2019 BAR EXAMINATIONS CIVIL LAW (Questions and Suggested

Answers)

January 2018, Mrs. A, a married woman on her sixth (6th) month

In
of pregnancy, was crossing

a street when she was suddenly hit by a car being recklessly driven
by Mr. X. As a result, Mrs.

sustained serious injuries and further, suffered an unintentional

A
1. abortion. Mrs. A was

hospitalized for two (2) months, during which she incurred

₱400,000.00 in medical fees. Her expenses were all duly
substantiated by official receipts. During the two (2)-month period of
her confinement, she was unable to report for work and earn any
salary, which was established at the rate of ₱50,000.00 per month.
Mrs. A then filed a civil case for damages against Mr. X.

a) xxx

 
b) xxx

  c) May Mrs. A claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby? Explain.

(3%)

Suggested Answer:

No, Mrs. A cannot claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its
pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked
juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is
no answer to invoke the provisional personality of

a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil
 Code, because that same

article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article" (Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20,
1961).  In the present case, since the unborn child lacked the needed juridical
personality due to the unintentional abortion, Mrs. A cannot claim damages on behalf

of her unborn baby.

Hand W were married in 1990. H, being a member of the Armed

2.
Forces of the Philippines (AFP),

was deployed to a rebel-infested area in 1992. Since then, W has not

heard from her husband,

H.

One day, the AFP informed W that H had been declared missing since
1995. In consequence, W diligently pursued all available means to
ascertain her husband's whereabouts, but to no avail.

Firmly believing that H had already died, W filed a claim before the AFP
in 2008 for the death benefits of the missing serviceman. However, the
AFP, despite being cognizant of H's status, would not act on the claim,
contending that H could not be presumed dead unless a judicial
declaration to this effect is issued by the proper court.

In what instance/s is a judicial declaration of presumptive death

necessary? In this case, is the

contention of the AFP correct? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

A judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary under Article 41 of the Family

Code for the

purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage.

2019 CIVIL LAW BAR EXAMINATIONS (Questions and Suggested Answers)

No, the contention of the AFP is not correct. Here, W was not seeking the declaration of
the presumptive death as a prerequisite for remarriage but to claim the death benefits
due to the missing serviceman. W was relying on the presumption of death under either
Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. A petition for
declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code is not allowed. Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, thus an action brought
exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles
actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there
would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be
established. A court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390
and 391 would be unnecessary as the presumption in the said articles is already
established by law (Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25,
2018).

3. Mr. Reyes is legally married to Mrs. Reyes. During the subsistence of

their marriage, Mr. Reyes cohabited with another woman, Ms. Cruz.
Out of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz's illicit relationship, a child named C
was born. In C's birth certificate, "Cruz" appears as the child's
surname, although Mr. Reyes expressly acknowledged C as his child.

In 2018, Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz ended their relationship. Mr. Reyes
thereafter lodged a petition in court for parental custody and change
or correction of C's surname in the child's birth certificate from "Cruz"
to "Reyes." At that time, C was only ten (10) years old.

(a) Should Mr. Reyes be granted custody of C? Explain. (2.5%) (b) Can
Mr. Reyes validly compel the change or correction of C's surname from
"Cruz" to "Reyes"? Explain. (2.5%)

Suggested Answer:

(a) No, Mr. Reyes cannot be granted custody of C. C is an illegitimate child and
parental authority over illegitimate children is lodged by Art. 176 of the Family Code
on the mother; hence, Mr. Reyes’ prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental
authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor illegitimate child also
goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit (Grande v. Antonio, G.R.
 No. 206248, February 18, 2014).

No, Mr. Reyes cannot validly compel the change or correction of C's surname from
"Cruz" to "Reyes”. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname
of his or her mother. The exception provided by R.A. 9255 (An Act allowing
Illegitimate children to use the Surname of their Father) is in case his or her filiation
is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may  use
(b) the surname of the father. Art. 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the
right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the
father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that
an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion
upon the illegitimate children (Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248,
February 18, 2014).

4. F, a Filipina, married J, a Japanese, in the Philippines. After three (3)

years, they had a falling out and thus, separated. Soon after, F initiated
a divorce petition in Japan which was not opposed by J because under
Japanese law, a grant of divorce will capacitate him to remarry. F's
divorce petition was then granted by the Japanese court with finality.

May the legal effects of the divorce decree be recognized in the

Philippines, and consequently, capacitate F to remarry here? Explain.
(3%)

Suggested Answer:

2019 CIVIL LAW BAR EXAMINATIONS (Questions and Suggested Answers)

Yes, the legal effects of the divorce decree may be recognized in the Philippines, and
consequently, capacitate F to remarry here. Foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify
marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this
jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided that
the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree — presumably
the Filipino citizen — must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien-initiated proceeding. Therefore, Art. 26(2) of the Family Code
should not make a distinction. In both instances, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their
alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law. Here, provided F
proves the divorce as a fact and demonstrates its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it, the legal effects of the decree will be recognized and consequently capacitate her to
remarry (Morisono v. Morisono, G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018, citing
Republic v. Manalo, G.R No. 221029, April 24, 2018).

5. X and Y were in a live-in relationship for the longest time, and were
already blessed with a child, Z. They finally decided to get married on
March 15, 2020. When X's parents found about the news, they were
thrilled and thus, donated in favor of Z, the family heirloom,
particularly, a gold ring valued at ₱250,000.00, which X and Y orally
accepted on behalf of their minor child. One day, X and Y got into a
serious quarrel, which resulted in them setting aside their marriage
plans.

(a) Is the donation to Z valid? Explain. (3%)

Assuming that the donation to Z is valid, may X's parents revoke

(b)
the donation on the ground

that the marriage of X with Y did not push through? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

No, the donation to Z is not valid. Under Art. 748 of the Civil Code, the donation of a
movable may be made orally or in writing. An oral donation requires the
simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right
donated. If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos
(P5000), the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the
(a) donation shall be void.

In the instant case, the donated gold ring valued at P250,000 was only orally
accepted, which does not conform to the formalities required by law. As such,
lacking the required written acceptance, the donation in favor of Z is void.
 No, assuming it is valid, X's parents may not revoke the donation on the ground that
the marriage of X with Y did not push through. First, the ground cited by X’s parents
(b)
is not one among those provided under Art.764 of the Civil Code for failure to
comply with conditions nor Art. 765 for ingratitude.

Second, while the ground cited is one among those which would allow revocation of a
donation propter nuptias. However, here, there was no donation propter nuptias.
Art. 82 of the Family Code provides that donations by reason of marriage are those
which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one
or both of the future spouses. Art. 86 of the same Code provides that non-celebration of
the marriage is one of the grounds for revocation of the donation by reason of marriage.
Here, it is clear that the donation was made in favor of the child and not in favor of one
or both of the future spouses, thus this does not fall squarely within the contemplation of
donation propter nuptias. Hence, not being a donation propter nuptias, it cannot
be revoked on the ground of non-celebration of the marriage between X and Y.

2019 CIVIL LAW BAR EXAMINATIONS (Questions and Suggested Answers)

6.

Name at least two (2) exclusions from the following property regimes
as enumerated under the Family Code:

Absolute community of property

(a)
(2%)

Conjugal partnership of gains

(b)
(2%)

Suggested Answer:

CPG
ACP (GEF)
   
(BERG)

1. Property acquired during the marriage 1. That which is Brought to the

by Gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits marriage as his or her own;
as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is
 2. That which each acquires during
the marriage by Gratuitous title;

expressly provided by the donor, testator or is

3. That
grantor that they shall form part of the community by right of
which
property; acquired

Redemption, by barter or by
exchange with

property to
one of the
belonging only

2. Property for personal and Exclusive use of spouses; and

either spouse however, jewelry shall form part
of the community property; purchased
4. That
is with
which
Exclusive

3. Property acquired before the marriage by either

spouse who has legitimate descendants by money of the wife or of the
a Former marriage, and the fruits as well as the husband (Family Code, Art.
income, if any, of such property (Family Code, 109).
Art. 92).

7. Believing that he owned a certain parcel of land and completely

unaware of any defect in his title thereto, Mr. A started to build a
house thereon. When Mr. P, the real owner of the land learned of Mr.
A's actions, Mr. P immediately demanded Mr. A to leave the premises.
However, Mr. A refused to leave, and instead, asserted that as a
builder in good faith, Mr. P is obliged to sell the land to him.

(a) Is the claim of Mr. A correct? Explain. (3%)

(b) Assuming that Mr. P all the while, knew but did not object to Mr. A's
construction of the
house on his property, may Mr. A compel Mr. P to purchase the said
improvement due to Mr.

P's bad faith? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

No, the claim of Mr. A is not correct. Under Art. 448 of the Civil Code, when
the builder  believes that he is the owner of the land, the real owner  of the
land has two options: (1) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after
reimbursing the builder in good faith the necessary and useful expenses under
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or (2) he may sell the land to the builder in
good faith, unless its value is considerably more than that of the improvements, in
(a) which case, the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. The real owner of
the land cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing (Spouses De Vera v. Spouses Mayandoc, G.R. No. 211170, July
3, 2017).  In the instant case, Mr. P would need to choose between his options
and is not simply obliged to sell the land to Mr. A as what the latter asserted.

Yes, Mr. A may compel Mr. P to purchase the said improvement due to Mr. P's bad
faith. Under Art. 454 of the Civil Code, when the landowner acted in bad faith and
the builder proceeded in good faith, the provisions of Art. 447 of the Civil Code shall
(b)
apply. Art. 447 provides that owner of the land shall pay their value and, if he acted
in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The builder, in
the case where the landowner is in bad faith, may remove the

2019 CIVIL LAW BAR EXAMINATIONS (Questions and Suggested Answers)

improvements even if it may result to injury to such improvements. Thus, if Mr. A does
not prefer to the latter, he may compel Mr. P to pay for the improvement plus damages
because of Mr. P’s bad faith.

8. Mr. E leased a piece of land from Mr. F to be used for his sawmill
business for a period of ten (10) years. Consequently, Mr. E placed
heavy machineries thereon to be used for his aforementioned
business, with the intention of removing them after the expiration of
the lease period. Are Mr. E's heavy machineries considered real
properties under the Civil Code? Explain. (3%)
Suggested Answer:

No, Mr. E's heavy machineries are not considered real properties under the Civil Code.
Art. 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may
be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works are immovable property.

Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a
plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant,
a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted
as the agent of the owner. Here, Mr. E is a mere lessee and not the owner of the
property or plant, thus the aforementioned heavy machineries are not real properties
within the contemplation of Art. 415 (5) (Davao Saw Mill Co. v. Castillo, G.R.
No. L- 40411, August 7, 1935).

9. Ms. U is a usufructuary of a piece of land owned by Mr. L. During the

existence of the usufruct, Ms. U introduced various useful
improvements on the land. Upon termination of the usufruct, Mr. L
requested Ms. U to remove the said improvements, but Ms. U refused,
demanding instead that Mr. L reimburse her the value of the same.

(a) What is a usufruct? (2%)

Is Ms. U's demand proper? Explain.

(b)
(3%)

Suggested Answer:

Usufruct is a real right, of a temporary nature, which authorizes its holder to enjoy all
the benefits which results from the normal enjoyment of another’s property, with the
obligation to return, at the designated time, either the same thing or, in special
cases, its equivalent.
(a)
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of
preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides (Civil Code, Art. 562).

(b) No, Ms. U's demand is not proper. Art. 579 of the Civil Code provides that the
usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements
or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter
 its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may,
however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without
damage to the property. Thus, Ms. U does not have a right to demand Mr. L to
reimburse the useful improvements introduced by her.

10. Village Hand Village L are adjoining residential villages in a

mountainous portion of Antipolo City, Rizal, with Village L being lower
in elevation than Village H. In an effort to beautify Village H, its
developer, X, Inc., constructed a clubhouse which included an
Olympic-sized swimming pool and an artificial lagoon on a portion of
land overlooking Village L.

During the monsoon season, the continuous heavy rains caused Village
H's swimming pool and artificial lagoon to overflow, resulting into a
massive spillover that damaged various properties

in Village L. Aggrieved, the homeowners of Village L filed a complaint

for damages against X, Inc. In defense, X, Inc. contended that
pursuant to the Civil Code, Village L, as the lower estate, was obliged
to receive the waters descending from Village H, the higher estate.
Hence, it cannot be held liable for damages.

Is X, Inc.'s position tenable? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

No, X, Inc.'s position is untenable. Art. 637 of the Civil Code provides that lower estates
are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man
descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with
them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase
the burden. A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D.
No.1067).

In the instant case, the swimming pool and artificial lagoon constructed by X Inc.
consequently increased the burden, as the continuous heavy rains being collected by
these artificial works resulted to massive spillover damaging the properties in Village L.
While the aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower estate to
receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from
higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a higher state are those
which are artificially collected in man-made swimming pool and lagoons, any damage
occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to
compensation (Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 125018, April 6,
2000). Thus, for constructing said artificial works resulting damage to Village
L’s properties, X Inc. is liable for damages

11. Mr. R is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Cebu

City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1234 issued in
1955. Since his acquisition of the lot, Mr. R and his family had been in
continuous, open, and peaceful possession thereof. Mr. R died in 1980,
resulting in the land being transferred in the names of his heirs, i.e., A,
B, and C, who became registered owners thereof as per TCT No. 5678.
During the entire time, said land had never been encumbered or
disposed, and that its possession always remained with them.

Sometime in 1999, A, B, and C wanted to build a concrete fence

around the parcel of land, but they were opposed by Mrs. X, who
started claiming ownership over the same property on the strength of
a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly entered into by her with Mr. R
during the time that he was still alive. Aggrieved, A, B, and C intend to
file a complaint for quieting of title against Mrs. X.

(a) What are the substantive requisites for the action to prosper? Do
they obtain in this case?

Explain. (3%)

Within what period should A, B, and C file the complaint for quieting
(b)
of title? Explain. (2%)

Assuming that B and C are residing abroad, may A, without the

(c)
knowledge of B and C, file

the complaint for quieting of title on behalf of all the heirs? Explain.
(2%)

Suggested Answer:
(a) For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Legal title
denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership (Heirs
of Extremadura v. Extremadura, G.R. No. 211065, June 15, 2016).  Here,
the above requisites are present as A, B and C have legal title in the subject real
property and the deed of absolute sale allegedly made in favor of Mrs. X cast cloud on
the title of the heirs.

2019 CIVIL LAW BAR EXAMINATIONS (Questions and Suggested Answers)

An action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible.

One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession
(b) gives him a continuing right to the seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own
title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession (Iglesia ni
Cristo v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006).

Yes, A, even without the knowledge of B and C, may file the complaint for quieting
of title on behalf of all the heirs. A, B and C as co-heirs are co-owners of the subject
property. As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for
ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of
possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action,
(c) even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all (Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada,
G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006).

12. D, an Overseas Filipino Worker, was on his way home to the

Philippines after working for so many years in the Middle East. He had
saved ₱100,000.00 in his local savings account which he intended to
use to start up a business in his home country. On his flight home,
tragedy struck as a suicide bomber blew up the plane. All the
passengers, including D, died. He left behind his widowed mother M;
his common-law wife, W, who is the mother of his twin sons, T and S;
and his brother, B. He left no will, no debts, no other relatives, and no
other properties except the money in his savings account.

Who are the heirs entitled to inherit from D and how much should each
receive? Explain. (5%)

Suggested Answer:

His widowed mother and twin sons are entitled to inherit from D. Art. 991 of the Civil
Code provides that if legitimate ascendants are left, the illegitimate children shall divide
the inheritance with them taking one-half of the estate, whatever be the number of the
ascendants or of the illegitimate children. Thus, the widowed mother - M
gets ₱50,000.00 while the twin sons – T and S, shall receive the other half
or ₱25,000.00 each. The common-law wife cannot inherit from him as a compulsory
heir, as she is not a legitimate spouse.

13. M, single, named his sister N in his will, as a devisee over a certain
parcel of land that he owned, with the obligation of preserving the land
and transferring it, upon N's death, to her illegitimate daughter O, who
was then only a year old.

Is the condition imposed on N to preserve the land and to transmit it

upon her death to O a valid case of fideicommissary substitution?
Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

Yes, the condition imposed on N to preserve the land and to transmit it upon her death
to O is a valid case of fideicommissary substitution. For there to be a valid
fideicommissary substitution, Art. 863 of the Civil Code provides the following requisites:
(1) There must be a first heir (fiduciary) primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate;
(2) There must be a second heir (fideicommissary) to whom the property is transmitted
by the first heir; (3) An obligation clearly and expressly imposed by the testator upon
such first heir to preserve the estate and to transmit it to the second heir; (4) The first
and second heir must be only one degree apart; and (5) Both the first and second heir
must be living (or at least conceived) at the time of the death of the testator. Here, all
the above requisites are present as N, the supposed fiduciary is obliged to preserve and
transmit the property to O, her illegitimate child who is one degree apart from her.

2019 CIVIL LAW BAR EXAMINATIONS (Questions and Suggested Answers)

7
14. Prior to his death, H, married to W, with children X, Y, and Z,
executed a holographic will entirely written, dated, and signed by him.
In his will, H instituted W, X, and Y as his heirs, and consequently,
made testamentary dispositions in their favor. H, however, expressly
disinherited Z on the ground that the latter once filed a civil case
against him in order to collect a particular sum of money he previously
owed Z.

(a) Was the disinheritance of Z proper? Explain. (3%)

Assuming that the disinheritance of Z was improper, how will it

(b)
affect the institution of heirs

and testamentary dispositions made in H's will? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

No, the disinheritance of Z is not proper. For there to be a valid disinheritance, it

must be for a cause expressly stated by law. Art. 919 (2) of the Civil Code provides
that children or descendant may be disinherited when a child or descendant has
accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six
years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless. The requisites of this
(a)
ground are: (1) the heir must have accused the testator of a crime; (2) the penalty
prescribed by law for such must be 6 years imprisonment or more; and (3) the
accusation must have been found groundless. Here, Z filed a civil case and not a
criminal case, thus the above requisites are not present, making the disinheritance
not proper.

Art. 918 of the Civil Code provides that disinheritance without a specification of the
cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not
(b) one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it
may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other
testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will n