Republic of the Philippines The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with
ional provisions, not in accordance with how
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, 
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
 
PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for
prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison
from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the
Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural
questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office
of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring
this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on
Appointments to intervene and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of
respondents on said petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The
parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two
(2) great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs
early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the
Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief
Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated inGold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The
intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed
in the constitutional provisions themselves.
the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what
they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be
appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the
President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad
Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
 In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President,
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third
are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate,
and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption."
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text
(Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6
of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that —
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a
xxx xxx xxx Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
bureaus, officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air
The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the
Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis
Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
supplied].
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may
by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments. The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution.
When the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article
VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on Appointments
(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the
over presidential appointments more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
Constitution. Thus-
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress.
Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be
recognized
xxx xxx xxx

The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.

(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to
take a few minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
the amendments that I would like to propose to the
Committee this morning.
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier
xxx xxx xxx
General or Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on
law vest in the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals
Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power and so on but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.
to appoint inferior officers in their respective offices.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed
the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution,
and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of
transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar
bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the
malpractices.
exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same
requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following:
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be
the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
recognized

Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the
 MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is
on page 7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the
words "and bureaus," and on line 28 of the same page, to
change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR
GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment
which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put
a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the
same page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO
APPOINT, et cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by
one. The first proposed amendment is to delete the words
"and bureaus" on line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other
Commissioners, what would be the justification of the
proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite
low in the executive department, and to require further
confirmation of presidential appointment of heads of
bureaus would subject them to political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed
amendment by deletion also includes regional directors as
distinguished from merely staff directors, because the
regional directors have quite a plenitude of powers within
the regions as distinguished from staff directors who only
stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the
supervisiopn of the staff bureau directors.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to
Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner proposed an
amendment to delete 'and bureaus on Section 16. Who
will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the
President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but
their appointment shall no longer be subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the
same answer of Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction
of the Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels
that this matter should be submitted to the body for a
vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by
one. We will first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and
bureaus on line 26, such that appointments of bureau
directors no longer need confirmation by the Commission
on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the
consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the
phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The
Chair hears none; the amendments is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed
amendment on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period
(.) after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and
substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee
accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it
clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not
have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an
amendment to his amendment, so that after "captain" we
 insert the following words: AND OTHER OFFICERS
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided
for in the Constitution whose appointments are vested in
the President, as a matter of fact like those of the different
constitutional commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in
Section 16 is not an exclusive list of those appointments
which constitutionally require confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation
of the words I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his
proposed amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND
OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE
VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION
UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by
the Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that
excludes those officers which the Constitution does not
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
like the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the
modification made by Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed
amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed
amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as
accepted by the Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears
none; the amendment, as amended, is
approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of
officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint
the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the
officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned
in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive
of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in
addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which
meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that
the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent
(confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in
the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that
the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate
to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line
with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but,
more so, because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and
expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are
officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if
such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art.
VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and
deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose
appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the
first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are
to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what
they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations
on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions
therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on
Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if
this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by
the President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII,
abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest
their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use
of the word "alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study
of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after
the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip
or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision
appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof —
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis
supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes
practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air
Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not herein provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way
of an exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment
of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its
framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized
by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of
lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the
courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the
third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part
of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the
second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and
positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group
of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of
fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987
Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22
June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one
chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner
(hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with
the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs
shall be appointed by the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No.
34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now
reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs
shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the
Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy
Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in
accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and
the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to
be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment
he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority
and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus
entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 
Separate Opinions
 
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court has deemed it necessary and proper, in consonance with its constitutional duty, to
adjudicate promptly the issue at bar and to rule that the direct appointment of respondent Salvador
Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (without need of submitting a prior nomination
to the Commission on Appointments and securing its confirmation) is valid and in accordance with
the President's constitutional authority to so appoint officers of the Government as defined in
Article VII, section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The paramount public interest and the exigencies
of the public service demand that any doubts over the validity of such appointments be resolved
expeditiously in the test case at bar.
It should be noted that the Court's decision at bar does not mention nor deal with the Manifestation
of December 1, 1987 filed by the intervenor that Senate Bill No. 137 entitled "An Act Providing For
the Confirmation By the Commission on Appointments of All Nominations and Appointments Made
by the President of the Philippines" was passed on 23 October 1987 and was "set for perusal by
the House of Representatives. " This omission has been deliberate. The Court has resolved the
case at bar on the basis of the issues joined by the parties. The contingency of approval of the bill
mentioned by intervenor clearly has no bearing on and cannot affect retroactively the validity of the
direct appointment of respondent Mison and other appointees similarly situated as in G.R. No.
80071, "Alex G. Almario vs. Hon. Miriam Defensor- Santiago." The Court does not deal with
constitutional questions in the abstract and without the same being properly raised before it in a
justiciable case and after thorough discussion of the various points of view that would enable it to
render judgment after mature deliberation. As stressed at the hearing of December 8, 1987, any
discussion of the reported bill and its validity or invalidity is premature and irrelevant and outside
the scope of the issues resolved in the case at bar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion and with the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento, and simply
wish to add my own reading of the Constitutional provision involved.
Section 16, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments,
agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress (Emphasis and 1st three
paragraphings, supplied).
The difference in language used is significant. Under the first sentence it is clear that the President
"nominates" and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments "appoints" the officials
enumerated. The second sentence, however, significantly uses only the term "appoint" all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. Deliberately eliminated was any reference
to nomination.
Thus, the intent of the framers of the Constitution to exclude the appointees mentioned in the
second sentence from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is, to my mind, quite
clear. So also is the fact that the term "appoint" used in said sentence was not meant to include
the three distinct acts in the appointing process, namely, nomination, appointment, and
commission. For if that were the intent, the same terminologies in the first sentence could have
been easily employed.
There should be no question either that the participation of the Commission on Appointments in
the appointment process has been deliberately decreased in the 1987 Constitution compared to
that in the 1935 Constitution, which required that all presidential appointments be with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments.
The interpretation given by the majority may, indeed, lead to some incongruous situations as
stressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice Cruz. The remedy therefor addresses itself to the
future. The task of constitutional construction is to ascertain the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and thereafter to assure its realization (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413). And the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent is the language of the Constitution itself.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur. It is clear from the Constitution itself that not all Presidential appointments are subject to
prior Congressional confirmation, thus:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress. 1
By its plain language, the Constitution has intended that only those grouped under the first
sentence are required to undergo a consenting process. This is a significant departure from the
procedure set forth in the 1935 Charter:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air
Forces from the rank of captain to commander, and all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may
by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments. 2
under which, as noted by the majority, "almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. 3 As far as the present Charter is concerned,
no extrinsic aid is necessary to ascertain its meaning. Had its framers intended otherwise, that is to
say, to require all Presidential appointments clearance from the Commission on Appointments,
they could have simply reenacted the Constitution's 1935 counterpart. 4
I agree that the present Constitution classifies four types of appointments that the President may
make: (1) appointments of heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and those of
other officers whose appointments are vested in him under the Constitution, including the regular
members of the Judicial and Bar Council, 5 the Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission, 6 the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections, 7and the
Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit; 8 (2) those officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may vest in the
President alone.
But like Justice Cruz in his dissent, I too am aware that authors of the fundamental law have
written a "rather confused Constitution" 9 with respect, to a large extent, to its other parts, and with
respect, to a certain extent, to the appointing clause itself, in the sense that it leaves us for
instance, with the incongruous situation where a consul's appointment needs confirmation whereas
that of Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs, his superior, does not. But the Idiosyncracies, as it were, of the Charter is not for us to
judge. That is a question addressed to the electorate, and who, despite those "eccentricities," have
stamped their approval on that Charter. "The Court," avers the majority, "will thus construe the
applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide." 10
It must be noted that the appointment of public officials is essentially an exercise of executive
power. 11 The fact that the Constitution has provided for a Commission on Appointments does not
minimize the extent of such a power, much less, make it a shared executive-legislative
prerogative. In Concepcion v. Paredes, we stated in no uncertain terms that "[a]ppointment to
office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion." 12 Springer v. Philippine
Islands 13 on the other hand, underscored the fact that while the legislature may create a public
office, it cannot name the official to discharge the functions appurtenant thereto. And while it may
prescribe the qualifications therefor, it cannot circumscribe such qualifications, which would unduly
narrow the President's choice. In that event, it is as if it is the legislature itself conferring the
appointment.
Thus, notwithstanding the existence of a Commission on Appointments, the Chief Executive
retains his supremacy as the appointing authority. In case of doubt, the same should be resolved
in favor of the appointing power.
It is the essence of a republican form of government, like ours, that "[e]ach department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction." 14 But like all genuine
republican systems, no power is absolutely separate from the other. For republicanism operates
on a process of checks and balances as well, not only to guard against excesses by one branch,
but more importantly, "to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government." 15 Viewed in that light, the Commission on Appointments acts as a restraint against
abuse of the appointing authority, but not as a means with which to hold the Chief Executive
hostage by a possibly hostile Congress, an unhappy lesson as the majority notes, in our history
under the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
The system of checks and balances is not peculiar to the provision on appointments. The
prohibition, for instance, against the enactment of a bill of attainder operates as a bar against
legislative encroachment upon both judicial and executive domains, since the determination of guilt
and punishment of the guilty address judicial and executive functions, respective y. 16
And then, the cycle of checks and balances pervading the Constitution is a sword that cuts both
ways. In a very real sense, the power of appointment constitutes a check against legislative
authority. In Springer v. Philippine Islands, 17we are told that "Congress may not control the law
enforcement process by retaining a power to appoint the individual who will execute the
laws." 18 This is so, according to one authority, because "the appointments clause, rather than
'merely dealing with etiquette or protocol,' seeks to preserve an executive check upon legislative
authority in the interest of avoiding an undue concentration of power in Congress. " 19
The President has sworn to "execute [the] laws. 20 For that matter, no other department of the
Government may discharge that function, least of all Congress. Accordingly, a statute conferring
upon a commission the responsibility of administering that very legislation and whose members
have been determined therein, has been held to be repugnant to the Charter. 21 Execution of the
laws, it was held, is the concern of the President, and in going about this business, he acts by
himself or through his men and women, and no other.
The President, on the other hand, cannot remove his own appointees "except for cause provided
by law." 22Parenthetically, this represents a deviation from the rule prevailing in American
jurisdiction that "the power of removal . . . [is] incident to the power of appointment, 23 although this
has since been tempered in a subsequent case, 24 where it was held that the President may
remove only "purely executive officers, 25 that is, officers holding office at his pleasure. In Ingles v.
Mutuc, 26 this Court held that the President may remove incumbents of offices confidential in
nature, but we likewise made clear that in such a case, the incumbent is not "removed" within the
meaning of civil service laws, but that his term merely expires.
It is to be observed, indeed, that the Commission on Appointments, as constituted under the 1987
Constitution, is itself subject to some check. Under the Charter, "[tlhe Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. 27 Accordingly, the failure of the Commission to either consent or not consent to the
appointments preferred before it within the prescribed period results in a de facto confirmation
thereof
Certainly, our founding fathers have fashioned a Constitution where the boundaries of power are
blurred by the predominance of checks and counterchecks, yet amid such a rubble of competing
powers emerges a structure whose parts are at times jealous of each other, but which are
ultimately necessary in assuring a dynamic, but stable, society. As Mr. Justice Holmes had so
elegantly articulated:
xxx xxx xxx
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ... When we come
to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be
received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it
by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between
legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. 28
xxx xxx xxx
We are furthermore told:
xxx xxx xxx
... (I)t will be vital not to forget that all of these "checks and counterpoises,
which Newton might readily have recognized as suggestive of the mechanism
of the heavens," (W. Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States
56 (1908)] can represent only the scaffolding of a far more subtle "vehicle of
life (Id. at 192: "The Constitution cannot be regarded as a mere legal
document, to be read as a will or a contract would be. It must, of the necessity
of the case, be a vehicle of life.") The great difficulty of any theory less rich,
Woodrow Wilson once warned, "is that government is not a machine, but a
living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory
of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is . . . shaped to its
functions by the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can have its organs
offset against each other as checks, and five." (Id. at 56.) Yet because no
complex society can have its centers of power not "offset against each other
as checks," and resist tyranny, the Model of Separated and Divided Powers
offers continuing testimony to the undying dilemmas of progress and justice. 29
xxx xxx xxx
As a closing observation, I wish to clear the impression that the 1973 Constitution deliberately
denied the legislature (the National Assembly under the 1971 draft Constitution) the power to
check executive appointments, and hence, granted the President absolute appointing power. 30 As
a delegate to, and Vice-President of, the ill-fated 1971 Constitutional Convention, and more so as
the presiding officer of most of its plenary session, I am aware that the Convention did not provide
for a commission on appointments on the theory that the Prime Minister, the head of the
Government and the sole appointing power, was himself a member of parliament. For this reason,
there was no necessity for a separate body to scrutinize his appointees. But should such
appointees forfeit the confidence of the assembly, they are, by tradition, required to resign, unless
they should otherwise have been removed by the Prime Minister. 31 In effect, it is parliament itself
that "approves" such appointments. Unfortunately, supervening events forestalled our
parliamentary experiment, and beginning with the 1976 amendments and some 140 or so
amendments thereafter, we had reverted to the presidential form, 32 without provisions for a
commission on appointments.
In fine, while Presidential appointments, under the first sentence of Section 16, of Article VII of the
present Constitution, must pass prior Congressional scrutiny, it is a test that operates as a mere
safeguard against abuse with respect to those appointments. It does not accord Congress any
more than the power to check, but not to deny, the Chief Executive's appointing power or to
supplant his appointees with its own. It is but an exception to the rule. In limiting the Commission's
scope of authority, compared to that under the 1935 Constitution, I believe that the 1987
Constitution has simply recognized the reality of that exception.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani A. Cruz in his dissent. I agree that the Constitution, as the supreme law of the
land, should never have any of its provisions interpreted in a manner that results in absurd or
irrational consequences.
The Commission on Appointments is an important constitutional body which helps give fuller
expression to the principles inherent in our presidential system of government. Its functions cannot
be made innocuous or unreasonably diminished to the confirmation of a limited number of
appointees. In the same manner that the President shares in the enactment of laws which govern
the nation, the legislature, through its Commission on Appointments, gives assurance that only
those who can pass the scrutiny of both the President and Congress will help run the country as
officers holding high appointive positions. The third sentence of the first paragraph — " ... The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." — specifies only
"officers lower in rank" as those who may, by law, be appointed by the President alone. If as
expounded in the majority opinion, only the limited number of officers in the first sentence of
Section 16 require confirmation, the clear intent of the third sentence is lost. In fact both the
second and third sentences become meaningless or superfluous. Superfluity is not to be read into
such an important part of the Constitution.
I agree with the intervenor that all provisions of the Constitution on appointments must be read
together. In providing for the appointment of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts (Section 9, Article VIII), the Ombudsman and his deputies (Section 9, Article XI), the Vice
President as a member of cabinet (Section 3, Article VII) and, of course, those who by law the
President alone may appoint, the Constitution clearly provides no need for confirmation. This can
only mean that all other appointments need confirmation. Where there is no need for confirmation
or where there is an alternative process to confirmation, the Constitution expressly so declares.
Without such a declaration, there must be confirmation.
The 1973 Constitution dispensed with confirmation by a Commission on Appointments because
the government it set up was supposed to be a parliamentary one. The Prime Minister, as head of
government, was constantly accountable to the legislature. In our presidential system, the
interpretation which Justice Cruz and myself espouse, is more democratic and more in keeping
with the system of government organized under the Constitution.
I, therefore vote to grant the petition.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
The view of the respondent, as adopted by the majority opinion, is briefly as follows: Confirmation
is required only for the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, to wit: (1) the heads
of the executive departments; (2) ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; (3) officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and (4) other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in the Constitution. No confirmation is required under the
second sentence for (1) all other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and (2) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Neither is
confirmation required by the third sentence for those other officers lower in rank whose
appointment is vested by law in the President alone.
Following this interpretation, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, who is not the head of his
department, does not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, but the ordinary
consul, who is under his jurisdiction, must be confirmed. The colonel is by any standard lower in
rank than the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, which was created by the
Constitution; yet the former is subject to confirmation but the latter is not because he does not
come under the first sentence. The Special Prosecutor, whose appointment is not vested by the
Constitution in the President, is not subject to confirmation under the first sentence, and neither
are the Governor of the Central Bank and the members of the Monetary Board because they fall
under the second sentence as interpreted by the majority opinion. Yet in the case of the multi-
sectoral members of the regional consultative commission, whose appointment is vested by the
Constitution in the President under Article X, Section 18, their confirmation is required although
their rank is decidedly lower.
I do not think these discrepancies were intended by the framers as they would lead to the absurd
consequences we should avoid in interpreting the Constitution.
There is no question that bureau directors are not required to be confirmed under the first
sentence of Section 16, but that is not the provision we ought to interpret. It is the second sentence
we must understand for a proper resolution of the issues now before us. Significantly, although
there was a long discussion of the first sentence in the Constitutional Commission, there is none
cited on the second sentence either in the Solicitor-General's comment or in the majority opinion.
We can therefore only speculate on the correct interpretation of this provision in the light of the first
and third sentences of Section 16 or by reading this section in its totality.
The majority opinion says that the second sentence is the exception to the first sentence and holds
that the two sets of officers specified therein may be appointed by the President without the
concurrence of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation is pregnant with mischievous
if not also ridiculous results that presumably were not envisioned by the framers.
One may wonder why it was felt necessary to include the second sentence at all, considering the
majority opinion that the enumeration in the first sentence of the officers subject to confirmation is
exclusive on the basis of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. If that be so, the first sentence
would have been sufficient by itself to convey the Idea that all other appointees of the President
would not need confirmation.
One may also ask why, if the officers mentioned in the second sentence do not need confirmation,
it was still felt necessary to provide in the third sentence that the appointment of the other officers
lower in rank will also not need confirmation as long as their appointment is vested by law in the
President alone. The third sentence would appear to be superfluous, too, again in view of the first
sentence.
More to the point, what will follow if Congress does not see fit to vest in the President alone the
appointment of those other officers lower in rank mentioned in the third sentence? Conformably to
the language thereof, these lower officers will need the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments while, by contrast, the higher officers mentioned in the second sentence will not.
Thus, a regional director in the Department of Labor and the labor arbiters, as officers lower in
rank than the bureau director, will have to be confirmed if the Congress does not vest their
appointment in the President alone under the third sentence. On the other hand, their superior, the
bureau director himself, will not need to be confirmed because, according to the majority opinion,
he falls not under the first sentence but the second. This is carefulness in reverse, like checking
the bridesmaids but forgetting the bride.
It must be borne in mind that one of the purposes of the Constitutional Commission was to restrict
the powers of the Presidency and so prevent the recurrence of another dictatorship. Among the
many measures taken was the restoration of the Commission on Appointments to check the
appointing power which had been much abused by President Marcos. We are now told that even
as this body was revived to limit appointments, the scope of its original authority has itself been
limited in the new Constitution. I have to disagree.
My own reading is that the second sentence is but a continuation of the Idea expressed in the first
sentence and simply mentions the other officers appointed by the President who are also subject
to confirmation. The second sentence is the later expression of the will of the framers and so must
be interpreted as complementing the rule embodied in the first sentence or, if necessary, reversing
the original intention to exempt bureau directors from confirmation. I repeat that there were no
debates on this matter as far as I know, which simply means that my humble conjecture on the
meaning of Section 16 is as arguable, at least, as the suppositions of the majority. We read and
rely on the same records. At any rate, this view is more consistent with the general purpose of
Article VII, which, to repeat, was to reduce the powers of the Presidency.
The respondent cites the following exchange reported in page 520, Volume II, of the Record of the
Constitutional Convention:
Mr. Foz: Madam President, this is the third proposed
amendment on page 7, line 28, 1 propose to put a period
(.) after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and
substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
Mr. Regalado: Madam President, the Committee accepts
the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that
those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
However, the records do not show what particular part of Section 16 the committee chairman was
referring to, and a reading in its entirety of this particular debate will suggest that the body was
considering the first sentence of the said section, which I reiterate is not the controversial
provision. In any case, although the excerpt shows that the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Foz was accepted by the committee, it is not reflected, curiously enough, in the final
version of Section 16 as a perusal thereof will readily reveal. Whether it was deleted later in the
session or reworded by the style committee or otherwise replaced for whatever reason will need
another surmise on this rather confused Constitution.
I need only add that the records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are
at best persuasive only and not necessarily conclusive. Interestingly, some quarters have
observed that the Congress is not prevented from adding to the list of officers subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments and cite the debates on this matter in support of
this supposition. It is true enough that there was such a consensus, but it is equally true that this Republic of the Philippines
thinking is not at all expressed, or even only implied, in the language of Section 16 of Article VII. SUPREME COURT
Which should prevail then the provision as worded or the debates? Manila

It is not disputed that the power of appointment is executive in nature, but there is no question EN BANC
either that it is not absolute or unlimited. The rule re- established by the new Constitution is that
the power requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments as a restraint on presidential
G.R. No. L-2348             February 27, 1950
excesses, in line with the system of checks and balances. I submit it is the exception to this rule,
and not the rule, that should be strictly construed.
GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
In my view, the only officers appointed by the President who are not subject to confirmation by the
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Commission on Appointments are (1) the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman and his
deputies, who are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council; (2) the Vice-President when he is
appointed to the Cabinet; and (3) "other officers lower in rank," but only when their appointment is First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco Carreon for oppositor
vested by law in the President alone. It is clear that this enumeration does not include the and appellant.
respondent Commissioner of Customs who, while not covered by the first sentence of Section 16, Gregorio Perfecto in his own behalf.
comes under the second sentence thereof as I would interpret it and so is also subject to
confirmation.
BENGZON, J.:

I vote to grant the petition

In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount
(P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon
would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount collected. The
defendant appealed.

The death of Mr. Justice Perfecto has freed us from the embarrassment of passing upon the claim
of a colleague. Still, as the outcome indirectly affects all the members of the Court, consideration
of the matter is not without its vexing feature. Yet adjudication may not be declined, because (a)
we are not legally disqualified; (b) jurisdiction may not be renounced, ad it is the defendant who
appeals to this Court, and there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred; (c)
supreme courts in the United States have decided similar disputes relating to themselves; (d) the
question touches all the members of the judiciary from top to bottom; and (e) the issue involves the
right of other constitutional officers whose compensation is equally protected by the Constitution,
for instance, the President, the Auditor-General and the members of the Commission on Elections.
Anyway the subject has been thoroughly discussed in many American lawsuits and opinions, and
we shall hardly do nothing more than to borrow therefrom and to compare their conclusions to
local conditions. There shall be little occasion to formulate new propositions, for the situation is not
unprecedented.

Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and
all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office." It also provides that "until Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation
of sixteen thousand pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not
"provided otherwise", by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the
rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.

Now, does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution
thereof?.
A note found at page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law Reports answers the question in the
affirmative. It says:
Where the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries of its judicial officers shall not
be dismissed during their continuance in office, it had been held that the state legislature
cannot impose a tax upon the compensation paid to the judges of its court. New Orleans
v. Lea (1859) 14 La. Ann. 194; Opinion of Attorney-General if N. C. (1856) 48 N. C. (3
Jones, L.) Appx. 1; Re Taxation of Salaries of Judges (1902) 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E.
970; Com. ex. rel. Hepburn v. Mann (1843) 5 Watts & S,. (Pa.) 403 [but see to the
contrary the earlier and much criticized case of Northumberland county v. Chapman
(1829) 2 Rawle (Pa.) 73]*
A different rule prevails in Wisconsin, according to the same annotation. Another state holding the
contrary view is Missouri.
The Constitution of the United States, likes ours, forbids the diminution of the compensation of
Judges of the Supreme Court and of inferior courts. The Federal Governments has an income tax
law. Does it embrace the salaries of federal judges? In answering this question, we should
consider four periods:
First period. No attempts was made to tax the compensation of Federal judges up to 1862 1.
Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was passed subjecting the salaries of "civil
officers of the United States" to an income tax of three per cent. Revenue officers, construed it as
including the compensation of all judges; but Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the judiciary, wrote
to the Secretary of the Treasury a letter of protest saying, among other things:
The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the compensation of every judge 3
per cent, and if it can be diminished to that extent by the name of a tax, it may, in the
same way, be reduced from time to time, at the pleasure of the legislature.
The judiciary is one of the three great departments of the government, created and
established by the Constitution. Its duties and powers are specifically set forth, and are
of a character that requires it to be perfectly independent of the two other departments,
and in order to place it beyond the reach and above even the suspicion of any such
influence, the power to reduce their compensation is expressly withheld from Congress,
and excepted from their powers of legislation.
Language could not be more plain than that used in the Constitution. It is, moreover, one
of its most important and essential provisions. For the articles which limits the powers of
the legislative and executive branches of the government, and those which provide
safeguards for the protection of the citizen in his person and property, would be of little
value without a judiciary to uphold and maintain them, which was free from every
influence, direct and indirect, that might by possibility in times of political excitement
warp their judgments.
Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining in the Treasury a portion of
the Compensation of the judges, as unconstitutional and void2.
The protest was unheeded, although it apparently bore the approval of the whole Supreme Court,
that ordered it printed among its records. But in 1869 Attorney-General Hoar upon the request of
the Secretary of the Treasury rendered an opinion agreeing with the Chief Justice. The collection
of the tax was consequently discontinued and the amounts theretofore received were all refunded.
For half a century thereafter judges' salaries were not taxed as income.3
Third period. 1919-1938. The Federal Income Tax Act of February 24, 1919 expressly provided
that taxable income shall include "the compensation of the judges of the Supreme Court and
inferior courts of the United States". Under such Act, Walter Evans, United States judge since
1899, paid income tax on his salary; and maintaining that the impost reduced his compensation,
he sued to recover the money he had delivered under protest. He was upheld in 1920 by the
Supreme Court in an epoch-making decision.*, explaining the purpose, history and meaning of the
Constitutional provision forbidding impairment of judicial salaries and the effect of an income tax
upon the salary of a judge.
With what purpose does the Constitution provide that the compensation of the judges
"shall not be diminished during their continuance in office"? Is it primarily to benefit the
judges, or rather to promote the public weal by giving them that independence which
makes for an impartial and courageous discharge of the judicial function? Does the
provision merely forbid direct diminution, such as expressly reducing the compensation
from a greater to a less sum per year, and thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet
effective, diminution, such as withholding or calling back a part as tax on the whole? Or
does it mean that the judge shall have a sure and continuing right to the compensation,
whereon he confidently may rely for his support during his continuance in office, so that
he need have no apprehension lest his situation in this regard may be changed to his
disadvantage?
The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of liberty
and justice would be assured by vesting the three powers — the legislative, the
executive, and the judicial — in separate departments, each relatively independent of
the others and it was recognized that without this independence — if it was not made
both real and enduring — the separation would fail of its purpose. all agreed that
restraints and checks must be imposed to secure the requisite measure of
independence; for otherwise the legislative department, inherently the strongest, might
encroach on or even come to dominate the others, and the judicial, naturally the
weakest, might be dwarf or swayed by the other two, especially by the legislative.
The particular need for making the judiciary independent was elaborately pointed our by
Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 78, from which we excerpt the following:
xxx     xxx     xxx
At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience as lawyer, legislator, and chief
justice enable him to speak as no one else could, tersely said (debates Va. Gonv. 1829-
1831, pp. 616, 619): . . . Our courts are the balance wheel of our whole constitutional
system; and our is the only constitutional system so balanced and controlled. Other
constitutional systems lacks complete poise and certainly of operation because they lack
the support and interpretation of authoritative, undisputable courts of law. It is clear
beyond all need of exposition that for the definite maintenance of constitutional
understandings it is indispensable, alike for the preservation of the liberty of the
individual and for the preservation of the integrity of the powers of the government, that
there should be some nonpolitical forum in which those understandings can be
impartially debated and determined. That forum our courts supply. There the individual
may assert his rights; there the government must accept definition of its authority. There
the individual may challenge the legality of governmental action and have it adjudged by
the test of fundamental principles, and that test the government must abide; there the
government can check the too aggressive self-assertion of the individual and establish
its power upon lines which all can comprehend and heed. The constitutional powers of
the courts constitute the ultimate safeguard alike of individual privilege and of
governmental prerogative. It is in this sense that our judiciary is the balance wheel of our
entire system; it is meant to maintain that nice adjustment between individual rights and
governmental powers which constitutes political liberty. Constitutional government in the
United States, pp. 17, 142.
 Conscious in the nature and scope of the power being vested in the national courts,
recognizing that they would be charge with responsibilities more delicate and important
than any ever before confide to judicial tribunals, and appreciating that they were to be,
in the words of George Washington, "the keystone of our political fabric", the convention
with unusual accord incorporated in the Constitution the provision that the judges "shall
hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their
services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office." Can there be any doubt that the two things thus coupled in place — the clause in
respect of tenure during good behaviour and that in respect of an undiminishable
compensation-were equally coupled in purpose? And is it not plain that their purposes
was to invest the judges with an independence in keeping with the delicacy and
importance of their task, and with the imperative need for its impartial and fearless
performance? Mr. Hamilton said in explanation and support of the provision (Federalist
No. 79): "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence
of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general course of human
nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will.
xxx     xxx     xxx
These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that the primary purpose of the
prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in
respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench, and to promote that
independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the
guaranties, limitations, and pervading principles of the constitution, and to the admiration
of justice without respect to persons, and with equal concern for the poor and the rich.
xxx     xxx     xxx
"gross income" on which taxes were payable included the compensation "of judges of courts of the
United States taking office after June 6, 1932". Joseph W. Woodrough qualified as United States
circuit judge on May 1, 1933. His salary as judge was taxed, and before the Supreme Court of the
United States the issue of decrease of remuneration again came up. That court, however, ruled
against him, declaring (in 1939) that Congress had the power to adopt the law. It said:
The question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its constitutional
power in providing that United States judges appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932
shall not enjoy immunity from the incidence of taxation to which everyone else within the
defined classes of income is subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed
itself to the position that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not,
when applied to the income of federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the
prohibition of Article 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads upon
the independence of judges who took office after the Congress has thus charged them
with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the
cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience on which
the framers based the safeguards of Article 3, Sec. 1. To subject them to a general tax is
merely to recognize that judges also are citizens, and that their particular function in
government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the
material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with
administering. (O'Malley vs. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, A. L. R. 1379.)
Now, the case for the defendant-appellant Collector of Internal Revenue is premised mainly on this
decision (Note A). He claims it holds "that federal judges are subject to the payment of income
taxes without violating the constitutional prohibition against the reduction of their salaries during
their continuance in office", and that it "is a complete repudiation of the ratio decidenci of Evans vs.
Gore". To grasp the full import of the O'Malley precedent, we should bear in mind that:

1. It does not entirely overturn Miles vs. Graham. "To the extent that what the Court now says is
But it is urged that what plaintiff was made to pay back was an income tax, and that a
inconsistent with what said in Miles vs. Graham, the latter can not survive", Justice Frankfurter
like tax was exacted of others engaged in private employment.
announced.

If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can find no justification in the
2. It does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine in Evans vs, Gore, although it indicates that
taxation of other income as to which there is no prohibition, for, of course, doing what
the Congressional Act in dispute avoided in part the consequences of that case.
the Constitution permits gives no license to do what it prohibits.

Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley) and piecing them together, the
The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed
logical conclusion may be reached that although Congress may validly declare by law that salaries
against all diminution, whether for one purpose or another; and the reason for its
of judges appointed thereafter shall be taxed as income (O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax
adoption, as publicly assigned at the time and commonly accepted ever since, make
the salaries of those judges already in office at the time of such declaration because such taxation
with impelling force for the conclusion that the fathers of the Constitution intended to
would diminish their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). In this manner the rationalizing
prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the
principle that will harmonize the allegedly discordant decision may be condensed.
independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could
come from taxing their salaries. (American law Reports, annotated, Vol. 11, pp. 522-25;
Evans vs. Gore, supra.) By the way, Justice Frankfurter, writing the O'Malley decision, says the Evans precedent met with
disfavor from legal scholarship opinion. Examining the issues of Harvard Law review at the time
of Evans vs. Gore (Frankfurter is a Harvard graduate and professor), we found that such school
In September 1, 1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as judge of the Unites States court of
publication criticized it. Believing this to be the "inarticulate consideration that may have influenced
claims. His salary was taxed by virtue of the same time income tax of February 24, 1919. At the
the grounds on which the case went off"4, we looked into the criticism, and discovered that it was
time he qualified, a statute fixed his salary at P7,500. He filed action for reimbursement, submitting
predicated on the position that the 16th Amendment empowered Congress "to collect taxes on
the same theory on which Evans v. Gore had been decided. The Supreme Court of the United
incomes from whatever source derived" admitting of no exception. Said the Harvard Law Journal:
States in 1925 reaffirmed that decision. It overruled the distinction offered by Solicitor-General
Beck that Judge Graham took office after the income tax had been levied on judicial salaries,
(Evans qualified before), and that Congress had power "to impose taxes which should apply to the In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court of the United States decided
salaries of Federal judges appointed after the enactment of the taxing statute." (The law had made that by taxing the salary of a federal judge as a part of his income, Congress was in
no distinction as to judges appointed before or after its passage) effect reducing his salary and thus violating Art. III, sec. 1, of the Constitution. Admitting
for the present purpose that such a tax really is a reduction of salary, even so it would
seem that the words of the amendment giving power to tax 'incomes, from whatever
Fourth period. 1939 — Foiled in their previous attempts, the Revenue men persisted, and
source derived', are sufficiently strong to overrule pro tanto the provisions of Art. III, sec.
succeeded in inserting in the United States Revenue Act of June, 1932 the modified proviso that
 1. But, two years ago, the court had already suggested that the amendment in no way
extended the subjects open to federal taxation. The decision in Evans vs. Gore affirms
that view, and virtually strikes from the amendment the words "from whatever source
derived". (Harvard law Review, vol. 34, p. 70)
The Unites States Court's shift of position 5 might be attributed to the above detraction which,
without appearing on the surface, led to Frankfurter's sweeping expression about judges being
also citizens liable to income tax. But it must be remembered that undisclosed factor — the 16th
Amendment — has no counterpart in the Philippine legal system. Our Constitution does not repeat
it. Wherefore, as the underlying influence and the unuttered reason has no validity in this
jurisdiction, the broad generality loses much of its force.
Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that Congress may validly enact a law taxing the
salaries of judges appointed after its passage. Here in the Philippines no such law has been
approved.
Besides, it is markworthy that, as Judge Woodrough had qualified after the express legislative
declaration taxing salaries, he could not very well complain. The United States Supreme Court
probably had in mind what in other cases was maintained, namely, that the tax levied on the salary
in effect decreased the emoluments of the office and therefore the judge qualified with such
reduced emoluments.6
The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in which judges already in office are made to pay
tax by executive interpretation, without express legislative declaration. That state of affairs is
controlled by the administrative and judicial standards herein-before described in the "second
period" of the Federal Government, namely, the views of Chief Justice Taney and of Attorney-
General Hoar and the constant practice from 1869 to 1938, i.e., when the Income Tax Law merely
taxes "income" in general, it does not include salaries of judges protected from diminution.
In this connection the respondent would make capital of the circumstance that the Act of 1932,
upheld in the O'Malley case, has subsequently been amended by making it applicable even to
judges who took office before1932. This shows, the appellant argues, that Congress interprets the
O'Malley ruling to permit legislative taxation of the salary of judges whether appointed before the
tax or after. The answer to this is that the Federal Supreme Court expressly withheld opinion on
that amendment in the O'Malley case. Which is significant. Anyway, and again, there is here no
congressional directive taxing judges' salaries.
Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law
expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant.
As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not
included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may
additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines
1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from
diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to
have been transplanted here;7 and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention
approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges' compensation, the Federal
principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans vs.
Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the inference is not illogical that
in restraining the impairment of judicial compensation the Fathers of the Constitution intended to
preclude taxation of the same.8
It seems that prior to the O'Malley decision the Philippine Government did not collect income tax
on salaries of judges. This may be gleaned from General Circular No. 449 of the Department of
Finance dated March 4, 1940, which says in part:
xxx     xxx     xxx
The question of whether or not the salaries of judges should be taken into account in
computing additional residence taxes is closely linked with the liability of judges to
income tax on their salaries, in fact, whatever resolution is adopted with respect to either
of said taxes be followed with respect to the other. The opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, to which the
attention of this department has been drawn, appears to have enunciated a new doctrine
regarding the liability of judges to income tax upon their salaries. In view of the fact that
the question is of great significance, the matter was taken up in the Council of State, and
the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice was requested to give an opinion on whether or
not, having in mind the said decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, there is justification in reversing our present ruling to
the effect that judges are not liable to tax on their salaries. After going over the opinion
of the court in the said case, the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, stated that
although the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States is not binding in the
Philippines, the doctrine therein enunciated has resolved the issue of the taxability of
judges' salaries into a question of policy. Forthwith, His Excellency the President
decided that the best policy to adopt would be to collect income and additional residence
taxes from the President of the Philippines, the members of the Judiciary, and the
Auditor General, and the undersigned was authorized to act accordingly.
In view of the foregoing, income and additional residence taxes should be levied on the
salaries received by the President of the Philippines, members of the Judiciary, and the
Auditor General during the calendar year 1939 and thereafter. . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Of course, the Secretary of Justice correctly opined that the O'Malley decision "resolved the issue
of taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy." But that policy must be enunciated by
Congressional enactment, as was done in the O'Malley case, not by Executive Fiat or
interpretation.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon
buying gasoline, or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property,
they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It
is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their
official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial
salaries is not a mere privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but a basic
limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest. (Evans vs. Gore)
Indeed the exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or
privilege. Let the highest court of Maryland speak:
The exemption of the judicial compensation from reduction is not in any true sense a
gratuity, privilege or exemption. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon
valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose
fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The
undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of
the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent
foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are
qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a
private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the
other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its
professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate
themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is
irrefutable that they guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is
not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to
 which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is
merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose
promoted is received in the place of the tax. Theory and Practice of Taxation (1900), D.
A. Wells, p. 541. (Gordy vs. Dennis (Md.) 1939, 5 Atl. Rep. 2d Series, p. 80)
It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax may imperil the
independence of the judicial department. The danger may be demonstrated. Suppose there is
power to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and
the Executive. In retaliation the income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all
salaries of government officials on the level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the
judges by 30 per cent, but they may not grumble because the tax is general on all receiving the
same amount of earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative branches in equal
measure. However, means are provided thereafter in other laws, for the increase of salaries of the
Executive and the Legislative branches, or their perquisites such as allowances, per diems,
quarters, etc. that actually compensate for the 30 per cent reduction on their salaries. Result:
Judges compensation is thereby diminished during their incumbency thanks to the income tax law.
Consequence: Judges must "toe the line" or else. Second consequence: Some few judges might
falter; the great majority will not. But knowing the frailty of human nature, and this chink in the
judicial armor, will the parties losing their cases against the Executive or the Congress believe that
the judicature has not yielded to their pressure?
Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive order the President has subjected his
salary to the income tax law. In our opinion this shows obviously that, without such voluntary act of
the President, his salary would not be taxable, because of constitutional protection against
diminution. To argue from this executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act in like
manner is to assume that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the
judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of
affairs.
The judgment will be affirmed. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6355-56             August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,  ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13
of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector
of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing
the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to
Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his
salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and
from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without
special pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they
were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding,
in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid
down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes
from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and
therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said
taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the
arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised,
brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the
United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that
taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates
the Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the
remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and
legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue,
our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress,
because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring
home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the
Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold
office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and
each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the
Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries,
because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries
during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution.
Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the
decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the
salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by
law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution,
particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income
tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically
prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590,
says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a
judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that
payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do
this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found
and decided otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental
principles regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power
to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of
the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to
the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the
Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to
interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the
Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then
the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not
limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson
et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they
cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to
maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and
unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the
fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as
to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the
exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political
agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)
Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important
functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely
connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or
are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur.,
905.).
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision,
validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall
be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919,
emphasis supplied)
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and
the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case
based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even
annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the
Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of
the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those
governing the separation of powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we
believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof.
Under the old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime
thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously
received his full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his
privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the
amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that
his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of
withholding the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to
his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of
pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday,
said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted
therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he
should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, — fifteenth and end of month. In the
present case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is
P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further
dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the
collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were
not exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be
actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving
but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by
P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing
the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of
interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the
salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or
act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding
weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not
conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be
usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became
Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law
was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy
any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay
income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed
by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of
the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other
constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the
Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of
the Public Service Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the
number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are
more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of
Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the
Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only
of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990
judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public
policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans
vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):
The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges,
but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench
and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the
maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution
and to the administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for
the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private
grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively,
but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption,
especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as
P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such
as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to
be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional
exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect,
much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the
constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court
declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is
based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged
with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in
cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance
in the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech,
remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a
natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and
Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and
exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural
and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when
used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22
[3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or
interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines
under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are
exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the
Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue
of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from
income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted
men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation.
(Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may
justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying
taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher
considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial
officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby
insuring the independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the
effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and
so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a
case by the highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
no pronouncement as to costs.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured
by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and
preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited
membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice
and training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late
Republic of the Philippines
in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming
SUPREME COURT
that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the
Manila
benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give
more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive,
they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax EN BANC
if paid would be real, substantial and onerous.
G.R. No. 78780               July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,  A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME
COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in
Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section
10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in
response to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding
of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had
reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. — The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief
Justice's previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of
this Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the
Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the
judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has
deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be
shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed
express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to
"give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of
Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear,
specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment
of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the
general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution
as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been
obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of
any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the
Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the
salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of
the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling
in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the
Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of
their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of
Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income
earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the
constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive
such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and
of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during
their continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution
specifically stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and
of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased.  4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973
Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the
original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII,
negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National
Assembly shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of
_____________ and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos. 5(Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented
their objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does
this not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal
protection of the law? After all, tax is levied not on the salary but on the combined
income, such that when the judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other
income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to
the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or
decrease of their salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their
salary and affecting the independence of the judges.
 MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the
special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in
taxation and the equal protection clause. 6
x x x           x x x          x x x
understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of
Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

MR. OPLE. x x x So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of
justices is subject to tax.
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner
Roberto Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of
Court and the judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of defense against the salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
executive and legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the
citizens outside, especially the humble government employees, might say that in trying
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General
to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of
Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the
extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number of
understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply
powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest
anymore.
degree by other employees of the government.

The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity,
objection.
which is, of course, denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7

And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo
A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor
subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches
in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the
original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer  8 that "the independence
of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their
salaries." Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin
G. Bernas stood up "in support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a
modification of the amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that
it is not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that
is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs.
Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil.
696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the
statement will read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this
position, I would say that the argument seems to be that the justice and judges should
not be subjected to income tax because they already gave up the income from their
practice. That is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees. And I know right
now, for instance, there are many people who have accepted employment in the
government involving a reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So,
they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service in
government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner
Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption,
Commissioner Bernas announced:
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there
will be a provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario
Braid kindly take note that the salaries of officials of the government including
constitutional officers shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed
herein and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to
income tax" is deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle
of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. 10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 121avvphi1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again
reproduced hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and
of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after
its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from
taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent,

Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED."But this is on the
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income
tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto
vs. Meer,13 as affirmed inEndencia vs. David  14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms
the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of
the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation
equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45459             March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,  priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of
Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of
the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are
blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are
for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the
greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be
prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While,
generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs.
516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to
"functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the
respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the
Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in
the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep
them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose
acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs.
Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as
follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our
country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us
that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the estate
will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized
this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional
development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of
December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission,
reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally
embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It
is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the
officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and
defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that
what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills
into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and
their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,"
they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our
Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes
(sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance
appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited
when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by
constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec.
928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and
Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their
observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes
polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against
the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR
TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND
PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein
appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the
Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and
printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes
the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question
appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated
September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent
alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted.
He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at
P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of
Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church.
Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it
appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took
advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines
and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the
President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that
the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church
chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-
7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as theseat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the
stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the
resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed
in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The
main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not
contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed.,
168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain
inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by
indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious
intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development
nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government
is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the
conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants
the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous
to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment
in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to
take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step
taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act
assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996]
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition
signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.[1] At least 29.30%
of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The
COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners opposition. On December 6,
1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the
holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a
petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a
temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the
restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why
they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was
without COMELEC approval.[2]
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view
of the Office of the Solicitor Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the
COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter
filed a reply.[3]
Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall
election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No.
7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof,
petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court
considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election
is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the
SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election
only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
[Emphasis added.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts,
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[4] The evident intent of Section
74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph
(b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.
Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK
election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a
mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the
SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be
deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by
petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the
Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute.[5] An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or
nugatory.[6]
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution.[7] Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government
Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate
of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that
killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x[8]
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this
case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one
year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of
the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could
choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office
than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the
intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested
and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under
Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office
concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.[9]
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election
should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the majority and
separate concurring opinions.
Davide, Jr., Please see separate concurring opinion
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE
OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents
maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to
provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset
to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and
GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September
1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. [4] In a subsequent
letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-
three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
 On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was
referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a
proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues that
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which
is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business
of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and
its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it
has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. [8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision
and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must
be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done. [9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the
term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the
first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while
petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired
therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the  patrimony of
the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional
provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national
patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the
Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost
in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents
postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes
place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the
submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well
be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to
submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since
respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did
abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail
as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an
imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the
authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles
on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
must be determined and all public authority administered. [11] Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who
merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. [12] A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.  Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. [13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon
a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. [14] This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not
self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
-
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED
 FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done.  For example, qualifications on
capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures,  et
cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is
not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of
any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication
that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must
be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art.
XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which
undoubtedly are not self-executing. [18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are
not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can
only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply not in
point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation [20] speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity, [21] the sanctity of family life, [22] the vital role of the youth in nation-
building,[23] the promotion of social justice, [24] and the values of education.[25] Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights [27] and on
education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare,[30]the sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nation-building [32] and the
promotion of total human liberation and development. [33] A reading of these provisions indeed
clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which
legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is
a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission[34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not
only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also
refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not
only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
[35]
 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.  While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to
dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. [36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and
Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military
Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture
Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for
their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a
renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino
talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest;
its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.  For
sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.  Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands. [38]
 The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And
the amendment would consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS
with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY
OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we
have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino,
do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What
about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may
refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will
include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities
fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a
Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called Filipino First policy. That means that Filipinos should be
given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the
national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the
subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo [43] -
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is
better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent
GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found
to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity
ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to
successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the
subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only
too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to
the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need
implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial
remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact
further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution,
even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive
action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional
command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution
and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument
again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried
out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of state
action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in
fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the
State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in
this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared
the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
onqualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder
will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet,
nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of
which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is,
as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding
rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law
that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate
the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share. [47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a
higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to
public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or
with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under
the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to
Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could
participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to
the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified
Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while
petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have
the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after
it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of
petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the
award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as
any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution
is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do
so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic
conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to
the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987
Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced;
so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun,
under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it
is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and
diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages
and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos
whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter
could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in
nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to
economic progress and development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by
the Courts First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner,
certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again
demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or
attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws,
or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed
criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and
preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence
over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at
the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-
material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of
a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. [49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and
republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government
authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The
nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must
adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a
policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to
the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of
property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the
most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a
hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to
cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of
twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the
Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in
the shaping of a country.[51]

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to
sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For,
indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less
than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul
for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn
from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is
sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is
entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if
the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning
Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Constitution.And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo, J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion
Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.
Panganiban J., with separate dissenting opinion.