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Edited by
Stephen Downes
First published 2014
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Ideas in the aesthetics of music: musicological approaches/edited by
Stephen Downes.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Music – Philosophy and aesthetics. 2. Musicology. I. Downes, Stephen C., 1962– editor.
ML3845.I34 2014
781.1’7 – dc23
2014011012
List of illustrations
Preface
Acknowledgements
1 Introduction
STEPHEN DOWNES
3 Absolute music
THOMAS GREY
4 Program music
JAMES HEPOKOSKI
7 Classicism/neoclassicism
KEITH CHAPIN
8 Romanticism/anti-romanticism
SANNA PEDERSON
10 Narrative
NICHOLAS REYLAND
13 Propaganda
JIM SAMSON
List of contributors
Index of musical works, composers and performers
Index of terms in aesthetics
General index
Illustrations
Musical examples
2.1 Rimsky-Korsakov, Sheherazade, Andantino, mm. 5–19
2.2 Bruckner, Symphony No. 1 (1890–1 version), finale, mm. 361–7
2.3 The Beach Boys, ‘God Only Knows’, figured bass reduction
5.1 Beethoven, Symphony No. 9, Finale, mm. 216–36
5.2 Wagner, Tristan und Isolde, Act 3: Isolde, ‘Tristan! Ah!’
5.3 Poulenc, Pastourelle, close
5.4 Poulenc, Concerto for Organ, Timpani and Strings, opening organ solo
5.5 Poulenc, Sextuor, ‘Divertissement’, opening
5.6 Tchaikovsky, Rococo Variations, mm. 17–21
6.1 Mozart, Piano Sonata, K. 457, first movement, mm. 1–19
6.2 Beethoven, Piano Sonata Op. 31, No. 2, ‘The Tempest’, first movement, mm. 1–24
6.3 Beethoven, Piano Sonata Op. 31, No. 2, first movement, progress of motive ‘y’ in
exposition
6.4 Beethoven, Piano Sonata Op. 31, No. 2, first movement, first-theme recapitulation
6.5 Beethoven, Piano Sonata Op. 31, No. 2, first movement, mm. 121–217, bass progression
6.6 Bruckner, Symphony No. 5, first movement, first and second themes
6.7 Bruckner, Symphony No. 5, first movement, closing group, progression from lyric to
march topics
6.8 Bruckner, Symphony No. 5, Finale, combination of march and chorale in first-theme
recapitulation
6.9 Bruckner, Symphony No. 5, Finale, combination of first- and last-movement main themes
in closing-group recapitulation
6.10 Berg, Piano Sonata Op. 1, mm. 1–11, functional and motivic design
6.11 Berg, Piano Sonata Op. 1, first-theme recapitulation
6.12 Berg, Piano Sonata Op. 1, C minor/B minor duality in first theme and overarching
cadential progression
7.1 Mozart, Die Entführung aus dem Serail, ‘Solche hergelauf’ne Laffen’
7.2 Stravinsky, The Rake’s Progress, ‘Farewell for now’, mm. 1–25
7.3 Rousseau, Le Devin du village, ‘Dans ma cabane obscure’, mm. 1–15
7.4 Beethoven, Fidelio, Act 2, Scene 1, ‘Gott! Welch Dunkel hier’
7.5 Riemann, Allgemeine Musiklehre (Katechismus der Musik), 2nd, revised edn, Leipzig:
Hesse, 1897, 108.
7.6 Mozart, String Quartet K. 590, Allegro moderato, mm. 1–18
7.7 Mozart, Symphony K. 551 ‘Jupiter’, Allegro moderato, mm. 387–92
10.1 Handel, Suite No. 6, Allegro (fugue), mm. 63–6
10.2 Beethoven, Piano Sonata, Op. 57, No. 1, ‘Appassionata’: Allegro assai, opening
10.3 Beethoven, String Quartet in F major, Op. 135, fourth movement: motto
10.4 Beethoven, Piano Sonata in A major, Op. 101, Allegretto ma non troppo, mm. 35–40
10.5a Chopin, Prelude, Op. 28, No. 3, opening
10.5b Chopin, Prelude, Op. 28, No. 3, mm. 20–7
10.6 Mahler, Symphony No. 9, first movement, Andante comodo: Fig. 3, mm. 20–4 (detail)
10.7 Beethoven, Piano Trio No. 5 in D major, Op. 70, ‘Ghost’, opening enigma
12.1a Mahler, Symphony No .9, third movement, mm. 352–5 (trumpets)
12.1b Mahler, Symphony No. 9, third movement, mm. 444–5 (clarinets)
12.2 Mozart, String Quartet in A major, K. 464, Minuet, mm. 55–72
12.3 Schubert, ‘Frühlingstraum’ from Winterreise, mm. 1–26
12.4 Beethoven, Piano Sonata, Op. 106, ‘Hammerklavier’, Scherzo, mm. 153–75
Figures
4.1 Generalized conceptual integration network
6.1 Bruckner, Symphony No. 5, first movement, formal synopsis
6.2 Bruckner, Symphony No. 5, Finale, formal synopsis
Table
3.1 Recurrent conceptual dichotomies in the discourse of ‘absolute music’
Preface
Aesthetics of Music is a collection of musicological essays that arose from two impulses. First, as
an historical musicologist who enthusiastically drew upon the discipline’s recent assimilations
(transformations and deformations) of new critical perspectives on history, politics, literary
theory, phenomenology, psychoanalysis and so on – feeding on the new musicologist’s
methodological smorgasbord – I began to be concerned for the place of aesthetics. Ideas that find
their traditional place within aesthetics (notions of beauty, taste, judgement, value, unity,
meaning and so on) seemed to permeate these diverse approaches to studying music, often in
innovative ways. Aesthetic ideas were clearly being rethought, revalued and revitalized by the
context of new creative and critical developments. But in other parts of recent musicology,
reflecting aspects of wider intellectual fashion, the notion of an ‘aesthetic’ seemed to be
neglected, rejected, even pilloried. In such a climate, on the one hand a sustained pursuit of the
aesthetic could seem suspicious or anachronistic, while on the other hand a ‘return’ to the
aesthetic could be deliberately provocative. It was clear that a renewed focus on how
musicologists think through aesthetic ideas would be timely.
The second impulse came from my experience as a teacher of aesthetics in British university
music departments. As I prepared these courses, and as my students kept reminding me, there
was no immediately obvious first place to go for an up-to-date picture of musicological thinking
about ideas in aesthetics. Philosophers, by contrast, seemed well served, and musicologists
rightly turn to them for specialist insights into musical ontology, meaning and other areas. But
musicological ideas of aesthetics, though of course informed by the gains and claims made by
philosophy, are (or should be) made different, through reflecting the specialist knowledge
required and developed by the discipline. In particular, musicological work in aesthetics can
confidently keep ‘close to the notes’ – however these are manifest or experienced in score,
performance, and/or recording – and close to the ways these materials are creatively produced,
related and received. The aim, however, is not to produce a traditional textbook, nor an
exhaustive compendium or ‘companion’, but a collection which, while surveying important
aspects of the development of ideas in the field and where they now stand, also offers new
critical positions and thereby proposes fresh areas for research in the aesthetics of music.
No collection of essays that seeks to offer space for sustained musicological discussion of
musical manifestations of aesthetics ideas could possibly cover all topics that have legitimate
claims for inclusion. The selection offered here has been chosen to offer perspectives on both
long-established topics and more recent ideas in ways that facilitate discussion of a diversity of
musical styles, including the Western classical concert tradition, popular music from a range of
geographical origins, jazz and music for screen. The ideas focused upon in the essays reflect and
refract core issues of value, judgement, technique (virtuosity) and analysis; reconsider and
problematize important oppositions (absolute music and program music; classicism and
neoclassicism; romanticism and anti-romanticism; avant-garde and tradition; the beautiful and
the sublime); and pursue new angles on constructions of meaning through engagement in debates
on dialectics, irony, music and moving images, narrative and propaganda.
Stephen Downes
Royal Holloway, University of London
October 2013
Acknowledgements
This book was completed during a period of research leave, the first part of which was granted
by the University of Surrey, the second by Royal Holloway, University of London. I am grateful
to both institutions for their support. I am also grateful to my editors at Routledge’s New York
office, Constance Ditzel and Elysse Preposi, for their wise and patient guidance through the
volume’s gestation.
Jake Willson set the musical examples with exemplary skill and care. The cost of reproducing
copyright examples was supported by the School of Arts, University of Surrey and Cardiff
University Music Department.
Francis Poulenc, Sextuor © Copyright 1945 Edition Wilhelm Hansen. All rights reserved.
International copyright secured. Reprinted by permission.
Francis Poulenc, Concerto en sol mineur pour orgue, orchestra à cordes & timbales (édition
1999) © Copyright 1999 – Éditions Salabert – Paris. Tous droits réservés – All rights reserved.
Reproduced by kind permission of MGB Hal Leonard, Italy.
Francis Poulenc, Pastourelle , © Editions Heugel & Cie, reproduced by kind permission of
Editions Heugel & Cie, Paris/United Music Publishers Ltd, England.
Chester Kallmann, Wystan Auden and Igor Stravinsky, The Rake’s Progress © Copyright 1951 by
Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd. Reproduced by permission of Boosey & Hawkes Music
Publishers Ltd.
1
Introduction
Stephen Downes
There is little literature in the history of modern philosophy that is more exasperating than that
devoted to the aesthetics of music. When the standard of philosophical competence is high
enough to be taken seriously, the standard of musical competence is usually (as with Kant and
Hegel) too low for the exercise to be worthwhile. Hardly any writer troubles himself with
examples or analysis, and almost all rest their case in some vast and vague abstraction …
(Scruton 1983, 34)
On the other side of the musical aesthetic discourse it might equally be considered that
musicologists have too often displayed lacunae in their philosophical competence. The result can
be that even when philosophers and musicologists appear to be talking about the same thing,
there is sometimes a despairing sense, to paraphrase Cole Porter, that while ‘You say sonata, I
say sonata’. And so it may be tempting to call off any prospective interdisciplinary relationship.
Yet, the philosopher Andy Hamilton has insisted, surely correctly, that aesthetics must not
simply be a subdiscipline of philosophy: ‘writers in aesthetics should bring to bear as much
critical awareness and practical knowledge of the arts as possible’. A plea one might, of course,
reverse – musicologists who engage with aesthetics should bring as much critical awareness and
knowledge of relevant philosophical insight as possible. Hamilton lays his Kantian and Adornian
cards on the table, particularly lauding the latter’s efforts to ‘unify philosophical aesthetics and
the analysis, criticism and history of art’, something he considers ‘essential though too rarely
attempted’. He also hails Scruton as one of a rare breed of philosopher who can offer such a
difficult ‘cross-fertilization’. Analytical philosophy, more broadly, gets it in the neck for a
‘puzzling philistinism’, the product of its characteristic ahistorical and ‘scientific bias’. For
Hamilton, the aesthetics of music ‘has to be understood through its history’ and as dealing with
something ‘humane in utterance’ (Hamilton, 2007, 2, 7–8). 5
Hamilton’s more positive viewpoint suggests that philosophers and musicologists might, after
all, be able to call the calling off, off. Scruton’s own Aesthetics of Music (1997), a full-length
discussion of musical aesthetics tellingly rich in concrete musical examples and not shy of
employing the terminology of music theory and analysis was clearly his own response to the
bleak scenario he described in 1983. The book quickly proved productively provocative in
musicological circles. Brave and bold, it is a work that wears the author’s musical expertise and
his musical prejudices on its sleeve. In the view of a prominent music theorist and musicologist,
Scruton’s book was especially important for drawing aesthetic inquiry closer to the concerns of
music theory and analysis and thereby demanding critical scrutiny of the languages those
disciplines deploy to describe music and its meaning.
Scruton, of course, remains a prominent figure who continues to write frequently on music
and, in so doing, continues to stimulate vigorous debate. In a recent collection of essays
responding to Scruton’s output on aesthetics (Hamilton and Zangwill 2012), a quarter are
devoted to musical issues. But of the fifteen contributors (including Scruton himself), Michael
Spitzer is the sole musicologist. Given the prominence of music in Scruton’s aesthetics, Spitzer’s
may seem to be a token presence, even if it is a particularly authoritative one (Spitzer has
produced two major musicological monographs steeped in philosophical erudition: Spitzer 2004,
2006). Elsewhere, Spitzer has urged for more balanced dialogue between musicology and
philosophy. In his introduction to a collection of ten essays on significant figures in the German
tradition of the philosophy of music (from Kant to Adorno), two of which are by musicologists,
he lays down a gauntlet for both disciplines. On the one hand, he identifies an ‘inward turn’ in
the ‘new’ musicology of the 1990s, which he characterizes as a ‘self-reflective’ scholarly project,
one which, ‘where it does look out, is highly selective, or apparently unaware of the crucial
philosophical backgrounds to its favoured sources of reinvigoration’. And on the other hand, he
notes the disappointing ‘passing over of musical structure’ in the work of those analytical
philosophers who deal with music, including, for example, Davies, Levinson and Kivy (Spitzer
2010). The recent formation and activity of the RMA and AMS Music and Philosophy Study
Groups 6 has provided a platform for scholars in the fields to engage more fully and publicly in
Spitzer’s desired dialogue. Aesthetics would surely be prominent. And yet the inaugural 2011
conference of the RMA group listed just one session on aesthetics. The 2012 program included
sessions whose titles focused on analysis, hermeneutics, ethics, perception, expression, music
and language; as with Grove Online, it seems that aesthetics is nowhere and yet, one suspects,
that it must be nearly everywhere.
While philosophers have continued to pursue a wide range of issues in aesthetics, the position
of aesthetics within musicology in recent times has seemed much more uncertain. The entry on
‘musicology’ in the Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music (to which this current volume
stands as in part complement and part contrast) states that the ‘bulk’ of recent activity in the
discipline has been engaged in ‘critical interpretation of musical works: what they mean (or
meant); why there were composed; and how they may inform a larger historical, intellectual, or
aesthetic discourse’ (London 2011). Aesthetics here can be read as the third-rated term, as
something of an afterthought. A decade earlier the prospects of aesthetics in musicology might
have seemed even bleaker. In Alastair Williams’s view, musicology throughout the 1990s
reflected the fact that ‘“aesthetics”, with its elitist connotations, is not a widely used term
nowadays in the fields of critical and cultural theory, since it evokes a rarefied branch of
philosophy concerned with the appreciation of art and nature’ (Williams 2001, 10). Such a view
seems to confirm that by the end of the twentieth century aesthetics had apparently become
irrelevant to the new, culturally informed and cutting-edge critical interests of musicologists. Not
so long before, however, a tranche of major musicological publications had offered authoritative
histories, digests and anthologies of musical aesthetics. The English translation of Carl
Dahlhaus’s condensed, concentrated Esthetics of Music (1982) was widely read in the 1980s (part
of the rich series of translations of Dahlhaus’s work appearing during that decade). Dahlhaus co-
edited with Ruth Katz a vast, multivolume collection of source readings (Dahlhaus and Katz
1986–93). A collection edited by Peter le Huray and James Day was warmly received as
providing a long-needed musicological resource (le Huray and Day 1981), as was a
contemporaneous and comparably authoritative collection by Edward Lippman (1986–90).
Lippman also provided a magisterial, one-stop History of Western Musical Aesthetics (1992) a
publication closely contemporaneous with the English translation of Enrico Fubini’s own
historical survey (Fubini 1991, whose publication history in its original Italian goes back to the
1960s). Less than ten years later, were these books really in danger of gathering dust in the
musicology remainder bin?
Musicological rumours of the death of aesthetics were, however, greatly exaggerated.
Introducing the provocatively titled Resisting the Aesthetic (1998), a collection of musicological
essays from the 1990s, Adam Krims called for a redefinition and interrogation, rather than
indulgence in a ‘fantasy of escaping the aesthetic’. He argued that a rethinking of aesthetics
needed to play a part of the development of a new musical poetics. In response to the ‘crisis of
close reading’ which arose from the rush to discredit musical analysis as an activity that
uncritically sustained outworn notions of aesthetic formalism and autonomy, Krims urged for the
development of self-reflective modes of approach in which aesthetic questions gained a new
place within critical practice. Crucially, for Krims, the disciplinary split between music theory
and musicology, a ‘disciplinary reinscription of the text/context dichotomy’, needed to be
overcome in order to develop a ‘postmodern’ music scholarship which resists the old ideology of
aesthetic autonomy (Krims 1998, 2–11). 7 (This disciplinary split has always been less operative
in British universities, where they characteristically co-exist within music departments, but
Krim’s arguments retained urgent currency across the oceanic divide.)
In a surreptitious footnote Krims reflects that a familiar aesthetic binary may be at play in
musicology’s disciplinary agony: ‘the fact that beauty, not the sublime, has constituted [music
theory’s] principal means of validation helps to explain its resistance to some postmodern
theories’. This binary returns later more prominently in Krims’s main text where he describes the
‘sublime presence of “the social” returning to haunt the formerly sanitized world of musical
structure’ (Krims 1998, 13, n. 1). Krims is overtly influenced here by Joel Galand’s 1995 essay,
‘The Turn from the Aesthetic’, itself a response to the famous debate in the early 1990s between
Gary Tomlinson and Lawrence Kramer on what should characterize a ‘postmodern’ musicology
(Kramer 1992, 1993; Tomlinson 1993a, 1993b). Galand turns to Peter Brooks’s cautionary
words regarding the impulse to ‘go straight for the interpretive jugular’, and the need to regard
the importance of a notion of aesthetics embracing form, structure and genre (Brooks 1994). In
particular, Galand urges that the ‘postmodernist distrust of the aesthetic needs to be tempered by
a recovery of what was originally at stake in the positing of such an autonomous sphere’. He
argues that the
distinction between ‘aesthetic autonomy’ on the one hand, and ‘worldliness and contextual
continuity’ on the other, is forced because notions of aesthetic autonomy were from the very
first interwoven with problems both ethical (the mediation of individual and society) and
epistemological (the mediation of precept and concept).
(Galand 1995)
Galand places special emphasis on the category of the sublime (and this is what Krims alighted
upon), as an opening up to unanticipated potentiality, as an emancipation. This aspect of the
aesthetic Galand traces right back to Alexander Baumgarten’s insistence in his seminal
Aesthetica (1750) on aesthetic confusion and the resulting separation of art from a singular
notion of truth or knowledge. The aesthetic emerges from contemplation and contingency; it
need lead neither to mystification nor to the transcendent. Galand urges that we have to ‘dare’ to
‘become sublime’ (Galand 1995, 80–5). Hail the bravery of the newly befuddled aesthete !
Galand points out the contrast between the aesthetic implications of romantic irony
(contingency, ambiguity and incompleteness) and the later romantic’s despair at the prospect of
‘the impossibility of attaining absolute knowledge, of reconciling our finite sensibility with the
infinite’, the ‘sentimental’ romantic’s consequent indulgence in a fantasy of absolute music
based on claims of art’s organic and transcendental properties (see Nelson 1998). From this late
romantic position, Galand notes, ‘it is easy to envisage how the aesthetic might become
ideologized’ (Galand 1995, 86, 90). If recovered, however, the critical edge of aesthetic’s
original context can act as a potential check on the tendency, too often found in the counters to
this aesthetic ideology, to reduce the richness of the human subject to a much less interesting,
one-dimensional political animal. If achieved, the aesthetic might then not merely survive the
debunking of the ideology of ‘absolute music’ (see Chua 1999) (and its prized assets of
autonomy and unity), but emerge invested with a revitalized relevance.
Terry Eagleton’s The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990) gave substantial impetus and focus to the
critical interrogation of the transcendent claims historically made for aesthetics. Its impact in
cultural studies was immense. After Eagleton, aesthetics was seen by some working in this field
(and in many other disciplines, such was the reach of Eagleton’s book) as the forbidden fruit. But
Michael Bérubé castigated those who, in recklessly polemical mode, proclaimed the purported
‘Return to Beauty’ in the 1990s for indulging in empty, provocative posing, for dismissing (or
forgetting) in dubious acts of disciplinary politics decades of work in cultural studies in which
the aesthetic remained a central concern (Bérubé 2004). Bérubé takes this critical moment as an
opportunity to ‘revivify’ persistent but important questions and in particular to revisit a famous
paragraph from Raymond Williams:
If we are asked to believe that all literature is ‘ideology’, in the crude sense that its dominant
intention (and then our only response) is the communication or imposition of ‘social’ or
‘political’ meanings and values, we can only, in the end, turn away. If we are asked to believe
that all literature is ‘aesthetic’, in the crude sense that its dominant intention (and then our only
response) is the beauty of language or form, we may stay a little longer but will still in the end
turn away.
(Williams 1977, 155)
Bérubé insists that the aesthetic is not something that exists in a realm discreet from the social
or historical: aesthetic functions become manifest under certain (social, historical) conditions. He
also points up the potentially critical and dissenting edge to aesthetics by emphasizing that
historically aesthetics developed in romantic opposition to the instrumentality and rationalization
of the dominant social system. He argues:
Where aesthetics went wrong theoretically was in its attempt to discover either the specific
properties of an object or (following Kant) the conditions of possibility for certain modes of
apprehension that would allow for a distinct realm of beauty.
(Bérubé 2004, 11–12)
In the early years of the twenty-first century several disciplines produced important texts that
offered revaluations of the aesthetic displaying the kind of critical sophistication and historical
awareness that Bérubé insisted upon. In literary studies, Isobel Armstrong proposed an
‘alternative aesthetic discourse’ in response to the anti-aesthetic voices, as counter to the way in
which the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ has left the aesthetic impoverished. Aesthetics, for
Armstrong, must not be a threadbare version of nineteenth-century German Idealism; recent
aesthetic debate, she argues, has been too often based on ‘derivative, oversimplified Kantianism’
on an unchanging, historically uninflected notion of the aesthetic. In particular she notes a
preoccupation with the sublime and widespread silence on the ‘politics and poetics’ of beauty,
driven by the conviction that the beautiful is the province of reactionary anachronism
(Armstrong 2000, 1–5). 8 Critical theorists John J. Joughin and Simon Malpas, introducing a
collection on the ‘new aestheticism’, noted how ‘the rise of critical theory in disciplines across
the humanities during the 1980s and 1990s’ had ‘all but swept aesthetics from the map’ (Joughin
and Malpas 2003). Critical disdain for the image of the solitary, unworldly aesthete and
debunking of proclamations of ‘Universality’ had done their work of aesthetic cleansing. In
response, Joughin and Malpas were concerned to revalue the ‘singularity’ of the aesthetic which
is too often ‘effaced’ through thick explications in terms of politics, culture, ideology, and so on.
In pursuing this line, they argued, criticism is ‘in continual danger of throwing out the aesthetic
baby with the humanist bathwater’. The requirement, therefore, is to ‘avoid the pitfalls and
reductive unities of an old-style aestheticism’ and also reconsider the philosophical relationship
of contemporary critical theory to aesthetics. In a fashion comparable with Armstrong, they
urged that the characterization of the aesthetic as a ‘static’ or ‘essentialist’ category needed to be
overthrown, and especially perhaps the prevailing over-simplified or one-sided notion of
aesthetic autonomy. Joughin and Malpas are keen to emphasize that this does entail dismissing
the relevance and significance of the recent critique of aesthetics. Rather, they seek a dialectical
conception of autonomy. If specificities and particularities of the art work and experience are
taken into account, then a historically, politically and critically informed approach need not be an
‘anti-aesthetic’ one (Joughin and Malpas 2003, 1–21).
Meanwhile, several prominent musicologists sought to untangle and reassess that web of
contested terms – autonomy, analysis and unity. David Clarke called for a more ‘dynamic,
frictional view of musical autonomy’, and noted the ‘slippage’ between autonomy and
overlapping terms, one of which is the aesthetic. Clarke argued that such terms should be neither
fetishized nor interred but rather, through examining their historical and political ‘situatedness’,
be made more malleable (Clarke 2003, 159–69). 9 Giles Hooper joined Joughin and Malpas in
the aesthete’s bathroom in declaring that ‘we need not suppose that we must throw the analytical
baby out with the pseudo-objectivist bath-water’. For Hooper, the
challenge facing contemporary musicological study … has less to do with the vicissitudes of
postmodern theory and the denigration of an outmoded ‘modernism’ – an attitude which only
serves to obscure and distract from more productive and pertinent matters – than with the
mediation between two apparently antithetical conceptions: music as an autonomous
manifestation of abstract structural relations, and music as a thoroughly and multiply mediated
concrete or symbolic phenomenon.
(Hooper 2004, 311–29; see also Hooper 2006)
Contemporaneously, Kevin Korsyn argued that, in the face of the charge that the aesthetic is
ideological because it proposes a false synthesis or unity, the need was to historicize notions of
unity and scrutinize the motives for their invocation. In particular, Korsyn noted that a ‘decisive
shift in attitudes towards unity occurred with the development of aesthetics as an independent
region of philosophy starting in the mid-eighteenth century’. From Bowie’s Aesthetics and
Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche he draws out the significance of the link between the birth
of modern aesthetics and the development of modern notions of subjectivity. For Korsyn, the
‘cryptosubjectivity’ of aesthetic discourse ‘is one reason why a reconsideration of the notion of
artistic autonomy in our time, through concepts such as that of intertextuality, has gone hand-in-
hand with critiques of the “Cartesian” subject’. Korsyn’s proposal is that in order to scrutinize
this relationship between aesthetics and subjectivity musicologists move beyond formalism by
opening the process of analysis to historical and contextual considerations. This would seem to
require a large degree of interdisciplinary work, but ultimately he is doubtful ‘whether a
synthesis or fusion of disciplines can fully achieve this goal, because the notion of synthesis may
itself be a formalist ideal’ (Korsyn 2004, 337–51; see also Korsyn 1993 and 2003).
In 2006 the bath-time aesthetics discussion group was joined by Richard Taruskin, who
identified the jeopardized ‘baby’ in question as ‘the shared view that art is valuable “for its own
sake”, worth our time even if it doesn’t give us new or useful knowledge’. Bemoaning a lack of
critical interrogation of aesthetic autonomy in musicology, he noted the ‘regrettable
metamorphoses’ of ‘that which sustained art in the nineteenth century to that which merely
stained artistic thought and practices in the twentieth’ (especially manifest in a marginalizing
avant-garde, moribund, anachronistic performance practices, and abstract, sterile, formalist
analytical musicological methods). Taruskin attacked the ‘stale binarism’ that lies behind the
separation of historical and aesthetic artistic significance in Dahlhaus’s Foundations of Music
History , a high profile example of the ‘great bane’ of the rigid ‘either/or’ which he identifies as a
legacy of Cold War cultural politics. Taruskin urges that we must now instead attempt a ‘truly
dialectical’ interaction, one incorporating the human agencies and historical contexts that
generate discourses concerning aesthetic autonomy, value and meaning of art. Ultimately,
however, Taruskin is ‘hostile to the idea of aesthetic autonomy’, which he views as ‘debased
beyond hope of redemption’ (Taruskin 2006; Dahlhaus 1983).
Some of this early twenty-first-century debate was revisiting ground tilled several years before
by the pioneering collection of essays on Music and Society edited by Richard Leppert and Susan
McClary, whose keynote statement was an essay on ‘The Ideology of Autonomous Art’ by the
sociologist Janet Wolff (1987). Contemporaneously, the relevance of aesthetic autonomy was
hotly debated in studies of pop and rock music, where it was always at least problematic. 10 Also
in 1987, Peter Wicke’s study of rock music, while rejecting the claims of artistic autonomy,
challenged the assumed blasphemy of talking aesthetics when Chuck Berry had well and truly
rolled Beethoven over. For Wicke, though rock songs are not artistic objects designed for
disinterested contemplation, and their content is not merely found in forms or some ‘hidden
“content”’ that demands deciphering, the ‘theoretical apparatus of aesthetics … helps to decipher
[rock’s] noisy sounds’. Rock is a ‘symptom’ of a social and cultural context but this should not
mean that addressing ‘the music’ is neglected or deemed needless. In Wicke’s study aesthetics
survives in necessary new guise. Rather than a ‘bourgeois’ aesthetics of art, which turns an
ideological blind eye to artistic technique, the mundane modes of musical production, Wicke
proposed an aesthetics of rock that turns its focus to the new technologies and is capable of
moving between the profane and quotidian, the niche and commercial, the provocative and
pleasurable. Two strands emerge as especially significant: an ‘aesthetic of sensuousness’ in
which the simple, banal and trivial, rather than viewed as aesthetic failure, play vital roles, and
an aesthetic of constructed synthesis, in which fragments snatched from the ‘whirlpool of mass
culture’ are formed into a various ‘commercial conglomerations’ (Wicke [1987] 1990, ix, xi, 24,
26) .
Wicke’s book was a sophisticated piece of aesthetic work. But where, asked Richard
Middleton in a sympathetic review, is ‘the text’ (Middleton 1991)? Any potential neglect of ‘the
music’ was declared as vehemently avoided in Theodore Gracyk’s 1996 attempt to ‘map’ the
aesthetics of recorded rock music. Gracyk aimed to ‘challenge the hegemonic impulses of high
culture’, invoking Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion of the complications in the relationship of
aesthetic judgements to the particularities of cultural period (thereby avoiding the ahistorical
dangers of transcendental aesthetics). By contrast with a bourgeois notion of ‘fine art’, Gracyk
sought an aesthetic that can make meaningful insights into music which is commercial and
technological but which also in certain practices embraces notions of autonomy. To develop this
he argues that due regard is required of the social aspects lying in the aesthetic, that his
predecessors have lapsed too readily into transcendentalism. He offers a defence of Kant against
the devotees of formalist autonomy. A sliding scale of autonomy is proposed, an ‘elasticity’ in
the concept (Gracyk 1996, i, xiii, 213–18). However, Gracyk’s rock aesthetics still left Donald C.
Meyer yearning for scholarly demonstrations of the ‘beauty and meaning’ of individual songs,
for a combination of ‘local’ and the ‘global’ perspectives (by which he meant text and context)
(Meyer 1998). A rebalancing along these lines was something attempted by Allan F. Moore in
his Rock: The Primary Text ([1993] 2001). Moore identified his ‘primary question’ to be an
‘aesthetic’ one, and the ‘primary text’ to be the musical sound itself. By contrast, for example,
with Simon Frith’s self-declared technical ignorance, Moore’s approach is underpinned by
detailed analysis of musical styles, which are considered to be ‘partially autonomous’. 11
The work of Rose Rosengard Subotnik has been especially important in new musicological
thinking about a range of important aesthetic questions. Subotnik’s essays began appearing in the
late 1970s, when they were often met with consternation: their acceptance into the musicological
‘canon’ was confirmed when they were collected and published in two volumes (1991, 1995).
Some have taken her work as cue to developing a musical aesthetics in which ideas of autonomy
are renegotiated rather than, as Taruskin would much prefer, allowed to drain irrecoverably down
the plughole. Andrew Dell’Antonio’s 2004 collection, Beyond Structural Listening? , takes its
spur from Subotnik’s questioning of the universality of the ‘structural listening’ model –
identified by Subotnik as the ‘leading aesthetic paradigm’ and ‘yardstick of aesthetic (and moral)
value’ in twentieth-century German and Anglo-American musicology. In response, Dell’Antonio
brings the discussion of aesthetics into the context of postmodern models of knowledge which,
after Lyotard, offer a counter to the modernist aim of revealing the deeply embedded truth-
content of art. This alternative model is one of negotiation, of recognizing the ‘impossibility of
stable truth’ of pursuing the immanent meaning of structures other than those of supposed
organic unity, the incomplete and partially integrated which allow spaces for the unknowable.
Thus ‘new parameters’ beyond the teleological or totalizing are suggested for the aesthetic
valuation of music. Dell’Antonio sees this as an expansion of possibilities operating in an
implicit ‘politics of listening’. Precursors are identified in Schumann’s musical criticism and the
sublime aesthetics of early nineteenth-century Romanticism (as noted by Galand, this is the
notion of aesthetics widely explored before the fantasy of absolute music took hold among the
later Romantics) (Dell’Antonio 2004, 1–11). In his contribution to the collection, Martin
Scherzinger highlights how the ‘radical particularity of musical experience’ can resist the
totalizing impulse and, more widely, how ‘the emancipatory figuration of the aesthetic’ can be
provide an opportunity ‘for imaginative political intervention in the world’. Scherzinger is
concerned with the question of how reflecting on the aesthetic (that is, an interpretative process
that doesn’t read ‘right through the musical text as if it was a mere representation of the social’)
might generate social and political insights: he is proposing a new relationship between the work
and the world, one based upon a dialectical antitheses between a ‘productive autonomy’ and an
‘effective resistance’ to that autonomy (Scherzinger 2004a, 253).
In a closely related essay, Scherzinger similarly wrote of the ‘complex and dialectical’
relationship of art and world, of how within that relationship the notion of aesthetic autonomy
has a ‘socially critical and provocative side’, one that can ‘defy’ ideological constraints on
meaning. In modernism, with its characteristic discontent with the world, Scherzinger sees this
dialectic being placed under heightened tension. He asks, then, how a new productive
relationship between aesthetics and politics might be developed in ‘postmodern’ times. A trawl
through the selected writings of Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht and Ernst Bloch leads
him to identify art’s authentic truth content as emerging through a dialectical relationship
between aesthetic norms and conditions handed down through history and the particularity of
subjective expression which negates or disintegrates these aesthetic materials and thus resists
false unities. However, as this relationship is truly dialectical, this process serves to sustain
aesthetic illusion. Scherzinger insists on the ‘vagueness’ and ‘variability’ of aesthetic autonomy,
so that its meanings can only be revealed through analysis of particular artistic examples
(Scherzinger 2004b). For Scherzinger, an opening up of discussion on the issues of aesthetic
autonomy, value and particularity, still widely considered taboo, is most urgently needed in the
early twenty-first century. This is because he sees the prospect of the emancipatory uncertainties
emerging from a relationship of the political and aesthetic as offering a desperately required
counter to the ‘closing’ of the American mind, the collapse of open, rational critique under the
political and institutional powers held by the adherents to the new dogma, a force that has also
been all too apparent in America’s strongest political ally, the UK. As Scherzinger noted,
Korsyn’s (dissensual) musicological community would ideally be one populated by ‘ironic
scholars’ who openly acknowledge, indeed delight in, the limitations and provisional status of
their claims to knowledge (Scherzinger 2006). Gone would be the days when, hand on the Urtext
score, a musicologist might make statements claiming to contain nothing but the whole truth.
These declarations came, of course, at a time made fraught by a viciously divisive political
atmosphere in both the US and UK, in which conflicting and contentious claims of ownership of
the ‘known’ and the ‘truth’ became notorious. Satirists had a field day. In the first transmitted
episode of The Colbert Report (Comedy Central, USA, 17 October 2005) Stephen Colbert said to
camera:
I will speak to you in plain, simple English. And that brings us to tonight’s word: ‘truthiness’.
Now I’m sure some of the ‘word police’, the ‘wordinistas’ over at Webster’s, are gonna say,
‘Hey, that’s not a word!’ Well, anyone who knows me knows I’m no fan of dictionaries or
reference books. They’re elitist – constantly telling us what is or isn’t true … I don’t trust
books. They’re all fact, no heart. And that’s exactly what’s pulling our country apart today.
’Cause face it, folks: we are a divided nation … between those who think with their head, and
those who know with their heart.
(Quoted in Erion 2007, 14, n. 5)
Even more humorously apposite is Colbert’s audacious address at the 2006 White House
Correspondents’ Association Dinner, in which he compared himself with President George W.
Bush, who was sitting just a few feet away :
We’re not so different, he and I. We both get it. Guys like us, we’re not some brainiacs on the
nerd patrol. We’re not members of the Factinista. We go straight from the gut; right sir? That’s
where truth lies, right down here in the gut.
Do you know you have more nerve endings in your gut than you have in your head? You
can look it up. Now I know some of you are going to say, ‘I did look it up, and that’s not true.’
That’s because you looked it up in a book. Next time, look it up in your gut. I did. My gut tells
me that’s how our nervous system works.
(Quoted in Griffioen 2007, 227) 12
In the Scherzinger–Korsyn vein, much musicological work in recent years has pursued a
sceptical interrogation aimed at revealing the ‘truthiness’ of claims to know what is true (more
widely, see Wolff 2008). However, the doubleness of Colbert’s devastating caricature is actually
especially revealing. Music can hit us in the gut as well as get inside our head; it possesses the
potential to have impact on both our physique and our psyche. Both can ‘get it’ but, partially
because of that double hit, the ‘it’ of the music is far from a stable ‘truth’.
Georgina Born’s work on cultural and aesthetic experience is pertinent here. She explores the
musical experience as one of both presence and meaning, one that can move between the somatic
and semantic where body and mind are interacting, potentially mutually intensifying, interfering,
or momentarily erasing. In such a model no prior assumption is made on which of these binary
terms is primary and each is always mediated by social and environmental contexts (musical
practices, institutions, technologies, ‘imagined communities’, manifold cultural, political and
economic processes). Both the social and the musical must therefore be considered multiple. To
illuminate these experiences Born proposes a new type of interdisciplinarity, a ‘relational
musicology’ (Born 2012; see also Born 2010a and in embryonic form, Born 1991). This aims to
reveal how aesthetic ideas are generated within modes of listening (and here we might recall
Subotnik), understood widely as ‘experiences’ which, depending on context, embrace the
contemplative, the corporeal and the collective (Born 2010b). 13 It is hard not to think of Prince’s
2004 funk hit ‘Musicology’ and in particular the line ‘’Cause we got a PhD in Advanced Body
Movin’, which encapsulates the potent co-existence of the immediate pleasures of physical
intoxication and a sophisticated knowledge-base that allows the listener, or dancer, to grasp the
song’s complex, allusive content, with its nostalgic and canonizing functions (especially
valorizing James Brown), which are visually reinforced by the imagery of the song’s video. 14
The somaesthetic, to use Richard Shusterman’s term (Shusterman 2012), of the bodily
experience, and the aesthetic pleasure of semantic recognition are brought together in a shifting,
grooving relationship. The urge to understand the wide range of musical experiences that
generate seemingly infinite variants of this kind of multiple aesthetics is what drives the recent
development of relational, cultural and critical versions of the activity formerly known simply as
musicology.
Prince’s declaration of doctoral distinction in dance practices in one sense raises him and his
funk band as highly trained specialists, musicians who have worked long and hard to reach an
‘advanced’ level of technique. Indeed, Prince is readily figured as a virtuoso artist making songs
and performances of high technical and aesthetic complexity (see Hawkins and Niblock 2011).
One is reminded of Susan McClary’s classic 1989 dissection of the political, institutional and
social contexts for the valorization and self-validation of composers of ‘difficult’ music (headline
figures in McClary’s discussion are Roger Sessions, Arnold Schoenberg, Milton Babbitt, Pierre
Boulez) whose work gains prestige as ‘high’ art in inverse relationship to its low levels of
comprehensibility and epitomizes an avant-garde stance of extreme autonomy (and also,
McClary argues, of endemic misogyny). By way of provocative contrast, McClary raises the
funk classic ‘System of Survival’ (1987) by Earth, Wind and Fire (who are name-checked by
Prince on the faculty of his musicology groove academy) as an example of a complex idiom
demanding musical (and technological) expertise and imagination yet also one with wide popular
appeal. Vital and exuberant, this is music replete with ‘infectious rhythms’, but McClary’s
hearing avoids the perils of primitivism, for this is a musical expression that ‘I’ will survive in
the face of institutional and political marginalization, a song that also manifests ‘an intelligence
that accepts experiences of the body … as integral parts of human knowledge that accrue value
precisely as they are shared and confirmed publicly’. This is ‘smart’ music, one that, along with
offering physical invigoration, invokes complex ‘forms of sedimented cultural memory’
(McClary 1989). 15 The funk aesthetic, as outlined by Shusterman (1992, 169–202), is one
example for David Hesmondhalgh of music’s ability to ‘promote human flourishing’ and its
emancipatory potential. In the face of the ‘suspicion’ in cultural studies of categories, including
the aesthetic, Hesmondhalgh mounts a defence of the experiences of music that can invigorate
and vitalize, can move and shake, or bump and grind, without neglecting or denigrating the
significance of meanings created by imaginative contemplation and emotional reaction
(Hesmondhalgh 2012). 16 To recall Colbert’s comical anatomy, the aim is to consider how the
experience of different types of music moves between the instinctiveness of ‘gut’ reactions, the
reflectiveness of the ‘head’ and the expressiveness of the ‘heart’.
In his Music and the Politics of Negation James Currie argues that though musicology may
seem to have woken up from the ‘nightmare’ of modernist dogma of aesthetic autonomy the
apparently enlightened ‘postmodern’ musicology that emerged might equally be identified as
ideological because of its wide exclusion of something to do with the ‘Music’ itself. For music to
hold its due position in musicological scrutiny, Currie argues, we should allow it to move
between enchantment (to suggest, or conjure aesthetic illusions of, something more beautiful
than the real) and disenchantment (to suggest a contextual sublime, of how music can intimate
and undermine, affirm and negate, its own autonomy through aspects of its musicality, including
formal process of integration, disintegration, unity and contrast, topic and allusion, surface and
depth, resolution and dissonance). We might then move between ‘enjoyment’ (the sublime
experience of jouissance ) and the ‘pleasures’ of the beautiful, and above all begin to embrace the
singular riskiness of autonomy (Currie 2013, ix and passim ). 17 As Lawrence Kramer has
recently put it,
the ‘cultural turn’ that reached musicology some two decades ago is now mature – mature
enough to confront its own conflicted relationship to the aesthetic. It was for a time necessary
to subordinate aesthetic appreciation to cultural critique so that the latter could find its voice.
But the aesthetic is insubordinate by nature.
Kramer argues that ‘aesthetic play trumps ideological form, including the form of the ideology
of the aesthetic’, that ‘we need to return to an arena that some of us have never left: the musical
work … to consult the work, not to idolize it’, and thereby allow aesthetic pleasure to fulfil its
potential as generator of an ‘immanent critique’ (Kramer 2008, 4–5). A volume that brings
together essays that consider a range of musicological approaches to topics in aesthetics is,
therefore, especially timely .
On what follows
As we have seen, the aesthetic, though contested and occasionally (it seems) detested, is
everywhere. Selecting from the vast array of ideas in musical aesthetics was therefore a tough
editorial task. The aim was to gather essays focusing on ideas that would include some long
considered central to the aesthetics of music (absolute music, the avant-garde, program music),
some important binary oppositions (beautiful and sublime, classicism and neoclassicism,
romanticism and anti-romanticism), some that have become hot musicological topics in recent
years (irony, metaphor, narrative, virtuosity), and some which may have seemed outdated,
neglected or until now scattered around an assortment of writings (dialectics, judgement and
value, propaganda). By contrast with a compendium of short entries, contributors were
commissioned to write essays of a length that allows detailed discussion of musical examples as
well as rich consideration of context. 18 Inevitably, this restricted the number of essays. No doubt
many readers will consider other or alternative topics to have strong claims to inclusion.
However, some that may seem to be notable absentees are well represented in the recent
literature, 19 and checking out the indices of this volume should demonstrate that the selected
topics facilitate the embracing of ideas related not only these issues but also, for example, to
genre, gender, nation, performance, and so on. The selected range also allows the discussion of
music from a wide variety of styles, tastes, traditions, functions, historical period, and
socioeconomic and geographical origins. The authors were chosen to offer a balance between
long-established figures of musicological authority and those whose careers are ascending
towards such status, as well as a balance between North American and British musicologists. It
remains a source of regret to me that there is only one female author among them, but sometimes
the availability and willingness of collaborators imposes such representation. I am, of course,
enormously grateful to those who in writing the essays that follow have contributed to the
making of this volume.
James Garratt’s chapter on values and judgements provides an introduction to one of the most
complex and controversial subjects in music aesthetics: value, in particular the issues and
problems surrounding the evaluation of musical works. It explores the challenges posed by the
collapse of traditional value systems – including the loss of a ‘gold standard of aesthetic
judgment’ (Baudrillard) – and discusses whether in the wake of this, it is still possible to make
principled judgements today. The opening section probes some key issues and problems, such as
the relationship between aesthetic value and art’s other values, and the nature of the principles
and criteria that might be used to justify a particular value judgement. In doing so, it introduces
ideas from key figures within Western aesthetics, such as Kant, and also the views of opponents
such as Bourdieu. It tackles head-on the charges of elitism and conceptual imperialism that have
been levelled at traditional conceptions of aesthetic value, acknowledging that all value systems
serve the ends of specific communities and rely on hierarchical, exclusionary strategies. It also
probes the limitations of evaluative criteria, stressing the impossibility of Dahlhaus’s notion of
‘proving’ a value judgement.
The chapter fleshes out these perspectives and relates them to practice by exploring two key
phases of value formation within Western music: the consolidation of the idea of classical music
within Austro-German culture in the age of Beethoven, and the defining phase of American rock
music and discourse in the mid to late 1960s. It draws on a wide range of contemporary texts in
order to shed light on how the new values emerged, how they were conceptualized by
contemporaries and how they conflicted with more established value systems. As well as
exploring the differences between the values of these two cultures, it also highlights the parallels
between the aesthetic ideas of rock’s champions in Crawdaddy and Rolling Stone and those of their
counterparts in the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung 150 years earlier; as well as placing a
premium on the idea of the artist, originality, authentic expression and the creation of fixed
musical objects, both discourses placed themselves in opposition to a mainstream perceived as
formulaic and commercially driven. This leads to a discussion of the precise relationship
between cultures and values, and the idea that the concept of culture has become too
cumbersome to capture the fluid ways in which value systems interact in the present age.
The term ‘absolute music’ as a designation for autonomous instrumental art music emerged in
the nineteenth century, although it became standard terminology only in the twentieth. In his
essay Thomas Grey explores how in modern scholarship the term has become identified with a
Romantic appreciation of the metaphysical value of instrumental art music as an ineffable
‘higher language’, resonating with affective and psychic states but not constrained within any
system of signification. Recognition of instrumental music as a paradigm of formal, non-
representational beauty independent of linguistic concepts predates the Romantic view and
continues up to the present. After reviewing the origins of absolute music as a term and concept,
the chapter then interrogates the boundaries of the concept, proposes a traditional dichotomy of
cultural attitudes, and notes ways in which ‘absolute music’ structures debates in current musical
scholarship.
The aim of James Hepokoski’s chapter on program music is to redirect a conversation now
grown stale into more fruitful, more practical modes of approach. It starts by laying out some
traditional understandings of and controversies surrounding program music (as a presumed
alternative to absolute music or ‘pure music’) and then proceeds to suggest some ways of
moving beyond the standard debates. Within the European art–music tradition the terms
illustrative music and program music refer to instrumental compositions that invite their listeners
to attend to them with the aim of grasping their correspondences with (normally) pre-given
external images, texts, sounds, situations, ideas, or narratives of varying degrees of specificity.
While broader understandings of the term have been advanced to include all illustrative music,
program music is most scrupulously regarded as that subset whose otherwise idiosyncratic
formal structures or musical materials are most readily grasped by mapping the details of the
music on to a governing external narrative or temporal sequence of images. A piece’s backdrop
storyline, that is, plays a vital role in helping one to understand its ongoing musical processes
and intended representational content.
When one peers into the voluminous literature on the history, aesthetics and practice of
illustrative claims within art–music, one is immediately entangled in knotted arguments and
terminological tussles. One of Hepokoski’s central contentions is that the traditional,
philosophically posed question, ‘is pure music (or this or that piece) actually capable of
expressing or representing things outside of itself?’ is unproductive. In part, this is because of the
record of historical evidence: much music of the past has been created and listened to under the
belief that it can. The traditional question’s narrow framing can imply a search for a hardened,
essential nature for ‘music alone’ an abstraction to be thrown on to the examination table and
considered largely apart from issues of the historicity of such questions or the differing affective
and imaginative experiences of those who interact compellingly, and in multiple ways, with
individual works. Some discussions along these lines can strike musicians as disorientingly
unmusical, caught up in a skein of philosophically in-house argumentation, where concerns to
preserve a disciplinarily sterilized wording seem distant from a more imaginatively attuned
musical knowledge and experience. Instead, Hepokoski’s essay suggests ways of cutting through
these issues by appealing to historical understandings and immediate experiences of listening.
Consequently, this essay glances at three of the many issues currently in play in any such new
understanding of program music: (1) titles and other paratexts (citing the views, among others, of
Levinson and Genette); (2) topic families (Ratner, Monelle, Hatten, and others); signs, metaphors
and blended spaces (Lakoff and Johnson, Fauconnier and Turner). These issues are not
conceptually separate but rather intersect as complements, different ways of approaching the
same theoretical problem. The essay concludes by touching on some practical problems of
extramusical implication as confronted within the disciplines of music history and analysis.
Right from what is often considered to be the birth of modern aesthetics in the eighteenth
century the relationship between the beautiful and sublime has held a prominent position. The
various manifestations of these concepts in philosophical discourse and artistic theory and
practice from the seminal texts of the Enlightenment through romanticism, modernism,
postmodernism and many other ‘-isms’ in between have received voluminous attention. In
musicology itself, the categories are hardly neglected, but though the sublime has generated
much prominent work, the beautiful has tended to do so rather more surreptitiously (this reflects
a wider tendency in cultural discourse), with the prominent exception of the sustained debate
over Eduard Hanslick’s Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (first published 1854). Chapter 5 starts on
familiar ground, discussing Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony and Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde as
works which, as many recent commentators have noted, complicate and problematize the two
terms and their relationship; it then turns to some under-explored categories – the comic, the
Gothic, the sentimental and the grotesque – which in different ways twist and turn the beautiful
and sublime to fascinating artistic ends. These aesthetic categories will be illustrated by
examples from the music of Francis Poulenc (passing by way of Tchaikovsky) in order to offer
maximal contrast to Beethoven and Wagner, and also to wrench the debate away from Germany.
Although dialectical modes of thought have, from the early nineteenth century forwards,
exerted a wide-ranging and fundamental influence on music-historical and music-theoretical
scholarship, a broad introduction to this strand of engagement is yet to be written. Consequently,
despite the fact that much current scholarship remains indebted to dialectical models there is as
yet no introduction supplying a concise contextualization of this research or surveying the field
to which it contributes. Julian Horton’s essay seeks to fill this gap, offering a thorough yet
accessible guide to the subject, which combines explication of the basic mechanisms of
dialectical thinking with a survey of landmark texts. The essay pursues five successive
objectives. It begins with an introduction to dialectics as a philosophical strategy, from Hegel’s
idealism and its impact on Karl Marx’s materialism to the negative dialectics of the Frankfurt
School in the twentieth century. It appraises the Hegelian method, especially as formulated in The
Phenomenology of Mind and construed in recent secondary literature, before assessing its
evolution in the so-called left- and right-Hegelian tendencies of nineteenth-century thought, the
persistence of left-Hegelianism in the theoretical Marxism of the interwar years, and ultimately
the negative dialectics of Adorno, which stressed the failure of dialectical synthesis as an arbiter
of social authenticity.
Horton then offers focused surveys of two threads of musical thought: theoretical applications,
as exemplified by A. B. Marx’s Formenlehre and Hugo Riemann’s theory of harmony; music-
historical applications, from Franz Brendel’s Geschichte der Musik in Italien, Deutschland und
Frankreich von den ersten christlichen Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart to Theodor Adorno’s
Philosophie der neuen Musik and after. The theoretical impact of the dialectical model is keenly
felt in A. B. Marx’s Die Lehre von der musikalichen Komposition , in which the evolution of
forms is construed as a result of the dialectic of rest and motion ( Ruhe and Bewegung ) incipient
in musical material and its resulting syntax (embodied respectively in the phrase forms of the Satz
and the Gang ). In Riemann’s functional theory, dialectical thought emerges instead in the
concept of harmonic dualism, which proposes the antithetical relationship of major and minor
systems.
The historical dimension of Hegel’s (1931) thought – its narrative of intellect’s progress
towards self-awareness, or the condition in which ‘mind is object to itself just as it is’ (
Phenomenology of Mind ) – had a fundamental impact on how the action of music history was
conceived. Horton pays special attention here to the notion of historical progress developed by
Brendel, and pursue its subsequent manifestations through the polarization of progressive and
conservative tendencies in late nineteenth-century Austro-German musical discourse and the
concept of historical necessity driving Schoenberg’s musical aesthetics, to the negative-
dialectical opposition of Schoenberg and Stravinsky underpinning Adorno’s Philosophie der
neuen Musik . Taking Adorno’s direct affiliation of Hegel’s dialectic and Beethoven’s concept of
sonata form as a starting point, Horton gives analytical substance to these considerations via a
succinct case study, looking afresh at the first movement of Beethoven’s ‘Tempest’ Sonata Op.
31, No. 2, as an example that has provoked influential dialectical interpretation (seminally in the
work of Carl Dahlhaus) and sustained subsequent commentary. In particular, he evaluates both
how antithesis might manifest itself in purely musical terms (as the embodiment of identity and
difference within musical material), as well as the idea that structural events might act
synthetically upon such an opposition (for example, in Adorno’s claim that dialectical
overcoming is a characteristic of the Beethovenian recapitulation). Horton concludes by
assessing the persistence of dialectical thinking and its prospects, notably in the wake of
postmodern philosophies and their musicological implications, taking the thoughtful analysis of
postmodern musicological trends in relation to Habermas’s work advanced by Michael Spitzer as
a touchstone for debate.
Classicism and neoclassicism are terms often linked to the music of the eighteenth and
twentieth centuries respectively, or to an art-music tradition that originated in Europe and spread
internationally, or, most broadly, to various musical traditions around the globe that have
developed canons of classics and practices of emulation. This diversity of classicisms suggests
that it is best to define classicism and neoclassicism liberally, as inflecting a variety of practices
(canon formation, imitation and emulation), stylistic ideals (formal balance, the synthesis of parts
into wholes, and the presentation of human artifice as nature), and values (restraint, order,
control). Although these practices, styles and values take many forms, crossing times and
cultures, they nonetheless often point in one of two different directions, termed ‘standard’ and
‘ideal’ classicism by Ernst Robert Curtius. Necessary for pedagogy but also beloved by dictators,
standard classicism emphasizes the codification of imitable norms, stylistic regularity, and a
restraint based on reason (or raison d’état ). A tempering of standard classicism, ideal classicism
emphasizes the production of inimitable works, a style that sometimes skirts the line between
classicism and mannerism, and a restraint based on taste and good judgement. Both types of
classicism can manifest themselves in composition, performance, dress, behaviour and all other
aspects of musical practice. Despite the ubiquity of classicist practices, however, they owe their
specific forms to the particularities of different historical situations. Notably, in the Western
tradition, without a canon of classic works, genres or artistic rules handed down from Greek or
Roman antiquity, musicians have had to establish their own classics and to develop their own
classic genres and techniques. If musicians have always held a close eye on their fellows in other
artistic media, they have also had to invent their discipline in a way unknown to others.
Sanna Pederson’s essay on romanticism and anti-romanticism begins by summarizing the
understanding of romanticism from the standpoint of a critical theory that argues for romanticism
as the only possibility of getting disentangled from the dialectic of the Enlightenment. An
historical account begins by showing how some of the main arguments against romanticism are
found in Hegel’s critique of romanticism and music. These include the idea of romanticism as
disease, as being all feeling and no thinking, and as having no real relation to the world. An
examination of Eichendorff’s literary fairy tale ‘The Marble Statue’ from 1819 establishes
romantic themes that recur in musical works from Schumann’s Liederkreis , Op. 38, to Wagner’s
Tannhäuser, Tristan und Isolde , and even his last opera, Parsifal . These include a dualistic
understanding of music, religion and woman as potentially both dangerously intoxicating and
restoratively purifying.
The years around the 1848 revolutions marked the first groundswell of anti-romantic
sentiment in music criticism. The confusion and contradictions within this critique reveal how
Hegel’s fundamental ambivalence about music and art in general developed into an anxiety over
music’s purportedly romantic nature. A realistic, politically engaged music would only be
possible if it could be separated from romanticism. After 1848, Wagner took up precisely that
question in his Zurich writings. His solution was to not question music’s essentially romantic
nature, but to supplement it with what it lacked, namely ideas and political engagement. The
Zurich writings are the most extended anti-romantic polemic against music that we have in the
nineteenth century. They share the same premises of another enormously influential critique of
the romantic understanding of music, Hanslick’s Vom Musikalisch-Schönen ([1854] 1986). The
backlash against romantic music can also be seen in the success of Offenbach’s creation of opéra
bouffe , a light, satirical genre that drew on eighteenth-century classical predecessors.
Wagner found it impossible to sustain his anti-romantic manifesto while continuing to
compose music. He found a way out with the writings of Schopenhauer, a philosopher whose
pessimism and metaphysical theory of music gave expression to a renewed or neo-romanticism
beginning in the 1850s. Inspired by Schopenhauer, Wagner came to see music’s romantic
qualities as positive rather than negative. The resulting work, Tristan und Isolde , is arguably the
most romantic opera ever written.
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music also represents a highpoint of
romantic expression. It tried to discredit anti-romantic arguments against music and celebrate the
Dionysian force of music, proclaiming a rebirth of art through Wagner’s operas. However,
within a decade Nietzsche reversed himself and turned against romanticism and Wagner. His
notions of romanticism as diseased and decadent played a major role in the emerging concepts of
decadence and degeneration that seemed to diagnose the condition of Western art and society at
the end of the nineteenth century.
Wagnerism reached its peak in the years leading up to the First World War. The inflation of
Wagner’s metaphysical, mystical theories by his followers pumped the romantic aspect of music
up to new dimensions. However, the First World War punctured the giant romantic bubble, and
after the Second World War there was an even stronger reaction against musical romanticism.
Since then, musicologists have been rewriting the history of the twentieth century and
discovering a continuity of romantic music from the nineteenth century that survived the
backlashes .
Another crucial opposition in aesthetics is that between tradition and the avant-garde. Certain
forms of jazz music have routinely been described as avant-garde, with the provocative,
challenging aspects of this music readily interpretable as subverting the conventions of a
tradition. Kenneth Gloag’s chapter outlines some key ideas about how in general the term avant-
garde may be positioned as a concept through an engagement with some of the key texts and
ideas, with Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde providing a productive starting point. Three
specific jazz musics that have all been identified as avant-garde in the literature – Charlie Parker,
Ornette Coleman and Anthony Braxton – are used as case studies to illustrate some of the critical
issues in the debate about jazz as an avant-garde art form. However, it is argued that, after a
moment of critical tension, these examples of avant-garde jazz have been absorbed into a
tradition in ways that begin to question how a concept of tradition is both constructed and
interpreted.
Slow-burning questions of music and narrative have long concerned musical criticism, but
more recently they have ignited into debates engulfing leading contributors to contemporary
musicology. As Nicholas Reyland shows in his essay, at their centre, the arguments have
concerned whether instrumental music can tell or otherwise represent a story and/or aspects of a
narrative discourse. Orbiting issues engage with (for instance) the role of the perceiver and her
listening community when music is heard as a narrative, how the criticism of music with text
(songs, program music, operas, concept albums, etc.) might be influenced by such debates, and
how a study of music outside the common-practice tonal period in Western art–music (the
crucible for most of the debating thus far) could impact on these considerations. Criss-crossing
the debate are unavoidable questions relating to music history and hermeneutics, not least those
concerning how and why music comes to tell specific (yet often opposing) stories for socially
and historically situated subjects. The debate over music and narrative is not only about whether
music can or cannot tell a story: it concerns the cultural work carried out when narratives are
enacted by musicians, performers and perceivers.
Reyland’s chapter surveys the relevant literature to date, summarizing key contemporary
disputes and placing them in a broader historical context. This permits the identification of places
where, broadly speaking, the literature has reached a consensus on central issues. From the
threads of the many existing theories of musical narrative, a meta-theory of musical narrativity
can begin to be woven. Yet cutting-edge work on the topic is also moving away, most
productively, from the question of whether one can speak of musical narrative, to consider
instead why one should be disposed to do so in the first place, and in turn what such acts of
reading might seek to achieve aesthetically, culturally or politically, for the makers, performers
and consumers of music (including, of course, the very music critics engaging in the discipline’s
narrative turn). Reyland’s essay therefore frames its survey of the literature to date (which is
itself divided into sections detailing narratological criticism of common-practice tonal music and
other musics) with a framing narration of its own: a new theory of musical narrativity that draws
on the existing literature but also on phenomenology, reader-response criticism and reception
theory to explain how music can come to be interpreted as a narrative, and how many narrative
readings can in turn be read for what they say about the construction of music’s aesthetic and
socio-cultural significance. Throughout the essay, thumbnail music analyses exemplify key
points relating to the literature, to the study’s original theoretical proposals, and to its discussion
of how and why musical narratives, and critical interpretations thereof, matter and mean.
Julian Johnson’s chapter explores musical irony as a historical category from the classical
style to postmodernism, suggesting that the ironic turn is part of a larger self-reflective or even
self-critical attitude within musical modernity. After considering some basic examples of musical
irony (founded in the disjunction between generic expectations and their subversion), it reviews
the relative paucity of scholarly studies of this aesthetic category in music (compared to literary
irony). Three historical divisions follow. The first of these examines irony and humour in Haydn
and Mozart’s chamber music, showing how the influence of opera buffa introduced the possibility
of irony into classical instrumental music, with a particular focus on Mozart’s ‘Haydn’ quartets.
The second section, focused on the nineteenth century, suggests that although big public forms of
musical romanticism often avoid an ironic mode, the idea continues to play a key role in other
forms, such as German lieder from Schubert and Schumann to Mahler, and also in comic opera,
specifically the operettas of Offenbach. The third section examines the varied forms of irony in
modernism, including works by Schoenberg, Stravinsky, Debussy, Ravel, Satie and
Shostakovich before concluding with a consideration of polystylistic aspects of more recent
music (Schnittke, Berio, Ligeti). The final section looks back across these two hundred years of
musical modernity to argue that the self-critique of musical forms and language by means of
irony points to broader philosophical significance. Not only is it contemporary with the self-
critique of language in literature and philosophy, but it also assumes a particular significance in
that context (as a non-linguistic form of irony). The chapter concludes by focusing on a single
moment of late Beethoven (the coda to the Scherzo of the Hammerklavier Sonata, Op. 106)
arguing that in this ‘moment’ one can discern a faultline of the whole of modernity.
Jim Samson’s essay on propaganda explores the concept in a rounded way, recognizing that
negative connotations of the term were neither there from the start nor suggested by the
etymology, where the essential link is with the propagation of values. The essay also identifies
and discusses elements of propaganda avant la lettre , bearing in mind that the term entered the
language as late as the seventeenth century, that it gained widespread currency only in the mid
nineteenth century, and that a key stage in its subsequent dissemination occurred as recently as
the First World War. A notably broad range of musical reference, which moves widely in
historical and geographical focus, includes discussion of the workings of censorship and
propaganda in the Bolivian Andes, the Griot or Jali musicians of West Africa, music in North
Korea, Iran, South Africa and Tibet. The topic is further elaborated by discussion of music and
confession in sixteenth-century Germany, music under Soviet Communism and recent examples
of music from the former Yugoslavia.
The discourse of virtuosity, as James Deaville explains, has occupied a central position in
musical performance and aesthetics for the past two hundred years. It has been able to maintain
its appeal despite ongoing aesthetic opposition and changes in popular taste. This continuing
fascination with excessive performance and the figure of the virtuoso merits study in terms of
history, practice, aesthetics and reception. However, as a cross-disciplinary cultural practice
cultivated since the Renaissance, virtuosity has historically encompassed excellence not only in
music, but also in other areas of human performance. Thus any aesthetic study of virtuosity must
position it as indexing extraordinary – even excessive – accomplishment in general, as reflected
in the earliest definitions of the term. As the concept and its phenomenal manifestation came to
centre around music in the early nineteenth century, philosophers and aestheticians were
challenged to bring virtuosity into intellectual discourse, however they may have responded to
the practice and its practitioners. The topic has remained a site of contention for cultural
observers and agents, marked by a series of constructed contradictions: genius or charlatan,
extraordinarily endowed human or machine, sincerity or manipulation, and even superhuman or
freak. These paradoxes that inhabit the world of the virtuoso and virtuosity may prove
irreconcilable, yet it is nevertheless possible to arrive at a description of the practice that draws
upon a wide range of historical and current thought. It is clear that virtuosity is a product of
performance that communicates something extraordinary between artist(s) and audience.
The investigation of the aesthetics associated with virtuosity necessitates several steps,
beginning with an exploration of the concept’s origins and historical meanings. This study
focuses on its development within the realm of classical music, in the disparate discourses of the
Anglo-American, French and German reception. Along the way, it is important to consider the
factors that have contributed to and hindered research into virtuosity and how the practice
evolved in its specific social and cultural contexts in those language regions identified above. An
extended review of the late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century literature about
virtuosity uncovers certain commonalities in its aesthetic assessment, including the centrality of
Liszt, but it reveals considerably more divergences that arise from the positions and perspectives
of individual authors and their own milieus. Thus the French have deployed aesthetics in their
attempts to come to terms with virtuosity (as seen in the work of Vladimir Jankélévitch and
Antoine Hennion, among others), while the numerically and conceptually wide-reaching array of
English-language studies rely upon an admixture of cultural studies and new historicist
approaches (e.g. Richard Leppert, Lawrence Kramer and Dana Gooley). This literature survey
leads to a distillation of aesthetic issues regarding the nature and role of the practice and
practitioner, a review of the critique of virtuosity and the related paradoxes, and a brief
consideration of the possibility of somatic excess and disability as informing the reception of
virtuosity.
Notes
1 Available at: www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music (accessed 30 July 2013).
2 Aesthetics does have an entry in Beard and Gloag 2005, 3–6. In German musicology the place of aesthetics has long seemed
more overtly central, manifest, for example, by the journal Musik & Ästhetik . Indeed musical aesthetics has long seemed
more prominent in continental Europe than in Anglo-American musicology. Those with French can see Arbo 2007, which
does contain a small number of English contributors but is dominated by French and Italian authors.
3 It also possibly raises issues of disciplinary confidence. A recent textbook in ‘music studies’ (Harper-Scott and Samson 2008)
also turns to Bowie for its chapter on aesthetics, when the rest of the sixteen chapters (except the one on Jazz, also by Bowie)
are all by musicologists.
4 See also the essays collected in Robinson 1997 and Stock 2007.
5 A similar plea for the sustained interaction of philosophical aesthetics and modern artistic practices and criticism was made in
Benjamin and Osborne 1991, xi.
6 Available at: www.musicandphilosophy.ac.uk ; www.ams-net.org/studygroups .
7 Like Hamilton, Krims raises Adorno as an important and inspirational precursor of this sort of project, for his interrogation of
the role of analysis and its relationship to historical interpretation in the pursuit of a work of art’s ‘truth content’. There has
since been something of a reaction against Adorno in some quarters and support voiced for alternative philosophical figures
for musicological engagement, for example Richard Taruskin’s hailing of Vladimir Jankélévitch as the ‘anti-Adorno’ on the
dust jacket of Carolyn Abbate’s translation of Jankélévitch’s Music and the Ineffable (2003), or the stellar panel (the
philosophers Bowie and Scruton and the musicologist Stephen Hinton) who discussed whether Adorno was a ‘dead duck’ at
the 2012 RMA MPG conference (panel and floor seemed in favour of the opinion that Adorno remains in pecking good
form).
8 On the marginalization of the ‘beautiful’, see my essay ‘Beautiful and sublime’ on pp. 84–110.
9 For an example of Clarke’s approach in detailed action, see Clarke 2011.
10 Leppert and McClary’s volume also included Frith 1987, which argued that an aesthetics of popular music must be based on a
sociology of popular music.
11 The revised edition of Moore’s book symbolized the sustained relevance of its central argument in the new century. For a
discussion of notions of the aesthetic and the nature of the pop ‘text’ closely contemporaneous with Moore’s second edition,
see Hawkins 2002.
12 British readers have little foundation for smug national feelings of political exemption or cultural superiority. For a hilarious
dissection from a British satirist of how the ‘West’ moved from the Age of Reason to the Age of Reagan and beyond, see
Wheen 2004.
1 Nicholas Cook (2012) has pointed out the relationship with Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics (2002).
3
14 See Vernallis 2004, which includes a case study analysis of the video for Prince’s ‘Gett Off’ (1991), with its comparable
evocations of James Brown (here alongside those of Jimi Hendrix).
15 The latter themes are also considered in McClary and Walser 1994.
16 Hesmondhalgh cites, as an important precursor, Anne Danielsen’s analysis, which moves along the ‘anti-primitivistic’ lines
McClary suggested twenty years earlier, of funk’s deployment of technical and musical technique (a good deal of hard work)
to produce physically uplifting art (Danielsen 2006).
17 Currie 2009 explores the political aspects of his argument more fully. Carolyn Abbate 2004 made proposals closely related to
Currie’s. Abbate sought to counter the tendency of hermeneutic interpretation to ignore the musical ‘real’ event, and find a
central place for ‘aesthetic pleasure, the apprehension of beauty’ which, she argues, ‘is not evil, nor is it just a hedonistic
consolation’, because beauty makes us more acutely aware of the phenomenal world. Important here for Abbate is Elaine
Scarry’s influential On Beauty and Being Just (1999). (Susan Sontag said something very similar in Against Interpretation
way back in 1964: that commentary should make the art ‘more real’, rather than tame it through interpretation, that ‘in place
of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art’.) This ‘erotic’ quality underlies (unstated) Ian Biddle’s discussion of the complex,
ambivalent, relationship of the (institutionalized, professionalized, specialized) discipline of musicology to the pleasures and
enjoyment of listening, of what it permits (and itself becomes enthralled by) and prohibits (what it might appear to be
appalled by); Biddle proposed that ‘radical’ pleasures (traumatic, transformative, or contentious) be considered within a
‘radical musicology’, one which leads to questioning the apparently unquestionable. ‘On the radical in musicology’, Radical
Musicology 1 (2006). Available at: www.radical-musicology.org.uk .
18 In this way the book contrasts with the ‘companion’ approach of, for example, Gaut and Lopes 2013, or a ‘reader’ such as
Stecker and Gracyk 2010.
19 See, for example, Berger 2005, Watkins 2011, Macarthur 2001, Neal 2001 and Walden 2013. Aesthetics is also a major idea
in, for example, Fonarow 2006 and Gracyk 2007; see also the images and texts in Savage and Gibson 2012.
Introduction
Questions of value are at the heart of music aesthetics, prompting or shaping most of the
other concepts, issues and debates explored in this book. This is hardly surprising, given that
values and judgements of one kind or another are a basic and constant part of our life
experience. Our values, and the values ascribed to music by the cultures we identify with,
are fundamental to how we interact with it, shaping what we listen to and how we listen to
it. Similarly, the process of evaluating music is not an abstruse activity limited to
professional critics or examiners, but rather an inextricable part of performing, composing
and writing about music.
In spite of its importance, value is an issue that musicians and musicologists tend to talk
around rather than confront directly. 1 In part, this is because of the unconscious or
unreflective way in which values – whether moral, political or artistic – often work: the
criteria shaping our choices and judgements are not always transparent to ourselves, let
alone communicated to others (see Levy 1987). The main reason for treading cautiously in
this area, however, is the much broader crisis that has eroded and latterly engulfed Western
conceptions of value, removing all sense of stability and certainty. While this crisis had been
brewing for two centuries, it is only in recent decades that Friedrich Nietzsche’s vision of a
future in which ‘the highest values are devaluated’ has come to fruition (Nietzsche 2003,
146). Paradoxically, the causes of this process – social atomism, consumerism, a collapse of
traditional sources of authority – resemble the ills that aesthetics, at the time of its
emergence in the late eighteenth century, was meant to be able to heal; for Friedrich Schiller
and contemporaries, aesthetic cultivation would ultimately instil wholeness and unity in
place of fragmentation (see especially Schiller [1794] 1967). Today, the idea of a society
united through beauty and shared aesthetic values seems a naive or even dangerous illusion.
Rejecting the idea of universal values, and dismissing truth, goodness and beauty as
ideologically dubious fictions, we have come to view values as made not given,
emphasizing their culturally contingent nature and local field of operation.
The idea that values are tied to particular cultures, and that each culture has its own
unique value system, has helped foster the view that ‘all cultures are equal in dignity, and
therefore of equal worth, since each can be seen as embodying an aspect of human totality’
(Koïchiro Matsuura, ‘Preface’ to Bindé 2004, ix). As this emphasis on equality and common
humanity suggests, modernity has not entirely discarded the values bequeathed by the
Enlightenment. Yet such values survive in a demystified and radically pluralistic form,
drained of the confidence and optimism that originally engendered them. Western culture’s
descent into what Gianni Vattimo describes as a ‘twilight of values’ has been far from
painless (Bindé 2004, 7–12). For the French theorist Jean Baudrillard, writing at what was
arguably the zenith of this process, the result has been a paralysing sense of decentredness
and rootlessness: ‘a dispersal and involution of value whose upshot for us is total confusion
– the impossibility of apprehending any determining principle’ (Baudrillard 1993, 10). The
sense that all fixed or shared points of reference have melted away is particularly acute in
relation to art and aesthetics; in Baudrillard’s analysis, the loss of a ‘gold standard of
aesthetic judgment’ has robbed art of its capacity to innovate, counter reality or follow its
own laws, making it wholly subject to the laws of the market (Baudrillard 1993, 14–15).
Reduced to a value-free game, the artworld has little to offer but a repetition of hollow
gestures divorced from the ideas that engendered them (Baudrillard 1993, 4; see also ‘The
Conspiracy of Art’ [1996], and ‘No Nostalgia for Old Aesthetic Values’ [1996] in
Baudrillard 2005). Aesthetic discourse and artistic institutions are for Baudrillard part of this
‘conspiracy of art’, concealing art’s commodification by continuing to draw on evaluative
concepts that have lost their substance.
In retrospect, the cynicism and world-weariness of such 1990s critiques may seem
overstated (since 9/11, it has become abundantly clear that strongly held values are by no
means a thing of the past). However, the central dilemma that Baudrillard identifies – the
loss of a gold standard of judgement, and the difficulty of orienting ourselves among
competing values – remains acute. This is particularly true in relation to music. Indeed, there
are few more striking symptoms of the decline of established aesthetic values than the
collapse in prestige of Western classical music over the last half century. Stripped of its
claim to embody universal, transcendent values, classical music has become simply one
genre among many. Value pluralism has brought clear benefits to the musical sphere, of
course, as is evident from the ever more diverse curricula of university music courses: the
classical canon has rightly receded as hitherto marginalized forms of music have been
embraced. But this same pluralism makes it hard to invoke the progressive, universalist
conceptions of culture and aesthetic education that enabled music to enter the academy in
the first place. If traditional aesthetic values are irretrievable or undesirable, does that force
us to accept the kind of value-free nihilism that Baudrillard describes? And is he right to
view art’s commodification – the collapse of artistic value into economic value – as being
unavoidable in our postmodern (or post-postmodern) age? (See Nealon 2012, esp. 43–65.)
There are three possible approaches to these questions. The most common – for
musicologists, as for the public at large – is to take it as read that musical evaluation is
simply a matter of personal taste (‘it’s all subjective …’), and to regard as elitist or intolerant
any notion that one work, genre or practice might be ascribed more value than another. This
perspective certainly points to the lack of confidence characterizing our age, as well as
reflecting some characteristic modes of present-day musical consumption (in particular the
solitary musical islands we inhabit as iPod listeners). In relation to our discipline, this stance
is exemplified by the 1990s New Musicology, with its zeal for highlighting the ideologically
charged nature of the values shaping Western classical music, and for debunking earlier
approaches to music analysis. This eagerness to critique the concepts and categories of old-
school aesthetics is matched by a reluctance to posit new alternatives to them (symptomatic
of this retreat from judgement, as Sianne Ngai has noted, is the use of the word ‘interesting’
as an ersatz for more emphatic evaluations; see Ngai 2008).
If the first approach embraces postmodernism, the second represents a modernist or
traditionalist resistance to it. From this perspective, the sceptical, subjectivist mentality
outlined above is a form of mass delusion engendered by capitalism and the culture industry
(modernist critique) or by trendy relativism and cultural decline (traditionalist critique).
Unlike the sceptics, latter-day modernists and traditionalists are keen to stress the superlative
value possessed by the music they favour, whether it be the avant-garde or the classical
canon. To sustain this viewpoint, they continue to draw on the assumptions, categories and
hierarchies of earlier aesthetics, dismissing the idea that these have lost their substance and
credibility. This endeavour to reassert traditional values is perhaps most associated with
right-wing commentators (the best-known example within music aesthetics is Roger
Scruton: see Scruton 1997, esp. 369–91, 474–508 and Scruton 2009, 205–27). However, it
can also be seen in the problematic ongoing project to resurrect the modernist philosopher
Theodor W. Adorno as a lodestar for musicology.
A third approach – that informing the present chapter – seeks to avoid these extremes of
debilitating uncertainty and false security. It rejects the idea that judgements of value are
purely subjective, emphasizing how the tastes of individuals are shaped and articulated
within social contexts. At the same time, it takes a pluralistic approach to value, recognizing
the diversity of value systems that co-exist in the present, and rejecting conceptions of value
conceived around the idea of a unitary artworld or aesthetic regime. Acknowledging the
plurality of values, it should be noted, makes them no less real: principled judgements not
only remain possible, but are fundamental to our involvement in and identification with
different forms of music-making. 2 Our active participation in musical communities –
multiple, overlapping and, increasingly, virtual – entails not simply assenting to shared
values, but rather a role in the ongoing process by which they are renewed and
reinvigorated. It is this active engagement, rather than any aesthetic dogma, that prevents
art’s value from being seen in purely economic or consumerist terms.
All of which makes it essential that we probe the value concepts and criteria inherited
from earlier aesthetics, establishing which remain useful and which need to be rethought or
discarded. First, I explore some key issues and problems, such as the relationship between
aesthetic value and art’s other values, and the nature of the principles and criteria that might
be used to justify a particular value judgement. I then compare how musical values
functioned within two different cultures at crucial junctures in the history of Western music:
the crystallization of the idea of classical music within Austro-German culture in the age of
Beethoven, and the defining phase of American rock music and discourse in the mid to late
1960s. After examining these case studies of value formation within particular cultures, I
then explore what it is that enables us to appreciate the music of cultures beyond our own.
The recurrent impulse and effort to define aesthetic value by contradistinction to all forms
of utility or as the negation of all other nameable sources of interest or forms of value –
hedonic, practical, sentimental, ornamental, historical, ideological, and so forth – is, in
effect, to define it out of existence.
(Herrnstein Smith 1988, 33)
There is some justification for this stance, given the highly restricted conception of
aesthetic value presented in some of the key texts on aesthetics from the eighteenth to the
twentieth centuries. In part, this narrow view of value stems from a tension within the
founding document of modern aesthetics, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790). In
carving out his realm of taste, Kant builds a series of distinctions, differentiating between
useful and beautiful objects, extrinsic versus intrinsic purpose, and sensory pleasure versus
disinterested contemplation. The purely aesthetic requires the exclusion of all extraneous
factors, including emotional response and a concern for content, since ‘any taste remains
barbaric if its liking requires that charms and emotions be mingled in … beauty should
actually concern only form’ (Kant [1790] 1987, 220, 223). These stringent conditions for a
pure judgement of taste are linked by Kant to an equally restrictive idea of ‘free beauty’:
Many birds (the parrot, the humming-bird, the bird of paradise) and a lot of crustaceans in
the sea are [free] beauties themselves [and] belong to no object determined by concepts as
to its purpose, but we like them freely and on their own account. Thus designs à la
grecque [Louis XVI style], the foliage on borders or on wallpaper, etc., mean nothing on
their own: they represent [vorstellen ] nothing, no object under a determinate concept, and
are free beauties. What we call fantasias in music (namely, music without a topic [Thema
]), indeed all music not set to words, may also be included in the same class.
(Kant [1790] 1987, 229, section 16)
[If] we assess the value of the fine arts by the culture [or cultivation] they provide for the
mind … then music, since it merely plays with sensations, has the lowest place among the
fine arts (just as it may have the highest among those [whose value] we assess by their
agreeableness as well).
(Kant [1790] 1987, 329, section 53)
The ideological agenda behind Kant’s opposition of high and low art – pitting the aesthetic
cultivation of an elite against the sensual gratification of the masses – is not made explicit.
Subsequent commentators such as Friedrich Schiller, however, were unabashed in
presenting this dichotomy in class terms, distinguishing the ennobled tastes of a ‘few select
circles’ from the animalistic pleasures of the populace at large, and considering music to
epitomize the latter: for Schiller, when music exercises its effect,
For the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, such dichotomies reveal the self-interest and
class prejudice behind the entire project of aesthetics. For Bourdieu, Kant’s aesthetic
principles express the ‘sublimated interests of the bourgeois intelligentsia’, performing the
ideological operation of making universal ‘the dispositions associated with a particular
social and economic condition’ (Bourdieu 1984, 492, 493). In Bourdieu’s reading, the entire
tradition of Western aesthetics from Kant to the present enacts the same operation through
its institutions, discourses and practices, affirming as natural the tastes and values of a
particular class. These dispositions serve not only as markers of status, but as a means to
legitimize and perpetuate existing class structures and social inequalities. For Bourdieu,
‘nothing more clearly affirms one’s “class”, nothing more infallibly classifies, than tastes in
music’ (Bourdieu 1984, 18). While classical music – ‘the “pure” art par excellence’ – may
seem to epitomize the Kantian notions of disinterested pleasure and the pure judgement of
taste, an appreciation for it is far from being something natural or innate; rather it is a sign of
a high level of cultural capital, of acculturation within a ‘more polished, more polite, better
policed world’ than that inhabited by lovers of other forms of music (Bourdieu 1984, 19,
77).
The most important aspect of Bourdieu’s critique of the aesthetic is his reminder, as Tia
DeNora puts it, that ‘unlike gravity or the sound barrier, artistic value is an institutional fact,
not a natural one’ (DeNora 2004, 44). Bourdieu’s emphasis on the role that institutions such
as concert halls, conservatoires and even university music departments play in producing
value and perpetuating hierarchies has had a major impact on subsequent discussions of the
topic (see, for example, Frith 1998 and Born 1995). However, there are several key
problems with his account. While he is right to stress the ideological dimension of Kant’s
dichotomies, he constructs an implausibly homogeneous picture of aesthetics and its values
on the basis of them (and in doing so, gives a distorted account of the role that the pure
judgement of taste plays in Kant’s text). 4 The result is that Bourdieu actually deepens the
divide between high and low art, presenting each as appealing to wholly separate, class-
based constituencies. In addition, he entrenches the notion that aesthetic value has relevance
only for high art (a move that helped ensure that aesthetics remained a dirty word within
sociology and cultural studies until the late 1990s). Thirty years on, Bourdieu’s view of
classical music as a marker of the dominant culture of the bourgeoisie looks decidedly
outmoded. Today, listening practices no longer map neatly on to class distinctions (if they
ever did), and current sociologists building on Bourdieu’s ideas tend to identify bourgeois
taste not with high art but with cultural omnivorousness or – as Zygmunt Bauman puts it –
‘maximum tolerance and minimal choosiness’ (Bauman 2011, 14; see also Peterson 1997,
Eriksson 2011 and Prior 2013). This points to a broader problem with Bourdieu’s view of
how taste communities relate to social strata. In what Bauman calls our ‘fluid modern
world’, the idea of rigidly demarked musical tastes, or for that matter, social classes, is a
thing of the past; not only are listening practices more pluralistic, but the tie has loosened
between value communities and the cultures that originally engendered them.
Paradoxically, these socio-cultural changes only reinforce the argument that distinctions
between high and low art, or claims for the superiority of one kind of music over another,
are arbitrary and ideologically grounded. 5 We should avoid assuming that aesthetic
hierarchies and dichotomies are signs of a hegemonic culture flexing its muscles, however,
since they can also serve as survival strategies for new or fragile subcultures. As the
reference to a ‘few select circles’ attests, the distinctions employed by Schiller and
contemporaries in carving out the aesthetic field, and in elevating the prestige of the art
forms they valued, reflected the aspirations of a small minority, not the interests of a
dominant class. Similarly, the two musical communities explored in the next section initially
represented minority tastes rather than powerful institutions or interest groups. As a glance
at some later artistic manifestos will confirm, the kinds of distinctions employed by Schiller
were to remain crucial for those championing new ideas and movements or challenging the
status quo. Rather than being unique to the discourses of high culture, all value communities
rely on hierarchies and exclusionary strategies in order to define and perpetuate themselves.
Recognizing that such distinctions – and the evaluative criteria that work alongside them –
are ubiquitous and serve the ends of particular communities helps us to see them for what
they are: propositions rather than diktats, unstable principles that continually compete with
alternative aesthetic constructs.
All of which suggests that we’re moving towards a position where good and bad music
exist, but do so only relationally (i.e. in relation to the local, contingent criteria upheld
within particular value communities). 6 We will return later to the problems posed by this
notion of discrete musical cultures, each governed by its own unique set of values; for now,
we need to establish how evaluative criteria work in practice. Musical judgements of value
amount to more than preferences, since the evaluation is accompanied by a justification that
appeals to shared principles. For an earlier generation of musicologists, including Carl
Dahlhaus, evidence-based argumentation grounded in music analysis provides a means of
objectively ‘proving’ a value judgement (Dahlhaus [1970] 1983, viii and 3). Today, there is
little point in trying to resurrect the term ‘objective judgement’, since it conjures up a host of
unhelpful associations (such as the idea of impartiality and of universal, timeless values).
But another sense of objectivity – that judgements need to make reference to the properties
of the musical object in order to be persuasive – remains crucial.
For nearly 2,500 years, the general principles informing such object-based judgements
have been remarkably consistent within Western aesthetics. From Aristotle to Augustine and
Aquinas, beautiful objects necessarily exhibit order, unity, proportion, clarity and
complexity; similarly, Monroe C. Beardsley, in what is probably the most influential
twentieth-century equivalent to such taxonomies, argues that aesthetic beauty rests on the
interplay between unity, intensity and complexity (Beardsley 1981, 454–89). Whether the
longevity of such criteria demonstrates their universality or simply their banality is a moot
point. At best, such general criteria offer merely a baseline for judgement, a low-level hurdle
that we expect musical works and experiences to leap over. At worst, they have been
elevated as ultimate guarantors of value: not so long ago, music analysts assumed that a
demonstration of unity was sufficient to secure a composer’s place in the musical canon,
while for a generation of high modernist composers, the pursuit of complexity became an
end in itself (see Morgan 2003 and the responses in Music Analysis 23, 333–88; Mahnkopf
2006). The limitations of these general criteria have led commentators to come up with
alternative principles, more specifically attuned to musical processes. One well-known
example is Leonard B. Meyer’s argument that music acquires value by setting up
expectations and then delaying their fulfilment; through creating and overcoming obstacles,
music rises above the conventional and heightens the listener’s gratification (Meyer 1959).
Another is Heinrich Schenker’s view that organic coherence, verifiable through his
analytical method, provides an incontrovertible measure of musical value: a means to
distinguish the masterworks of Bach and Beethoven from the inorganic aberrations of
Wagner and Stravinsky (see Pastille 1995).
For Lawrence Kramer, general value criteria such as unity, coherence, complexity and
narrative tension fail to address the particularity of individual musical works, and thus miss
what compels us to engage with them:
Many forgotten or little-esteemed works meet all the criteria with little or no effect. The
truth is that meeting aesthetic criteria is easy. Many much-beloved works do not bother to
do it, or do it as a matter of routine while going about their more vital business.
(Kramer 2009, 25)
But the distinctive qualities of such works do not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, their
individuality is dependent on their generic, institutional and cultural contexts – that is, the
conditions of possibility within the value community that produced them. The sounding
forms of individual works – to adapt a Hanslickian manoeuvre – are conditioned by the
inner form of conventions and values with which they are in dialogue. The more we grasp
this inner form, the more we understand the evaluative criteria pertinent to a particular work.
These criteria are highly variable, being historically and generically specific. A seemingly
universal aesthetic principle such as originality, for example, only emerged in Western
culture in the second half of the eighteenth century, and offers a misleading measure for
music of earlier periods; even during the periods when it was operative, its importance was
outweighed by other criteria in some fields of composition (e.g. church music). (On
originality, see Adorno 1997, 172–3; see also Garratt 2002, 9–11, 173–80.) In addition, we
should avoid assuming that criteria that served as generic norms within one national
tradition had the same weight elsewhere.
Consider, for example, the theme from the second movement of Rimsky-Korsakov’s
Sheherazade ( Musical Example 2.1 ). Approached with expectations shaped by the Austro-
German symphonic tradition, there is some justification for Roger Scruton’s negative
evaluation of the theme, which he bases on ‘the limpness of the melodic line, the lack of
inner voices, and the failure to develop’ (Scruton 1999, 373). For Rimsky-Korsakov’s
defenders, such as Steven Griffiths, such a dismissal mistakes as a failing the work’s chief
strength – that is, its ‘directness of expression unhampered by quasi-symphonic complexities
of texture and structure’ (see Griffiths 1990, 245). Certainly, Scruton’s reasoning seems
faulty, given the quasi recitando idiom and the developmental potential of the theme’s
metrical ambiguity (a potential fully taken up in the subsequent variations). Even so,
Scruton’s negative evaluation may seem to be justifiable on other grounds. From an early
twenty-first-century perspective, the theme smacks of orientalist kitsch (think desert
caravans and harem girls); indeed, the sheer overexposure of this music, together with the
numerous pallid imitations it inspired, has had the effect of leaching away at least some of
its charm and vitality (on kitsch, see Kulka 1996). 7
In the case of this example, two different lines of argument generate a similar overall
evaluation. But what if a range of evaluative criteria produce a conflicting picture? We tend
to assume that lower-level aesthetic criteria add up to produce an overall judgement.
However, even if such criteria result in a litany of superlatives, there is no guarantee that the
work in question deserves a correspondingly glowing overall evaluation; as Theodore
Gracyk argues, ‘the piece might be a hodgepodge of merit-qualities that lack internal
connection to one another’ (Gracyk 2011, 170). A more familiar problem is the degree of
influence that one particular criterion should have on an overall evaluation. In this
connection, Dahlhaus cites the critic Hans Georg Nägeli’s negative appraisal of the first
movement of Mozart’s Symphony No. 41 (‘Jupiter’); for Nägeli, the use of alternating tonics
and dominants in the passage before the second theme debases the work through its
triviality:
Pay attention to measures 19–21 in the first Allegro and compare them with measures 49–
54; furthermore, do the same in the second section, measures 87–89 and 117–122. Such a
mere alternating between a triad and a six-four-chord based on the exact same note is
already trivial per se, indeed, it is one of the most worn-out and common commonplaces
that typically is only used by the most common composers in orchestral compositions to
facilitate the entrance of the French horns into the tutti. Here, however, this triviality
appears analogously twice (i.e., four times in the very same piece).
(Nägeli 1826; in Dahlhaus [1967] 2004, 342)
To damn the whole on the basis of such a detail would surely count as poor judgement.
While musical preferences often rest on such small moments, moving beyond such narrow
focuses is what differentiates a reasoned evaluation from a preference or a Nägeli-style
polemic. If I had to plump for one of the two versions of Bruckner’s Symphony No. 1 in C
Minor (1866, 1890–1), for example, the first thing that would enter my head would be the
extraordinary passage in the coda of the revised version (Musical Example 2.2 ), music that
seems to break out of the confines of its surroundings and offer a monumental summation of
its composer’s late style. While I enjoy luxuriating in this moment of overripe romanticism,
however, I have no doubt that a point-by-point comparative evaluation would find in favour
of the earlier version of the symphony (in which the work’s pithily classical themes are
matched by their elaboration rather than fussily reworked to suit a later idiom). Such
judgements treat evaluative criteria as evidence that can be stacked up in order to prove a
case. But although the language of judgement recalls the world of the courtroom, there is
nothing remotely definitive about artistic evaluations. There is no equivalent to DNA
evidence among evaluative criteria; rather, as Gracyk argues, they offer no more than ‘rough
heuristics for evaluating partial aspects of works’ (Gracyk 2011, 173).
Musical Example 2.2 Bruckner, Symphony No. 1 (1890–1 version),
finale, mm. 361– 7
rock has been co-opted by high culture, forced to adopt its standards – chief of which is
the integrity of the art object. It means the end of rock as a radical experiment in creating
mass culture on its own terms, ignoring elite definitions of what is or is not intrinsic to
aesthetic experience.
(Willis [1968] 2005, 222)
The idea that the cultural establishment was imposing its own values on to rock led Richard
Meltzer and other critics to sketch out an alternative ‘rock aesthetic’, with the aim of
maintaining its distinctness and counter-cultural energy (Meltzer [1970] 1987; see also
Chester 1970). The view that approaching rock from the perspective of art overlooks its true
values, or ‘praises it for all the wrong reasons’, remains common today (Gracyk 2007, 12).
But however valid, this standpoint should not obscure the extent to which sixties rock
appropriated principles and practices from high art. The shift away from cover versions
towards largely original material, and the concern for creating unified albums were two
symptoms; just as important was the increasing concern with creating complex, fixed
musical objects – sometimes irreproducible in live performance – within the recording
studio. No less than classical music, rock began to be seen as rewarding repeated listening
and demanding undistracted contemplation; commenting on Pet Sounds , Brian Wilson
urged that ‘the best way to listen to the whole album is through headphones in the dark’
(Wyn Jones 2008, 46).
Crucial to value formation within both classical music and rock were the kind of
dichotomizing strategies seen earlier in Kant. In order to elevate some music to the level of
high art, music critics around 1800 zealously partitioned the musical field, marginalizing
genres, practices and even classes of listeners who failed to measure up to the new aesthetic
ideals (see especially Sponheuer 1987). One particularly unhelpful dichotomy that emerged
in this period is that of pure versus applied art, or art music versus functional music. (On the
relationship between functional or ‘non-aesthetic’ music and value, see Gracyk 2011, 173–
4.) Misreading Kant’s distinction between free and accessory beauty, Nägeli constructed a
particularly rigid distinction between these two categories, consigning everything except
pure instrumental music to the lower sphere of applied art (Nägeli 1802–3, 225–37, 265–74;
see Garratt 2010, 33–4). Fundamental to elevating music’s status was excluding genres that
offered only sensuous stimulation or empty virtuosity, with the aim of fencing off – as
Rochlitz put it – ‘music which makes itself valid as art from that which is a mere fleeting
entertainment’ (‘Verschiedenheit der Urtheile über Werke der Tonkunst’, in Rochlitz 1824–
32, Vol. IV, 193). Such dichotomies were reinforced from the 1820s through the widespread
elevation of Beethoven as an antithesis to Rossini, pinning the eagle against the butterfly, or
German seriousness and truth against Italian sensuality and triviality (on the Beethoven–
Rossini debate, see Sponheuer 1987, 9–35). During Beethoven’s lifetime, it must be
emphasized, these new ideals represented a minority aspiration, remained in a state of flux,
and in no sense reflected the norms animating contemporary institutions and practices. This
explains the tensions that exist between some of the new artistic values and Beethoven’s
own output; it was later generations that sought anxiously to distinguish the ‘true’ values of
Beethoven’s age from those that produced the ‘Battle Symphony’ Wellingtons Sieg , or the
cantata Der glorreiche Augenblick (see Cook 2003).
Rock defined itself through similar dichotomies, with musicians and critics seeking to
distance its creativity and subversiveness from commercial mainstream pop. In an early
issue of Crawdaddy , Paul Williams emphasized that ‘rock ‘n’ roll, or the big beat, or
whatever clumsy term we want to use, is a musical idiom quite apart from what is selling at
the moment; i.e. quite apart from pop music’ (Williams [1966] 2002, 39). Like the
proponents of classical music a century and a half earlier, Williams distinguished the select
category of listeners capable of appreciating rock from the majority, with its ‘strange
affection for saccharine-sweet movie soundtracks and for Herbert Alpert and his Tijuana
Dross’ (Williams [1966] 2002, 39). Although one British critic invoked the Kantian
opposition of fine and agreeable art in championing the Stones over the Beatles, rock critics
were in general wary of the distinctions and vocabulary associated with high culture (Merton
1968). Far from rejecting sensuous pleasure or the idea of entertainment, critics like Robert
Christgau emphasized rock’s physicality, ‘unrelenting eclecticism’ and ability to ‘dignify the
ephemeral and demean the profound’ (Christgau [1970] 2013). The most extensive attempt
to grasp rock’s eclecticism, Meltzer’s Aesthetics of Rock (1970), argued that rather than
carving out a territory for itself through such dichotomies, rock had swallowed them whole,
revelling in its ‘incoherency, incongruity, and downright self-contradiction’ (Meltzer [1970]
1987, 7). Tellingly, Meltzer argued that only after acknowledging how rock had widened the
vocabulary of aesthetics – through drawing in the ‘incongruous, trivial, mediocre, banal,
insipid, maudlin, abominable, trite, redundant, repulsive, ugly, innocuous, crass, incoherent,
vulgar, tasteless, sour, [and] boring’ – should critics consider applying high art terms such as
‘poignant, sincere, beautiful, etc.’ to it (Meltzer [1970] 1987, 13). Such a perspective –
resisting the urge to tidy up or sanitize the rock aesthetic – finds plenty to support it in the
Beach Boys back catalogue. The group’s most successful album of 1965–6 was not the arty
Pet Sounds but a collection of covers ( Beach Boys’ Party! ), while one year earlier the band
had released the kind of festive LP more often associated with fifties’ crooners (The Beach
Boys’ Christmas Album ). And few forms of pop more closely resemble a caricature of
Adorno’s critique of the culture industry than the surfing songs – ‘Surfin’ Safari’ (1962) and
‘Surfin’ USA’ (1963), which made the group’s name.
One shared component within the values of classical music and rock is an aesthetic of
subjective expression, reflected in the ideas of genius, originality and authenticity found in
both discourses. In both cultures these ideas were surprisingly fluid and multivalent. While
genius and originality were well established as aesthetic criteria by Beethoven’s day, some
of his critics understood them in terms quite different from Romantic notions of
untrammelled creativity or rhapsodic personal revelation. Rather, reviewers schooled in
eighteenth-century aesthetics conceived genius as inventiveness (the capacity to produce an
inexhaustible flow of workable musical ideas) and an identifiably personal idiom, qualities
that were expected to be matched by an adherence to other aesthetic principles if they were
to avoid straying into bizarreness and caprice (see Morrow 1997, 99–133). Thus, a Viennese
reviewer praised the ‘Eroica’ Symphony for its
great and daring ideas, and, as one can expect from the genius of this composer, great
power in the way it is worked out; but the symphony would improve immeasurably (it
lasts an entire hour) if B. could bring himself to shorten it, and to bring more light, clarity,
and unity into the whole.
(Anon., ‘Vienna, 9 April’, Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung , 7 (1805), 501–2, in Senner
2001, 17)
Only a small minority of critics used the term ‘genius’ in the Romantic sense when praising
Beethoven, such as an 1807 review describing how, ‘scorning all fetters, he expressed
himself with all the depth and genius of his soul’ (Anon., ‘News. Prague’, Allgemeine
musikalische Zeitung , 9 (1807), 610, in Senner 2001, 34). Even Hoffmann, aware of the
negative associations of genius with ‘extravagant bizarreness’ and ‘uncontrolled
imagination’, avoided using the term without clarification: one of the most surprising
aspects of his review of Beethoven’s Fifth is his recurrent qualification of genius with the
idea of circumspection (Besonnenheit ), as in his argument tha t
is it only through entering very deeply into the inner structure of Beethoven’s music that
the great presence of mind of this master reveals itself, which is inseparable from true
genius and is nourished by unceasing study of the art.
(E. T. A. Hoffmann, ‘Review’, Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung 12 (1810), 630–42 and
652–9, in Senner 2001, 97–8)
If genius remained unstable and contested in the age of Beethoven, the concept of
authenticity was in a similar state of flux in sixties rock discourse. Authenticity, in the sense
of honest, heartfelt personal expression, was dismissed as ‘meaningless’ by Meltzer as a
criterion of value (Meltzer [1970] 1987, 10). 9 For other critics, however, it rapidly came to
serve as rock’s key point of orientation: the glue that enabled its eclectic idioms to gel
together and a brake on – or compensation for – its drift towards artistry and artifice. The
concept entered rock discourse via folk rock; it first crops up in Crawdaddy , perhaps
unsurprisingly, in relation to Bob Dylan, described as a ‘1960s bard with electric lyre and
color slides, a truthful man with x-ray eyes you can look through if you want’ (Williams
[1966] 2002, 36). The idea that rock offered a window on the soul of its creators put a
premium on originality, spontaneity and raw emotion. A 1970 review of Van Morrison notes
that ‘what one hears is not style, but personality … the authenticity of spirit’, while Landau
argued that ‘the criterion for art in rock is the capacity of the music to create a personal,
almost private universe and to express it fully’ (Anon. 1970; Landau, 1972, 15). Several of
the concept albums from the late 1960s were perceived as suspect from this perspective; for
Landau, the posturing, artifice and lack of truth of the Stones’ Their Satanic Majesties
Request brought it close to kitsch, while Richard Goldstein condemned Sgt. Pepper as an
‘immense put-on … dazzling but ultimately fraudulent’ (Landau 1967; Goldstein 1967). Pet
Sounds , in spite of its artistic ambitions, proved immune to such criticism. While band
member Mike Love was concerned that it would be regarded as ‘ego music’, critics
considered it to take the ideal of authenticity to a new level; for Stephen Davis, it showed
that composer Brian Wilson had ‘his psyche on the pulse of universal subjectivity’, offering
an ‘intense, linear personal vision’ with the ‘emotional impact of a shatteringly evocative
novel’ (Davis [1972] 2013).
In the case of Beethoven, contemporary reviewers employed a range of intrinsic and
technical criteria – unity, organic development, clarity of modulation, diligence in
contrapuntal elaboration, and so on – to back up their general evaluations. Even these kinds
of criteria meant different things to different critics. Thus when Wendt talks of the
importance of unity, what he has in mind is not primarily how themes or movements
interrelate, but rather the necessity of a ‘dominant mood, which the work of art must bring
forth as a total impression’ (Amadeus Wendt, ‘Thoughts about Recent Musical Art, and van
Beethoven’s Music’, Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung 17 (1815), 630–42 and 652–9, in
Senner 2001, 187). As Holly Watkins points out, Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven’s Fifth
too remains loyal to the eighteenth-century idea that each movement should be governed by
a single affect (Watkins 2004, 198). However, Hoffmann, alongside a handful of other
contemporary reviewers, was also concerned with demonstrating the thematic unity of
Beethoven’s works (in this case, the ‘deeper relationship’ between the themes of the two
allegros and the minuet; Senner 2001, 110). Other critics such as Rochlitz also supported
their judgements with detailed commentaries on the music, highlighting the ways in which
Beethoven had departed from convention and thus deceived listeners’ expectations (Anon.
[Friedrich Rochlitz], ‘Review’, Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung 9 (1807), 321–3, in Senner
2001, 21–2) .
This level of musical commentary is foreign to sixties rock discourse; indeed, some critics
regarded such discussion as pointless, arguing that ‘the aesthetic originality of rock never
inhered in its strictly musical qualities’ (Christgau [1970] 2013). As Ellen Willis noted in
1968, however, albums such as Pet Sounds and Sgt. Pepper , not to mention the preference for
more complex music and lyrics exhibited by rock’s new ‘student-hippie-intellectual
audience’, resulted in ‘an increasing tendency to judge pop music intrinsically’ (Willis
[1968] 2005, 222). Certainly, internal musical criteria alone cannot give an exhaustive
account of a song’s value, although they may not seem a bad place to start. Consider one of
the best-loved songs from Pet Sounds , ‘God Only Knows’, hailed by Paul McCartney as the
greatest song ever written. Indeed, the effusive praise routinely lavished on this song has led
to something of a backlash: Gracyk singles it out in highlighting the distortions that result
from treating rock as art, arguing that any subtlety it possesses is ‘only discernible against
the backdrop of 1960s formulas’ (Gracyk 2007, 13). But this backdrop – just like the body
of expectations that Beethoven’s ‘Eroica’ plays against – is not something external to the
music, but rather is heard in dialogue with it. The 32-measure song form provides the
conditions of possibility for the music of ‘God Only Knows’, and there is nothing unusual
about its 8+4 measure verse/chorus scheme; similarly, the idea of a bridge section in a
related key is standard within the genre. What is different here, however, is how the move to
the subdominant in the bridge conditions the tonal behaviour of the entire song, which,
though nominally in E major, is characterized throughout by a tension between it and A
major (see Musical Example 2.3 ).
This tonal plasticity – emphasized by the avoidance of authentic cadences and root-
position tonics – is what gives the song its feeling of expansiveness. But the rigidity of the
eight-bar phrase structure is also softened by the subtlety of the voice leading, in particular
the supple bass lines (notice how the tension between E and A major is reflected in the
mixed messages sent out by the chords and voice leading in measures 7–8 and
subsequently). By beginning each verse in the subdominant, Wilson makes the song’s
masterstroke seem utterly natural. While the idea of presenting the verse harmonies in the
subdominant in the bridge was not new, what is striking here is the smoothness with which
the song drops back into the original key – a moment rendered even more arresting by the
truncated three-measure phrase that precedes it. No wonder that Daniel Harrison claims
‘there is no moment in rock music more harmonically and formally subtle than this
transition’, and that Dominic King describes it as ‘the most perfectly constructed song in
pop history’ (Harrison 1997, 35; King [2005] 2013).
All of which raises several questions. Does discussing the song in this manner –
emphasizing its harmonic sophistication and how it plays with expectations – merely
subordinate it to evaluative criteria conceived around art music? Given that, like any
artefact, it is the product of a particular culture, should we restrict ourselves to the kind of
appraisals that were the norm within that culture at the time it was conceived? And if not,
does that mean that the music of all cultures and periods can be measured by the same
standards: where should we draw the line? Clearly, the analytical comments made above
only access one aspect of the song’s value (a fuller account would surely mention the
colourful ‘Baroque rock’ instrumentation, the delicate ways in which the vocal line and
harmonies respond to the lyrics, and the haunting lead vocals). Yet as my choice of ‘God
Only Knows’ reveals, there is a danger when classically trained musicians venture into pop
that they focus on material that can most readily be accommodated within their existing
aesthetic biases; as Gracyk argues, ‘we know that some popular music meets some of the
standards of excellence recognized by traditional aesthetic theory. But it usually satisfies
another set of standards, inimical to those traditional standards’ (Gracyk 2007, 25). As the
comparative discussion above confirms, there are substantial divergences between the values
of rock in its defining phase and those of classical music. Few would dispute Gracyk’s
argument that rock should be accorded its own aesthetic, rather than judged from
perspectives conceived around classical music: after all, doesn’t every culture have its own
very different set of values?
Musical Example 2.3 The Beach Boys, ‘God Only Knows’, figured bass
reduction
Perhaps it does, but the idea of culture is certainly an obstacle to understanding how these
different values interact. The problem is that it suggests a series of hermetic boxes, each
containing its own wholly distinct value system. Thus Gracyk speaks of the ‘barriers’ and
‘divides’ between musical cultures, a viewpoint that leads him to argue that ‘far from being
a universal language, music appears to be a divisive force’ (Gracyk 2007, 69, 77; Gracyk
2011, 174). However, this perspective seems at odds with our everyday experience of
engaging with and appreciating music from a range of cultures. The capacity to appreciate
music from multiple cultures should not lead us to overlook the differences between their
values, or to minimize the effort that fully understanding them involves. It does remind us,
though, that value communities are loose, porous formations, constantly overlapping and
intermingling; rather than emphasizing simply what’s unique and distinct about them, we
also need to look for points of commonality. Two centuries ago, Kant assumed the existence
of a sensus communis aestheticus – a shared sense of the aesthetic – that enabled
cosmopolitan individuals to cultivate a broadened way of thinking and make judgements
from a universal standpoint (Kant [1790] 1987, 295, section 40). While Kant’s universalism
is no longer attractive, we can surely still benefit from conceiving the aesthetic as an active
endeavour to grasp the values of other cultures and to seek out common ground between
them.
Notes
1 Notable exceptions include Dahlhaus [1970] 1983; Johnson 2002; Kramer 2009.
2 Some examples of the broader project of re-establishing the idea of principled judgements include Squires 1993 and Wolff
2008.
3 On Kant, Schiller and aesthetic ideology, see Eagleton 1990 and Woodmansee 1994, esp. 57–86.
4 For a more detailed discussion of Bourdieu (and his misreading of Kant), see Gracyk 2007, 29–33.
5 For a useful survey of how aesthetics has responded to critiques of the high/low dichotomy, see Novitz 2003.
6 On the ubiquity of the concept of bad music, see the essays in Washburne and Derno 2004.
7 See also www.arabkitsch.com (accessed 25 June 2013).
8 The idea of a museum phase in the history of Western classical music stems from Burkholder 1983.
9 The wider connotations of authenticity in rock are explored in Weisethaunet and Lindberg 2010.
Introduction
Any music is ‘absolute’ – in the usual understanding of the term – if it is presented to the listener
as a sounding aesthetic object without accompanying verbal text (in the form of vocal lyrics,
program, or descriptive title) and without serving any particular function besides the listening
experience itself. Normally, this is understood to be instrumental music, although vocalise or
electronic music, for example, could also fit the definition. While clear examples can be found in
the music of the late Renaissance or early Baroque in the form of instrumental canzonas,
ricercares, contrapuntal fantasias and above all the Baroque fugue, the apogee of ‘absolute
music’ as a practice and an ideology is usually located between the era of Viennese classicism, in
the later eighteenth century, and the early Romantic era, when writers such as E. T. A. Hoffmann
began to articulate a distinct, positive aesthetic of pure instrumental music (most famously in
Hoffmann’s 1810 review-essay on Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony). 1
The opposition to instrumental music expressed by British essayist Charles Lamb in his
‘Chapter on Ears’ ( Essays of Elia , 1823) is a satirical provocation on the part of a professed
musical agnostic, but it is in many ways just as instructive as the paeans to the transcendent
powers of ‘pure music’ intoned by his German Romantic contemporaries:
Above all, those insufferable concertos, and pieces of music, as they are called, do plague and
embitter my apprehension. Words are something; but to be exposed to an endless battery of
mere sounds; to be long a-dying, to lie stretched upon a rack of roses; to keep up languor by
unintermitted effort; to pile honey upon sugar, and sugar upon honey, to an interminable
tedious sweetness; to fill up sound with feeling, and strain ideas to keep pace with it; to gaze
on empty frames, and be forced to make the pictures for yourself; to read a book, all stops ,
and be obliged to supply the verbal matter; to invent extempore tragedies to answer to the
vague gestures of an inexplicable rambling mime – these are faint shadows of what I have
undergone from a series of the ablest-executed pieces of this empty instrumental music .
(Lamb 1835, 43)
With the beginning of this finale Beethoven’s music takes on a more distinctly speaking
character: it leaves behind the character of pure instrumental music such as had been
maintained throughout the first three movements, the realm of infinite and indistinct
expression…. We must admire how the master has prepared the entrance of language and the
human voice as something both anticipated and necessary by means of the shattering recitative
of the double basses when, nearly transgressing the boundaries of absolute music, this
recitative engages the other instruments with its powerfully emotional discourse, pressing for
some resolution, and finally issuing in a lyrical theme.
(Wagner 1887, vol. 2, 60–1; trans. Grey 2009, 486)
Wagner’s text would not have reached many readers, at least until it was reprinted in his
collected writings in the 1870s. All the same, it tells us a great deal about the emerging critical
discourse of what would eventually be canonized under his phrase, ‘absolute music’. First of all,
he provides the alternative, more standard locution for the idea in the early nineteenth century,
‘pure instrumental music’. Second, he alludes to the Romantic aesthetic ideology that had been
influentially articulated by E. T. A. Hoffmann, specifically with reference to Beethoven’s
symphonies, in relating ‘pure instrumental music’ to ‘the realm of infinite and indistinct
expression’. Third, he rehearses his own critical argument, more emphatically and influentially
expressed in The Artwork of the Future some years later (1849), that Beethoven’s Ninth – like
the later music as a whole – exemplified a modern aesthetic imperative for music to move
beyond the realm of ‘indistinct expression’ and to seek new representational and expressive
determinacy either through the internal development of compositional resources – harmonic,
melodic and formal – or ultimately through a new synthesis of music with poetry or drama. 3
While the initial circulation of this 1846 program note may have been very restricted, Wagner
returned to the term ‘absolute music’ repeatedly throughout both The Artwork of the Future and
Opera and Drama (1852), texts that were widely read and debated following their first
publication. In both of those texts the term is subject to Wagner’s polemic against the cultivation
of the traditional arts in their individual, isolated (‘absolute’) condition, which is to be
superseded by the combined or ‘total artwork of the future’ (Gesamtkunstwerk der Zukunft ).
Eduard Hanslick’s path-breaking short treatise of 1854 Vom Musikalisch-Schönen ( On the
Beautiful in Music or, in Geoffrey Payzant’s 1986 translation, On the Musically Beautiful ) has
traditionally been viewed as a theory of absolute music. This view is certainly accurate, even
though – somewhat paradoxically – the term ‘absolute music’ appears only incidentally in the
text. As with Wagner’s first use of the term, this ‘incidental’ appearance is nonetheless
significant, and can help us understand the general purpose of Hanslick’s treatise as well as
clarifying some common misapprehensions about it.
In the middle of his second chapter, devoted to the demonstration that ‘the representation of
feelings is not the content of music’, Hanslick comments on the methodology of this
demonstration: ‘We have deliberately chosen instrumental music for our examples.’ (In addition
to a brief analysis of the opening theme of Beethoven’s overture to the ballet The Creatures of
Prometheus Hanslick invokes, in passing, Bach’s preludes and fugues, symphonies of Haydn and
Mozart, and ‘an adagio of Beethoven, a scherzo of Mendelssohn, or a piano piece by Schumann
or Chopin’ as representative types; Hanslick [1854] 1986, 14).
This is only for the reason that whatever can be asserted of instrumental music holds good for
all music as such. If some general definition of music be sought, something by which to
characterize its essence and its nature, to establish its boundaries and purpose, we are entitled
to confine ourselves to instrumental music. Of what instrumental music cannot do, it ought
never be said that music can do it, because only instrumental music is music purely and
absolutely (denn nur sie ist reine, absolute Tonkunst ).
(Hanslick [1854] 1986, 14–15; see Hanslick [1854] 1990, 52)
Hanslick is making a simple clinical, procedural point. Arguments about how music ‘works’
or about its effects are best made with reference to music without accompanying text, function or
other extra-musical dimensions. Hanslick’s later critical opposition to both the theories and the
music of Richard Wagner has, together with the resonance of the phrase die reine, absolute
Tonkunst when recalled out of context, probably contributed to the notion that Hanslick’s treatise
glorifies instrumental music at the expense of vocal music or opera. 4 In fact, in the very
nextsentence Hanslick denounces invidious comparisons of the value of instrumental versus
vocal music as ‘dilettantish’ and irrelevant, following which he turns to examples of vocal music
(if only to prove the non-exclusive relationship of verbal semantics to musical settings of a given
text).
Just as in Wagner’s reference to ‘absolute music’ in his 1846 commentary on Beethoven,
Hanslick’s single use of the phrase ‘absolute music’ (as absolute Tonkunst ) exemplifies its
genealogy in the locution ‘purely instrumental music’, which continued to remain standard
parlance throughout most of the nineteenth century. Both Wagner and Hanslick apply the
adjective ‘absolute’ in the sense made current at the time through the writings of Ludwig
Feuerbach to denote an isolated, specialized branch of knowledge, practice or inquiry. Wagner
would go on to emphasize the critical implications of this isolation – a ‘bad’ autonomy charged
with cutting music off from a natural and healthy interaction with its sister arts – throughout the
so-called Zurich writings from around 1850. Hanslick’s unique application of the adjective in On
the Musically Beautiful , on the other hand, can easily be heard to resonate with the Hegelian
metaphysics of the ‘Absolute’ (which he famously invoked in a passage later deleted from the
final pages of the treatise at the prompting of his colleague Robert Zimmermann). 5 To begin
with, however, ‘absolute music’ denoted for both Wagner and Hanslick simply the repertoire of
‘pure instrumental music’ as it had developed over the preceding two centuries of European
musical practice.
Although, as Sanna Pederson has persuasively demonstrated, neither Wagner’s nor Hanslick’s
original uses of the phrase ‘absolute music’ brought the term into regular critical use during their
lifetimes, both of them exerted considerable influence on debates over the concept and status of
‘purely instrumental music’ at a time when the emerging canon of instrumental classics was
confronted by modern, post-Beethovenian music with claims to new levels of expressive or
semantic determinacy. Wagner stated his position in no uncertain terms. ‘Who will be to
Beethoven what he was, necessarily, to Mozart and Haydn?’ he asks, rhetorically, in The Artwork
of the Future . ‘No one, not even the greatest [musical] genius, since the Genius of absolute
music no longer needs him’ (Wagner 1887, vol. 3, 101). 6 That is to say, for Wagner the age of
‘absolute music’ has come and gone; the ‘greatest musical genius’ will henceforth be working in
some other sphere (specifically, the combined musical-dramatic ‘artwork of the future’). And
although Hanslick, as mentioned, did not set as his goal in On the Musically Beautiful to argue for
the supremacy of a classical instrumental canon over opera, program music, or the dawning
Wagnerian ‘music drama’, it is entirely justified to view his book as the first and faraway most
influential statement on the idea of ‘absolute music’, even if he did not grant the term itself a
special status.
The essentials of this statement can be located in two arguments of Hanslick’s book: the
‘negative’ thesis of his second chapter, that the artistic value or ‘content’ of music
(paradigmatically, instrumental music) is not to be sought in the putative feelings or emotions
generated by it; and the ‘positive’ thesis of his third chapter, that the artistic value or ‘content’ of
music, however elusive, is intrinsic to the materials of the composition and their treatment by the
composer, what Hanslick tried to sum up as tönend bewegte Formen (‘musically sounding forms
in motion’, or in Payzant’s translation, ‘tonally moving forms’; (Hanslick [1854] 1990, 75;
[1854] 1986, 29). 7 Hanslick had more difficulty in formulating the second, or positive thesis of
musical beauty, in part because he was hobbled by an obligation to work with categories of
‘form’ and ‘content’ received from contemporary aesthetic philosophy. In treating the categories
of musical ‘beauty’, ‘value’ and ‘content’ as all more or less synonymous, and insisting on their
immanence to ‘musically sounding forms in motion’ Hanslick can be regarded as articulating a
foundational principle of ‘absolute music’.
A succinct definition of the idea can also be found near the beginning of his third chapter
(‘The Musically Beautiful’), where he answers the question ‘What kind of beauty is the beauty of
a musical composition?’ as follows :
It is a specifically musical kind of beauty. By this we understand a beauty that is self-
contained and in no need of content from outside itself, that consists simply and solely of tones
and their artistic combination. Relationships, fraught with significance, of sounds which are in
themselves charming – their congruity and opposition, their separating and combining, their
soaring and subsiding – this is what comes in spontaneous forms before our inner
contemplation and pleases us as beautiful.
(Hanslick [1854] 1986, 28) 8
Along with ‘purely musical’, the phrase ‘specifically musical’ was another standard locution for
the idea of absolute music in Hanslick’s and Wagner’s time, one whose currency can be directly
linked to the impact of On the Musically Beautiful . It is worth recalling again, as Pederson has
shown, that only Wagner used the term ‘absolute music’ with any regularity before the end of the
nineteenth century, and that only in his ‘Zurich’ writings of 1849–51 where it is the object of a
polemical critique (Pederson 2009). Despite the undeniable importance of a Romantic
metaphysics of ‘purely instrumental music’, the Hegelian notion of the ‘Absolute’ routinely
invoked in current scholarly discussion of ‘absolute music’ was not necessarily central to
discussions of the idea in the nineteenth century. Hanslick’s ‘specifically musical’ and Wagner’s
‘absolute music’ around 1850 simply denoted ‘music alone’ (to invoke the title of one of Peter
Kivy’s many essays on music aesthetics – see Kivy 1990), while the claims of such music to
transcendent metaphysical import remained a matter of context, repertoire and individual critical
beliefs.
Questions of terminology aside, it has long been assumed that a philosophical discourse of
absolute or purely instrumental music emerged between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries in response to the rapid rise of instrumental genres such as the sonata, string quartet,
and symphony during this period, above all in the canon of the ‘Viennese classical school’ of
Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven. Mark Evan Bonds has influentially proposed an alternative
view, that a new propensity to ‘idealist’ structures of thought in German-language philosophy of
the period provided the necessary matrix for a new valuation of instrumental music in the era of
Beethoven and E. T. A. Hoffmann (Bonds 1997; see also Bonds 2006). The issue can easily
devolve into a kind of chicken-or-egg problem if we attempt to isolate musical practice from
intellectual-cultural context, and it probably makes most sense to view the two in a productive
dialectical or symbiotic relation. Clearly much had changed between the time of Fontenelle’s
querulous challenge, Sonate, que me veux-tu? and the effusions of Tieck, Wackenroder, or
Hoffmann over the intimations of utopian and infinite other worlds vouchsafed by the sonatas
and symphonies of their day. The concept of absolute instrumental music gained further critical
traction soon after Wagner and Hanslick named it around 1850 with the extensive debates over
program music, ‘music drama’, and the ‘New German School’ of musical progressives – debates
generated in large part by the polemics of Wagner’s ‘Zurich’ writings of 1849–51.
This is why one may set a poem as a song, or a visual representation as a pantomime, or set
both to music in an opera. Such individual pictures of human life, set to the general language
of music, never correspond or connect to it with complete necessity; rather, they stand in the
same relation to it as an arbitrary example does to a general concept.
(Trans. Dahlhaus 1989, 131; Schopenhauer [1818] 1969, vol. 1, §§52, 263) 9
The position makes sense for someone like Schopenhauer who had grown up in an era when
imitation theory and the doctrine of affections were still the norm. One or another setting of one
or another Metastasio simile aria differs only incidentally, not essentially, from the rest, never
bearing the unique impress of single, unmistakable illocutionary model.
Extrapolating from this view, even without reference to the Schopenhauerian ‘Will’, we could
insist simply on the phenomenological pre-eminence of the immediate acoustic experience of
any musical work, object or performance. Many textual and cultural contingencies may
determine crucial elements of the sounding object in a performance of Musorgsky’s Boris
Godunov or a song by Rodgers and Hart or a mixed-media aleatoric composition of John Cage.
But in this strict view, those contingencies will not fundamentally alter the experience of these as
music , rather than as drama, lyrics or performance concept. Our attitude toward the music may,
of course, be inflected by those other things, but the music is what we hear first.
Nothing is less absolute than music, as regards its presence in our lives, and the champions of
an absolute music are clearly a muddle-headed bunch. To confound them it would suffice to
have them name, if they could, any music independent of those forms derived from corporeal
motion or from poetic verse (according to the causal circumstances).
(Wagner 1887, vol. 5, 191; trans in Wagner [1857] 2011, 76) 10
Wagner is referring to his ‘genealogy’ of classical instrumental forms from the traditions of
binary dance forms of the earlier eighteenth century and, more broadly, the relation of classical
phrase structure to symmetries of dance or rhyming metrical verse. In this view, there is no such
thing as a ‘purely’ abstract music, since all empirical musical practices (as opposed to
speculations about divine or celestial music) are conditioned by aspects of the human body,
voice and fundamental cultural practices. Thus, if Romantic composers like Berlioz or Liszt
choose to push the envelop of musical form by inflecting its primitive dance-based outlines with
allusion to mythic or literary narrative, this need not constitute an unpardonable transgression.
No music is truly ‘absolute’, since all music is founded, at some level, on shapes and forms of
human activity. The foundational activities of song, dance and religious ritual, he argues, are
merely giving way to more differentiated models of myth, epic and drama. As the musical means
enabled by those first categories become more differentiated or sophisticated, with time, this
expansion of the human ‘models’ for musical practice is a natural move in the cultural evolution
of the art form.
Mozart’s Serenade No. 9 in D major belongs, like that whole half-obsolete genre of the
serenade itself, to a more accompanimental, decorative kind of music. In the right place ideally
in the park of some old castle – and at the right time, on a fragrant summer night, such music
might act as a balsam to our drowsy senses and feeling. Today, a century after its composition,
it offers too little substantial interest [substantiellen Gehalt ] for musical reflection and
emotional engagement [unserem musikalischen Nachdenken und Nachfühlen ] when presented
as an independent concert item; it merely ripples past us softly and gently, without making any
deeper impression.
(Hanslick 1886, 294)
Belying his posthumous, largely mistaken, reputation as a classicist and a formalist, Hanslick
dismisses even one of Mozart’s more mature and, indeed, more ‘substantial’ serenades as too
beholden to its original function as aristocratic divertissement to qualify as legitimate, ‘absolute’
musical fare in the modern concert hall.
A program Hanslick encountered shortly afterwards, in December 1883, provides a cross-
section of contemporary repertoire illustrating precisely the boundaries that the concept of
absolute music was intended to police as it started to become an accepted critical tool. This
program, conducted by Hans Richter, consisted of the premiere of Brahms’s Third Symphony,
the Viennese premiere of Liszt’s symphonic poem Mazeppa , and an orchestral song-setting of
Shelley’s ode ‘To Night’ (in German translation) by Robert Volkmann. Not surprisingly,
Hanslick’s response to the Brahms symphony confirms how much the viewpoint of On the
Musically Beautiful as well as Hanslick’s attitudes as a music critic (the two are by no means
identical) continue to define what is still understood today as absolute music. Appealing to the
topos of ineffability or music’s transcendence of language, he laments that ‘the critic’s eloquence
diminishes in proportion to that of the composer’ and that only extensive score examples or,
better still, repeated listening can truly reveal the aesthetic value of the work (Hanslick 1886,
361). 13 He eschews the ‘poetic-picturesque’ method of ‘translating one’s impressions into a
series of images, balladic motifs, or novelistic episodes’, since that runs counter to his ‘belief in
the purely musical significance of an instrumental composition’. Still, he readily situates
Brahms’s new Third Symphony with respect to the affective and topical associations of the
Beethoven canon as well as of Brahms’s first two symphonies (starting from Richter’s sobriquet
for the Third as Brahms’s Eroica ). Brief verbal accounts the thematic material, dynamic contours
and generalized musical attributes are offered (‘more concentrated in form, more transparent in
detail, more plasticity of motivic ideas, richer instrumentation and more varied timbral
combinations’ than the first two symphonies). Yet the music emerges as paradigmatically
absolute precisely in defying adequate verbalization. It is not just the work’s structural, textural
or rhythmic complexity, but also its situatedness within a network or discourse of ‘symphonic’
values that contributes to its quality as a meaningful artwork. (Hanslick’s final comment is
simply ‘if only Schumann were still alive to hear it!’.)
The Liszt symphonic poem and the Volkmann orchestral song on the same program both
belong outside the pale of absolute music, clearly, but that does not principally determine
Hanslick’s critical response to them. Comparing the general tone of ‘reflective, dignified, warm
feeling’ in the Volkmann with that of Schumann’s Paradies und die Peri he groups them, together
with Brahms’s and Beethoven’s symphonies, as ‘poetic musical works [ Tondichtungen ] that
breath freely the atmosphere of musical beauty’, in spite of the ‘differences in content and form,
as well as artistic value’ (Hanslick 1886, 366). The negation of those ideals in Mazeppa is not
strictly blamed on the choice and role of the poetic program, although Hanslick is predictably
dismissive of both. Rather, as with most of Liszt’s orchestral works, he objects to what he
regards as noisy, pretentious, overwrought treatment of musically feeble materials (‘the lack of
formative musical power applied to great ideas that grow and move from inside outwards is
masked in all of them by showy orchestral effects and all sorts of portentous gesturing’)
(Hanslick 1886, 367). Moreover, Hanslick himself points out the genealogy of this particular
symphonic poem in a series of piano etudes, acquiring its official association with the poetic
protagonist of Hugo and Byron only midway through the series. (‘It would not be unfair to call it
a tenderly reared and groomed piano etude’, he concludes, alluding perhaps to Mazeppa’s horse,
who in Hanslick’s view is the real protagonist of the story; Hanslick 1886, 368.) The genesis of
Mazeppa as a symphonic poem illustrates a broad truism, even if Hanslick does not dwell on the
implications in his review: Romantic program music is seldom ‘purely’ programmatic, any more
than Romantic symphonies are ‘purely’ absolute, if the first means adhering closely to a
preconceived verbal–narrative outline and the second means eschewing any referential
dimension that might be construed as extra-musical. Symphonic poems no less than symphonies
are often located ‘between’ program and absolute music, taken as heuristic ideal types. 14
The principal object of music is to please us physically, without troubling the mind to search
for useless comparisons in it. One must absolutely regard music as a pleasure of the senses and
not of the mind. As soon as we try to attribute the cause of its impressions on us to a moral
principle we lose ourselves in a labyrinth of extravagances.
(Cited in Neubauer 1986, 169)
***
As Roger Scruton rightly asserts, ‘the term “absolute music” denotes not so much an agreed idea
as an aesthetic problem’ (Scruton 2013). 18 The problem begins with ascertaining the degree of
aesthetic autonomy that might plausibly be ascribed to a particular musical work or practice.
Since no music exists outside of some cultural context, cultural contingency alone is not useful in
establishing the boundaries of absolute music (unless it were to refute the concept altogether).
For practical purposes, music involving any kind of a verbal text, beyond generic titles and
performance directions, should be excluded from the category, although it is reasonable to make
distinctions regarding the substantive role of the text in the production and reception of the music
in question. It is certainly reasonable to distinguish between instrumental music that operates
within a strongly circumscribed set of conventional musical procedures (Bach’s The Art of
Fugue , a Clementi piano sonata) and that which invites, or requires, a range of specific, ‘real-
world’ references (Beethoven’s Wellington’s Victory , Grofé’s Grand Canyon Suite ). The term
‘absolute music’ emerged at a time when the need for such distinctions began to be felt more
pressingly than before. It was also a time when the practice of culturally unmarked ‘absolute
music’ was giving way to a more self-conscious, culturally marked conception of ‘Absolute
music’. Aesthetic awareness of the earlier practice seems to develop during the eighteenth
century, and continues alongside the emergence of the consciously elevated Romantic aesthetic
and practice in the next century (say, a popular air with variations by Henri Herz alongside the
‘Diabelli’ Variations of Beethoven).
The whole spectrum of ‘absolute’ musical attitudes and practices continued to accompany the
accumulating canon of Western art music into the twentieth century, when the canon and the
accompanying aesthetics became increasingly historicized. 19 In scholarship of the later
twentieth century, however, the two ‘cultures’ of absolute music yield a new division: the fixed
musical text as the autonomous object of musical analysis, as opposed to the ‘open text’ of
cultural-hermeneutic interpretation. Traditionally, the work of professional music theorists is
performed on examples from the Western canon taken in the first sense, while increasingly the
work of musicologists (if it still concerns that canon) is performed in the second sense. ‘Post-
canonic’ Western art music, for its part, continues to cultivate both autonomous and
heteronomous tendencies inherited from the Romantic era, though it is seldom inclined to forgo
the prestige of the upper-case Absolute.
In glossing a series of remarks from Igor Stravinsky, famous for his dismissal of the Romantic
fetish of music as ‘expression’, Richard Taruskin draws attention to a characteristically high-or
late-modernist doctrine of ‘the music itself’. This certainly designates music as an isolatable
aesthetic object worthy of close analytical scrutiny. Taruskin associates Stravinsky’s idea of ‘the
music itself’ with his turn to serialism in the 1950s, asserting that ‘it has nothing to do with the
nineteenth century’s “absolute music,” with which it is now often mistakenly interchanged’
(Taruskin 1997, 365–8). ‘For the absoluteness of absolute music,’ Taruskin continues, ‘as
Wagner (yes Wagner) first envisioned it, was an absolute expressivity, not an absolute freedom
from expression.’ The remark illustrates how completely the later Romantic–metaphysical sense
of ‘Absolute’ music has come to dominate usage, even though Wagner himself used the term
almost exclusively to designate musical practice divorced from the rest of culture – indeed, just
‘the music itself’. For late Stravinsky and the high-modernists of the generation of Pierre Boulez,
Milton Babbitt and the Darmstadt school, the ‘first culture’ of absolute music had returned with a
vengeance, or we might say, with an attitude. Music was now provided with a pithy retort to that
impertinent question, Sonate, que me veux-tu ?: ‘Nothing – who cares if you listen?’ Even if this
is a contested caricature of musical high modernism, it suggests an extreme form of ‘absolutism’
that synthesizes aspects of both our traditional cultures, the empirical-formalist emphasis on pure
sounding object and a belief in music’s elevation above quotidian human affairs.
The strength of the term ‘absolute music’, despite the continual fluctuations of usage, lies in
the way it forces some determination on the part of the user (listener) as to what range of things
he or she brings to the music in question, and what range of things she or he is inclined to take
away. Questions of musical expression, signification and value, the ontology of musical form,
text and work will always be with us, and the variety of such questions is to be celebrated, not
bemoaned. The concept of absolute music remains a necessary compass in navigating our
bearings in relation to repertoire of all kinds, in deciding what it means to us as ‘just music’,
what kinds of things we might add to or subtract from that figure, and in analysing virtually any
of our beliefs about what music does.
Notes
1 For the text of Hoffmann’s review, see Charlton 1989, 234–51; the later redaction published in Part 1 of Kreisleriana (1814)
as ‘Beethoven’s Instrumental Music’ is also included, 96–103. The latter, as translated by Oliver Strunk, can also be found in
Treitler 1998, 1193–98.
2 Fontenelle’s famous question seems to have circulated as a timely bon mot after the middle of the eighteenth century. Its
citation in the entry ‘Sonata’ in Rousseau’s Dictionnaire de Musique (Paris: chez la Veuve Duchesne, 1768, 444–5), where
Rousseau contrasts the aesthetic claims of vocal and instrumental music, has probably most contributed to its canonization.
(Rousseau mentions it as a conversational, rather than published, remark.)
3 On this general argument in Wagner’s writings, and its parallels in contemporary critical thought on music, see Grey 1995,
chapters 1 and 2.
4 Nick Zangwill, to cite one example, speaks of Hanslick’s ‘purist stance against opera’, although this has no bearing on his
project of remounting Hanslick’s case against ‘emotions’ as the content of music in terms of contemporary analytic-
philosophical aesthetics (Zangwill 2004, 30). Even Carl Dahlhaus commits this error in Chapter 2 of The Idea of Absolute
Music when he writes: ‘Hanslick, in appropriating Wagner’s term ‘absolute musical art’, did just the opposite [of Wagner],
reverting to E. T. A. Hoffmann’s thesis that pure instrumental music was the ‘true’ music and represented the goal of the
history of music’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 27). Moreover, the quoted phrase (‘reine, absolute Tonkunst’) is, of course, Hanslick’s
version, not a version ‘appropriated from Wagner’. Neither Hanslick nor Hoffmann claim that instrumental music ‘represents
the goal of the history of music’.
5 On the deleted passage, see Dahlhaus 1989, 28; Bonds 1997, 414–16; and Bonds 2012.
6 ‘Wer will nun auf Beethoven das sein, was dieser auf Haydn und Mozart im Gebiete der absoluten Musik war? Das größte
Genie würde hier nichts mehr vermögen, eben weil der Genius der absoluten Musik seiner nicht mehr bedarf.’
7 A problem with Payzant’s rendition of this famous phrase is that the word ‘tonal’ in modern English usage connotes features
of the major-minor diatonic ‘tonal’ system as codified since the seventeenth century, while the German word ‘Ton’ and its
derivatives (‘tönen, tönend’) connote musical sound-material more generally (even if, for Hanslick and his contemporaries,
such material was inevitably construed as ‘tonal’ also in the more restricted sense).
8 In the original this passage reads: ‘Es ist ein specifisch Musikalisches. Darunter verstehen wir ein Schönes, das unabhängig
und unbedürftig eines von außen her kommenden Inhaltes, einzig in den Tönen und ihrer künstlerischen Verbindung liegt.
Die sinnvollen Beziehungen in sich reizvoller Klänge, ihr Zusammenstimmen und Widerstreben, ihr Fliehen und sich
Erreichen, ihr Aufschwingen und Ersterben, – dies ist, was in freien Formen vor unser geistiges Anschauen tritt und als schön
gefällt’ (Hanslick [1854] 1990, 74). Despite the many large and small emendations made to the text by Hanslick across the
many editions that appeared in his lifetime (as indicated in Strauss’s edition), this whole passage notably remained
unchanged.
9 Schopenhauer does, in fact, distinguish between the justifiable use of music to set vocal texts (where the music provides an
appropriate if not exclusively necessary ‘counterpoint’ to the text) and programmatic or ‘imitative’ music, meaning for him
mainly musical imitations of natural phenomenon. These miss the point of music in trying to operate like poetry or painting,
i.e. in representing the phenomenal world.
10 Wagner’s original epithet (translated here) was ‘sinnlose Köpfe’. In the published version of the text Franz Brendel, editor of
the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik , seems to have modified this to read ‘the advocates of an absolute music clearly do not know
what they are talking about’ (Wagner 1887, Vol. 5, 191).
11 ‘While applying a technique that had its origins in text setting’, the ricercare, by exhaustively exploring transpositions and
permutations of a single subject, has ‘clearly and deliberately transcended those origins and has entered the utopian realm of
abstracted technique’ (Taruskin 2005, 610).
12 Excerpts of Michaelis’s essays in the Allegemeine musikalische Zeitung are translated in le Huray and Day 1988, 199–205.
13 The discussion of the Third Symphony quoted from in this paragraph extends from 361 to 366. Gooley 2011, 313–15 cites
this review of the Third Symphony premiere as an example of Hanslick’s methods of negotiating between establishing a
consensus with his readership and at the same time instructing them in matters of taste and judgement, especially of new or
challenging works.
14 The phrase ‘between absolute and program music’ has been invoked in modern critical scholarship above all with reference to
the role of topical-characteristic and narrative traits in the symphony from Beethoven to Mahler, as well as elements of
generic and formal hybridity. See, for example, Wiora 1963, Finscher 1979 and Newcomb 1984. The aesthetic implications of
these intersections are also discussed in Dahlhaus 1989, chapter 9 (‘The Idea of the Musically Absolute and the Practice of
Program Music’): 128–40.
15 For a summary of the terms of Kant’s aesthetics and music’s ambiguous position in the Critique of Judgement , see Ginsborg
2011, especially the section on ‘Kant’s alleged formalism’, 334–36, as well as Neubauer 1986, chapter 13, ‘Kant and the
Origins of Formalism’, 182–92.
16 Some preliminary considerations relevant to the question can be found in Davies 1999 and Gracyk 1999. Within the culture of
Western modernist art music the experimental tradition from John Cage back to the Italian ‘futurists’ would have to be
considered. Early in the twentieth century Feruccio Busoni invoked the term ‘absolute music’ (without necessarily
envisioning later experimental let alone popular practices) to mean a new, improvisatory practice unfettered by conventions of
scale, tonality, ‘textbook’ form, or the orchestral instrumentarium. ‘Absolute’ in this sense means absolutely free, unbounded.
See Knyt 2012.
17 Similarly, the musical meditations of Vladimir Jankélévitch, which have attracted renewed attention under a broadly
postmodernist aegis, are strongly grounded in the second, Romantic-metaphysical culture of absolute music, inflected with a
Franco-Slavic accent in place of the traditional Germanic one. See Jankélévitch, 2003, and the panel Gallope et al . 2012.
18 Scruton’s otherwise useful resumé of the ‘aesthetic problem’ erroneously attributes the term itself to the Romantic critics of
the 1790s and early 1800s, none of whom, of course, used it.
19 Sponheuer 2005 outlines two directions the idea of absolute music has taken in ‘post-Romantic’ culture: contemporary art
music adopts a formalist stance, relating to the ‘first culture’ described above, while the public at large remains committed to
the Romantic-metaphysical view (although it seems unclear whether that can be distinguished here from the traditional
‘aesthetics of feeling’, as writers from Hanslick to Dahlhaus have been at pains to do).
Chess does not tell stories. Mathematics does not evoke emotions. Similarly, from the
viewpoint of pure aesthetics, music does not express the extramusical. But from the viewpoint
of psychology, our capacity for mental and emotional associations is as unlimited as our
capacity for repudiating them is limited. Thus every ordinary object can provoke musical
associations, and, conversely, music can evoke associations with extramusical objects.
(Schoenberg 1967, 93)
The supposed opposition of absolute and program music is a false dichotomy, one forged in
the heat of nineteenth-century polemics…. The seemingly mutually exclusive extremes—
absolute versus programmatic understandings—are not our only choices. Between them lies a
flexible middle ground, a vast zone of nuanced implication that may be tapped in various
ways, depending on the desired point of view. Consequently, what we encounter is a spectrum
of possibilities under which any single piece might be framed for understanding….
Nevertheless, in their interactions with the public, composers sometimes highlighted one or
two of these meaning-strata while downplaying the others. Some works do invite richer
speculation about representational allusion than do others.
(Hepokoski 2001, 434–5)
Considerations along these lines lead one to conclude that the traditional, philosophically posed
question ‘is pure music (or this or that piece) actually capable of expressing or representing
things outside of itself?’ is unproductive. In part, this is because of the record of historical
evidence: much music of the past has been created and listened to under the belief that it can.
(Schoenberg’s remark quoted at the outset of this chapter underscores that conviction.) The
traditional question’s narrow framing can imply a search for a hardened, essential nature for
‘music alone’ – to draw upon Kivy’s term – an abstraction to be thrown onto the examination
table and considered largely apart from issues of the historicity of such questions or the differing
affective and imaginative experiences of those who interact compellingly, and in multiple ways,
with individual works (Kivy 1990). Some discussions along these lines can strike musicians as
disorientingly unmusical, caught up in a skein of philosophically in-house argumentation, where
concerns to preserve a disciplinarily sterilized wording seem distant from a more imaginatively
attuned musical knowledge and experience.
The many varieties of art music, however, are typically engaged with by performers and
listeners under variable social roles and conditions made available by broader cultural matrices.
We may regard these experiences as total listening situations in which music is never experienced
as isolated or alone – never heard free from the force-fields of expectation, habit, knowledge or
external association. Nicholas Cook has made the same point, adding, ‘It is through the
interaction of music and interpreter, text and context, that meaning is constructed…. It is wrong
to speak of music having particular meanings; rather it has the potential for specific meanings to
emerge under specific circumstances’ (Cook 2001: 180). Within the art-music culture of
listening being considered here, aesthetic absorption and knowledgeable commitment (fired in
part by Schoenberg’s ‘mental associations’) are familiar components of adequate participation.
Listeners set these into motion by sympathetic acts of projection, identification and imagination.
These are the terms in which the program-music question is most productively addressed.
No brief treatment of such topics can do justice to the labyrinthine problems at hand. One is
obliged to simplify, to filter out much that is relevant. What follows are mere glances at three of
the many issues currently in play: titles and other paratexts; topic families; signs, metaphors and
blended spaces. These issues are not conceptually separate. They intersect as complements,
different ways of approaching the same theoretical problem. I conclude by touching on some
practical problems of extramusical implication as confronted within the disciplines of music
history and analysis.
an extremely useful falsehood. For so strong is the urge, in the West, to give music a subject, a
literary content, a philosophical message, that a proper mean can only be struck, it would
seem, by aiming at the opposite, formalist extreme. Whatever its usefulness, however, a
falsehood it remains.
(Kivy 1984, 216) 9
Those willing to move beyond that falsehood will engage the important play of associative
imagination and psychology as participatory aspects of the total musical experience. Kendall
Walton puts his finger on the central issue: ‘Mere titles often suffice to make music patently
representational; indeed I cannot imagine music which an appropriate title could not render
representational. Music stands ready to take on an explicit representational function at the
slightest provocation’ (Walton 1994, 47). Walton alludes here to the framing functions that,
within literary theory, we can associate with Gérard Genette’s study of paratexts , features of
presentation ancillary to the otherwise unadorned text: titles, intertitles, epigraphs, separate
explanatory notes, dedications, and much more – conditioning mediations between the text and
its readers (Genette 1997). Paratexts are also central to the repertory of music presently under
consideration and particularly to the experience invited by illustrative or program music. Here
the unadorned text is the bare notation (or its acoustic realization), though that text is surrounded
and inflected by a panoply of ‘non-sounding elements’ – paratextual and cultural – necessary for
a rich, historically adequate construal. 10 In Lawrence Kramer’s terms, most musical texts
(including seemingly non-illustrative ones) are accompanied by textual and citational inclusions,
two types of ‘hermeneutic windows’ inviting robust interpretations from those who are drawn to
pursue them (Kramer 1990, 9–10).
Within the field of philosophical aesthetics Jerrold Levinson (1985) has laid out the case for
titles with admirable clarity:
Titles of artworks are often integral parts of them, constitutive of what such works are….
[They] are plausibly essential properties of them, in many cases…. The title slot for a work of
art is never devoid of aesthetic potential; how it is filled, or that it is not filled, is always
aesthetically relevant. (A work differently titled will invariably be aesthetically different.) …
[Titles] serve as presumptive guides to perception of a certain sort.
Most instances of explicitly illustrative music bear what Levinson designated as either a
‘focusing’ or ‘disambiguating’ title-type. The former guides the listener towards the leading
conceptual idea of the work; the latter ‘can serve to fix or endorse one perceptual reading rather
than another’, important ‘if the body of the work is representationally ambiguous [as often within
musical works]’ (Levinson 1985, 23, 24, 35, 36; Kivy 1984, 40 also endorses the disambiguation
function of titles). To this we need only add the obvious, namely, that all relatable paratexts may
be considered under the same line of thought. These include: a composer’s (or authorized
proxy’s) separate, sometimes detailed programmatic explanation of the music (as with Weber’s
Concertstück , Berlioz’s Symphonie fantastique , or the composer-approved, published
Musikführer that lead us through the illustrative details of Richard Strauss’s tone poems);
ongoing intertitles distributed throughout the score to indicate what is being currently
represented here or there (as with Vivaldi’s Four Seasons , with its ‘demonstration-sonnet’ lines
intercalated at relevant locations within the individual string parts, Liszt’s Schiller-based Die
Ideale , Smetana’s Vltava or Bartók’s Kossuth ); and suppressed programs that are later discovered
and made public (as with Berg’s Lyric Suite ).
As I have written elsewhere, a titled character-piece for keyboard or a titled concerto, overture
or symphonic poem participates in a tradition wherein the implicit game of intermedial
association is presupposed to be aesthetically significant (Hepokoski 1992). In declining to play
the associative game proposed by the composer one would be – following Levinson’s argument
– listening to an ‘aesthetically different’ composition, even though it would ‘sound the same’. 11
Bracketing out the historically conditioned title of La mer in quest only of its ‘meaning as music
[alone]’ is certainly possible and may be gratifying on its own terms. But it is nonetheless to
construe the work in an aesthetically different sense from that of the more complete conception
offered by the composer. Some listeners may not be troubled by this. From the standpoint of an
enriched hermeneutics, though, titles and composer-intended paratexts – however we might learn
of them – are essential for more thoughtful explorations of the layers of connotational and
cultural implication that such works invite us to consider.
Topic families
Beyond verbal paratexts the question of musical representation extends into the individualized
content and processes of the programmatic work – its succession of musical modules, most of
which, while highly characterized, will not carry explicit labels. How might we interpret their
potentially representational roles? When considering the possible semantic implications within
Western instrumental music, philosophers have typically sought to elucidate the musical sign or
figure not by examining concrete situations of historical practice but rather by interrogating the
logic and persuasiveness of the various theoretical possibilities. Typical is the approach taken by
Stephen Davies, hauling the program-music claim before the analytic-philosophical tribunal. ‘If
music is representational,’ we are told, ‘it must satisfy the general conditions for representation.’
Davies posits four that are ‘necessary’: (1) the composer’s intention to illustrate; (2) a
medium/content distinction (the music should represent something other than music); (3) some
sense of resemblance between the music and what is represented (possibly adapted from Richard
Wollheim’s ‘seeing-in’ theory for pictorial art); and (4) the potentially clarifying role of
conventions. Following an exhaustive review of philosophical positions and their complications,
Davies pronounces the verdict:
For the most part, the richness of music does not arise from its depictive powers…. [though] I
allowed that there may be a degree of depiction in music … based on natural (but
conventionally structured) resemblances…. Music’s power lies more with its expressive than
with its limited representational possibilities.
(Davies 1994, 51–121; quotations from pp. 52–3 and 121) 12
A cleaner, more provocative path through all of this has been cleared in the past three decades
within the discipline of music study proper, particularly (though by no means exclusively) in the
subfields concerned with the historical identification and interpretation of musical ‘topics’. These
are recurring, ‘conventional musical signs, or ‘commonplaces’ of style … familiar, expressive,
rhetorical gestures encoded in referential musical patterns’ (McKay 2007, 160). None of this is
news to music scholars, well aware that the study of musical topoi was proposed in 1980 by
Leonard G. Ratner, who documented several late eighteenth-century types and subdivided them
into topics and styles (Ratner 1980, 9–29). 13 Most of them are readily recognizable: dance-
rhythm identifiers (gavotte, minuet, passepied, gigue, bourrée, contredanse), march, fanfare,
musette, pastoral, hunt, Sturm und Drang, Empfindsamkeit , singing style, brilliant style, learned
style, mechanistic clockwork, French Overture, and others as well. One of several strategies of
that decade to encourage the legitimation of a historically responsible hermeneutics, topic theory
helped the discipline, in Hatten’s words, to begin ‘to recover from the [midcentury] repression of
expressive discourse fostered by a formalist aesthetics’ (Hatten 1994, 228; also quoted in McKay
2007, 161) .
Ratner’s original list of connotative signifiers opened the door not only to inquiries into the
associative connotations and registers of such topics (Allanbrook 1983) or to a tabulation and
modest expansion of the accepted eighteenth-century ‘universe of topic[s]’ (Agawu 1991, 30)
but also to a broader array of shared, readily understood musical signs within the tradition,
however creatively individualized these commonly shared signs (or types) might have been
realized in any particular work (or token). One might imagine the vast set of such signs to be
arranged on a continuum of musical ostension, ranging, on the one end, from more or less
obvious or onomatopoetic instances (‘sounds like’) to, on the other end, less obvious figures of
conventional or arbitrary association. 14 (Zones within this continuous span might be regarded as
correlates to Peirce’s famous distinctions between the icon, index and symbol.) The easy cases
are the most obviously mimetic ones, musical analogues of actual sounds that in turn call up
associated images: thunderstorms, rushing water, hunting horns, bagpipe drones, bells, bird calls,
animal cries, battle-clashes. All such are the stock-in-trade of the seventeenth- and early
eighteenth-century aesthetic of ‘imitation’: Farina’s Capriccio stravagante of 1627 (imitating cat,
dog and hen); Biber’s Sonata violino solo representativa for violin of ( c .1669: nightingale,
cuckoo, frog, hen, quail and cat) and militaristic Battalia (1673); various storm interludes (
symphonies ) in French tragédies lyriques – and in Vivaldi’s ‘Spring’ (along with birds and a
barking dog); and so on.
Moving along the continuum, one finds analogues of slow- or fast-moving actions or motions:
light breezes, sunrises, rippling brooks, spinning wheels, pictorial ascents or descents, sunrises,
rapid, energetic bustle, glistening sparkle, sudden surprises, bucolic placidity, and so on. 15
Further along, these blend into motion- or contour-analogues of human emotions or affects, more
or less standardized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: jubilant fanfare-like effects;
ascending or descending contours with characteristic affective connotations; the major–minor,
slow–fast dichotomies and their emotive implications; in minor, the well-documented lament or
grieving figure (a descending-tetrachord bassline from tonic to dominant, sometimes
chromatically filled in – a type of passus duriusculus – and produced as an ostinato bass); various
standardized depictions of the demonic (or dance of death); accepted folkloric signs or other
national style-identifiers of a people, nation or Volk ; and many others. And on the far end, less
unequivocally, one encounters characteristic signs of triumph or defeat, exultation or manic fear,
struggle, despair, breakthrough, the heroic, the learned, the hymnic, the lyric, the ineffable,
rapturous love, divine grace, and dozens, perhaps hundreds, of others – all standard topical
effects of nineteenth-century music. Far from remaining semantically mute or ineffably cryptic,
asking only for our rapt and reverent silence, much of the instrumental music within the
European tradition is bursting with connotative implication historically inlaid into the style and
waiting to be explored hermeneutically by the imaginative and responsible interpreter.
Individualized topics have musical and cultural histories, spanning the centuries. These may
be considered as topic families extended through historical time, within which they are subject to
social and individual ramifications and modifications. One may trace the tradition of battle-
depictions, for instance, from Janequin’s program chanson, La Bataille de Marignan; La guerre (
c .1520s) and William Byrd’s ‘The Battle’ (1591, from My Ladye Nevell’s Booke ) through many
dozens of subsequent works including Beethoven’s Wellington’s Victory and Tchaikovsky’s 1812
Overture , along with several pieces from the twentieth century. Or the topic family of bird-calls
from Janequin through Biber, Vivaldi, Haydn, Beethoven, Wagner, Ravel, Delius, Respighi,
Messiaen, Rautavaara ( Cantus arcticus , 1972), and beyond; or storms; or bells; or mechanical
clocks and other gear-and-lever gizmos; or the sea; or dreamlike or enchanted travel by boat
(siciliana? barcarole?, e.g. Edgecombe 2001). Large-scale historical studies have been made of
the musical signs of the pastoral (Jung 1980); of the structural and varied affective connotations
of The Chromatic Fourth during Four Centuries of Music (Williams 1997); and even of musical
depictions of such human gestures as questions (Jessulat 2000). In addition to providing
sophisticated discussions of the historical background and intellectual structure underpinning
topic theory, Raymond Monelle has produced historical and cultural studies of several topic
families and their near-relatives. These include the 6/8, 9/8 or 12/8 galloping gait of the ‘noble
horse’ from c .1800 through such exemplifications as Schubert’s ‘Erlkönig’, Wagner’s Ride of the
Valkyries and Sousa’s march, The Washington Post ; the descending half-step pianto (the figure of
tears, grief or wearied sigh); and a book-length historical study of ‘hunt, military, and pastoral’
(Monelle 2000, 41–80 and 2006). The potential list of such inquiries seems endless.
Several points follow – and not a few caveats. First, it is clear that much, perhaps even most,
Western instrumental music participates in a historically conditioned, shared semantic network, a
significant portion of which is at least approachable by topic-family theory, broadly and flexibly
construed. Even though irreducible factors of pure music’s systematic procedures and regulated
traditions are also very much in play, the now stale argument that untexted music – much less
program music or music with titles – is ipso facto incapable of pointing toward recognizable
external referents or affects with cultural connotations is no longer tenable. Conversely, though,
one needs to realize that topic theory, still in its raw and rudimentary phases, by no means
answers all of our interpretive questions. Overplaying its cards can lead to breathtakingly naïve
hermeneutic claims. Second, the universe of topic families, including their many shades and
variants, is far larger and more varied than anyone has yet described. It also includes overlapping
topics and individual figures capable of more than one topical reference. Third, selecting an
appropriate (generalized) topic-label for a given figure is more challenging than might initially
appear. A procedural risk of topic theory is that it can tempt the overconfident interpreter, with a
presumed master-code-book securely in hand, to leap rashly into a quick, reductive labeling. To
do so is to discredit what ought to be a more subtly tinged enterprise. We need to think through
our descriptors critically, sceptically, weighing alternatives, problematizing what we might mean
with such descriptions. Most of the entailments that follow rely on our initial decisions, and
those decisions are often the weak links in the chain. (Let Ratner’s designation of the opening of
the Eroica as a waltz stand as a caution to us all: Ratner 1980, 223.)
Fourth, even when we think that we have identified the proper family of a given figure, we
need to be attentive to the nuances and complications that any individual token of it can present.
It may be that the manner of its realization is more noteworthy than the topic itself. Fifth, merely
identifying a topic or series of topics is not enough. Topic-recognition must never be taken to be
a simple translation of music’s meaning into words. It is only an initial step prompting further
inquiry and careful interpretation, particularly with regard to topical inflection and the narrative
journey through arrays of topical successions. Sixth, compositionally to illustrate or connote
musically is, more often than not, to activate a pre-existing topical tradition of signification and
then to tailor it to one’s own cultural and aesthetic purpose. To access a culturally available style
is to channel the memory of its historical traditions, to draw on the potential of its past history of
connotatively charged accumulations. Any topical study of a single work or set of closely related
works should consider the matter both synchronically and diachronically. Individual evocations
of birds, water, battles, storms, fanfares, hunts, and all the rest may plug more directly into the
topical tradition than into the external referent itself .
This last point questions the extent to which extramusical references are, in fact, extramusical
at all. Monelle deals with the issue from the standpoint of a hard-line semiotics. ‘The status of a
… semiotic entity [such as a musical topic] is not guaranteed by its relation to a real state of
affairs, but by its interpretability within a code.’ Ultimately, the verbal designation for a topic
(storm, pastoral, lament, and so on) can be best grasped as what Peirce called an ‘interpretant’, a
conventional mode of connecting the signifier (or, for Peirce, the ‘representamen’) to the
signified (or ‘object’). In short, musical topics, while codelike, ‘need not refer [directly] to a
‘world’ of extension’ [objective things in the world ‘out there’], and their meaning is not
‘referential’. On the contrary, they must refer to semantic values, defined and implied by the
signs themselves…. The meaning of the musical sign is not to be sought in the world at all. It is
to be sought within the [signifying] system’ (Monelle 2006, 20–32; quotations from 21 and 22).
This is an aggressive claim. Encountering a historically advanced instance of the tempest topic –
Beethoven’s ‘Gewitter, Sturm’ movement from the Pastoral Symphony, say, or Wagner’s Prelude
to Act 1 of Die Walküre – need not be regarded as an ad hoc, individual illustration of any
particular, external storm, nor even of essential storminess, as grounded in the composer’s
personal experience. Rather, on Monelle’s semiotic-absolutist terms, what would be conjured up
is a new realization of the craft-inherited ‘musical storm’: a traditional, vividly imaginative
convention available within the historical codes of music. 16
Conceptual acuity within the generic space realizes that we are invited to locate similar
attributes within the two input spaces. We are then asked to correlate aspects of the ‘music
alone’– phrase-to-phrase modular content and longer range structure – with the implications of
the work’s evocative title (or other paratext) through an imaginative recognition of those
topological or structural attributes that both input spaces are imagined to have in common. Cook
refers to these as ‘enabling similarities’ or ‘homologies’. They can include shared specifics of
motion, speed, repetitive gestures, precision, intensity, clash, turbulence, calm, affective posture,
high or low cultural register, and many others. 2 2
Here is where the deployment of topic families or appropriately individualized, ad hoc
gestures renders the situation more complex. From this perspective the ‘music alone’ (what one
hears, the acoustic surface) can be recognized as pre-loaded with historically conditioned
significations: hunt, march, storm, prayer, minor- or major-mode connotations, or any of a vast
number of expressive or representational possibilities. Like dead or frozen metaphors, these
seemingly natural associations of topic are long-established cultural products of earlier
metaphorical blends. Hatten refers to them as immediate, stable and near-literal ‘correlations’ or
‘shared general meanings’, conventions that are ‘inherited from earlier styles’ and can
encompass accrued expressive meanings (‘expressive genres’) broader than topics per se. 23
What one might at first naively imagine to be a simple input of ‘ music alone’ is not ‘music
alone ’ at all. It never is. Instead, even while we may not be cognizant of the underlying factors
at work in these fluid moments of immediacy and transience, we experience music as a richly
complex, affective space that is always already the outcome of several earlier, assimilative
blends that can be (or have been) automatically set into motion in our own acts of listening. Held
up to inspection, the ‘music alone’ turns out to be a generous aggregate of ready-made,
previously blended spaces, historical accretions, standardized connotations – hyperblends of
newer metaphors grounded in multiply accumulated layers of more elemental, prior metaphors –
that are each themselves open to historical and stylistic inquiry. Bristling with interpretive
potential, the rippling thicknesses of these connotative features afford a near-immediate cross-
space mapping of the ‘music alone’ onto the non-musical implications suggested, in yet another
stage of assimilation, by the provided programmatic title or paratext. The result of the mapping is
a new entity, a conceptual hyperblend, understood as an emergent meaning made possible
through the listener’s individualized, performative acts of absorption and imagination. The
mutually correlatable tensions of the music and the analogue-image are brought together into a
differing, unitary mental space of new signification, a newly created metaphorical meaning. 24
An additional aspect of the encounter with any piece of music is the experience of its
sonic/modular change through linear time: attending to the musical process in motion. This
stream-of-change carves out a singular temporal space of affect and image. Changing from
moment to moment as the piece scrolls through time, the processual flow of enacted blends can
be construed, with the help of memory and anticipation (phenomenological retention and
protention), as an impression of coherent, expanding spatiality. Enabling that impression is a
cross-space mapping, in Lakoffian terms, of the common TEMPORALITY as SPACE metaphor,
perhaps inflected also with such schemata as CONTAINER merged with JOURNEY (or even
STORY). With such a realization (while I do not seek to oversimplify a complex matter) the
problematics typically associated with the issue of musical narrative can be recast. When the
impression of narrativity occurs in music, it is the result of the production of a different mode of
conceptual integration. And again, it is one typically invited by the program-music composer. 25
(I revisit the question of linearity in the final section of this chapter.)
The common, spatial impression of the blended-space end-product has been noted in differing
ways. For philosopher Kendall Walton, the ‘representational arts’ in general are characterized as
fictional ‘work worlds’ built upon ‘props’ in ‘games of make-believe’. Even non-representational
music is experienced as having ‘spatial perspectives’ construable as engrossingly subjective,
intimate ‘game worlds’ of ‘imagined feelings’ (Walton 1990; 1994, 56, 59). For musicologist
and cognitive theorist Eric F. Clarke, the final experiential product is a ‘virtual object that I hear
as having a bodily character’, one with ‘virtual agency’ and ‘virtual motion’ readily attributed to
it. The performer’s or listener’s willing absorption into an ‘environment’ of ‘virtual reality’
encourages and rewards a close personal identification with these musical blends and processes
(Clarke 2005, 182–8). Even more broadly, all of this resonates synergistically with music theorist
Robert Hatten’s extended semiotic studies of the embodied nature and communicative potential,
for style-competent listeners, of ‘musical gesture’, defined as an ‘energetic shaping through time’
and a ‘movement (implied, virtual, actualized) interpretable as a [conventionalized] sign … [and]
marked as meaningful … biologically and/or culturally’ (Hatten 2004, 1, 93, 125). 26 And much
of this, with some allowance for flexibility, can also be read as compatible with Lawrence
Kramer’s recent insistence on the mutual, deeply subjective interaction of music and listener,
with the latter ‘hearkening’ to the call of music and, in effect, lighting the music up (
Aufleuchtung ) with a sympathetic response, hearing music under an aspect. For the humanist
Kramer, however, the semiotic route, aspiring to science and objectivity, misses the point:
‘Semiotic models suggest that expressions signify or symbolize feelings without requiring their
presence in either sender or receiver.’ Instead, Kramer insists that we need to realize instead the
indispensable role of participatory subjectivity, to understand that it is only ‘that openness, which
coincides with the necessary mutuality of the expressive act and the reply that reexpresses it,
[that] marks the point of theoretical sufficiency’ (Kramer 2012, 156). 27
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for
precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of
the crafts…. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to
indicate the truth roughly and in outline…. It is the mark of an educated [person] to look for
precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits.
Notes
1 Klauwell 1910, v–vi: While other construals are defensible, program music, ‘in the strict[est] sense’, is that in which the form
and content of the piece, in purely musical terms, would be ‘an unsolvable puzzle’ without the supplied program. Scruton
2001, 397: ‘Properly speaking … programme music is … music that seeks to be understood in terms of its programme; it
derives its movement and its logic from the subject it attempts to describe.’ The all-too-familiar, negative variant of this
construal asserts that a program is often offered to cover up defects in purely musical structure or logic.
2 The characterization is that of Hatten 1994, 232.
3 The opposing nineteenth-century arguments were more complicated and nuanced than might initially be imagined. For
German-language readers, the extended historical summary of the whole question of program music in Altenburg 1997 is
magisterial, providing a commanding overview of the changing concepts of the attendant issues and complications. See also
Dahlhaus 1988, 365–85. For English-language readers, among the numerous brief treatments of the debate over music and
representation in the nineteenth century are Dahlhaus 1982, 52–63 and 1989, 128–40; Goehr 1998, 6–47; and Hepokoski 2001.
4 On this point (here considering Tovey’s defence of Beethoven’s Pastoral ) Richard Will’s remarks are on the mark: ‘Like
many of his contemporaries, [Tovey] assumes that programmatic music is based on ‘extramusical’ considerations such as the
narrative structure of programs rather than the ‘musical’ principles that underpin absolute music, whose presence in the
Pastoral , conversely, reveals that it is not an unusual mixture of music and language but a ‘perfect classical symphony’….
[But this leads to the position that] any work using a sonata or other familiar form … is [to be] considered absolute music with
an irrelevant text. The works are thereby defended from the accusations of formal incoherence leveled at programmatic works
by writers like Eduard Hanslick, Edward Dannreuther, or Tovey … but they are also put decisively in the realm of the
ineffable’ (Will 2002, 19–20). (See again Klauwell 1910 and Scruton 2001.)
5 Summaries of Langer are also readily located. See, for example, Åhlberg 1994.
6 Foundational for any discussion of this issue, Mahler’s famous – and conflicted – comments from 1896, 1897 and 1902 on the
utility of printed programs for his early symphonies may be found in Martner 1979, 177–81, 212–14 and 262. ‘Inner-program’
claims, insisting that his music’s ultimate content resides in a quasi-spiritual ‘mood’ or ‘residue of mystery’, are made in letters
to Max Marschalk (20 March 1896) and Max Kalbeck (January 1902). Verbal ‘signposts’ and ‘milestones’ (preliminary aids
within what is more truly a musical sphere of ‘obscure feelings, at the gate that opens into the ‘other world’) are adduced in a
letter to Marschalk on 26 March 1896 and compared with ‘a map of the heavens, so that [the listener] can get a picture of the
night sky with all its luminous worlds. But any such [programmatic] exposition cannot offer more. People have to have
something already known to refer to if they are not to lose their way.’
A contextualized précis of Mahler’s views, along with a discussion of the term ‘form motive’ (from Wagner’s 1857 essay,
‘Über Franz Liszt’s Symphonische Dichtungen’), may be found in Dahlhaus 1989, 90–1. On Liszt, Wagner and the form
motive, see Hepokoski 2001, 433–4. For similar historical issues and recent discussions, see also Hepokoski 1998. A helpful
pathway leading beyond some of the program- and/or absolute-music snares in Mahler is provided in Micznik 2007.
7 For a discussion interrelating the Egmont story’s implied narrative action with the work’s musical structure, see Hepokoski
2002.
8 Scruton’s anti-representationalist argument was initially laid out in his frequently cited, earlier essay, ‘Representation in
Music’, Philosophy 51 (1976), 273–87. A telling reply to any such assertion about ‘musical understanding’ may be found in
Kivy 1984, 148.
9 ‘Musical purism’ is also a term associated with Kivy. Kivy’s book is a strong, extended defense of musical representation.
See also the useful reply to it in Dempster 1994.
10 Cf. Roman Ingarden’s argument that some ‘nonsounding elements’ belong to the ontology of the musical work: 1986, 83–
115.
11 This position is explorable through the classic philosophical question of the identity of indiscernibles: things are not identical
if they do not have all of their properties in common. Cf. the famous exemplification of a different case of non-identical
indiscernibles in Jose Luis Borges’s 1944 short story, ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote’ .
12 Scruton 1976 had postulated five similar conditions, one of which is particularly stringent and on whose terms, on Scruton’s
view, music fails: ‘A representational work of art must express thoughts about its subject, and an interest in the work should
involve an understanding of those thoughts … Sometimes we feel that a work of art is filled with thought, but that the thought
cannot be detached from the work. It is impossible to put it into words (or into other words). Such cases, I should like to say,
are cases not of representation but of expression’ (273–4). Or: ‘Thoughts have structure: they refer to objects, and predicate
properties of them’, Scruton 1997, 127). For Wollheim’s influential ‘seeing-in’ theory – now discussed by most philosophers
of music aesthetics – see Wollheim 1980.
13 Also relevant are standard figures of rhetoric, potentially fruitful but not considered in the present essay. Ratner’s pioneering
work is both acknowledged and subjected to a much-needed critique in Monelle 2000, 24–33.
14 See also the similar ‘typology of musical illustrations’ laid out in Kivy 1984, 28–60.
15 Richard Will’s close study of The Characteristic Symphony in the Age of Haydn and Beethoven (2002) – of which
Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony is the most noted example – documents that that genre ‘is first and foremost a genre of
pastoral idylls, thunderstorms, military conflicts, hunts, and political identities’, p. 2). In terms of tabulation: ‘Titles consisting
of only one or a few words identify over 70 examples as pastoral … 15 as military, 15 as hunts, 10 as storms, and more than
30 as expressions of national or regional characters – in sum, nearly 150 symphonies or movements as representations of
[these] five subject categories’ (p. 1). For a recent identification of the ‘sunrise topos’ in music, see Sisman 2013.
16 Monelle’s example (2006, 28) is not a storm but the signification of a ‘noble horse’, previously discussed in Monelle 2000.
17 See, for example, the recent discussion of the mid- to late-eighteenth century’s astonishment at the ready ability of the mind
to visualize things within musical experiences as laid out in Loughridge 2011. One of several telling examples is provided on
p. 214: ‘For the German composer Adam Hiller [in 1754] … the ability of musical imitations to bring to mind visual images
seemed inexplicable – magical.’ Loughridge goes on to note that in that year Hiller wrote: ‘We often let one sense give the
illusion of another or we let hearing represent things that otherwise would not be at all suitable for it. Things that should be
grasped by means of an entirely different sense organ seem suddenly to have changed their nature: we believe we find them in
tones, and we really do find them there, as vastly different as they otherwise are. Is this not a kind of magic?’ Here the
translation is taken from Lippman 1992, 118. I take the term ‘pictorial listening’ in the decades around 1800 from the
important comments on musical pictorialism, tableaux and ‘visual or quasi-visual experiences’ in Mathew 2013, 89–101.
18 The article updates and summarizes the theory initially presented in Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and elaborated in numerous
other studies of each author. More recently, Lakoff has welded his project to cognitive-science research – neural flows and
pathways of the brain, cross-synapse firing, and so on, all of which led him to an even more emphatically ‘embodied’ concept
of the mind – and has updated and redubbed his theory as ‘The Neural Theory of Metaphor’ (Lakoff 2008).
19 For a summary, see Fauconnier and Turner 1995, 183–204, esp. 184. A related term associated with Lakoff is ‘image-
schema’ (with an ‘image-schema structure’ characterized by a ‘cognitive topology’: Lakoff 1993, 214. Lakoff’s synoptic
‘Neural Theory of Metaphor’ (2008, 30) understands Fauconnier’s and Turner’s term ‘mental space’ as ‘a mental simulation
characterizing an understanding of a situation, real or imagined’ and ‘blending’ as ‘neural binding’.
20 The model in Figure 4.1 , and the quotations in the text above, are derived from Fauconnier and Turner 2002, passim , and
1998, 133–87, from which I adapt wordings found on 134, 142–4.
21 Cook 2001 takes us through many of the complicating issues at hand in helpful ways. Zbikowski has been interested in the
applications of Fauconnier, Turner and recent metaphor theories to vocal music. Among his several discussions see
Zbikowski 1999, 2002, 2008, 2009. Sceptical of the utility of applying language-grounded concepts of metaphor to the
different conceptual world of music, Spitzer (2004) is concerned with developing historical, aesthetic and phenomenological
constructions of the issue, calling upon the metaphor-theory frameworks, for instance, of Paul Ricoeur (itself indebted to that
of Max Black) and several others.
22 Cook 2001, e.g. 172–4, 181. Some of the attribute types listed here are taken also from Hatten 1994. Cook’s homologies and
enabling similarities are what Lakoff would call the ‘ontological’ or ‘epistemological correspondences’ between the ‘image-
schema structure[s]’ of each domain (Lakoff 1993, e.g. 214).
23 Hatten 1994, 67–90 (expressive genres, topics, ‘frozen’ metaphors), 162–72 (‘The Role of Metaphor’), 255, 289; 2004, 12.
From the latter, see also p. 297, n. 1, comments on Lakoff and Johnson, Fauconnier and Turner (judged to be ‘a richer
model’) and Zbikowski. Monelle 2006, 22–3, also summarizes Hatten’s concept of correlation vis-à-vis topic theory.
24 Here I have inflected Fauconnier and Turner with language from the tension-metaphor theory of Max Black, particularly as
summarized and inflected by Paul Ricoeur in, e.g. Ricoeur 1976, 46–52, and 1981, 165–81.
25 Within historical practice the multiplication of metaphors or hyperblends is typically extended beyond the individual work to
be broadly applicable as grounding aesthetic axioms of certain types or schools of composition. Such metaphors may be
understood as foundational guidelines for both composition and subsequent reception: compose works and invite
performances and listenings to them as if such-and-such were the case. See Watkins’s recent provocative study of depth
metaphors (2013).
26 The importance placed on embodiment reaches back to Johnson 1987 and to Lidov 1987. For other issues of subjective
identification within the world of music construed as signs, see Cumming 2000.
27 Aufleuchtung , aspect and ‘hearkening’ occur repeatedly as central ideas throughout the book.
28 Subsequent discussions of music and ‘mood’ (as opposed to object-directed ‘emotion’) are numerous. Some engaging
samples include Berger 2000, 200–1; Savage 2009, 93–5, 101–2, 104, embedded within a Ricoeur-inflected approach; Carroll
2003, 521–5, and Kivy’s response to Carroll (Kivy 2009, 79–99), insisting that while music, contra Carroll, does not ‘arouse’
moods, it can be (in Kivy’s characteristic wording) ‘expressive of’ them.
29 The programmatic intentions are laid out in Todd 1993, 12–13, 72.
30 On the importance of this problem, see my discussions throughout Caplin et al . 2009, especially ‘Sonata Theory and Dialogic
Form’, 71–89.
31 I have sought to do this with such studies as Hepokoski 2006 and – extending the procedure to a composition with more
‘abstract’ claims – Hepokoski 2012.
Introduction
The impact of the rediscovery of the treatise on the sublime ascribed to Longinus (1978), the
importance of Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the
Sublime and Beautiful ([1757] 1990) and Kant’s Critique of Judgement ([1790] 1952) have
been summarized aplenty. 1 However, although the sublime has generated voluminous,
often adulatory critical commentary, the beautiful has tended to do so rather more
surreptitiously. 2 Theodor Adorno and Jean-François Lyotard famously declared the sublime
to be the authentic aesthetic mode of modern art. The sublime size of the twentieth-century
literature on the sublime reflects the widely held sympathy for this view, and also the ability
of the term to generate seemingly unlimited variants or subtypes. 3 The beautiful, by
contrast, has frequently been considered to be a suspicious aesthetic choice for the artist of
modern times. Beauty is often condemned as anachronistic, reactionary or fake, as lapsing
too readily into kitsch through offering false, invidious perfections. In this way beautiful
forms are often marked as the disreputable products of an ideological airbrush, from which
we gain dubious pleasure because we are duped and fail to notice the exclusions or
marginalizations that allow the construction of images of apparent flawlessness. When
Lyotard famously stated that the sublime ‘is perhaps the only mode of aesthetic sensibility to
characterize the modern’ (Lyotard 1991) he derived this stance from Adorno, who wrote in
his Aesthetic Theory that adherence to a sublime aesthetic is necessary for authentic modern
art:
after the fall of formal beauty, the sublime was the only aesthetic idea left to modernism
… The ascendancy of the sublime is one with art’s compulsion that fundamental
contradictions not be covered up but fought through in themselves; reconciliation for
them is not the result of the conflict but exclusively that the conflict becomes eloquent.
(Adorno 1997, 197) 4
One prominent aspect of this tonal complexity is the extensive melisma on angenehmere ,
which occurs over the transitional harmonic moment in the move from minor to major, and
the change from emphasis on B to B (and therefore suggests a move from negation to
affirmation; see Musical Example 5.1 ).
These melismatic extravagances, out of place in a recitative, far more likely to be found in
an aria, might be heard as generating an ironic distance from the pleasures evoked in the
text. In the Third Critique Kant notoriously applied the term angenehm to music in order to
relegate its aesthetic status (see Kant [1790] 1952, 195–6). Beethoven’s musical
excessiveness suggests ironic negation of this denigration of music as merely agreeable
sensations (as Hinton notes, ‘agreeable’ or ‘pleasurable tones’ is almost a tautology in
Kantian terms). Furthermore, in these melismas Beethoven invokes an operatic style, one
‘adequate to the kind of reception suggested by Kant’s term’. With Beethoven’s well-known
antipathy towards Rossini in mind, the melismas are a cryptic allusion to the virtuoso
dispenser of angenehmere Töne . For Hinton, the baritone’s preceding ‘not these tones’
rejects the instrumental variations that had earlier been cut off by the Schrekensfanfare
(Wagner’s term for what many have heard as a sublime, terrible rupture) and thus rejects the
‘symphonic’, or ‘cultured’, treatment of the theme. After this rejection, the ‘Rossinian’
melismas ironically present the musically beautiful alternative. Thus, two possible versions
of the finale to come are presented – one cultured, the other pleasant (Hinton 1998).
For Hinton, this unresolved ambiguity can be heard as reflecting Beethoven’s awareness
of the limits of his art. In the face of the obligations of the genre, the burdens of working
through the finite towards realizing a vision of the infinite that is the goal of the ‘sublime’
symphony, Beethoven realizes the ultimate inability to supply symphonically the fullness of
joy. The late eighteenth-century origins of the symphonic sublime have been traced by Carl
Dahlhaus, who cites Schulz’s article on the symphony in Johann Georg Sulzer’s Allgemeine
Theorie der schönen Künste (1794) as seminal. The article describes the symphony as
‘grand, noble, and sublime’ and compares it with the Ode through its characteristic
combination of passion and reflection. This combination also informs Hoffmann’s critique
of Beethoven’s Fifth which extols sublime effects but also Beethoven’s cerebral
achievement in marshalling the ‘apparent disorder’, the rapturous and suddenness, the
convulsions of the ‘ grand style’, towards an order that is higher (or deeper, depending on
which spatial metaphor is employed). Here Hoffmann echoes Sulzer’s article on the sublime
in Allgemeine :
Musical Example 5.1 Beethoven, Symphony No. 9, Finale, mm. 216–36
When order is created out of disorder and confusion then, for those who discern in some
degree the rightness of it, it is a sublime thought, that, out of all the apparent disorder in
the physical and moral world, the most beautiful order is achieved in the whole.
(Dahlhaus 1991, 68–72)
Passions, whether violent or not, must never be expressed to the point of exciting disgust,
and music, even in the most terrible situations, must never offend the ear, but must please
the listener, or in other words must never cease to be music.
(Solomon 1986, 17)
Mozart’s music hardly seems to require beautification, although it did get a dose of
‘sublimification’ through the romantic legacy of a preference for the Sturm und drang works
in G and C minor, where if beauties are found they are conditioned by ‘strangeness’ (see
Carruthers 1998). The long acknowledged special quality of beauty in Mozart’s music has
recently been discussed in ways which begin to reveal a beautiful complexity that is far from
passive or monochrome. Schiller considered the sublime to be a ‘mixed feeling’, a
combination of ‘melancholy’, ‘joyousness’ and ‘rapture’ (Schiller [1801] 1966, 198). The
beautiful might be similarly composite, ambiguous and, again like the sublime, tinged with
irony. For Solomon, Mozart’s slow movements are paradigms of those works of the
‘greatest beauty’ which are ‘pervaded by heavy sadness, a knowledge of loss, a touch of
fear, a sense of transience, a whiff of mortality’. Their formal returns act as repairing,
healing, and a move towards an ideal fusion (Solomon 1996, 194–7). For Scott Burnham,
Mozart, poised at the crossroads of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, offers ironic
intimations at once revelatory and resigned, redemptive and melancholy. We hear the
sound of these intimations as beautiful. The awe we experience in perceiving them is not
overwhelming, not in the sublime manner.
(Burnham 2013, 101)
The beautiful in Mozart offers an alternative sense of self to that created in the Kantian
sublime, one generated through access to an inner realm, one of transcendence but also
involving a loss of innocence. In Burnham’s words this is a ‘melancholy’ yet ‘astonishing’
beauty of ‘ironic intimation’, one that in Così fan tutte goes so far as to problematize the
equation of truth and beauty (Burnham 2013, 114–15).
Hanslick judged the music of the last movement of Beethoven’s Ninth, for all the
‘immensity’ of its subject and ‘grandeur if intention’, and ‘for all its [musical] brilliance’, to
be ‘ unschön ’. This judgement comes in an extended footnote to discussion of the ‘harmful
and confused’ attempt to understand music as a language – consequences of
‘disconnections’ and ‘interruptions’ which ‘signify nothing but ugliness’ (Hanslick [1891]
1986, 43). In his Beethoven essay, published in the centenary year 1870, Wagner described the
Ninth as a highpoint in Beethoven’s achievement in ‘advancing’ music ‘far beyond the
region of the aesthetically Beautiful, into the sphere of the absolutely Sublime’ (Wagner
[1870] 2008, 32, 36). Such descriptions firmly place ‘advanced’ music in the sublime
aesthetic category. Sections of Wagner’s essay are none-too-veiled critical responses to
Hanslick’s On the Musically Beautiful . Though Wagner takes Schopenhauer as his starting
point for the concept of the sublime in music, he departs from this to move into an anti-
Hanslick polemic (see Kropfinger 1991, 136–9). 13 Wagner argues, via Schopenhauer, that
the ‘illusive surface’ ( Schein ) of art is a mere ‘semblance’. From the ‘principle of
tranquillisation by sheer pleasure in the semblance’, he writes, ‘has come our term for beauty
( Schönheit ); the root of which word in our German language is plainly connected with
Show ( Schein ) as object, with Seeing ( Schauen ) as subject.’ The beautiful is a dream-like
illusion, or delusion. By contrast, Wagner describes the striking concept of the ‘scream’:
From the most terrifying of such dreams we wake with a scream , the immediate
expression of the anguished will … Now if we take the Scream in all the diminutions of
its vehemence, down to the gentler cry of longing, as the root element of every human
message to the ear … neither artistic beholding nor artistic fashioning can result from
aught but a diversion of the consciousness from the agitations of the will.
With the ‘scream’, at whatever level of intensity, no illusion is possible. And this is the basis
of music’s sublime nature. Music’s true character is revealed as ‘the effect of beauty, the
very first effect of music’s appearance, advances the most directly to a revelation of her
truest character through the agency of the sublime’ (Wagner [1870] 2008, 7–8, 11, 13, 15).
14 Music reveals that truth is sublime and sublime is truth.
Wagner argues that the systematic ordering of rhythmic structure in periodic phrasing
moves music closer to the beauty characteristic of plastic forms, but it is possible to pierce
these beautiful musical forms through moments of rupture. These moments of formal
disruption reveal music’s true, sublime essence. The complex intensifications of Tristan’s
delirium scene in the final act of Tristan und Isolde are a sustained rupture of this kind, in
which musical coherence is seriously imperilled. Tristan’s death at the end of this scene is a
‘critical moment’ followed, according to Thomas Grey, ‘naturally [ sic ] by a stabilizing
catharsis’ provided by Isolde’s quasi-autonomous ‘Transfiguration’. This cathartic ending,
Grey notes, also ‘picks up the thread of the Act II love duet so brutally broken by
Brangane’s scream’ (Grey 1995, 337). The long-delayed closure of the cruelly interrupted
Act 2 love duet in the final cadence of the Transfiguration is clear and familiar. The
similarly belated closure of the musical ruptures at Tristan’s death near the beginning of Act
3, Scene 2 is more subtle. As Isolde takes the dying Tristan in her arms, the opening
paragraph of the Act 1 Prelude is recapitulated ( Musical Example 5.2 ). This is a potentially
closing gesture of return to the work’s musical origins as well as a musical expression of the
powerful force of memory. The recapitulation proceeds up to the beginning of the ‘glance
motive’, but is broken at the moment Tristan expires. His final spoken word, ‘Isolde’, halts
progression through pausing on the E–D appoggiatura. He dies as the rhythm and motive
begins up again, but the music stops on a reharmonization of the melodic B Grey notes that
it is ‘severed with exquisite delicacy by a diminished triad [E —G –C] struck on the
harp’ (Grey 1995, 357). Isolde gasps (‘Ha!’) on F . (As Wagner says in his Beethoven essay,
sublime moments of rupture need not always be screamed out fortissimo. ) Subsequently,
Isolde pleads that Tristan’s wound might be healed and she recalls the rapture of the lovers’
night with a momentary adumbration of the B major resolution of her upcoming
transfiguration music. Her final pitch at the end of the Transfiguration is the F upon which
her gasp had broken the musical form at the moment of trauma, now supported by the
heavenly harp’s B major arpeggios, possibly a belated resolution of the harp’s rupturing
diminished triad. The final recall of the opening of the Act 1 Prelude in the very last bars
accomplishes the formal closure that the recapitulation during Tristan’s death scene had
promised yet not fulfilled. It also completes a musical ‘frame’ for the piece, enclosing the
opera’s sublime boundlessness with beautiful, formal control.
Musical Example 5.2 Wagner, Tristan und Isolde , Act 3: Isolde,
‘Tristan! Ah!’
as one of the two forms in which the beautiful manifests itself in its gradual unfolding
from an original unity. The other form with which the sublime is intimately linked and
which presupposes the sublime for its full effect is the comic.
Vischer’s argument highlights the idea that both the comic and the sublime are based on a
dismantling of the beautiful, ideal identity of the sensible and supersensible. In Vischer’s
comic sublime, by contrast with the tragic sublime, after this negation there is no drive
towards a final resolution or affirmation of order. However, although comedy brings the
sublime down to earth, it needs its high aspirations to survive. The comic can bear no fake
sublimity. The infinite longing for the sublime ideal remains, but the comic subject is not
allowed to forget the life mundane and the limits of sublime possibilities. Modiano ponders
whether a comic version of the sublime might be more likely to remain attractive in a
sceptical, anti- or post-romantic age, in which hope for transcendence or subjective unity is
denuded, even though it depends upon a sustained power of the absolute through requiring
comparison of the finite and the infinite, a comparison which particularly flourished in the
romantic era (Modiano 1987). 20 Writing in the 1970s, Thomas Weiskel famously asserted
that the sublime, as a tainted aesthetic, ‘must now be abridged, reduced, and parodied as the
grotesque, somehow hedged with irony to assure us we are not imaginative adolescents’
(Weiskel 1976: 6). And Mondiano notes how ‘the moderns customarily turn the comic into
the absurd and the sublime into the anti-sublime’; but there is much modern art in which the
distinctions and rejections that Weiskel and Modiano describe are complicated by nostalgic
remnants of traditional aesthetic concepts. The music of Francis Poulenc plays with such
categorical ambiguities with particular subtlety. In so doing, it invokes variants of the
sublime and beautiful in the guises of the comic, Gothic, sentimental and grotesque.
Poulenc’s little piano Pastourelle (1927) at first presents a naive and carefree character –
an idyll of gentle comfort and delights. In its final measures, however, this is thrown into
doubt and disarray ( Musical Example 5.3 ).
Musical Example 5.4 Poulenc, Concerto for Organ, Timpani and Strings,
opening organ solo
The infernal return to Bach can be heard as disturbing discovery rather than rappel à
l’ordre . The chord in m. 2, a diminished seventh over a dissonant bass, is an harmonic
deformation of rather macabre effect, after which it is impossible not to hear a ‘shiver’ or
‘shudder’ on the strings, again on that tawdry, favourite chord of uncertainty, the diminished
seventh. The evidently borrowed nature of the opening immediately challenges the notion of
artistic autonomy, and yet, at the motivic level the rest of the concerto can be shown to be
one of Poulenc’s most ‘unified’, that is, self-derived or autonomous works. The concerto
wears the motivic variations that tie the main themes together on its sleeve, so the one,
penultimately placed exception to this motivic ‘family’ (an elegiac string theme) is
especially telling. In the end, then, autonomy is again challenged by exoteric material.
Before this, however, at the structural climax, the comic turn characteristic of the Gothic
gives an unsettling twist to the anticipated moment of formal resolution and subjective
synthesis.
The opening paragraph of the concerto is in effect a slow introduction, leading in
conventional fashion to a climactic dominant. What follows is a kind of double exposition,
two parallel paragraphs based on subjective dualisms. A third allegro theme (fig. 37), derived
from a jubilant subsidiary idea, sounds like a recapitulation as it marks the return to the
‘home’ key, G minor, and restores the allegro tempo of the first main theme. It also suggests
summary or synthesis as it incorporates dissonant chords from the slow introduction (1
before fig. 38) and transformations of material from the second subject of the first
expository thematic pair (fig. 41). This, however, is the most complex, ambiguous section in
the concerto, characterized by multidimensional hybridity. It combines elements of the first
two subjects, and in traditional formal terms, as recapitulation, it suggests a new, unified
identity emerging out of previous contrast and dissonance, a restoration of beautiful form.
However, for all those suggestions of roundedness, resolution and unification it is a comic
turn, a character generated by the perky motivic repetitions and the registration of the organ,
which unceremoniously takes the instrument out of the church and dumps it into the
fairground. Through motivic transformation (or deformation) and timbral effect the jocular
displaces the jubilant. There is a kind of doubleness (which the double structure of the work
to this point also sustains) in that at once the moment suggests the aspiration to subjective
unity or resolution in ‘deep’ structure, yet only to take an unexpected humorous turn to the
frivolous, a light-heartedness not apparently ‘earned’ or anticipated, couched in tones of
decidedly ‘low’ cultural value. One could read this as a Freudian comic displacement or
substitution in the face of something terrible or fearful and thereby sustain the depth
psychological strain of much Gothic criticism, but the moment’s effect depends also upon
surface ambiguity and playfulness, achieved through apparent hybridity and malformation.
After this the subsequent return of the opening ‘authentic’ musical relic sounds less a
commemoration and more a bastardization.
Mourning, through elegy, is the concerto’s last response, elegy as reparation and mode of
utmost beauty, which seeks to ‘transform pain into something endurable’. 23 In this elegiac
theme Poulenc’s use of lower, muted solo strings rather than violins in full ‘throat’ might
suggest distance or darkness. His great friend Jean Cocteau might well have gagged; he had
famously demanded composers write for an ‘orchestra without the caress of the strings’. The
string solo is an instrumental tone previously used in the second subject of the second
thematic pairing, where Poulenc’s Concerto is at its most saccharine and hence seems to
challenge notions of ‘good taste’ most strongly. The category invoked here is the
‘sentimental’, a kind of debased beautiful, evoked in the concerto as aesthetic complement
to the debased sublime of the Gothiccomic. As Hans Keller noted, the romantic solo violin is
the chief suspect as instrumental carrier of the sentimental. Keller identifies the inhibitions
and defences against sentiment produced by the fear of feeling held most strongly by those
in the ‘best society’, a society that calls sentiment ‘sentimentality’. Such defensiveness is
often built upon ‘a chronic sense of humour’ (Keller 1994, 71). One of Poulenc’s artistic
achievements is that humour and sentimentality are released from such a crippling bind
through their central role in rethinking the traditional aesthetics of the sublime and beautiful.
The sentimentalist is routinely denied a place at modernism’s high table. This is part of
modernism’s ‘anxiety of contamination’, to use Andreas Huyssen’s phrase, the aesthetic
barrier is erected to separate (and protect) ‘art’ from the trivial, banal, tawdry and the
commonplace. Huyssens describes how this is notably exemplified by Gustav Flaubert’s
Emma Bovary, a ‘sentimental’ reader of trashy romances, who stands for ‘woman’ as lover
of inferior literature, confirming her place with mass culture on the low side of the ‘great
divide’, a division excluding women and their sentimentality from high art. (And, by
extension, their forms of beauty: Huyssen cites Max Horkheimer and Adorno’s figuring of
mass culture as the evil queen seeking confirmation, in her own mirror, that she is the ‘most
beautiful in the land’. Huyssen 1986, ix and 44–62; Horkheimer and Adorno 1982, 141). 24 )
As Elizabeth Maddock Dillon (2004) notes, the sentimental is condemned for its lack of
subtlety or ambiguity, its transparent, manipulative and false expression, its wilful turn away
from the darker ‘truth’ of the ‘real’. Aesthetically, the sentimental seems worthless. And
ethically it seems, at best, dubious. However, Dillon argues that considering aesthetics as
political practice reveals close links with sentimentalism, one that facilitates analysis of
sentimentality’s prominence in the nineteenth century and its debasement in the twentieth.
The eighteenth-century rise of modern aesthetics and the turn to liberal politics were both
founded upon the freedom ascribed to the autonomous, aesthetically educated subject.
Sentimentalism, by contrast, seems to offer no such autonomy, but rather anti-individualism,
a consequence of its basis in consumerism, functionalism and domesticism (of women, of
course). Dillon continues by noting that sentimentalism characteristically includes the
moment of reflection on an emotion that is excessive and overtly cultivated. The
characteristic use of established convention, the turn to well-worn tricks of the trade, also
makes constructiveness manifest. Sentimentalism can therefore offer a critical aspect, one
exposing the limits or problems underlying pretensions to aesthetic autonomy (and of liberal
politics). Rather than be seen simply as aesthetic failure, the sentimental has the potential to
expose both the possibilities and the limitations of the aesthetic: ‘one might locate aesthetic
and political possibilities – conjunctions and disjunctions, negotiations between inside and
outside – within rather than beyond the formulaic feelings of sentimental discourse’ (Dillon
2004; see also Tanner 1976–7).
The sentimental also, of course, raises the wider issue of kitsch. The best analysis of this
relationship is Robert C. Solomon’s discussion of ‘sweet kitsch’ (Solomon 1991). 25
Kitsch’s fatal flaw can lie in its perfect execution, its unblemished quality, as well as in its
lack of ambiguity, necessary in that it is overtly designed to illicit a predictable response,
often through recourse to cliché. Kitsch exhibits a beauty that seems unrealistically pure,
immaculate or simplistic, or lays its overt knowledge of traditional forms and techniques on
with the thickest trowel around. The fake, moribund, morbid, mawkish, spurious and
saccharine: these are the expressive reference points of kitsch and its enjoyment is often
explicitly diagnosed as unwholesome, a symptom of malaise, indolence or indeed of
effeminacy. It is excessive, its emotion is not sufficiently suppressed; it is childlike, naive,
immature, its devotees are displaying an inability or lack of desire to cultivate the control of
the adult sophisticate, the tastes of the true aesthete.
Solomon offers a ‘qualified defence’ of sweet kitsch through rethinking and revaluing
sentimentality. He notes, as did Keller, the modern suspicion of the more tender emotions,
one based on the orthodoxy of ‘masochistic modernism’, which preaches algolagnic art, the
pleasure of pain, or a modernist credo that ‘tis better to shock than to delight or sympathize.
A key figure in the ethical degrading of the sentiment and sentimentality was Kant (again)
for whom the aesthetic judgement of sentimentality was impossible or irrelevant, for he
dismissed it on ethical grounds as deceitful, as manifesting a flaw in character, even as mark
of decadence or degeneracy. Subsequent attacks on kitsch are often less aesthetic than
political, or are focused on its problematic emotional content/character as apparently a mode
of distraction or self-deception whose aim is soothing catharsis through emotional
manipulation which violates subjective autonomy and freedom, and is therefore humiliating
(and hence also, of course, a potentially powerful tool of ideological indoctrination through
propaganda). However, Solomon argues that ‘one of the purposes of art’ might be ‘to
remind us of just those tender, outgrown sentiments’, perhaps even to disturb us regarding
their loss. ‘Better yet, art can help us feel them again, and move us to action on their behalf.’
Vicarious emotion is not necessarily false; neither need be the apparently superficial or
ephemeral. The venerable depth versus surface binary is a powerful metaphor which
celebrates total, long term engagement and denigrates momentary diversions in which
nothing appears to be at stake. All out depth, however, is the ‘province of a few self-
destructive romantics’; ‘casual emotion … is the currency of everyday life.’ Of another
pernicious binary divide, between pleasure and culture, Solomon challenges us to consider
which is the more ‘self-indulgent’. Of the charge that sentimentality is a distortion of
‘reality’, well this could be a most valuable strategy. And, in any case, all emotions tend to
distort; distortion is the norm, not the abnorm.
To summarize, when we hear music as sentimental we might, after Solomon, look
positively upon versions of sweet and possibly vicarious expression and so recuperate
expressive and aesthetic types elsewhere too swiftly rejected. After Dillon, in sentimental
music we might hear a rather sophisticated probing of the problem of aesthetic autonomy
and the related issue of artistic sincerity through overt constructiveness and reflectiveness –
building with old bricks and emoting on emotion. Some signals for a sentimental hearing of
music would be overt borrowing; overt technique; legitimization of the apparently banal; a
reflection on the problem of returning to very or over familiar forms of beauty.
‘Divertissement’, the second movement of Poulenc’s Sextuor , opens with an allusion
almost as overt as that which begins the Organ Concerto. In this case it is to Mozart’s Piano
Sonata in C major K545, a work which, perhaps for amateur pianists particularly, is iconic
of Mozart’s ‘beautiful’ Classical style ( Musical Example 5.5 ).
The differences, though, are telling. In Poulenc’s first bars, by contrast with Mozart, the
melodic third is absent. This allows it to be prominently present in the accompaniment,
where it is subject to major–minor alteration. The ‘tenor’ line in the piano doubles the
oboe’s dissonant C to expressive effect as the static tonic harmony means that the leading-
note creates the major seventh dissonance, whereas in the Mozart there is passing harmonic
support for the leading note B. This inner piano line foreshadows the turn in the oboe
melody in m. 2. This is comparable with the inverted relationship between the bass and the
treble lines in the Mozart. Poulenc replaces Mozart’s Alberti bass with an accompanimental
figure of similar rise and fall, but now with falling sixth from the ‘sweet’ major third, a fall
that will soon become melodically significant. 26
After a contrastingly jocular middle section the closing part of the movement begins with
the return of the opening theme in the fashion of ternary form. However, the returning theme
is played in the dominant. Such tonal ‘misbehaviour’ is not unusual for Poulenc, but his
tonal choices should not be lightly dismissed as inconsequential. The contradiction of
traditional tonal expectation creates a return strongly tinged by a sense of loss. This is
intensified as the dominant turns to minor, in an expansion of the major–minor fluctuation
of the opening two bars. The recapitulation is condensed, but time is allowed for sighing
descents over the dominant of A and a new descending chromatic figure (fig. 8). Sighs and
laments seem the order of the day. This expressive quality combines with the lack of tonal
closure, felt poignantly because the evocation of ternary design suggests a partial sense of
lost formal beauty because the remnants of such closed formal ‘logic’ remain in play. As a
result, we might hear the movement as sentimental in the familiar, elegiac Schillerian sense
in which a return to Arcadia is recognized as impossible, but the urge to go forward to
Elysium, which Schiller proposed, also seems absent. Instead, it proposes a form of
expression in which a lost, beautiful (Mozartian) mode is evoked in deliberately excessive
and sweet yet partial reconstruction, excessive because it really does lay on the material
carriers of expression more thickly than in the ‘original’ .
Musical Example 5.5 Poulenc, Sextuor , ‘Divertissement’, opening
Poulenc’s opening melody is also a flagrant pilfering from the gavotte of Stravinsky’s
Pulcinella . He has pickpocketed a musical imposter; there’s no honour among
compositional thieves. Stravinsky’s counterfeit is poised, cool and undemonstrative;
Poulenc’s, in the best sentimental fashion, is indulgent, melancholy and effusive, yet pensive
and self-reflective. Anything Igor can do, Francis can do more sentimentally, but Stravinsky,
too, has his sentimental moments. In this aspect creative relationships with the music of
Tchaikovsky are especially telling. In Tchaikovsky, Poulenc found a Mozartian ally in his
pursuit of sentimental beauty. Tchaikovsky’s reverence for Mozart is often dismissed as
nostalgic, as producing superficial, faked and fawning Mozartiana. This is part of the once
critically commonplace dismissal of Tchaikovsky’s music as vulgar, sentimental and
feminine (all terms Poulenc would eagerly embrace for his own music of course). By
contrast with the assimilation of Mozart, starting with Hoffmann, into an invented tradition
of the Germanic musical sublime, Tchaikovsky’s enthusiasm for Mozart plays an important
part in his commitment to an aesthetic of pleasure, delight and enjoyment, related to
preromantic discourse. This aesthetic is reflected in the preference for the theatrical or
quotidian rather than ambitions towards the abstract or transcendent. Furthermore,
Tchaikovsky’s overt eclecticism made him especially conscious of style, composing music
‘nonchalantly transparent to models and sources’ (Taruskin 1997, 249–53). The latter
comment could equally apply to Poulenc or Stravinsky. Tchaikovsky lies transparently
behind Stravinsky’s Le baiser de la fée (1928), of course. He lies more coyly perhaps in the
first two movements of Stravinsky’s Concerto for Piano and Wind (1923–4) where the
‘sentimental’, Tchaikovskian ‘resonances’ of ‘stifled sighs’ reveal ‘the nostalgia, however
mocked or squeamishly disguised, was real enough’ (Taruskin 1996, 1608). However
repressed, these echoes of Tchaikovsky’s sentimental style suggest that beneath the brittle
exterior of Stravinsky’s music lies a soft centre.
In a radio interview, Poulenc declared that the main theme for the Adagietto of his 1924
ballet Les biches was inspired by a melody in The Sleeping Beauty (here he beats Stravinsky’s
Le baiser de la fée by four years; see Poulenc 1954, 55.) 27 An unacknowledged
Tchaikovskian resonance lies in the chromatic swoon, which is the melody’s second idea.
This might recall the chromatic inflections common as an expressive turn in Mozart’s
melodies, especially through the second-hand example of Tchaikovsky’s Rococo variations,
Op. 33. In Tchaikovsky the chromatic material that brings his theme to a close (mm. 17–21)
can be considered sentimental because it lies outside the controlled, ‘beautiful’ thematic
form as an excessive, one might say, indulgent supplement (its pastoral resonances – pedal
open fifth and woodwind scoring – add further qualities of a sentimentalized idyll; see
Musical Example 5.6 ).
It is also an expansive, delayed echo of the F (flat sixth) which inflected the end of the
horn solo line immediately prior to the theme’s presentation. The melodic emphasis on the
flat sixth on the horn is a romantic sign of melancholy and seems to confirm the sense that
the ‘Mozartian’ theme that follows is being recalled as a beloved lost object. The chromatic
codetta to the theme offers sentimental reflection on this melancholic context (the pastoral
idyll, then, is characteristically shadowed by elegy). In Poulenc, the excessive chromaticism
is placed centrally within the main melody and is derived from the chromatic inner line in
the accompaniment. They are sensual, erotic sighs, but the extension of chromatic descent to
the enharmonic minor third emphasizes the melancholic character. The chromatic rise of the
second half of the theme offers a counterbalance, peaking on the joyful major sixth (G) and
leading to purely diatonic closure. It is this rising part of the theme that most directly relates
to the melody of the Pas de quatre of Sleeping Beauty that Poulenc played in the 1954 radio
program. In a 1948 radio talk called L’exquise mauvaise musique , Poulenc said: ‘In
Tchaikovsky, between the pure and the sublime, there is room for this type of delicious
music’ (Poulenc 1999, 67). 28 The chromatic gesture in the Adagietto is a ‘deliciously bad’
musical idea: second or even perhaps third hand, sentimental, neither ‘pure’ nor ‘sublime’,
but vicarious and vulgar, posing, in provocatively erotic fashion, as an alternative to the old
binary opposition of beautiful and sublime.
The evocations of the Gothic, comic, sentimental in Poulenc’s music are crucial to the
compositional revaluation of aesthetic traditions of the beautiful and sublime. Poulenc’s
aesthetic choices were often strongly driven by political imperatives. In the fraught political
arena of early twentieth-century France, with prominent state investment in culture and
manipulation of its public discourse, composers acutely felt the ‘pull’ between aesthetics and
ideology. Against a circumscribed notion of French ‘classic’ style (Latin, pure,
proportionate, well ordered, a beautiful style to be remembered and defended) Poulenc and
others sought to include that which was excluded from this notion (the popular, the
commercial, new alternatives to ‘authorized’ forms of beauty). It was a dissenting and
demystifying impulse, a railing against reification and chauvinistic idealism. However, as
Jane Fulcher notes, this was pursued through ‘respecting traditional cultural frames so that
the internal, logical breaks would become more apparent’. Aesthetic norms and traditional
hierarchies were invoked in order to be disorientated. Alongside this working from within,
there was a desire to incorporate the exoteric, to construct a subjectivity not based on
romantic inwardness but on collective experience. Satie, described in Le coq as one who
‘insouciantly abjures “the sublime”’ was a model, but one that each of Les Six took to
different ends (Fulcher 2005, 15, 156, 165). 29 For Poulenc, the end was to establish a
repertory of strategies that facilitated new musical variants – inversions, subversions, one
might even say perversions – of those aesthetic qualities traditionally assigned to the
beautiful and sublime.
Notes
1 A brief selection of recent secondary sources offering both persuasive overviews and interesting critical angles: Kirwan 2005,
Shaw 2006, Prettejohn 2005, Scruton 2009, Zangwill 2001 and Eagleton 1990, who is especially trenchant on the sublime.
2 Todd Gilman has noted, following Frances Ferguson, how the sublime tended to be discussed in detachment from the
beautiful, as part of the marginalization of the latter. Gilman describes how the work of the English composer Thomas Arne
suffered through being identified with denigrated notions of beauty by contrast with the increasing value placed on the
‘sublime’ music of Handel. Gilman 2009, Ferguson 1992, 44–5. On Handel and the sublime, see, for example, Shapiro 1993,
Harris 2005 and Mathew 2009. The wide spread of considerations of the sublime in recent musicology can be indicated, for
example, by Jaeger 2010 and Krims 2002. For an interesting pair on a ‘subspecies’ of the sublime in music, see Shreffler
2006 and Drott 2004. The discussion of Hanslick’s Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (first published 1854) shows no sign of
slowing: important recent musicological enquiries include Petty 1998, Burford 2006, Titus 2008, Bonds 2012, and the essays
in Grimes et al . 2013.
3 Those who have followed the recent development of ‘ecomusicology’ (usefully exemplified by the essays collected in
Journal of the American Musicological Society , 64 (2), Summer 2011, might see, for example, Hitt 1999. In the wake of
9/11, there has been important work on the sublime, terror and trauma; see, for example, Ray 2005 and, more generally,
Battersby 2007.
4 This view has been highly influential in recent musicology. Max Paddison states that the shift from natural beauty to the
natural sublime in the philosophy of Burke and Kant ‘is the mark of the modern age’ and concludes that ‘autonomous avant-
garde music’ (a musical trend of wide cultural prestige, one characteristically complex, esoteric, iconoclastic and
overwhelming) is the ‘epitome of the experience of the sublime’ (Paddison 2004).
5 On Schopenhauer and the sublime, see, for example, Vandenabeele 2003, Trigg 2004 and Vasalou 2013.
6 Also see Hickey [1993] 2009 which provoked something of a critical storm in the early 1990s.
7 Lochhead’s essay elicited a playfully polemical response from James Currie (2008). On the gendered discourse of the
beautiful and sublime, see Korsmeyer 2004, esp. 37–47 and 133–40; Yaeger 1989, 191–212; Mattick, Jr 1990; on the
gendered discourse of musical beauty, see, for example, Head 1995. For a musicological essay indebted to Jameson’s
‘technological sublime’, see Richardson 2008, esp. 144–6.
8 Kant’s ideas on music’s place in aesthetics have received much discussion. For recent analysis, see, for example, Parret 1998
and Weatherston 1996.
9 Published in Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung (Leipzig). Hoffmann’s review is available in translation in Bent 1994, 145–60,
and Charlton 2004, 234–50.
1 In the entry on ‘Schönheit’ and ‘Schön’ in Gustav Schilling’s Universal Lexicon der Tonkunst (1834–8), the beautiful is
0 identified with a formal perfection achieved through unity in variety and a vitality given to pleasing form made possible
through a higher spiritual power, ‘the faculty of the absolute’ and a ‘striving for the ideal’. For Schilling, beauty thus causes
the infinite to be felt in finite forms. He identified contrasting ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ qualities (such as strength–
gentleness, sublime–naive), which ‘consort’ together to create ‘sublime beauty’. The sublime is thus merely one category of
beauty and not diametrically opposite to it (for Schilling the opposition of beautiful and sublime has ‘destroyed the unity of
art’). But such perfections, the highest forms of beauty, are striven for, desired, and only partially realized in artistic
reflections of eternal beauty. Music, in its special substance, however, is the most brilliant foreshadowing of the transcendent.
In le Huray and Day 1988, 313–17.
11 In Berlinische musikalische Zeitung (1805); trans. available in le Huray and Day 1988, 202–4.
12 Schiller nonetheless argued that we need the two, both the sublime sudden jolt of freedom and the refined sensuousness of
beauty: Schiller 1966, 198–9, 201, 211.
13 For Wagner’s explicit denigration of those who identify music’s essence with the ‘pleasure in beautiful forms’ (Hanslick
hardly requires naming), see Wagner [1870] 2008, 14.
14 On examples of the scream in Wagner, see Friedheim 1983.
15 The public debate between Hans Werner Henze and Helmut Lachenmann in the early 1980s sustains this argument on
whether ‘Tristanesque’ beauty remains relevant in twentieth-century music; see Lachenmann 1980 and 1997, Henze 1983,
345–6 (entry dated 13 October 1982) and Downes [1973] 2011.
16 Dahlhaus constructs the ‘twin styles’ in 1989, 8–11, 56. This is critiqued by Kramer, 1995, 46–51. For an attempt to subvert
the division of the beautiful into two through this Beethoven–Rossini opposition, see Downes 2003. For discussion of
Rossini’s reported comments on music’s sublime and beautiful characteristics, see Fabbri 1994.
17 More on the Gothic sublime below. Space does not here permit consideration of Berlioz’s important contribution to the
debate on music as sublime. See, for example, Kolb 2009, esp. pp. 32–3.
18 This is highly suggestive for understanding the music of Debussy.
19 Parts of this section were presented at the conference ‘Rethinking Poulenc’, Keele University, June 2013, and at a research
seminar hosted by the Music Department, University of Nottingham, February 2013.
20 A stimulating and approachable essay on this topic is Brendel 1990.
21 The following paragraph is greatly indebted to Homer’s study. On the relationship of the Gothic and sublime, see also Botting
1995, 25–8.
22 On the sublime in the Gothic novel, see also Ferguson 1992, 97–113. For recent musicological considerations of the Gothic,
see Esse 2009, Head 2011, the reading of Chopin’s Prelude in C minor, Op. 28, No. 20 in Kramer 2012 and Grey,
forthcoming.
23 Danto feels we ‘understand too little about the psychology of loss to understand why the creation of beauty is so fitting as a
way of marking it – why we bring flowers to the graveside, or to the funeral, or why music of a certain sort defines the mood
of mourners. It is as though beauty works as a catalyst, transforming raw grief into a tranquil sadness, helping the tears to
flow and, at the same time, one might say, putting the loss into a certain philosophical perspective’ (Danto 2003, 111).
24 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has highlighted how the homo–heterosexuality opposition marks many cultural binarisms, including
art/kitsch and sincerity/sentimentality; the latter is associated with discredited or devalue notions – manipulative, vicarious,
morbid, knowing, the arch. Sedgwick argues that, from the late nineteenth into the early twentieth centuries, the exemplary
sentimentalist is not the woman but the ‘homosexual’, and the problematic rehabilitation of the sentimental is manifest in
several guises, including the camp (2008, 143–6).
25 For a thoroughly negative view, see Savile 2002: 315–19; and for a rejoinder in the same volume, Newman 2002: 320–31.
Solomon’s work on sentimentality is also critiqued in Begbie 2007.
26 There are many motivic derivations in Poulenc’s opening paragraph.
27 Moore 2012, 11–15 shows the comparison with the theme from The Sleeping Beauty , which Poulenc played during the radio
interview.
28 entre le pur et le sublime chez Tchaikovski, il y a la place pour ce genre de délicieuse musique . In Poulenc (1954) used the
similar phrase l’adorable mauvaise musique to describe the piano music of Anton Rubinstein (la célèbre Romance ), Grieg
and Borodin, which he heard his mother play alongside Mozart, Chopin, Schubert and Schumann.
29 The other crucial context for these aesthetic choices, which cannot be discussed here, is the social milieu from which
Poulenc’s commissions emerged; for discussion of examples, see Epstein 2013 and Kahan 2010.
Introduction
Prospects
The Great Either/Or is the seemingly inescapable debate, familiar to all academically
trained musicologists … epitomised in the question made famous by Carl Dahlhaus … the
most prestigious German music scholar of his generation: Is art history the history of art,
or is it the history of art ? What a senseless distinction! What seemed to make it necessary
was the pseudo-dialectical ‘method’ that cast all thought in rigidly – and artificially –
binarized terms.
(Taruskin 2010, xvii; see also Dahlhaus 1983)
Richard Taruskin’s indictment of dialectical thought hardly bodes well for a chapter
committed to explaining dialectics as a music-analytical tool. Taruskin’s argument fans out
from a specifically methodological complaint about dualism’s pointless reductionism to
encompass ideological objections about false notions of dialectical necessity, especially
those claiming the music-historical high ground in the wake of Schoenberg’s view of
atonality as an imperative foisted on music by history. Laid to rest by postmodern critique in
other disciplines as a remnant of modernism, dialectics has, for Taruskin, persisted
anachronistically in musicology thanks to the sheer force of Theodor Adorno’s influence,
buttressed by Dahlhaus’s popularity.
Ironically enough, the historicism that Taruskin marshals as a working alternative
furnishes the grounds for dialectics’ resuscitation. For although the mortality of Hegel’s
philosophy has long been recognized – as Charles Taylor observed in 1975, ‘no one actually
believes [Hegel’s] central ontological thesis, that the universe is posited by a Spirit whose
essence is rational necessity’ – the intimate relationship dialectical thought enjoys with the
post-Enlightenment history of Western music speaks to a need for an analytical approach
that captures this relationship and unpacks its implications (Taylor 1975, 538).
Consequently, although we can accept Taruskin’s suspicion of the idea that music history
reflects a dialectically unfolding meta-narrative, it is entirely reasonable to argue that music
written in the age of Hegelianism absorbs something of that epistemological context. This
argument can be extended to encompass Adorno as well. Even if his elitist apologia for
Second-Viennese modernism can be attacked as limited in time and place, that very
historical and geographical circumscription underpins the terms of his work’s historicist
defence.
The convergent evolution of central European philosophy and a wide range of phenomena
that have come to define the institutions of European art music supplies perhaps the most
compelling justification for this attitude. Most overt in this respect is the historical parallel
between the development of Hegel’s critical dialectic out of Kant’s system of antinomies
and the evolution of high-classical practice into the music of the ‘Romantic generation’, as
Charles Rosen describes it, a correlation to which Beethoven must inevitably be regarded as
pivotal (see Rosen 1995; Rosen has specifically in mind the generation of composers from
Schubert to Wagner). More generally, the close fit between philosophy and music in this
time can be understood as the product of a post-revolutionary turn, which witnessed the
emergence of philosophical and musical strands of idealist thought, as well as a complex of
social, cultural and political forces, in which many of the structures of contemporary musical
life have their origin (on this subject, see Weber 2008).
In the history of ideas, the dialectical shift is a major element of the Sonderweg or ‘special
path’ that German intellectual life arguably pursued from the later eighteenth century (on
which, see Lepenies 2006). Fragmented politically and only belatedly affected by the forces
of industrialization that transformed England or revolution that shaped France, the German
lands fostered a strand of philosophy emphasizing cultural idealism over political or
economic emancipation, which had tangible musical manifestations. Thus, when Robert
Schumann, writing in 1839, opined that ‘Just as Italy has its Naples, the Frenchman his
revolution, the Englishman his merchant marine, etc., so the German has his Beethoven
symphonies … With Beethoven he has recovered in spirit what he lost to Napoleon’, he
gave voice to a sense of shared cultural identity orientated around Beethoven, which is
coeval with the idealist philosophy of Hegel or the poetry of Hölderlin (see Schumann 1965,
148; trans. modified).
The primary aim of this chapter is to scrutinize the relationship between dialectical
thought and musical analysis, paying special attention to close reading of the post-
Beethovenian repertoire. I nominate three epistemic shifts as a broad historical framework.
The first is naturally located around the turn of the nineteenth century, in the context that
produced Hegel himself and Beethoven as his musical correlative. The second is signalled
by the ‘sharper key’ of Germanic musical politics obtaining after the revolutions of 1848,
driven by the reception of Wagnerian music drama and Lisztian instrumental music and
apostrophized in Franz Brendel’s overtly Hegelian history of music, which delineated
contemporary music in antithetical terms and lent new urgency to the need for compositional
solutions that overcame keenly felt dualisms (Brendel 1852; see also Gur 2012). The debates
raging around the symphony in the late nineteenth century, which found their epicentre in
the stand-off between Brahmsian and Brucknerian variants in Vienna, signified a
polarization of opinion that was in many cases (Brendel’s, for instance) consciously
dialectical. The third shift encompasses Second-Viennese modernism up to 1914, a
repertoire that furnished the musical ground zero of many of Adorno’s arguments, and
which can be understood as a point of culmination for the idealist turn, notwithstanding later
attempts at revival.
These historical markers provide a structure for narrating a history of contact between
music and dialectics (rather than a dialectical history) via analytical case studies of
Beethoven’s ‘Tempest’ Sonata, Op. 31, No. 2, Bruckner’s Symphony No. 5 and Berg’s
Piano Sonata Op. 1 respectively. By way of establishing philosophical and methodological
contexts, I provide a brief preparatory appraisal of Hegelian and Adornian dialectical
mentalities, in so far as this is possible under the present constraints .
Although it is possible to talk about a dialectic, it is advisable to avoid the most popular
way of explaining it: in terms of the schema ‘thesis – antithesis – synthesis’. Hegel never
himself used this terminology, and he criticised the use of all schemata. In the
Phenomenology Hegel did praise ‘the triadic form’ that had been rediscovered by Kant
…; but this is a reference to the triadic form of Kant’s table of categories, not a method of
thesis – antithesis – synthesis.
(Beiser 2005, 161)
Beiser is no less suspicious of the view that dialectics is a kind of formal logic: ‘Another
common misconception is that the dialectic is some kind of alternative logic, having its own
distinctive principles to compete with traditional logic. However, Hegel’s dialectic was
never meant to be a formal logic, one that determines the fundamental laws of inference
governing all propositions, whatever their content’ (Beiser 2005, 161). In general, it can be
argued that any attempt to render the dialectic in methodological terms is bound to fail,
because Hegel’s philosophy is altogether opposed to methodology, in the sense of a
structure of principles that is justified a priori and then applied to problems of ontology or
epistemology.
Hegel’s opposition both to the notion of philosophy as a methodology or system of a
priori principles and to the idea of formal logic are evident in the introductory remarks to the
Science of Logic :
[W]hat logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge … first emerge as
the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition. Similarly, it is essentially
within the science that the subject matter of logic, namely, thinking or more specifically
comprehensive thinking is considered: the Notion of logic has its genesis in the course of
the exposition and cannot therefore be premised.
(Hegel 1969, 43)
Logic, in these terms, is not the form of cognition abstracted from its content; rather, Hegel
locates it in the realm of ‘pure science’, in which context it is an absolute mode of thought,
arising when the opposition of form and content has been overcome. In other words, it ‘is to
be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth
as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature’; or as explained more succinctly in the
Encyclopaedia Logic , it is ‘the science of the pure idea , that is, of the Idea in the abstract
element of thinking’ (Hegel 1969, 50; 1991, 45).
The view pursued here explains the dialectic in three basic ways: first, as a turn in the
history of ideas, in which respect it responds primarily to Kant; second, as an a posteriori
response to the ontology, or being, of the subject; and finally, as a model of the historical
development of consciousness. In the first sense, Hegel’s dialectic is an attempt to rescue
metaphysics in the wake of Kant’s critical philosophy, and specifically of the system of
antinomies developed in Part II of the Critique of Pure Reason , which forms a central
component of what Kant termed the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’. In that context, Kant
formulated four antithetical propositions (antinomies) as an elaboration of the ‘antithetic of
pure reason’ (Kant 1991, 257–81). These together map out a terrain of assertions, arising in
the application of pure reason, which generate contradictory but logically consistent forms.
He explains:
If we employ our reason not merely in the application of the principles of the
understanding to objects of experience, but venture with it beyond these boundaries, there
arise certain sophistical propositions or theorems [which] have the following peculiarities:
they can find neither confirmation nor confutation in experience; and each is in itself not
only self-consistent, but posesses conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason –
only that, unluckily, there exist just as valid and necessary grounds for maintaining the
contrary proposition.
(Kant 1991, 257)
Kant nominated four such antinomies, each defined by a thesis and its antithesis: (1) the
world either is, or is not, infinite with respect to time and space; (2) every ‘composite
substance’ either is, or is not, irreducibly complex; (3) everything that happens either is, or
is not, determined with respect to causality; and (4) there either does or does not exist an
‘absolutely necessary being’, which is the world’s primal cause. Kant’s objective was not
reconciliation of the antinomies, so much as the development of a ‘sceptical method’, which
policed transcendental propositions (Kant 1991, 258–9).
Hegel praised Kant for elevating dialectic to the status of ‘ a necessary function of reason
’ [Hegel’s italics], but criticized Kant’s dualistic formulation on the grounds that ‘if no
advance is made beyond the abstract negative aspect of dialectic, the result is only the
familiar one that reason is incapable of knowing the infinite; a strange result for – since the
infinite is the Reasonable – it asserts that reason is incapable of knowing the Reasonable’
(Hegel 1969, 56). In the Science of Logic , the notion of dialectic develops immediately out
of this perception: it does not reside in antinomy in the Kantian sense, but in ‘the grasping of
opposites in their unity or of the positive in the negative’ (Hegel 1969, 56).
The ontological explanation of the dialectic posits it as the mechanism of the progressive
self-understanding of consciousness (the Spirit or Geist ). Tracing the progress of this is the
task of the Phenomenology of Mind , in which, as Hegel described it, he had ‘exhibited
consciousness in its movement onwards from the first immediate opposition of itself and the
object to absolute knowing’ (Hegel 1969, 48). As Hegel explains, this is related to a
conception of logic, because logic as pure thought comes about through the agency of the
dialectic, as a consequence of the action of overcoming, synthesis or ‘sublation’ ( Aufhebung
), which eliminates the distinction between thought as the object and the subject of
consciousness. 1 Ultimately, the Science of Logic is organized as a narrative of the dialectic
through which the condition of logic ‘as pure reason’ comes about; as Taylor explains,
‘Hegel is going to offer us a transcendental logic which will also be an ontology’ (Taylor
1975, 227). Thus the Logic operates by scrutinizing the dialectical process through which
grounding categories in our experience of reality are constituted. Hegel’s first category,
‘Being’, for instance, devolves into quality, quantity and measure, and each is dismantled
into subcategories, which are defined through dialectical motion, beginning with the
opposition of being and nothing, the synthesis of which produces the condition of becoming.
Finally, the dialectic constitutes an historical model, because the progress of Spirit
towards self-understanding is also the engine of human history. 2 The ultimate goal of
history in these terms is a situation in which the model of the state is in exact accord with
Spirit’s self-understanding; and this is of necessity ‘a community which is in conformity
with reason; or … one which embodies freedom’, since Spirit’s self-understanding as pure
reason is also the condition of its freedom (Taylor 1975, 389). In these terms, world history
is regarded as a progression of civilizations, which tend increasingly towards the unity of
society and the self-conceiving Spirit, each dialectically superseding its predecessor. The
dialectic is therefore the mechanism of a goal-orientated history, driven forwards by the
actions of ‘world-historical individuals’, who access the condition of the Geist , or in Hegel’s
terms ‘comprehend the substantial content which is the will of the world Spirit’, and so push
society towards the next stage of its development (see Hegel 1955, 89–90; quoted in Taylor
1975, 392).
The force-field of Adorno’s intellectual career … would thus include the generating
energies of Western Marxism, aesthetic modernism, mandarin cultural despair, and
Jewish self- identification, as well as the more anticipatory pull of deconstructionism.
Although at certain moments and in certain moods Adorno may have been attracted more
to one of these poles than to another, his work as a whole can best be grasped as an
uneasy tension among all of them.
(Jay 1984, 22)
Adorno pursues Hegel’s philosophy of history to the extent that he accepts the dialectic as
history’s basic mechanism, and adopts its Marxian inversion by seeing in this process the
reflection of an economic or sociological base rather than a transcendent World Spirit. In
Adorno’s formulation, however, this process is deprived of its synthetic goal. The will
towards overcoming constitutes a bourgeois aspiration, arising from the post-Enlightenment
dialectical tension between the subject’s rational freedom and his or her subordination to the
collectivizing tendency of society. 3 If the achievement of the Enlightenment was to
emancipate the individual by asserting the primacy of rational autonomy over social
function or convention, then the question arises as to what kind of a society can be devised,
which respects this autonomy while also preserving a notion of collective responsibility. The
great bourgeois aspiration is the attainment of such a social order, the citizens of which
could act freely in accordance with the dictates of reason and simultaneously fulfil their
communal responsibilities; this, in effect, is Hegel’s state in unity with the self-conceiving
Geist .
Adorno’s historical model is in essence the narrative of this aspiration’s failure. The truth
of the post-Enlightenment world is the looming impossibility of reconciling individual and
collective; it is, in other words, defined by an antinomy that can’t be resolved, not by the
escalating resolution of contradictions that drives Hegel’s model. The more individuals posit
utopian solutions, the more acutely the inadequacy of these solutions is exposed. Worse, the
political mechanisms of the bourgeois world have led either to the increasing subordination
of the individual to the reproduction of capital (in market economies) or to the hubristic
assertion of an individual will over an anonymous populace (in totalitarian societies).
Adorno borrows the Marxian notion of alienation to characterize the results: the protracted
experience of an unresolved conflict between the self-knowledge of rational freedom and its
instrumental domination by society serves to accentuate the condition of social isolation. In
brief, the individual’s authentic modern experience is alienation, the sense of a disjunction
between self-knowledge and social circumstance that can never be reconciled. It is in this
sense that Adorno’s philosophy of history is negative-dialectical ; the fabric of society is
defined by contradictions, the attempted synthesis of which is consistently negated. 4
This view is given music-historical traction via another dialectical argument: the claim
that music’s autonomous structures embed its social significance. Musical works, like all art,
constitute ‘the unconscious historiography of their epoch’ (this idea is formulated in this
way in Adorno 1984, 261). Their social ‘essence’ can therefore be read from their technical,
structural components; the intra-musical embodies the extra-musical, because the former is
the dialectical partner of the latter. Properly conceived, the task of music analysis is thus not
simply to give a structural account of the musical work, but to unearth its ‘truth content’,
since its social meaning unavoidably speaks through its technique (see Adorno 1982).
More than this, a work’s structure is inevitably freighted with traces of its history, because
the work’s individuality is always wrought from convention. The argument here turns on a
dialectical definition of musical material, as that which simultaneously individuates the
piece of music and defines the lingua franca on which the composer draws (see Paddison
1993, ch. 2). The main theme in the first movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata Op. 2, No.
1, for example, is unique to that piece, to the extent that its specific identity is shared with no
other work. Yet every aspect of the theme is conventional: its initial motive comprises a
Mannheim ‘skyrocket’ decaying to a turn figure; the partnering of tonic and dominant forms
of this idea in measures 1 to 4 is a widespread device, as is the paraphrase of the same
motives and harmonic progression in half the duration in measures 5 to 6; and overall, the
theme’s sentential design relates it to thousands of other late eighteenth-century melodies.
The theme, in brief, is simultaneously individual and conventional.
Connecting this perception to the negative-dialectical concept of history allows the
tension between tradition and innovation to be interpreted socio-politically as well as
musically. The rational subject’s relationship to society speaks through the composer’s
individuation of convention; the musical material’s task is in this respect the mediation (
Vermittlung ) of the creative subject and its objectified social other. And because this
interaction is disposed in time across a work’s or movement’s overall form, the formal
process takes on the character of a narrative of the subject’s social condition. Thus, Adorno
explicitly stressed the analogy between Beethoven’s treatment of sonata form and the
Hegelian dialectic, which was guaranteed by Beethoven’s treatment of the recapitulation as
a locus of reconciliation (see Adorno 1957 and 1998). At least in Beethoven’s middle
period, this relationship borders on synonymy: Beethoven expresses in music what Hegel
expresses in philosophy.
Adorno brought the negative-dialectical idea to bear on his own historical circumstances
in the Philosophy of New Music , first published in 1949. 5 The dialectical method is
announced immediately in the Introduction’s recourse to Walter Benjamin, which cites
Benjamin’s dictum in the Origins of German Tragic Drama that ‘Philosophical history as the
research of origin is the form that, in the most remote extremes … reveals the configuration
of the idea as the configuration of the totality, characterized by the possibility of a
meaningful juxtaposition of these extremes’ (Benjamin 1977, 47, cited in Adorno 2006, 7).
The vicissitudes of Adorno’s present, however, render inadequate any application of this
idea that pushes towards Hegelian syntheses:
At a historical hour, when the reconciliation of subject and object has been perverted to a
satanic parody, to the liquidation of the subject in the objective order, the only philosophy
that still serves reconciliation is one that scorns the illusion of reconciliation and asserts
against universal self-alienation the reality of the hopelessly alienated for which the
‘thing-itself’ scarcely speaks any longer.
(Adorno 2006, 25)
Adorno sees in these circumstances ‘the far limit of … immanent method’: new music can
either express alienation as the authentic condition of the modern subject, or else sacrifice
subjectivity to an ‘objective order’, which devalues the free individual before the musical
analogue of false totality. Critical method cannot move beyond this dualism, but is instead
bound to reveal either the truth of alienation or the lie of totality in any musical work.
The book’s design nominates the governing music-historical antinomy of its time –
progress and regression – embodied in the music of Schoenberg and Stravinsky as the
extremes of these two poles. Its local organization remains true to critical theory’s anti-
systematic stance, progressing paratactically through the elaboration of dialectically argued
concepts (23 in the Schoenberg essay; 27 in the Stravinsky essay), which form a
constellation of ideas rather than a ramified, teleological thesis.
In the technical domain, the defence of Schoenberg is founded on a defence of atonality,
as the necessary outcome of a tendency inherent in the musical material. As Adorno argues:
In Brahms, development, as thematic labour, had already utterly siezed possession of the
sonata. Development, universalized, is to reconstruct the sonata’s problematic totality ….
Within the framework of tonality he broadly rejects the conventional formulae and
rudiments, and at every moment – so to speak – he produces the unity of the work anew,
in freedom …. By assimilating Beethoven and Brahms, Schoenberg’s music can lay claim
to the legacy of classical bourgeois music much as the materialist dialectic relates back to
Hegel.
(Adorno 2006, 47)
Schoenberg’s technique is progressive precisely because it realizes this tendency at a new
level of innovation, a characteristic that also guarantees its social authenticity:
The cognitive power of new music … is legitimate only in that it … transcends – both
annuls and saves – romantic differentiation on a technical level, and thus according to its
substantiality. The subject of new music … is the real, emancipated, isolated subject of
the late bourgeois period.
(Adorno 2006, 47–8)
In all, Adorno offers us a stark choice: if music pursues a notion of community, then it
embraces a lie of collectivity that tends towards totalitarianism or submission to the culture
industry; if music honours the material’s immanent tendency, then it forever condemns the
composer to isolation.
Three analyses
Adorno’s work brings the association of dialectics and musical thought to an apex of
sophistication. Its biggest lacuna is the absence of a correspondingly complex approach to
analysis, a difficulty that has been addressed by Max Paddison:
One cannot escape the feeling that, even though the analyses themselves tend to be
irritatingly fragmentary, the real problem lies in the strange disparity between the
sophistication and radicality of his aesthetics and sociology on the one hand, and on the
other hand the lack of sophistication and the traditional character of his music-analytical
method.
(Paddison 1993, 169 )
Numerous attempts have since been made to add more analytical flesh to Adorno’s
philosophy (for example, see Chua 1995; Spitzer 2006; Agawu 2005). The three analyses
offered here gloss some of these attempts, while also advancing novel dialectical readings.
Central to each analysis is a preoccupation with the antinomies projected by the material on
the one hand, and with the nature of the formal processes they compel on the other. The
former are understood as the music’s generative elements, the latter as the means by which
the struggle for reconciliation is realized in musical form. The embodiment of conflict is
explored in a variety of parameters, from motivic and thematic considerations to topical
discourse and its expressive consequences.
What imparts coherence to this music is, for Dahlhaus, not the procession of formal
functions (first theme – transition) but the concept regulating material development, which is
manifest in the processes in which the motives participate. The disposition of the harmony
exacerbates this condition. The tonic’s grounding assertion is located at the start of the
transition; in harmonic terms, measures 1–20 comprise an upbeat to the transition, which
then honours its conventional tonal function by modulating.
Dahlhaus associates this dialectical turn with Beethoven’s middle-period music in
general, a shift that is coeval with the first maturity of Hegel’s philosophy (Op. 31, No. 2
dates from 1802; the Phenomenology of Mind was published in 1807). Its consequence is the
emergence of a conception of form as the exposure and resolution of a problem: the opening
of Op. 31, No. 2 sets up a ‘problematic’ – the dialectic of pre- and post-thematic functions –
to which the remainder of the movement is a response. The problem itself is the movement’s
‘underlying idea’, defined as
Musical Example 6.2 Beethoven, Piano Sonata Op. 31, No. 2, ‘The
Tempest’, first movement, mm. 1–24
the manner in which a specific association is made between the development of the
thematic material, the disposition of the formal functions, and the succession of the
aesthetic characters: a manner of connection which can be traced back to a problem, to
which the finished movement is the solution.
(Dahlhaus 1991, 145)
Dahlhaus argued that the dialectical concept of form he found in the ‘Tempest’
apostrophized the ‘strong’ form of composition in its time, supplying one half of an
overarching historical dialectic between Beethovenian instrumental music, the urgent
teleology of which foregrounded the concept of ‘becoming’, and Rossinian vocal music,
which maintained the primacy of ‘being’ in its preoccupation with a melody’s inherent
quality rather than its structural potential (see Dahlhaus 1989, 8–15). Although we might
baulk at such nationally grounded dichotomies (the ‘strength’ of Beethoven’s conception
implies the weakness of Rossini’s), we can nevertheless accept that a dialectical reading of
the ‘Tempest’ captures something of the work’s context in the history of ideas.
The first movement’s unresolved antinomies also have strong Adornian resonances. The
form’s subjective aspects – its thematic specificities and the ideas they embody – are not
reconciled with the dictates of formal convention. Instead, the recapitulation sacrifices
convention to subjectivity in key respects. The first-theme reprise is essentially a region of
subjectification, which temporarily dissolves the notion of a ‘tight-knit’ main subject into a
fantasia on its motivic content, an event from which the recapitulation’s synthetic function
never fully recovers. 8 The mediation of a social dialectic is tangible: the failure to contain
the music’s subjectivity within sonata conventions parallels the failure to generate social and
political order from rational individuality. In musical as well as political terms, the
resolution of this conflict is deferred as an aspiration.
The long closing theme steers a middle path between the duality of dance and song thus
far engendered, beginning with a lyric theme in the winds accompanied by a dotted crotchet-
quaver string rhythm, which as the section proceeds accelerates to recover the first theme’s
march rhythm, engulfing its nascent lyric features in the process ( Musical Example 6.7 ).
The acceleration goes into reverse following the highpoint at measure 199, and the
exposition closes with a calculated emptying out of the martial rhythm to the point of double
augmentation reached in measures 207–8, from which the structural cadence ensues.
Altogether, the exposition offers a threefold perspective on the dialectic of the secular and
the sacred, overlaid with a conflict between dance and song, and disposed so that each
perspective articulates a theme group, placing a different topic at its subjective core. The
disjunct disposition of the material raises another issue, which is the music’s oft-noted
block-like construction. Schubertian parallels are commonplace; similar habits in that
context have been explained as instances of parataxis: the non-linear presentation of material
associated with lyric rather than dramatic origins. 12 In stark contrast to the subsumption of
formal functions into developmental processes evident in the ‘Tempest’ Sonata, Bruckner
accentuates formal divisions with caesuras, in advance of which the music seems drained of
its developmental impetus. The result is a stratified texture more redolent of Stravinsky than
Beethoven. In itself, this can be understood dialectically, because the antithesis of parataxis
– the hypotactic continuity associated with Beethoven’s sonata forms – is not absent. Rather,
Bruckner constructs developmental threads, which weave dynamic continuities through the
paratactic design. On the largest scale, these continuities are the agents of synthesis: in the
Finale especially, their convergence is central to the form’s teleological process.
The movement’s design is explained in this way in Figure 6.1 . Thematic units are
disposed as self-contained boxes; instances of developmental continuity across the form are
signified by connective arrows. The four ideas proposed in the introduction (processional,
fanfare, chorale and martial peroration) are labelled I1–I4 successively; as the arrows
explain, these ideas are gradually worked into the developmental discourse in the
development and coda. Each expositional block then sets up material, which is later
revisited. The first theme, labelled A, operates teleologically in the manner of an ‘heroic’
Beethovenian subject. Its properties are exhaustively explored in the development as a
dramatic intensification of expositional instabilities, culminating in a detailed convergence
with the introduction’s fanfare idea (I2) in measures 283–314. The retransition reconstructs
A over a dominant peroration, but the recapitulation frustrates resolution of the theme’s
instabilities, its modal ambiguities being preserved in a radically compressed design. Theme
A ultimately prevails in the coda, which progresses from B minor to a triumphant tonic
major, fusing the theme’s Hauptmotiv with features of the introduction’s processional.
This triumphalism is, however, premature because it comes at the expense of the
movement’s other thematic protagonists. Themes B and C play only peripheral roles in the
development (C initiates the development, but quickly cedes to I1; B recurs in advance of
the retransition, which retrieves I4) and they remain paratactically isolated in the
recapitulation. Moreover, in both cases the reprise intensifies the material’s instability and
truncates its formal design. The overall impression is of two antithetical trajectories: theme
A works dynamically towards resolution in the coda; themes B and C persist as
disconnected, static blocks, the designs of which decay under recapitulation. The
movement’s ending is expressively provisional, because the antitheses of the sacred and the
secular, and of dance and song, are not brought together through the union of parataxis and
hypotaxis.
The daunting task of resolving these issues falls to the Finale. The form, appraised in
Figure 6.2 , revisits and augments the first movement’s topical postures, disposed
paratactically in a way that again encourages the impression of a devolution of the social
order into its antithetical components. The opening recovers the first movement’s
introduction, but this now performs the opposite function; instead of adumbrating the
movement’s discourse, the slow processional initiates a series of disjunct prior-movement
reminiscences (measures 11–28), which briskly appraise the narrative to this point. 13
As Figure 6.2 explains, the Finale’s sonata design builds additional complexities into the
first movement’s dialectical scheme. The first group is unequivocally martial, but its fugal
organization (it is labelled as ‘fugue 1’ in Figure 6.2 ) suggests the learned style, and this
engenders a tension between two topics: the contrapuntal context lends the march an archaic
flavour, which its first-movement counterpart lacks. The second theme is a schnell polka and
as such displaces the first movement’s thematic opposition of secular and sacred styles:
here, both themes are secular, but represent secularity in its military and civilian spheres.
The closing group comprises two topically and thematically distinct sections (C1 and C2 in
Figure 6.2 ). The first dramatizes A-theme material through minor-mode inflection and
embellishment with Sturm-und-Drang tremolando string figuration. This texture is
perfunctorily dismantled in measures 159–174 and C2 follows as an unadorned chorale.
Thus far, the Finale has, like the first movement, disposed its material paratactically, as a
sequence of discontinuous blocks. The development, recapitulation and coda gradually and
systematically allow developmental continuities to take control of the discourse. The entire
span of the movement from the start of the development onwards is essentially one
developmental arc, allowing for a single digression accommodating the return of the second
subject. The key to this shift is counterpoint: following a perfunctory pre-core section based
on the C2 chorale, the development comprises two fugues, the first (‘fugue 2’ in Figure 6.2 )
based on C2, the second (‘fugue 3’) combining the chorale with the first subject. This
combination is announced at the outset of fugue 3, but its most assertive presentation occurs
at the start of the recapitulation, measure 374, following a formidably complex exploration
of the two subjects’ combinatorial properties ( Musical Example 6.8 ). 14 By foregrounding
counterpoint, the Finale opens up synthetic possibilities that are not available in the first
movement. At a stroke, the development and first-theme reprise reconcile two conceptual
oppositions: the sacred and secular materials for the first time work collaboratively, and the
conflicted relationship between dance and song starts to unravel.
The closing-theme group and coda address two issues left unresolved at the first-theme
reprise. The closing group rapidly abandons its correspondence with the exposition in favour
of a secondary development section, which makes counterpoint a cyclical device by
variously combining the first- and last-movement main themes (the most extensive
combination is shown in Musical Example 6.9 ). The integrative effect of this combination is
implicative as well as actual, because it reveals the Finale’s main theme as a mediator
between the chorale and the first-movement march, that is, as a theme that can combine with
both. The retrieval of the first-movement theme is consequently more than a simple act of
recall; it signifies a reappraisal of that theme’s meaning for the work’s governing duality in
the light of the Finale’s contrapuntal solutions.
The coda, in turn, rectifies an inadequacy in the contrapuntal strategy. In fugue 3, march
and chorale are recast as partners rather than antagonists; the result is, however, not a new,
higher-level premise, but a relationship of equals that secularizes the sacred as much as it
sanctifies the secular. The coda reconceives this relationship in an entirely new light, by
marshalling the two march themes as the basis of the accompanimental texture for a chorale
prelude, the topical identity of which is magnificently exposed with the chorale’s entry as
cantus firmus from measure 583. In a colossal instance of what in Baroque music might be
termed Einbau technique, the martial music is drawn into the service of the chorale. It is hard
to imagine a more compelling musical realization of dialectical overcoming: the coda posits
the chorale as a new thesis, the agent of a social order in which the work’s secular elements
submit to a now self-evident Christian truth.
There is, of course, a great deal more to be said about the processes at work in this
symphony; the analysis nevertheless does enough to clarify some essential points. Primarily,
contrary to much popular discourse on the composer, there is very little in this music to
support the view that it conveys a pre-modern religious worldview. In its own way, the Fifth
Symphony is as radically teleological as its Beethovenian precedents; certainly, Bruckner
absorbs wholesale a concept of the symphony as idealist narrative, even if he remained
largely indifferent to the literature and philosophy grounding that narrative in the
Bildungstrieb (the drive towards cultural perfection) or historical dialectic. The difference
between Beethoven and Bruckner resides in Christianity’s function in this context. Whereas
(in the Ninth Symphony at least) Beethoven wants to show us a humanist ideal, in which
tribulation is banished by brotherhood, Bruckner envisions an ideal in which the verities of
faith are reaffirmed in the overcoming of social contradictions. The contradictions
themselves and the drama of their overcoming, however, remain expressively central to the
concept of symphonic narrative. Consequently, and crucially for the present chapter, the
notion of dialectic is pivotal to an understanding of this process, not because Bruckner
consciously designed symphonies in a Hegelian way, but because he inherited a genre that
had by the time of the composer’s maturity folded binary opposition into its conceptual
premise.
Musical Example 6.10 Berg, Piano Sonata Op. 1, mm. 1–11, functional
and motivic design
[W]hen the exposition is repeated, the cadential progression of the Grundgestalt – the
only cadence within the entire exposition – has been placed in the service of closing the
exposition . As a result, here is an exposition that breaks a fundamental sonata rule: the
subordinate region, rather than confirming a new tonal centre, closes in the home key . In
that the Grundgestalt provides the only phrase that unequivocally defines a key, it is the
only true stable element against which Berg’s departure towards whole-tone and atonal
elements can be measured. In this work the Grundgestalt thus comes to represent tonality
itself: rather than juxtaposing a home key with a contrasting tonal centre, Berg verges on
contrasting tonality with atonality.
(Schmalfeldt 1991, 109)
It is worth bringing Schmalfeldt’s observations into closer contact with Adorno’s reading.
Taken together, they suggest that it is not only sonata form that is reified as historical
material here, but also tonality itself, as the principle that form articulates. Berg achieves this
by reconceiving sonata form’s thematic syntax, such that the Grundgestalt isolates rather
than articulates the tonic within the Sonata’s design. The dialectic of convention and
innovation is therefore contained with the first four measures, as a conflicted premise from
which the form evolves: perceived motivically, the Grundgestalt is thematically generative;
perceived harmonically, it is pre-thematic.
Close scrutiny of the first-theme group clarifies some of the mechanisms of this dialectic.
Its overall effect is to nurture form-functional ambiguity. Schmalfeldt has recognized the
opposed tendencies for thematic functions to become transitional and for transitions to
become thematic: measure 12 sounds like a transition, but the pitch-invariant return of the
main theme at measure 18 converts the intervening music retrospectively into a small-
ternary B section; conversely, although measure 18 initiates an A reprise, by the time we
reach the highpoint at measure 25 this section has definitively transformed into a transition.
Such bifocal ambiguities also colour the music’s local design. Schmalfeldt reads measures 4
2 ∓6 as continuational, but we might also see them as a veiled response to an opening
statement, notwithstanding the objection that measures 1–4 function as a cadence. Adorno
has noted the use of what he calls ‘axial rotation’ in these measures: characteristics of earlier
motive forms are retained ‘but their succession is altered’ (Adorno 1991, 43). Thus motives
‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ as labelled by Adorno and Schmalfeldt, and bracketed in Musical Example
6.10 , recur in measures 4 2 ∓6 reordered as ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘a’. More than this, as Musical
Example 6.10 also explains, the Grundgestalt ’s underpinning chromatic bass descent,
defined in Musical Example 6.10 as ‘d’, recurs here in inversion, and the phrase is rounded
off in measure 6 with a twofold motivic counterpoint, which overlays variants of ‘a’ on to a
transposition of ‘c’ that parallels the end of the Grundgestalt : the new form of ‘a’ appears in
stretto between soprano and bass; and bass and alto effect a combination of ‘a’ and ‘c’. All
of this means that these measures can be understood as a variation of measures 1–4 1 as
much as a continuation phrase. The core dialectic embodied in the Grundgestalt is
consequently reproduced across measures 1–6, which comprise cadence and continuation if
harmony is given analytical primacy, or statement and response if motivic variation is taken
as the dominant parameter.
The Grundgestalt ’s pre-emptive cadential function imposes a risk of tautology on the
phrase ending, which is evaded by collapsing classical thematic syntax into a reassertion of
the dualism of function and process. Measures 7–8 fragment the material in a manner typical
of continuation functions, counterpointing ‘b’ and inversions of ‘c’, but the liquidation of ‘c’
in measure 8 is not coordinated with a cadential endpoint. Instead, ‘b’ and ‘c’ reappear in a
T1 transposition in measure 9. The functional perspective shifts again: measures 4 2 ∓8 now
resemble the contrasting middle of a small-ternary theme, nested within the A section of the
theme group’s overall ternary design, to which the Grundgestalt supplies the A section. The
initial cadence has to be reinterpreted afresh: rather than comprising a cadence abnormally
preceding a continuation, it emerges as the closing gesture of a (very small) A section. The
local A 1 implied by measure 9 is, however, also denied closure, dissolving instead into the
liquidation of ‘c’ in measures 10 and 11.
The way these local dialectical tensions map onto the form’s large-scale divisions is
evident through comparison of the expositional first theme and transition with the
corresponding music in the recapitulation, which enters with the retrieval of ‘a’ as anacrusis
in measure 110 3 and ends with the second-theme reprise initiated in measure 137. Berg
replaces the ternary features apparent in the exposition with a continuous span of music, in
which thematic presentation transforms into transition without harmonic delineation. The
first theme’s design is retained (with modifications that will be considered below) until
measure 117, from which point a process of contrapuntal fragmentation takes hold,
culminating at the dynamic highpoint of measure 129, which exhaustively developes the
combinatorial properties of ‘a’, ‘d’, ‘c’ and latterly ‘b’. The music of the theme’s contrasting
middle is now recast as an appendix to this intensification beginning at measure 131, serving
to connect the climax to the second-theme entry.
The most immediately striking feature of the recapitulation is, however, removal of the
cadence that delineates the Grundgestalt , the phrase instead culminating on a half-
diminished seventh chord ( Musical Example 6.11 explains this). As a result, the first-theme
recapitulation becomes entirely motivic; the Grundgestalt is denuded not only of its
affiliation with the putative tonic, but also (extrapolating from Schmalfeldt’s reading) of its
affiliation with the tonal system altogether. The dialectic of tonality and atonality is thus
reproduced on a larger scale; rather than stabilizing the exposition first theme, the
recapitulation displays its purely chromatic alternative.
Yet even though the trajectory thus far has pulled away from a reconciliation of tonal and
post-tonal media, the Grundgestalt yields two additional features, which supply the means of
the tonic’s ultimate recovery. Returning to Musical Example 6.10 , Schmalfeldt inteprets the
overall progression in measures 1–4 as a ii 7 ∓V∓i voiced as an imperfect authentic cadence
(IAC), in which the soprano in measure 2 is conceptually resolved onto in measure 4. Yet
one of the most notable aspects of the cadence is the fact that resolution of the surface
soprano in measure 3 onto , which would confirm a PAC, is conspicuously absent. The
unresolved – becomes a structural issue for the entire Sonata. Its persistence is felt in the
recapitulation, where, as we have seen, is reconceived as a suspension over a half-
diminished chord; and the recapitulation of the second theme supplies no tonic PAC in the
manner of sonata theory’s ‘essential structural closure’. As Musical Example 6.12 clarifies,
resolution of this issue is reserved for the work’s closing measures. A tonic PAC is finally
attained in measures 174–5 at the end of the closing theme, but is here commuted to . The
Grundgestalt ’s cadence finds an ultimate point of repose, but only once its soprano voice
leading has been chromaticized. The closing cadence mediates tangibly the dialectic of tonal
and post-tonal materials; the work’s tonality is secured by making a voice-leading
concession to its chromatic antithesis.
In fact, the seeds of this trade-off are embedded in the Grundgestalt itself. Musical Example
6.12 also points out its inherent tension between B minor and C minor. Prior to measure 3,
one might easily imagine the second sonority of measure 2 as a C minor tonic seventh
chord, to which the initial half-diminished chord is a chromatic prefix; and the soprano’s
progress as far as measure 3 1 is readily construed as in C minor, an impression
that is only scotched once B minor V 9 has intervened by the end of measure 3. Thus the
Grundgestalt implies two semitonally related keys, the relationship of which projects yet
another perspectival dialectic: C minor is present as pre-cadential harmony in search of a
cadence; B minor emerges as a cadence in search of pre-cadential harmony. The means by
which C minor is ultimately accommodated within B minor is also the means by which the
final cadence mediates its chromatic antithesis: alteration of allows a residue of C minor –
its tonic scale degree – to persist even as the Sonata closes in B minor.
In Berg’s Op. 1, the embedding of antinomies has progressed to a point of almost
inconceivable density. The Grundgestalt itself is burdened with dialectical tensions to an
extent that impedes their simultaneous comprehension, and the music thereafter accrues
antithetical perspectives at every formal juncture, from the level of the phrase design to the
overall form. The resulting kaleidoscopic excess of conflicted readings generates a feeling of
disorientation that is both acute (because it pertains to each individual moment) and
cumulative (because it is sustained across the Sonata). The ultimate sense that no
overarching synthesis can draw all of these conflicts into a higher unity – in brief, the work’s
negative-dialectical posture – is basic to its expressive trajectory, and it is this above all that
locates it as one historical end-point to the manner of composition introduced in the first
movement of Beethoven’s ‘Tempest’. Unlike Beethoven, however, Berg supplies no finale
that might take up his movement’s dualities and resolve them; the Sonata’s manifold
teleologies are simply left hanging with its closing chord. This is Adorno’s fractured totality
in nuce : resolution persists here as an aspiration with no prospect of fulfilment.
Conclusions
Although these analyses offer evidentially grounded narratives of formal and material
processes, the dialectical premise from which they proceed requires retrospective critical
qualification. We might, in particular, reasonably ask whether music can ever truly embody
contradiction. Dialectical thought is in the first instance conceptual ; whether we regard it as
logical or critical, the idea that the world necessarily responds to antinomic characterization
is at base an observation about its conceptual structure. However, the application of this idea
in musical analysis inevitably proceeds by metaphor or analogy, because musical material
has no capacity to embody concepts as immanent properties.
This point can be illustrated through consideration of the problem of formulating quality
or ‘being’ in musical terms. In the Science of Logic , Hegel distinguishes three states of
being, comprising the category of quality – ‘pure being’, ‘determinate being’ and ‘being-for-
self’ (being-in-itself) – the succession of which is construed dialectically. Pure being is
characterized as ‘equal only to itself’ and ‘not unequal relative to an other’; its antithesis is
‘nothing’, understood as ‘complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content’,
which is ‘undifferentiatedness in itself’. Because both being and nothing are defined by the
‘absence of determination’, they are, however, in effect the same. The resulting ‘unity’ of
being and nothing is called ‘becoming’: ‘their truth is … [the] movement of the immediate
vanishing of the one into the other: becoming [italics in original], a movement in which both
are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself’ (Hegel
1969, 81–3). The sublation that produces becoming generates a unity that is ‘determinate
being’, the ‘simplest oneness of being and nothing’, which Hegel also calls Dasein (‘being in
a certain place’ ) (Hegel 1969, 110). This also forms the starting point for a dialectic. The
antithesis of determinate being is finitude, because ‘being in a certain place’ is constituted
by limitation; the sublation of finitude produces the infinite , and this in turn supplies the
basis of a third category, ‘being-for-self’, or ‘infinite being’, which is ‘absolutely determined
being’ (Hegel 1969, 116–17 and 137). The process then begins again: ‘being-for-self as
such’ is opposed by plurality, which is understood as the differentiation of the one and the
many; and under sublation this creates attraction, which unifies being-for-self and plurality.
Finally, this unity furnishes the basis for Hegel’s second overarching category, ‘quantity’,
which altogether constitutes the antithesis of quality.
How might such a mode of argument be brought to bear on music? The literal application
of Hegel’s exhaustive derivation would court triviality, offering little more than a dialectical
explanation of any discrete span of music’s condition as a phenomenon, an explanation it
would necessarily share with any other phenomena possessing quality (if Hegel’s model is
to have any philosophical credibility at all). To state that measures 1–20 of the first
movement of the ‘Tempest’ are ontologically tractable because in their basic essence they
overcome the dialectic of being and nothing is to say nothing of music-analytical value
whatsoever.
Of course, Adorno and Dahlhaus do not proceed like this. Instead, they rely on the
assumption that musical characteristics can be understood conceptually in a way that is
susceptible to explication via dialectical argument. The affiliation of material and concept
comes first; the dialectical reading follows. The concept is not immanent to the music,
however: the ‘Tempest”s opening is not introductory because that concept resides within the
music; such a reading is plausible because conventions mimicking the rhetoric and syntax of
language allow us to make an analogy between the characteristics of measures 1–20 and
prefatory rhetoric, and those of 21–41 with the continuation rather than presentation of an
idea. In brief: convention facilitates analogy; analogy allows the marshalling of concepts;
and the availability of a dialectical structure of argument allows those concepts to be
disposed antithetically. Music, however, does not consist of concepts, but of sonorous
formations that can be made to stand for concepts.
None of this undermines fatally the project of analysing music in dialectical terms. The
intertwining of music and the history of ideas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
is sufficiently dense that any parallels drawn between dialectics and musical structure can be
amply justified through recourse to the cultural milieu as common ground. And no music
historian who is happy to accept the prominent role played by Hegel’s progressive notion of
history in the formation of culture can reasonably argue that it has no relevance for the
analysis of music. The looming danger – and Taruskin’s caution is well taken in this regard
– is that dialectics becomes a species of false consciousness, an all-encompassing model of
reality that all phenomena must reflect, rather than a tool enabling us to comprehend the
interaction of music, philosophy and society in a historically sensitive way.
The demise of Hegelianism has become a virtual first principle for those areas of the
humanities and human sciences trading under the names of postmodernism and neo-
liberalism in the last several decades. In political history, the collapse of the Berlin Wall has
been taken as conclusive evidence of its absolute morbidity, a claim given perhaps its most
well-known formulation in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man ,
which advanced the thesis that the triumph of late capitalism engendered the demise of any
concept of history as an overarching imperative or metanarrative (Fukuyama 1992). Yet the
global financial crisis has since cast considerable doubt on the security of Fukuyama’s
confident assertions, and the manifest cracks in the neo-liberal architecture that the crisis
exposed encourage us to find renewed value in an idealist philosophical mindset. This
chapter has cast dialectics in explicitly historicist terms, but its day as a model of the
political present may yet come again.
Notes
1 The question of how to translate Aufhebung is perennial and seems to admit no universally agreed solution. The common
options are sublation, synthesis, overcoming, resolution and reconciliation, none of which quite captures the German original.
I treat these alternatives as synonyms throughout this chapter, in the absence of a definitive adjudication on the issue. For
Hegel’s own explanation of the concept, see, for example, Science of Logic , 1969, 106–8.
2 For an overview of Hegel’s model of history, see McCarney 2000.
3 The groundwork for this model is laid out in Adorno [1932] (2002), trans. as ‘On the Social Situation of Music’ in Essays on
Music , ed. Richard Leppert, trans. Susan H. Gillespie, 391–436. For a commentary, see Paddison 1993, 97–106.
4 Adorno’s most substantial elaboration of the negative-dialectical idea is Negativ Dialectik (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp,
1967), trans. E. B. Ashton as Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1973), which includes a substantial excursus on the
Hegelian dialectic, 300–60.
5 Philosophie der neuen Musik (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1949). I have throughout referred to Philosophy of New Music
Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), in view of the oftnoted problems with the
other available English translation Philosophy of Modern Music , trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster (London:
Sheed & Ward, 1973). For a penetrating analysis of the problems of translating this book, see Subotnik 2011.
6 For a counterpoint to Adorno’s reading, see Levitz 2004.
7 On the ESC in the first movement of the ‘Tempest’, see Hepokoski 2009, 203–5.
8 On the distinction between tight-knit and loose-knit thematic design, see Caplin 1998.
9 For a pertinent taxonomy of instrumental finale types, see Talbot 2001.
10 On the relationship between form and expression in this work and the Fourth Symphony, see Hatten 2001.
11 For a consideration of this topical discourse in the context of a general appraisal of the topic in nineteenth-century music, see
Horton in press.
12 On parataxis in Schubert’s music, see Mak 2006 and 2010.
13 The model for this is, of course, the opening of the Finale of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, a richly suggestive allusion, but
one that cannot be elaborated here.
14 For a more extended consideration of the design of this movement, see Horton 2006 and 2013, especially 215–19.
Introduction
On 26 September 1781, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart wrote from Munich to his father in
Salzburg about his work on Die Entführung aus dem Serail . As he explained his
compositional choices, he voiced his respect for a principle of restraint. In his discussion of
Osmin’s aria Solche hergelauf’ne Laffen , he first emphasizes the character’s excessive
behaviour. Provoked by Pedrillo’s questions and look, Osmin demands that Pedrillo be first
beheaded, then hung, then skewered on a hot spit, then burned, then bound and drowned,
and finally, just to ensure a job well done, quartered. As Mozart wrote:
For just as a man in such a towering rage oversteps all the bounds of order, moderation
and propriety and completely forgets himself, so must the music too forget itself. But
since the passions, whether violent or not, must never be expressed to the point of exciting
disgust, as music, even in the most terrible situations, must never offend the ear, but must
please the listener, or in other words must never cease to be music , so I have not chosen a
key foreign to F (in which the aria is written) but one related to it—not the nearest, D
minor, but the more remote A minor.
(Anderson 1985, 769)
In part, the statement is a simple comment on the process of stylization involved in any
mediated representation of the world. In much eighteenth-century music, sighs are decorous
chromatic descents and fear never comes out as a scream. In part, the statement shows
Mozart’s awareness of a primary social function of music in his time, to provide pleasure to
those with the leisure and means to enjoy it. However, the statement is more still. It also
shows Mozart’s desire to achieve a balance between expressive force and cultivated grace.
Mozart wished to portray excess, but he worked with a normative notion of ‘music’ that
demanded limitation.
Although by no means a sufficient condition, such restraint is an essential ingredient of
classicism at multiple levels. From ethical and political perspectives, it can be both a good
and bad thing. Stylistic or formal restraint contributes to the capacity of certain musical
works, genres, styles, as well as the musicians who produce them, to serve as classics for later
generations, and thus as a means both to convey the wisdom of the past and to discipline or
suppress alternatives in the present. For those of classicist persuasion, then, such classical
models not only provide practical lessons but also demand an attitude of restraint and
humility. Classicists do not accept as their sole standard the musical wonts of the day, which
are ruts or fashions to them, even as they may be proper practices or exciting innovations to
others. The critical or stultifying edge of classicism can also be turned inwards, to rein in
received habits and thoughtless actions, as well as individual desires and passionate
expressions. Finally, neoclassicism implies self-consciously respectful, nostalgic, or ironic
distance with respect to classicism itself. Classicists take their bearing from classical
models, neoclassicists from a classicizing tradition. In music, neoclassicism has come to be
associated with the twentieth-century rejection of Romanticism (Messing 1988; Whittall
2001), but it is easy to espy neoclassicism in much of the classicism of the preceding
centuries. The line is blurry at best. 1
No matter one’s feelings about the phenomenon of classicism, one cannot deny its
centrality as a historical force. While Mozart did not identify with self-styled classicists of
his day, most of whom worked in literature, architecture or the visual arts, he showed his
adherence to principle of restraint. Mozart’s letter indicates the precise point at which he felt
that excess could be intimated. He drew attention to issues of metre and modulation plan.
Mozart shifts from to an impetuous ‘Turkish’ 3/4. And, as he pointed out to his father, he
chose the mediant A minor over the closer key, the submediant D minor ( Musical Example
7.1 ). These changes of metre and key pushed at the boundaries of eighteenth-century style,
but not overly so. The mid eighteenth-century theorist Friedrich Wilhelm Marpurg (1753,
99–104) distinguished between four degrees of distance in modulations, and the modulation
to the mediant counted in the first, closest group – that is, to modulations proper (
eigentliche Ausweichungen ). Mozart respected the boundaries of his contemporaries’
expectations and thereby showed his sensitivity to a collective common sense.
Musical Example 7.1 Mozart, Die Entführung aus dem Serail , ‘Solche
hergelauf’ne Laffen ’
Some two centuries later, Igor Stravinsky insisted with equally famous words on the
restraint involved in his music, but he was far more radical. To pre-empt the surprise that he
imagined his Octet (1923) would evoke, Stravinsky wrote in an American journal:
My Octuor is a musical object. This object has a form and that form is influenced by the
musical matter of which it is composed…. My Octuor is made for an ensemble of wind
instruments. Wind instruments seem to me to be more apt to render a certain rigidity of
form I had in mind than other instruments – the string instruments, for example, which are
less cold and more vague. The suppleness of the string instruments can lend itself to more
subtle nuances and can serve better the individual sensibility of the executants in works
built on an ‘emotive’ basis. My Octuor is not an ‘emotive’ work, but a musical
composition that is based on objective elements that are sufficient in themselves.
(White 1979, 574–5)
Like Mozart, Stravinsky sees it desirable to limit emotion, but he goes far further than his
eighteenth-century predecessor. Where Mozart presented restraint as necessary for the
effective communication of the passionate state of Osmin, Stravinsky rejected emotion
altogether. He too draws attention to the stylization involved in his composition, but goes so
far as to present the work as a pure play of form. Formal restraint and the stylized utterance
become formalism and self-conscious play of style.
The letter of a composer speaking as a craftsman to an intimate is not the same as the
‘position paper’ (Walsh 1999, 375) of a composer speaking as a polemicist and propagandist
to an anonymous public. A truer point of comparison to Mozart’s Entführung would be
Stravinsky’s own opera, The Rake’s Progress (1951). Not only did Stravinsky self-
consciously reference Mozart’s operas, in particular Don Giovanni and Così fan tutte , but,
even given three decades development of a multifaceted composer, the work serves as a
better indication of the relationship of form to passion in Stravinsky’s music than the Octet.
It is not that the music cannot be heard as emotive, but rather that form masks and changes
the character of the emotion. Stravinsky makes one aware of the artifice involved in a
character’s expression of a passionate state.
In the brief duettino ‘Farewell for now’ ( Musical Example 7.2 ) sung by Tom Rakewell
and Anne Truelove, Anne is neither cold nor objective. Her music is touching. At the same
time, it is artificial. The duet resembles a strophic song and owes some of its pastoral
innocence to this cyclical form, though each strophe is highly manipulated. The instrumental
introduction (the first strophe) places a blithe duet of interwoven melodies at odds with the
accompaniment, as for example when a double leading tone in the two melodic voices
clashes with the harmony beneath (m. 4). Then, when Anne enters, she sings two phrases,
each one metrically akilter. The first sets up an anacrusis–crusis pattern (fare- well ) that
quickly swings awry as an anacrusis lengthens to a full measure. The second phrase places
poetry’s weak syllables on music’s strong beats and vice versa. Such play of form and text
emphasizes the staged character of the actions and passions presented in the opera. The
staged character makes one aware of the artificiality of the production at the same time one
feels the force of the drama. Indeed, the tragedy of Tom’s ‘progress’ owes its subtle but
potent force to the fact that the tale is told with the light style and stage buffoonery of
comedy .
Musical Example 7.2 Stravinsky, The Rake’s Progress , ‘Farewell for
now’, mm. 1–2 5
As this list attests, the concept of classicality straddles a philosophical spectrum that governs
matters both mundane and metaphysical. While some aspects of classicality – those that
stand at the beginning of this list – govern pragmatic issues of artistic production,
organization and reception, others – those towards the end in particular, but potentially all of
them – entail metaphysical commitments or, at the very least, intense attention to the
difficult philosophical issues that beset the human interaction with the natural world.
Definitions of classicality thus vary according to philosophical taste. Originally,
metaphysics of perfection were essential to the phenomenon of classicism. Since the early
nineteenth century, artists and critics have edged away from metaphysics. Scholars on both
sides of the Atlantic have noted a discrepancy between Anglo-American empiricism
(grounded in analysis) and German philosophically inspired approaches that emphasize
reception history and critical theory (Webster 1991, 356; Finscher 1994–2007, 231).
The stretch of the spectrum between the pragmatic and the ideal is the source of many of
the controversies surrounding the concept of classicism. While it is relatively easy to argue
that Mozart served later generations as a classic – a model – critics disagree as to whether
Mozart’s position as a classic is due purely to his excellence (a value judgement with its
attendant difficulties of substantiation – see the section on Attitudes and values on pp. 164 –
6 ) or whether it might owe much to nationalist ideologies. Haydn (who lived for the most
part away from Vienna) and Clementi (who developed his career in London) were classics
in their own day, far outshining Mozart’s light, but since then have required scholarly
reminders to retain their classic status (Webster 1991; Gerhard 2002). At another level,
Mozart’s approach to eighteenth-century formal strategies may seem easy to capture in tight
formal models, such as sonata forms, functions, styles and principles (Caplin 1998;
Hepokoski and Darcy 2006), but the unifying impulse behind such music theory has also
been challenged. Did Mozart really aim at or achieve synthesis (Allanbrook 2002; Schmidt
2002)? The ostensibly empirical analysis has a strong strain of idealism to it.
In a way comparable to Mozart, Stravinsky has served as the measure of musical
neoclassicism (Cross 1998). He has also attracted controversy. Critics call attention to his
resurrection of eighteenth-century musical styles (‘classical’ styles), to his flippant attitude
towards subjective expression, to his rejection of meaning accessible through words and to
his mannerist deconstruction of formal synthesis. However, the controversy around
Stravinsky has been of an entirely different sort from that surrounding Mozart. While critics
contest the very ideal of classicality around Mozart, espying ideology in claims to perfected
synthesis, they have fewer difficulties with the ideal of neoclassicism. The self-conscious
attempt to resurrect past styles seems less metaphysically freighted and more mundane.
However, Stravinsky’s ostensible nonchalance vis-à-vis metaphysics has itself troubled his
waters. His avoidance of expressive utterance and formal synthesis has caused his fiercest
critics, notably Theodor Adorno, to doubt his humanity:
The renunciation of all psychologism, the reduction to the pure phenomena that appear
per se, is to disclose a region of indubitable, ‘authentic’ being…. [It] is a matter of the
chimerical uproar of culture against its own essence as culture. Stravinsky foments this
uproar not only in his aesthetic flirtation with barbarism but also his fierce suspension of
what in music is called culture, the humanely eloquent artwork.
(Adorno 2006, 107–8)
Classicism and neoclassicism are thus threatened by a double bind between the empirical
and the ideal. The utopian dimension of the concept of classicality arouses suspicion that it
serves as a cover for political ideology. At the same time, the rejection of these same utopian
ideals has been taken as a sign of disbelief in the power of humanity to better itself.
These weighty issues only gradually coalesced around the term ‘classic’. The term
originated in ancient Rome, where the classicus was a taxpayer of the highest status.
Eventually, the term was metaphorically applied to authors of high status as well (Curtius
1953, 247–51). However, ‘classical’ only came into its own after the twelfth century, once
writers began to delineate and fret at a decisive split between things ancient, venerable and,
in short, ‘classical’, and those things new and modern (Curtius 1953, 253–5). While any
modern writer can become venerable with the passing of a generation, the concept of the
classical depends on the decisiveness of the gap. Behind it lies a constantly retold tale of
high civilization lost and regained. With this gap goes the peculiar status and function of the
classic. The classic is not simply old. It is something old that retains its value in the present
(cf. Girard 2008: 240). While classicism owed much to the power of ancient Greece and
Rome to inspire new production, it could also be reconfigured around other perceived
historical breaks, even those of a few short decades, as can be seen in the reception of
Mozart, Haydn and Beethoven as classics beginning early in the nineteenth century (Gruber
2002).
While this basic historiographic structure of past models and present value stands at the
origin of the concept of classicism, just as the principle of restraint runs through its various
manifestations, it is best to approach the concept liberally. Classicism affords no single,
simple definition, and even the component parts of the idea can contradict each other. This
chapter will group these various components under three broad headings: practices, styles
and attitudes. The practices spill from musical production into reception. The styles concern
the musical results and the attitudes underpin the practices and resonate in the music.
There are three other widespread uses of the term ‘classical’ that need to be
acknowledged, although this chapter will not dwell on them. The term serves as a label to
designate the music composed roughly between 1720 and 1815 (‘classical period’), although
dates will vary (Webster 2004). It also denotes the genre or tradition of art music that
originated in Europe and has since spread internationally (‘classical music’). The period and
genre terms are, at best, but convenient monikers and, at worst, arid reifications and
simplifications of complex mediations between past and present, model and emulation, and
individual and society. The practices, styles and attitudes, by contrast, criss-cross history.
Third, one finds the term applied to other traditions of music that have developed
attitudes, styles and practices comparable to the Western art tradition, although they are also
distinct (e.g. Indian classical music, Japanese classical music, jazz, etc.). To visit the term
‘classical’ on such traditions is to run the risk of colonizing them with terminology
developed in a Western context, although to avoid comparison is to run the opposite peril of
failing to engage in intercultural dialogue (Schofield 2010). Nonetheless, there is good
reason to remember the specificities of the term within the Western musical tradition. As
noted, since early modernity musicians have lived in cultures that were in thrall to the
immense prestige and continuing presence of ancient Greece and Rome (Grafton et al .
2010). However, while musicians were affected by the unfolding and the fate of classicism
at large, they at the same time faced a unique situation. Because musicians inherited
information about ancient music, but no music itself, they were forced but also free to invent
their classicisms to a far greater extent than their colleagues in the other fine arts.
Practices
Practices of reception, in particular ones motivated by a desire for education, lie at the heart
of classicism. A person takes a cue from the past and uses it as a guide for current practice.
Yet this practice of reception is not a simple matter, especially in music. Not only can
musicians take various types of cue from the past – ethical, philosophical and stylistic – but
they must decide what constitutes the canon of models, what sort of lessons should be
learned from this canon of models and how new production should relate to old.
While musicians generally focus on issues of style, the ethical and philosophical
principles of antiquity were essential to the Western classical tradition and did play out in
musical traditions. Musicians learned models of ethical behaviour through their readings of
authors of antiquity, as well as through their readings of modern authors strongly oriented
towards antiquity. To take one example, the first-century Roman author Plutarch passed
through many hands in the eighteenth century. His Parallel Lives offered agreeably readable
biographies along with moral commentary on the protagonists’ virtues and faults. Although
a Platonist, Plutarch had integrated elements of Stoicism into his thought and writings, and
the mix of ethical and quasi-religious contemplation went down well with later readers.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, wrote in his Fourth Promenade :
Of the small number of Books I still occasionally read, Plutarch is the one that grips and
benefits me the most. He was the first I read in my childhood, he will be last I read in my
old age; he is almost the only author I have never read without gaining something.
(Rousseau 2000, 28)
In 1801, a year before he penned the Heiligenstadt Testament, Beethoven also called
attention to Plutarch. To his friend Franz Wegler he confessed:
I have often cursed my Creator and my existence. Plutarch has shown me the path of
resignation. If it is at all possible, I will bid defiance to my fate, though I feel that as long
as I live there will be moments when I shall be God’s most unhappy creature….
Resignation, what a wretched resource! Yet it is all that is left to me –
(Anderson 1961, 1, 246; cited in Borthwick 1998, 269)
On the side of indirect influence, one might cite Mozart’s appreciation of the novel Les
Aventures de Télémaque . He read the book in Italian translation during his trip to Italy in
1770 (Mozart 2005, 5, 388 [8 September 1770]), and it later furnished the plot for his opera
Idomeneo (1781). The book also influenced the Abbé Terasson’s novel Sethos (1731), one of
the many sources for Die Zauberflöte (1791). The author of Télémaque was the Archbishop
François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, a decided adherent of ancient literature in the
Querelle des anciens et des modernes . The novel not only held up the loyalty, bravery and
moral fortitude of its eponymous hero up for praise, but also offered many episodes that
contrasted virtuous and lax behaviour. Idomeneo owes its plot to one such episode.
The great gap between Rousseau’s simplicity of style and Beethoven’s sophistication
indicates that ethical values can be transmitted musically in various ways. In both ‘Dans ma
cabane obscure’ from Rousseau’s Le Devin du village (1752, Musical Example 7.3 ) and
‘Gott! Welch Dunkel hier’ of Beethoven’s Fidelio (1805, rev. 1806 and 1814, Musical
Example 7.4 ), the male protagonist sings of his desire for his beloved, evoking a drama of
darkness and light to characterize current troubles and desired idyll. (Florestan’s vision of
Leonore is not included in the musical example.) The contexts are different, though. Colin
sings his romance in the final scene of Le Devin , after he and Colette have been reunited.
Florestan expresses himself in a scena from the depths of the prison and without any
knowledge that his beloved is literally on the doorstep.
In my dark hut
Dans ma cabane obscure
Toujours soucis nouveaux; Always new worries;
Vent, soleil, ou froidure , Wind, sun, or cold,
Toujours peine et travaux . Always difficulty and work.
Colette, ma bergère , Colette, my shepherdess,
Si tu viens l’habiter , If you come inhabit it,
Colin dans sa chaumière Colin in his thatched cottage
N’a rien à regretter . Has nothing to desire.
God, what darkness here!
Gott, welch Dunkel hier!
O grauenvolle Stille! O horrible silence!
Öd ist es um mich her , It is desolate around me,
nichts, nichts lebet auβer mir , Nothing, nothing lives except me,
o schwere Prüfung! what a harsh trial!
Doch gerecht ist Gottes Wille! But God’s will is righteous!
Ich murre nicht, das Maβ I do not complain – the measure
der Leiden steht bei dir! of suffering is yours to determine!
The musical settings stand at opposite ends of their respective times’ stylistic spectrums.
Rousseau offers a simple romance, rather than the virtuoso arietta that his audience might
have expected at this point in a divertissement (Charlton 2012, 155). The simplicity of the
melodic line stands for the simplicity of the soul that produces it. Beethoven, on the other
hand, offers a fully developed scena , with orchestral introduction, accompanied recitative,
cantabile and cabaletta. In his accompanied recitative, the dialogue between the gruff turn
figures (lower strings) and plaintive rising figures (winds and first violins) emphasize the
pathos of the situation, while the subsequent atmospheric string tremolo offer an appropriate
backdrop for Florestan’s anguished response to the desolate cell. The shift from F minor
towards A major accomplished over the course of this recitative reflects Florestan’s
fortitude in solitude. He does not complain. While both composers wished to express
strength and the ethical stance of the self-reliant man – appropriately supported by a wife –
Rousseau found this expression of authenticity in moving simplicity, Beethoven in dramatic
intensity.
Musical Example 7.3 Rousseau, Le Devin du village , ‘Dans ma cabane
obscure’, mm. 1–1 5
Musical Example 7.4 Beethoven, Fidelio , Act 2, Scene 1, ‘Gott! Welch
Dunkel hier’
Most musicians showed less interest in the philosophical legacy of antiquity than in the
ethical one, but they worked within a critical climate shaped by this legacy. There were
many philosophies in antiquity, and thus musicians and music critics could draw diverse
inspiration from their readings, from idealist thought on perfections to empiricist attention to
sensory experience. The latter is less commonly recognized than the former. Stephen
Greenblatt (2012) has argued that the Epicurean materialism of Lucretius’s De rerum natura
(first century BCE) had a decisive impact on pleasure-oriented aesthetics after it was
discovered in the fifteenth century. The philosophy of antiquity provided a counterweight to
the teachings of the Church. To ascribe empiricism and appreciation of pleasure in later
times solely to this ancient catalyst would surely be to exaggerate the weight of the classical
heritage. Nonetheless, empiricist sensibility sat well with classicist leanings. For example,
the Scottish moral philosopher and economist Adam Smith was attentive to ancient learning,
penning an essay on ‘The Principles which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries;
Illustrated by the History of the Ancient Logics and Metaphysics’ (Smith 1795, 112–29). The
materialism of his approach expresses itself in his approach to the arts. In the essay ‘Of the
Imitative Arts’, written some time between 1751 and 1764, he writes:
The mind being thus successively occupied by a train of objects [i.e., ‘a combination of
the most agreeable and melodious sounds’], of which the nature, succession, and
connection correspond, sometimes to the gay, sometimes to the tranquil, and sometimes to
the melancholy mood or disposition, it is itself successively led into each of those moods
or dispositions; and is thus brought into a sort of harmony or concord with the Music
which so agreeably engages its attention.
(Smith 1795, 163)
The tutelage in technique, style and genre is the most complex aspect of musical
classicism because of the peculiar situation of music already noted. Architects and visual
artists could look back to the temples and statuary of antiquity. Writers could emulate the
style and genres they recovered from libraries. Musicians, however, could only look back to
descriptions, prescriptions and idealizations of music, such as Plato’s discussion of the
modes in the Republic , Cicero’s Dream of Scipio or Boethius’s later synthesis of Greek music
theory. The music itself was missing. This situation caused musical classicism to develop
only gradually. One can define three stages, although the standard caveats about historical
schemas apply.
The first stage of musical classicism consisted in an emulation less of antique models than
of the practices of antiquity, along with the practices of other humanists. This second-hand
classicism began in the Renaissance, the time in which classicism first flourished. The
establishment of a canon of classic authors and the reformation of practices of imitation and
emulation was particularly important. In his Liber de arte contrapuncti (1477), Tinctoris
famously wrote that ‘it is a matter of great surprise that there is no composition written over
forty years ago which is thought by the learned to be worthy of performance’. Then, after
listing Ockeghem, Régis, Busnois, Caron and Faugues, as well as their teachers Dunstable,
Binchois and Dufay, Tinctoris remarked:
Certainly I never listen to them or study them without coming away refreshed and wiser.
Just as Virgil took Homer as his model in his divine Aeneid , so, by Hercules, do I use
these as models for my own small productions; I have, in particular, openly imitated their
admirable style of composition with regard to the placement of consonances.
(Weiss and Taruskin 2008, 68)
According to Peter Cahn (1989), Tinctoris drew upon Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria to
develop his vision of artistic practice. The book had become a central text for Renaissance
scholars after its first printing in 1470. Moreover, Rob Wegman (1996) has argued that this
practice of canonization and imitation was essential to the emergence of a modern notion of
the ‘composer’ – that is, an author in the strong sense of the word.
The second stage of classicism emerged over the course of the sixteenth century as writers
began to look more closely at the descriptions of ancient music and the values attributed to
it. Had the pursuit of harmony and grace perhaps silenced the passion described in ancient
texts? Did the sophisticated polyphony of the preceding hundred years have a proper
pedigree? Did the polyphony perhaps forget the centrality of the human individual in the
artistic endeavour? Always aware of Horace’s admonishment to poets to delight ( delectare
), to edify ( prodesse ) or to do both, humanists reasserted the importance of edification,
using their close readings of antiquity as a source of legitimization. As Vincenzo Galilei
wrote in the Dialogo della musica antica, et della moderna (1581):
If the aim of modern practitioners is (as they say) to delight the sense of hearing with the
diversity of the consonances, … let this goal of delighting with the diversity of their
chords be left to these instruments, since being deprived of sense, motion, intellect,
speech, discourse, reason, and soul, they are not capable of anything else. But let men,
who have been given by nature all these beautiful, noble, and excellent abilities, seek by
their means not only to delight but, as imitators of the good ancients, also to be of use,
since they have the ability to do this.
(Berger 2006, 311–12)
As humanists rummaged through old texts and discussed their discoveries with musicians,
the aesthetic principles of antiquity rose in importance.
Most important was the principle of verisimilitude, or truth to nature. The point was not a
realistic imitation of nature, but rather the creation of an artistic statement that had the force
of nature. Although musicians by no means ignored delectation, they intensified their quest
for efficacy in a musical presentation of a verbal utterance (e.g. a cantata) or of a musical
action (e.g. an opera). The central question for verisimilitude was: Could one forget the
artificiality of the artistic statement and believe in the represented passions or actions? Such
classicism was fragile, as history was to tell. Opera may have been born from humanist
discussions about ancient drama and the verisimilitude of passionate song, but it was easy
for librettists and musicians to use music as an excuse to escape classical precedent, to
cultivate extravagant, illogical and highly pleasurable spectacle (Rosand 1991, 34–65).
Opera would forever after swing from spectacular profusion to classicist reform and back
again.
The third wave of classicism occurred in the eighteenth century, as musicians developed
strategies of phrase construction in such a way that they might mimic the fluid phrases of
classical rhetoric. This development can be traced through the efforts of music theorists.
During this century, they turned from the description of rhetorical figures towards the
elaboration of a system of phrase punctuation – that is, cadence (Bonds 1991; McCreless
2002, 872–6). In other words, they turned from an issue that addressed parts (the figure) to
one that concerned wholes (phrase organization). It may have been medieval music theorists
who first borrowed the term ‘period’ from rhetoric and baroque theorists who developed it
into a music-theoretical term of independent standing. However, it was not until the 1780s
that Heinrich Christoph Koch arrived at a sophisticated definition of the term that could be
applied to phrases of variable length, harmony and character (Blumröder 1971–2006 [1996],
1–7; Burnham 2002, 881–3). This led to the development of a musical syntax that permitted
the appropriation and successful application of classicist criteria of form, such as unity in
variety. While musical and verbal rhetoric functioned differently (Vickers 1984; Hoyt 2001),
musicians were inspired to develop fluid phrases that approximated those of classical
rhetoric.
Classicist formal criteria were not new, but for music to develop its own classicism it was
important that the formal arrangement of musical phrases bore comparison to that of human
speech, at the same time that they did not depend on the formal articulations of a text. This
allowed the music to appear ‘human’, rather than divine, to contemporaries. In the 1780s,
for example, Heinrich Christoph Koch justified cadences in psychological terms, as ‘resting
points for the spirit’ ( Ruhepunkte des Geistes ), and developed a theory that matched form
to the process of reception and compared it to necessary resting points to be found in
language (Koch 1782–93, 2, 342). If, by contrast, one looks back to the Renaissance, when
the premium placed on suavity also encouraged classicist formal criteria, one finds musical
structures of sophistication, formal balance and great harmony, but these structures were
considered divine, a manifestation of universal harmony. This remained true of other
contrapuntal, formally integrated forms well into the eighteenth century (Yearsley 1998).
Thus, musicians appropriated the elements of Western classicism in three stages, first
developing the basic practices of canon formation and emulation, along with the necessary
concept of the work, then appropriating the aesthetic principles of verisimilitude and
attention to ‘nature’, in particular human nature, and finally the stylistic means to realize the
formal criteria of balance and unity in variety, but in a way that bore a symbolic
resemblance to human speech. Once these three elements were in place, it was possible for
musicians to develop their own classical tradition, and it is perhaps no accident that
eighteenth-century style and practice remained the foundation for later pedagogy. Grounded
in a practice of canonization and respectful competition between generations, eighteenth-
century style aimed to remain true to human nature even as it developed the artifice of fluid,
variegated, yet also graceful musical utterances. Even when musicians challenged
eighteenth-century styles or aesthetics, they nonetheless took them as a point of departure
and as a standard by which their own efforts should be judged. In part for such reasons,
Friedrich Blume (1970) characterized eighteenth and nineteenth centuries together as a
‘Classic-Romantic’ period.
As they developed such canons of models and practices of imitation, musicians collected,
idealized, abstracted and imitated, but in different ways. While musicians up until the
eighteenth century imitated canons of styles, for example, thereafter musicians also
increasingly paid heed to a canon of works (Dahlhaus 1984, 49–50). It was less Palestrina’s
works than the style of music abstracted from it that served later generations as a model of
classical vocal polyphony. It was a simplified style, one that had been accommodated to the
vertical orientation favoured by thoroughbass polyphony and amenable to development in
very different stylistic situations (Heinemann 1994, 64–5 and 101–17). By contrast, the
classicism of the eighteenth and later centuries depended very much on the canonization of
works, first the operas of Lully in France (Weber 1990), then the concerti grossi of Corelli
and the oratorios of Handel in Britain (Weber 1992), then the operas, oratorios and
instrumental genres cultivated by Haydn, Mozart and eventually Beethoven in Vienna
(Gruber 2002), later to be joined by many others.
Canons of styles abstract general characteristics of music, while canons of works point to
particular characteristics. In other words, the former are canons of codifiable procedures that
provide lessons to later generations, while the latter are canons of inimitable works that offer
a standard of quality to be approached and hopefully matched, but that are also sui generis .
Classicist modelling and imitation generally takes a middle position between these two
poles. Thus, even nineteenth- and twentieth-century artists who sought the originality mined
their predecessor’s compositions for tricks of the trade (cf., e.g. Cross 1998; Thorau 1999;
Sisman 2000). Genre often mediated between the general and the particular. It was Corelli’s
concerti grossi that contributed especially to the canon (Weber 1975, 75–89), Handel’s
oratorios (Weber 1975, 103–42; Finscher 1987), Haydn’s string quartets (Krummacher
2005: 1, 147–77) and so forth. The mediating function of genre can be seen, for example, in
the organization of Charles Rosen’s The Classical Style (1971), where the classical style (in
the singular) of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven is broken down and analysed according to
the three composers’ respective composition in various genres .
Distinctions between the general (the codifiable) and the particular (the inimitable) point
to a significant difference in practices of classicism. In his magisterial overview European
Literature in the Latin Middle Ages , Ernst Robert Curtius (1953, 274) distinguished
between ‘standard’ and ‘ideal classicism’. Standard classicism refers to the respect for
regularity (or grammatical correctness in literature) and its canons are codifiable. Curtius
defends the necessity of standard classicism: ‘It is of advantage to the economy of a
literature if a large stock of such goods is available’ (1953, 274). Yet he also argues that
such classicism can ultimately weigh down artistic production if differences in quality are
ignored. Such differences of quality are often perceived as metaphysical differences, as
Curtius notes.
We feel the Classicism of Raphael and of Phidias as Nature raised to the Ideal. To be sure,
every conceptual attempt to circumscribe the essence of great art is a makeshift. Yet the
above formula would to some extent apply to what affects us as ‘classical’ in Sophocles,
Virgil, Racine, and Goethe.
(Curtius 1953, 273)
As Curtius construes it, the binary distinction between standard and ideal classicism may be
a metaphysical one, driving a wedge between ‘great art’ and the rest. It might be wiser to
acknowledge differences of quality, but also to treat the two forms of classicism as two
tendencies within practice, one now favouring regularity and strict control in the technical
means, the other aiming more for the force of the end effect. Many evaluative terms used to
regulate classicist practice (‘simplicity’, ‘harmony’ etc.) can apply to either means or ends
(Chapin 2008, 167–71). Depending on how they are applied, they can guide practice
towards either standard or ideal classicism.
Such differences – between canons of styles and works, and between standard and ideal
classicism – are related to the type of imitation taken up by an artist. An artist may relate to
past works or styles in a continuum of ways, from exact copying to paraphrase, imitation,
emulation, innovation and, at the vanishing point of the spectrum, utter originality. To
differentiate between different ways of mediating between past and present, Martha Hyde
has distinguished four different types of imitation of the past: eclectic, reverential, heuristic
and dialectical. Reverential imitation layers modern ornaments over faithful transcription
(Hyde 2003, 110). Eclectic imitation involves a montage of material of the past which is not
subjected to a logically developed plan (102). Heuristic imitation subjects this montage of
material to a plan that forefronts the self-conscious activity of the composer (114–15).
Finally, dialectical imitation stages a dialogue between past and present in which both model
and imitation critique and allow themselves to be critiques by the other (122). Hyde
exemplifies the categories on neoclassical works, and thus ones that self-consciously play up
the ‘anachronism’ between past and present. However, the four types of imitation could as
easily be applied to classicist imitation, which in general aims to dissolve anachronism
through an emphasis on what in the model is ostensibly timeless.
One must have a relaxed air when one is at the harpsichord. One should not fix one’s gaze
too much on any object, nor leave it too vague, and finally one should not look at the
company, if there be one, with a preoccupied air.
(Couperin 1717, 5–6)
However, despite the cultivation of classical style across musical practice, the issues of style
have been most finely debated with respect to musical works.
In most classicist practices there is a tension between what can be objectively ascertained
and what is accessible only to subjective intuition. In the musical domain, this tension can be
seen in the theories of phrase lengths. Music theorists, most famously Hugo Riemann, have
idealized the priority of four and eight-bar phrases ( Musical Example 7.5 ) and textbooks
will begin harmony by teaching students how to swing suavely from tonic to dominant and
back home again (e.g. Aldwell and Schachter 2003: 83–96; Kostka and Payne 2004: 102–3).
However, the power of a piece rarely lies in such regularity. In the first movement of
Mozart’s String Quartet in F major K. 590 ( Musical Example 7.6 ), the opening bars are
strikingly irregular. In the first nineteen measures, a rising triad in half notes starts phrases
four times, but metrical weightings and phrase lengths differ. First, all instruments
participate in a unison exposition of the rising triad and descending scale, but dynamics and
the three-bar phrase unit with metrically weak closure flaunt norms of phrase construction
(mm. 1–3). Second, Mozart retains the length of three bars, but differentiates the voices and
the harmony. The cadence is now clear, but the phrase nonetheless sits oddly. The rising
triad motive is metrically ambiguous, part measure-long extended upbeat, part phrase
beginning (mm. 4–6). Third, Mozart casts the rising triad motive as a measure-long upbeat,
though one hears it thus only in retrospect, thanks to the regularity of the four measures that
follow (mm. 7–11). Only in m. 16, the beginning of the bridge, is the rising triad motive
seamlessly integrated into a harmonious phrase unit, if one only three bars long. And so the
process continues. In other words, Mozart works with a constellation of gestures and phrase
norms, but never allows them to coalesce into a formation that affords exact description.
Too much of the effect depends on the metamorphoses, as well as such evaluative terms as
‘seamless’ and ‘harmonious’. In such cases, ‘unity’ may be too strong or too
undifferentiated a word to capture the integrity of this ‘variety’. Matthias Schmidt (2002)
has suggested ‘similarity’ [ Ähnlichkeit ] as a music theoretical category more appropriate to
Mozart’s music. Rose Subotnik (1991, 107–9) has put forward ‘analogy’. The point is that it
is hard to name Mozart’s game. ‘Constellation’, ‘similarity’ and ‘analogy’ lack the hard
sobriety of ‘unity’. They leave it to aesthetic intuition (or psychological study) to divine the
relationship of parts and the sense of the whole.
Musical Example 7.6 Mozart, String Quartet K. 590, Allegro moderato,
mm. 1–18
A third way to describe the grace, harmony and integration prized by classicism appeals
even less to objective criteria. It is to address directly the conflict between codifiable means
and inimitable effect. A style or work should appear unstudied or ‘natural’, despite the
thought and effort that lies behind it. Famously, the Renaissance courtier Baldasar
Castiglione offered his readers the ideal of sprezzatura , or ‘a certain nonchalance which
conceals all artistry and makes whatever one says or does seem uncontrived and effortless’
(1976, 67). The disappearance of artifice in art was a central goal of artists in many
centuries, and would ultimately underpin a variety of classicist ideals and catchphrases.
Verisimilitude , a watchword well into the eighteenth century, required artworks to have the
semblance of truth, that is, to seem plausible as a representation of a human utterance or
action, despite the fictional and consciously constructed nature of the work. The eighteenth-
century concept of the galant was naught but a new word to describe sprezzatura (Sheldon
1975, 1989; Seidel 1994–2007). Sublimity and genius , which supplanted galanterie and
verisimilitude in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, involved a process in which the
end effect (the feeling of sublimity) subsumes the material production of the effect into it.
One is taken by the experience. Just before Immanuel Kant described genius as the ‘talent
(natural gift [ Naturgabe ]) that gives the rule to art’ (2000, 186 [§46]), he emphasized that
art must appear as nature:
In a product of art one must be aware that it is art, and not nature; yet the purposiveness in
its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint by arbitrary rules as if it were a
mere product of nature.
(2000, 185 [§45])
He thereby opened the door to yet another ideal for the classicist whole: organicism . If an
art work were organic, it would appear as nature and even, when buttressed by a full
metaphysics of genius, the work would be the product of nature (Solie 1980; Schmidt 1990).
The survey suggests that a classical ideal of style and form inspires a variety of styles and
genres, including many not normally associated with classicism. Even as musicians in the
‘Baroque’ seventeenth century pursued emotional intensity at the expense of polyphonic
suavity, they sought to achieve verisimilitude. For their part, Romantics pursued the organic
integrity of the musical work. Twentieth-century modernists could also profess similar
ideals. For example, in 1927 Alban Berg discussed the formal design of his opera Wozzeck
(1925), only then to take up the classicist position that technique is subsumed into the effect:
No one in the audience, no matter how aware he may be of the musical forms contained in
the framework of the opera, of the precision and logic with which it has been worked out,
no one, from the moment the curtain parts until it closes for the last time, pays any
attention to the various fugues, inventions, suites, sonata movements, variations, and
passacaglias about which so much has been written.
(Berg 1989, 153)
Ideals of classical sheen are equally prevalent in performance. When visited by a pianist
in Vienna, for example, Mozart noted that the man played ‘a lot’ but in a rough and laboured
way, without any taste or sentiment. When the man exclaimed at Mozart’s facility as a
performer, Mozart replied, ‘Yes, I had to work too, in order now to be allowed not to work’
(Mozart 2005, 3, 312 [28 April 1784]). In other words, Mozart hid the high artifice of his
virtuosity, along with the work that he had put into it, behind a polish that made it all seem
effortless. The account is prophetic of Mozart reception in general. Contemporaries and later
generations have heard primarily the polish in his music, rarely the labour.
The classical ideal of art-as-nature was challenged most radically in the twentieth century
by neoclassical composers. Neoclassical composers might respect the ideal of artifice-as-art,
as for example in Ravel’s Tombeau de Couperin (1918). Many, however, consciously worked
against the aesthetic illusion, often in the name of ‘objectivity’. Stravinsky, for instance, in
arguing against the illusion of humanity that strings might produce in the Octet, also wished
to exclude ‘all nuances between the forte and the piano’ (White 1979, 575). Not only do
abrupt shifts in dynamics contribute to the sense of disjuncture between parts, but they also
overturn the classicist model of synthesis at another level. Dynamics and other
‘performative’ nuances contribute to the appearance of artifice as art/nature.
I cannot write poetically, for I am no poet. I cannot arrange styles of speech with such art
as to produce effects of shade and light, for I am no painter. Even by signs and pantomime
I cannot express my reflections and thoughts, for I am no dancer. But I can do so by
means of tones, for I am a musician.
(Mozart 2005, 2, 110–11 [8 November 1777])
When it inspires a community, the refinement of practice can be closely guarded and can be
treated as a bulwark against other practices or communities of the time. In such cases,
restraint expresses itself as a reticence to accept contemporaneous practices perceived as
either compulsive or impulsive – that is, practices marked either by too much rigour or by
too little. Both the self-confidence that derives from a long tradition and the ‘shock of the
ancients’ (Norman 2011) felt by a look back to the distant past can provide people with the
impetus to reject what had become comfortable in the present. Thus, classicist restraint can
be directed against the rigour of the academic and pedagogue, but also against practices
adopted without sufficient reflection from either the recent past (routine) or the present
(fashion). Such restraint can promote rejuvenation through a fresh look at the distant past, as
well as the refinement of technique over time, but also conservatism and resistance to
change.
In contrast to the cultivation of restraint found in the various disciplinary traditions of
classicism, the political culture of restraint grew from aristocratic courts (Fader 2003).
Castiglione’s sprezzatura was taught to an elite audience, and the manuals on etiquette,
behaviour and conversation that followed often developed this elitism into critiques of the
perceived faults of ‘lower’ social groups: the compulsiveness (i.e. the work ethic) of the
bourgeoisie, the pedantry (i.e. rigour) of academics and churchmen, the lack of moral values
(i.e. lack of aristocratic demeanour) of popular classes, the barbary (i.e. cultural alterity) of
foreigners, and so forth. However, sprezzatura and the implicit critiques that went with it
were also directed against the aristocracy itself, in particular against the feudal aristocracy
and their warrior values. The process of civilization that spread the ideal of sprezzatura
beyond the aristocratic milieu played out in many ways. As non-noble men of letters often
played a central role in the education and entertainment of the polite aristocracy, the
cultivation of grace opened the door to a degree of meritocracy within the political
establishment, especially as courts required bureaucracies and thus attracted educated
commoners into their orbits. However, the process of civilization also contributed to the
hierarchical organization of society and to the regulation of open competition (Elias 1981).
As restraint furthered the maintenance of political order even as it supported reflection,
classicism has been the aesthetic of preference for many political regimes, as well as
political players without power who hoped to install regimes of control. Thus, with the
French monarchs leading the way, absolutist rulers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, imperialist nations in the eighteenth and nineteenth, and totalitarian regimes in the
twentieth have all favoured classicism. For reasons of both professional expediency and
political conviction, artists could find common cause with such regimes of control. Igor
Stravinsky expressed his admiration for the Italian Fascist leader Benito Mussolini. ‘He is
the savior of Italy and – let us hope – of Europe’ (Walsh 1999, 521).
Yet classicism, as often as it buttressed politics of control, also provided the means to
temper or subvert political authority. First, a person could always argue that the centre of
power had cultivated the wrong form of control, a control based on formalized rules rather
than good judgement. Thus, although artistic classicisms of good taste often participated
willingly in political classicisms of strict order, they could also be a critical voice. Daniel
Gordon has shown that French seventeenth- and eighteenth-century conversation manuals
could be oriented towards the royal court at Versailles or towards the decentred world of
salons in Paris (Gordon 1994). The royal court and its politics were represented above all by
large, official works, in particular the operas of Lully, and by calls for the order represented
by genre purity. By the early eighteenth century, however, musicians often experimented
with style and genre mixture. This was not so much a fall from classical aesthetics, which
still dominated French discussion, as a tempering of norms that had become too rigid. These
musical experiments had a political resonance, as they were associated with the circles
around Philippe II, Duke of Orleans and Regent of France between the death of Louis XIV
(1715) and the ascension of Louis XV to the throne (1723). Genuinely enthused by Italian
styles, Philippe and those in his circle also found in them a symbolic critique of the
regimentation of French politics that two centuries of absolutism had wrought (Fader 2005,
2007; Cowart 2008, 191–252). Hardly a revolutionary or far-reaching critique, to be sure,
coming as it did from aristocratic circles and in the modulated tones of music, but a critique
it nonetheless was.
Note
1 Other notable conceptual introductions and historical studies of classicism and neoclassicism in music include Heartz and
Brown 2001; Finscher 1994–2007; Krummacher and Stephan 1994–2007; Danuser 1997; Gruber 2002; Taruskin 2005, 5, 447–
598. See the extensive bibliographies in Finscher 1994–2007; Krummacher and Stephan 1994–2007.
Introduction
Like most other accounts of musical romanticism, this chapter centres on German thinkers and
composers. It is not a comprehensive, descriptive overview of romantic music, but rather a
narrative of how romantic ideology affected musical aesthetics over the course of the nineteenth
century. It proceeds hermeneutically rather than empirically, attempting to define a romantic
understanding of music rather than cobbling together a definition from musical characteristics of
individual works. Let us orient ourselves within the vast literature on romanticism around three
basic points. The first is the special relationship between music and romanticism, well expressed
in Nietzsche’s words: ‘I fear I am too much of a musician not to be a Romantic’ (1921, 335).
We can move directly from this conflation of music and romanticism to our second point,
which can be seen as a reaction, an interrogation of the first: surely not all music is romantic? A
chronological juxtaposition only muddies the waters; romantic theories of music, which arise in
the 1790s, do not coincide with the nineteenth-century repertoire commonly referred to as
‘romantic’. While musicologists divide the music of that century into early and late romantic
periods, placing the dividing line around 1850, scholars of German literature distinguish a ‘Jena
romanticism’, occurring around 1794–1808, from a literary late romanticism that flourished
during the first two decades of the nineteenth century (Prawer 1970). In contrast, composers of
the so-called ‘romantic generation’ in music, which includes Berlioz, Mendelssohn, Schumann,
Liszt, Wagner and Chopin, were all born around 1810, after literary romanticism had reached its
peak (Dahlhaus 1988; Eggebrecht 1996: 590).
An appreciation of this chronological disjunction is necessary for my third point: romanticism
is not merely a neutral descriptive term; it is a stance or position taken by those who were either
very strongly for or against it. Therefore, anti-romanticism has had a major role in defining
romanticism.
For purposes of understanding romantic ideology, I will turn to an earlier generation, the poets
and philosophers born around 1770 in Germany. These creative men and women reacted strongly
against the Enlightenment’s belief in the rational design of a better world. Their most radical and
anarchic response to the modernization and rationalization of society was proclaimed in the first
decade of the nineteenth century by August and Friedrich Schlegel, Schelling and Novalis.
However, the aesthetic writings of this ‘Jena circle’ centred primarily on literature, leaving it to
Tieck, Wackenroder and E. T. A. Hoffmann to adumbrate a concept of musical romanticism .
Weimar Classicism, especially as expressed by Goethe and the aesthetics of Hegel, forms the
counterpart to this particular romanticism. These thinkers were the first to define romanticism in
opposition to classicism and to draw the analogy of sickness as opposed to health. They thus
inaugurated the polemical discourse that defines romanticism and also indicates how strongly it
has always functioned as a value judgement. As Carl Schmitt, himself an important critic of
romanticism, remarked, ‘The easiest thing to do would still be to follow Stendhal and simply say
that romantic is what is interesting and the classical is what is boring, or naturally the other way
around’ (Schmitt 1991, 4). By designating something as romantic, a critic often reveals ethical,
political or moral values rather than strictly aesthetic concerns.
These three points – the special bond between music and romanticism, the vagueness of a
chronological definition and the value judgement implicit in defining the ‘romantic’ content of
an artwork – go a long way towards explaining why it is so hard to pin down musical
romanticism. Musicologists place its beginnings anywhere from 1780 to 1830 and often see it
persisting well into the twentieth century (Samson 2001). For instance, a reader turning to
Richard Taruskin’s comprehensive history of Western classical music can find romanticism
invoked for music as early as Mozart and as late as Schoenberg (Taruskin 2005). Such an
expansive view leads observers like Dieter Borchmeyer to complain about ‘the musical concept
of romanticism, which denotes everything and nothing … and is applied to the entire
development of music from Franz Schubert to Richard Strauss, and so, ultimately, does not mean
anything at all’ (Borchmeyer 1994, 40).
In response, rather than concentrating on defining the chronological boundaries of
romanticism, we need also to fill in the comparatively neglected history of anti-romanticism.
This reveals a different picture: a history of music over the last two hundred years that can be
seen as cyclic. Instead of an undifferentiated ‘romantic period’, we observe a series of waves of
romanticism, separated by periods of vehement reaction that also ebb away. After the first
romantic era and a backlash to it around 1850, a second wave of romanticism, or ‘neo-
romanticism’, lasts until the First World War. The following period of anti-romanticism reaches
its peak in the 1920s. The cycle repeats once more, with the period after the Second World War
marking the most extreme version of anti-romanticism to date. From the current standpoint of the
early twenty-first century, it appears that, despite repeated attempts to kill it off, musical
romanticism lives on.
A detailed description of this history is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, I will
illustrate this premise by discussing romanticism and anti-romanticism in their primary locus, the
nineteenth or so-called ‘romantic’ century. I will also comment upon the question of the
persistence of romanticism and anti-romanticism in the musical modernism of the early twentieth
century. In the following section I will characterize the main themes of romantic ideology within
the framework of modern society and how they are manifested in music.
Wagner’s Tannhäuser
‘The Marble Statue’ also illuminates significant romantic aspects of Richard Wagner’s ‘grosse
romantische Oper’, Tannhäuser (1845). One of the sources for Wagner’s opera was the
Tannhäuser saga in the 1806 collection Des Knaben Wunderhorn ; Eichendorff almost certainly
knew this saga and incorporated features of it into ‘The Marble Statue’ (Hanss 1989: 14).
Therefore, there are similarities between Wagner’s opera and Eichendorff’s story because they
have a common source. However, there are deeper connections. Like the story, the opera is based
on a stark dualism that is subtly undermined. Tannhäuser is an artist who is seduced by Venus,
and unlike Florio, succumbs. However, he escapes Venus in Act I by calling out to the Virgin
Mary. While Florio experiences a rite of passage and emerges ‘reborn’, Tannhäuser is torn apart
by his inner turmoil; unable to live with himself, he dies, albeit redeemed by the saintly
Elisabeth.
Musically, the dichotomy is presented at the outset in the Overture: chorale-style music that is
steady, predictable and traditional. The music of the Venusburg that follows is free flowing,
chromatic and more colourfully orchestrated. Musical keys are also used symbolically to
reinforce the opposition. The opera begins in E major with Venus in possession and ends in E
major, with the redemption of Tannhäuser by Elisabeth. The two keys are audibly juxtaposed in
the song contest, when Wolfram’s courtly love song is interrupted by Tannhäuser’s praise of
Venus and physical pleasure.
Although the portrayal of the powers in play is undeniably schematic, upon closer inspection
Tannhäuser can be seen to manifest an ambivalence that blurs the division between good and evil
(Dahlhaus 1979a: 25–7). Like ‘The Marble Statue’, the opposites also sometimes become
doubles. In performance, the roles of Venus and Elisabeth are frequently performed by the same
singer. Another way that Wagner departs from a strict bifurcation of good and evil is the
presence of a third kind of music, ‘natural’ music. In Act One, after being returned to the ‘real’
world, Tannhäuser experiences several extraordinary minutes of ‘natural’, ‘diegetic’ music,
meaning music that one could encounter in the real world, not in the theatre, but also sounds not
made by humans (Abbate 2001, 123–5). The orchestra (the extra-diegetic ‘soundtrack’) is silent
as a shepherd sings and plays his pipe, which overlaps with singing pilgrims passing by as they
make their way to Rome. The only accompaniment is the sound of cows shaking their cowbells.
In this opera about music, ‘natural’ music is portrayed and described; for instance, Tannhäuser’s
first speech recalls church bells. This spontaneous music represents something different from the
artful songs by Tannhäuser and his fellow musicians. The presence of a third, natural realm, set
off against the supernatural realm of Venus and the realm of social convention represented by
Elisabeth, lends some ambiguity to Wagner’s message.
From the far background a train of Bacchantes approach, who rush in among the pairs of
lovers, inviting them to wild delights. By gestures of rapturous intoxication the Bacchantes
excite the lovers to increasing license. The revelers rush together with ardent love-embraces.
Satyrs and Fauns have appeared from the rocky clefts and now force themselves in their dance
between the Bacchantes and the pairs of lovers.
(Wagner 1916, 414)
Wagner represents the erotic frenzy and bliss musically by using extremes of orchestral colour,
texture and harmony. In contrast, the description of Orfeé ’s Fourth Tableau (finale) specifies
merely: ‘The Underworld. As the curtain rises, all the gods of Olympus and the Underworld are
gathered round a table. They are crowned with flowers and are drinking. Bacchanale’ (Crémieux
1936). Eurydice’s Hymn to Bacchus is set as a bouncy, cheerful strophic song with a chorus,
sung by a coloratura soprano. The bacchanale culminates in the energetic cancan: a duple metre
kick-step, regular phrasing, simple harmonic progressions and infectiously repetitive tune.
Neo-romanticism
In the second half of the nineteenth century, romanticism took on a new lease on life as a
consequence of the failure of the 1848 revolutions throughout Europe. The resulting defeatist
attitude about making the world a better place easily crossed over into a desire to escape from
reality into a subjective, inner world of feelings. This neo-romanticism acquired philosophical
legitimacy in the 1850s with the discovery of Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy of
will and his evaluation of music as the highest of the arts that had been originally published in
1819. Musical metaphysics in the later nineteenth century were inevitably coloured by
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, as filtered through the writings and music of Wagner. In 1854, after
he had closed out the series of his politically engaged Zurich essays (1849–52), Wagner first
encountered Schopenhauer’s writings. They became critically important to his artistic and
philosophical development because they enabled him to break out of his anti-romantic view of
music. Although the political and philosophical critiques of romanticism had certainly not been
refuted, they receded enough in importance to allow a resurgence of musical romanticism, or as
Carl Dahlhaus called it, ‘neo-romanticism’ (1979b). Schopenhauer also influenced the writings,
as well as the music, of composers whom Dahlhaus would call modernist. This is perhaps
because Richard Strauss, Gustav Mahler, Arnold Schoenberg and others were all centrally
engaged with Wagner.
What was it about Schopenhauer’s writings that made them so relevant to musical thought
after 1850, decades after they were written? Naturally, composers would have been attracted to
his claim that music was the highest of the arts, but Schopenhauer went far beyond this, asserting
that music was on such a different level that literally nothing else in the world could compare to
it.
Music differs from all the other arts by the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon, or,
more exactly, of the will’s adequate objectivity, but is directly a copy of the will itself, and
therefore expresses the metaphysical to everything physical in the world, the thing-in-itself to
every phenomenon. Accordingly, we could just as well call the world embodied music as
embodied will.
(1966, vol. 1, 262–3)
These claims for music exactly fitted the cultural mood after 1850; the very aspect of music that
had traditionally been seen as problematic, its inability to represent through pictures or words,
came to be exalted as the quality that made it superior to mere representation of the world.
Instead of trying to change society, artists could escape into a philosophically defensible
alternative world through music.
Another particular passage in The World as Will and Representation transfixed composers in
the later nineteenth century:
The composer reveals the innermost nature of the world, and expresses the profoundest
wisdom in a language that his reasoning faculty does not understand, just as a magnetic
somnambulist gives information about things of which she has no conception when she is
awake.
(1966, vol. 1, 260)
Wagner quoted this sentence in 1870 in his long essay, ‘Beethoven’. It also appears in
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy in 1872. Mahler referred to it in his letters and it plays a key role
in the argument presented by Schoenberg in his famous 1912 essay, ‘The Relationship to the
Text’ (1975, 141–5).
Composers must have found this passage so compelling because, first, it told them that
musical creation revealed the innermost nature of the world. Music does not merely express
beauty or feelings; it expresses the profoundest wisdom. Second, this creative process is not a
conscious act, but rather something that occurs in an alternative state of consciousness, akin to
being put to sleep by being ‘magnetized’. Perhaps anxious to maintain their authority against the
emerging disciplines of musicology and music theory, composers were attracted to a view of
music as not something that can be theorized, analysed or evaluated by the reasoning faculty.
Schopenhauer’s description confers on the composer the importance that can hardly be claimed
by any other kind of person and relieves the composer of having to account for his importance,
because there is no way his music can be rationally explicated.
Life and death, the whole signification and existence of the external world, in this work
depend entirely on the emotions of the soul. The whole affecting action becomes prominent
only because it is demanded by the innermost sentiment and comes to light as it has been
prepared in the depths of the soul.
(1873, 40)
We might conclude that because of this inner emotional origin, not much takes place on stage in
Tristan – in terms of duration, the ‘action’ sequences (sword fights at the end of the second and
third acts) take only a few minutes, while the remaining four hours or so of the opera involves
working through the characters’ feelings through monologues, confrontations and discussions.
Tristan is romantic in other ways as well. All of these discussions of inner states concern love
and death and other familiar romantic binary oppositions. The real world versus the alternative
world is musically and verbally depicted as literally the difference between night and day. The
most traditional romantic imagery occurs at the beginning of the Act Two: King Marke’s hunt is
the occasion for off-stage horns making hunting calls, an effect Wagner also used in Tannhäuser .
There is a reference to the ‘natural’ music of a water fountain and Isolde attributes her situation
to the goddess of love, named ‘Frau Minne’ in the German medieval version. Even the
supernatural plays a role in the plot, with the drinking of the ‘magic’ love potion.
The dualistic framework of Tristan is just as strong as in Tannhäuser (love/death, day/night,
public/private), but Wagner musically undermines these oppositions with a more sophisticated
treatment that continues to elude definitive interpretation. One example is the vision/light
metaphor in the libretto and its corresponding leitmotif in the music. Although the ‘day’ leitmotif
obviously stands for the real world, it appears in other contexts that prevent us from
understanding it so simplistically. Tristan und Isolde also departs from some of the regular
devices of earlier romantic writings and from Tannhäuser . The power of music is not a theme
here; no singing contest or artists are involved. Perhaps most exceptionally among all of Wagner
operas, in Tristan redemption is not found in woman or religion, but rather in sexual love between
man and woman.
The radically new aspects of both the music and the libretto of Tristan und Isolde can be traced
to Wagner’s understanding of Schopenhauer’s pessimistic theory of the will (Chafe 2005). As
Schopenhauer described it ,
The nature of man consists in the fact that his will strives, is satisfied, strives anew, and so on
and on; in fact his happiness and well being consist only in the transition from desire to
satisfaction …. Corresponding to this, the nature of melody is a constant digression and
deviation from the keynote in a thousand ways …. in all these ways, melody expresses the
many different forms of the will’s efforts, but also its satisfaction by ultimately finding again a
harmonious interval, and still more the keynote.
(1966, vol. 1: 260)
Here Schopenhauer equates musical cadence with satisfaction of desire or the will, so a musical
composition that mirrors life should never end, just as desires never ends until death (Bowie
2009: 247–9). Wagner’s imaginative musical portrayal of the will in the form of sexual arousal
constitutes the ‘sound world’ of Tristan .
Wagner also puts into practice Schopenhauer’s theory that music can represent more directly
than any other medium extreme mental and physical states. Especially in the Third Act, Tristan’s
final stages of life are portrayed in music: going in and out of consciousness, delirium,
hallucination, heart beats. Tristan’s music begins with reminiscences from Act Two, perhaps
representing an unconscious dream state that re-enacts his momentous coming together with
Isolde and his terrible loss of King Marke’s trust. Tristan refers to his time in another world
(unconsciousness) to the point of ‘Urvergessen’ (total lack of consciousness of the real world);
this is audibly depicted as a move to a remote key, here D major, and a soft-as-possible dynamic
marking ( ppp ). After a moment of almost silence, however, the desire motive (at ‘Wie schwand
mir seine Ahnung?’) returns for first time in this act; this leads to a build-up of chromaticism and
the music returns to full strength until Tristan collapses (‘Das Licht, wann löscht es aus?’). The
delirium that follows (at ‘Das Schiff! Das Schiff! Dort streicht es am Riff! Siehst du es nicht?’)
momentarily retreats into another dreamlike reminiscence section (‘Muss ich dich so versteh’n,
du alte, ernste Weise’) and a slow intensification of all parameters, until he imagines himself
blinded and burned by the sun (‘O dieser Sonne sengender Strahl’). A second collapse (at
‘Verflucht, wer dich gebraut!’) is followed by an ominous silence (‘was je Minne sich gewinnt’)
where Kurwenal believes that Tristan has died, and then the resumption of a heartbeat as the
desire motif finally returns (‘O Wonne, nein’).
Finally, Tristan’s next monologue, a full hallucination (‘Und drauf Isolde’), is portrayed in a
distinctly different way than the previous two states of altered consciousness. Rather than
steadily increasing in intensity, Wagner keeps the music slow and regular, but somehow eerily
unmoored through orchestration and tonality, until Tristan turns from a hallucinatory vision of
Isolde (‘Ach Isolde, Isolde, wie schön bist du’) back to Kurwenal. The importance of this opera
and the third act in particular cannot be underestimated as a source of inspiration for Nietzsche’s
Birth of Tragedy .
Nietzsche
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music (1872), heavily influenced by
Schopenhauer and Wagner, presents some of the familiar themes of romanticism, such as the
rejection of the ‘real’ world in favour of a fascination with dreams, intoxication and music. What
Nietzsche added to the mix was a characterization of modernity as the fatal embrace of scientific,
rational thought. Nietzsche put all his hopes in the Dionysian force of music, specifically
Wagner’s operas, to overcome modernity. The Birth of Tragedy is based on the assumption of
the downfall of civilization due to fragmentation of the individual, which itself was not a new
idea but central to the German concept of Bildung . He attacked the standard narrative, however,
by locating the ‘perfect’ era (i.e. before the fall) in archaic Greece up to the middle of the 5th
century BC, which he deemed an aesthetic culture. For Nietzsche, the downfall began with the
period that had hitherto been considered the peak of Hellenic achievement, the period of
Euripides and Socrates. Socrates is scandalously portrayed as the beginning of the fatal
‘disenchantment of the world’ – initiating an unhealthy, overly intellectual approach to the
central questions about the meaning of life.
Rather than Socrates, Nietzsche chooses Dionysus as his hero. Dionysus, the son of Zeus and
the mortal woman Semele, was the god of wine, worshipped by female followers known as
Bacchantes and male followers including satyrs (half-man, half-goat). Worshipping Dionysus
through music making and dancing resulted in frenzied intoxication, Rausch . For Nietzsche, the
significance of Rausch went far beyond pleasure. It dissolves the individual identity, which
involves unbearable pleasure and pain. It is made bearable through representation. In the 6th
century BC in Athens, festivals of Dionysus featured hymns called dithyrambs, which had
originally been sung and danced by choruses of men disguised as satyrs, wearing masks and
goatskins. These hymns had been performed in a circular area called orchestra (literally, ‘dancing
place’), and in about 535 BC a dramatic aspect was added to this choral performance by an
Athenian named Thespis, the ‘father of the drama’; in this sense one can say that theatre was
born out of the cult of Dionysus (Hatab 2001).
Nietzsche identified Dionysus with a fundamental irrationality essential to art. Raymond
Geuss characterizes this as acknowledging: ‘that destructive, primitively anarchic forces are part
of us (not to be projected into some diabolical Other), and that the pleasure we take in them is
real and not to be denied’ (Geuss 1999, xxx). He claimed that in his time, only music still had a
connection to Dionysus, as it had not yet succumbed to science:
Out of the Dionysian root of the German spirit a power has arisen which, having nothing in
common with the primitive conditions of Socratic culture, can neither be explained nor
excused by it, but which is rather felt by this culture as something terribly inexplicable and
overwhelmingly hostile – German music as we must understand it, particularly in its vast solar
orbit from Bach to Beethoven, from Beethoven to Wagner.
(Geuss 1999, 119)
Nietzsche further argued that Wagner’s music—specifically Tristan und Isolde —drew upon the
same Rausch as the forces that had brought Ancient Greek tragedy into being. This musical
polemic mystified and outraged his philological colleagues, who could only understand it as
inappropriate and off-topic. After its publication, Nietzsche’s career in philology was effectively
over before it even began.
In the following decade, Nietzsche resigned his position, became alienated from Wagner, and
repeatedly announced that he had turned against romanticism (Del Caro 1989). His Preface to the
second edition of The Birth of Tragedy , entitled ‘An Attempt at Self-Criticism’, excoriated his
first book as embarrassingly romantic. Indeed, the Preface explicitly contradicts his own book
and warns against
current German music , which is Romanticism through and through and the most un-Greek of
all possible forms of art; furthermore, as a ruiner of nerves it is in the first rank, a doubly
dangerous thing amongst a people who love drink and who honour obscurity as a virtue,
particularly for its dual properties as a narcotic which both intoxicates and befogs the mind.
(Geuss 1999: 10)
Decadence
Nietzsche played a major role in the late nineteenth-century emergence of the concepts of
decadence and degeneration. In the Preface to The Case of Wagner (1967) he claimed: ‘nothing
has preoccupied me more profoundly than the problem of decadence’. He used the French word,
décadence , but associated it mainly with Wagner (Borchmeyer 1983: 632). The relationship of
Nietzsche’s accusation of decadence to his earlier critiques of Wagner and romanticism is
difficult. One scholar recently summed up what many have concluded: ‘in Nietzsche’s
conceptual world and vocabulary, the terms romanticism, pessimism, modernity, and finally
decadence are related in such an intricate fashion that an attempt to define each term in its own
right seems an impossible or even useless enterprise’ (Gogröf-Voorhees 1999: 143).
In The Case of Wagner the emphasis again is on Wagner as a ‘sickness’ from which Nietzsche
says he has recovered: ‘My greatest experience was a recovery. Wagner is merely one of my
sicknesses’ (1967, 155). At this late stage in his writing, as the chronically ill forty-four year old
was approaching his final physical and psychological breakdown, he phrased the issue as a series
of emotionally charged exclamations: ‘Is Wagner a human being at all? Isn’t he rather a
sickness? He makes sick whatever he touches – he has made music sick’ (1967, 164).
Nietzsche presented a provocative alternative to Wagner in the famous first sentence of The
Case of Wagner : ‘Yesterday I heard—will you believe it? —Bizet’s masterpiece for the
twentieth time’ (1967, 157). Nietzsche had indeed attended Bizet’s Carmen several times, but he
had also rediscovered his passion for operetta. He had seen Offenbach’s La belle Hélène during
his student days and had planned to write an essay on Offenbach back in 1868 (Love 1979). Now
French operetta, especially Offenbach, took on a new significance as the opposite of everything
German, romantic, northern, serious, and turgid. One could argue that his epigraph, ‘ ridendo
dicere severum ’ (through what is laughable, say what is somber) applies better to Offenbach’s
satires than Bizet’s lurid drama. For Nietzsche, Offenbach also served as a classical alternative to
romanticism. Nietzsche’s love for what he called a classical style of music included that of his
friend Heinrich Köselitz, who composed under the name Peter Gast. Although this composer
never achieved success in his own day and has been considered a mediocre talent ever since,
Nietzsche valued him as a light, cheerful antidote to Wagnerian decadence. Nietzsche’s
enthusiasm for Gast reached its peak just before his breakdown in 1889. He lavishly praised
Gast’s opera Der Löwe von Venedig as Italian music for Germans and compared him favourably
to Mozart.
Degeneration
Nietzsche used both decadence and degeneration in his quasi-physiological critique of Wagner’s
music. Degeneration can be distinguished as the more ‘medical’ term, defined as hereditary
mental and physical traits that deviate from the norm. It was used quasi-metaphorically so that
various kinds of social groups and their cultural products could be described in the same manner
as an individual organism. From the perspective of biology, degeneration could be viewed as
atavism – the reversion to origins. It represents a shift from a more spiritual romantic organicism
to the many scientific and quasi-scientific theories of primitive origins that flourished in the
nineteenth century. Even music aesthetics was influenced by atavism, adding anthropological
theories of an Urmusik to its formerly purely historical interest in the origins of music. Pre-
linguistic expressive sounds, such as screaming, moaning, sighing, were studied as kinds of
Urmusik . From the perspective of romantic aesthetics, Urmusik was the one and only source to
draw upon for authentic, powerful music. However, for anti-romantics, all this inarticulate
moaning was regressive – ‘primitive’ rather than ‘primal’.
As early as 1860 the music historian Ambros used the term degeneration in relation to the
influence of Liszt and Wagner in the development of music, which he compared to symptoms of
a sick, superannuated organism (Ambros [1860] 1865, 174). Thomas Grey suggests going back
even earlier, to Hanslick’s 1854 description of ‘pathological listening’, as a precursor to theories
of a degeneration of music (Grey 2002). Max Nordau’s Degeneration ( Entartung ) from 1892
was the most popular ‘biomedical’ book on the downfall of art and culture at the end of the
century. A Jewish medical doctor who spent the most significant part of his career as a journalist
reporting to Vienna from Paris, Nordau wrote several popular books besides Degeneration .
Nordau blamed aesthetically reprehensible art on the degeneration of society. Individuals
succumbed to nervous illnesses as a consequence of the fatigue that came from the increased
pace of modern life and the increasing use of narcotics to deal with it. Nordau used and expanded
on Nietzsche’s complaints about Wagner as increasing exhaustion, causing overexcitement and
hysteria. Thomas Grey notes that Nordau’s book was so popular because, ‘like the related
concepts of hysteria and neurasthenia , that of degeneration provided the satisfaction of labeling,
with apparent medical-scientific precision, elusive but nonetheless very acutely felt anxieties
over the modern condition’ (Grey 2002, 87).
Nordau counted Nietzsche and Wagner as examples of decadent artists and thinkers, even
though he drew on Nietzsche for his understanding of decadence. This was just one example of
the paradox of critics of decadence being examples of decadence. As one writer recently put it,
Nietzsche’s critique of decadence and modernity ‘rests on the unresolved and unresolvable
paradox of being part of that which one condemns’ (Gogröf-Voorhees 1999, 139). In The Case of
Wagner Nietzsche acknowledged: ‘I am, no less than Wagner, a child of this time; that is, a
decadent’ (1967, 155).
Introduction
Jazz, since its first moments of emergence, has been intimately linked with, and described
through, images of progress, radical change and new frontiers. 1 Early forms of jazz were shaped
by the encounters between an essentially oral musical culture and modernity as defined by the
new technologies of recording. At various stages of the historical development of the music there
have been profound shifts, marked transformations and, most notably, ideological conflicts
around the tensions between the old and the new, tradition and innovation. The focus on
innovation in jazz generates a close interface between this music and a concept of avant-gardism
and poses questions about how the tradition of this unique musical context is both constructed
and interpreted. In pursuing questions of the relevance of a concept of an avant-garde in relation
to jazz this chapter will ‘improvise’ on some current literature on jazz and, more generally,
existing theoretical reflections upon, and models of, avant-garde cultural practices. Three
specific jazz musics that have been described as avant-garde – Charlie Parker, Ornette Coleman
and Anthony Braxton 2 – are invoked as reflections of the processes and problems involved in
defining an avant-garde, a term that, when used in relation to jazz, ‘obscures as much as it
reveals’ (Kelley 1999, 136).
It is notable that some of the most meaningful attempts to outline a theory of an avant-garde
came at a historical moment – the 1960s – at which some jazz musicians were producing some of
the most intensely difficult and provocative avant-garde music imaginable as part of what very
quickly became known as the ‘new thing’, a new music in an avant-garde moment. 3 However,
this literature was, in effect, not listening. I refer in passing to Renato Poggioli’s The Theory of
the Avant-Garde , first published in English in 1968, and Peter Bürger’s similarly titled work
originally published in 1974, neither of which deals directly with music, but both, in different
ways, grapple with the problematic issues of defining any cultural practice or context as avant-
garde.
There is evidently some form of critical consensus as to what constitutes an avant–garde, with
the aforementioned qualities of radical change and progress forming integral parts of recurring
definitions based on what Jim Samson describes as ‘connotations of frontiers, leadership,
unknown territory and risk’, all of which are implicit in the original military terminology of the
advanced guard (Samson 2001, 246; see also van den Berg 2009). René Girard highlights
‘inconsistency’ as a ‘major intellectual virtue of the avant-garde’ and it is clearly feasible to
substitute creative practice for intellectual virtue (Girard 2008, 237). The sense of the
unpredictable that is implicit in Girard’s ‘inconsistency’, the element of shock, or at least
surprise, is a common presence in most creative contexts that have been described as avant-
garde, leading to an assumed rupture with the pattern of consistency implicit in tradition. This
rupture can be interpreted as a ‘state of rebellion against the cultural mainstream, a state
expressed in its dedication to provocation, controversy, and shock’ (Adlington 2009, 3). These
descriptions outlined above ‘accompanied the term as it was appropriated for and by artists’
(Samson 2001, 246). The process of appropriation highlighted by Samson is generally seen to be
located within twentieth-century culture following on from strong precursors in the nineteenth
century, 4 with specific moments and movements such as, for example, Dada and Surrealism in
the visual arts during and after the First World War, or the emergence of the post-Second World
War avant-gardism of composers such as Pierre Boulez and Karlheinz Stockhausen through their
association with Darmstadt, elevated as striking instances of an avant-garde moment in both
theory and practice. 5 While these moments, among others, share something in common through
their provocative stance in relation to history and tradition, there are profound differences. In the
case of Dada the essentially anti-art position it adopts becomes antagonistic towards art as an end
in itself and suggests a desire for a point of contact between art and life, a desire upon which
Bürger builds a great deal of his interpretation. In contrast, the high-art aspirations of an aesthetic
autonomy as enshrined in the music and polemics of Darmstadt positions an avant-garde practice
as effectively an end in itself.
That the same terminology of avant-garde can appear to work for very different examples,
such as Dada and Darmstadt, suggests something of the basic paradox that is situated at the
centre of any attempted theorization of an avant-garde, a paradox that suggests that the concept is
both more plural and pliable than is often suggested by the singular definition of the avant-garde
and that the co-existence of several, often very different avant-gardes will begin to subvert the
claims made by and for such a concept in both theory and practice. The polarity formed between
these two admittedly different avant-garde ideologies and practices, Dada and Darmstadt, and the
tension between the plural and the singular, is now available for reinterpretation through other
cultural and critical contexts, including jazz music.
How a construction of an avant-garde in either its singular or plural versions is situated in
relation to other concepts, primarily that of modernism, involves a much wider set of issues. For
Poggioli the avant-garde is effectively situated within modernism, using the terms almost
interchangeably: his somewhat standard response sees the avant-garde as that which leads
modernism but does nothing to critique the ideological essence of that concept. 6 In contrast,
Bürger makes a more complex and subtle move towards a differentiation between modernism
and the avant-garde. For Bürger, modernism perpetuated the hierarchical distinction between so-
called high and low culture and the ‘historically specific avant-garde’ 7 is therefore defined as an
attack on the institutions and ideas that underpinned this distinction, effectively situating itself as
a critical gesture towards modernism’s accommodation with prevailing ideological and
institutional orthodoxies. It is also notable that through his exclusive focus on Dada, particularly
the work of Marcel Duchamp, Bürger articulates a somewhat singular representation of avant-
garde cultural practices.
While wanting to resist falling into the trap of collapsing potentially different concepts –
avant-garde, modernism – into a singular totality, in contrast to Bürger’s positioning of an avant-
garde as a critical reflexive gesture towards modernism, the more seemingly routine view of an
avant-garde as effectively the sharp edge of modernism remains a feasible interpretive strategy.
This sharp edge helps give modernism its own sense of internalized difference and diversity, and
therefore places limitations around the conflation of modernisms into the alleged metanarrative
as claimed by some postmodern theory. This interpretation of the positioning of the avant-garde
on the edge of modernism generates its own critical distance from the interchange of terms active
in Poggioli’s account. However, this sharp edge, in itself, requires further comment. Richard
Murphy’s description of the avant-garde serving ‘as the political and revolutionary cutting-edge
of the broader movement of modernism, from which it frequently appears to be trying with
difficulty to free itself’ is an effective summary and, as will become evident, one that lends itself
directly to jazz music (Murphy 1999, 3). On this account, the avant-garde is again positioned on
the edge of modernism. It may try to escape beyond the edge, but this is a move loaded with
difficulties and may ultimately be conditioned by either failure or, alternatively, the ‘escape’
beyond modernism into a somewhat ‘uncritical’ postmodernism.
The initial image of an avant-garde that struggles to free itself from modernism is a vivid
reflection of the way in which jazz practices identified as avant-garde, particularly in the 1960s,
are closely intertwined with images of freedom, with that concept of freedom defined in musical
terms as the attempt to free the music from the conventions and expectations of a modern jazz. 8
However, the distinction that Bürger seeks to draw between modernism and avant-garde needs to
remain in play and will become relevant for jazz in that the critical noises made by some jazz
musicians, particularly in the 1960s, appeared at the time as a culturally dissonant gesture that
not only radically questioned its own musical practices but also critiqued the institutionalized
economic frameworks around the music in the form of jazz clubs, festivals, record labels, etc.
and looked to transcend that framework through wider notions of a cultural and musical freedom,
a process of transcendence that was already active in the mobility of jazz music between ‘low’
entertainment and ‘high’ art form. 9
Free jazz
Although it articulates interacting patterns of similarity and difference in relation to bebop, alto-
saxophonist Ornette Coleman’s music emerged already different, complex, but also accessible
through the immediacy of the recording process. 14 Coleman himself seems to have been already
marked by difference. His early musical experiences were scarred by a sense of failure and
indifference, with only marginal contact with an older generation of jazz musicians or
participation in regular performance situations. This ‘outsider’ status operates in a way that is
similar to the figure of tragic genius as presented by Parker: Coleman as ‘other’. However,
Coleman’s emergence at the end of the 1950s presented a music that is being formed with
remarkable rapidity and results in an immediacy of impact. In fact, from a certain perspective,
this was a music that, complete in itself, seemed to come from nowhere. Coleman’s New York
debut performances at the Five Spot in November 1959 generated intense debate about this new
music, much of it acrimonious, with musicians and critics divided over the merits of Coleman’s
innovations. However, this impact was, for some jazz musicians, critics and listeners, highly
positive. According to Gendron, to Coleman’s ‘proponents’, he ‘represented a much-needed new
development in jazz, opening a new field of activity, after the great innovations of bebop had
turned into cliché (Gendron 2009, 211). The suddenness, the ‘inconsistency’ of the moment
projected against the consistency of convention and tradition, generated an aura of avant-
gardism, the shock of the new.
One of the most significant critical voices in the debates about this music in its own time, and
with a remarkable legacy, was Amiri Baraka, a radical writer and political activist whose
antagonistic response to a white cultural mainstream can be defined as avant-garde. In his book
Blues People , first published in 1963, and therefore providing an immediacy of response to
recent developments in the music, Baraka describes these developments as ‘for lack of a more
specific term, “avant-garde”’, and mentions Coleman as well as the pianist Cecil Taylor in this
context. According to Baraka:
The implications of this music are extraordinarily profound, and the music itself, deeply and
wildly exciting. Music and musician have been brought, in a manner of speaking, face to face,
without the strict and often grim hindrances of overused Western musical concepts; it is only
the overall musical intelligence of the musician which is responsible for shaping the music. It
is, for many musicians, a terrifying freedom.
(Baraka 1963, 224–7)
For Baraka, the free jazz of Coleman, and others, was a rejection of received notions about
musical forms and content, not just from within the jazz tradition but projected against ‘Western’
concepts, a proposal that positions the debate on Baraka’s own political terms. However, in the
context of this chapter, what is most immediately notable is his proposal that the resulting
freedom is ‘terrifying’. I read this as a statement about avant-garde art as sublime, the movement
away from normal modes of understanding and interpretation through the unpredictable yet
intentional ‘inconsistency’ of a new creative force.
Coleman’s music readily and quite deliberately identified itself with avant-gardist images of
change and progress through titles such as The Change of the Century, Tomorrow is the Question
and The Shape of Jazz to Come (all recorded in 1959), or project a declaration of otherness (
Something Else , 1958) and otherness in relation to ownership ( This is Our Music , 1960–1). 15
Coleman clearly sought to define himself as engaging in a process of ‘making it new’. For
example, in his liner notes to Change of the Century , he states:
Some of the comments about my music made me realize … that modern jazz, once so daring
and revolutionary, has become, in many respects, a rather settled and conventional thing. The
members of my group and I are now attempting a break-through to a new, freer conception of
jazz, one that departs from all that is ‘standard’ and cliché in ‘modern’ jazz.
(Coleman 1960)
However, while this may draw attention to the departure, or break, with the past, the fact that it
comes in the form of a self-legitimizing, self-reflexive statement, seems to begin to draw
attention to the highly constructed discourse around this music, a process of construction that
record companies and musicians conspired in through promotional images (cover art), titles and
descriptions (liner notes).
While it sought to depart from all that is ‘standard’ in modern jazz and position itself on the
sharp edge of modernism, Coleman’s music also still sounded as a meaningful reflection of an
evolving jazz tradition, even if this was not fully evident to some at the time. Three specific
tracks are now isolated for further discussion: ‘Lonely Woman’ (from The Shape of Jazz to Come
), ‘Blues Connotation’ and ‘Beauty is a Rare Thing’ (both from This is Our Music ).
‘Lonely Woman’, as the title already indicates, suggests a certain mode of isolation and
distance, and the music articulates the dialogic relationship between past and present through its
repositioning of the aura of alienation which envelops the blues, with the blues defined as the
source from which tradition is both defined and departed. This track begins with the bass firmly
grounding the music on D, and as the initial theme revolves around D minor it is possible to hear
this as a reflection of the repetition of the past in the form of a recognisable tonality. However,
the lines that Coleman and Don Cherry unfold across this bass give a very different perspective
to the overall effect of the track. This is, through its apposite title and sound, a music that
signifies its own sense of isolation, one that may be heard as an echo of the alienated subject of
modernity. However, the reference to the blues as a historical and cultural source brings the
problems of defining a jazz avant-garde back into focus. ‘Lonely Woman’ may form part of The
Shape of Jazz to Come but it is clearly marked by what it is claimed to be seeking to depart from:
tradition, in this instance, as defined as the source.
This sense of origin is present, and perhaps more clearly defined, in other Coleman recordings
from this period. For example, ‘Blues Connotation’ gives a clear indication of Coleman’s
relationship to the blues and its position as a contributing source to his own evolving musical
language, while ‘Bird Food’ (from Change of the Century ) can, in contrast, be heard as
Coleman’s appropriation of Charlie Parker as a precedent for his own project. Ajay Heble
accurately interprets these titles as reflecting Coleman’s relationship to the past and his own
sense of origin:
Coleman has always been paradoxically rooted in the very traditions from which he seems to
depart. This rootedness – exemplified in song titles such as ‘Blues Connotation’, ‘When Will
the Blues Leave’, ‘Monk and the Nun’, ‘Bird Food’, and ‘The Legend of Bebop’ –
problematizes any simple linear narrative of the music.
(Heble 2000, 51)
Notes
1 I would like to thank Sarah Hill for comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
2 The focus on these three musicians is based on their centrality within this particular discourse. However, I acknowledge that
this is in itself problematic, potentially being perceived as excluding other musicians or, through its exclusively North
American-centred context excluding relevant musics from other regions (Europe, for example), within which these issues can
be seen to have a continuing significance. However, the selection is based on the argument of a powerful presence of a jazz
tradition, of which all three selected musicians are part, whose significance will be considered in part of the conclusion to this
chapter.
3 The use of the term ‘new thing’ is evident in a number of different ways, including the titling of albums, the most notable
example being New Thing at Newport , featuring one side from John Coltane and the other by Archie Shepp. This recording
was released in 1965 on the Impluse label, which became heavily associated with the new music. For further discussion of the
‘new thing’, see Monson 2007, 262–3. See also Gendron 2009.
4 For a neat synopsis of the nineteenth-century origins of the term in relation to the emergence of Dada and other art
movements, see Hopkins 2004, 2–4.
5 This somewhat routine account of Darmstadt has been questioned. See, for example, Attinello 2007.
6 In an extended forward to Bürger’s book, Jochen Schulte-Sasse states: ‘Poggioli’s “theory” is at best a theory of modernism
that explains certain basic characteristics of artistic production since the middle of the nineteenth century … Yet, in his
tendency to equate modernism and the avant-garde – and to subsume both under the label “modernism” – Poggioli typifies
the Anglo-American tradition’ (Schulte-Sasse 1984, xiv). Schulte-Sasse goes on to give examples of how the terms are
conflated through reference to Weightman 1973, the title of which makes this interchange transparent. He also refers to the
work of Irving Howe in this context. However, although Schulte-Sasse’s initial response to Poggioli as prelude to Bürger is
notable, it will not be pursued further in this immediate context.
7 I use the term ‘historically specific’ in that the avant-garde artwork exists in the specificity of the moment, which is now
distant, and is perhaps both shaped by and definitive of that moment in time. For a useful summary of Bürger’s work in
relation to history, see Schulte-Sasse 1984, xxxii–xxxix.
8 Of course, the interrelationships between how the term modern jazz may be constructed and what is commonly understood as
modernism are formed and interpreted are clearly problematic. However, the general association between jazz and modernism
can be formed around the impact of technology (recording) and the fact that the chronological emergence and development of
jazz as an art form coincides with that of modernism through the twentieth century. This aspiration of freedom has more
direct political and social dimensions. On the issue of jazz in relation to a concept or concepts, of freedom, see Saul 2003.
9 This mobility forms a central part of Bernard Gendron’s examination of such engagements: ‘in the history of high/low
engagements, jazz is the music in between, the music of passage, the link between the earliest (cabaret music) and the latest
(rock)’ (Gendron 2002: 10).
10 However, the significance of this process and context is questioned by Alyn Shipton: ‘I remain skeptical about the degree to
which the jamming at Minton’s and Monroe’s genuinely moved jazz forward, beyond consolidating the changes to the role of
the rhythm section’ (Shipton 2001, 463). If Shipton is correct in questioning this significance, it may also look towards a
questioning of the mythology that has evolved around this particular aspect of bebop.
11 The description of Parker as tragic genius is based on his early death in 1955 at the age of only 34, a death that was the result
of a long period of heroin addiction and alcohol abuse.
12 For a summary of this recording, including background and debates about who actually accompanied Parker on it, see Shipton
2001, 475–6.
13 Gendron effectively captures the passing of the moment and its role in the act of canon formation: ‘Although dead as a
movement and a fashion, bebop would soon acquire a new life as perhaps the most venerated component of the jazz canon
and performance repertory. Indeed, the emergence of a jazz modernism initiated by bebop, and thus of a jazz “art music,”
helped legitimatize the subsequent construction of a jazz canon in the 1950s’ Gendron 2002, 157.
14 For a good overview of Coleman and free jazz, particularly in relation to tradition as defined by a jazz canon, see Anderson
2007. For an account of Coleman’s career in general, see Wilson 1999.
15 Avant-gardist images of future, progress and change were also evident in the titling of recordings by other jazz musicians.
Notable examples include Cecil Taylor’s Jazz Advance (1956) and Lennie Tristano’s Descent into the Maelstrom (1953), both
of which predate the emergence of Coleman in 1959.
16 The specific Pollock painting that was used is titled White Light (1954) and forms part of the collection of the Museum of
Modern Art New York.
17 All musicians involved worked within a jazz context. However, there is some degree of difference of background and
experience among the musicians. For example, Eric Dolphy (bass clarinet) was already engaged in a radicalization of jazz
while Don Cherry (trumpet), Charlie Haden (bass) and both Billy Higgins and Ed Blackwell (drums) were familiar with
Coleman’s music and the direction it was taking. In contrast, Freddie Hubbard (trumpet) and Scott LaFaro (bass) were less
familiar with this new music, with both coming from more immediately accessible jazz contexts and this may be reflected in
their contributions to the collective improvisation.
18 For contrasting examples of the reception of this recording, see Walser 1999, 253–5 and 395–400.
19 It is notable that Coleman’s discography consists exclusively of his own recordings. Although he has worked with regular
collaborators, this has always been on the basis of his own leadership, with this authorial presence, in the context of a
‘collective improvisation’, being potentially problematic. The suggested association between Coleman and autonomy is
further reinforced if mention is made of Coleman’s harmolodic system, his own private, technical lexicon, the details of
which are not directly relevant to the present discussion, but the extent to which it suggests a highly personalized perspective
underlines the interpretation that is being offered here.
20 Coltrane’s acknowledgement of the importance of Coleman is evident through his recordings of Coleman compositions with
musicians who were most directly associated with Coleman – Don Cherry, Charlie Haden, Ed Blackwell. Originally recorded
in 1960, the resulting album was not released by Atlantic until 1966 under the bold title of The Avant-Garde .
21 For a wider discussion of the significance of AACM, see Lewis 2008. The development of AACM as a forum of self-
organization had been preceded by the Jazz Composers Guild (JCG), led by trumpeter Bill Dixon, and coexisted with similar
organizations in other locations, including the Black Artist Group (BAG) in St Louis. Interestingly, Gendron in his discussion
of the JCG situates this trend within what, paradoxically, had become an avant-garde tradition of organization: ‘The Jazz
Composers Guild (JCG) followed in a long tradition of avant-garde self-help and self-advertising organizations in the art
world, dating at least as far back as Zürich Dada, the Italian Futurists, Bauhaus, and what for [Bill] Dixon was the most
salient model, the artist-run galleries on 10th street in the East Village’ (Gendron 2009: 213). For further discussion of JCG
and the issues of avant-garde organization, see Piekut 2011: 102–39.
22 Relevant recordings include The Vandermark 5, Free Jazz Classics Vols 1 & 2 (2000), on which Vandermark and his
collaborators interpret ‘classic’ material from Coleman, Braxton, Cecil Taylor, among others; and John Zorn, Spy v. Spy
(1989), on which Zorn leads a series of reinterpretations of Coleman material. Both projects could be seen to effectively
repeat Braxton’s In the Tradition , but now it is Braxton who is, among others, positioned historically in relation to a tradition
as interpreted retrospectively by other, younger musicians.
23 See Ward and Burns 2002 and Jazz – A Film by Ken Burns (dir. Ken Burns, DVD, 2001). The point here is that the highly
accessible version of jazz history presented by Burns, particularly in the TV/DVD format, deliberately marginalizes what was
perceived as avant-garde jazz practices from its representation of a jazz tradition. This exclusive view of the jazz tradition has
been perpetuated by Marsalis in a number of different contexts, including his role in the Lincoln Centre Jazz program, which
was a source of cultural power, and in his own music.
24 Ake’s discussion is based on the use of ‘standards’ – recurrent, familar material within a jazz context. The point of
comparison is between Wynton Marsalis’s use of recognizable standards such as Gershwin’s ‘Embraceable You’ and Cole
Porter’s ‘What is this Thing Called Love?’, among others, on his Standard Time Vol. 2: Intimacy Calling album (1991) as an
attempt to effectively solidify the tradition into a singular construct and Bill Frisell’s use of material from an eclectic range of
sources, including Ives, Copeland, Madonna and Bob Dylan on his Have A Little Faith album (1993). If Marsalis can be seen
to present a reductive, singular view of a tradition, then Frisell’s pluralistic approach can be seen to continue to ask pertinent
questions about both the performance of standards and the tradition within which such practices evolved. See Ake, 2002,
chapter 6.
A campfire story
The histoire is the what
and the discours is the how
but what I want to know …
is le pourquoi .
Why are we sitting here around the campfire?
(Le Guin 1981, 188)
Once upon a time, a very long time ago now – about 1990 – an intermittently fiery debate
ignited around the question of whether music could tell stories. With so much of the world’s
music employed at least partly in the service of storytelling – from songs, operas, ballets,
programmatic symphonies and musicals to films, plays, video games, music videos, sacred
rites and other social rituals – musicologists asked whether it was also possible to conceive
of instrumental music from traditions such as Western art music (i.e. music without voices,
lyrics, programmatic texts, illustrations, dramatic accompaniments, dance, explanatory titles,
etc.) as being somehow, at least some of the time, some kind of a narrative. Could music –
just music – tell stories?
Fiery debates are rarely spontaneous; indeed, they are rarely that original. Like the seven
basic plots Christopher Booker identifies as underpinning the entirety of human storytelling
(Booker 2004), academic discussion in any given field often replays familiar concerns,
albeit filtered through contemporary issues. Furthermore, discursive campfires were flaring
up everywhere in musicology around 1990, with interest in narrative taking its place
alongside the ‘admixture and dissemination of new or borrowed methodologies, ideologies,
and buzz-words’ during the period of theory transfusions which invigorated music criticism
in the 1980s and 1990s – the ‘New Musicology’ later caricatured by Nicholas Cook and
Mark Everist as a ‘curiously serial process in which theoretical positions were taken up and
cast aside’ (Cook and Everist [1999] 2001, ix).
Yet Cook and Everist’s summary discarded some of these positions too hastily. For instance,
narratological approaches to music, rather than being cast aside by the community at large,
have developed into a stable feature of the musicological landscape. Today, narrative
approaches offer a broadly coherent body of methodologies blending music analysis
(practised in ways that productively blur boundaries between formalism and hermeneutics)
and broader historical and cultural concerns aligned with the once ‘New’, now firmly
established, critical-theoretical musicology.
One reason for the survival of music narratology beyond the 1990s was that it rekindled a
longer standing tradition. The quest to read music as narrative, Joseph Kerman has noted, is
‘one of music criticism’s most persistent and persistently controversial projects’ (Kerman
1999, 47). The controversy stretches back to nineteenth-century flashpoints concerning the
value of programmatic music versus absolut Tonkunst , but its roots go much deeper.
Consider, for instance, Byron Almén’s critique of Jérôme-Joseph de Momigny’s 1805
analysis of Handel’s ‘Fugue’ from the Harpsichord Suite No. 6 in F minor (Almén calls it
‘an important historical attempt to supplement a descriptive structural account of an
instrumental work with an interpretative account of that work’s expressive features’), which
surveys Momigny’s reading of the piece as the representation of a three-way argument
between a love-stricken daughter, romance-forbidding father and ever-loving mother
(Almén 2008, 16–20, citing and translating Momigny 1805). ‘The two-part canon’,
Momigny wrote (mm. 63–6; see Musical Example 10.1 ), ‘is a portrayal of mother and
daughter lamenting their inability to soften the heart of the wrathful father’.
Musical Example 10.1 Handel, Suite No. 6, Allegro (fugue), mm. 63–
66
Yet actually – indeed crucially – this is not, as Almén notes, precisely the story that
Momigny claims the music is telling or otherwise representing. In framing his interpretation,
Momigny becomes prudently provisional: ‘This, or something like it, is the range of feeling
that we believe Handel might have experienced, or the image that he might have had in
mind, as he composed this fugue.’ For reasons explored below, it might be better to
reformulate this statement along the following lines. This, or something like it, is the type of
story that this particular musical discourse’s intimation of a plot of events invites suitably
predisposed listeners to call into mind; the final interpretive result of that process may or
may not relate to the creative intentions of a composer; the emplotment and interpretation,
however, will probably broadly resemble interpretations by other listeners within the same
cultural community, while contributing to the tales that the music is telling about when it
was created, those who have played it, and how it has been received. For musical narratives
have an intriguing quality: any particular telling or representation ( discours ) of a plot of
musical events (i.e. any live, recorded or imagined performance) can tell a markedly
different story ( histoire ) to different interpreters; collections of those different stories,
though, tend to form productively fuzzy networks of interpretive coherence. Some scholars
consider this ambiguity to be the great failing of musical narrative; for others, it is le
pourquoi .
Fred Maus has described how explorations from the late twentieth century onwards of
Musicologists reignited their enquiry into music and narrative with sparks borrowed from
narratologists, linguists, philosophers and semioticians specializing in literature, film and
history. Hayden White, for instance, had recently suggested that a narrative possesses ‘a
certain content prior to any given actualization of it in speech or writing’ (White 1987, xi);
before him, Roman Jakobson had explained that it is possible to translate a narrative poem
like Stéphane Mallarmé’s L’après-midi d’un faune into ‘music, ballet, and graphic art’
because ‘certain structural features of [its] plot are preserved despite the disappearance of
[its] verbal shape’ (Jakobson 1960, 350). As the music and narrative debate began to
generate heat, scholars gathered around the campfire, excitedly sharing fresh stories about
music and the new theoretical perspectives from which one could tell such stories, and
thereby participating in the wider ‘narrative turn’ pirouetting through the arts, humanities,
and beyond (see Phelan and Rabinowitz 2005, 1–16).
Adaptation was a common initial approach. A number of musicologists pursued the
question of whether music could express narrative via theoretical approaches adapted from
literary narratology – an understandable starting point, but not without its problems. For
example, Anthony Newcomb, influenced by Vladimir Propp’s work on folk tales, argued for
paradigmatic plot archetypes in Schumann and Mahler’s music (Newcomb 1992); Patrick
McCreless searched for contrapuntal-harmonic enigmas in Beethoven’s ‘Ghost’ Trio, Op.
70, welding Roland Barthes’s codes from his theorizing of narrative to a Schenkerian
analytical framework (McCreless 1988); Maus identified how the agents and actions
suggested by the opening of Beethoven’s ‘Serioso’ String Quartet in F minor, Op. 95
express the qualities Aristotle deemed central to the success of a well-made play in his
Poetics (Maus 1988); Robert Hatten explained how Mikhail Bakhtin’s notions of dialogism
and heteroglossia in the novel help make sense of disruptive moments in Beethoven (Hatten
1991); and Eero Tarasti adapted A. J. Greimas’s semiological approach to the grammar of
narrative in an analysis of Chopin’s G minor ballade (Tarasti 1992).
Broadly construed, these efforts illuminated two models of musical narrativity that drew
on literary narratology’s approaches to the play and the novel. One might call these two
models the mimetic and diegetic hypotheses. The mimetic hypothesis considers music’s
capacity to represent agents and their activities in the manner of a play or other narrative text
that unfolds as a real-time imitation of events. The diegetic hypothesis considers music’s
capacity to project a narrator to recount a plot involving agents and their activities in the
manner of a novel or epic poem. In time, a synthesizing hypothesis emerged, positing
musical narratives as representations of the experiencing consciousness of a persona (see,
for example, Karl 1997 and Klein 2004). The experiencing consciousness hypothesis had the
benefit of linking back to a well-spring of much work on music and narrative, Edward T.
Cone’s influential The Composer’s Voice , which explored the notion that some music
induces listeners to posit ‘a musical persona that is the experiencing subject of the entire
composition, in whose thought the play, or narrative, or reverie, takes place’ (Cone 1974,
94). As the experiencing consciousness model was a synthesis of the other two, however, it
remained vulnerable to doubts raised about both the diegetic and mimetic hypotheses by
scholars less enamoured with the idea of musical narrativity.
The most instructive objections were presented by Jean-Jacques Nattiez and Carolyn
Abbate, who arrived like fire wardens to dampen the flames of the music narratology
campfire, just in case it was about to get out of hand (see Nattiez 1990 and Abbate 1991; see
also Abbate 1989). It was Nattiez who bluntly pointed out that ‘it is not within the
semiological possibilities of music to link a subject to a predicate’ (Nattiez 1990, 244). In
other words, instrumental music cannot unambiguously signify, describe or interconnect
representations of agents and their actions; such interpretations are only possible if the
listener is guided by an extra-musical prompt, like a program note or interpretive
predisposition. This bids farewell to overly literal applications of the mimetic hypothesis.
For instance, Nattiez writes of Strauss’s Till Eulenspiegels lustige Streiche that ‘with the help
of the title, I can readily agree that it concerns the life and death of a character. I certainly
hear that he moves, jumps, etc. But what exactly does he do? I don’t know’ (Nattiez 1990,
244). Music can hint – through gestures, style topics, iconic and indexical semiotic
conventions, and other means – at types of action, mood and atmosphere; instruments and
ensembles can approximate different agents (e.g. a clarinet as a lusty prankster); listeners
primed to listen for concretely signified agents and actions via a program note or evocative
title can fill in the gaps. Music alone, however, cannot specify the fine grain of narrative
detail. The gap to be traversed by the interpreter’s imaginative input in such ‘narratives’
therefore appeared, to Nattiez, prohibitively wide.
Abbate’s wet blanket stressed, in turn, an upshot of music’s semiological limitations with
ramifications for the diegetic hypothesis: music cannot posit a past tense.
In terms of the classical distinctions, what we call narrative – novels, stories, myths, and
the like – is diegetic … It is a tale told later, by one who escaped to the outside of the tale
… Music’s distinction is fundamental and terrible; it is not chiefly diegetic but mimetic.
Like any form of … temporal art, it traps the listener in present experience and the beat of
passing time, from which he or she cannot escape …
(Abbate 1991, 53)
This, in turn, bade farewell to overly literal claims about music based on the diegetic
hypothesis. As Nattiez and Abbate’s objections still register regarding the experiencing
consciousness model, the issues raised can profitably be explored through a discussion of
Gregory Karl’s narratological analysis of the first movement of Beethoven’s ‘Appassionata’
Piano Sonata, Op. 57 (see Karl 1997).
Karl’s interpretation of the role of the movement’s insistent D –C motif pivots around
perceiving this musical idea as an antagonist interrupting the reverie of a protagonist
represented by Beethoven’s more voluble opening theme (see Musical Example 10.2 ). How,
though, can one identify when those intrusive notes do or do not represent the antagonist?
The first few appearances of the motif, for example, tally neatly with this reading; the
composing out of the motif in the ensuing transition seems to call for alternative strategies.
Yet this is actually a creative misreading of Karl’s argument. Viewing the work through the
experiencing consciousness hypothesis (i.e. as a fictional representation of a persona’s
mental life), he suggests that the musical discourse is akin to an intellectual reverie (the
opening idea) on which a darker thought (the D –C motif) intrudes. The composing out of
the motif during the transition might thus be recovered for a narrative reading as some kind
of mulling over of ideas en route to the persona’s next significant thought (the second subject
group).
A crucial point for Karl is the dramatic function of these ideas within a wider system of
primarily oppositional relationships: the idea that the D –C motif antagonizes the main
theme, not that it represents an actual antagonist. Even so, Nattiez’s basic objection remains
unresolved. It is not within the semiological capacity of music explicitly to say when the D
–C motif represents an antagonist or an intrusive thought, nor specifically to state who or
what that antagonist or thought might be. Yet the possibility emerges that this is not so much
a theoretical problem as an analytical opportunity. Slightly more generally construed, the
movement might be conceived as an allegorical tale about antagonistic or intrusive events or
ideas, and how they might be dealt with, rather than about a more specific antagonism or
character – in turn bringing to mind, perhaps, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s depiction of music as
‘myth coded in sounds instead of words … and provid[ing] the comforting illusion that
contradictions can be overcome and difficulties resolved’ (Lévi-Strauss 1981, 659–60; cited
in Nattiez 1990, 241).
Yet reading the Beethoven transition as a narrational gloss on preceding events raises the
specter of Abbate’s objection to the diegetic hypothesis. How is a musical persona being
projected to present events, direct the perceiver’s attention towards salient details, or
encompass those details within a narrational commentary? Vera Micznik has argued that
there is no need ‘to appeal to external agency’ and posit a narrator outside of some musical
texts because ‘narrational knowledge’ is communicated, ‘the “possible story” is enacted and
at the same time told by its own materials’ (Micznik 2001, 243). Narrative music, in other
words, enacts both a tale and its telling, like a film or a play. This neat idea echoes Adorno’s
notion that ‘music recites itself, is its own content, narrates without narrative’ – a concept to
which this chapter returns below (Adorno [1960] 1992, 76). Yet the argument that one can
talk of narrative in music if only one recognizes, as William Kinderman discusses, the
correct ‘configuration of audible elements inherent in the work of art’ (Kinderman 1992,
143) (these signify the story, say, and these the narration) imposes a dangerous circularity of
logic. Prior to having formed an interpretation of a piece as a particular narrative (i.e. as a
telling or representation of a specific story), it may prove tricky to differentiate between the
elements representing moments in a story and elements narratorially framing those
moments, due to the semantic imprecisions outlined above.
It would be a mistake, however, to read too much into these counter-arguments. For a
start, they were not countering claims that scholars interested in musical narrative had ever
made – at least not with much force or so simplistically. Maus’s discussion of music as
drama in Beethoven’s Op. 95, for instance, is certainly an example of a scholar thinking
through the diegetic hypothesis, but the results are light years away in theoretical
sophistication and critical nuance from Momigny’s assertions about Handel’s family drama.
Brazen attempts to read narrators into instrumental music are also few and far between, with
most scholars reflecting Abbate and Nattiez’s most valuable shared objection: not to the idea
of musical narrativity per se but rather to the idea of music narrating (i.e. speaking or
otherwise concretely signifying) through instrumental or other untexted musical means, the
semantically specific utterances of the teller of a tale. Where scholars have engaged
productively with the possibility of a musical narrator, it has been in sophisticated work like
Hatten’s adaptation of Bakhtin to Beethoven analysis, or John Rink’s historically
contextualized discussions of the performer as narrator (see Hatten 1991 and Rink 2001).
Those gathered around the musical narratology campfire have thus been overheard
muttering to each other that the fire wardens’ objections, ultimately, seemed ‘slightly weird
– who needs to be told such things?’ (Maus 2005, 467). Rather than abandoning intuitions of
commonality between, for instance, the way in which ‘the sequence of musical events in a
composition … invites comparison to the unfolding of a narrative plot’ in a play or novel,
some scholars have chosen to consider ways in which musical narratives deploy ‘special
means’ to achieve related yet distinctive structural and symbolic goals (Maus 2005, 467–8).
When music adopts a narrative register, it is not seeking to become a simulacrum of the
novel or the play (or a film, a comic book, etc.). Music has its own ways and means of being
narrative, some of which imply the types of plot central to many acts of musical analysis.
Recall, for instance, Heinrich Schenker’s assertion that, in music as in life, the reversals,
disappointments, delays and obstacles represented by a voice-leading reduction’s
middleground and foreground form an almost dramatic course of events (Schenker 1979, 5).
Crucially, however, once one considers, as Almén urges, music’s relationship to other
narrative media as sibling rather than descendental (see Almén 2008, 12), new connections
emerge, while highlighting each medium’s unique contribution to storytelling. Novels, for
instance, can posit a past tense; films concretely link subjects and predicates; music does
neither convincingly. However, neither film nor the novel has the means to invoke embodied
responses mirroring an agent’s physical travails akin to music’s powers in this domain – to
feel, to adapt Roland Barthes’s words, the bodies that beat in the text (Barthes [1982] 1985,
299). For in musical narratives, perhaps more than in any other narrative form, Vladimir
Nabokov’s ‘telltale tingle’ is felt, not in the brain or the heart, ‘but with [the] spine’
(Nabokov 1980). Distinctive narrative media perform narrative distinctively, requiring
perceivers to bridge the gap between discourse and story in different ways.
So the well-meaning intervention of the camp authorities only briefly dimmed the music
narratology flames, which in the main were already being carefully tended by those gathered
around them. Rather than fleeing in the manner of Cook and Everist’s serial theorists, many
scholars had remained at the fireside, bringing together the glowing coals of parallel ideas to
build a self-sustaining fire; a number of these reliable theoretical constants inform the
discussions in this chapter. As the campfire regained strength it also began to function, once
more, as a beacon. New scholars, attracted by the glow, arrived to offer assistance with the
fire’s tending, but also seeking answers to tough new questions. What about narrativity in
rock and pop music, or non-Western musical repertoires (Nicholls 2007; Negus 2012)?
What about Western art music after common-practice tonality (Meelberg 2006; Klein and
Reyland 2013)? Do other repertoires with primarily instrumental music, such as jazz, have
distinct forms of narrativity (Harker 2006)? And how might these new questions and
repertoires shed light, reflexively, on music narratology’s critical concerns?
The investigation of music and narrative is clearly an unfinished tale. The remainder of
the present chapter explores aspects of the story so far by examining interconnected ways of
speaking about musical narrative and offering a couple of new perspectives. Some of these
tales are my own; others are tales I have heard around the campfire and found useful to retell
elsewhere, especially when considering musical narrative with my students. Both the tales
and the accompanying analytical sketches are therefore offered as toasted marshmallows –
not a substantial meal, for sure, but hopefully enough to tempt the reader closer to the
campfire, to toast a few new ideas herself. After all, something similar to this invitation – to
play, to imagine, to create – lies at the heart of music’s offer when it takes the narrative
register.
Synecdoche narrativity
It is not that music wants to narrate, but that the composer wants to make music in the
ways that others narrate.
(Adorno [1960] 1992, 62)
Scholars responding to objections to the idea of music as narrative have often advanced
music’s lack of linguistic specificity as a positive. Maus, for instance, has stressed the role
of perceivers in hearing ‘musical successions as story-like because they can find something
like actions, thoughts, and characters in music’ and are therefore tempted to imagine those
moments as going ‘together to form something like a plot’ (Maus 1991, 6). He also eschews
the idea of music signifying a finely detailed story, stating that ‘there is no single
determinate underlying story to be recovered from a text’; subsequently, ‘retellings or
paraphrases’ of compositions (i.e. interpretive narrativizations) ‘are constructed by readers
or hearers in the service of various interests they happen to have’ (Maus 1991, 7). For Maus,
this is not a problem but an opportunity: analysing those different interpretations offers a
window on to the performative stories people tell about themselves. A musical plot thus
permits, indeed encourages, ‘the play of different interpretations’ (Maus 1991, 33). Kerman,
similarly, argues that music bears its narrative potential ‘as a mnemonic field with markers
rather than a preset matrix for narrative’ (Kerman 1999, 47) and, for Karl, music’s plot-like
structures are coherent not ‘because [a musical narrative] embodies a specific meaning or
tells a particular story, but because its abstract dramatic plan possesses an inner logic
capable of suggesting any number of stories of a particular type without telling any of them’
(Karl 1997, 32).
The key phrase here is ‘stories of a particular type’. When music can be interpreted as
narrative, the plot of events presented bear what Cone termed an expressive potential: ‘the
wide but not unrestricted range of possible expression’ opened up by a composition’s
temporal succession of sensuous, congeneric and extrageneric signifiers (Cone 1974, 166).
Other ways in which listeners may experience music as narrative, however, involve
alternative ways of hearing music, some of which eschew the kind of structural listening
required if musical emplotments are to shade into narrativizations of a piece’s expressive
potential.
White asserted that narratives have some kind of essence independent of their specific
iterations (White 1987, xi). What is the nature of music’s relationship to that essence? One
way to think of musical narrative – an approach that may chime with a broad range of
listener experiences – is to consider music’s putative plots as the representation of
narrativity’s essence, i.e. of the experience of narrativity itself, rather than specific stories.
Given that humans spend so much time imagining, listening to, performing and decoding a
form of organized sound – i.e. language – that narrates, it is unsurprising that music, with its
similarly expressive flow of sonic ideas, can often be heard as something like a narrative: a
narrative simulacrum.
Picture the following scene. A musicologist is working through her e-mail inbox first
thing in the morning. As on many previous occasions, she complements that dull yet
stressful task with the second disc in a 1991 CD reissue of Alfred Brendel’s early 1960s
Viennese recordings of Beethoven’s late piano sonatas for the Vox label. The CD begins
with the first of the last five sonatas, the A major, Op. 101. Around the music narratology
campfire, the musicologist has heard persuasive tales about this composition’s story. Hatten,
for example, long ago persuaded her that the first movement’s ‘progress from pastoral
through the threat of tragedy and back to pastoral affirmation’ is not only a valid
interpretation of the Allegretto ma non troppo ’s specific plot of events, but is also ‘replicated
at the level of the four-movement sonata as a whole’, when ‘the triumphant affirmation of
the heroic topic elevated to a transcendent plane’ is signified by music that repairs
potentially catastrophic breaches and, in doing so, raises ‘the pastoral to a spiritual level’
(Hatten 1991, 85–6). Perhaps the musicologist briefly indulges her ego by imagining that, in
Brendel’s realization of Beethoven’s musical narrative, one can hear a synecdoche for one
scholar’s struggle towards the transcendent goal of no unanswered emails. The truth,
though, is probably less fanciful. The musical narration is keeping the musicologist
company; its musical voices comfort her with the spirit of human communication, but not
with the demands of specific conversation.
Clearly, even musicologists who remain committed to the irreplaceable productivity of
what Eric Clarke calls the ‘vanishingly rare’ experience of structural listening are usually
doing no such thing when listening to music (Clarke 2005, 144). Some of music’s functions
in everyday life, however, may still involve notions of narration. Like Nipper the dog
listening intently to His Master’s Voice emerging from the horn of a gramophone, the voices
of Brendel and Beethoven function, in this imaginary but familiar instance, as a calming
influence. As the first two measures shape a gestural rise and fall – so ‘emblematic of the
pastoral’ (Hatten 1991, 82) should the musicologist care to pay attention to such things
(which she does not, presumably, unless unconsciously she is associating the pastoral, as
topos, with the maternal, and so indulging in dubiously gendered fantasies of music as
quasi-parental protection) – she may, at most, catch herself demonstrating the verifiability of
Arnie Cox’s ‘mimetic hypothesis’ (Cox 2011). The musicologist’s breathing in and out,
mirrored in the slight raising and then drooping of her head, mimics the contour of the
musical gesture, as if her body is responding to another person’s utterance with an
intimation of interest. The overall gesture is a gently affirmative nod. ‘How interesting,
Brendel-Beethoven’, she seems to be replying: ‘Do go on.’
Yet is this really where music’s relationship to narrative ends? Nattiez certainly suggested
that music only imitates ‘the outward appearance’ of narration (Nattiez 1990, 251). Moving
from general similarities between music and language (as alluded to, for instance, by the
Greek designation for lyric poetry, mousikê ) to the work of recent phoneticians, he argued
that, because ‘music and language share the linearity of discourse and the use of sound
objects … [m]usic is [only] capable of imitating the intonation contour of a narrative’
(Nattiez 1990, 251). As an example, Nattiez suggests that ‘it is not necessary to have read
the motto which heads the finale, ‘Muss es sein? Es muss sein’, in order to recognize from
the outset’ of the last movement of Beethoven’s String Quartet, Op. 135 ‘that we are in the
presence of a question’ (see Musical Example 10.3 ): the ascending fourth connotes a
question, the descending fourths a pair of responses. ‘And from then on’, Nattiez claims, one
can interpret the movement as ‘a musical transposition of a dialogue’ in which we do not
know what is being said; instead, ‘Beethoven depicts the character of the exchange, rather as
if we catch the inflection of it from the other side of the wall’ (Nattiez 1990, 251). Yet
because one might be tempted to fill in the gaps with speculation – as when one strains to
catch specific words in an argument happening in a next-door household – this is the type of
moment at which listeners make the ontological mistake of believing that ‘since music
suggests narrative, it could itself be narrative’ (Nattiez 1990, 245). And listeners should resist
that impulse, Nattiez admonishes, lest they stoop to superfluous metaphor.
Musical Example 10.3 Beethoven, String Quartet in F major, Op. 135,
fourth movement: motto
Adorno’s ostensibly similar claim (cited in Nattiez’s essay) that music is ‘a narrative
which relates nothing’ arises from a concern, in his Mahler monograph, to explain how that
composer created music ‘emancipated in novel-like fashion from fixed schemata’, as in the
Third Symphony’s liquidation of the recapitulation in its sonata form first movement
(Adorno [1960] 1992, 83). Yet this is not merely an issue of creative or even ethical
intentions. Mahler’s music ‘often sounds’ as if it is seeking to call to mind ‘the great novel’:
‘The curve it describes is novelistic’, Adorno writes, ‘rising to great situations, collapsing
into itself’ (Adorno [1960] 1992, 69). In a manner Nattiez later paralleled, Adorno therefore
argues as follows:
The ear is carried along on the flow of the music as is the eye of the reader from page to
page; the mute sound of the words converges with the musical mystery. But the mystery
is not solved. To describe the world to which epic music alludes is denied to it: the music
is as clear as it is cryptic. It can make the ontological category of objective reality its own
only insofar as it screens itself from objective immediacy; it would remove itself from the
world if it tried to symbolize or even depict it.
(Adorno [1960] 1992, 70)
This elegant statement reminds one that Adorno’s desire to protect the cryptic in music was
motivated by something more profound than Nattiez’s theoretical objections. Elsewhere,
Adorno rejected the ‘false impression that the world outside is such a well-rounded whole’
as those created, for instance, by pre-modernist novels, and also the notion that music might
reproduce that false impression, as in Lévi-Strauss’s perspective on music offering the
‘comforting illusion that contradictions can be overcome and difficulties resolved’ (Lévi-
Strauss 1981). Such texts offer ‘the existing world a kind of solace’ but in doing so shape a
form of false consciousness that one should seek to resist, not least through encounters with
music that respect music’s otherness – its imperviousness to concrete storytelling and other
forms of interpretive specificity – and which thereby celebrate music’s ‘power to resist
society’ (see Adorno 1970, 2, 73, 321). Such objections lend a heroic air to attachments to
the idea of music’s anti-narrativity.
Yet it is difficult to square such a view with the possibility that, surfacing even
momentarily from her overflowing inbox, our Brendel–Beethoven-admiring musicologist
might respond virtually mandatorily to the intimations of the pastoral style topic and also to
its subsequent troubling by the tragic (see Musical Example 10.4 ). She might thus begin
emplotting, with little more conscious effort than it takes to read an e-mail anecdote from a
friend, a reading of the music that, while ultimately impervious to the literal, leads her
towards an abstract but not hopelessly unspecific story told at the broad-brush level of a
series of moods or states of being. Such hearings might even go a little further.
Musical Example 10.4 Beethoven, Piano Sonata in A major, Op. 101,
Allegretto ma non troppo , mm. 35–40
Returning to Mahler, for instance, consider the manner in which those grand novelistic
curves traverse the ‘symbolic landscape’ mapped by Constantin Floros in his three-volume
study Gustav Mahler , and the ‘primary role’ of these abundant and varied ‘cultural symbols
… in shaping and maintaining [Mahler’s] musical discourse[s]’ (Almén 2006, 135; see also
Floros [1977] 1994). Hence, in Almén’s readings of the Wunderhorn symphonies, which pair
narrato-logical close analysis with interpretation of the mythologies surrounding iconic
symbols in Mahler’s music, the first movement of the Third Symphony is not merely an
audacious sonata deformation. Pairing the work with the Fourth Symphony, it becomes the
beginning of a ten-movement ‘ascent through … layers of being or self to an experience of
the divine’ (Almén 2006, 165) .
Extrageneric symbols, though, are not the only way that music beads its narration-like
threads with somewhat less ambiguous content. Music can also articulate plots of congeneric
ideas. As Barthes argued, echoing Nabokov’s ‘telltale tingle’ but further evoking the
intercon-nectedness of affective, emotional and intellectual responses to a plot’s ‘veritable
‘thrilling’ of intelligibility’:
‘suspense’ accomplishes the very idea of language: what seems the most pathetic is also
the most intellectual – ‘suspense’ grips you in the ‘mind’, not in the ‘guts’.
(Barthes 1977, 119)
Sensuous, extrageneric and congeneric signifiers braid together in musical discourse, and
once one begins to attend to how the ideas they articulate follow and relate to one another –
particularly if one is then moved to consider the structure thus emplotted in terms of its
potential revelation of an overarching pattern – one may swiftly find oneself tingling all over
in response to music that can profitably be investigated as narrative because, put boldly,
aspects of that music are narrative.
Like many approaches to music analysis, reading pieces as narrative involves segmenting a
musical experience into a hierarchy of more or less significant moments and then
interpreting the relationships between them. Unlike some approaches to music analysis,
narratology engages with the transformation of ideas over time, rather than the gradual
revelation of an essentially static unity. Narratives, after all, present stories, and stories are
temporalized disunities. Frank Kermode spoke of a narrative’s tick-tock, Aristotle of a
drama’s beginning, middle and end, and Tzvetan Todorov of plot’s movement from stability
to disruption, recognition, repair and, finally, a new form of stability (Kermode 1967;
Aristotle 1996; Todorov 1971). In every case, the essential narrative component is change
over time. So what changes in a musical narrative?
Different music scholars have focused on different parameters in order to codify different
aspects of musical narrativity. The following discussion introduces three such approaches to
listening for the plot (archetypes, agency and enigmas), all of which can be considered, in
turn, in relation to an overarching quality of most musical narratives: transvaluation. All four
topics, furthermore, reveal the interpretive proteanism manifested by analyses of music as
narrative, which render explicit or even promote the slippage between observation and
interpretation, analyst and text that is present, albeit sometimes unacknowledged, in acts of
musical analysis.
***
Given narratology’s focus on change over time, it is unsurprising that musicologists have
sought to define it as the sine qua non of musical narrativity. An early pioneer of music
narratology, Jann Pasler, argued that the ‘ultimate reason narrative events are directed and
connected is that they undergo or cause transformation, which is probably … narrative’s
most important and most illusive characteristic’ (Pasler 1989, 241); Vincent Meelberg’s
more recent theorizing of musical narrativity, which draws on the work of narratologist
Mieke Bal, is founded on the notion of narrative as ‘the representation of a temporal
development’ (Meelberg 2006, 39); and for Almén, James Jacób Liska’s concept of
transvaluation is the most productive expression of this concept.
A transvaluation is a significant change of state that occurs over time and alters the
ranking of different components in a narrative’s system of values. Obvious non-musical
examples include the changing fortunes of characters in a story. Given the centrality of
conflict to its storytelling, for instance, George R. R. Martin’s fantasy epic A Song of Ice and
Fire might almost have been retitled Game of Transvaluations on its adaptation for television
(HBO, 2011–). A memorable peak in season one of Game of Thrones occurs when a young
and twisted king, Joffrey, orders the shock public execution of one of his lords and servants,
Ned Stark, in front of members of Stark’s own family. It is not merely the unexpectedness of
the twist, or the violence, that creates this scene’s affective charge: there is a nauseating
lurch in character rankings as Joffrey usurps symbolic power by ruthlessly killing Ned.
Transvaluation, though, is just as central to the everyday power struggles of soap operas like
Eastenders as it is to prestige television dramas like Game of Thrones . Transvaluations are
everywhere in narrative, Liszka writes, ‘playing out the tensions between the violence of a
hierarchy that imposes order and the violence that results from its transgression’ (Liska
1989, 133; quoted in Almén 2008, 65). In music, Almén clarifies, ‘transvaluation involves
reversals that either upset or reaffirm the prevailing order, leading to a variety of outcomes’
(tragic, comic, romantic or ironic) through the victory or defeat of the hierarchy or
transgressor and the manner of its achievement (see also Almén and Hatten 2013, 75–82).
Chopin’s G major Prelude, Op. 28, No. 3, the first example of transvaluation provided in
Almén’s A Theory of Musical Narrative , offers a conflict that is subtle, its ‘violence’
conceptual rather than visceral. The piece unfolds as ‘a gentle dialogue, a dance of
possibilities’ between musical elements, with ‘an initial hierarchy of relatively distinct
motivic elements’ being succeeded by an act of integration (Almén and Hatten 2013, 77).
The first melodic phrase of the prelude divides into two subphrases (see Musical Example
10.5a ), which Almén’s close reading identifies as motives setting up an ‘opposition
between the potential for relatedness and the potential for separateness’ (Almén 2008, 5)
through their articulation of various similarities (e.g. shared intervals), differences (e.g.
contrasting registers) and continuities (e.g. an interconnecting melodic descent across the
registral divide). Almén suggests that one might interpret the motives as agents: dramatis
personae sharing kinship but prevented from fully realizing their interconnection. The
possibility of sensing familiar (or even familial) narrative trajectories, a degree of suspense
and even sympathy or empathy is thereby glimpsed: will the second motive’s individuality
flourish, transgressing the hierarchical dominance of its predecessor, or will their kinship be
more fully revealed, leading the music back towards order?
The overall ‘harmony-with-nature’ expressive context established for this dialogue by the
accompanimental ostinato’s allusion to the Romantic Spinnerlied means that ‘the listener
might be inclined to prefer’, or at least to expect, ‘a synthesis or mediation’ (Almén 2008,
7). And that is what the Prelude’s narrative duly supplies. In measures 20–7, after various
attempts at conciliation, ‘the longest unbroken melodic span of the piece’ forms a ‘melodic
descent combin[ing] the rhythmic profiles of [the two motives] into a single, extended line’
while ‘an active return to [the] tonic’ finalizes the resolution of any sense of conflict (see
Musical Example 10.5b ). The shift in values, following Almén, could be read to blend irony
with romance: the closing synthesis replaces the initial hierarchy (irony), while preserving
aspects of its diversity of elements and style (romance).
Alongside tragedy and comedy, for instance, Booker’s seven basic archetypes have other
obvious musical analogues, revealing aspects of narrativity in fundamental compositional
processes. The voyage and return plot – in which heroes and heroines ‘travel out of …
familiar, everyday ‘normal’ surroundings into another world … where everything seems
disconcertingly abnormal … [before] (usually by way of a ‘thrilling escape’) they are
released and can return to the safety of the familiar world where they began’ (Booker 2004,
87) – could be identified as a plot archetype lending meaning to experiences of pieces
exploring the basic dynamics of tonality. It may not be the story of Chopin’s G major
Prelude, for instance, but it is certainly a contender in readings of Scriabin’s response to
Chopin, his Prelude No. 3 in G major, Op. 11. The Chopin remains closely moored to G
major; the Scriabin’s voyage takes a spin around the harmonic harbour before returning to
its moorings, having experienced several ‘abnormal’ harmonic waves en route; Bach’s
opening prelude in the Well-Tempered Clavier makes an understated epic of its departure
from and eventual return to C major, via music including wholly logical (in terms of
harmony and voice-leading) yet sensuously ‘abnormal’ measures of chromaticism (mm. 22–
3) which, marvellously, also prepare the ‘thrilling escape’ of the dominant pedal beginning a
measure later; and some pieces, such as Steve Reich’s Variations for Winds, Strings and
Keyboard , set sail and never return, revelling in ‘the strangeness’ of each new wave of a
harmonic process and its diverting ‘freaks and marvels’ (Booker 2004, 87) – but then, the
problematizing of narrativity in modernist and postmodern music is often predicated on
breaking with the archetypal expectations instilled in listeners by music and other narratives
dating from, or indebted to, earlier epochs and practices.
One of the origins of narrative approaches to music – the reception history of the Andante
con moto from Beethoven’s Piano Concerto No. 4 in G major, Op. 58 – further demonstrates
how listeners make intuitive, or rather culturally conditioned, links between musical plots
and narrative archetypes. As Kerman has documented, associative interpretations of this
movement’s opposition between stern string statements and calmer piano refrains have often
alighted, independently, on the story of Orpheus trying to quell The Furies (Kerman 1992).
Booker’s theories suggest why this should be unsurprising. His ‘Overcoming the Monster’
archetype – a tale concerning a ‘terrifying, life-threatening, seemingly all-powerful monster
whom the hero must confront in a fight to the death’ – is another storytelling constant, with
examples ranging from The Epic of Gilgamesh to Dr No and including, arguably, many
concertos in which the soloist is pitted against powerful orchestral opposition (Booker 2004,
22). It is thus within the expressive potential of Beethoven’s particular plot of events to
sound generally orphic to any listener whose cultural experience includes tellings of the
Orpheus myth or similar stories of monsters challenged and, perhaps, overcome.
Yet such associations are not merely picturesque diversions from the search for the ‘truth’
of abstract musical structures and neither are the two forms of enquiry unrelated. Archetypal
and other forms of cultural association enable listeners to access both the ‘easy’ (in
Kerman’s term) content of Beethoven’s concerto and the representation of a changing
relationship between different musical parameters writ large in the interactions of soloist and
orchestra. Scott Burnham makes a similar point regarding the insights of programmatic
readings of the first movement of Beethoven’s Eroica symphony. Where Schenker reduced
away the famously transgressive horn call before the recapitulation as a cadential trifle, for
instance, Burnham meticulously charts how the ‘syntax of the passage’ brings about ‘the
unanimous programmatic response that something both momentous and mysterious is afoot’
(Burnham 1992, 14). To a Schenkerian, the horn call is not a significant plot event; to
narrativizing interpreters, it is a turning point. Burnham encourages rapprochement:
[P]ractitioners operating from a range of critical and analytical standpoints notice similar
things in this music and express them in the different languages available to them. There
remains, however, a fundamental aspect of the Eroica Symphony that is addressed
exclusively through programmatic criticism.
(Burnham 1992, 18)
For some interpreters of the Eroica , the horn call represents the summoning or return of
the music’s hero. In such readings, the movement’s main theme represents a protagonist or,
in the term generally favoured by music narratologists, an agent. Important studies of
musical agency have included accounts exploring musical genres in which characters are
explicitly represented, such as the concerto (Kerman 1999) or the mid twentieth-century
genre Philip Rupprecht calls instrumental drama (Rupprecht 2013). In most music, however,
such as the Eroica , agency is less explicit because soloists are less prominent. There may be
a general sense of agency (as when one speaks of ‘the music’ doing something, such as ‘the
Eroica ’s main theme returning’) but no clear-cut agent (recall Nattiez’s objections to overly
literal applications of the mimetic hypothesis). In other cases, musical agency may be more
like a secret agent, slipping in and out of the shadows cast between musical lines, performers
and interpreters, with its identities, locations and disguises exploring a range of
combinations. Whatever one’s sense of a musical experience’s agents or agency, that sense
may be central to one’s subsequent experience of empathy, sympathy or music-induced
emotions (Robinson and Hatten 2012) .
An important examination of this aspect of musical agency – Maus’s aforementioned
essay on the first seventeen measures of Beethoven’s String Quartet in F minor, Op. 95 –
grapples with these theoretical challenges. In the course of his analysis, Maus also identifies
a pitch-organizational issue that, following a different strand of music narratology, one
might identify as a plot enigma: a mystery that the quartet’s agents enact and then seek to
resolve. Maus argues that the opening two measures of the quartet do not solely invite
reduction to the backdrop of an implied i–V–i progression in F minor. The metrical
placement of what might otherwise be an unproblematic passing tone (D ) on a strong beat
– its accentuation intensified by the melodic unity of the quartet voices and expressive
commitment of their forte gesture – transgresses the basic harmonic order. Maus writes of
the awkward incompleteness of this figure, which, following McCreless’s work on
Beethoven’s ‘Ghost’ Trio, one might also conceptualize as a musical enigma. How will the
piece solve the problem of this transgression?
The enigma in the first movement of Beethoven’s ‘Ghost’ Trio is certainly presented with
theatrical flair. While other Beethoven movements and indeed pieces revolve around
chromatic enigmas and their overcoming (such as the ‘antagonistic’ D Karl discusses in the
‘Appassionata’), the process rarely begins quite so brusquely (see Musical Example 10.7 ).
McCreless describes as ‘the most arresting moment in the opening of the first movement of
the ‘Ghost’ Trio … the arrival of the chromatic F in m. 5 and the ‘subposition’ of the B in
the following measure; all the rhetorical features of the music draw this moment to our
attention’ (McCreless 1988, 17).
***
When certain plot types pile up in a creative oeuvre – Beethoven’s chromatic enigmas,
Dickens’s Bildungsromane , the concerto genre’s multitudinous monsters – the temptation to
interpret the broader biographical, cultural or historical significance of their recurrence can
be overwhelming. It may seem appealing, for example, to consider whether overcoming
transgressive chromatic enigmas, not by rhetorical force or charm alone but also with the
full weight of music-developmental intellect, is a token of Beethovenian heroism, and thus
of his music’s embodiment, as decreed by broader processes of reception, of Romantic
notions concerning mastery and subjectivity. Yet as Nicholas Cook and Lawrence Kramer
have argued regarding music and meaning, albeit from rather different critical perspectives,
the shift from the suggestive indeterminacy of a piece’s signifying structures to the
specificity of social context will be actualized differently, if also potentially
interconnectedly, by different interpreters (see Cook 2001 and Kramer 2004).
As Maus has demonstrated in a sensitive exploration of the synergistic relationship
between analytical narratives and the respective personalities, institutional positions and
intellectual concerns of the scholars who proposed them, narratological actualizations
heighten the degree of performativity already inherent in the act of reading music as a plot
(Maus 2005). Should one therefore seek to disentangle the theoretical and musicological
strands of such an enterprise? Not necessarily. Spitzer argues, after Adorno, that ‘a musical-
critical theory attends both to [music’s] implicitly social character and to its adequacy to the
irreducibly musical part of musical experience’ (Spitzer 2006, 263), or what Max Paddison
calls the ‘dual-character of music: as self-contained, self-referential structure and as social
fact’ (Paddison 1996, 23). Musical narratives, by emerging at the intersection of
compositions, performances and interpretations, all of which are shaped by historically and
culturally situated agents, demand attentiveness to music’s dual-character and thus to the
development of critical-analytical approaches to music akin to James Hepokoski and Warren
Darcy’s call for an analytically grounded ‘hermeneutic understanding of music as a
communicative system, a cultural discourse implicated in issues of humanness, worldview,
and ideology’ (Hepokoski and Darcy 2006). Together with the focus that music narratology
invites on the actualization of meaning as a temporalized phenomenon in music – a vital
annex to recent theorizing of musical meaning – this may, in fact, be the approach’s most
significant contribution to musicology, and one of the most important sites for future
investigations in this area. The stories we tell about music are functions of the only
meaningful tale most of us will ever participate in telling around the campfire – the one that
we tell about ourselves .
Without a frame to contain it, the soundtrack both simultaneously embodies the diegesis in its
entirety and denies the possibility of its appearing. The soundtrack is the point at which the
impossibility of sound film’s diegesis assumes positive form … the soundtrack cannot serve to
guarantee the image’s fantasy of completion.
(Neumeyer 2014, 409) 10
The questions raised by this brief survey are presumably similar to those that prompted three
direct interventions in what might be termed the ‘Gorbman protocol’: Kassabian (2001), Stilwell
(2007) and Winters (2010), along with some other follow-up discussion in Davis (2012), Winters
(2012) and Yacavone (2012). The first, larger question might ask whether it would be beneficial
and indeed possible to resolve or escape from this apparent dialectic cul-de-sac (screen music as
part of/separate from the diegesis; screen music as non-narrational in a predicative sense/screen
music as constructing narrative; screen music as inevitably subordinate mode of response/highly
powerful determining agent in the context of screen works) and, if so, how this could be done.
The answer may come in stages. Prior to the interventions named above, Royal Brown provided
a critically sophisticated, if ultimately ambiguous, perspective while at the same time retaining
the diegetic/non-diegetic framework. With reference to the films Duelle and Noroît by Jacques
Rivette (both 1976 11 ) and Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958, music by Bernard Herrmann) he posited
the ability of non-diegetic screen music to become ‘another form of fiction’ whose mythic
qualities allow it somehow to transcend synchronically the diegetic time of the film, and even the
cultural-generic frame of cinema itself, partly because audiences ‘confuse … narrative and
diegesis’, where the latter is the perceived reality of the film and the former is its story structure
that Brown suggests operates in a similar way to music (1994, 71, 84) – fabula and syuzhet in
David Bordwell’s formulation (1985). Brown insists that in such cases, music offers a parallel
narrative (thus external to the film, and with ‘metacinematic’ potential – a term that remains
undefined, but seems to be a stronger version of Gorbman’s meta-diegetic, extra narrating voice),
which, in the case of Vertigo and Bernard Herrmann’s score, the main character Scottie can
inhabit (or even produce) while in a state of obsession and psychological neurosis. The way that
such a parallel narrative or fiction (defined by Brown as ‘the illusory permanentization and
essentialization of a set of structural relationships’ (71)) is inserted into the diegesis gives this
film its peculiar expressive power. We can perceive here a tentative and somewhat tortuous
attempt to redefine the nature of a represented diegesis by identifying additional layers of
musical ‘fiction’ (problematically both external to and within the screen diegesis) and yet
determinedly holding on to the Gorbman model, and allowing characters to traverse the
cinematic ‘fourth wall’ in a kind of eternally regressive set of nested illusions. The flipside of
this type of complex aesthetic argument is exemplified in David Neumeyer’s extreme taxonomic
approach, which attempts to account prosaically for every conceivable type of music and sound
in the world of a screen work (1997). Here, the diegetic/non-diegetic pairing takes its place
among a range of other categories of what he calls ‘cinematic musical codes’ (see his figure 3,
n.p.), in a detailed parsing of screen sound components. Extremely useful though such an
approach is in a lexical sense, it is of less immediate benefit to the present discussion since
Neumeyer consciously demotes the issue of diegesis so that it appears on the same operational
level as, for example, ‘vocal/instrumental’, ‘musically closed/open’, and ‘thematic/motivic
referentiality’, a ploy that I would argue unduly divests it of its ontological and aesthetic
significance. 12
The first substantial theoretical challenge to the Gorbman protocol came from Kassabian who,
at least to begin with, seemed wisely to divorce considerations of aesthetic value and function
from processes of production in screen works. In addition to her protest, shared by several
scholars, against the reductive nature of the binary, more importantly she reiterated and expanded
on Lack’s view: ‘[t]he distinction between diegetic and nondiegetic music … obscures music’s
role in producing the diegesis itself ’ (Kassabian 2001, 42; my emphasis). This crucial step was
nevertheless somewhat hampered by then falling back on Hagen’s tripartite industry-led model
(see fn. 4) and attempting to map it on to the diegetic/non-diegetic framework. Robynn Stilwell
(2007) operates firmly within the Gorbman model, but focuses on the points of strain that it can
barely contain. Referring to a variety of films, including René Clair’s Sous les Toits de Paris
(1930; music by Raoul Moretti and Vincent Scotto), King Kong (1933; dir. Merian C. Cooper and
Ernest B. Schoedsack; music by Max Steiner), The Wizard of Oz (1939; dir. Victor Fleming;
music by Harold Arlen, George Stoll, Herbert Stothart, and Robert W. Stringer), Lifeboat (1944;
dir. Alfred Hitchcock; music by Hugo Friedhofer), Casablanca (1942; dir. Michael Curtiz; music
by Max Steiner et al .), The Killing Fields (1984; dir. Roland Joffé; music by Mike Oldfield), The
Silence of the Lambs (1991; dir. Jonathan Demme; music by Howard Shore) and The Insider
(1999; dir. Michael Mann; music by Pieter Bourke and Lisa Gerrard), she examines more
directly than most the fluid interface between the two poles of the binary, and importantly, if
only in a preliminary sense, proposes what she calls the ‘metadiegetic sublime’, a Romantic-
idealist philosophical epigone at work when screen music, ‘soaring above the diegesis’, ‘takes
the foreground’ and can ‘literally and metaphorically, seem to spill out over/from behind the
screen and envelop the audience, creating a particularly intense connection’ (2007, 197), rather
like Brown’s extruding yet affecting metacinematic fiction. Ben Winters takes a more
theoretically robust approach, and, calling on Daniel Frampton’s ‘filmind’ neologism (a film’s
own ‘organic intelligence’, the ‘film itself’; Frampton 2007, 7, cited in Winters 2010, 233),
attempts to restore the Gorbmanesque category of non-diegetic screen music (which after all, is
the most widespread of screen music types) to the ontological fold of films’ narrative space,
coining for such music the term ‘intra-diegetic’. There are problems with Winters’s intervention
both terminologically (the proposed use of ‘intra-diegetic’ while retaining ‘diegetic’ seems
uncomfortable and open to confusion), and conceptually (the higher level duality he proposes
between ‘extra-fictional’ (overture and intermission screen music) and ‘fictional’ (all other
screen music) is somewhat underdeveloped and again open to misunderstanding in terms of
where the boundaries of the screen work’s fictional space lie ( vis-à-vis opening and closing
credit sequences, for example) and how these relate to narrative and diegesis). Nevertheless, the
greatest value of Winters’s contribution lies in his persistent differentiation between the act of
narrating and the narrated act , between music as producer and as product of narrative: ‘To assume
that music functions primarily as a narrating voice in a narratological sense, rather than as an
indicator and occupier of narrative space, is perhaps to misunderstand the broader nature of
cinematic diegesis’ (2010, 225). 13
Given the highly problematic notion of ‘the film itself’, which is dangerously reminiscent of
Jean-Jacques Nattiez’s semiological chimera ‘neutral level’ or ‘material trace’ in music (1990,
28), it would be relatively simple, and might indeed be necessary, to reconceive the ‘filmind’ as
an amalgamation of Jerrold Levinson’s ‘implicit fictional presenter’ (1996) or the ‘implied
filmmaker’ (discussed in Carroll and Moore 2011) (after all, the film has to have been created by
someone), and the individual consuming subject who for Gorbman (with reference to the
‘Kuleshov effect’) ‘infer[s], reconstruct[s] the diegesis’ (1980, 15) and who for Winters
‘construct[s] cinematic diegesis … with reference to the conventions of film’ including
‘“background music”’ [which] plays a constitutive role in shaping our construction of the
diegesis’ (2010, 243). However, does this, and the attendant transference of narrative agency to
the ‘filmind’, do enough to account for/legitimize the difference between music as ‘narrating
voice’, from which Winters is keen to distance the debate, and music as an ‘indicator … of
narrative space’? If the ‘filmind’ inevitably combines both poietic and aesthesic agencies of
narrative construction (and it should be remembered that the latter is just as external as, if not
more than, the former), can or should that difference be sustained? Winters’s argument hinges on
asserting a distinction between, and indeed the complete independence of, narrative (the
constructive process) and diegesis (the product that just ‘is’) in screen works, and in
understanding the (as-yet-undefined) ‘broader nature of cinematic diegesis’. As he notes, this
distinction – or rather ‘the relative autonomy of the narrative and diegetic principles’ – was
proposed by film theoretician Noël Burch who inferred it in a preliminary sense from, on the one
hand, the difficulty uninitiated audiences have identifying with the diegesis of silent films, but,
on the other hand, the ease with which they cope with the ‘standard narrative codes’ of the same
films (1982, 18). 14 Burch, however, toes the standard line contra Winters that music (of the type
commonly classified as non-diegetic) has an ‘essentially narrative role’ and ‘remains an extra-
diegetic signifier’ (26), and he also crucially suggests that in the ‘iconic hegemony’ of the sound
film, ‘ narrative and diegetic processes tend to fuse , causing … frequent heuristic confusion
between them’ (20; my emphasis). Moreover, where Roland Barthes, according to Burch,
identified ‘the apparent fusion between connotational and denotational levels of signification in
the still photograph’, Burch himself claims that ‘[i]n the talking cinema the (con)fusion between
these two levels is far more complete’ ( ibid ., fn 7). In the light of this, as an alternative to
prising open and maintaining a distinction between screen music as narrator (mostly denied by
Winters) or as narrated, I am more interested in exploring this fusion or collapse of narrative and
diegesis, denotation and connotation, even diegesis and mimesis (and the resultant breakdown of
the dialectic outlined previously), a process in which music is fully implicated, or which music
may even embody.
1 their world of music, since they are entertainers and take part in a stage act;
2 the musical world supplied by the implied filmmaker, since they move, act and gesture (often
theatrically) in time to:
a music, performed in the story, that they are not participating in, and/or that occurs in a
different physical location;
b music that cannot be related to any live or recorded performance in the story;
c music of an ambiguous ontological nature that can be heard by them (and viewers) backstage
during the live performance, but to which they ‘impossibly’ move at times in complete
synchrony, or which seems aesthetically to veer away from the live performed music to
provide an emotive contour for human interaction;
3 by extension, the world of music constructed by the viewer.
Traditional models would describe 2 (c) above as a case of diegetic music shifting into fulfilling
a non-diegetic function, with suspension of disbelief, or perhaps the ‘filmind’, obviating any
need for realistic points of reference, as the music helps to construct the film’s narrative space.
Neumeyer’s recent categorization (2009b), as far as it is possible to ascertain, would take this
music to be (1) narratively plausible, (2) realistic, (3) musically closed, and (4) off-screen, but
arguably would not be able comfortably to situate it as diegetic or non-diegetic. These
descriptions do not do justice to the level of pervasive ‘musicalization’ in evidence here in a
screen work that cannot securely be categorized as a ‘film musical’. Backstage romance and
intrigue become the ‘front-of-stage’ performance by means of the relatively seamless continuity
and ebb and flow of off-screen stage music. At one point, for example, the troupe exit the stage
after a performance, and the continuation of the music (perhaps into what Neumeyer calls a
‘quasi-background “limbo”’; 2009b, 51), as well as the ongoing physical interaction of the
characters with it backstage, together with a cutaway to stage hands, reinforce the sense that the
boundary between backstage and onstage is dissolved; and, if all the world is a stage, then
poietically derived acts of narration, aesthesically received narrated acts, denotation and
connotation, diegesis (telling) and mimesis (showing) tend to fold into one another to form a
musicalized über -diegetic totality. 16
That this distinctive aesthetic was not confined to Musikspektakelfilme is demonstrated in the
better known drama Abschied (1930), the first UFA-made sound film. A serious, slice-of-life film,
Abschied boasts an impressive line-up of co-creators: director Robert Siodmak, scriptwriter
Emeric Pressburger, cinematographer Eugen Schüfftan, music by Erwin Bootz. The story, set in
a Berlin ‘hostel for homeless bourgeois people’, concerns the misunderstanding between a young
couple (Peter and Hella) that over the course of one evening leads them unnecessarily to part
company. Knitting the whole series of events together is the intermittent piano music (a mixture
of popular dances, the poignant title song and some pre-existent music), performed, sometimes
visibly, by another resident of the hostel played by Erwin Bootz, the composer of the original
music. After the opening credits (during which the title song is heard), the premise is set up very
early and obviously in the film that its piano music is ‘diegetically’ legitimated through visible
performance. However, on many subsequent occasions this music apparently is narratively
motivated in ways that counter its ‘realistic’ basis, and this ontological tension generates a highly
ambiguous and expressive musicalized screen aesthetic. At times the piano (being played
elsewhere in the building) ‘impossibly’ responds to hesitant looks and pregnant pauses in
dialogue at moments of melancholy between the two main characters (Peter is about to leave to
take up a job in another city). Elsewhere it helpfully ‘drops out’ during phone calls, or Hella
‘impossibly’ starts singing to it at exactly the moment it reappears. In Neumeyer’s terms it might
be said of this last case that she could be singing to off-screen diegetic music as ‘onscreen non-
diegetic music’, in ‘an expression of [her] subjectivity’, perhaps not even knowing that she is
performing (2009b, 46). However, it might be much easier for us to accept that, suspending the
‘rules’ of a normative realism, and accepting a form of musicalized diegesis that circumvents
diegetic legitimation and aligns in part with the film-musical aesthetic, the Hella character
somehow just joins in naturally and fully consciously with the diegetic piano playing because
this is the magical fictional world that such musicalization engenders.
Moments of affection are sometimes directed by changes in musical style or sound level, as
when the couple begin to dance a slow waltz to the title music, which seamlessly emerges, now
much louder, from previous popular dance music heard very faintly. Right on cue, the piano
music ends at an awkward moment in the conversation when Peter asks Hella if she has been
unfaithful to him, and the dance ceases. At one point Peter’s frustration and suspicion are
musicalized in the pianist’s obsessive practising of successively shorter parts of the Animato
section from the opening movement, ‘Preambule’, of Schumann’s Carnaval Op. 9 (1834–5) – a
work which, rather like the hostel, is populated by a ‘cast’ of imaginary characters mediated
through music, and, in relation to the couple, calls upon the trope of the masked ball where
hidden, secret or mistaken identities are the order of the day. The ever-tightening spiral of the
Schumann excerpt finishes at exactly the moment when Peter finds what he wrongly takes to be
conclusive incriminating evidence of Hella’s infidelity, the name and address of another man
hidden in a book. After Peter has left the hostel, Hella eventually at the end of the film finds the
engagement ring he was going to give her which bears the engraving: ‘Wear it always; forget me
never’, whereupon a slow track around the now-empty room begins, and the principal theme
returns now augmented by strings and voice, which sings ‘Everything in life ends like a song,
fades and flies away when you say farewell’. This turn to what would traditionally be termed
non-diegetic underscore for the first and only time in the film does several things: it adheres to
the convention of supplying ‘outro’ music at the end of a film; it expressively and sonically
enhances the principal musical theme for greater emotional impact and audience involvement; it
fuses or collapses narrating and narrated modes, telling and showing, ‘knowing about’ and
‘being there’ to allow the deepest audience immersion in the physical and mental space of the
film world; and it lends a clinching coherence to the entire integrating musical fabric of the film,
an aestheticized state intimated in the evocative song lyric. The music that has been organically
permeating through the walls of the hostel and temporally through the scenes of the film (via the
pianist both as character and as the film’s real-world composer) as an aesthetic embodiment of
the mutual collapse of narrative (space) and diegesis, is now revealed to have pervaded, even
incarnated the entire inner consciousness of the character Hella all along: to have been the
‘acoustics of her soul’. Abschied ’s aesthetic contests the Gorbman protocol since its music
becomes the film’s fictional space of integrated fantasy in such a way as to be inseparable both
from any narrating mechanism and from what is narrated. It takes on the imaginative character
and function of their conjoined identity.
An aesthetics of psychosis
To an extent, my thinking here aligns with recent investigations of screen music ontology in the
context of philosophical analysis and/or more wide-ranging repertoire. Among many other
things, these investigations have pointed out the misapplication to film of the original Greek term
‘diegesis’ (the relating of a story in the teller’s own voice), when ‘mimesis’ (the acting out of a
story) is more appropriate (see Taylor 2007 and Yacavone 2012). Winters talks of characters in
The Best Years of Our Lives (1946; dir. William Wyler, music by Hugo Friedhofer) ‘moving not
just through a narrative space, but a musicalised narrative space’ (2012, 48). Yacavone posits for
screen works an ‘aesthetic world-space’ that is ‘beyond narrative’ (2012, 35), 17 and, using the
model of the Klein bottle to build on Winters’s argument, Nick Davis holds that ‘it is distinctly
unhelpful to treat “story” and “discourse” as if they were formally separable for purposes of
analysis’; that in conjunction with other screen elements, music ‘becomes simultaneously “story”
and “discourse”’ and is thus able to ‘generate narrativity by forming part of narrative’s
characteristic troping without being, qua music, narrating action’ (2012, 14, 10, 18). Alessandro
Cecchi reminds us of the subjectively mediated nature of both narration and diegesis, the latter
all the more so because it is ‘the result of a (subjective) act of inference based on a construction
which has itself been mediated from a subjective viewpoint’ (2010, 5). These levels of mediation
render it impossible to distinguish at an ontological level between either the purportedly
‘objective’ contents and ‘subjective modalities of the narration’ (ibid ., 4), or the diegetic and
non-diegetic, including the case of music whose function remains ‘broadly independent of its
topology’ (ibid ., 5), which at best remains peripheral to the aesthetic experience of audio-visual
media.
While it is true, as Winters points out, that it would be unreasonable to consider screen music
as ‘the creator of all the narrative we experience’ if this idea is used as an explanation for how it
might form ‘an extra-diegetic layer of narration’ or how it might ‘narrate the events of the
diegesis’ (2012, 43), this does not preclude music from having the extremely powerful capacity
to usurp, subsume or embody the very dissolution of the dialectic previously outlined. To talk of
an entirely musical or musicalized diegesis might nevertheless be a step too far (even in the genre
of the screen musical, though perhaps not in some experimental contexts) since for one thing it
conjures up a late-Wagnerian operatic aesthetic of only partial applicability to screen works, and
is exclusive to the point of risking aesthetic blindness. In any case, it is an inaccurate way of
describing the process, for which the solidity of concepts and their dialectic frame have become
perilously insecure. Though addressing screen sound rather than music specifically, James
Buhler suggests:
A profound uncertainty follows from the attempt to substitute the continuity of the soundtrack,
which has no formal limit, for the image as the ground of diegetic representation. In many
films today, sound takes the place of the establishing shot, and it loses the promise of
plenitude that had always been the opening of desire marked by the frame edge.
(Buhler 2014, 411)
The soundtrack gives us the basic perspective, the ‘map’ of the situation, and guarantees its
continuity, while the images are reduced to isolated fragments that float freely in the universal
medium of the sound aquarium. It would be difficult to invent a better metaphor for psychosis
… we have here the ‘aquarium’ of the real surrounding isolated islands of the symbolic.
(Žižek 1991, 40, cited in Buhler 2014, 411)
However, the world of screen works (including the documentary genre and especially the
‘reality TV’ genre) has always been predominantly one of a fantastic, magical detachment from
reality. In this sense, then, ‘psychosis’ seems a perfectly apt term for a medium which does not
strictly obey the rules of logic or of physical time and space, despite – or perhaps because of –
the emergence of classic continuity editing. Far from this being a new phenomenon, however, I
suggest that it is as old as the screen medium itself, and something that we as viewers naturally
accept. If, for Žižek, screen sound by the 1990s had become the ‘“aquarium” of the real’ in
which symbolic images float as isolated fragments, in the silent film era the presence of live
musical accompaniment, coupled with that musical repertoire’s denotational-connotational
malleability, had already both wedded the fictional with the real, and at the same time
highlighted their ontological separation: the ‘real’ of the ‘unreal’ screen images is less accessible
than the ‘unreal’ of the ‘real’ music. If there was any historical and aesthetic continuity between
the silent and sound eras, then I suggest it lay somewhere within this perceptual quandary of yet
further mutually collapsing tendencies.
Although I took two little-known early European examples to illustrate my thinking, the
mutual influence of American and German filmmakers in the vital formative years of the
medium and beyond, is a topic worthy of more detailed examination. 18 I contend also that even
the most commercial of mainstream Hollywood repertoire partakes of the same kind of ‘mass-
psychotic’, dialectic-overcoming aesthetic. To take one example: the opening of the first Star
Wars film (1977; dir. George Lucas, music by John Williams), perhaps unusually has no credit
sequence beyond the two logos of ‘20th Century Fox’ and ‘Lucasfilm’. 19 There is thus minimal
framing of the screen work. The following intertitle ‘A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away
…’ is an unproblematic narrating act, lying exterior to the world of the film as story, but inside
the film as created work. The film title and scrolling explanatory text receding into the distant
black of space appear approximately two seconds later together with Williams’s music. It is
arguable that without the stirring score, this textual element could also be taken as an exterior
narrating device (although it also has strong connotational content). 20 In the final moments of its
disappearance and for a further ten seconds, overwhelmingly black screen is gradually populated
by faint stars before the first substantial image (of a small planet) appears, the most obvious
visual signal of the mimetic beginning of the films’ story. However, I would claim that the
presence of music throughout this passage – and music that is initially replete with militaristic,
heroic, emotively striving and wild-west-pioneering allusions 21 – has the effect of shifting the
mimetic beginning of the film’s story earlier to the appearance of the title ‘Star Wars’ on screen.
It is from this point that perception of a work being narrated is strongly encouraged to dissolve
into a much less resistant identification with, and immersion in, an unfolding ‘performed’ story
that for the time being is predominantly musical. The boundaries between the film as work and
as story, between diegesis and mimesis, and between narrating and the narrated are collapsing
through the presence of music that would traditionally be described as separate from the diegesis,
and by implication an exterior narrative voice, but which adopts a mimetic function. If one
accepts Aristotle’s classification of diegesis as a subset of the overarching mode of poetic
creation – mimesis – then here the music as ‘showing’ or ‘enacting’ completely overwhelms the
scrolling text as ‘telling’ and dominates the minimal visual content emerging at the end of this as
well. In this paradoxical sense, while not narrating, it nevertheless creates or embodies narrative.
Although the genetically secondary status of the music in relation to the image in the process of
production might elicit corresponding kinds of aesthetic evaluation, I maintain that the music
assumes primacy here as a determining screen agent both expressively and structurally: during
the period of primarily black screen the downward semitonal shift from the diatonic major home
key to minor and to unstable chromatic decoration, coupled with the thinning of orchestral
texture to high-tessitura sonorities in woodwind and celeste, and the less marked metrical
identity, serve to blend mimesis with diegesis (if not to subsume the latter) by lending
expectancy to our interpretative experience of the neutral void of distant space and by opening
out a structural space within which the film’s first substantial visual element appears. Such a
‘katabasis’, or downward trajectory of intensity, is common in, for example, the symphonic
music of Mahler where it often signals a structural or expressive turning point. 22 In these two
minutes of screen time at the opening of an audio-visual experience that in many ways
epitomized a historical turning point in the socio-cultural relationship between viewer and sound
film spectacle, the binary oppositions of (1) music’s inevitable separation from/essential
implication in screen diegeses, (2) its non-narrational/narratively constructive function, and (3)
its responsive/directive activity, are dissipated, and continue to be so to varying degrees
throughout the film.
We live in an increasingly musicalized screen world as Kassabian explores in her diagnosis of
the ‘end of diegesis as we know it’ (2013). In current hyper-mediatized ipod, music-video and
public as well as online environments, either by choice or imposition, non-musical portions of
human existence are becoming gradually scarcer. Whether this is a symptom of the final
psychotic, dialectic collapse (between screen worlds and real worlds) or whether it is just another
case of life imitating art for all our collective enrichment, remains to be seen and heard.
Notes
1 A field variously referred to as film/screen music (studies), film/screen musicology, studies of music (sound) and the moving
image, musical multi-media, or the audio-visual. In this discussion I will generally use the terms screen work or screen music
for the object of study, and screen studies or screen music studies/screen music scholarship for the practice of this study.
2 This classification, derived by Gorbman from the 1950s/1960s narrative theory of Gérard Genette and film theory of Étienne
Souriau, divides screen music into that which can be heard by the characters within the represented scenario (diegetic) and
that which cannot (non- or extra-diegetic). A third category, meta-diegetic, was adapted by Gorbman to label music that
seems to be projected by the inner psychological state of a character who thus ‘“takes over” part of the film’s narration’
(Gorbman 1987, 23). The term meta-diegetic has since been applied more widely to any diegetic music that can only be heard
in the imagination of one character in the scenario.
3 David Neumeyer has usefully explored the interaction between production process technology and theoretical understanding
of film music (Neumeyer 1997 and 2009b).
4 See Winters 2010, 225 for a summary of this critique, to which should be added Neumeyer 1997, 2009b; Cecchi 2010; Davis
2012; Winters 2012; Yacavone 2012.
5 See, for example, Kalinak 1992, Burt 1994, Lack 1997, Timm 1998, Hickman 2006 and Kalinak 2010. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, authors of theoretical books on screen music that pre-date Gorbman, or of practice-based/industry-led guides
from any era, do not use the terms diegetic and non-diegetic (see, for example, Hagen 1971, Bazelon 1975, Evans 1975,
Prendergast 1977, Sonnenschein 2001). Hagen’s tripartite formulation of source music, source scoring and pure dramatic
scoring is among the most nuanced of categorizations in the industry sector (1971, 190–206), and was, in fact, taken up by
Annahid Kassabian in her critique of the diegetic/non-diegetic binary (2001, 42–9).
6 There is disagreement about the latter, even in discussions of silent-era music. For Rick Altman, the producers of sound or
music operate ‘implicitly within the space implied by the image’, sound is not ‘a rhetorical addition to the image’ but ‘a form
of ventriloquism’ (Altman 2004, 92 (original emphasis); see also 370). Donnelly by contrast suggests that ‘the music of silent
cinema … was … predominantly “non-diegetic”: emanating from outside the world constructed by the film, as if appearing
from heaven’ (2001, 6).
7 The reverse is also acknowledged but regarded as ‘today largely hypothetical’ (Adorno and Eisler [1947] 1994, 70).
8 It was this, according to Camper, that inspired experimental film maker Stan Brakhage to make silent films, ‘because sound
tends to dominate image’ (1985, 378)
9 Citing Federico Fellini, Fellini on Fellini (New York: Dalacorte, 1976), from Nat Shapiro (ed.), An Encyclopedia of
Quotations about Music (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 319.
10 I am very grateful to James Buhler for allowing me access to pre-publication versions of parts of this volume.
11 Duelle has a team of composers: Jean Cohen-Solal (composer: effect music), Robert Cohen-Solal (composer: effect music),
André Dauchy (composer: improvised music (as Dauchy), Roger Fugen (composer: improvised music), Daniel Ponsard
(composer: effect music) and Jean Wiener (composer: improvised music) Noroît also has a team of composers: Original
Music is credited to Jean Cohen-Solal, Robert Cohen-Solal and Daniel Ponsard.
12 A related taxonomy had been earlier proposed in Percheron and Butzel 1980, while extensions, glosses and differing
perspectives on this approach have been subsequently offered in Neumeyer 2009a, 2009b and Smith 2009.
13 This distinction is re-emphasized by Winters in a more recent article, of which it forms the basic premise (Winters 2012).
14 The deciding factor for Burch was the absence of lip-synch sound in the silent era.
15 I am grateful to the British Academy and DAAD for funding three research visits to the Bundesarchiv in Berlin, and the
Friedrich Murnau Stiftung in Wiesbaden during 2013.
16 In technological terms, Neumeyer notes that ‘before 1932, when post-production re-recording was first generally used,
background music was more likely to be employed in a musical than in a dramatic feature’ (2009b, 43–44), quoting Kathryn
Kalinak’s adherence to established nomenclature: ‘In The Love Parade (1929), for instance, diegetic music in the production
numbers spills over as nondiegetic music for ensuing scenes’ (Kalinak 1992, 68). The precarious generic affiliation of
German Tonfilmoperetten at this time, of which Die vom Rummelplatz is a particularly challenging example, does not
necessarily invalidate, but certainly complicates these observations. For example, outside of any performed music in the film,
simple acts such as knocking on an office door, are integrated rhythmically with music. I would argue that the musically
dominated aesthetic context clearly favours this mode of understanding over the theoretically more conventional one in which
the music would be described as having been synchronized to the image/action.
17 Though Yacavone’s model of nested phenomenological ‘wholes’ existing as ‘parts’ within that film world is at best unclear.
His aim, with regard to ‘the represented, fictional world of a film’, contra Winters, is to ‘reconfirm its distinct denoted
character, and … fully recognise and chart, to the extent possible, the irreducible symbolic, aesthetic, and phenomenological
whole within which this represented world of characters and their lives and stories (together with the represented space and
time as a setting for these) is itself contained as but one part of a film’s presentation’ (2012, 36).
18 Existing, primarily historical, studies in this area include Erich Angermann, ‘Die USA in den “Goldenen Zwanziger Jahren”’,
in George Eckert and Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf (eds), Deutschland und die USA, 1918–1933 , Braunschweig: Albert Limbach,
1968, 53–64; Douglas Gomery, ‘Economic Struggle and Hollywood Imperialism: Europe Converts to Sound’ in Altman
1980, 80–93; Eric Rentschler, ‘How American is It? The U.S. as Image and Imaginary in German Film’, German Quarterly
54 (1984), 603–620; Anton Kaes, ‘Mass Culture and Modernity: Notes Toward a Social History of Early American and
German Cinema’, in Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh (eds), America and the Germans , Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1985, 317–31; Frank Trommler, ‘The Rise and Fall of Americanism in Germany’, in Trommler and
McVeigh, 332–42; Victoria de Grazia, ‘Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas,
1920–1960’, Journal of Modern History 61 (1989), 53–87; Jan-Christopher Horak, ‘Rin-Tin-Tin erobert Berlin oder
Amerikanische Filminteressen in Weimar’, in Walter Schatzberg and Uli Jung (eds), Filmkultur zur Zeit der Weimarer
Republik , Munich: Saur, 1992, pp. 255–70; Ian Jarvie, Hollywood’s Overseas Campaign. The North Atlantic Movie Trade,
1920–1950 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Thomas Saunders, ‘Comedy as Redemption: American Slapstick
in Weimar Culture’, Journal of European Studies 17 (1987), 253–77; Saunders 1994; and the essays in Laurence Kardish
(ed.) Weimar Cinema, 1919–1933: Daydreams and Nightmares , New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010.
19 Given the narrative/diegetic ambiguity of opening and closing screen title sequences, investigating why they almost
invariably involve music would seem an important project. Such sequences are beginning to be explored further in the
literature, for example, Stanitzek 2009, Davison 2013a and 2013b, Powrie and Heldt forthcoming.
20 Although it imparts information (however negligible), the denotation of the text is complemented by connotational content
through its movement, its perspective, and its cultural allusions to adventure serials of many types from a bygone era.
21 For the last of these one could point to the distinctive harmonic progression at the end of the first phrase – tonic – flattened
7th – dominant – tonic – (itself a collapsing in of a modal/diatonic harmonic dialectic) that can be found in various earlier
scorings of cinematic and TV Westerns, for example Jerome Moss’s theme from The Big Country (1958), Harry Sukman’s
theme to the TV series The High Chaparral (1967–71; this theme extends the progression with intervening chords on the
flattened 3rd and flattened 2nd before the perfect cadence), and Williams’s own score for The Cowboys (1972) which features
related tonic – subdominant minor — tonic, and flattened 6th –flattened 7th – tonic progressions. Interestingly, Williams and
Sukman shared the scoring for the TV spin-off series which aired in 1974.
22 See Adorno [1960] 1992, 45, where such episodes are described as ‘collapsing passages’, and Schmierer 2005 for application
of the term katabasis in a discussion of the first movement of Mahler’s Das Lied von der Erde .
This chapter explores the idea of musical irony as a historical phenomenon, rather than
merely a matter of individual composers’ taste. In doing so, it suggests that irony might be
understood as part of the broader musical modernity of the post-Enlightenment age,
stretching from the eighteenth century to the present. Notwithstanding the fact that many
significant composers had little interest in irony, this longer view shows irony to be not just
a symptom of musical modernity but also a key device through which music expresses a
critical awareness of its own conventions and aesthetic status; as Lawrence Kramer suggests,
in modernity ‘nothing can be read without irony, or at least the possibility of irony’ (Kramer
2011, 231). That said, compared to the numerous explorations of irony in literature, there are
remarkably few studies devoted to musical irony; of those there are, almost all are written in
relation to individual composers. 2 Perhaps the lack of any overview tells its own story: until
quite recently, it seems, discourse about music has been unwilling, to the point of denial, to
treat music as anything less than a form of sincere, authentic and direct expression. Yet
music itself, from Mozart to Mahler, Schumann to Stravinsky, and Haydn to Ligeti, has
proposed a far greater degree of self-critical and reflective awareness of its own expressive
capacities. It is this history of musical self-reflection, highlighted in musical irony, which
forms the focus of the rest of this chapter.
something similar to the audacity of annihilating humor, an expression of scorn for the
world, can be perceived in a good deal of music, like that of Haydn, which destroys entire
tonal sequences by introducing an extraneous key and storms alternately between
pianissimo and fortissimo, presto and andante.
(Richter [1804] 1973, 93)
Today, we might not hear Haydn as expressing ‘scorn for the world’ but commentators have
often remarked on the capacity of Haydn’s music to subvert listeners’ expectations, playing
with the possibilities of sudden changes of musical direction in ways generally heard as
humorous. This became possible in Viennese Classicism because of its imitation of the
grammatical and rhetorical patterns of language, an idea explored in eighteenth-century
music theory as well as musical composition. 3 By establishing a sense of musical grammar
and syntax that implied a logic akin to that of language, composers opened up rich
possibilities for a playful subversion of that logic. It was thus the outward predictability of
conventional procedures in the Classical style that enabled its subtle and sophisticated level
of discursive play.
More recently, a number of scholars have drawn attention to this dimension of Classical
instrumental music. For Daniel Chua, irony ‘is the distinguishing feature’ of the Classical
style, exemplified in the music of Haydn whose forms ‘explore an ironic gap in their
constant preoccupation with their own dislocated structures’ (Chua 1999, 209–10). Mark
Evan Bonds locates the link between Haydn and literary irony in the late eighteenth century
in the way that ‘art-works overtly call attention to their own techniques of artifice’ (Bonds
1991a, 68). Scott Burnham similarly suggests that Laurence Sterne’s meta-novel finds a
parallel in Haydn’s meta-music; both, he comments, ‘foster an ironic sense of aesthetic
detachment’ (Burnham 2005, 74). Burnham’s analysis of Haydn’s musical humour draws
out specific techniques by which this is achieved – exaggeration, parody, incongruity,
discontinuity, and musical ‘punch lines’ at points of return and endings. As Gretchen
Wheelock underlines, such strategies not only depend upon a knowing audience, but
actively draw the listener in ‘as highly self-conscious participants in a process of completing
the jest’ (Wheelock 1992, 13). 4 In Burnham’s words, Haydn’s ironic humour requires the
listener:
to be caught out and then brought back inside, to move from being fooled to being
informed, from being manipulated to being aware of being manipulated, from enacted
object to understanding subject – this shift in perspective forces a sudden recognition of
consciousness. And this brief shock of recognition is not a vertiginous glimpse into a
solipsistic abyss but rather a surging confirmation of the self-transcending diversion of
self-consciousness.
(Burnham 2005, 75 )
In demanding the listener’s interaction in this way, Haydn thus embodies something of
the alternating flow of thought and counter-thought by which Friedrich Schlegel
characterized the new ironic literature of his time (Behler 1990, 83). These might seem like
grand claims to make of the often light-hearted humour of works like Haydn’s Op. 33
Quartets (1781), nicknamed gli scherzi on account of the Minuet movements being recast as
scherzi (literally, jokes). For the generation writing on art and literature around 1800,
however, the category of the ernster Scherz (the serious joke) was central to the broader idea
of ‘Romantic irony’, most frequently associated with early romantic literature, in the works
of Ludwig Tieck, Friedrich Schlegel, Jean Paul Richter and E. T. A. Hoffmann. The same
attitude of mind can be found in Classical music of the same period – and, indeed, in
musical techniques that closely parallel literary ones. Haydn’s play with musical
conventions, as later with the young Beethoven, embodies the attitude of Romantic irony by
foregrounding the self-consciousness of the creative subject (not just the composer, but also
the performer and the listener).
Romantic irony is more than simply ‘humour’, as Rey Longyear insists in distinguishing
between the ‘playfulness’ of Haydn and the Romantic irony of Beethoven. The latter, he
suggests, is found in the arresting juxtaposition of the poetic and the prosaic, as between the
Adagio movement of the Violin Sonata, Op. 96 and the Scherzo that follows it, or the
similar contrast between the third and fourth of the Bagatelles, Op. 126 (Longyear 1970,
655). The aesthetic intention in Beethoven’s musical irony, Longyear argues, is to expose
music’s own artifice, to reveal the illusion of the aesthetic construction. He offers as an
example the Finale of Beethoven’s Quartet in F minor, Op. 95. This was dubbed by the
composer as a ‘Quartetto serioso’ yet, in the coda of the Finale, its high seriousness is
undermined by a turn to the musical comedy normally associated with opera buffa . The
light-hearted Allegro ending, Longyear suggests, ‘exemplifies many of the other
characteristics of romantic irony which Schlegel described: paradox, self-annihilation,
parody, eternal agility, and the appearance of the fortuitous and unusual’ (Longyear 1970,
649). 5 The ironic turn of Classical music, though it may provoke no more than a wry smile
from the informed listener, is thus also an affirmation of self-consciousness; it draws the
listener into the self-contained world of the musical work, while simultaneously
acknowledging itself as a fictive activity, a work of pure artifice and artful construction. The
sudden digressions, interruptions, non sequiturs and inappropriate exaggerations exhibited in
musical humour are thus the musical corollaries of the literary devices of Romantic irony,
summarized by Lloyd Bishop as a ‘frequent recourse to oxymoron, paradox, parabasis,
parataxis, montage, or other staccato effects such as sudden changes of mood, theme or
stylistic register’ (Bishop 1989, 17). They constitute a musical version of what happens
when an actor steps ‘out of character’ by moving towards the audience to comment on the
play of which he is part.
This is exactly what Friedrich Schlegel meant when he described irony as ‘a permanent
parabasis ’ (Schlegel 1963, 85) a term that refers to the moment, in ancient Greek drama,
when an actor steps across the threshold that separates the theatrical space to communicate
directly with the audience. In works of romantic literature it is most frequently found in
novels in which characters comment upon the progress of the narrative or on their own
fictional status. Richter, in the Vorschule , points both to Tieck’s Prinz Zerbino and also to
Sterne’s Tristram Shandy . In the latter, he says, the author ‘several times speaks lengthily
and reflectively about certain incidents, until in the end, he concludes: “all the same, ’tis not
a word of it true”’ (Richter [1804] 1973, 93), 6 a sentiment that the ending of Beethoven’s F
minor Quartet, Op. 95 (discussed above), might be heard to parallel. The serious business of
humour (the ernster Scherz ) was thus to do with foregrounding the gap between the
mundane world of the particular characters and their story and a sense of a far broader
perspective. Humour was a tool for dissolving the finite boundaries of the everyday world of
objects in order to project a sense of infinitude, exactly the sense of a ‘constant alternation of
self-creation and self-destruction’ found in the philosophy of Schlegel (Behler 1990, 84).
This idea of parabasis in music can be seen most immediately in opera buffa , the comedy
of which is founded upon a kind of complicity between the audience and key characters on
stage, at the expense of those whose folly will be exposed. Both Schlegel and Richter talk
about irony in terms of a ‘transcendental buffoonery’ and ‘Italian buffoonery’, referencing
the critical capacity of the Italian commedia dell’arte that also informs the origins of opera
buffa . Consider Mozart’s Don Giovanni , an opera in which parabasis is deployed to puncture
the fiction of the drama observed by the audience, but also as part of the sudden and
uncomfortable turns in this opera between its dark and serious subject matter and the light-
hearted comedy of its telling. In the final scene of the opera, as the Don awaits his
mysterious dinner guest, the on-stage band plays contemporary operatic hits as a comic nod
to the audience that underlines the fictive and theatrical nature of the tale they are watching.
As the band plays an excerpt from Mozart’s own Le nozze di Figaro , Leporello’s wry
comment ‘I know this one rather too well’ is typical of the way he constantly bridges the gap
between stage and audience. It provides one example among many of how opera buffa ,
filtered through writers like Marivaux, Goldoni and Gozzi, took from commedia dell’arte a
kind of critical anti-naturalism that opposed the otherwise generally mundane quality of its
subject matter.
This critical anti-naturalism is precisely why a fascination with the ironic stance of opera
buffa resurfaces so powerfully in the early twentieth century and why Mozart’s Così fan tutte
, vilified, ignored or rewritten for much of the nineteenth century, fascinated the twentieth
century because of its ‘modern’ tendencies to break its own narrative frame, decontextualize
its own conventions and insist that identity is performed not given (see Hunter 1999, 45).
However, the real test of the possibility of musical irony is found in instrumental music. As
Charles Rosen and others have shown, the development of the Viennese Classical style was
indebted to the influence of opera buffa , absorbing into the symphony, string quartet and
sonata not only the clarity and pacing of comic opera, but also clear dramatic types and
modes of interaction. Haydn’s Op. 33 Quartets, Rosen underlines, were written at the end of
a decade that Haydn had spent supervising comic opera productions at Esterháza. Mozart’s
new set of quartets, written between 1782 and 1785 and dedicated to Haydn, were composed
while he waited for his first opera buffa libretto from Da Ponte. Mozart’s set provides an
excellent and sophisticated example of how irony can work in Classical instrumental music.
Published in 1785, these six quartets mark a move from the innocence of the Enlightenment
logic of Mozart’s earlier music to the far more contradictory world of Romantic irony. The
hallmark of this new style is the way in which Mozart creates a disjunction between the
simplicity of his chosen material and the sophistication of its treatment; nowhere is this
clearer than in the humble Minuet. In Mozart’s ‘Haydn Quartets’, this most conventional of
genres is constantly undercut by musical materials that become too complex – harmonically,
rhythmically, contrapuntally and emotionally.
The Minuet of the A major quartet, K. 464, provides a good example and is worth
examining closely ( Musical Example 12.2 ). Ostensibly a short and simple little movement,
its combination of sparse, fragmented textures and unprepared tonal juxtapositions produce
music of solitary introspection rather than the innocent collective dance implied by the
genre. The harmonic twists are highly subtle. The modulation to the dominant in m. 13 is
made by a substitution chord (the sudden C major triad, mm. 11–12) approaching the
dominant key by means of its flat submediant. The preparation for the strong cadence at the
end of the first section of the Minuet is diverted by a further substitution, so what should be
a simple IV–V six–four/five–three preparation in m. 23 leads instead, via the B in the bass,
to C minor in m. 24. In the second half of the Minuet the return of the tonic and main theme
(m. 55) is almost instantly derailed by the harmonic sequence beginning in m. 59. The
highly chromatic bass line (given by cello and viola in parallel octaves) leads to a repeated
diminished 7th chord, left hanging in the air (mm. 63–4), before the quiet resumption of the
tonic is picked up in m. 65. The aftermath of the diminished 7th chord still echoes in the
substitution chord in m. 69.
Musical Example 12.2 Mozart, String Quartet in A major, K. 464,
Minuet, mm. 55–72
These harmonic twists, too complex for the simple Minuet, are heard alongside an
emphasis on the simple repeated crotchet figure, first heard in mm. 5–8, which uses an
element of repetition central to the genre but exaggerates it until it sounds more like a fugal
exercise. The result is something that appears to present the elements of an innocuous
Minuet but implies something different by means of their treatment. What should be festive
music becomes oddly melancholic, introverted and subdued; motivic economy, outwardly
the vehicle of creative strength, here becomes rather obsessive and inward. Heard in such a
way, this simple Minuet by Mozart anticipates a modernist inversion of generic signification
that connects this music to Mahler .
Elsewhere, Mozart presents Minuets and Trios where the latter are not just contrasting but
radically dissociated from their Minuets. In the D minor Quartet, K. 421, for example, the
Minuet presents agitated contrapuntal music in D minor, shot through with sliding
chromaticism and an obsessive use of a dotted rhythm, quite at odds with the simplicity of
the genre. However, the Trio that follows in the subdominant major, utterly diatonic and
monodic, is breathtakingly naive. As if to underline its complete inversion of the world
hitherto presented, it reverses the little dotted-note figure of the Minuet. Something similar
can be heard in Mozart’s later String Quintets. In the G minor Quintet, K. 516, for example,
the wistful simplicity of the Trio seems to present the classical ideal as something lost,
sandwiched between the alienated Minuet and its repeat, and in the D major Quintet, K. 593,
the Trio contrasts so strongly that it sounds like a piece of theatrical make-believe, its ultra-
high 1st violin and pizzicato accompaniment drawing attention to its own artificiality.
Mozart’s late chamber music anticipates Stravinsky in the melancholy of its ironic beauty
(the term is Scott Burnham’s, 1994). Self-aware of its own fictitiousness, it seems to
acknowledge that the self appears only where it is performed in language and that, outside
such moments of social performance, the subject becomes inaudible, even to itself. At the
same time, however, it counters this acknowledgement with nostalgia for an identity that
might still lie outside of such language games. This music thus recurrently stages a kind of
overstepping of itself through elaboration that is too rich for the material and the form; by
breaking free from the conventional space in which it must move, the expressive voice
necessarily alienates itself. Irony is thus its default position, or else it lies; therein lies the
modernity of Mozart’s music.
The tradition of German Lieder running from Schubert to Mahler is built on this
fundamentally ironic double-take by means of the contrast between the simplicity of its
materials and the sophistication of their treatment. The simplicity of the material comes
initially from the cultivated folk tone ( Volkston ) of the poetry it sets, evincing a similar act
of musical pastiche. Schubert, like Mahler seventy years later, uses simple musical means to
evoke a folksong style – melodies based on simple triads, repetitive motifs, especially
rhythmic ones, and simple strophic forms. At the same time, both mark this material as not
folk music, by subtle deviations from it – twists in the harmony, interruptions,
exaggerations, a disjunction between text and music. The fundamentally ironic turn thus
derives not from the more modern aspects in themselves, but precisely the difference between
a collective folk voice in which the individual is not essentially separate from the collective,
and the harmonic, melodic and dramatic twists that highlight the protagonist’s distance from
this ideal unity. In other words, Schubert’s evocation of an older, simpler past , is part of the
means by which he highlights a present alienation.
This divided consciousness is often explicitly thematized in songs as, for example, in
‘Wehmut’, from Schumann’s Eichendorff lieder, Op. 39 (1840). ‘It is true, I can sing at times
as though I were happy’, begins this deceptively simple song, ‘but secretly tears well up to
relieve my heavy heart’. Schumann achieves his exquisite balance of conventional
simplicity and inward disclosure by taking the form of a naive little song, but subtly
inflecting it. The symmetrical phrase structure and major key denote outward calm and
contentment, but the turn to the relative minor for the answering couplet (mm. 5–6) drives a
sharp but subtle wedge between outward sense and ironic difference. This is one of
Schumann’s most telling devices, inherited directly by Brahms and Mahler. The power and
poignancy of German lieder is located precisely in this gap (Brauner 1981; Rosenberg
1988).
Both Schumann and Mahler were fascinated by the key literary figures of German
romanticism for whom irony was such a central strategy. In the case of Schumann, as John
Daverio underlines, irony is not only indebted to literary models, but conceived in literary
terms, making Schumann ‘perhaps the first [composer] in Western musical history to view
the art of composition as a kind of literary activity’ (Daverio 1997, i). His models were most
obviously E. T. A. Hoffmann and Jean Paul Richter, but where other composers adapted
Hoffmann’s stories or took on some of the insights of his music criticism, Schumann’s
music demonstrates a real kinship in terms of narrative technique and aesthetic form. 7 Their
shared sense of aesthetic self-awareness is manifest in the ways in which texts problematize
themselves – as in various forms of authorial intrusion into the apparently autonomous
world of the story itself, moments when the fictional world is broken into by the normally
invisible author.
Schumann has several ways of achieving this effect of a divided voice. One is his use of
quotation, either literally (as with the return of the opening theme of Papillons Op. 2 in the
middle of the ‘Florestan’ movement of Carnaval Op. 9) or else by presenting a section of
music as if it were a quotation (as in Davidsbündlertänze , Op. 6, No. 15, where a piano
introduction is followed by what is clearly a song, aspiring to something non-pianistic
despite the fact that both are actually played by the piano). A second clear strategy for
creating ironic distance is Schumann’s use of abrupt structural discontinuities as a way of
questioning the music’s own formal propositions. Just as Hoffmann’s narratives are marked
by sudden, violent moments of breakthrough between the everyday world and a fantastical,
spirit world, so Schumann’s music shows a parallel fascination with formal dislocation. The
opening sequence of pieces in Papillons (1831), for example, presents a series of tiny pieces,
disjunct with respect not only to key but also to musical style, gesture, texture and tempo.
The sequence of separate sections imposes a kind of form and implies a certain logic but at
the same time suggests something contingent, as if these fragments might have been ordered
quite differently. By such strategies, as Heinz Dill underlines, ‘the creative process itself
becomes thematic, i.e., the content of the work of art is art itself, or, more precisely, the
making of art’ (Dill 1989, 178). This structural discontinuity is often marked by Schumann’s
designation of a passage as an ‘intermezzo’, sometimes functioning like a ‘trio’ by being
combined with a scherzo. It thus corresponds to the original idea of an intermezzo as an
episode that ‘comes between’ other sections, but its provenance in opera buffa is significant
here, and thus its direct link to the appearance of commedia figures in eighteenth-century
operatic intermezzi . In his Intermezzi , Op. 4 (1832), Schumann presents a whole collection
of short pieces that were traditionally understood to come between larger more serious
pieces, signalling a deliberately tangential perspective, avoiding direct statement in favour of
displacement. In this insistence on diversion, Schumann’s music famously signals a
preference for allusion, masks and fictional identities, a play with language that is explicitly
historical. The first piece of the Intermezzi , for example, begins with a grand, rather sombre
piece of quasi-canonic baroque counterpoint, complete with double-dotted rhythms.
However, its studied historicism is answered by an unequivocally modern passage and, on a
larger scale, the piece juxtaposes this ‘baroque’ first section with a whimsical ‘Alternativo’
section replaying the same basic musical material in modern dress. One musical manner
calls the other into question; neither can safely be taken at face value.
The dangers of explaining musical irony as a product of a composer’s individual
disposition rather than in cultural and historical terms are underlined by the case of Mahler.
Although his own strategies of irony are indebted to the music of Schubert and Schumann
(most obviously the lieder), Mahler’s ironic tone has repeatedly been explained away as a
result of his own psychology, often elided with his ‘Jewish’ nature in a manner that borders
on a crude racial stereotype. This was certainly the tone of much musical criticism in
Mahler’s own time, though it now provides some fascinating historical insights for all its
distasteful elements. When, for example, the critic Max Kalbeck referred, in 1900, to
Mahler’s First Symphony as a Sinfonica Ironica he unwittingly drew attention to a tension
between genre and material in the late nineteenth-century symphony that far exceeds Mahler
as an individual; the implied contrast with Beethoven’s Eroica , intended to denigrate
Mahler’s work, points instead to a historical process (as Richard Strauss also did, with
wonderful self-irony, with his Sinfonia Domestica ). 8 Mahler was not unaware that his use
of folk materials, from his settings of poetry from Des Knaben Wunderhorn to his use of
these ‘naive’ materials in the early symphonies, would cause consternation among his
critics, to say nothing of his importing into the most hallowed form of Austro-German
instrumental music aspects of urban popular music, operetta and military marching bands. If
ever proof were required that Mahler and Bruckner took an antithetical approach to music, it
is found here, in Mahler’s multi-voiced symphonic tapestries, music (in the words of Peter
Franklin) ‘that demands to be read as if between quotation marks’ (Franklin 2001, 615). As
we saw in the example from the Rondo Burleske of the Ninth Symphony, however, the
peculiar character of Mahler’s musical irony is that the affirmation of the ideal of authentic
expression and the self-mockery of that ideal appear side-by-side (see Hefling 2001;
Johnson 2009).
For Mahler’s Viennese contemporary, the writer, editor and critic Karl Kraus, irony was a
sharp tool for cutting through the tangled undergrowth of social, political and journalistic
lies that flourished in lazy thinking and the misuse of language. For him, the negativity of
irony was not an end in itself, but a means of clearing the space to allow a more careful and
purer use of language. In his later years, one of his most popular ways of using the material
of the world to indict itself, was his ‘recital’ of Offenbach operettas (half-sung, half-spoken
performances by Kraus himself, with piano accompaniment). 9 In this way, half a century
after Offenbach’s heyday, a rather unmusical Viennese critic thus reactivated the ironic force
of Offenbach’s music which, in its own time, had attracted the admiration of no less a
philosopher than Nietzsche (who saw it as a counterbalance to Wagnerian music drama). 10
Largely ignored by the course of Austro-German music, Offenbach (a German abroad)
signals a specifically Parisian kind of musical irony which stands at the head of a long
French tradition. Debussy once referred to his ‘transcendental irony’ (Janik 2001, 113);
Saint-Saëns acknowledged him in Le carnival des animaux (1886) where the tortoise is
depicted by a massively slowed-down version of the ‘Galop infernal’ from Offenbach’s
Orphée aux enfers (1858).
Like all comic opera, Offenbach plays with the disjunctions of style and substance,
material and context. His use of the characters and iconography of classical antiquity (as in
La belle Hélène , 1864) was a tool to expose the historical pretensions of the Second Empire
of Napoleon III. His sensitivity to the comic potential of the deliberate mismatch between
contemporary popular dance music and his mythic and grand historical characters
undoubtedly follows in a long tradition of comic opera (back through Rossini to Mozart and
beyond). Amid all the satirical comedy, however, Offenbach’s work tells some incisive
truths about its age by means of its musical irony. In Orphée aux enfers , the polarization
between the state of boredom that seems to affect everyone in the opera and the ‘infernal’
headlong rush to oblivion of the dance music points, with telling accuracy, to the
contradictions of modern urban life – to its sense of accelerating time and technology
coupled with a state of emptiness and boredom. La vie parisienne (1866), which begins in a
Parisian railway station, makes this paradox its theme.
Their difficulty lies partly in an incapacity – which in itself is nothing but want of habit –
for abstract thinking; i.e., an inability to get hold of pure thoughts and move about in them
… When people are asked to apprehend some notion, they often complain that they do not
know what they have to think. But the fact is that in a notion there is nothing further to be
thought than the notion itself … The mind, denied the use of its familiar ideas, feels the
ground where it once stood firm and at home taken away from beneath it, and, when
transported into the region of pure thought, cannot tell where in the world it is.
(Hegel 1987, 7)
Hegel famously dismissed instrumental music, as Kant had before him, as similarly
unintelligible, yet this passage is striking in that it characterizes philosophy in ways that
suggest a remarkable parallel with the intellectual play of a musical tradition that not only
surrounded him, but had been sounding forth even before his birth.
It is no coincidence that the idea music might be like a language arose at the same time
that modern philosophy questioned its own adequacy as language. By the same token, the
self-conscious questioning of the limits of musical language in the twentieth century needs
to be understood in conjunction with the philosophical Sprachkritik of Mauthner, the Vienna
Circle and Wittgenstein. Bowie’s study of the relationship between music, philosophy and
modernity argues persuasively that music has a critical relationship to philosophy that
hinges precisely on its non-linguistic aspect. Musical irony may be understood as a
particular version of this, taking on attributes of language in order to bring them to self-
conscious scrutiny. This is, of course, quite different from philosophy itself, because music’s
principal means of doing this is to stage the disjunction between grammatical conventions
and their performance in particular, individual works rather than to work with concepts.
There is no better demonstration of this than the non-conceptual particularity with which
Beethoven’s music challenges the totality of the systemic whole in which his music works.
The Hammerklavier Sonata, Op. 106 (1818) announces the definitive move to a ‘late style’
even as it attempts to recoup the affirmative tone of Beethoven’s early music. The ‘heroic’
fanfare that begins the first movement reappears in quite different guise at the start of the
Scherzo, foreshortened into a simple anacrusis figure whose sequential repetitions saturate
the movement. The transition from its central Trio section is effected by a buffa interlude
(Presto, mm. 81–112) whose faux drama accentuates the comic nonchalance of the Scherzo
theme when it returns (one could imagine Leporello whistling it to himself). It is the Coda of
this movement, however, which presents the most startling act of authorial intrusion. The
peremptory close in the tonic, B major (m. 160) mirrors that of the original scherzo (m. 46),
but is now answered by an elongated play with the concluding figure in which the repeated
B s (forte) are answered, in a lower octave, by repeated B s (piano). The enharmonic
change from B to A implies a new modulation, before the bare repetition of the B in
multiple octaves becomes (apparently through sheer force of repetition) a flattened-
supertonic and falls back to B for the concluding measures. The innocuous motif, nothing
more than a weak cadential figure, is heard three times, transposed an octave higher on each
repetition until it simply evaporates (pianissimo) .
Musical Example 12.4 Beethoven, Piano Sonata, Op. 106,
‘Hammerklavier’, Scherzo, mm. 153–7 5
These few bars are emblematic of the nature, depth and significance of musical irony.
Cast in comic form, they nevertheless make audible the gap that breaks open the illusion of
the artwork as an autonomous whole. The authorial interruption of the music’s formal and
grammatical logic inscribes the presence of a divided self-consciousness, one that both
creates the work and, at the same time, underlines its own awareness of the fictive and
constructive nature of that creation. The significance of this far exceeds questions of musical
style or familiar accounts of idiosyncratic composers ‘playing’ with musical conventions.
The narrow gap between the B and the B marks a defining moment of historical slippage
between language and subject, a fissure that opens up between the functioning system and
the subject’s self-awareness of it. As such, this momentary break in musical grammar,
passed off as ironic humour, is the audible manifestation of a far deeper and more significant
fracture – one that runs all the way down to the fault-line of modernity itself.
Notes
1 The importance of genre in this respect is discussed by a number of writers, including Dubrow 1982, Kallberg 1988, Samson
1989 and Micnik 1994.
2 The most extensive study is Sheinberg 2000. There are a few book-length studies of musical irony devoted to specific
composers, including Zank 2009, Johnson 2009, Castagné et al . 2001, Celestini, 2006, and a collection of articles and
chapters (mostly referenced in the course of this article) addressing the use of irony in Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert,
Schumann, Mahler, Ravel, and Prokofiev.
3 Principally in the theoretical works of Mattheson, Koch, Sulzer, Forkel. This is discussed by Bonds 1991b and Spitzer 2004,
207–75.
4 The title of Wheelock’s book derives from a phrase in the preface to Domenico Scarlatti’s Essercizi per gravicembalo
by which the composer describes his own music.
5 The most sustained example, Longyear suggests, is the Scherzo of the Quartet, Op. 59, No. 1.
6 The Sterne quote is from Book 8, Chapter 27 of Tristram Shandy .
7 The idea of narrative in Schumann has been discussed by a number of writers, notably Newcomb 1987.
8 Max Kalbeck, Neues Wiener Tagblatt , 19 November 1900.
9 Kraus gave 124 ‘readings’ of Offenbach between 1929 and 1935. See Janik 2001, Chapters 5 and 6. See also Botstein 2009.
10 Letter from Nietzsche to Erwin Rohde, cited by Janik 2001, 113. For the original citation, see Janz 1972, 120.
11 Kaminsky suggests that the Histoires naturelles of 1906 are ‘the exemplar of literalism and irony’ in Ravel (Kaminsky 2000,
171). See also Zank 2009.
12 For more on the inverted sublime, see Downes, ‘Beautiful and Sublime’, this volume, pp. 95–7.
Preamble
All art, irrespective of how it is intended or received, has elements of autonomy character and
elements of dependency character. This is not an either–or. And likewise, all art has elements of
intrinsic value and elements of instrumental value. We may enjoy it or loathe it, but either way it
has some capacity, small or great, to transform us. There are four separate categories here, and
the balance between them constantly shifts. Yesterday, the instrumental value of an artwork may
have seemed all-important; the poet might save the world. Today, its intrinsic value may be
foregrounded; we appreciate what we now take to be its inspired pointlessness. Here, the artwork
seems to have broken the chains binding it to the social world; the painter makes her own
statement. There, its ecology is all too obvious; the social determinants of that same statement
stare us in the face. A little distance, temporal or spatial, can make all the difference.
Propaganda, more or less by definition, places the emphasis firmly on one of these four
categories, instrumental value, but not to the exclusion of the others. For one thing, any art may
be propagandized, including art that originally aspired to an autonomy character. Propaganda is
certainly about intentions, but not always the intentions of the author, nor even the intention of
the text, to borrow a formulation of Umberto Eco (1991). And for another thing, those who read,
view or listen are not bound by anyone’s intentions. However explicitly encoded, the message
may be decoded quite differently.
Even if we focus exclusively on instrumental value, we must allow a further complication. Just
where does propaganda begin? When Dickens depicted the prisons, schools and workhouses of
Victorian England, he had a mission of social amelioration; he set out to make a difference. Is
this propaganda? If we resist the label here, it may be because we have drawn a line somewhere
on the spectrum between intrinsic value and instrumental value. On one side of the line – the
Dickens side, let us say – the artwork may engage with and reflect upon a social and/or political
subject matter; it may be intended as a force for social and/or political change. Its primary
business, however, we believe, is art. On the other side of the line that subject matter is not just a
material to be elaborated; it has become the substance or content of the artwork. And to that
extent intrinsic value is occluded.
Just where we place this line is so much a matter of individual judgement that we might
reasonably question if it can have any explanatory value at all. Is it not less restrictive to accept
the relativism implicit in my opening remarks? Thus, Dickens, like Shakespeare, depended on
something like a mass market, and openly catered for that market (dependency character). Yet the
afterlife of his novels has demonstrated that they transcended this commodity status (autonomy
character). Likewise, there is no contradiction between the propaganda function of his novels
(their instrumental value) and their demonstrable aesthetic qualities (their intrinsic value).
If we consider the pedigreed usage of the term ‘propaganda’ and the connotative values it has
acquired, we may find further arguments against including Dickens, notably that propaganda is
conventionally deemed to present a one-sided, partisan picture of whatever reality is at stake; in
other words, there is an exclusion of alternative points of view. In this habitual understanding of
propaganda, the bias and selectivity in the message are tantamount to deliberate falsification.
Propaganda is viewed as antithetical to truth; it is on the wrong side of the moral argument. It
hardly helps that it is commonly associated with the manipulative strategies of mass
communication, with the traumas of war, and with the abuse of power, notably through a politics
of dictatorship, whether of the right or the left.
This negative image is so all-pervasive that it has become part of the modern definition of the
term, at least for ‘primary’ forms of propaganda, by which I mean the distortion, suppression or
censorship of information by various (usually mass) media, as well as proscriptive education and
other forms of institutionalized persuasion. Yet artworks stand at something of an angle to this
explicit manipulation of information. However much they proselytize, they represent a
‘secondary’ form of propaganda, though there may be an ontological grey area here. This chapter
will nod towards ‘primary’ forms at the end, but its principal concern will be with music and
music-making per se. Within that constraint I will try to explore the concept in a rounded way,
recognizing that negative connotations were neither there from the start nor suggested by the
etymology, where the essential link is with the propagation of values. And I will also identify
and discuss elements of propaganda avant la lettre , bearing in mind that the term entered the
language as late as the seventeenth century, that it gained widespread currency only in the mid
nineteenth century, and that a key stage in its subsequent dissemination occurred as recently as
the First World War.
It is time to take an example from music. When Beethoven composed his ‘Eroica’ Symphony
he intended it, inter alia , as cultural support for ideas of liberal humanism that were part of the
climate of social romanticism in the arts at that time; even the title has instrumental value here. 1
Thomas Sipe has demonstrated that the ‘Eroica’ was understood in just this way by many of
Beethoven’s contemporaries (Sipe 1998). Yet later in the nineteenth century the same symphony
could be read as a paradigm of ‘absolute music’. And in a present-day performance by Daniel
Barenboim and the East–West Divan Orchestra it can become propaganda for the Middle East
peace process (this before we have heard a note; it is enough to recognize who is performing and
who is on the podium). These multiple readings draw attention to a key paradox about music and
propaganda. Since it lacks referential acumen, wordless music ought to be poorly equipped to
serve as propaganda. Yet precisely that lack of specificity makes it all the easier to appropriate
for one cause or another.
We are helped in negotiating these ambiguities by terms of reference already present in the
poetics of antiquity. In particular, the concept of propaganda might be grounded in theories of
mimesis and rhetoric. Theories of mimesis allow that music may convey a message, including a
subliminal message. Yet this already introduces a problematic of meaning and of value, where
music may be either a degenerative copy of noumenal forms (incapable of truth) or an imitation
of the soul (incapable of lies); these, very roughly, represent Platonic and Aristotelian positions
respectively. Theories of rhetoric, meanwhile, shift the focus to questions of agency and
persuasion, taking us even more directly into the territory of propaganda. The devices of rhetoric
confront us directly with the space that can exist between substance and style, and between idea
and presentation. Moreover, a further consequence of this, also recognized by the ancients, is that
music – because of its affective power – can be both enabling and subversive, and thus invites
both appropriation and censorship.
Panorama
Appropriation or censorship may serve any number of causes, and only some can be explored
here. 2 Music may be appropriated or censored by a faith, and the earliest uses of the term
‘propaganda’ appeared in just this context. It may advance the interests of a nation or a would-be
nation, and did so often and volubly in the nineteenth century, at which point ‘propaganda’
began to acquire its pejorative associations. It may act as the mouthpiece of a controlling ethnic
majority, or as part of the cultural capital accrued by an ethnic minority (in which case it works
to enhance visibility). What all these have in common is that they are concerned with the play of
power, either by those who exercise it or by those over whom it is exercised. However, our
present age of mass media has found yet other uses for music. It may promote a product, sell a
lifestyle, improve our health and productivity, and recruit a cohort, to name but some. Such
blatantly commercial propaganda is also about power, but it is more about persuasion.
While the term ‘propaganda’ was coined in a modern European setting, the concept knows no
boundaries, either of time or of place. Even the most ancient empires of today’s Middle East
used cultural forms as modes of propaganda, as we know from the explicitly proselytizing stone
carvings found in the Assyrian palace of Nineveh, a celebration of royal power and a stark
warning of the price of dissent. Music leaves a less obvious material trace, given that only a
limited number of ancient civilizations and societies developed notational systems, but there is
an abundance of secondary evidence, in both written and oral histories, attesting its importance
to the powerful in earlier times, most obviously as a means of social control. In some cases,
especially in pre-modern societies, such evidence can be illuminated further by means of present-
day ethnographies.
Two brief case studies, located in different continents, will make the point. Henry Stobart has
drawn our attention to the use of music by the Incas as a means of ‘orchestrating’ the year, a
practice that continues among rural communities in the Bolivian Andes to this day (Stobart 2006,
ch. 3). He further points out that these musical calendars, determined by the selection of genres,
instruments and tunings, and closely tied to climate and crop production, were by no means
neutral. They were intimately related to mechanisms of social and religious control, and to the
reinforcement of political order and ancestral authority. The monthly ceremonies of the Inca
rulers, marked by particular song genres, instrumental groups and dances, contributed to the
establishment and maintenance of distinct social hierarchies among the subjects of the empire. In
other words, the imposition of calendars was also an imposition of power. Even today, Stobart
tells us, music continues to play a role in defining ethnic, territorial and class identities in the
Bolivian Andes, and it can further articulate a sense of an idealized past and a degenerate
present, a theme that is common to many cultures.
Compare this with Thomas Hale’s account of the Griot or Jali musicians of West Africa. Hale
informs us that the many roles of Griot musicians included praise singing as a means of
celebrating the power and ancestry of the rulers, of whose entourage they formed an essential
component (Hale 1998). Praise singing has been well documented elsewhere in Africa (Gleason
1984), but the practice of the Griots has a notably ancient pedigree in the great sub-Saharan
kingdoms to the west, and especially the gold-rich kingdom of Mali. Hale refers to written
sources that stretch back a good seven centuries to the writings of the Moroccan traveller Ibn
Battuta, who encountered Griot praise singers at the court in Mali in 1352. He goes on to
illustrate historical continuities by referencing European travel writings from the sixteenth to the
twentieth centuries. Throughout this period the musicians remained close to those who exercised
political power, and they stand as testimony to the perceived efficacy of music as a means of
upholding authority.
In authoritarian states in the modern world this role is commonly associated with an official
state style and aesthetic, with roots in either a classical or a ‘folk’ culture. This is starkly
exemplified by the changing phases of North Korean music since the political division of the
peninsula. Keith Howard identifies three such phases (Howard 1996, 2006). In the early days of
the new state, dance troupes and related orchestras, on a familiar Soviet model, functioned not
just as celebratory ballast for state occasions, sports events and mass rallies, but also as
‘propaganda squads’ designed to energize the workforce. Then, in the late 1950s, these
performance troupes yielded to the so-called Galloping Horse Movement, which worked to
eliminate all traces of elite culture and to promote indigenous creativity based on demotic
traditions, as understood and arbitrated by Kim Il Sung. Finally, from the 1970s onwards, the
juche movement formalized the ideological element in North Korean official music, such that
artists were required to reflect state policy through a ‘seed policy’ in which an ideological
element formed the kernel.
This is an extreme form of an official aesthetic, broaching no counter culture and no dissent,
and employing strict censorship to maintain the status quo. It testifies to the truism that the more
repressive the dictatorship, the more omniscient the dictator; Kim Il Sung was an expert on
music, as on everything else! However, persuasion can be more nuanced, as music history in
South Africa illustrates. Grant Olwage demonstrates how missionary choralism was used during
the colonial age as a (Foucauldian) disciplinary tool (Olwage 2005), for example, while Johnny
Clegg and Michael Drewett document and discuss some of the censorship later employed by the
apartheid state (Clegg and Drewett 2006). There was resistance to that censorship, of course, but
the resulting counter-propaganda could often be articulated safely and effectively only from
without the state; witness, with Shirli Gilbert, the role of music in ANC (African National
Congress) projects in diaspora, and in particular ensembles such as Mayibuye in the 1970s and
Amandla in the 1980s. Here a subversive black South African popular music flourished in exile
(Gilbert 2007).
Where counter-propaganda was fostered at home, it could involve both musicians and
audiences in a precarious – even a dangerous – balancing act, and it could also misfire.
Christopher Cockburn’s reception history of Handel’s Messiah in 1950s South Africa illustrates
that the musico-political tightrope was as real for white liberal audiences as for the black singers
involved in the performances of the Johannesburg African Music Society (JAMS) (Cockburn
2008). One of his conclusions is that ‘instead of helping to turn back apartheid, the JAMS
performances eventually became its victims’. In another essay in the same collection, Brett Pyper
demonstrates comparable ambivalence within the institution of the State Theatre in Pretoria
during the later stages of apartheid (Pyper 2008). In particular, he exposes the space that can
exist between the monolithic propagandizing agenda of ‘official’ institutions and the diverse,
nuanced and constantly shifting cultural practices they host.
Such reversals and ambiguities are the story of music in repressive regimes. Consider Iran.
Between the 1979 Revolution and the electoral victory of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 there was
relatively little opportunity for a culture of dissent, but Laudan Nooshin informs us that after the
legalization of popular music enacted by the reformist Khatami regime, a grass-roots
‘alternative’ music, influenced by Western rock, developed alongside the newly legalized
mainstream movement. This music acted as a channel for political dissent, and in doing so
displaced an earlier black market in ‘imported diaspora pop’ (Nooshin 2009). Nooshin discusses
this in relation to developing ideas of a civil society, the emergence of a distinctive youth culture
and the spread of the internet, but she further points out that an officially sanctioned culture
industry found ways to absorb and neutralize this critical dimension. Her case study is Arian
Band, which steered a cautious path between conformism and dissent, somehow gaining official
approval while simultaneously speaking to the concerns of disillusioned youth. In a discreet
propaganda, Arian Band, it seems, gives public voice to a promesse de bonheur . There is no
preaching, but simply by ‘reclaiming public space in the name of civil society’, the band offers a
cultural model of what a society might be.
It is worth stressing the importance of both popular music and traditional music to
propagandizing agendas, whether official or dissenting. By definition, popular music reaches the
widest possible public and it cultivates the direct emotional appeal in which propaganda tends to
trade. There are certain global patterns here. Typically, radical elements of mass culture will be
neutralized through appropriation by the status quo, and that in turn will prompt alternative
forms of subversion. Popular music, in other words, can serve several masters, but traditional
music (so-called ‘folk music’) is no less versatile and can exert a no less powerful ideological
charge. Since it supposedly embodies the voices of the ancestors, the fathers, it can stand for
stability and history in ways that can be useful to those in authority, but equally to those who
protest. Propaganda, then, often involves a play on the different meanings that can arise from
state, traditional and popular styles.
Something of this play of meanings emerges from Anna Morcom’s online article on Tibetan
music and dance since the 1950s (Morcom 2007). Morcom’s starting point is the official, heavily
‘sinicized’, state music that represented Tibet through to the 1980s, but she proceeds to
demonstrate that the relaxation of censorship during that decade led both to a revival of
traditional styles and to the importation of popular styles. In the late 1980s and 1990s this all
added up to a genuinely radical counter-culture, where music could reinforce a sense of
‘authentic’ Tibetan identity extending well beyond official prescriptions. However, the real
fascination of Morcom’s account is her suggestion that not only was this popular music
appropriated by the state in due course; a reverse appropriation also took place, in which state
styles were in turn redirected by ‘the people’, becoming forms of desirable modernity. There is
continuous slippage between style and idea in this surface play of meanings; it is a modern
version of that ancient counterpoint of which theories of rhetoric speak.
A similar play on state, traditional and popular styles has been demonstrated by ethno-
musicologists working on music in China and in its related territories. Nimrod Baranovitch, for
example, has discussed how pop/rock music was appropriated by the Chinese state through
Chinese MTV and state-sponsored pop concerts, effectively neutralizing its subversive charge
and absorbing it increasingly into the world of ‘state performing arts’, where it could acquire an
explicit propaganda role (Baranovitch 2003). Yang Mu likewise shows how traditional music has
been appropriated for propaganda purposes in China, with the academic world heavily
implicated (Yang Mu 1994; for a parallel study in Singapore, see Tan Shrz Ee 2005). The other
side of the coin is that both these genres have been able to retain a dissenting role in those
territories whose relation to China has been problematized historically. In this connection, several
scholars have examined how music has been hijacked by identity politics to generate a counter-
culture. We see something of this already in Morcom’s work on Tibet, but Nancy Guy has
presented comparable sequences for Taiwan, and Barbara Mittler for Hong Kong (Guy 1999;
Mittler 1996, 1997).
This brief global tour begs some further questions about music and propaganda. Returning for
a moment to mimesis, and to the views of Plato and Aristotle, we may note that to invoke
distortions is also to invoke essences; in other words, to examine ideologically motivated
transformations of meaning is also to interrogate truth content or authenticity. Traditional music
has been especially susceptible to the quest for authenticity. The idea that this music has survived
for centuries gives it a powerful emotional charge as a representation of strength and stability,
encouraging nostalgia for a mythic-pastoral world of conservative values, where older moral and
social orders are preserved. Yet such views risk essentialism. Lying behind them is perhaps a
fear of change, a rejection of the contemporary world and of an associated commercialism that
can be conveniently represented by highly generalized understandings of popular music. Acts of
recovery, in short, can distort the lens just as much as acts of appropriation.
Epilogue
These various case studies may enable some useful generalizations about music and propaganda.
It is clear that one mode of propaganda relies on the capacity of music first to arouse emotions
and then to channel and energize them. The issues involved in affective response are beyond my
brief in this essay, but several psychologists believe that music has the capacity to catalyze both
reductive and polarizing tendencies (positive or negative) within emotional arousal when it is
allied to particular social or political goals. 9 This is germane to propagandistic music in North
Korea and to celebratory music everywhere. Unpromising though it may seem, a comparison of
the Xenakis’s Mycenae Polytope , performed on location in 1978, and the Opening Ceremony of
the 2012 London Olympics is very much to the point; in both cases music and spectacle
celebrated nationhood by underlining historical continuities.
This mode of propaganda is no less germane to the singing of Protestant songs and hymns in
Reformation Germany. However, Protestant hymnody also reminds us that propaganda can
depend on ‘prototypicality’, meaning an appropriate ‘fit’ between music and setting, and that this
in turn can promote conformity and compliance. As Steven Brown puts it, music can thus
homogenize social behaviour within groups (Brown 2006). The success of the Xenakis polytrope
in Mycenae likewise depended on an appropriate fit and, in a rather different way, so did those
JAMS performances of Messiah in South Africa. Even the translation of traditional music into
folk music within state socialism (the folk ensembles in the Soviet bloc) might be understood in
these terms. In each case the aim is, or was, to strengthen and unify group ideologies.
Prototypicality helps the powerful to use music as a means of behavioural control: by welding
music to ritual (the Incas), by exploiting existing tastes to direct social action in determinate
ways (popular music in China) and, conversely, by censoring supposedly subversive repertories
(Apartheid in South Africa). In such instances subjects may well be unaware of the persuasion;
the propaganda may be subliminal, and this is all the more important given that it has to
overcome the inertia of pedigreed responses. One US national security directive of July 1950
spelled this out: the most effective propaganda, it reads, allows ‘the subject [to] move in the
direction you desire for reasons which he believes to be his own’ (Saunders 1999, 4). Music can
be supportive, and the Cold War politics to which the directive refers is by no means the only
relevant context. Of course, behavioural control is not always exercised subliminally. At the far
extreme from hidden persuasion we have music as humiliation and torture. This is a big, dark
and increasingly topical, subject. It can only be hinted at here, but has been discussed at length
by Joseph Moreno and Suzanne Cusick in the contexts of (respectively) the holocaust and
Guantanamo (Moreno 2006; Cusick 2006).
Propaganda may also depend on music’s emblematic value, which allows it to affirm or
reinforce the attitudes and prejudices associated with particular (e.g. counter-cultural or
subcultural) identities. By functioning as an emblem, a badge, music can play a role in
movements of protest and dissent (Western pop in Tibet and Iran). However, it can also allow
propagandists to manipulate the stereotypes, targeting particular social groups, age ranges or
genders. Almost by definition propaganda counters individuation in musical taste and encourages
a sense of pride in the group, as well as a sense of hostility towards non-members. To an extent,
‘traditional music’ and ‘classical music’ worked in this way in nineteenth-century art music, just
as ‘popular music’ works in that way in certain totalitarian regimes in the Far East today. This
was also the role of neo-folk and turbo-folk in former Yugoslavia, where group identities were
further cemented by associative links (through lyrics and videos) with negative stereotypes of
permissive sexuality and gansta violence.
In today’s world there is music ‘round the clock’. This has a bearing on propaganda, if only
because of the conventional wisdom that it numbs the senses or empties the mind, leaving us
open to subliminal suggestion. Some psychologists add a sophisticated sheen to the conventional
wisdom by referring to ‘double arousal’, where – it is argued – there is a compensatory
dimension to arousal by music and arousal by the context in which the music is experienced; if
one is high, the other will be low (North and Hargreaves 2008, 90). This might have relevance to
some of the political contexts already discussed (at a time of high tension or war, does music
need to be simple and direct?), but it is more pertinent to a dimension of propaganda that has not
been discussed at all in this chapter: music as a commercial and advertising tool. Here we invoke
what I earlier called primary propaganda, where music’s role is either entirely catalytic or
entirely parasitic. Many of the categories discussed above – prototypicality and compliance,
subliminal persuasion and group identities – map onto this context without difficulty; but
perhaps none is more apt than ‘double arousal’. We learn from empirical studies that low
involvement in the product (any toothpaste will do) allows music to propagandize efficiently.
The converse also holds, however. If we are genuinely interested in the product (I really want the
best toothpaste), we will be less swayed by the propaganda.
One of the most entertaining accounts of music in commercial environments concerns two
wine-buying studies summarized by North and Hargreaves (2008, 280). In the first study, set in a
supermarket, French wines outsold German when typically French music was played, while
German wines outsold French when typically German music was played. In the second study, set
in a specialist wine shop, sales of the more expensive wines were significantly higher when
classical music was played than when the Top 40 was played. In both studies we witness
subliminal persuasion with a vengeance. Our purchasers made a good ‘fit’ between the music
and the wine; they were suitably compliant and conformist; they subscribed to a strong sense of
group identity; and they valued the emblematic status that allows music to define the group. If
music can sell wine, it can also sell democracy, religion, nationhood and war.
Notes
1 Beethoven’s title is modest in ambition compared to a whole rash of late twentieth-century titles designed to prick our social
consciences, or – the cynic might say – to ensure that we are ‘on side’ before the music begins. A case in point is Krzysztof
Penderecki, Threnody to the Victims of Hiroshima .
2 I am grateful to Anna Morcom, Henry Stobart and Tan Shzr Ee for helpful advice on this section.
3 The Bektashi order in particular drew on local traditions of music and dance. For a case study of acculturation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, see Aščerić 2004.
4 I am grateful to Stephen Rose for advice on this section.
5 Dahlhaus 1980 has reminded us of the spurious basis of this association.
6 Frolova-Walker 2006 exposes the contradiction at the heart of this project.
7 In addition to Saunders 1999 and Carroll 2003, one might cite Beal 2006, Thacker 2007 and Monod 2005.
8 For an account of the rise and fall of Yugo-Rock, see the chapter ‘Rock Music’ in Ramet 1996.
9 Relevant here is the ‘circumplex model’ outlined by North and Hargreaves 2008, 128ff.
True virtuosity gives us something more than mere flexibility and execution; a man may
mirror his own nature in it.
(Schumann [1841] 1891, 171)
The attraction of the virtuoso for the public is very like that of the circus for the crowd. There
is always the hope that something dangerous will happen.
(Debussy 1921, 54) 1
The virtuoso slaughters the piece of music in the name of the spellbound community as an act
of atonement … in a concert, as in our dreams, the actors in the rites may exchange their roles.
Frequently we may no longer know who is being sacrificed: the work, the virtuoso or
ourselves.
(Adorno 1963, 66)
Introduction
Studying the aesthetics of virtuosity brings the researcher into direct contact with a host of
contradictory meanings and interpretations that not only cut across centuries of music-making
and virtually every style type, but also play out in other disciplines and professions, ranging from
dance and theatre to jurisprudence and theology. 2 Given this permeation of society past and
present by notions of ‘virtuoso’ and ‘virtuosity’, such an investigation must necessarily exclude
substantial plots of territory in order not to become uselessly general. In this survey of aesthetic
issues, the field of enquiry limits itself to instrumental art music, to which the lion’s share of
aesthetic contemplation has been dedicated in the last two centuries. 3 Furthermore, the chapter
invokes Liszt’s name and activities frequently: he is the jumping-off point if not focus for most
historical and current investigations of virtuosity and thus the greatest number of documents has
been assembled around his virtuosic performances; his abilities as technician and interpreter
were recognized by friend and foe alike; and the ‘Lisztomania’ of the 1840s is taken as the
progenitor of late twentieth-century crazes over virtuosi in the realm of popular music. 4
Towards a definition
Upon first consideration, the task of defining the term ‘virtuosity’ for music would appear
straightforward, for which purpose a standard music-lexical might suffice. However, the
researcher quickly becomes aware of hurdles that require negotiation. First, English-language
music dictionaries seem to possess an aversion towards addressing the practice called
‘virtuosity’, while the person of the ‘virtuoso’ receives attention (see Jander 2013; Randel 1986,
925) – more about this imbalance below. General dictionary definitions, like that in the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary – ‘great technical skill (as in the practice of a fine art)’ – do not address the
diversity and complexity of the practice. 5 However, the general public seems to know
instinctively what it should mean, so that Hollywood was able to entitle an action film Virtuosity
without any extra explanations. 6 Indeed, the concept seems to be rooted in the habitus of
Western civilization: we use it to describe artistic and sport performances, the public
presentations of teachers, clerics and other speakers, accomplishments in work contexts, and
even love-making.
Thus one might be tempted to posit that virtuosity after all does represent ‘great technical
skill’, which attaches it to a person. However, if we consider it from the perspective of
performativity, we must ask, what is the real site of virtuosity? In music we must ask, is it a
quality that a performer possesses, is it a feature of the music, or does virtuosity inhabit the act of
exercising it? In other words, is it ontological or phenomenological? Or something else again?
(See Hennion 2012, 125.) These questions have preoccupied philosophers, aestheticians,
musicologists and performance theorists from the time of Marin Mersenne’s Harmonie
universelle (1636) to Vladimir Jankélévitch (1979) and Lawrence Kramer (2001).
The historical consideration of virtuosity makes apparent another complicating issue: the
practice has not received the same valuation over the years and among its assessors. What was
initially perceived as a designation for virtue became the subject of derision in the nineteenth
century, as a powerful critique against virtuosity and its alleged shallowness – i.e. lack of
aesthetic substance – arose. The stigma associated with it has persisted in academic circles
through to the end of the twentieth century, when scholars from various performative humanistic
disciplines, including dance, theatre and music, came to realize the significance of the practice
for cultural modernity and identity formation (Smith 2002, 76). The public, however, has always
seemed to appreciate its qualities and effects, and not just as passive spectator/auditors: 7 as we
shall see, the virtuoso concert hall/stage has historically served as the site for a transfer of power
between performer and audience.
A final difficulty in defining the concept resides in the praxis of virtuosity, the exercise of the
skill that seems to characterize it. Must the virtuoso performer necessarily overcome the
limitations of his/her instrument/voice through display that invokes tropes of excess, e.g.
prestidigitation or coloratura? Or can the performance of a slow movement elicit the designation
of virtuosic, through the mastery of control and expression? Investigating the aesthetic and
practical meanings behind the concept should shed light upon its applications in such varied
contexts .
Virtuoso. (Ital.) One who feels delight in, and possesses taste for, the musical science.
(Busby 1817, 326)
It is less surprising to discover the same wording in Busby’s Complete Dictionary of Music
(1827) than to find it reprinted in the Complete Encyclopedia of Music that John W. Moore
freely adapted from Busby and published initially in 1854 (Moore 1854, 964), which was then
reissued by American publisher Oliver Ditson in 1880 (Moore 1880).
German musical lexicography presents an advanced understanding of the concept at an early
date. Thus Johann Adolph Scheibe wrote the following in 1738:
The word virtuoso is too general, for one uses it for everyone who excels in a science or an art,
and thus you always have to say a musical virtuoso or a virtuoso in music. Moreover, when
used in music, the word virtuoso usually is appropriated only for those who are excellent in
singing or playing.
(Scheibe 1745, 206) 12
German philosophers and aestheticians of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
accommodated virtuosity within their respective aesthetic systems, which at the same time laid a
rational foundation for its critique. The list of contributors to the discussions is impressive:
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, Theodor Mundt and
(later) Friedrich Theodor Vischer, among others. These figures had to account for a practice that
developed from an aesthetic ideal to a popular cultural phenomenon, occasioning a general shift
from a position that tended to regard virtuosity as a component of genius to one that vilified it as
superficial and self-serving. Thus if Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz, writing in 1807, could demand
of the artist of genius that he ‘be fully technically capable [and] accordingly possess artistic
virtuosity’ (Pölitz 1807, 23), Mundt argued in 1845 that ‘an age of virtuosity has broken out
instead of an age of art’ (Mundt, 1845, 27).
With regard to music, Gustav Schilling’s definition from 1840 typifies the term’s eventual
firm identification with performance in German-speaking Europe:
We generally use the term virtuosic for those musicians who make it their primary task to
present compositions that have already been composed, and to which end they have attained
an especially high degree of proficiency on an instrument or in singing.
(Schilling 1838, 780) 13
This was written at a time when virtuosity had become firmly established as a popular musical
practice in the concert halls and opera houses of Europe. Music from the era increasingly
reflected and encouraged the development of technical skill, although composers from earlier
periods already had challenged the practical and interpretive boundaries of contemporary
performers, with Bach’s organ virtuosity as one aspect of his activity that was noted during and
remembered after his lifetime (see Schulenberg 2013). Among others, Jane O’Dea maps out a
progression of virtuoso talent from Mozart through Paganini (O’Dea 2000, 4) whose activity as
‘violoniste extraordinaire’ (d’Ortigue 1837, 3) occupies a watershed position in the literature
about virtuosity and served as an inspiration for Liszt (Metzner 1998, 143). And, of course, it
was Liszt’s performance and music that came to define virtuosity for generations.
Arrival at a semantic consensus about the practice and practitioner of virtuosity does not imply
its widespread acceptance, however. As already observed, English critics and audiences
demonstrated general opposition to the phenomenon, even as exercised by a commanding figure
like Liszt (Wood 2010, 180–214), and certain German and French critics and aestheticians also
developed antagonistic attitudes towards the exercise of virtuosity. The opposition helped to
define its aesthetic parameters, whereby notions of excess and transgression came to define the
practice .
Literature review 14
Post-war phases
Given the critique, it stands to reason that scholarly engagement with virtuosity would defer its
appearance until such a time that performance, and in particular the performing body, would
occupy a position of respectability or at least acceptance within the academic community. Thus
Marc Pincherle’s pioneering book Le Monde des virtuoses (1961) remained an isolated
publication, even though his discussion of the phenomenon remained focused on individuals
through historical information and anecdotal accounts, in other words, did not essentially stray
from what Bronwyn Davies and Susanne Gannon and others have termed the principle of
‘collective biography’ (Davies and Gannon 2006, 1–15). Virtuosity would remain the purview of
the public sensationalist and curiosity seeker and the journalist until after the poststructuralist
turn of the 1970s, when formerly marginalized areas of investigation and the role of the body in
culture entered into scholarly discourse.
Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the earliest serious examinations of virtuosity arose (1) in
response to Liszt, (2) in France and (3) at the hands of aestheticians. Jankélévitch published the
remarkable book Liszt et la rhapsodie: essai sur la virtuosité in 1979, which assisted in the
acceptance of Liszt as a serious topic for aesthetic consideration, while at the same time
appreciating and advocating ‘the transcendence of virtuosity’ (Davidson 1998, viii). At the
beginning of the decade, musicologist/historian Robert Wangermée had already drawn attention
to the traditions governing the virtuoso in the early nineeteenth century, in the sense of a contract
with his or her public, to be manipulated by a network of interlocking interests (Wangermée
1970; see also Wangermée 1987).
Virtuosity by and large entered into German-language musical scholarship of the late
twentieth century through the study of the concerto in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 15 Most
notable among the early investigations was Tomi Mäkelä’s dissertation from 1989, which
demonstrated how virtuosity influenced compositional thought and how its immanence grounded
it within the concept of the musical work (Mäkelä 1989). Widening the field of investigation to
concerto virtuosity in all eras, Konrad Küster followed in 1993 with Das Konzert: Form und
Forum der Virtuosität (Küster 1993).
Scholars from the Anglo-American academic communities appeared reluctant to take the issue
of virtuosity up into scholarly discourse, and even more so in musicology, for quite differing
reasons, however; on the one hand, the post-war years in North American musical studies
witnessed an ever-increasing trend towards positivistic research, 16 while British musicologists
seem to have relegated such research to the work of biographers (see Allsobrook 1991; Walker
1983–96, esp. vol. 1, 1983). It is indicative of anglophone musicology that the first serious
monographs about virtuosity by a musician did not appear in print until Jim Samson’s Virtuosity
and the Musical Work: The Transcendental Studies of Liszt (Samson 2004) and the publication of
Dana Gooley’s dissertation as The Virtuoso Liszt (Gooley 2004). 17
However, an American scholar from the field of history, William Weber, laid the foundations
for the study of virtuosity in any genre through his pioneering study Music and the Middle Class:
The Social Structure of Concert Life in London, Paris and Vienna Between 1830 and 1848
(Weber 1975). Drawing on historical and sociological methodologies in interpreting the material
culture of the time, Weber established the role of the ‘popular’ virtuoso concerts in the musical
life of the newly formed alliance of the aristocracy and the upper-middle class within those three
cities. As such, he provided the first empirically based insights about the social role of the
virtuoso, anticipating later research into the history of keyboard virtuosity. 18
Moreover, two North American scholars working in disciplines outside musicology, Paul
Metzner in history and Susan Bernstein in comparative literature, authored dissertations
respectively in 1989 and 1991 that introduced poststructuralist perspectives to the figure of the
virtuoso (Metzner 1989; Bernstein 1991). 19 Metzner explored the multivalence of the term for a
wide variety of cultural activities in which the subject of the French Enlightenment could excel,
while Bernstein situates virtuosity in a nexus between music and literature, arguing for the
writings of Heine, Liszt and Baudelaire as virtuosic productions on the basis of linguistic and
literary theory. Lacking in historical details, these two studies nevertheless reflect how the
discourse around virtuosity profited from the poststructural turn – they both argued for it as a
cultural practice of far-reaching social relevance.
The 1990s brought widespread recognition of virtuosity as a key consideration in performance
studies, even as that field began to exert its influence over musicology. The interest in virtuosity
has not only persisted to the present but has intensified, with monographs, conferences and
research collectives dedicating themselves to understanding the phenomenon in theory and
practice. All but the most popular literary manifestations of the new academic ‘virtuosomania’
have shared the common feature of some degree of dependence on interdisciplinarity, i.e. on
approaches and insights from other fields of enquiry and not just the performing arts: researchers
from history, anthropology, even theology have joined the ongoing discussions.
Certain academic publications and scholars after 1990 played key roles in the development of
virtuosity as a topic for serious aesthetic study. An amalgam of historical musicologists
(especially Liszt specialists), sociologists and cultural theorists, the list of authors includes Jim
Samson, Dana Gooley, Richard Leppert, Lawrence Kramer, Cécile Reynaud, Bruno Moysan,
Antoine Hennion, Tomi Mäkelä and Thomas Kabisch. The anglophone musicological studies,
potentially the most fruitful for the aesthetics of virtuosity, fall into a rough chronology of
research that builds upon successive publications, albeit generally to the neglect of the French-
and German-language secondary literature.
Anglophone interpretations
Liszt predictably served as the starting point for the evolving discourse. After Alan Walker
established a biographical basis for his activities as touring virtuoso (Walker 1983–86)
collections of documents about his performances in various locations followed, creating a
foundation for the analysis and interpretation of his activities. Above all, Geraldine Keeling
gathered reviews of his Parisian concerts (Keeling 1986, 1987), David Allsobrook collected
documents from his English tours (Allsobrook 1991) and Michael Saffle published the copious
documentation for his concerts in Germany (Saffle 1994). The aforementioned studies by
Metzner and Bernstein would encourage and inform the interpretive work of Kramer and
Gooley, even though the Liszt chapter by Metzner amounts to little more than a critical
biography. Virtuosic musical performance (and writing about music) above all helped to
destabilize the romantic aesthetic that privileged the ineffability of music over literature in
Bernstein’s interpretation.
Bernstein’s study appeared too late to serve as a source to inform Richard Leppert’s 1999
investigation. As an Adornian, Leppert engaged with the social conditions and material culture
that shaped the virtuoso as a ‘modern’ figure who embodied and mobilized such paradoxes as
looking/hearing, passive/active, male/female, superhuman/machine and charlatan/genius. He was
particularly concerned with period representations and the visuality of the virtuoso’s performing
body, for ‘the abstract quality of artistry and paradoxical immateriality of sonority itself were
experienced and made concrete by the presence of performers and their physicality in producing
sound’ (Leppert 1999, 258). Virtuoso bodies were texts to be read by the emerging bourgeoisie,
with personal identity staged as a spectacle. Thus for Leppert virtuosity played a crucial social
role, at least during the period of the Vormärz.
In 2001, Kramer published his interpretation of Liszt’s virtuosity as the chapter ‘Franz Liszt
and the Virtuoso Public Sphere’ in his important text Musical Meaning: Toward a Cultural
History , which stresses the lived experience of music (Kramer 2001). Gooley calls Kramer’s
perspective ‘a broadly new-historical approach’ (Gooley 2004, 4) that interprets the phenomenon
through such diverse cultural practices and historical contexts as visuality, theatricality, the bal,
the carnivalesque, star celebrity and musical excess. His primary thesis argues for virtuosity as a
manifestation of the bourgeois public sphere: ‘Mingling aesthetics, entertainment, and social
transformation, virtuoso performance both summons a large public into being and pleasurably
resists social domination by replacing it with the masterful but self-expending charisma of the
artist’ (Kramer 2001, 99).
Over ten years later, Kramer would expand on the last point, elaborating on the ‘self-sacrifice’
of the virtuoso, ‘which is also his [ sic ] self-aggrandizement’ (Kramer 2012, 239). Here Kramer
develops his reading of the virtuoso body and its communicative power, although as a symbolic
body, a simulacrum that ultimately manifests itself in the listening body, i.e. the audience. This
material substance of what he calls ‘social force’ enables the public to experience the pleasure of
the Other (the performing body of the virtuoso). The concept of virtuosity as excess most
prominently links Kramer with other aesthetic models for the practice.
The texts by Bernstein, Leppert and Kramer individually – yet clearly interconnectedly –
introduced poststructuralist thought to the study of Liszt’s virtuosity – the authors regarded his
‘excessive’ performances as the sites for important cultural work among his audiences. Such
interventions would in turn stimulate further cultural interrogations of the phenomenon within
the Anglo-American academic community, although still ostensibly centred on Liszt.
Samson’s and Gooley’s more comprehensive studies of Liszt followed in the wake of this
anglophone efflorescence. That they originated independently of each other is borne out by their
thoroughly contrasting approaches and emphases: Samson provides the first detailed
interpretation of virtuosity on the basis of composition(s), in his case focusing on the
Transcendental Etudes of Liszt, while Gooley undertakes a close investigation of the contexts in
which Liszt’s publics assigned meanings to his performances. Distancing himself from Leppert
and Kramer, Samson posited that ‘a direct, close-to-the-text engagement with musical materials
is likely to prove more revealing than the seductive hermeneutics of the 1980s and 1990s’
(Samson 2004, 2).
Samson presents one of his primary tasks as that of exploring the relationship between the
event-status and the work-status of music, which underlies the tensions behind the practice of
virtuosity. His approach advocates a balance between the earlier musicological emphasis on
work-status and the more recent privileging of event-status, recognizing that in the Études Liszt
inscribed the virtuosity in the music itself. Where Samson agrees with his ‘new musicological’
predecessors (without admission) is over the aesthetics of the concert hall :
Audiences mold it [virtuosity] to their own needs. And in this respect the public concert
tapped into a rather fundamental human need, the need to admire and applaud, to experience
extremes of emotion vicariously, through a kind of secret identification with epic motifs …
(Samson 2004, 78)
Already before the appearance of his book Gooley had published an article about virtuosity,
‘Warhorses: Liszt, Weber’s Konzertstück , and the Cult of Napoleon’, in which he investigated
the military dimension of Liszt’s performances and issues of violence on the virtuoso stage
(Gooley 2000). The subsequent monograph studied the diversity of meanings that attached to his
person through a series of case studies that interrogate canonic moments from or aspects of his
performing career: the 1837 duel with Thalberg, his martial performance style, the Pest concert
of 1840, the German performances of the early 1840s, and the Berlin concerts of 1842. In each
case he situates virtuosity within a complex of cultural discourses that were in circulation in a
given place at a given time. For example, the ‘Lisztomania’ of 1842 Berlin reflected the ‘social
unwellness’ of the city’s inhabitants, which expressed itself in the excessive responses at the
virtuoso events. Gooley posits the roots of these public displays in the repressive rule of
Friedrich Wilhelm IV – the Berliners found a release in Liszt’s performing body. It is important
to remember that Gooley’s observations base themselves upon Liszt’s practice of virtuosity –
since they are so specifically geohistorically grounded, such readings may not apply to other
virtuosi of the time. 20
In Franz Liszt and His World (2006), Gooley revisits (Liszt’s) virtuosity, this time in terms of
the journalistic critique of the practice from the 1830s and 40s (Gooley 2006). There he extends
the enquiry to encompass the growing conflict between the rise of German symphonic music and
the cult of the virtuoso: an elite group of critics, informed by emerging notions of self and ego,
encouraged bourgeois perception of the individual performer’s eccentricities and of the audience
excesses he or she empowered in contrast with the collectivity and proper social decorum of the
symphony. These findings extend beyond Liszt, laying the foundations for contemporary
discourses against virtuosity.
French-language interpretations
In comparison with the American musicological approaches to virtuosity that have been
informed by cultural studies and have centred on Liszt, French scholars have further cultivated
the socio-aesthetic path of Jankélévitch in particular. Liszt may serve as a focal point, but in
general he functions as an index of the relationship between virtuosity and Romanticism.
Moreover, if Anglo-American specialists tend to produce individual studies on virtuosity, the
work of continental Europeans – especially German scholars – has appeared in anthologies,
typically conference proceedings volumes.
Indeed, the first substantial French contribution to the subject after Wangermée and
Jankélévitch was a wide-ranging collection of essays, Défense et illustration de la virtuosité
(Penesco 1997). The volume’s pioneering comprehensive approach to virtuosity established a
precedent that no ensuing anthology was able to match, in terms of time frame (from the Middle
Ages to the end of the nineteenth century), nationality (French and Italian), performance vehicle
(piano, voice, violin) and mode of reception (composition, theoretical writing, press review) .
Cécile Reynaud’s scholarly activity has interrogated virtuosity from diverse perspectives,
including its meanings for French Romanticism and its critical reception and social impacts. The
monograph Liszt et le virtuose romantique (Reynaud 2006) follows her 2001 dissertation and the
special ‘virtuosity’ issue of the journal Romantisme: Revue du dix-neuvième siècle (2005) that she
edited. Like Bernstein’s work, the dissertation examines the encounter of music and literature as
realized through the figure of the virtuoso, with special emphasis on the aesthetics of
instrumental music and the emergence of autonomy. Reynaud regards the virtuoso (and
virtuosity) as the product of a singular conjunction of an aesthetics, a technology (the instrument
of the piano) and a type of individual. In discussing Liszt, Reynaud extends the concept of
virtuosity to non-performance contexts, so that for her he also occupies the role of virtuoso
composer, transcriber and reader.
The aforementioned collection reflects Reynaud’s own wide-ranging interest in the early
nineteenth-century in France, especially with regard to cultural Romanticism. Her contribution
argues for a reading of virtuosity that regards it as an escape for Liszt and Paganini away from
the critique of the times and towards a transcendent Romanticism (Reynaud 2005). Other authors
profitably examine literary constructions of virtuosity: Éric Bordas argues for the application of
the designation to French novels of Romanticism (and not just poetry; Bordas 2005); Sylvie
Jacq-Mioche reads the early nineteenth-century literature on ballet virtuosity as a balancing act
between aesthetics and moral concepts (Jacq-Mioche 2005), and Moysan finds in it contradictory
elements of modern subjectivity (solism and decentredness; Moysan 2005).
Moysan, who has devoted most of his academic career to Liszt research, developed his
thoughts more fully in the study Liszt virtuose subversive (Moysan 2009). This sophisticated
analysis of Liszt’s virtuosity draws upon the advances of American cultural studies approaches,
but focuses on the concept of ‘fantaisie’ as the nexus for music, politics and social life, played
out through a negotiation between performer and audience. According to Moysan, Liszt
introduced a set of codes that subverted those in force at the time, thereby adopting the role of
social reformer – at the same time, the ambiguity of instrumental music allowed him to practice a
hidden commentary on stage.
Most recently, Antoine Hennion has produced a set of reflections on virtuosity that reintroduce
certain fundamental questions to the discussion (Hennion 2012): is it in the performance, or in
the music, or somewhere else? Does it serve its own purposes or is it in service of a work? Does
it ‘hide art by very art’ (Hennion 2012, 128)? After reviewing the aesthetic terms for the
possibility of virtuosity, he comes to the conclusion that the traditional, classical separation of
work and performance will not allow for a viable virtuosity. Rather, its effects should be sought
in the fusion of creation and execution, whereby he points to jazz as the quintessential virtuosic
art form.
German-language interpretations
It is interesting to observe how the most substantial German contributions to the discussions over
virtuosity after 1990 adopted the form of essay collections and a major research project. This
situation undoubtedly arose from several different factors, both aesthetic and practical: German
musicology historically undervalued Liszt and virtuosity (for the reasons Gooley articulated in
2006), the Habilitation requires a study on a topic other than that of the dissertation (thereby
discouraging continued research on a given subject), and the Deutsche Forschungs-gemeinschaft
has traditionally promoted larger projects and conferences .
Just one year before the appearance of Penesco’s collection, the Basler Jahrbuch für
historische Musikpraxis published its 1996 issue as ‘Virtuosität und Wirkung in der Musik’. A
scholarly journal devoted to historical performance practice suited the topic of virtuosity quite
well, and the issue did introduce specialized perspectives on the practice and its practitioners,
although the coverage was uneven (two essays on Clara Schumann) and the publication lacked
any broader engagement with the topic. Perhaps most significant for the aesthetic question was
Erich Reimer’s essay ‘Der Begriff des wahren Virtuosen in der Musikästhetik des späten 18. und
frühen 19. Jahrhunderts’ (Reimer 1996).
Starting five years later, three other anthologies appeared in succession, none of them
representing an effort to systematically examine the topic (such a collaborative study remains a
desideratum for musicological literature). The earliest, Virtuosen: Über die Eleganz der
Meisterschaft—Vorlesungen zur Kulturgeschichte (2001) resulted from a series of lectures at the
Herbert von Karajan Centrum, Vienna (Fleiß and Gayed 2001), and the broader topics adopt a
wide-ranging set of methodologies in the hands of five authorities from divergent disciplines (see
Riethmüller 2001; Saïd 2001). Most relevant and innovative is the contribution by Albrecht Betz,
who calls on Adorno and Canetti to respond to Nietzsche’s severe critique of virtuosity in
Menschliches, Allzumenschliches ( Human, All too Human ) (Betz 2001).
However, by virtue of the number and diversity of contributions, Musikalische Virtuosität from
2004 covers the most substantial territory among these German-language collections. Above and
beyond the case studies for the practice in the hands of individual composers such as Chopin,
Schumann and Mendelssohn (and not Liszt), the volume’s authors present virtuosity in its
historical, social and cultural contexts, largely in central Europe. Musikalische Virtuosität
significantly expands the sphere of topic areas in the academic discourse around virtuosity:
Cornelia Bartsch (2004) considers the historical gendering of performers, virtuosi and the
concert experience; Linde Grossmann (2004) queries the factors behind the pedagogy of
virtuosity; Reinhard Kopiez (2004) empirically explores the relationship between virtuosity and
human physiology; and Peter Wicke (2004) changes the conversation to deal with popular music.
As such, the volume reflects the array of traditional and newer interpretive approaches the
researcher can bring to the topic, each invoking a different set of aesthetic premises.
Its breadth of topics notwithstanding, Musikalische Virtuosiät remains grounded in the musical
practice and practitioner. In contrast, Virtuosität: Kult und Krise der Artistik in Literatur und
Kunst der Moderne (Arburg et al . 2006) returns the discussion to an interdisciplinary level, and
more evenly represents the field of inquiry. While the essays do not interject new viewpoints into
the ongoing academic debates about virtuosity, the wide chronological span affords observations
into the twentieth century, especially from the turbulent years of the Jahrhundertwende.
Possibly the most ambitious and most broadly interdisciplinary research undertaking regarding
virtuosity was the subproject ‘Die Szene des Virtuosen: Zu einer Grenz-Figur des Performativen’
within the Sonderforschungsbereich Kulturen des Performativen of the Freie Universität Berlin.
Established in 1999 (and terminated in 2010), the special research area sponsored a variety of
activities in connection with its overall theme and its individual subprojects, which included the
topic of the virtuoso. The collaborators on virtuosity presented conferences, workshops and
publications, the most significant results of which was the final conference and its proceedings
(Brandstetter 2012). Topics of contributions ranged from chess and cooking to hiphop and
‘Guitar Hero’, reflecting the all-embracing conception of the organizers: ‘What is virtuosic?
Everything that so elevates that for one it leads to self-improvement, the other is stunned,
enthusiastic, and motivated to break out into applause – or into pandemonium and protest.’ 21
That not the star performer alone but the performance of virtuoso and audience serves as the site
for both affirmation and contestation of tastes, values and ultimately politics across disciplines
and their practices emerges as one of the group’s most significant contributions to the discussion:
Last but not least, this dynamic of attestation or contestation of excellence makes apparent
how the proof of the virtuoso never establishes itself through the singular figure alone, but
rather always in a scene of reciprocal experiential intensification with an audience. 22
Aesthetic issues
The review of literature reveals high levels of aesthetic contestation over the concepts of
virtuosity and virtuoso, which precludes any essentialist definition or even agreement on
common features. Indeed, cultural contradictions seem to underlie the aesthetics of virtuosity, to
the extent that it thrives in a set of dialectics between dualisms such as centre and periphery, high
and low, and spirit and substance. That the emergence of paradoxical terms like these
accompanied the historical rise of virtuosity is understandable, for it challenged traditional
aesthetic concepts of value, constructions of identity and modes of social propriety. Yet just this
contested practice has also resulted in pleasure and empowerment among its audiences, and (to a
limited extent) has contributed to the democratization of the concert hall.
If the composition has, as it were, objective solidity so that the composer himself has put into
notes only the subject itself or the sentiment that completely suffuses it, then the reproduction
must be of a similar matter-of-fact kind. The executant artist not only need not, but must not,
add anything of his own, or otherwise he will spoil the effect. He must submit himself entirely
to the character of the work and intend only to be an obedient instrument … If … art is still to
be in question, the executant has a duty, rather than giving the impression of an automaton …
to give life and soul to the work in the same sense that the composer did. The virtuosity of
such animation, however, is limited to solving correctly the difficult problems of the
composition on its technical side and in that process avoiding any appearance of struggling
with a difficulty laboriously overcome but moving in this technical element with complete
freedom. In the matter not of technique but of the spirit, genius can consist solely in actually
reaching in the reproduction the spiritual height of the composer and then bringing it to life.
(Hegel, cited in Hunter 2005, 362 )
Here, in rather clear and concise formulation, we encounter the ideal of virtuosic performance
that would predominate musical discourse to the present: the submission to the composition, the
merging with the composer’s spirit, the genius of communicating that spirit to the audience, the
deployment of technical skill (in the service of the work) and the avoidance of extraneous
additions. The seeds of the critique of virtuosity are readily evident in the passage; such were the
standards by which future virtuosi would be assessed and by which many, including Liszt, would
fail for subsequent generations of aestheticians and critics.
Carl Lommatzsch’s transcriptions of Schleiermacher’s aesthetic lectures (published in 1842)
likewise associated virtuosity (in any art) with a high degree of accomplishment, but regarded
the work as occupying a position of productive tension between ‘genius’ ( Genialität ) and
virtuosity. Schleiermacher’s thought moreover accounted for a ‘one-sided’ ( einseitige ) and
‘mechanical’ ( mechanische ) virtuosity, concepts that would prominently figure in the censures
of the practice. Friedrich Theodor Vischer’s Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen: Die
Kunstlehre from 1851 maintains the dialectic between creative genius and reproductive virtuosity
(‘the virtuoso is not a producing artist’; ‘Der Virtuos ist nicht produktiver Künstler’), yet allows
for a bridge through performance, whereby ‘he immerses himself fully in the spirit of the
composition and, through all of the moments and motions of his performance, brings it to full
expression’ (Vischer 1846, 117).
This perception of virtuosity as the domain of the reproductive artist has dominated the
popular and academic discourses surrounding it for over two hundred years. Attempts to dislodge
the phenomenon from this artist-centred position have concentrated on reintroducing the work
concept into performativity, which ‘draws the performer right into the heart of the work’
(Samson 2004, 2). Such a construction recognizes and ostensibly eliminates the prospect of
technical proficiency masquerading as virtuosity, a concern articulated by aesthetician and critic
alike since the late eighteenth century. While it is possible to push virtuosity from music’s event-
status towards its work-status (see Samson 2004), one runs the risk of reducing the practice to
velocity and associated techniques, which leads Hennion to aver that ‘Schumann’s pieces or, in a
less unambiguous way, those of Chopin are not virtuosity pieces’ (Hennion 2012, 131).
However, if virtuosity consists in a high degree of facility and interpretive ability, why should a
moving, fully proficient presentation of a slow movement – devoid of ornaments – not be
considered virtuosic? For example, Liszt’s (concert) transcriptions of songs by other composers
like Schubert and Robert Franz often hewed close to the originals, i.e. without extraneous
ornamentation, and yet are reported to have exercised a profound effect on their auditors. 23
With regard to the audience, Brandstetter, Bandl-Risi and van Eikels compellingly argue that
virtuosity and the virtuoso only acquire meaning when, ‘in a scene of reciprocal experiential
intensification with an audience’, practice-room heroes must prove themselves on stage. 24 The
high-level performer not only pleases the public through mastery of the notes and their
expression, however; audience members have historically reported some form and degree of
corporeal and/or psychic empowerment through the experience of virtuosity. 25 Few
aestheticians or musicologists have considered the actual dynamics of the virtuoso concert hall,
with the exception of Kramer. Popular music scholars may have more intensely studied the
practice, yet other than Rob Walser’s studies in which he addresses physiological responses to
volume and distortion, 26 their tendency as well has been to regard dexterity, precision and
amplitude (among other features) as markers of a virtuosity that mysteriously impacts its
listeners. Kramer explains ‘ecstatic fandom’ through the public’s co-experience with the artist,
who disseminates him- or herself as a gift to the audience and ‘through whose body and its
appendages each spectator [ sic ] sees and loves himself [ sic ]’ (Kramer 2012, 241).
Thomas Wartenberg provides an alternative interpretation for audience-celebrity interactions,
a transaction of power that can apply to the virtuoso experience as well: the public ultimately
responds to the virtuoso’s exercise of power, as personality, as technician, as interpreter
(Wartenberg 1990). Sociologists conceptualize relations of power as a continuum, ranging from
domination to liberation (see, for example, Freire 1985). Wartenberg’s paradigm identifies what
he calls transformative power relationships, which rely on the development of trust within the
subordinate agent (person acted upon) towards the dominant agent (actor):
In this power relationship, the dominant agent encourages the subordinate agents to develop their
own potential, empowers them. This also describes the power of virtuosity, wherein audience
members give themselves trustingly over to the dominant agent of the virtuoso, for the purpose
of their own transcendent empowerment. Wartenberg uses the concept of ‘superposition’ of
agents to describe these relationships, which for virtuosity can metaphorically join dominant and
subordinate agents (performer and listener) in the experience of musical performance. This
translates not only into narcissistic jouissance , but also into social outcomes; as Kramer
suggests, ‘The audience becomes a material embodiment of social force as such but only insofar
as its members surrender themselves unconditionally to the virtuoso’s transfiguring
presence’(Kramer 2012, 219). Richard Taruskin posits an enunciatory role for the virtuosic artist
of the romantic era: ‘The virtuoso would become a sublime, rabble-rousing orator on behalf of
social progress’ (Taruskin 2009, 265). 27
The same transformational experience has occurred since the nineteenth century in the face of
virtuosity. Although the effect on the audience may be transitory – much like Bakhtin’s carnival
(Bakhtin [1941] 1984) – its social benefits cannot be disavowed, at least as a temporary
liberation from oppressive economic, social and cultural conditions at a given time (Deaville
1998). Whether the professional observer (i.e. critic, composer, performer) labels the results
‘ravishing virtuosity’ (Bie 1899, 75) or marks the presentation of a ‘tawdry virtuoso’ (Britten
[1952] 2003, 116), the success or lack thereof ultimately inhabits the domain of the audience
whose response – contingent upon multiple factors within individuals – will arbitrate in a given
context, and then not uniformly. Most commentators presume a unitary crowd reaction to a
virtuoso performance, yet between the antipodes of approval or disapproval exists a whole range
of responses available to each person in the hall, even if fellow audience members may influence
a collective response.
Undoubtedly, the salutary effects of virtuosity upon the general public have led to its
continuing popularity, even at times when the mandarins of taste have inclined to renounce the
practice as shallow and vainglorious, as in the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. 28
The reception of virtuosity has also varied according to the vehicle of dissemination; the attitudes
in the daily press reflect those of its consumers, which are generally favourable, while those in
music journals and professional publications are apt to adopt a more cautious position on the
virtuosity of an artist. The most critical voices may have been those in the scholarly literature
until about 1990, when such performance began to come into its own as a historical (and current)
cultural practice.
The virtuoso performer also performed a self, a public persona uniting expressive power and
sensitivity with celebrity. The result of this union was to incorporate excess into the very field
of social relations meant to restrict excess: the excess on the one hand of the performer as a
charismatic exception to whom all things are permitted and the excess on the other hand of the
spectator drawn into the licensed intoxication of ecstatic fandom.
(Kramer 2012, 231 )
He proceeds to explain the process whereby the transfer of power and pleasure takes place, a
transaction and communication that call to mind Wartenberg’s transformational power, only here
involving an undifferentiated mass audience in the sense of a ‘social totality’: 32
The virtuoso body is like a battery charged with the shock of the unknown; the function of the
virtuoso performance is massive discharge – a public transference of cathexis, understood to
pass from the interior of the virtuoso to the interior of the audience … The body of the
Lisztian virtuoso pushes its capacity to channel overwhelming force to the outer limit of
possibility … The virtuoso’s self-sacrifice, which is also his self-aggrandizement, allows the
audience in some degree to possess the performer by focusing on bodily part-objects and thus
to take possession of the Other’s pleasure.
(Kramer 2012, 238–9)
In a discussion of the dancer Oguri, Judith Hamera draws on a different metaphor to embody
the excess of virtuosity: the monster. ‘The virtuoso as sacred monster rewrites plots of possibility
for other bodies even while demonstrating the inability of other bodies, including those of critics,
to execute this virtuous discipline themselves’ (Hamera 2000, 149). Yehudi Menuhin first
described the extraordinary body of the virtuoso as a ‘sacred monster’ 33 , and that image well
captures another paradox of the virtuoso – superhuman/freak.
While the trope of ‘virtuosity as excess’ dominates the interpretive realm for somatic cultural
practices, within that discourse resides another potential reading of the literary and visual
records, quite the opposite to the virtuoso as superhumanly endowed hero: the virtuoso as non-
normate in the sense of a ‘freak’ and a model of disability. Some performers were visibly
disabled, which invited comment: Maria Theresia Paradis ‘was presented as a freak – a
performer who was young, female, foreign, and blind – in her tours to Paris and London. The
public that paid to hear and gawk at these performers connected their prodigious musical abilities
to something “alien” about them – their nationality or youth or handicap’ (Parakilas 2002, 65).
Of course, the tortured, deteriorating body of Paganini with all of its virtuosic skill performed the
freak-genius paradox of virtuosity, in his case enabled and empowered by a mythical allegiance
with the forces of darkness. In contrast, able-bodied virtuosi like Liszt came to represent physical
excess in performance that transcended the corporeally possible, and thus likewise satisfied the
voyeuristic demands of his audience, yet were coded as disabled in various cultural for a; for
example, caricatures regularly presented virtuosi like Liszt, Thalberg and Gottschalk as
possessing too many fingers or hands. Whether displaying and performing bodies of lack or
excess, the extraordinary body of the virtuoso has become the site for verbal or visual images
drawn from the rhetoric surrounding disability, like the Washington Post review of Hilary Hahn
that compared her to a ‘freak of nature’ (Battey 2011) or the commentator from the BBC who
wrote about the ‘virtuoso contortions’ of jazz saxophonist Courtney Pine (Longley 2012).
Closing remarks
As this chapter has revealed, the phenomenon of virtuosity is revealed in performance; whether
recording can capture that aura remains to be determined, Glenn Gould’s practice and aesthetics
notwithstanding. The polysemous nature of virtuosity has ensured that generations of performers
and audiences will assign it diverse meanings, according to collective contexts and individual
identities. Its paradoxical character bears out the innate multivalence of the concept, which,
despite over three centuries of reflection, still resists clear definition. Still, the study of the
practice and practitioner does suggest some common ground, even if delimited by its contested
aesthetic status. Virtuosity is a product of performance, bringing one or more exceptional
interpreting bodies into communication with an audience that undergoes an extraordinary
experience through that mediation.
A number of virtuoso- and virtuosity-related issues remain to be explored by the academic
community. First among them is the ‘Liszt problem’: until we move away from Liszt and his
audience as the templates for analysis, 34 we will not be able to arrive at a more comprehensive
understanding of the phenomenon. Gooley and Moysan stress the unique character of Liszt’s life
and activity as virtuoso, and yet his practice becomes the standard by which the meanings behind
that designation are studied. What about Kalkbrenner, Pixis or Hummel, among many other
‘average’ piano virtuosi of his day, let alone the thousands since then, in different styles and on
diverse instruments and voices and as conductors?
Questions of gender and sexual identity have scarcely entered into discussions of the topic,
where Clara Schumann may be mentioned from an historical perspective, but any possible
inherent differences encoded in the performance and the reception of female virtuosos have not
yet received attention, across style boundaries. This also applies to women audience members
and their responses to male and female virtuosic performers/performances, again, whatever the
style.
Indeed, the audience of virtuosity remains a fruitful field for study, and this includes in
particular cognitive research in performance venues, whereby somatic responses could be
empirically measured and compared. One question that such a methodology could help answer
would address differing abilities of perception among audience members, which could reflect
varying levels of listening ability or attentiveness and lead to identifying a ‘virtuoso
spectator/auditor’ if such exists. Another aspect of audience research is the extent to which
technology mediates and modifies the experience of virtuosity. Are recorded audio-only
performances truly regarded as less virtuosic? Do older audio recording techniques hinder the
listener’s appreciation of exceptional talent? Do video tapes and DVDs (and televised
performances) also provide a reduced experience?
Finally, researchers should seriously examine figures who have historically occupied the
borderland between virtuosity and charlatanry (and not Liszt, whose superior talents were never
a matter for debate). Liberace, for example, billed himself as ‘Liberace – the most amazing piano
virtuoso of the present day’ (Pyron 2000, 79), while the followers of saxophonist Kenny G like
to brand him as a saxophone virtuoso. 35
This last topic leads back to the narrative of the virtuosic as solitary, Byronian artist,
struggling against the elements and the gods, who disperses his/her remarkable favours over an
undifferentiated mass of humanity. As Hamera remarks, however, ‘there is another possibility.
That is: to abandon the singular hero-story of virtuosity entirely in favor of a bracing love story
between artist and critic [i.e. public] in which each remakes the other’ (Hamera 2000, 151).
Therein may reside the true mystery and miracle of virtuosity.
Notes
1 ‘L’attrait qu’exerce le virtuose sur le public parait assez semblable à celui qui attire les foules vers les jeux de cirque. On
espère toujours qu’il va se passer quelque chose de dangereux …’
2 My sincere gratitude to those who have directly and indirectly assisted in the preparation of this chapter, including editor
Stephen Downes (Royal Holloway), colleagues Dana Gooley (Brown University) and Richard Leppert (University of
Minnesota), and particularly graduate student Agnes Malkinson (Carleton University), whose expert bibliographic work
facilitated the study’s completion. Unless indicated otherwise, the translations are by the author.
3 Hennion 2012, Miller 2009, Walser 1993 and Wicke 2004 have established the aesthetic parameters for virtuosity in jazz and
popular music, which differ in significant aspects from those for art music.
4 Ken Russell’s 1975 film Lisztomania makes the connection tangible through the casting of Roger Daltrey as Liszt.
5 ‘Virtuosity’, in Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary . Available at: www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/virtuosity
(accessed 23 January 2013).
6 The film was released in 1995, directed by Brett Leonard and featuring Denzel Washington and Russell Crowe.
7 Since looking and listening are equally crucial components of the virtuoso experience, this chapter will adopt the compound
term ‘spectator/auditor’ for the audience act of consuming virtuosity.
8 See, for example, Alsted 1664 in which he observes in the unpaginated ‘To the Reader’, ‘I know that all Virtuoso’s will
encourage those things which conduce to the Improvement of any ingenious art’.
9 ‘Cette Superiorité de genie, d’adresse ou d’habilité, qui nous fait exceller soit dans la Théorie, soit dans la Prattique des beaux
Arts.’
10 ‘un excellent Peintre, un habile Architecte’.
11 ‘mot emprunté de l’italien, qui signifie, Un homme ou une femme qui a des talents pour les beaux-arts, et particulièrement
pour la musique’. Institut de France, Dictionnaire de l’Académie française , 6th edn, Vol. 2 (Firmin-Didot frères, 1835, 941).
This definition represents a version of one already in circulation in France during the mid-eighteenth century, as exemplified
by Supplément au dictionnaire universel français et latin … (Nancy: Pierre Antoine, 1752): ‘Mot emprunté de l’Italien, pour
dire, Un homme ou une femme qui ont des talens pour les Arts, comme la Musique, la Peinture, la Poésie, &c.’, col. 2309.
12 ‘Das Wort Virtuose ist zu allgemein/denn man sagt es von allen, die sich in einer Wissenschaft oder Kunst besonders hervor
thun; und man müste also allezeit sagen/ein musicalischer Virtuose, oder ein Virtuose in der Music … Ueber dieses wird auch
das Wort Virtuose, wenn es in der Music gebrauchet wird, am meisten nur denjenigen beygeieget, welche etwan im singen
oder spielen vortreflich sind.’
13 ‘Virtuos nennen wir gewöhnlich denjenigen und jeden solchen Musiker, der sich vornehmlich den Vortrag bereits
componirter Tonstücke zur Aufgabe macht, und zu dem Ende einen besonders hohen Grad von Fertigkeit auf einem
Instrumente oder im Gesange erworben hat.’
14 The following review surveys publications in three language groups – English, French and German – which correspond to the
most substantial bodies of primary and secondary sources about virtuosity. As will become apparent, they also represent
distinct cultures of reception for the practice.
15 Already in the 1970s Friedhelm Krummacher had published a short essay on this approach to the topic (Krummacher 1974).
16 Leon Plantinga did publish an article about Clementi’s virtuosity and the ‘German manner’ in the Journal of the American
Musicological Society in 1972, but there the practice represents an ostensibly shallow approach to music from which the
composer Clementi developed into a style of harmonic and contrapuntal complexity (Plantinga 1972).
17 Gooley’s Princeton dissertation from 1999 was entitled ‘Liszt and his Audiences, 1834–1847: Virtuosity, Criticism, and
Society in the Virtuosenzeit ’.
18 Both Weber and Kenneth Hamilton would carry on the investigations into virtuoso repertoire as reflected in concert
programs. See Weber 2009, in particular Ch. 5: ‘Convention and Experiment in Benefit and Virtuoso Concerts’, 141–168, and
Hamilton 1998.
19 Bernstein’s dissertation appeared under the same title from Stanford University Press in 1998.
20 Although it may sound oxymoronic, the ‘average virtuoso’ finds no place in the work of Gooley or other anglophone authors.
21 ‘Was ist virtuos? Alles, was sich so sehr steigern lässt, dass jemand es darin zu einer Vortrefflichkeit bringt, die andere
verblüfft, begeistert, dazu motiviert, in Beifall auszubrechen—oder auch in Tumult und Protest.’ ‘Prekäre Existenz’ Call for
Papers, 2010. Available at: www.bewegungsforschung.de/pdf/ankuendigung_szene_des_virtuosen.pdf (accessed 23 January
2013).
22 ‘Nicht zuletzt wird in dieser Dynamik der Attestierung und Bestreitung von Exzellenz sichtbar, dass sich die Evidenz des
Virtuosen nie durch die singuläre Figur alleine, sondern immer in einer Szene wechselseitiger Steigerung mit einem Publikum
herstellt.’ Ibid .
23 The best source about Liszt’s transcriptions is Kregor 2012. Even Liszt’s nemesis Eduard Hanslick has to recognize that his
transcriptions were ‘epoch making’ (Hanslick 1869, 336).
24 This raises the question of whether a performer can acquire the reputation of a virtuoso exclusively from the recording studio,
which seems unlikely in the modern performance tradition: even Glenn Gould initiated his career as a concert artist.
25 See Williams 1990 for a compendium of reports about the ‘transcendental’ effects of Liszt’s virtuosity, and not just from
published reviews; he also includes diary entries and letter passages by the virtuoso and his contemporaries among the
documents.
26 Walser 1993, 45. His third chapter, ‘Eruptions : Heavy Metal Appropriations of Classical Virtuosity’ (57–107) is particularly
noteworthy for its detailed examination of specific virtuosic practices in heavy metal and their effects.
27 Taruskin’s invocation of ‘the sublime’ may or may not reference David Nye’s work on the ‘technological sublime’, but Nye’s
concept of a sublime that ‘permitted both the imagination of an ineffable surplus of emotion and its recontainment’ certainly
could apply to the experience of virtuosity (Nye 1994, 282).
28 As Burk 1918 noted, ‘[the] public flocks to the lure of billboards and world renown, pays enormous sums, and beholds, in
puerile wonderment and delight, feats which dazzle, and leave in their wake little more than a tingle of stupefaction.’
29 See, for example, Bohlman 1993, especially 411–13, where he discusses the role of rap during the Los Angeles riots of 1992.
30 In their publications from the early 1990s, Susan McClary and Rob Walser appear to occupy opposing perspectives on this
issue: see Deaville 1997, 181–2.
31 Borsszem Jankó , 6 April 1873 published the set of eight caricatures of the performing Liszt by János Jankó, which illustrate
his wildly contrasting demeanours at the keyboard.
32 This concept is foundational in the social thought of Adorno.
33 Yehudi Menuhin, interview with Sixty Minutes , 21 March 1999, cited by Hamera 2000, 148.
34 For a discussion of this issue, see Deaville 2007.
35 Popular websites, including those for Kenny G himself, www.kennyg.com , and for ticket services like Ticketmaster,
http://reviews.ticketmaster.com/7171/736524/kenny-g-reviews/reviews.htm?page=24&sort=rating , document the enthusiasm
of the public, which contrasts with the dismissive tone in reviews by jazz/sax professionals.
Jeremy Barham is Reader in Music at the University of Surrey. He researches in the areas of
Mahler and early modernist culture, screen music, and jazz. His publications include Rethinking
Mahler (Oxford), ‘Mahler: Centenary Commentaries on Musical Meaning’ (guest-edited issue of
Nineteenth-Century Music Review ), The Cambridge Companion to Mahler, Perspectives on
Gustav Mahler , as well as studies of screen music in 19th-Century Music, Music and the Moving
Image and The Musical Quarterly . He is series editor of Oxford Studies in Recorded Jazz , and
is currently working on two monographs: Music, Time and the Moving Image (Cambridge
University Press) and Mahler, Music, Culture: Discourses of Meaning (Indiana University
Press).
Keith Chapin is Senior Lecturer in Music at Cardiff University. He has taught at Fordham
University (New York) and at the New Zealand School of Music (Wellington). He specializes in
issues of critical theory, music aesthetics and music theory in the seventeenth through twentieth
centuries, and in particular on issues of the sublime and counterpoint. He has been Co-Editor of
Eighteenth-Century Music and Associate Editor of 19th-Century Music . The collection of essays
Speaking of Music: Addressing the Sonorous , co-edited with Andrew H. Clark, appeared with
Fordham University Press in 2013.
James Deaville is Professor in the School for Studies in Art and Culture: Music at Carleton
University, Ottawa. He has published in the Journal of the American Musicological Society,
Journal of the Society for American Music and 19th-Century Music Review (among others), has
contributed to books published by Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press,
Princeton University Press, Ashgate and Routledge (among others), and is editor of Music in
Television: Channels of Listening (Routledge, 2011). He has published essays about virtuosity
since 1997: ‘The Making of a Myth: Liszt, the Press, and Virtuosity’, in Analecta Lisztiana II :
New Light on Liszt and His Music (Stuyvesant, NY: Pendragon Press, 1997, 181–95); ‘Liszt’s
Virtuosity and His Audience: Gender, Class, and Power in the Concert Hall of the Early 19th
Century’, in Hamburger Jahrbuch für Musikwissenschaft (1998, 281–300); ‘La figura del
virtuoso da Tartini e Bach a Paganini e Liszt’, in Enciclopedia della musica , Vol. 4: Storia della
musica europea , ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez (Einaudi: Torino, 2004, 803–25); Review-article of
Dana Gooley, The Virtuoso Liszt , in Journal of the American Musicological Society , Vol. 60,
No. 3 (2007): 666–677; and ‘A Star is Born? Czerny, Liszt and the Pedagogy of Virtuosity’, in
Beyond the Art of Finger Dexterity: Reassessing Carl Czerny , ed. David Gramit (Rochester:
University of Rochester Press, 2008, 52–66).
James Garratt is Senior Lecturer in Music and University Organist at the University of
Manchester. His publications include two monographs: Palestrina and the German Romantic
Imagination: Interpreting Historicism in Nineteenth-Century Music (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) and Music, Culture and Social Reform in the Age of Wagner
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). He has written widely on nineteenth-century
German music, aesthetics and culture, and has published numerous articles and reviews in Music
and Letters, Journal of the Royal Musical Association, 19th-Century Music Review, 20th-
Century Music , and the American Historical Review .
James Hepokoski is Professor of Music and Chair of the Department of Music at Yale
University. Exploring new ways of synthesizing the once-separate domains of music history,
music theory, and music as cultural discourse, he is the author or co-author of seven books and
has written several dozen articles on a broad range of musical topics. His book from 2006, co-
authored with Warren Darcy, Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in
the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata , won the 2008 Wallace Berry Award from the Society for
Music Theory. This was followed in 2009 by a joint dialogue with William Caplin and James
Webster entitled Form, Forms, & Formenlehre: Three Methodological Reflections (University of
Leuven Press). His most recent book is a collection of fifteen of his musicological essays from
1984 to 2008, Music, Structure, Thought (Ashgate 2009). While his current work primarily
involves exploration into Late Beethoven, his recent essays include a study of the first movement
of Brahms’s First Piano Concerto (in Expressive Intersections in Brahms: Essays in Analysis and
Meaning , ed. Heather Platt and Peter H. Smith (Indiana, 2012)) and a contribution, ‘Ineffable
Immersion: Contextualizing the Call for Silence’, to the Vladimir Jankélévitch Philosophical
Colloquy that appeared in JAMS 65 (2012). A discussion of Carl Dahlhaus’s concepts of text
and event, and their ever-persistent variants in more recent anglophone musicology, was
published in 2013 under the title The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini: Historiography,
Analysis, Criticism , ed. Nicholas Mathew and Benjamin Walton (Cambridge University Press).
Julian Horton is Professor of Music at the University of Durham. He has taught at University
College Dublin, King’s College, London, and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he held a
Research Fellowship. His research focuses on the analysis of nineteenth-century instrumental
forms, with special interests in the symphony, the piano concerto and the theory of sonata form.
He is author of Bruckner’s Symphonies: Analysis, Reception and Cultural Politics (Cambridge
University Press, 2004), editor of The Cambridge Companion to the Symphony (Cambridge
University Press, 2013) and has published in The Cambridge Companion to Bruckner, Music and
Letters, Musical Quarterly and Music Analysis . In 2012, he was awarded the Westrup Prize for
his work on first-movement form in the early nineteenth-century piano concerto.
Julian Johnson is Regius Professor of Music, Royal Holloway, University of London. He has
published widely on Viennese modernism (Mahler, Webern, Berg and Schoenberg) but his
research interests extend across the broad period of musical modernity from the late eighteenth
century to the present. His historical studies of music are always shaped by questions of musical
meaning, evident in an engagement with the philosophy of music, ideas of nature and landscape
in music, and the relation of music to the other arts (literature and painting). He was for many
years an active composer and his music has been professionally performed in Europe, the USA
and Japan. His Three Pieces for Orchestra (1992) was performed by the BBC Symphony
Orchestra and broadcast on BBC Radio 3, as was his choral work, The Kingfisher (1993),
performed by the BBC Singers. He is a regular speaker at international academic conferences –
most recently speaking in London, Cologne, Vienna, Graz, Frankfurt, Toronto, Seattle and New
York – but he has also given frequent public talks to a wider audience for the Royal Opera
House, Glyndebourne Opera, the Philharmonia Orchestra, the London Sinfonietta and on BBC
Radio 3. In 2009, he acted as Series Consultant to the Philharmonia Orchestra for City of
Dreams: Vienna 1900–35 . In 2005, he was awarded the Dent Medal of the Royal Musical
Association for ‘outstanding contributions to musicology’.
Sanna Pederson , who specializes in German music history and culture in the nineteenth
century, has been the Mavis C. Pitman Professor of Music at the University of Oklahoma since
2001. Her most recent work has been engaged with the aesthetic theories of Richard Wagner and
has eleven articles in The Cambridge Wagner Encyclopedia related to that topic. She has also
been working on the history of the term absolute music. ‘Defining the Term “Absolute Music”
Historically’ appeared in Music & Letters in 2009 and she has published elsewhere and given
many conference papers on the subject in recent years. In 2005–6 she was a Charles A. Ryskamp
Research Fellow with the American Council of Learned Societies, and was on the editorial board
of the Journal of the American Musicological Society 2007–13. Earlier work focused on the
reception of Beethoven, on which she has published with regard to nationalism, gender studies,
narrative theory and historiography. Her dissertation from the University of Pennsylvania was on
‘Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism, 1800–1850’.
Nicholas Reyland is Senior Lecturer in Music at Keele University. His research interests include
the life and music of Witold Lutosławski, narratology, screen music, affect, emotion and
embodiment, and, more broadly, the theory, analysis and criticism of music since 1900. He
published his first two books in 2012: Zbigniew Preisner’s ‘Three Colors’ Trilogy: A Film Score
Guide (Scarecrow Press) and the co-edited collection (with Michael Klein, Temple University)
Music and Narrative since 1900 (Indiana University Press). He has also published essays on
music and narrative in Music & Letters, Music Analysis, Music Sound and the Moving Image and
Witold Lutosławski Studies . He has given invited research seminars at prestigious venues,
including Cornell University, the Fryderyk Chopin Institute and the Institute for Musical
Research, written for The Guardian , been interviewed on BBC Radio 3 and appeared as a
preconcert speaker at the BBC Proms. His present projects include edited collections on analysis
and the body, and on Lutosławski’s life and music, an analysis textbook, and a series of essays
on affect, emotion and narrativity in a range of musical repertoires.
Jim Samson is Emeritus Professor of Music, Royal Holloway, University of London. He has
published widely (including eight single-authored books and seven edited or co-edited books) on
the music of Chopin, and on analytical and aesthetic topics in nineteenth- and twentieth-century
music. His books have been translated into German, Polish, Spanish and Japanese. He is one of
three Series Editors of The Complete Chopin: A New Critical Edition (Peters Edition, in
progress). In 1989 he was awarded the Order of Merit from the Polish Ministry of Culture for his
contribution to Chopin scholarship, and in 2000 he was elected a Fellow of the British Academy.
His publications include The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Music (Cambridge
University Press, 2002), Virtuosity and the Musical Work: The Transcendental Studies of Liszt
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), which was awarded the Royal Philharmonic Book Prize in
2004, and most recently Music in the Balkans (Brill, 2013). He edited a textbook with J. P. E.
Harper-Scott, An Introduction to Music Studies , and is currently preparing a co-edited volume
on ‘Greece and its Neighbours’ (with Katy Romanou) and an edited volume on Music in Cyprus.
His edition of the Chopin Ballades (Peters Edition) was named ‘2009 Edition of the Year’ in the
International Piano Awards . He is currently writing a novel set during the Greek War of
Independence.
Index of musical works, composers and performers
Alpert, Herb 34
Andriessen, Louis 251
Arian Band (Iran) 264
Ayler, Albert 197
Babbitt, Milton 10 , 58
Bach, Carl Philipp Emanuel 254
Bach, Johann Sebastian 29 , 44 , 50 , 52 , 253 , 266 ; The Art of Fugue , BWV 1080, 54 ; Brandenburg Concerto No. 5, BWV 1050,
; Fantasia and Fugue in G minor, BWV 542, 98 ; The Well-Tempered Clavier 47 , 52 – 3 , 58 , 217
Barenboim, Daniel 260
Bartók, Béla 267 ; Kossuth 67
Beach Boys, The 32 , 35 ; ‘God Only Knows’ 37 – 8 ; Pet Sounds 32 , 34 – 8
Beatles, The 34 ; Sgt Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band 33 , 36 – 7
Beethoven, Ludwig van, 7 , 12 , 25 , 29 , 32 , 34 – 6 , 45 – 6 , 51 – 2 , 69 , 87 , 93 – 5 , 112 , 118 , 150 , 151 , 157 , 205 , 247 , 253
Bagatelles, Op. 126, 242 ; The Creatures of Prometheus , Op. 43, Overture 44 ; Der glorreiche Augenblick , Op. 136, 34 ; Egmont
Overture, Op. 84, 63 , 66 ; Fidelio , Op. 72, 151 – 4 ; Piano Concerto No. 4 in G, Op. 58, 217 – 18 ; Piano Sonata in D minor, Op.
32, no2. ‘The Tempest’ 15 , 112 , 120 – 7 , 129 , 135 , 139 – 41 ; Piano Sonata in A, Op. 101, 210 – 12 ; Piano Sonata in B , Op.
106 ‘Hammerklavier’ 18 , 255 – 7 ; Piano Sonata in C, Op. 111, 52 – 3 ; Piano Sonata in F minor, Op. 2, No. 1, 117 ; Piano
Sonata in F minor, Op. 57 ‘Appassionata’, 206 – 7 ; Piano Trio in D, Op. 70, ‘The Ghost’ 205 , 219 – 20 ; String Quartet in F
minor Op. 95 ‘Serioso’ 205 , 207 , 219 – 20 , 242 ; String Quartet in F, Op. 135, 211 , 220 – 21 ; Symphony No. 3 in E , Op. 55,
‘Eroica’ 35 , 37 , 57 , 70 , 218 , 249 , 260 ; Symphony No. 5 in C, Op. 67, 35 , 36 , 42 , 86 , 89 ; Symphony No. 6 in F, Op. 68,
‘Pastoral’ 64 , 71 , 79 n.4 ; Symphony No. 9 in D, Op. 125, 14 , 43 – 4 , 47 , 87 – 90 , 94 , 135 ; Thirty-Three Variations on a Waltz
by Diabelli, Op. 120, 58 ; Violin Sonata in G, Op. 96, 242 ; Wellington’s Victory , Op. 91, 34 , 58 , 69
Benes, Jára: Die vom Rummelplatz (dir. Lamac), 230 – 1
Berg, Alban 253 ; Lyric Suite 67 ; Piano Sonata, Op. 1, 112 , 135 – 40 ; Wozzeck 164 , 250
Berio, Luciano 18 ; Sinfonia , 253
Berlioz, Hector 49 , 170 ; Harold en Italie 78 ; Symphonie fantastique 63 , 67
Berry, Chuck 7
Bejelo dugme (‘White Button’) 270
Biber, Heinrich: Battalia 69 ; Sonata violino solo representative 69
Binchois, Gilles 155
Birtwistle, Harrison: Punch and Judy 253
Bizet, Georges: Carmen 183
Blume, Friedrich 157
Bootz, Erwin: Abschied (dir. Siodmak) 231 – 2
Boulez, Pierre 10 , 58 , 189
Brahms, Johannes 54 , 63 , 112 , 118 , 248 ; Symphony No. 3 in F, Op. 90, 51 , 56 – 7 , 127 ; Symphony No. 4 in E minor, Op. 98,
Braxton, Anthony 17 , 188 , 197 – 9
Brendel, Alfred 210 – 12
Britten, Benjamin 251
Brown, James 10
Bruckner, Anton 52 , 54 , 112 , 239 , 249 , 253 ; Symphony No. 1 in C minor 31 ; Symphony No. 2 in C minor 128 ; Symphony No. 3
in D minor 128 ; Symphony No. 5 in B 112 , 127 – 35
Busnois, Antoine 155
Buus, Jacques 49 – 50
Byrd, William: ‘The Battle’, from My Ladye Neville’s Booke 69
Laibach 271
Lang Lang 289
Lassus, Orlande de 253
Liberace 292
Ligeti, György 18 , 240 , 251 ; Aventures 253
Liszt, Franz 19 , 48 – 9 , 63 , 112 , 170 , 276 , 279 – 85 , 287 , 289 – 92 ; Dante Symphony 78 ; Die Ideale 67 ; Mazeppa 51 – 2
Lully, Jean-Baptiste 157
Lutosławski, Witold: Symphony No. 4 216
McCartney, Paul 37
Mahler, Gustav 18 , 66 , 79 n.6 , 179 , 185 – 6 , 205 , 211 – 12 , 234 , 239 , 244 , 247 – 8 , 251 , 253 ; Des Knaben Wunderhorn 249
Symphony No. 1 249 ; Symphony No. 3 212 ; Symphony No. 4 212 ; Symphony No. 6, 127 ; Symphony No. 9, 127 , 216 – 17 ,
240 , 249
Mancini, Henry: Touch of Evil (dir. Welles) 22 6
Marsalis, Wynton 199 – 200
Mendelssohn, Felix 44 , 170 , 285 ; ‘Hebrides’ Overture, Op. 26, 65 ; Overture to A Midsummer Night’s Dream , Op. 21, 77
Menuhin, Yehudi 291
Messiaen, Olivier 69 , 239
Meyerbeer, Giacomo: Robert le diable 94
Monk, Thelonious 190
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 18 , 44 – 6 , 90 , 103 , 144 – 6 , 148 – 9 , 157 , 164 – 5 , 171 , 183 , 240 , 250 – 1 , 253 , 279 ; Così fan tutte
146 , 243 ; Divertimento for String Trio K. 563, 57 ; Die Entführung aus dem Serail 144 – 6 ; Don Giovanni , 146 , 243 , 253 ;
Idomeneo 151 ; Le nozze di Figaro 243 ; Piano Sonata in C minor, K. 457, 120 – 1 ; Piano Sonata in C, K. 545, 101 ; Serenade, K.
320 ‘Posthorn’ 50 – 1 , 57 ; String Quartet in D minor, K. 421, 245 ; String Quartet in A, K. 464, 243 – 4 ; String Quartet in F, K.
590, 159 – 61 ; String Quintet in D, K. 593, 245 ; String Quintet in G minor, K. 516, 245 ; Symphony No. 39, K. 543, 57 ;
Symphony No. 41, K. 551 ‘Jupiter’ 31 , 161 – 3 ; Die Zauberflöte 151
Musorgsky, Modest: Boris Godunov 48
Myaskovsky, Nikolay 270
Tchaikovsky, Pyotr 14 , 103 ; 1812 Overture , Op. 49, 69 ; Francesca da Rimini , Op. 32, 78 ; Rococo Variations , Op. 33, 103 – 4
The Sleeping Beauty , Op. 66, 103 – 4 ; Symphony No. 6, Op. 74, ‘Pathétique’ 127
Thalberg, Sigismond 291
Van Morrison 36
Vandermark, Ken 199
Vivaldi, Antonio: The Four Seasons 63 , 67 , 69
Volkmann, Robert 51
classicism 12 , 15 – 16 , 31 , 33 , 42 , 45 , 47 , 49 , 51 – 5 , 84 , 101 , 105 , 112 , 118 , 120 , 123 , 137 , 144 – 67 , 171 – 2 , 183 , 241
253 , 266 , 268 , 284 , 290
comedy 11 , 14 , 95 – 9 , 105 , 146 , 214 , 216 – 7 , 230 , 242 – 3 , 250 , 254 – 5 , 257
gender and sexuality 10 – 12 , 56 – 7 , 86 – 7 , 89 , 175 – 6 , 180 – 1 , 185 , 211 , 273 , 285 , 290 , 292
genre 4 , 12 , 15 , 16 , 24 , 32 , 34 , 37 , 43 , 46 – 8 , 50 , 56 , 64 , 72 , 74 , 76 , 78 , 87 , 127 , 135 , 144 , 148 – 50 , 155 , 157 , 163
gothic 14 , 94 , 96 – 9 , 105
grotesque 14 , 95 – 8
meaning 2 , 5 , 7 – 11 , 47 , 51 , 56 – 7 , 64 – 6 , 68 , 70 – 2 , 74 – 5 , 96 , 116 , 119 , 128 , 134 , 149 , 172 , 210 , 217 , 221 , 226 , 239
, 263 – 4 , 282 – 3 , 289 – 92
memory 11 , 70 , 74 , 91 , 252
metaphor 2 , 12 , 14 , 52 – 5 , 57 , 64 – 5 , 71 – 8 , 89 , 101 , 140 , 211
modernism 6 , 8 – 9 , 11 , 14 , 18 , 24 – 5 , 29 , 54 , 56 , 58 , 84 , 86 , 89 , 99 – 100 , 111 – 12 , 115 , 163 , 171 , 179 , 185 – 6 , 189
195 – 6 , 217 , 225 , 244 , 250 – 57 , 267 – 70
taste 15 , 18 , 24 – 8 , 35 , 99 – 100 , 164 – 6 , 254 , 268 , 270 , 272 – 4 , 278 , 286 , 288
topic 11 , 14 , 26 , 51 , 64 , 68 – 78 , 120 , 128 – 30 , 133 – 4 , 206 , 210 , 212 – 13 , 216
tradition 117 – 9 , 145 , 149 – 50 , 157 , 165 , 172 , 175 , 179 – 80 , 185 – 6 , 188 – 96 , 198 – 200 , 203 , 205 , 245 , 247 , 249 – 50
255 , 262 – 7 , 270 – 2
tragedy 48 , 95 , 97 , 119 , 127 , 146 , 182 , 191 – 2 , 210 , 212 , 214 , 216 , 217 , 253
transcendentalism 5 , 8 , 24 , 32 , 42 , 46 , 63 , 86 – 9 , 93 , 97 , 103 , 114 – 16 , 210 , 243 , 250 , 254 , 284 , 288 – 9
trivial 7 , 31 , 34 – 5 , 64 , 87 , 97 , 99 , 140
truth 4 , 8 – 10 , 23 , 34 , 36 , 48 , 79 , 85 , 90 – 1 , 95 , 98 , 100 , 114 , 116 – 18 , 134 , 140 , 156 , 163 , 172 , 218 , 245 , 250 – 2 ,
Dada 189
Dahlhaus, Carl 3 , 7 , 12 , 15 , 29 , 31 , 56 , 63 , 66 , 88 – 9 , 111 , 115 , 120 – 1 , 123 , 126 – 7 , 135 , 140 , 179 , 185
Danto, Arthur 1 , 85
Danuser, Hermann 253
Darcy, Warren 221
Daverio, John 248
Davies, Bronwyn 280
Davies, Stephen 1 , 3 , 68
Davis, Nick 232
Dell’Antonio, Andrew 8
Demme, Jonathan: The Silence of the Lambs 228
DeNora, Tia 28
Derrida, Jacques 86
Dickens, Charles 259 – 60 ; Great Expectations 216 – 7 , 221
Dill, Heinz 248 – 9
Dillon, Elizabeth Maddock 100 – 1
Ditson, Oliver 279
Donnelly, Ken 226
Drewett, Michael 263
Duchamp, Marcel 189
Dudow, Slatan: Kuhle Wampe 229
Eagleton, Terry 5
Eastenders 214
Eco, Umberto 259
Eichendorff, Joseph von 16 , 173 – 5
Eichhorn, Andreas 89
Eisenstein, Sergei 225 – 6
Eisler, Hans 225 , 229
Eisner, Lotte 230
Epic of Gilgamesh 218
Everist, Mark 203 , 209
Fauconnier, Gilles 14 , 72 – 3
Fellini, Federici 226 – 7
Feuerbach, Ludwig 54 , 115
Fink, Robert 89
Fisher, Alexander 265
Flaubert, Gustav 99
Fleming, Victor: The Wizard of Oz 228
Floros, Constantin 212
folk music 36 , 69 , 248 – 9 , 262 – 3 , 266 – 8 , 270 – 3
Frampton, Daniel 228
Franklin, Peter 249
Freud, Sigmund 96 – 7
Frith, Simon 8 , 28
Fubini, Enrico 4
Fukuyama, Francis 141
Fulcher, Jane 105
funk 10 – 11
Fussell, Paul 267
Habeneck, François-Antoine 94
Habermas, Jürgen 115
Hale, Thomas 261 – 2
Halm, August 52
Hamera, Judith 291 – 2
Hamilton, Andy 2 – 3
Hanslick, Eduard 43 – 6 , 48 , 50 – 7 , 63 , 89 , 90 ; On the Musically Beautiful [ Vom Musikalisch-Schönen ] 14 , 16 , 26 , 29 , 44
– 5 , 91 , 176 – 7 , 184
Harrison, Daniel 37
Hatten, Robert 14 , 68 , 74 – 5 , 205 , 208 , 210
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 1 , 2 , 16 , 45 – 6 , 52 , 54 , 94 – 5 , 111 – 18 , 123 – 4 , 127 , 135 , 140 – 1 , 161 , 171 – 3 , 180 ,
; Lectures on Aesthetics 172 , 286 ; The Phenomenology of Mind 14 – 15 , 113 – 15 , 254 ; Science of Logic 113 – 14 , 140
Heidegger, Martin 77
Heine, Heinrich 281
Heister, Hanns-Werner 278
Hennion, Antoine 19 , 277 , 281 , 284 , 287
Hepokoski, James 124 , 221
Hesmondhalgh, David 11
Hinton, Stephen 87 , 89
Hitchcock, Alfred: Vertigo 227 ; Lifeboat 228
Hoeckner, Berthold 115
Hoffmann, E. T. A. 32 , 35 – 6 , 42 – 3 , 46 , 53 , 57 , 86 , 88 – 9 , 94 , 103 , 170 , 172 , 242 , 248
Hooper, Giles 6
Horace 155 – 6
Horkheimer, Max 99 – 100 , 115 , 172
Howard, Keith 262
Hucke, Helmut 161
Hugo, Victor 95
Huyssen, Andreas 99
Hyde, Martha 158
Jacob, Max 97
Jacq-Mioche, Sylvie 284
Jakobson, Roman 205
Jameson, Frederic 86
Jankélévitch, Vladimir 19 , 277 , 283
jazz 1 , 17 , 56 , 150 , 188 – 222 , 270 , 284 , 289 , 291
Jean Paul see Richter
Joffé, Roland: The Killing Fields 228
Johnson, Mark 72
Johnson, Samuel 278
Joughin, John J. 6
McClary, Susan 7 , 10 – 11 , 56 – 7 , 89
McCreless, Patrick 205 , 219
McKay, Nicholas 64
Mäkelä, Tomi 280 – 1
Mallarmé, Stéphane 56 , 95 , 205
Malpas, Simon 6
Man, Paul de 85
Mann, Michael: The Insider 228
Marpurg, Friedrich Wilhelm 145
Martin, George R.R.: Game of Thrones 214
Marx, A. B. 15 , 63 , 77 , 94 , 123
Marx, Karl 14 , 115 – 16 , 171
Maus, Fred 205 , 208 – 9 , 219 – 21
Meelberg, Vincent 214
Meltzer, Richard 33 – 6
Mersenne, Marin 277
Metzner, Paul 278 , 281
Meyer, Leonard B. 29
Michaelis, Christian Friedrich 33 , 50 , 89
Micznik, Vera 207 – 8
Middleton, Richard 8
Milbank, John 86
Milošević, Slobodan 271
Modiano, Raimonda 95
Momigny, Jérôme-Joseph de 204 , 208
Monelle, Raymond 14 , 70 – 1
Moore, Allan F. 8
Moore, John W. 278 – 9
Moore, Rachel 267 – 8
Morcom, Anna 263 – 4
Moreno, Joseph 272
Moritz, Karl Philipp 50
Mottram, Ron 226
Moysan, Bruno 281 , 292
Mundt, Theodor 279
Murphy, Richard 190
Mussolini, Benito 166
Quintilian 155
Vattimo, Gianni 23
Vischer, Friedrich Theodor 95 , 279 , 287
Yang Mu 263
Young, Terence: Dr No 218
Zangwill, Nick 1 – 2 , 3
Zbikowski, Lawrence 72
Zelter, Carl Friedrich 163
Zhdanov, Andrie 270
Zich, Otakar 1
Žižek, Slavoj 93 , 233