25. Actual Case or Controversy
Actual Case or Controversy
G.R. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Salonga v. Pan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J
FACTS:
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed
by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the
filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and
prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute
him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila
area in 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner
Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of
Preliminary Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. stating that “the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12,
1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the
supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the
time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has
not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint charging
Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP
31 and PD 1736. The counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga
for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him which was denied. On 4
January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of information for violation of the
Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The
resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the
present petition for certiorari.
It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the
prosecution to justify the filing of information against him. He states that to sanction his further
prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists
in the Philippines today.
ISSUES:
Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
HELD:
No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and
separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted
the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its
evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused
in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to
withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it
once again in the Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the
prosecution.
26.
G.R. 133250 July 9, 2002
Chavez v. PEA
CARPIO, J
FACTS:
The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating Public Estates Authority (PEA).
On the same date, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring
to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"[2] under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands.
Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." The Senate Committees reported the
results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report and among the conclusions are: (1) the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the
JVA itself is illegal.
PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA”.
President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. Due to the approval of the Amended
JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because
of subsequent events.
HELD:
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI
furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms
and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the
signing of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the
Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the
Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by
simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on
the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the
ambit of judicial review.
The court ruled that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its
jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the
signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of
the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it
is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the
effects of such unconstitutional contract.
27. Legal Standing
G.R. 155001 May 5, 2003
Agan v. PIATCO
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III. Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) then constituted the Prequalification Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which
approved the project.
DOTC caused the publication of an open invitation to bid. On September 20, 1996, the
group composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo, later on became
PIATCO), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank)
(collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their proposal to the PBAC and the latter awarded
the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
The Government and PIATCO signed the “Concession Agreement for the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession
Agreement) and granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during
the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the
rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that
the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date,
and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to
MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the
NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and
ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and
other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.
28. Legal Standing
G.R. 127685 July 23, 1998
Ople vs. Torres
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12
December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the
right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds,
(1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to
privacy.
Respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
HELD:
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No.
308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of
GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
Ople’s concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers,
claiming that they would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements,
filed a petition for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the
legality of the various agreements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the workers of the international airline service providers and several
employees of MIAA have legal standing.

HELD:
Petition granted. NAIA Concessionaries and service contractors (petitioning
employees) have the LEGAL STANDING

In the above-mentioned cases, petitioners have a direct and substantial interest to

protect by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. They stand to lose their
source of livelihood, a property right which is zealously protected by the constitution. Moreover,
subsisting concession agreements between MIAA and petitioners-intervenors and service
contracts between international airlines and petitioners-intervenors stand to be nullified or
terminated by the operation of the NAIA IPT III Under the PIATCO Contracts.

The financial prejudices brought about by the PIATCO Contracts on petitioners in these cases
are legitimate interests sufficient to grant their petition.
29. Legal Standing
G.R. 124360 November 5, 1997 30. Legal Standing
Tatad v. Secretary G.R. 192935 December 7, 2010
PUNO, J. Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
MENDOZA, J
FACTS:
In the case of Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, the petitioner is questioning the FACTS:
constitutionality of some provisions in Republic Act No. 8180 or otherwise known as the For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which
Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of1996. R.A. No. 8180 which was created primarily essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010,
entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
To liberalize and deregulate the downstream oil industry in order to ensure a truly
In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the
competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply of
legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the
environmentally-clean and high-quality petroleum products. The Act was created to promote and
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
encourage the entry of new participants in the downstream oil industry, and introduce adequate
therefor.
measures to ensure the attainment of these goals. However, this was not the way the petitioners
saw the act and instead looked at it in a way which would violate the equal protection clause of
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
those new entrants who want to enter the market with the imposition of the different tariffs which
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong,
would discourage the new entrants, maintaining the market control of the big companies such as
and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Caltex, Shell and Petron and thus promoting monopolies in the Philippines
Representatives.
Respondents aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they did not sustain nor will
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
ISSUE:
previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the
Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent
law and executive order
collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to
his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.
HELD:
YES. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section
the Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
barren ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal
law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to assail EO No. 1
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases
HELD:
at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-
or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court
of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies
has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the
usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.
Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of petitioners for
they pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve forthright resolution.
As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez: “To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.”

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
31. Legal Standing
G.R. 174697 July 8, 2010
CREBA v. ERC and Meralco
BRION, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit corporation, organized under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines. The ERC is a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative regulatory body
created under Section 38 of the EPIRA. Respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a
corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
The ERC promulgated the Magna Carta for Residential Electricity Consumers (Magna
Carta), which establishes residential consumers’ rights to have access to electricity and electric
service, subject to the requirements set by local government units and distribution utilities (DUs).
The petitioner seeks to nullify Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, on the following grounds: (1)
it is unconstitutional since it is oppressive and it violates the due process and equal protection
clauses; (2) it contravenes the provisions of the EPIRA; and (3) it violates the principle of unjust
enrichment.
Petitioner claims that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR is unconstitutional as it is oppressive
to the affected end-users who must advance the amount for the installation of additional
facilities. Burdening residential end-users with the installation costs of additional facilities defeats
the objective of the law – the electrification of residential areas – and contradicts the provisions
of the legislative franchise, requiring DUs to be financially capable of providing the distribution
service.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has legal standing to sue.
HELD:
The Petitioner Has No Legal Standing. We do not see the petitioner as an entity with
the required standing to assail the validity of Section 2.6 of the DSOAR.
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a party’s personal and substantial interest in a
case, arising from the direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged
governmental action. Legal standing calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term
"interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the governmental action, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a
person’s constitutional rights are adversely affected by a statute or governmental action, he has
no legal standing to challenge the statute or governmental action.
32. Legal Standing
G.R. 157013 July10, 2003
Macalintal v. COMELEC
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1 suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case
in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed
the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the
Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or
alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the
right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file this case
HELD:
The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition.
R.A. No. 9189 appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a
supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law
shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.
Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. The Court has held that they
may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds because expenditure of public funds
by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds.
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of
citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the
petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to
the Filipino people.
The court cited Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs.
Tan,5 where the Court held: “Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient personality
standing, or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance
to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of these petitions.”
 saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and
order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be
In this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of
evolved, they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and
suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
identifying violators is necessary.
33. Legal Standing
G.R. 80508 January 30, 1990
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level
Guanzon v. De Villa
conference should bring together the heads of the Department of Justice, Department of
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
National Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to devise
procedures for the prevention of abuses.
FACTS:
The 41 petitioners alleged that the “saturation drive” or “aerial target zoning” that were
SEPARATE OPINION:
conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no
CRUZ, J.
specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest
served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or
The majority says it cannot act against the drives because no one directly affected has
identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls
complained. Such silence, if I understand the ponencia correctly, has in effect purged the drives
and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded
of all oppressiveness and washed them clean.
like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo
marks. The residents complained that they’re homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings
(The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are conducted not in the enclaves of
and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the
the rich but in the deprived communities, where the residents have no power or influence. The
operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment.
parties directly aggrieved are afraid. They are the little people. They cannot protest lest they
Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and
provoke retaliation for their temerity. Their only hope is in this Court, and we should not deny
tactical informations.
them that hope.)

The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction.
the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are constitutional
the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning was intended to flush out questions that must be met. There are many decisions applying this doctrine.
subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were
conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may
actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a
such event. proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has the right to call the firemen.
Everyone has the right and responsibility to prevent the fire from spreading even if he lives in the
The forty-one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of other block.
Metro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that
they have a common or general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their
human rights and the reign of peace and order in their communities. They claim to represent
"the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before this Court."

The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petition
contending inter alia that petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the
proper parties to institute the action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are the proper parties to institute the action.

HELD:
The petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon,
and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and
where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.

The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit.
Where not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not
initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive departments and for trial
courts. Well-meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on
indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme
Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional litigation
have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed.
If our policy makers sustain the contention of the military and the police that occasional

34. Legal Standing
G.R. 132922 April 21, 1998
TELEBAP v COMELEC
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They
are suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal
standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to
suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law.
Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring
this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the
Philippines affected by the enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television
broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for
campaign and other political purposes. Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the
ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2)
that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3)
that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media of communication or information during the period of election.
Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing to assert the rights
of radio and television broadcasting companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it
can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the
third party cannot assert his constitutional right, or that the eight of the third party will be diluted
unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third party's constitutional claim. None of
these circumstances is here present. The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in
the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of
the affected companies.
GMA’s Legal Standing – YES – has legal standing
The court decided to take the case since the other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc.,
appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates
radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of §92 of
B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the
COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial
election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.
Petitioner's allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide free air time
is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of §92.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election
and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners
claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time
to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time
for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC
Time.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing in filing this case.

HELD:
TELEBAP’s Legal Standing – NO legal standing
To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing is determined by the substantive merit
of his case or preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be held to be without
standing. Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury fairly is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.3 Members of petitioner have
not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of Section 92 of B.P. Blg.
881.

Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered voters since

this case does not concern their right of suffrage.

Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must
specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute.
35. Earliest Opportunity
G.R. 131124 March 21, 1999
Umali v. Guingona
PURISIMA, J.

FACTS:
Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to
March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994.

On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against

the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his
incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President authorized
the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately
referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.

Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to
send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3),
and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the
PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the
evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima
facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6,
1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement
and all benefits under the law.

After the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition, the petitioner presented a motion
for reconsideration, this time, theorizing that the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption is an unconstitutional office without jurisdiction to conduct the investigation against
him.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality belatedly in its motion
for reconsideration of the trial court's decision

HELD:
As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner
in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too
late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.

The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following,
namely: (1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court; (2) the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must
be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
and must be the very litis mota of the case.

It did not address the requisite of earliest opportunity in raising the question of
constitutionality.