Paper  presented  at  the  5th  ECPR  Grad  Student  Conference,  Innsbruck,  July.  3-­‐5  2014.  

“The  terror  attacks  in  Norway:    

Explaining  the  crisis  management  of  the  emergency  
services.  Different  logics  of  action  at  play?”1  
Helge  Renå  (helge.rena@aorg.uib.no),  

PhD  Fellow,  Institute  of  Administration  and  Organization  Theory,  University  of  Bergen  

Introduction  
The   two   terror   attacks   22nd   of   July   2011   (hereby   22/7)   put   Norway   in   a   crisis   situation,   the  
government,   the   emergency   agencies   and   the   society   as   such   faced   an   enormous   task.   Not   since   the  
9th   of   April   1940   have   the   political   authorities   been   affected   as   when   the   car   bomb   exploded   at  
Regjeringskvartalet   at   15.25   pm,   22/7   (NOU   2012:17).   And   seldom,   if   ever   in   the   Postwar   period,   has  
a  shooting  massacre  by  one  single  gun  man  caused  so  many  lives  as  the  shootings  on  the  island  of  
Utøya  only  hours  later  the  same  day.  The  two  attacks  occurred  at  different  locations  within  a  time-­‐
span   of   three   hours.2   The   two   attacks   launched   the   largest   rescue   operation   in   Norway   since   the  
Second   World   War.   The   response   mobilized   resources   not   only   from   the   local   area   but   from   quite  
distant  regions  of  Norway  and  even  cross-­‐border  from  Sweden  (Rimstad  et  al.  2014,  5).  69  persons  
were  killed  and  60  injured  by  the  shootings  at  Utøya,  while  eight  persons  were  killed  and  112  persons  
were  injured  by  the  bomb  in  Regjeringskvartalet  (Refsdal  2014).    

From  2001  and  onwards  there  have  been  several  major  terror  attacks  in  the  “Western  world”.  9/11  
in   2001,   the   Madrid   bombings   in   2003   and   the   suicide   bombings   in   London   in   2005.   These   terror  
attacks   were   all   conducted   by   islamistic   terrorists.   Furthermore,   Spain   and   United   Kingdom   have   a  
long  history  of  terror  attacks  domestically,  e.g.  via  the  terror  groups  ETA  and  IRA.  United  States,  as  
the   only   superpower   (formerly   as   one   of   two)   and   often   involved   directly   or   indirectly   in   armed  
conflicts   abroad,   the   fear   of   terror   attacks   is   always   present.   Thus,   the   risk   of   terror   attacks   have  
historically   been   considered   high   in   Spain,   United   Kingdom   and   USA   and   emergency   preparedness  
and   terror   preventing   measures   have   been   a   political   priority.   Given   these   countries   experience   with  
terror  attacks,  armed  conflicts  and  risk  scenarios  in  accordance  with  this   gives  reason  to  expect  they  
have   functioning   and   well-­‐known   systems   and   routines   when   it   comes   to   internal   and   societal  
security,  hereunder  contingency  plans,  crisis  management  etc.  Furthermore,  their  risk  awareness  is  
high  –  a  terrorist  attack  is  a  realistic  scenario,  something  imaginable.  
                                                                                                                         
1
 This  paper  is  an  outline  of  my  PhD  project,  how  it  is  thought  conducted  for  the  time  being  (started  on  my  PhD  
mid-­‐March  this  year).      
2
 The  shootings  at  Utøya  started  appr.  at  17.15  (Stormark  2012:132)  and  the  gunman  was  reported  arrested  at  
18.36  (NOU  2012,  121).  

1  
 
Along   these   lines   Norway,   at   least   prior   to   22/7,   can   be   described   as   diametrically   different   from   the  
three   abovementioned   countries.   Norway   is   generally   regarded   as   a   peaceful,   open   and   robust  
democracy,  and  had  limited  previous  experience  with  terrorism  (Rykkja,  Lægreid,  and  Fimreite  2011).  
To  expect  Norway  to  be  the  next  scene  for  a  major  terror  attack  in  the  “Western  world”  prior  to  22/7  
was  not  very  probable.  In  this  sense,  the  terror  attacks  in  Norway  can  be  classified  as  a  “least  likely  
case”,   least   likely   to   expect   major   terror   attacks.   Furthermore,   being   a   peaceful   country   Norway  
seldom   experience   shootings,   armed   conflicts   and   alike.   Consequently,   it   is   reason   to   believe  
Norwegians   risk   awareness   (when   it   comes   to   armed   attacks)   are   low.   Experiences   with   major  
domestic   rescue   operations   are   also   limited.   Therefore,   the   terror   attacks   on   22/7,   was   a   new   and  
unexpected  event,  also  for  the  personnel  in  the  emergency  services.   For  many  of  them  it  was  also  an  
unexpected   scenario.   In   this   respect   it   would   not   be   surprising   if   the   emergency   services   showed  
signs  of  not  putting  up  to  the  test.                    

How  did  the  emergency  services  respond  to  the  terror  attacks  and  why  did  they  respond  as  they  did?  
These   empirical   questions   are   the   starting   point   for   my   PhD   project   that   will   study   the   crisis  
management  of  the  emergency  services  under  the  terror  attacks  in  Norway  22/7.  Crisis  management  
is   here   understood   as   the   sum   of   activities   aimed   at   minimizing   the   impact   of   a   crisis.   Impact   is  
measured  in  terms  of  damage  to  people,  critical  infrastructure,  and  public  institutions.  Effective  crisis  
management   saves   lives,   protects   infrastructure,   and   restores   trust   in   public   institutions   (Boin,  
Kuipers,   and   Overdijk   (2013)).   The   time   horizon   for   the   empirical   analysis   is   from   the   time   of   the  
bomb   explosion   at   Regjeringskvartalet   to   the   level   of   readiness   was   lowered   to   moderate   by   the  
government   authorities.3   The   aim   of   the   project   is   to   study   the   more   theoretically   intriguing  
question:   what   were   the   organizational   and   behavioural   conditions   behind   the   crisis   management   of  
the  emergency  services  on  22/7?      

From   a   crisis   management   perspective   a   crisis   contains   five   key   management   tasks:   i)   sensemaking   –  
grasping   crises   as   they   unfold,   ii)   decision   making   –   critical   choices   and   their   implementation,   iii)  
meaning   making,   iv)   end   games,   and   v)   learning   from   crisis   and   the   politics   of   reform   (Boin   et   al  
2005).   This   study   focus   on   the   two   first   phases.   Thus,   the   overall   question   for   this   study   –   what   were  
the   organizational   and   behavioural   conditions   behind   the   response   of   the   emergency   services   on  
22/7?  –  is  limited  to  sensemaking  and  decision  making.  

The   documentation   of   what   happened   on   22/7   is   vast,   both   from   the   national   level   (DSB,   2012;  
KAMEDEO  2012;  Lereim  et  al  2012;  NOU  2012;  Sønderland  et  al  2012),  and  on  the  local  level  from  
the  participating  organizations  and  governmental  bodies  (Lien,  Ørn,  Øye,  Skille,  &  Solberg,  2011;  Oslo  
University   Hospital,   2011;   Tomlinson,   Rosenlund,   Hammer,   Hovland,   Hallgren,   &   Salhus,   2012).   But  
studies   looking   into   why   things   happened,   which   is   the   aim   of   this   PhD   project,   are   scarce.   As   the  
“what   happened   here”-­‐question   is   well   documented   this   frees   us   to   the   more   interesting   why-­‐
questions.   The   project   will   use   this   dramatic   case   of   crisis  management   as   a   window   to   view   more  
fundamental  organizational  issues.  

It   is   also   worth   mentioning   that   some   of   the   best   contributions   from   organizational   research,   with  
lasting  theoretical  insights,  is  in  fact  case  studies  of  crisis.  Examples  include  the  analysis  of  the  Cuba  
crisis   by   Allison   (Allison   1971),   analysis   of   the   Challenger-­‐disaster   by   Vaughan   (Vaughan   2009),   the  
                                                                                                                         
3
 I  haven’t  the  exact  time  yet,  but  the  main  point  is  to  focus  on  the  time  period  of  the  terror  attacks  and  until  
the  readiness  level  was  lowered,  i.e.  some  hours  after  the  gunman  was  captured.  

2  
 
analysis   of   the   accidental   shootdown   of   two   U.S.   helicopters   over   Iraq   by   Snook   (Snook   2000)   and  
Weicks  analysis  of  the  Tenerife  air  disaster  in  1977  (Weick  1990)  and  the  fire  accident  in  Mann  Gulch  
(Weick  1993).  As  pointed  out  by  Carroll  (1995,  in  Snook  2000,  9)  unusual  organizational  events  and  
subsequent   “incident   reviews   are   central   to   the   systematic   development   of   organizational   theory”.  
My  project  will  take  part  in  this  research  tradition.  

Explaining  actors  actions  in  a  crisis:  theoretical  perspectives    

The   theoretical   starting   point   of   this   project   is   that   human   failure   related   to   crisis   often   has   a  
fundamental   organizational   anchoring   (Boin   2008;   Fimreite   et   al   2011).   More   generally,   the   way  
organizational   forms   manifest   themselves   in   principles   of   specialising   and   coordination   functions  
have   behavioural   consequences   for   the   managers   and   employees   in   an   organization   (March   and  
Olsen   1989;   Egeberg   2003).   On   the   other   hand,   all   organizations,   including   those   with   clear  
hierarchical   structures   and   a   strong   rule   of   command   and   control,   consists   of   people.   As   Oettinger  
(1990)   pointed   out:   “fallible   and   resolutely   imperfect   people   are   part   of   command   and   control  
systems”   (Oettinger   1990).   Recent   case   studies   of   crisis   management   argue   that   one   important  
success   criteria   is:   ”alert   and   decisive   individuals   and   (…)   organizations   [that]   worked   together   in  
innovative  ways”  (Boin  et  al  2005:147).  Thus,  in  order  to  understand  and  explain  how  organizations  
respond   to   and   manage   crisis   situations   it   is   important   to   understand   the   relation   between   the  
organization  and  organizational  properties  and  individual  decision  making  in  the  organization.      

The  study  will  do  this  by  using  analytical  perspectives  from  organizational  theory  when  studying  the  
relevant   organizations.   The   study   will   apply   two   perspectives   from   organization   theory,   instrumental  
and   institutional.   The   instrumental   perspective   focus   on   the   formal   structure   of   an   organization,  
keywords  are  hierarchy,  laws  and  rules  as  well  as  formal  routines  (Egeberg  1989:189;  Christensen  et  
al  2004:33-­‐34).  Essential  in  the  institutional  perspective  is  the  idea  of  the  appropriate,  an  individual  
acts  based  on  previous  experiences  of  what  has  functioned  well  and  what  is  considered  as  acceptable  
and  reasonable  within  the  environment  where  the  actor  operates  (March  and  Olsen  1989;  Selznick  
1957).    

When  studying  key  actors  (individuals  and  groups)  in  the  organizations  the  study  will  draw  heavily  on  
the   sensemaking   concept   in   particular,   and   more   generally   on   established   explanations   of   human  
behaviour,  e.g.  the  extensive  literature  explaining  why  most  people  find  it  very  hard  to  process  and  
share   information   under   conditions   of   stress   and   deep   uncertainty   (Reason   1990,   Kahneman   2011;  
Coates  2012)  in  Boin,  Kuipers  and  Overdijk  2013,  82).          

Sensemaking   is   defined   as:   ”the   ongoing   retrospective   development   of   plausible   images   that  
rationalize  what  people  are  doing”  (Weick  2008:1403),  and  is  especially  visible  in  handsoff  situations,  
i.e.   a   crisis   which   is   characterised   by   low   probability/high   consequence   (Weick   1988:305).   The  
sensemaking  approach  view  organisations  as  ”loosely  coupled  systems”  (Weick  1976:1).  In  order  to  
understand   how   organizations   function   we   need   to   shift   focus   from   organisational   outcome   to   the  
process  of  organizing,  from  decision  making  to  meaning  (Mills  2003:39-­‐40;  Weick  1993:635).  Decision  
making   is   a   dependent   variable   in   sensemaking.   The   argument   is   that   to   ”decide”   presupposes  
previous  consideration  of  a  matter  causing  doubt  (Weick  1988:305).  Thus,  the  sensemaking  approach  
(i.e.   Mills   2003;   Sutcliffe   and   Weick   2005;   Tsoukas   and   Chia   2002;   Weick   1995)   offers   a   theoretical  
framework  for  explaining  (a)  individual  differences  in  the  way  events  are  understood,  (b)  how/why  

3  
 
those  differences  are  translated  into  ’sensible  interlocking  behaviours’,  (c)  the  relationship  between  
identity  construction  and  organisational  outcomes  (Mills  2003:35).  

Previous  research  clearly  shows  that  what  emergency  services  and  their  employees  have  done  prior  
to   major   crises,   e.g.   exercises   and   scenario   thinking   (organizational   level)   and   former   experience   and  
professional  background  (individual  level),  is  of  great  importance  with  respect  to  how  well  they  will  
succeed  in  their  crisis  management.    

Thus,  in  order  to  explain  the  organizational  and  behavioural  conditions  behind  the  crisis  management  
of  the  emergency  services  on  22/7  we  need  to  describe  not  only  the  formal  and  informal  structure  of  
the  emergency  services  (cf.  organisational  theory),  but  should  look  into  what  the  emergency  services  
had  done  of  exercises  prior  to  22/7.  

Hypothesis    
The  study  is  primary  explorative  in  its  form.  Still,  drawing  on  the  abovementioned  literature,  general  
knowledge  of  the  events  of  22/7  and  prior  research  some  simple  hypothesis  can  be  formulated.  

1. The  difference  in  crisis  management  performance  on  22/7  between  the  emergency  services  
was  because  of  structural  differences  in  the  organisations  formal  structure.  

E.g.  formal  structure  in  the  police  force,  especially  when  in  large  sharp  operations,  are  
characterised  by  rule  and  command,  strong  hierarchy  and  SOPs  (standard  operating  procedures),  
whereas  the  health  care  services  are  more  characterised  by  flat  structure  and  professional  
discretion.  

2. The  difference  in  crisis  management  performance  on  22/7  between  the  emergency  services  
was  because  of  institutional  differences  in  the  organisations.  

E.g.  the  fire  department  have  normally  much  more  exercises  and  drills  than  the  police  department.  
Firefighters  in  Norway  have  appr.  50  percent  of  their  working  hours  for  exercises,  drills,  going  
through  routines  etc  while  an  ordinary  policeman  in  Norway  have  fourty  hours  a  year  for  training  and  
exercises  (NOU  2012).4    

3. The  difference  in  crisis  management  performance  on  22/7  between  the  emergency  services  
was  related  to  the  different  tasks  they  are  assigned  to  do.    
4. The  difference  in  crisis  management  performance  on  22/7  between  the  emergency  services  
was  because  of  qualitative  differences  in  their  technical  infrastructure  

Research  design  
Inspired  by  Snook  (2006)  analysis  of  the  shootdown  of  two  U.S.  helicopters  in  Iraq  1994  I  want  to  give  
an  explanation  across  levels.  Starting  on  the  ground,  at  the  incident  scenes  of  Regjeringskvartalet  and  
Utøya  I  want  to  explain  why  the  incident  commanders  acted  as  they  did,  e.g.  why  did  not  the  incident  
commander  at  Regjeringskvartalet  communicate  at  all  with  the  operation  leader  for  the  first  35  
minutes  of  the  operation?  Despite  the  fact  that  the  written  guidelines  for  the  police  underlines  the  
importance  of  close  cooperation  and  communication  between  the  operation  leader  and  incident  

                                                                                                                         
4
 I  am  not  hundred  percent  sure  on  the  numbers  yet,  but  that  there  is  a  big  difference  is  beyond  doubt.  

4  
 
commander,  especially  in  acute  crises  (p.  113).  Here  the  dependent  variable  is  individual  
action/inaction.                      

Shifting  up  one  level  of  analysis  from  individuals  to  groups,  I  want  to  explain  why  central  groups  
acted  as  they  did,  e.g.  why  the  incident  command  post  (consists  of  incident  commander  (police),  fire  
commander  and  medical  commander)  at  Utøya  were  able  to  relocate  and  take  decisive  actions  on  
their  own  behalf  without  checking  with  their  superiors  first  (Rimstad  et  al.  2014).  Or  why  the  stab  in  
the  Oslo  Police  district  never  formally  overtook  the  role  of  the  operation  leader  making  it  hard  for  
the  operation  leader  to  know  what  her  own  responsibilities  were  in  the  transition  from  one  
organizational  structure  to  the  other  (NOU  2012).  Here  I  will  use  what  we  know  from  prior  research  
on  how  groups  perform  in  emergency  organisations  in  extreme  situations.  Here  the  dependent  
variable  is  group  action/inaction.  Shifting  up  one  level  of  analysis  I  will  explain  more  general  qualities  
and  flaws  of  the  crisis  management  of  the  emergency  services,  e.g.  why  the  Oslo  police  district  were  
reluctant  to  call  for  extra  resources  and  why  the  police  seemed  unprepared  for  the  task  they  were  
given  whereas  this  was  not  the  case  for  the  health  care.  Here  concepts  and  general  knowledge  from  
organizational  theory  and  organizational  research  will  be  central.  

In  the  foregoing  I  have  been  talking  about  the  emergency  services  and  giving  explanations  across  
levels,  on  an  individual,  group  and  organizational  level.  The  numbers  of  individuals  and  groups  
involved  in  the  crisis  management  of  the  emergency  services  on  22/7  are  numerous.  It  is  not  possible  
to  cover  all  these  actors  and  elements  in  a  fruitful  way  within  the  scope  of  a  PhD  project.  Thus,  I  have  
to  narrow  the  scope  of  my  analysis.  

In  the  table  below  I  have  listed  what  actors  at  the  organizational,  group  and  individual  level  I  plan  to  
include  in  my  analysis.  The  selection  of  actors  is  aiming  to  fulfill  the  following  two  criterias:  i)  
relevance,  actors  that  had  a  crucial  role  should  be  included,  ii)  feasibility,  several  data  sources  on  the  
crisis  management  of  this  actor  are  available.  Regarding  the  organizational  level  I  think  an  account  
differentiating  between  police,  health  care  and  fire  department  would  be  to  simplistic,  e.g.  there  is  
huge  differences  between  Oslo  and  Nedre  Buskerud  Police  District  when  it  comes  to  resources,  
competence  and  experience.  Furthermore,  they  both  had  to  act  on  their  own  in  the  first  phase  of  the  
action  at  respectively  Regjeringskvartalet  and  Utøya.  It  should  also  be  mentioned  that  the  main  focus  
is  on  the  police  and  the  health  care.  The  Fire  Department  is  included  mainly  because  it  is  one  of  the  
three  emergency  services  that  has  a  defined  role  at  any  incident  scene  in  Norway.  They  did  not  play  a  
dominant  role  on  22/7,  but  they  were  one  of  the  three  main  actors  at  the  incident  scenes  and  should  
therefore  be  included  in  the  analysis.    

  Police   Health  care   Fire  dept  

 
Organization   Oslo  Police  District  (OPD)   Vestre  Viken  Hospital  Trust   Oslo  Fire  department  
  Nedre  Buskerud  Police  District  (NBPD)   Oslo  University  Hospital   Hole  Municipal  Fire  
the  National  Police  Directorate   Trust   department  
the  National  Health  
Directorate  
 
Group   The  “stab”  in  OPD  and  NBPD,  and  in  the   The  “stab”  in  South-­‐Eastern    

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 National  Police  Directorate   Norway  Regional  Health  
Authority,  Oslo  University  
and  Vestre  Viken  Hospital  
Trust  and  in  the  National  
Health  Directorate  
 
Individual     Leader  of  the  stab  in  OPD  and  NBPD   Operation  leader  at  the   Fire  commander  at  Utøya  
Operation  leader  in  OPD  and  NBPD   AMK-­‐central  in  Oslo  and   and  Regeringskvartalet  
Incident  Commander  at   Drammen    
Regjeringskvartalet,  Utøya  island  and   Medical  commander  and  
main  land   ambulance  commander  at  
Utøya  and  
Regeringskvartalet  
 
Table  1.  Actors  at  the  organizational,  group  and  individual  level  that  are  subject  to  analysis.  

Research  questions  
Note   to   reader:   Hoping   to   clarify   the   goal   of   the   analysis   I   have   decoupled   the   overall   research   question   in  
more   refined   and   specific   questions,   cf.   list   below.   Some   of   the   research   questions   are   descriptive   and   some  
are   explanatory.   The   aim   of   the   descriptive   research   questions   is   to   describe   relevant   aspects   of   the   case,  
whereas   the   explanatory   research   questions   links   the   answers   to   the   descriptive   research   questions   to   the  
overall  research  question.  

Descriptive  
“Prior  to  the  case”-­‐questions  

1. What  was  the  formal  structure  of  the  strategic,  operative  and  tactical  level  in  the  emergency  services,  
hereunder  what  are  their  role  and  tasks  under  normal  circumstances  and  under  extreme  crisis  
situations?  
2. What  was  the  informal  structure  of  the  strategic,  operative  and  tactical  level  in  the  OPD  and  the  
NBPD?  
3. What  was  the  informal  structure  of  the  strategic,  operative  and  tactical  level  at  the  actors  in  health  
care  (those  listed  in  table  1)?  
4. What  characterised  the  technical  infrastructure  of  the  communication  system  and  operation  and  
alarm  centrals  in  the  emergency  services?  

Case-­‐specific  questions  

1. How  (through  what  channels)  was  the  bomb  explosion  reported  to,  and  within,  the  emergency  
agencies,  and  what  was  the  content  of  the  reports?  
2. How  (through  what  channels)  was  the  shootings  at  Utøya  reported  to,  and  within,  the  emergency  
agencies,  and  what  was  the  content  of  the  reports?  
3. What  was  the  formal  background  and  working  experience  of  the  policemen  and  health  care  personnel  
at  the  operative  and  tactical  level  in  Oslo  and  Buskerud  working  on  22/7?  
4. How  did  the  Oslo  Police  (personnel),  health  care  (personnel)  and  Fire  Department  at  the  strategic,  
operative  and  tactical  level  respond  to  the  bomb  explosion?    
a. What  assessments  were  done  regarding:  
i. Detection  (The  scale  and  type  of  attack,  including  number  of  culprits)  
ii.  Mobilizing  more  resources  
iii. securing  own  personnel,  and  critical  objects  (vital  buildings,  technical  infrastructure  
etc)    
b. What  orders  and  instructions  were  given  (primary  focus  will  be  on  coordination  and  
communication)?  

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 5. How  did  the  Oslo  and  Buskerud  Police  (men)  and  health  care  (personnel)  at  the  operative  and  tactical  
level  respond  when  they  started  receiving  reports  of  shooting  at  Utøya?    
a. What  assessments  were  done  (cf.  4a)?  
b. What  orders  and  instructions  were  given  (cf.  4b)?  

Explanatory    
1. How  can  characteristics  of  the  formal  structure  in  the  emergency  services  explain  their  crisis  
management  in  Oslo  and  Utøya  on  22/7?  
2. How  can  existing  informal  structures  in  the  emergency  services  explain  their  crisis  management  in  
Oslo  and  Utøya  on  22/7?  
3. How  can  characteristics  of  the  technical  infrastructure  of  the  communication  system  and  operation  
and  alarm  centrals  explain  explain  their  crisis  management  in  Oslo  and  Utøya  on  22/7?  
4. How  can  differences  in  what  tasks  the  emergency  services  were  assigned  to  explain  their  crisis  
management  in  Oslo  and  Utøya  on  22/7?  

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