of Bilal Rasen Jabbar AI-Ruhaima AI-Ebadi, dated 6

December 2004, in typed [MOD017171] and handwritten [MOD013135]
fo rm;

jj. Witness statement of Mahud Jihaijeh Dawood AI-Mozani, dated 5

December 2004, in typed [MOD013017] and handwritten [MOD013019]
fo rm;

kk. Witness statement of Imatchia Hussein Muhammed AI-Mozani, dated 5

December 2004, in typed [MOD012692] and handwritten [MOD012694]
fo rm;

II. Witness statement of Kahz’al Jabratallah Khalad Mulla AI-Helfi, dated 5

December 2004, in typed [MOD012441] and handwritten [MOD012443]
fo rm;

mm. Witness statement of Khatia Hussein Abd Alwan Shwaily, dated 6

December 2004, in typed [MOD013067] and handwritten [MOD013069]
form; and

nn. Witness statement of Khmeisa Jabar Naameh AI-Majidi, dated 6

December 2004, in typed [MOD016872] and handwritten [MOD016874]

Rank and role

2. I joined the RMP on 4 October 1984. I left the RMP in October 2013, as I had
completed 28 years of service and wanted to pursue a civilian career.

In 2004, I was a Captain in the Special Investigation Branch ("SlB") UK, RMP.

Around the beginning of October 2004, I deployed to Iraq on Op TELIC 5. This

was my first deployment to Iraq. I remained there in theatre around the end of




April 2005. During the deployment I was the Officer Commanding ("OC") of 61
Section SlB, and I was based at Basra Airport throughout the tour, along with
the rest of 61 Section.

My job title was "Senior Investigating Officer for 61 Section", which meant that

I had ultimate responsibility for all SlB investigations in Iraq. The Inquiry has
asked me if I had a particular area of expertise. I am not certain what this
question refers to exactly, but as the OC of 61 Section SlB I was expected to
know more about investigative work, policies and procedures than the other
members of the team. There were about 14 people in 61 Section, who were
all members of the SlB. We investigated allegations of serious and complex
crimes, such as grievous bodily harm, rape and murder. These investigations
were categorised as level 3 enquiries. I was also in charge of a separate
group of personnel called the Theatre Investigation Group ("TIG"), which
investigated allegations of less serious crimes. These investigations were
categorised as level 1 and 2 enquiries.

Traininq and instructions

Pre-deployment training
5. I had pre-deployment training before deploying on Op TELIC 5. This largely
involved mandatory training, covering fitness, weapons handling, first aid,
cultural awareness, the Law of Armed Conflict, mine clearance and basic
infantry skills like manoeuvring on the battlefield.

During pre-deployment training, the only specialist training relating to the work

of 61 Section SlB was designed and provided by me to other members of 61

Section. I believe that this was a week-long course. I cannot recall specifics
now, but I explained how I intended to manage investigations and what
expected from investigators. I also discussed how to interview Iraqi nationals
explaining that grieving relatives should be treated with understanding,
empathy and kindness. I said that interviews should be video recorded, or
tape recorded if video recording was not possible. I wanted an independent
record of the interview that could be reviewed if necessary, as I was
concerned that we might get false information if an interpreter made mistakes.




It is possible that some interviews in theatre were not recorded by video or

tape, as we had repeated technical problems caused by sand.

During the course, I also said that I was considering using a different system

for investigating cases, instead of having individual investigators dedicated to

one case, which was the normal practice in the UK and Germany. This was
because of the poor security situation in Iraq, as a lot of manpower would be
required to protect each individual investigator when he or she wanted to
travel around the country. I said I was considering using an incident room
style of investigation, where several people would co-operate.

I explained that I would review all of the open SlB cases and identify actions

that were required for each case and the locations where investigators would
have to go to complete them, writing the information on a form I planned to
adapt from an action sheet form used in major incident investigations; I
adapted the form in Iraq. I would then organise the forms according to the
location where the required actions would take place, placing each group of
forms in a separate tray (I adapted them from box lids) with the location
written on it. I would then decide the order in which the locations should be
visited. This is what I meant in my May 2008 statement when I said that I
directed all enquiries of every case file until we had reduced the backlog
[MOD013557]. I would then give each tray to the most senior person going to
that location to take the lead in completing the outstanding actions. There
would still notionally be one investigator leading each outstanding case, but
they would not be the only person working on the case.

I canvassed views on this approach, and the general opinion that it was a

good idea if our workload justified it. This was the system adopted during Op

My RMP experience

10. By the time I deployed to Iraq in 2004, had 20 years experience in the RMP,
and I had been in the SlB for 14 years. I had handled level 1, 2 and 3




enquiries, and felt confident in dealing with all three levels of enquiries. My
superiors also indicated to me that they saw me as being very experienced.

11. I was commissioned in 2003, and I had been an OC for between one and two
years before deploying to Iraq on Op TELIC 5. For about five years before I
was commissioned, I had the opportunity to manage and oversee
investigations run by more junior colleagues.

12. I had applied to attend the Senior Investigating Officer ("SlO") course a
number of times before 2004. However, my applications were declined for
financial reasons. I completed the course after Op TELIC 5. During the
course, I and the other attendees discussed our experience of investigations,
and they told me that they felt 61 Section’s investigations during Op TELIC 5
faced unique challenges that were not experienced during UK investigations. I
found that I had already learnt a lot of what was taught on the SlO course, I
believe more than 50% of the training. I also realised that some of the training
was not really practical in hostile locations like Iraq.

61 Section SIB and the TIG

13. 61 Section SIB was made up from about 11 RMP personnel and 3 RAF
personnel. I can recall the following personnel during the tour:

a. Warrant Officer Class Two Phil Neville (the Sergeant Major of 61

b. Staff Sergeant Jason Shearer;
c. Staff Sergeant Denise Rose;
d. Staff Sergeant Pam Reid;
e. Sergeant Paul Gledhill;
f. Sergeant Nigel Nevitt;
g. Sergeant Danny Brown;
h. Sergeant Jason Wright;
i. Sergeant Nick Smith, RAF;
j. Sergeant "Ewok" Roland, RAF (I do not recall his first name); and
k. A Sergeant called Paul, RAF (I do not recall his surname).




14. SSgt Rose committed suicide during the tour and was replaced by SSgt Reid,
who was not present for the pre-deployment training course I ran. I believe
that the RAF personnel changed frequently during the tour due to injury,
health issues and because one replacement officer was unsuitable. Two
female naval clerks, both with the rank of Leading Wren, were also allocated
to us in Iraq, but I cannot recall their names. They stayed in the office and
performed admin tasks.

15. There was another group of RMP personnel in Iraq on Op TELIC 5, which was
called 115 Provost Company. These RMPs had a combat-support role, for
example advising the infantry with how to deal with detainees or recover
evidence. A number of them also formed the TIG, which performed level 1
and 2 enquiries, which involved crimes like petty theft and assault.

16. I focused on managing the level 3 enquiries that were handed over to us in
Iraq by the outgoing 61 Section SlB team, which was commanded by Captain
Lucy Bowen. WO2 Neville took primary responsibility for managing the new
level 3 enquiries that we received during the tour. He would brief me on the
progress made in the first 48 hours of an enquiry and then brief me at weekly
intervals. At each meeting we would agree on how to progress the enquiry. I
still had responsibility for all of the SlB enquiries and assisted WO2 Neville
with tasks like securing extra resources as and when they were needed. WO2
Neville also managed all of the TIG’s enquiries. I still reviewed the TIG’s
cases and signed off on reports, but WO2 Neville’s supervisory role with the
TIG allowing me to focus more on level 3 enquiries.

17. I recall that I and the rest of my team received a handover in Iraq from Capt
Bowen, which lasted for four days. I can recall being briefed on how best to
investigate cases in an environment like Iraq and who important British
military personnel in the theatre were. One of the four days involved me, WO2
Neville, Capt Bowen and her Sergeant Major (Warrant Officer Class Two
Terry) discussing each of the cases being handed over. I recall that a large
number of cases were handed over, and given this most of the discussions
about each case were short. I am not certain of the exact number of cases




handed over, but I am content with the figures in my May 2008 statement,
which states that 78 level 3 enquiries and 32 TIG cases were handed over

18. After the handover, I followed my plan of reviewing all of the open SlB cases
to identify the actions that were required to progress them, as I refer to earlier
in this statement. This was a more thorough review than the case discussions
I had with Capt Bowen during her handover. After adding the information
about the actions required to the forms I had designed and organised them in
separate trays by location, I believe I had about eight trays. I assigned each of
them to the senior person visiting that location, as planned.

19. I learnt during my handover with Capt Bowen that previously it had been
policy to investigate every instance of British military personnel firing rounds
where someone had been killed or seriously injured, or there was suspicion
that someone had been killed or seriously injured. I understood that this was
why so many investigations had been run before my tour. Around the time
that I arrived in Iraq, a policy was brought in that allowed local commanders to
carry out their own investigations. If their investigation concluded that rounds
were fired in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict and Rules of
Engagement, their report would be sent to the Divisional Legal Officer (a
number of people held this position, I do not recall who they were) and the
Force Provost Marshall ("FPM") to review. If they agreed with the conclusion
of the report, they would sign it and send it to the Brigade Commander to sign
(I do not recall who this was). This would confirm there was no need for a
military police investigation into the matter. This procedure dramatically
reduced the number of new investigations that were carried out subsequently.

20. Throughout the tour I had meetings with the FPM, the Multi-National Division
(South East) ("MND (SE)") Chief of Operations and the Brigade Chief of Staff.
My line manager in Iraq was the FPM, initially Lieutenant Colonel Sally
Purnell, who was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Rob Davey about a month
into my tour. I spoke to the FPM on a weekly basis to give them case updates.
I did this largely out of courtesy and also because they could use their rank to




help get me extra resources. I met with the MND (SE) Chief of Operations at
least six times during the tour, discussing the difficulty of securing resources. I
found him very cooperative. I think I only met with the Brigade Chief of Staff a
few times during the tour to try to get more resources.

21. More than once a week I spoke to my technical director and commander in
the SlB, Lieutenant Colonel Stenning, who was based in the UK. I would call
him for advice about certain cases, but I did not find his advice useful. I
believe that at the time he had no recent operational experience and he had a
limited investigative background.

The Danny Boy investiqation

Handover from Capt Bowen

22. I think that the brief I received on the Danny Boy investigation lasted about an
hour. The Op TELIC hand over certificate [MOD018680] does not assist my
memory as to the detail of the handover. Capt Bowen explained that the
purpose of the investigation was to examine the circumstances of the battle of
Danny Boy and find out whether the deaths that occurred during it had been
in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict and Rules of Engagement. I
understood that bodies of the dead had been brought back to Camp Abu Naji
("CAN") after the battle and that there were allegations that the dead had
been unlawfully murdered in the camp and/or that the bodies had been
mutilated. Capt Bowen explained during the brief that there had been a delay
in starting the investigation, but I cannot now recall the cause of the delay.
She also explained that it had been difficult to take evidence from the soldiers
involved due to the high operational tempo in Iraq, coupled with 61 Section’s
high caseload and limited resources.

23. By the time I took over 61 Section SlB, I believe that Capt Bowen and her
team had managed to interview about half of the military personnel that had
been connected with the battle of Danny Boy. They had also recovered a lot
of documents I would have expected to be generated during an investigation
like this one. I cannot recall specific details, but this would have included




things like Operations Room logs, operational orders, training records and
maps. Local Iraqis, apart from the detainees, had not been interviewed. I
cannot recall why this was the case, although I have no reason to doubt that it
was due to the high threat level in AI Amarah, as explained in my May 2008
statement [MOD013558].

24. Capt Bowen also explained during the brief that she had requested an
independent officer, Major Malcolm Downie, to come from the UK to review
the work that 61 Section had done on the Danny Boy investigation. Maj
Downie’s report said that there was no evidence to suggest there had been
any unlawful activity, but that in the interests of completeness a few more
statements should be taken. I did not agree with his position and felt that the
investigation needed to be balanced with evidence from Iraqi witnesses.

Running the Danny Boy investigation

25. As I explain earlier in this statement, I had ultimate responsibility for this and
all other 61 Section SlB investigations in Iraq. I was involved in the Danny Boy
investigation for the whole tour. I oversaw it by reviewing evidence, holding
meetings with the lead investigator (Sgt Gledhill), agreeing with him further
actions to be carried out and performing logistical tasks like sending
investigators to perform tasks. During the tour I had two weeks’ leave and a
further week’s compassionate leave, during which WO2 Neville was in charge
of 61 Section SlB.

26. As with the other cases I inherited, I reviewed the Danny Boy file, which
included reading all of the statements and documents that had been
recovered whilst Capt Bowen was in charge of 61 Section. From those
documents I identified other lines of enquiry. I also kept what is referred to in
the policing world as a "policy file" or "policy book", which recorded decisions
taken in the investigation and the rationale behind the decisions. The policy
file was a book of carbonated A4-size forms. Each form was divided into two
A5-sized sections, "decision made" and below it "rationale behind the
decision". Capt Bowen had kept a policy file, which I had access to. I recall
that Maj Downie’s review said that she did not need to keep one for the Danny




Boy investigation; I cannot recall if she stopped using her policy file after that.
I decided to create my own policy file as to me it was a very personal
document, and I felt more comfortable using my own one.

27. I think I created around 180 or 190 of these decisions, each with an
accompanying rationale, for the Danny Boy investigation. Each decision
generated a varying number of action points, depending on the nature of the
decision. I saw the priorities in the investigation to be to interview the
remaining soldiers before their memories became vague and to interview local
Iraqis who might have been able to provide relevant evidence. However, as I
set out in more detail later in this statement, I had a variety of difficulties in
interviewing witnesses for the Danny Boy investigation.

28. I recall that after the handover with Capt Bowen, I sat down with Sgt Gledhill
and WO2 Neville to discuss the case. We discussed the best way to get
evidence from local Iraqis and decided to pursue all possible options in
contacting potential witnesses. This included seeking assistance from the
local magistrate (referred to as "the judge" in my May 2008 statement
[MOD013556]) and Chief of Police in AI Amarah, but as the investigation went
on an Iraqi doctor became the main point of contact in locating Iraqi
witnesses. I cannot recall the doctor’s name, but I believe it may have been
AI-Shawy, as referred to in my October 2008 statement [MOD014040]. I refer
to his involvement in the case and my opinions of him later in this statement.

29. Sgt Gledhill spent most of the tour at CAN, organising interviews by liaising
with the local Iraqi authorities and British military personnel stationed at CAN.
He also conducted some of the interviews. He would inform me of how many
people he was going to interview on a particular day, and I would send up
investigators and one or two interpreters if they were required. I believe that
all of the SlB team were involved in some way with the interviews at CAN,
although I cannot be certain if some personnel in the team had more
involvement than others. Personnel from SlB UK and Germany were involved
in interviewing personnel out of theatre. I also asked personnel from SlB UK
to get expert opinion on the injuries of the bodies visible in photographs of the




dead that were recovered from Captain Rands, the Intelligence Officer at
CAN. They located a UK pathologist, Doctor Nick Hunt, whose report was
received late into the tour. I recall that I asked SlB UK to contact the media to
see if they could provide us with any evidence, but I cannot recall if anything
useful was obtained this way.

30. As was standard practice, the investigation had a case file diary, which was a
central record of work carried out on the investigation. Entries were made by
the person who had performed the task in question or by other SlB personnel
(not the naval clerks) on their behalf. Periodic reviews were carried out by me
and WO2 Neville. I expect that Capt Bowen would have reviewed the case file
diary whilst she was the OC of 61 Section SlB. SlB UK and Germany would
have had their own case file diaries, which would have been sent to 61
Section when they had completed their lines of enquiry. In addition to the case
file diary, I expect that any investigator involved in the case would have made
a record of their actions in their police notebook, as was standard practice.
These notes would have been brief and noted information such as who they
had interviewed, the date, time, location and how the interview had been
recorded. The only other record I can think of that was kept of the steps taken
during the investigation is the policy file I refer to earlier in this statement.

31. At some point in the tour, I requested an independent team to run the Danny
Boy investigation. I am not certain, but I believe I made the request within four
weeks of arriving in Iraq. I believed it was not practical for 61 Section SlB to
run the investigation with the amount of manpower we had at the time. Lt Col
Stenning refused my request. He told me that the investigation had already
been reviewed and there were no suggestions of foul play, so he did not see
the need for an independent team to run the investigation. I said that I thought
that there was a lot of work to be done in the interests of fairness, but he did
not agree with me. Later in the tour, perhaps within a month of it finishing, Lt
Col Stenning told me to complete the Danny Boy investigation by the end of
the tour. believe that this deadline was met, and the covering letter to the
final investigation report dated 14 March 2005 [MOD018788] indicates that I
was still in theatre when the report was finished.




Preparation of the Iraqi witnesses interviews

32. As I explain earlier in this statement, I considered it very important to take

statements from local Iraqis. This would assist in identifying who the
deceased were, help identify other witnesses and generally ensure that I
could have confidence the investigation had been fair and complete. I believe
that I spoke to the FPM, MND (SE) Chief of Operations and Brigade Chief of
Staff before and during the interviews with the local Iraqis so that they were
aware generally of what was happening. I may have also asked for their
assistance in the process, but I cannot be certain that I did so or what help
they may have provided. I do not believe that I would have discussed how the
interviews would be performed, as this would not have been their business.

33. The interviews with the Iraqis were conducted at CAN. We had considered the
possibility of interviewing them at an Iraqi police station, but given the murders
of RMP personnel in 2003 and the general security situation in Iraq, it was
decided this would not be safe. I cannot recall the dates that they took place,
except that they occurred during the tour. We asked the local Iraqi authorities
to help us identify witnesses. I cannot recall who we contacted first, but I
believe it would have been the Chief of Police, as this had been my normal
practice outside of Iraq. I recall attending a meeting at CAN with the Chief of
Police and another with the magistrate. Dr AI-Shawy attended both of the
meetings. I cannot recall much about the meetings now, except that I found
the Chief of Police and magistrate expected me to help them with problems
they were having unrelated to the Danny Boy investigation, such as having
more weapons, before they would help me. I said I would do what I could in
the hope that they would assist. It also appeared to me that Dr AI-Shawy was
more influential than the two officials, as they both seemed to defer to him. I
recall at one of the meetings Dr AI-Shawy handed over a floppy disc of
photographs. I cannot now recall taking receipt of this myself, but I have no
reason to doubt that I did, as shown by the receipt dated 5 December 2004

34. After the meetings there was correspondence with the magistrate and Chief of
Police by letter, asking for their help. Sgt Gledhill also tried to meet with them



and one of our interpreters would try to speak to them by phone. However,
they did not engage with our requests for assistance. Instead, Dr AI-Shawy
helped us obtaining local Iraqi witnesses. I cannot recall exactly when he did
this, but it was after the meetings. As I explain below, the witnesses were
relatives of the deceased, those who had washed the bodies after they had
been received from the local hospital and other people suggested to us by Dr

35. The only concerns I can recall having about the interviews with the Iraqi
witnesses were the same ones that I would have had for any interview with a
non-English speaker from a different culture. For example, correct
interpretation would be critical, especially given the fact that witnesses might
speak a particular dialect. Also, I was aware of the cultural sensitivities in Iraq
concerning interactions between unrelated men and women. The majority of
my investigators were male. I only had one female investigator during the
tour, and it took a month to replace SSgt Rose. However, I cannot now recall
if female witnesses were sometimes interviewed by male investigators.

36. I did not interview any of the Iraqi witnesses. However, I went to CAN a
number of times during the tour. I cannot be certain how many times, but I
think that I went there at least two or three times. One reason was so that I
could gain a better understanding of what had happened when the bodies of
the dead were brought back to CAN. I also met with the Battlegroup
commander to get his help with interviewing the Iraqi witnesses. I am
reminded by my 2008 statement that he was extremely willing to assist with
our investigation as he saw this as a hearts and minds opportunity. Another
person I met with at CAN was Captain Joe Shepherd, a member of the RMP
based at the camp. I found him useful in getting local information, such as on
the problems of working in the local area. Whilst I was at CAN I met some of
the relatives (I do not recall which ones). I introduced myself, offered my
condolences and indicated that the investigation was going to be impartial.

37. I briefed the SlB investigators about the interviews before they went to CAN,
but I cannot recall if they were individual or group meetings. The scope of the




interviews was to have the dead Iraqis positively identified in accordance with
UK standards; I believe that this had to be done by someone who had known
the deceased for at least five years. The witnesses were only to be shown the
heads of the deceased from the photographs, rather than the whole body.
They were also to be asked what they understood the deceased was
supposed to be doing the day he died, as well as any other relevant
information like the names of other witnesses.

38. Another reason for holding the interviews was to seek permission to exhume
the bodies, and I instructed my investigators to seek consent to do this. I do
not know why the issue of consent was not addressed in the statements taken
from Iraqi witnesses in December 2004 and January 2005. However, I believe
that I was told by my investigations that all of the relatives refused to give
consent, except for one. In the end we did not attempt to exhume any bodies.
I learnt from the Iraqi police that it would almost impossible to locate individual
graves, as they were not accurately marked or recorded. We were also
unable to get consent of the local magistrate for the exhumations, which I
believe was another requirement. We would have needed a very large
number of soldiers to secure the area and protect the investigators, and I do
not believe that this could have been justified given it would not have been
possible to guarantee we were exhuming the right bodies. Finally, amongst
the other comments in Dr Hunt’s report, his view was that there would be little
evidential value in exhuming the bodies, due to decomposition.

39. In addition to the relatives of the deceased, I wanted my investigators to

interview the people that had received the bodies from the hospital, as they
had washed and clothed them for burial, so could provide an account on the
condition of the bodies. We were able to interview some but not all of them. I
describe the difficulty in obtaining witnesses later in this statement.

40. The Inquiry has asked me about the note of invitation to CAN [MOD022773].
I do not recognise this document, and do not believe that it was prepared by
me or another member of 61 Section SlB, for the following reasons:

a, l am not "JD" Smith;




b. Standard military letter writing guidelines require the recipient to be

noted at the top-left of the letter;
c. We did not refer to ourselves as "Department 61";
d. We did not mix abbreviations and non-abbreviations;
e. We used CCRIO (I cannot recall what this stands for) numbers instead
of dossier numbers;
f. TELIC has been misspelt as "Tilic"; and
g. It is generally poorly drafted and does not confirm to service letter
writing protocols or RMP procedures.

41. I notice that the document refers to a claim for compensation. This was not a
reason why we held the interviews. I am not certain who created the
document, but I believe it possible that it was created by the area claims
department regarding a claim for compensation that they were dealing with.

Conduct of the Iraqi witness interviews

42. I was not present during the interviews so cannot comment on whether
witnesses were escorted or accompanied to them, but I would not have
objected to a witness being accompanied, providing that the other person was
not connected to the investigation. It was good practice to stop a witness
hearing what other witnesses had to say. I believe that Dr AI-Shawy wanted to
be present during all of the interviews. I directed that this not be allowed,
given that he had said he had collected the bodies and was therefore a
witness. I believe that my instruction would have been followed, and I was not
aware that he was present during any of the interviews with the Iraqi

43. It was policy that at least one investigator should be present with the witness.
If a witness was female, she had to be interviewed in the presence of another
woman. I believe that if no female investigator or interpreter was available,
someone like a female clerk from the Battlegroup would have to sit in during
the interview.

44. During the tour, I regularly reminded our interpreters to translate exactly what
was said by the investigator and witness during an interview. They were not to




do anything else. I said it was important that they not draw inferences from
what was said and let them influence their translation. On a few occasions
investigators raised concerns that interpreters were not following these
instructions, so kept reminding the interpreters to do so. As the tour went on,
there appeared to be fewer translation problems with one interpreter, so they
were used more.

45. I reminded investigators of the instructions I had given during pre-deployment

training about how to interview grieving relatives, as I refer to earlier in this
statement. I did not hear anything during the tour that suggested these
instructions were not followed. I do not know if any signs or indications were
given by the witnesses as to their mood or feelings during the interviews.

46. The Inquiry has asked me how the interviews were run. They would have
followed the general "PEACE" (Planning & Preparation, Engage & Explain,
Account, Conclusion and Evaluate) model. Every investigator would have
explained their role and the purpose of the interview at the start (to identify the
deceased, establish what the witness knew the deceased had been doing
immediately prior to their death, what they saw of the body if they were
involved in washing it and to get authorisation to exhume the body). The
procedure was to ask the witness for their general memories within specific
parameters, such as a certain period of time, and then to ask questions to
clarify their evidence. Witnesses should have been able to give other relevant
information, in addition to answers to questions asked, as well as clarify or
amend information they had provided earlier during the interview. All of the
SlB investigators in 61 Section were PEACE trained, so I have no reason to
doubt that they would have followed this procedure. I was not aware of any
additional information given by witnesses before the interviews commenced or
after they concluded.

47. As I explain earlier in this statement, I had directed during pre-deployment

training that interviews were to be video or tape recorded. The only reason I
can think why this would not have happened would be technical problems. I
believe that all of the interviews with the Iraqi witnesses during the Danny Boy




investigation were recorded by video or tape, but I cannot be certain that there
were no technical problems that meant this was not possible in some cases. I
note that email on 7 May 2009 from Capt Lewis said that the interviews of
Iraqi doctors/medical staff in January 2005 were not recorded [MOD040795]; I
was not aware of this. I cannot recall seeing the email before, but I do not
remember if this was because the email was not received, I did not read it or I
have forgotten it. The Inquiry has asked me if I contributed to the text of items
1 to 11 in the email. I was on leave at the time, as set out in the email, so do
not believe that I contributed to it. Capt Lewis was a member of SlB, but she
was not involved in the 2004 to 2005 Danny Boy investigation in Iraq. I am not
certain, but I believe she was asked to review the investigation after it had
concluded in relation to Judicial Review proceedings.

48. It was mandatory to take handwritten notes during the interviews. Handwritten
notes should have been lodged with the investigation file. If any notes were
made on police pocket notebooks, relevant sections would have been
photocopied and exhibited to the file. The original notebooks would have been
handed in, normally to the Warrant Officer in charge, which would have been
WO2 Neville.

49. I was not aware of any difficulties that occurred whilst the interviews were
conducted, such as witnesses having difficulties in understanding what was

50. I do not know how long the interviews lasted, but I believe the investigators
would have taken as much time as was needed to conclude the interviews. I
believe that an interview would have been continued if it was necessary. I was
aware that at times witnesses did not return to CAN to continue their
interviews. I do not know why they did not return, and I cannot recall how
many interviews were affected in this way.

51. The statements were to be written on the day that the interview was
concluded, as this was best practice in case witnesses did not return to finish
the interviews. I directed that the statements be written on the standard
witness form, 266A/B. The SlB investigators were trained on how to produce




statements, so I expected them to follow their training. I expected that the

statement would include all relevant information that was said during the

52. A handwritten draft of the statement would have been produced in English by
the investigator. It was up to them to decide whether to rely on what the
interpreter said and their handwritten notes, or to use recordings to produce
the draft statement. However, I expect that they would have relied on what the
interpreter said and their notes. The recordings were only made as an
independent account of the interview. I believe that the tape recorders were
standard UK police interview machines, which did not have a playback facility.
It would have been possible to replay an interview recorded by video.

53. The investigator may have signed the draft statement, but it would not have
been signed by the witness. I do not know when exactly the investigator would
have produced the draft statement. They may have done it during the
interview, for example at the end of each topic, or at the end of the interview.
Capt Lewis’ email states that the statements were taken in Arabic
[MOD040795]. This would not have been possible, as the interpreters were
not trained on how to take statements and the investigators would have
needed to be able to check that all the relevant information was in the draft
statement. Not necessarily everything the witness said would go into a
statement, especially as some wanted to talk about matters unrelated to the
Danny Boy investigation.

54. I had directed that each statement should be translated into Arabic by our
interpreters, after it had been drafted in English. This was to allow the witness
to read the statement or have it read to them, and it was practice for this to
happen before the statement was signed. The witness should have been
allowed the opportunity to make changes to the statement, and it was
standard practice to ask a witness if they wanted to make any changes. I
cannot recall any witnesses refusing to sign the final statement. The final,
signed statement in Arabic was to be translated into English in Basra.




55. Other than the PEACE model of interviewing, my pre-deployment training and
directions that I refer to above, I do not recall a policy that governed the way
in which interviews were to be conducted and statements to be taken.

56. There were difficulties in interviewing some Iraqi witnesses. Apart from the
issue of some witnesses not returning to complete interviews, there were
issues with identifying witnesses, as many of them did not have suitable
identification documents. Also, we were not always provided with the
witnesses we requested. Dr AI-Shawy repeatedly promised access to
witnesses but they did not always appear. Sometimes we were sent different
witnesses to the ones we had requested; I recall being informed by my
investigators that many of these people could not provide first-hand evidence,
making comments like "1 saw it through the eyes of my brother". I think that Dr
AI-Shawy tried to tell us who he believed the relevant witnesses to be.
However, we persisted in requesting the witnesses that we wanted.

57. Whilst the interviews were being conducted, I started to suspect that Dr AI-
Shawy was coaching at least some of the witnesses. I understood that he
escorted a majority of the witnesses to CAN. My investigators reported to me
that sometimes witnesses claimed to know something when they admitted
that they were not there. Some of these witnesses said during the interview
that Dr AI-Shawy had told them to say it, or they said that he had told them to
claim they were the deceased’s next of kin when they were not. I also recall
that one or both of our interpreters reported to me a couple of times that they
had overheard Dr AI-Shawy trying to tell witnesses what to say before their

58. Dr AI-Shawy was also insistent that the bodies had been mutilated, but I did
not take what he said at face value. First, I did not know whether he was
suitably qualified to make such an assertion. Second, he provided death
certificates, but there were inconsistencies between these and some of the
other evidence we received. These were noted at serials 12 [MOD018800], 16
[MOD018802], 18 [MOD018803], 20 [MOD018804] and 27 [MOD018806] of
Annex A to the investigation report. Third, Dr Hunt concluded in his report that




the visible injuries had occurred before death. Finally, I recall that Dr AI-
Shawy suggested that the genitalia of one of the dead, which he identified in
the photographs, had been cut off. However, the evidence from the parents of
the deceased in question contradicted this allegation.

59. Given all these issues, I felt that Dr AI-Shawy was an unreliable witness and
was interfering with our work, either because he did not understand the
requirements of UK law or had an agenda. I had to tolerate him being involved
in securing Iraqi witnesses, as the magistrate and Chief of Police were not
assisting us at all with the process, but I remained cautious in dealing with

Other aspects of the Danny Boy investigation

60. The Inquiry has asked about what difficulties we faced in running the Danny
Boy investigation. We were extremely busy throughout the tour, as far as I
was concerned to an unprecedented level, not just for deployments to Iraq but
also for previous deployments that occurred during my military career. We
were woefully undermanned in relation to the number of investigations we
were required to carry out, and I felt that the SlB UK command, including Lt
Col Stenning, did not properly support us. We had difficulty deploying
investigators on the ground, as there was a requirement that to do so we
needed at least a 12 person team with 3 vehicles. Capt Bowen had priority
status in using a special 12 man force protection team, but this privilege was
withdrawn when I took over 61 Section (I do not know why). I therefore often
found it hard to get a 12 man team together when investigators needed to go
out on the ground, especially given that 61 Section personnel had leave
during the tour. Sometimes I was given extra personnel to assist with force
protection, but increasingly we used helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft when
they were available. This assisted with the manpower shortage, but it did not
resolve the issue entirely.

61. In addition to the problems involving Iraqi witnesses that I explain earlier in
this statement, we had difficulties in obtaining military witnesses for interviews
or with them sometimes having to terminate interviews prematurely. I




sometimes felt that the chain of command did not see it as a priority for their
personnel to be interviewed. However, this was understandable given the high
operational tempo and the dangerous security situation in Iraq, and I could
see that it would be difficult for commanders to spare personnel at times.
Sometimes there were communications problems, which I believe were Army-
wide. I do not recall these problems lasting for more than 24 hours at a time.

62. I would have recorded these difficulties in my policy file. Investigators would
have also recorded problems like military witnesses being unavailable and the
reason why in the case file diary. I did not report the difficulties to anyone,
although I would have escalated urgent requests to interview personnel up
their chain of command. I do not believe that anything could have been done
to avoid the problems we had, either concerning interviewing personnel or
regarding communications.

63. I cannot recall problems regarding the investigation that were linked to
specific investigators.

64. During the tour, I regularly told my team that they should ask the military
personnel that they interviewed if they had taken photographs or recorded
videos on personal equipment relevant to the matter being investigated. This
was best practice and would assist in gaining evidence; I did not do this on
specific instructions given to me. I therefore expect that they would have
asked these questions of military personnel involved in the battle of Danny
Boy. As I mention earlier in this statement, photographs of the dead were
recovered from Capt Rands. I cannot recall exactly when they were
recovered, but I expect he would have been asked for any relevant
photographs he took during his interview. Apart from the photographs on the
floppy disc provided by Dr AI-Shawy, I did not personally recover any
photographs or video footage and only reviewed what was recovered.

65. The Inquiry has asked me if any laptops or cameras belonging to military
personnel were checked by RMP personnel for photographs or footage. I
cannot recall this happening now in relation to the Danny Boy investigation,




although if such a device was recovered I expect it would have been

forensically examined in the UK.

66. I did not collect any documentation like exhibits or incident records. If I was
aware of a document and considered it important, tasked personnel to
recover it. I reviewed what was recovered, and I was not aware that any
documentation was withheld from 61 Section SlB.

67. I expect that Sgt Gledhill would have drafted the final investigation report; I
reviewed it. I cannot recall what action I took after the review, but I may have
made amendments and asked Sgt Gledhill for more information to clarify
queries I had. I signed the final version and produced a covering letter, with a
standard distribution list of who the report should be sent to. I concluded my
deployment with 61 Section SlB at the end of the tour.

Other matters

68. The Inquiry has asked me if there are any documents that I consider relevant
to the Inquiry and that I have not already been referred to. My policy file and
the action sheets I created in relation to the Danny Boy investigation could be
relevant. I believe that they would be in an archive box held somewhere in the
UK. In 2005 they were stored in HQ SlB UK RMP, Bulford, but I do not know
where they are now.

69. I did not receive a debrief on completion of my 2004-2005 tour to Iraq, nor
was I offered counselling.

70. I have not given any account of any of the matters relevant to the Inquiry to
the press or media.

Statement of Truth

I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed ........................................................


Dated: .........................................................