1. DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC.

, DUSIT
THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD. AND FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS. (G.R. No. 180440, December 05, 2012)

Facts:

This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed on 28 August 1996 by petitioner
Dr. Genevieve L. Huang[4] against herein respondents Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI)[5]
and Dusit Thani Public Co., Ltd. (DTPCI),[6] as owners of Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (Dusit
Hotel);[7] and co-respondent First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation (First Lepanto),
[8] as insurer of the aforesaid hotel. The said Complaint was premised on the alleged
negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff, in the untimely putting off all the lights
within the hotel’s swimming pool area, as well as the locking of the main entrance door of
the area, prompting petitioner to grope for a way out. While doing so, a folding wooden
counter top fell on her head causing her serious brain injury. The negligence was
allegedly compounded by respondents PHI and DTPCI’s failure to render prompt and
adequate medical assistance.

Issue:

Is respondent liable based on quasi-delict?

Held:

As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove

the presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held
liable, to wit:

(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;

(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.[78]

Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established as it is the basis of her action.[79] The burden of proof is upon petitioner.
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that “burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense
by the amount of evidence required by law.” It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his
cause of action or the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged
in his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he
has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence.[80]

In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI. Other than
petitioner’s self-serving testimony that all the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area
were shut off and the door was locked, which allegedly prompted her to find a way out
and in doing so a folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other
evidence was presented to substantiate the same.

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Res ipsa loquitur

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause
thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and
not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence
and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
[87] Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or
presence of negligence. If there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the creative reason for the said
doctrine disappears.[88]

Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with
the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.[89]

In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff negligently
turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still not
fall on petitioner’s head had she not lifted the same. Although the folding wooden counter
top is within the exclusive management or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI, the
falling of the same and hitting the head of petitioner was not due to the negligence of the
former. As found by both lower courts, the folding wooden counter top did not fall on
petitioner’s head without any human intervention.

The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any showing
that the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI were negligent. Since in this case, the
trial court and the appellate court found no negligence on the part of the employees of
respondents PHI and DTPCI, thus, the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence and
be made to pay the millions of pesos damages prayed for by petitioner.

2. Lucas vs Tuano

Facts:

Claiming to have steroid-induced glaucoma[45] and blaming Dr. Tuaño for the same,
Peter, joined by: (1) Fatima, his spouse[46]; (2) Abbeygail, his natural child[47]; and (3)
Gillian, his legitimate child[48] with Fatima, instituted on 1 September 1992, a civil
complaint for damages against Dr. Tuaño, before the RTC, Branch 150, Quezon City. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2482.

In their Complaint, petitioners specifically averred that as the "direct consequence of

[Peter's] prolonged use of Maxitrol, [he] suffered from steroid induced glaucoma which
caused the elevation of his intra-ocular pressure. The elevation of the intra-ocular
pressure of [Peter's right eye] caused the impairment of his vision which impairment is
not curable and may even lead to total blindness."[49]

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In the end, petitioners sought pecuniary award for their supposed pain and suffering,
which were ultimately brought about by Dr. Tuaño's grossly negligent conduct in
prescribing to Peter the medicine Maxitrol for a period of three (3) months, without
monitoring Peter's IOP, as required in cases of prolonged use of said medicine, and
notwithstanding Peter's constant complaint of intense eye pain while using the same.

Held:

For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of
the medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged
violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-
patient relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding
for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation,[76] must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements
must co-exist in order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.

When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is

generated. And in accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents
that he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing
in the same field; and that he will employ such training, care, and skill in the treatment of
the patient.[77] Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to [the former]
to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in
like cases.[78] Stated otherwise, the physician has the duty to use at least the same level
of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition
under similar circumstances.

This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert
medical testimony, because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter
peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the field.[79]

There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such
duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this]
constitutes the actionable malpractice.[80] Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon
the testimony of an expert witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to
meet the standard level of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in
like cases.

Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient, for
there must be a causal connection between said breach and the resulting injury sustained
by the patient. Put in another way, in order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it
must be shown that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury
must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes";[81] that is, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. And the

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proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.[82]

Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same, in order to establish the
proximate cause [of the injury] by a preponderance of the evidence in a medical
malpractice action, [the patient] must similarly use expert testimony, because the
question of whether the alleged professional negligence caused [the patient's] injury is
generally one for specialized expert knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson;
using the specialized knowledge and training of his field, the expert's role is to present to
the [court] a realistic assessment of the likelihood that [the physician's] alleged
negligence caused [the patient's] injury.[83]

From the foregoing, it is apparent that medical negligence cases are best proved by
opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same
general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the
expert opinion of qualified physicians [or surgeons] stems from the former's realization
that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating;[84] hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.

In the case at bar, there is no question that a physician-patient relationship developed

between Dr. Tuaño and Peter when Peter went to see the doctor on 2 September 1988,
seeking a consult for the treatment of his sore eyes. Admittedly, Dr. Tuaño, an
ophthalmologist, prescribed Maxitrol when Peter developed and had recurrent EKC.
Maxitrol or neomycin/polymyxin B sulfates/dexamethasone ophthalmic ointment is a
multiple-dose anti-infective steroid combination in sterile form for topical application.[85]
It is the drug which petitioners claim to have caused Peter's glaucoma.

However, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, "[t]he onus probandi was on
the patient to establish before the trial court that the physicians ignored standard medical
procedure, prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an
absence of the competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly
situated."[86] Unfortunately, in this case, there was absolute failure on the part of
petitioners to present any expert testimony to establish: (1) the standard of care to be
implemented by competent physicians in treating the same condition as Peter's under
similar circumstances; (2) that, in his treatment of Peter, Dr. Tuaño failed in his duty to
exercise said standard of care that any other competent physician would use in treating
the same condition as Peter's under similar circumstances; and (3) that the injury or
damage to Peter's right eye, i.e., his glaucoma, was the result of his use of Maxitrol, as
prescribed by Dr. Tuaño. Petitioners' failure to prove the first element alone is already
fatal to their cause.

3. Loadmasters vs Glodel Brokerage

Facts:

On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of
Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All
Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey"
from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date.

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Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes
from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn,
engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the
cargoes to Columbia’s warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.

The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its
employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of
copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6)
truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads
for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbia’s warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks
en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1)
truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.

Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the
copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for
insurance indemnity in the amount of ₱1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and
adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount of ₱1,896,789.62 as insurance
indemnity.

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and
Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case
No. 02-103040. It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the
loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the
consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss."2

On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision3 holding Glodel liable for damages
for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters’ counterclaim for damages
and attorney’s fees against R&B Insurance.

Held:

Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly
and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article
2194 of the New Civil Code, "the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary."

Loadmasters’ claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the
consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not
have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage
Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York,/McGee & Co., Inc.19 where this
Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a contractual relationship, to wit:

Page 5 of 19
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against
Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a cause of action. The
present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading
and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both
Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is
not a party to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the
insurance carriers may have a cause of action in light of the Court’s consistent ruling that
the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In fine, a liability for tort may arise
even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In the present
case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of
the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal
handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual
relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of
negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action
arising from quasi-delict. [Emphases supplied]

What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each
wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are
several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even
partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which
the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors
that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the
negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in the case of Far
Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals,24

X x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to
all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible
persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them
was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the
same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result
and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of
them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

4. PSBA vs CA

Facts:

A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while
on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-

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Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his
death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but
were elements from outside the school.

Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim
(President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas
(Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant
Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to
adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his
relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.

Held:

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of
Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs.
Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted,
however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from
tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks
the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already
of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher
elucidated thus:

The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation,
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding
that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise
generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence
becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The

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negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence
occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

5. Light Rail Transit Authority vs Navidad

Facts:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the
LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist
fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,
between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At
the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman,
was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously.

On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along
with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman,
the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death
of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

Held:

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under
the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article
2180,13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence
or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can
then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed
to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a
showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the
one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.16 Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the
parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules
on tort to apply.17

6. Fabre vs CA

Facts:

Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus.
They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which

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they operated in Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in
1981, after trying him out for two weeks, His job was to take school children to and from
the St. Scholastica's College in Malate, Manila.

On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young
Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private
respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.

The group was scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
However, as several members of the party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical
Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until 8:00 o'clock in the evening. Petitioner
Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus.

The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge
at Carmen was under repair, sot hat petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it
being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Baay in
Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on
the highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described as "siete." The road
was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of
50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel
brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned
over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The
bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its
front portion.

Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the
floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came down by a wooden seat
which came off after being unscrewed. It took three persons to safely remove her from
this portion. She was in great pain and could not move.

The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said
he was not familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care
he took in driving the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said
that he saw the curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly
slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was too late.

The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day, November 3, 1984. On the
basis of their finding they filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The
case was later filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus
Escano P1,500.00 for the damage to the latter's fence. On the basis of Escano's affidavit
of desistance the case against petitioners Fabre was dismissed.

Held:

First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on the
theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or
on the theory of quasi delict or culpa aquiliana as both the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals held, for although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual
both in origin and nature," nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a

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tort." 2 In either case, the question is whether the bus driver, petitioner Porfirio Cabil, was
negligent.

The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who
owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record.
These factual findings of the two courts we regard as final and conclusive, supported as
they are by the evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it
was raining, and as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. He averred
these facts to justify his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is
undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only
slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead. 3 By then it was
too late for him to avoid falling off the road. Given the conditions of the road and
considering that the trip was Cabil's first one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven
his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony 4 that the vehicles passing on that
portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50
kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.

Considering the foregoing — the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it
was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the
normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain,
Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private
respondent Amyline Antonio.

Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the
presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection
and supervisions of their employee.

Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant
possessed a professional driver's license. The employer should also examine the applicant
for his qualifications, experience and record of service. 5 Due diligence in supervision, on
the other hand, requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of
employees and issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.6

7. Pereña vs. Zarate

Facts:

The Pereñas were engaged in the business of transporting students from their respective
residences in Parañaque City to Don Bosco in Pasong Tamo, Makati City, and back. In
June 1996, the Zarates contracted the Pereñas to transport Aaron to and from Don Bosco.
On August 22, 1996, as on previous school days, the van picked Aaron up around 6:00
a.m. from the Zarates’ residence. Aaron took his place on the left side of the van near the
rear door. The van, with its air-conditioning unit turned on and the stereo playing loudly,
ultimately carried all the 14 student riders on their way to Don Bosco. Considering that
the students were due at Don Bosco by 7:15 a.m., and that they were already running
late because of the heavy vehicular traffic on the South Superhighway, Alfaro took the
van to an alternate route at about 6:45 a.m. by traversing the narrow path underneath
the Magallanes Interchange that was then commonly used by Makati-bound vehicles as a
short cut into Makati. At about the time the van was to traverse the railroad crossing, PNR

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Commuter No. 302 (train), operated by Jhonny Alano (Alano), was in the vicinity of the
Magallanes Interchange travelling northbound. As the train neared the railroad crossing,
Alfaro drove the van eastward across the railroad tracks, closely tailing a large passenger
bus. The passenger bus successfully crossed the railroad tracks, but the van driven by
Alfaro did not. The train hit the rear end of the van, and the impact threw nine of the 12
students in the rear, including Aaron, out of the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train,
which dragged his body and severed his head, instantaneously killing him. Alano fled the
scene on board the train, and did not wait for the police investigator to arrive.

Held:

Although the basis of the right to relief of the Zarates (i.e., breach of contract of carriage)
against the Pereñas was distinct from the basis of the Zarates’ right to relief against the
PNR (i.e., quasi-delict under Article 2176, Civil Code), they nonetheless could be held
jointly and severally liable by virtue of their respective negligence combining to cause the
death of Aaron. As to the PNR, the RTC rightly found the PNR also guilty of negligence
despite the school van of the Pereñas traversing the railroad tracks at a point not
dedicated by the PNR as a railroad crossing for pedestrians and motorists, because the
PNR did not ensure the safety of others through the placing of crossbars, signal lights,
warning signs, and other permanent safety barriers to prevent vehicles or pedestrians
from crossing there. The RTC observed that the fact that a crossing guard had been
assigned to man that point from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. was a good indicium that the PNR was
aware of the risks to others as well as the need to control the vehicular and other traffic
there. Verily, the Pereñas and the PNR were joint tortfeasors. Pereña vs. Zarate, 679
SCRA 208, G.R. No. 157917 August 29, 2012

8. Chan vs INC

Facts:

The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner. It is located in Sta. Rita
East, Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent. The
gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its
washrooms. In view of this, the services of Dioscoro “Ely” Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured by petitioner, as the former was
allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. Petitioner and Yoro executed a
Memorandum of Agreement3 (MOA) on 28 February 1995. Diggings thereafter
commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of the respondent
that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter.
The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the
damage and prejudice of the respondent.

On 18 April 1995, a Complaint5 against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller, petitioner’s
engineer, was filed by the respondent before the RTC, La Union, Branch 31, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. A-1646.

Held:

ART. 2176.—Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is

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governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Based on this provision of law, the requisites
of quasi-delict are the following: (a) there must be an act or omission; (b) such act or
omission causes damage to another; (c) such act or commission is caused by fault or
negligence; and (d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. All
the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation which
caused damage to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises
and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on respondent’s
premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation
between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other. Chan,
Jr. vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., 473 SCRA 177, G.R. No. 160283 October 14, 2005

For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are
joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet
the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit .
Chan, Jr. vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., 473 SCRA 177, G.R. No. 160283 October 14, 2005

Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had
provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or
outside petitioner’s property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from
liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable. Chan, Jr. vs.
Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., 473 SCRA 177, G.R. No. 160283 October 14, 2005

9. Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing,

Inc.,11 was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the
NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it
flew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about
fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane. Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla
investigated the matter and saw black and white sugarcanes on the road, on both lanes,
which appeared to be flattened.14

On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint15 for damages
against PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC of Manila, Branch 16. They alleged, inter alia,
that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for motorists
when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass
through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to
put up emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of
such spillage; and that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the
direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Latagan and the damage to
Arnaiz’s car.

In its Answer,17 PNCC admitted that it was under contract to manage the North Luzon
Expressway, to keep it safe for motorists. It averred that the mishap was due to the
“unreasonable speed” at which Arnaiz’s car was running, causing it to turn turtle when it
passed over some pieces of flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the proximate cause of
the mishap was PASUDECO’s gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and its failure to

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clear and mop up the area completely. It also alleged that Arnaiz was guilty of
contributory negligence in driving his car at such speed.

Held:

PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and

that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent
acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries. As such, PASUDECO
and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. As the Court held in the vintage case of Sabido
v. Custodio: According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted
from the acts of the other tort-feasor. Philippine National Construction Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 467 SCRA 569, G.R. No. 159270 August 22, 2005

10. Cerezo vs. Tuazon

Facts:

Held:

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is
liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation
in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation.
Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and
the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages
from Mrs. Cerezo alone. Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 141538 March 23,
2004

An employer’s liability in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary
and direct. Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 141538 March 23, 2004

An employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct while the employer’s
liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167, G.R. No.
141538 March 23, 2004

11. NEGLIGENCE; CRITERION FOR DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF NEGLI-GENCE.

—The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a
prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
about to be pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of

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 the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive fact in negligence. Picart
vs. Smith., 37 Phil. 809, No. 12219 March 15, 1918
12. Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative
or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care
is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances. Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674, No. L-21291
March 28, 1969
13. Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d. ed.),
Sec. 1324 as “the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such person suffers injury.” By such a test, it can readily be seen
that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is
measured; it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself
so situated. All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to
use that care and diligence expected of reasonable men under similar
circumstances. Cusi vs. Philippine National Railways, 90 SCRA 357, No. L-29889
May 31, 1979
14. Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as
a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they
transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that
they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid
responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving
that they observed such diligence. Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V.
vs. Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc., 383 SCRA 23, G.R. No. 143133 June 5,
2002
However, the presumption of fault or negligence will not arise if the loss is due to
any of the following causes: (1) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other
natural disaster or calamity; (2) an act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil; (3) an act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or the container; or (5) an
order or act of competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of
destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then
the carrier is liable therefor. Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V. vs.
Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc., 383 SCRA 23, G.R. No. 143133 June 5, 2002
15. The improper parking of truck created an unreasonable risk for anyone
driving on that street for which the truck driver should be held responsible as the
negligence of a car driver bumping that truck was no more than a forseeable
consequence of the risk created by the truck driver.—We believe, secondly, that the
truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather
an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the
private respondent's car would in all probability not have occurred had the dump
truck not been parked asked without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although
later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the
accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the
petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable
consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver

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 had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty
to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon
them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation
in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability. Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353, No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
16. Xxx
17. Applying the test formulated in Picart vs. Smith (37 PHIL 809) private
respondent is not guilty of contributory negligence because he could not have
reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him considering the circumstances.
—The Court finds the contention that private respondent was, at the very least,
guilty of contributory negligence, thus reducing the damages that plaintiff may
recover, unmeritorious. Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code
contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although
not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being the defendant's lack of due care.
In the instant case, no contributory negligence can be imputed to the private
respondent, considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v.
Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918): The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence
of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that. x x x The private respondent, who was
the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen
the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances.
Even if the private respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in
question could not easily be noticed because of its construction. Civil Aeronautics
Administration vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 28, No. L-51806 November 8, 1988
18. Probability
19. Same; Same; Same; “Emergency Rule,” Explained; An individual who
suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.—Courts have traditionally been compelled to
recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to
the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such
situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening
or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and
reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening
conditions. Under the “emergency rule” adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of
Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless

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 the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Valenzuela vs. Court of
Appeals, 253 SCRA 303, G.R. No. 115024, G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996
20. Negligence; Unexplained Break in Electric Wire; Responsibility of Lighting
Company for Death of Child.—Shortly after 2 o'clock in the afternoon trouble
developed in an overhead wire conducting electricity for lighting purposes in the
City of Manila. The wire soon parted and one of the charged ends fell to the ground
in shrubbery close to the way. The lighting company received a telephonic report of
this incident at 2.25 p. m., and promised to send an inspector. At 4 p. m. the
neighboring school turned out and as the children went home one of the boys, of
the age of 9 years, touched the wire with his hand and received a shock which
resulted in death. Held, that the lighting company was responsible for the death.
The delay in leaving this danger unguarded so long after information of the trouble
was received constituted negligence on its part. Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co.,
57 Phil., 478, No. 35283 November 5, 1932
21. Res Ipsa Loquitur; As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may
be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.—Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the
application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a
presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the
person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. DM. Consunji, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 357 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur; The presumption or inference may
be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a
disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
inference.—As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred
when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur.
Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then
shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or
overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. It
is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption
or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into
play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been
established. DM. Consunji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA 249, G.R. No.
137873 April 20, 2001
22. Res Ipsa Loquitur; An application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
thing speaks for itself, comes to fore.—In the absence of any clear explanation on
what other factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties
of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want
of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the
benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation of 702 meters. An application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, comes to fore. Where
the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident

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 arose from want of care. National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 453
SCRA 47, G.R. No. 124378 March 8, 2005
23. Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to
a given situation, the following conditions must concur: (1) the accident was of a
kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2) that the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence.—The finding by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that M/V Manila City caught fire and sank by reason of the negligence of
the workers of CSEW, when the said vessel was under the exclusive custody and
control of CSEW is accordingly upheld. Under the circumstances of the case, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to
a given situation, the following conditions must concur: (1) the accident was of a
kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2) that the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence. Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc.
vs. William Lines, Inc., 306 SCRA 762, G.R. No. 132607 May 5, 1999
24. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an
inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The
doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence
warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of
negligence when direct evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that
the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the
happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. Perla Compania De
Seguros, Inc. vs. Sarangaya III, 474 SCRA 191, G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
Test to determine the existence of negligence.— The test to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: did the
defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation would have employed? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc. vs. Sarangaya
III, 474 SCRA 191, G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
25. Case 1
26. Requisites in Order for the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Apply in Cases
Involving Medical Negligence.—In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption
of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the
injury, provided that the following requisites concur: 1. The accident is of a kind
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is
caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Cantre vs. Go, 522 SCRA 547, G.R. No. 160889
April 27, 2007
27. Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Requisites for the Applicability of the Doctrine.
—Literally, res ipsa loquitur means “the thing speaks for itself.” It is the rule that
the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances,
may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet
with an explanation. Stated differently, where the thing which caused the injury,
without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and

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 the injury is such that it should not have occurred if he, having such control used
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the
injury arose from the defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to
him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. From the foregoing
statements of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury
was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was
such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who
had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation
by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the “control
and management of the thing which caused the injury.” Professional Services, Inc.
vs. Agana, 513 SCRA 478, G.R. No. 126297, G.R. No. 126467, G.R. No. 127590
January 31, 2007
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary
rule.—In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence,
does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability,
being a mere evidentiary rule. In other words, mere invocation and application of
the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Here,
the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr.
Fuentes. Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana, 513 SCRA 478, G.R. No. 126297,
G.R. No. 126467, G.R. No. 127590 January 31, 2007
28. Res Ipsa Loquitur; There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed
with, and that is under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; Where res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of
injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its
fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.—There is a
case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. As held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals : Although generally,
expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff,
the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the
necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain
of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of
mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily,
only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to
whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of
skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and
surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by
any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa
loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the
court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of
care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would
not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only
what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all
that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission

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 complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of
the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other
way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress
for injury suffered by him.

Requisites for Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur.—Petitioners now contend that all
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur were present, namely: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a
rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case—the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or
a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment; The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce
the desired result.—-Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not
immediately apparent to a layman so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur.
The question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of the
standard of care required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of the
correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr.
Marlyn Rico. As held in Ramos:. . . . Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary
doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in
malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge
and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as
would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be
made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more
unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the
usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a. suit against a
physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any
particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did
not produce the desired result . Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, 341 SCRA 760,
G.R. No. 130547 October 3, 2000

29.

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