17. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.

MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY ALIAS

GAVINO SIBONGHANOY, ET AL., Defendants, MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO.,
INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding Company and defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-21450.
April 15, 1968.]

Facts of the Case:

On July 19, 1948, spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog (Tijam for brevity) filed a case
before Court of First Instance of Cebu against spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio (Sibonghayon for brevity) to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest
and costs with a prayer for a writ of attachment which was issued by the court against
Sibonghayon’s properties, but was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by
Sibonghayons at the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Surety for brevity) on the July 31,
1948.

In the Answer filed by Sibonghayon, a counterclaim was interposed which was answered by the
Tijams and, after a joint trial, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the Tijams which became
final and executory and a writ of execution was issued against the Sibopnghayons , but, was
returned unsatisfied, prompting the Tijams to move for the issuance of a writ of execution
against the Surety’s bond causing the Surety to file a written opposition citing two grounds,
namely,
(1) Failure to prosecute and
(2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the
judgment.

and prayed that the Court to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond and also
cited an affirmative relief to relieve Surety of its liability, if any, under the bond in question.

The Court denied the motion of the Tijams solely on the ground that no previous demand had
been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment, causing the Tijams to make
necessary demand which the Surety failed to satisfy the judgment, thus, the Tijams filed a
second motion for execution against the counter-bond.

At the hearing of the motion, the Court granted the Surety’s motion to be given five days within
which to answer the motion, but, the Surety failed to file such answer, thus, the Court granted
the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued to effectuate the satisfaction of
the judgment against the Surety’s bond, but, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground
that the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section
17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court which, the Court denied causing the Surety appealed to
the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for
reconsideration.

In the Surety’s brief, no other question was raised and only cited the assignment of errors
without raising the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly. The
Tijams did not file their brief which did not prevent the Court of Appeals to decide the case
affirming the orders appealed from , on December 11, 1962.

On January 8, 1963, the Surety filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a
motion for reconsideration which was granted by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of
January 10, 1963. Two days thereafter, the Surety filed a MOTION TO DISMISS, citing for the
first time that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case
since Tijam’s action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 is
for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only which is within the jurisdiction of inferior
courts which has original exclusive jurisdiction on all civil actions where the value of the
subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of
interest and costs as provided by Section 88 of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948, which became effective on June 17, 1948 , a month before
the date of filing of the instant case on July 19, 1948, and further prayed the Court of
Appeals to set aside its decision of December 11, 1962 and to dismiss the case.

On January 16, 1963, the Court of Appeals made a Resolution requiring the Tijams to answer
the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so, prompting the Court of Appeals, on May 20,
1963, to resolve its decision be set aside and to certify the case to the Supreme Court citing
that the case is for a sum of money in the amount of P1,908.00, exclusive of interest
originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, but, on June 17,
1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of
original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more
than P2,000.00 and the Court of Appeals believe that the point raised by the Surety’s motion is
an important one which merits serious consideration, taking note that the case had been
pending for almost 15 years, but throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised
the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court’s adverse decision and cited
three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which are relevant to the instant case
where the Supreme Court frowned upon the ‘undesirable practice’ of appellants
submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse, further stating that, considering that the
Supreme Court has the ‘exclusive’ appellate jurisdiction over ‘all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue’ as provided by Sec. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended, the Court of Appeal had no other recourse but to certify this case to the
Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court cited that, while it is undisputed fact that the action was for the recovery of
the sum of money in the amount of P1,908.00 only which is within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1948 which took effect about a month prior to the date of filing and, while, it is true that the rule
that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law,
and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case,
the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, the Surety, who
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, is now barred by laches from invoking the plea at
this “late hour” for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with its active
participation when this instant case commenced on July 19, 1948, or. almost fifteen
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

Thereby, declaring the Surety estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons, thus, estoppel in pais , of estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches, because of its failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which could or should have been done earlier by
exercising due diligence and its negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The Supreme Court further explained the doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" which is
based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question
of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted .

The Supreme Court ruled affirming the orders appealed with costs against the appellant Manila
Surety.

Ration Indictus:

The question of lack of jurisdiction of the court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.

However, if the one who has the right to assert lack of jurisdiction of the court failed to
assert it for a long period of time and who actively participated in the procedure is barred
and estopped by laches because the active participation of a party in a case is
tantamount to recognition of of that court‟s jurisdiction and will bar a party from
impugning the court‟s jurisdiction.