2006 GSIA Thesis

Grain Matters:

A Chinese Perspective of Non-

Traditional Security

Yim Ho Ching, David

4173151

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 A thesis submitted on 6/11/2006 for the Degree of
Master of Arts (International Relations) in the
Graduate Studies in International Affairs Program,
Department of International Relations, Research
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian
National University

This thesis is submitted in accordance with the

rules and guidelines set out in the 2006 GSIA

Program Information Handbook. This thesis

has not been submitted in full or in part for

assessment for any other course or program. I

have read the guidelines on plagiarism and in

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accordance with these all sources are fully,

properly and accurately acknowledged.

Signature

Date

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 Contents

Introduction P. 5

Chapter One:
Evolving Theories of Security
and the relevance to China P. 14

Chapter Two:
Understanding Food Security in China:
From Self- Reliance to Interdependence P. 26

Chapter Three:
Understanding Food Security in China:
Changing identities and Great Power Responsibility P. 40

Conclusions P. 53

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Endnotes P. 56

Bibliography P. 67

Abstract

In recent years, and a series of international non- traditional security crises has

serious debate amongst scholars of international relations over the changing nature of

security threats. The concept of non- traditional security has attracted significant

attentions. However, most of the existing studies have neglected the issue of food

security. Moreover, the voice of the developing world is often silent. This thesis aims

to address the gap in the literature. It does so by studying the evolution of the Chinese

concept of non- traditional security, with a particular focus on the issue of food

security and the influence of external force on this issue.

I take a constructivist approaches that allows me to work at the nexus of domestic

and international levels of analysis. The history of the People’s Republic China is

reviewed through the lens of food security to provide insights into the mindset of the

Chinese leaders during the Mao and Deng era. Contemporary Chinese foreign policy

behaviours are also reviewed to understand the changes in Chinese concept of non-

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traditional security.

The central argument of this thesis is that improvements in domestic and

international security environments lead to changes in Chinese national identity from

‘victim’ to responsible major power, which is reflected in the increase participation in

international cooperation related food security.

Grain Matters: A Chinese Perspective on Non-

Traditional Security

‘Security is the first word which occurs to me if I look back on my youth –

security not only in family relations, but in a sense scarcely imaginable
since 1914.’--- E. H. Carr1.

Today, I am deeply sorry to report that the situation remains intolerable and
unacceptable – all the more so because ten years have passed. Business as
usual will not do… Failure to achieve the World Food Summit objective
would be shameful.2--- FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf, at a press
conference of The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2006, 30 October
2006.

Introduction

Since the end of Cold War, the issue of redefining ‘security’ has been intensely

debated among academics, policy- makers, and civil society actors alike. In calling for

a reformulation of the traditional notion of security focused on military forces, a

number of scholars have argued for a broadening of the concept to include a range of

traditional and non- traditional threats. Moreover, for many, the state is no longer the

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sole referent of security, individuals also deserve attention. The debate between

respective advocates of state- centric and human- centric security now resonates

within the realm of everyday international politics.

One of the major problems involved in taking a non- traditional perspective on

security is that the analyst is faced with the difficulty of prioritising one issue over

another. This thesis will focus on only one aspect of the non- traditional security

agenda, namely food security. While acknowledging the importance of other aspects

of non- traditional security, such as economic security, public health security and

energy security, I have chosen to focus on food because this tends to be overlooked by

security analysts and scholars of international relations (IR).

In the discipline of international relations, food security has not received as much

attention as other issues on the non- traditional security agenda, such as resource

security and public health security. Food security seems to be regarded as a problem

for the developing world only. However, global demographic change and

environmental degradation mean that the issue cannot simply be viewed along a non-

traditional faultline. Food security is also likely to demand more rather than less of

our attention in the future.

The non- traditional security agenda is not without its critics. Some scholars remain

committed to the traditional approach to security. They argue that the focus of studies

on security should not be changed, in order to preserve the clarity and validity of

security studies3. Other critics argue against the securitization of human development

because it obscures the relationship between conflict and underdevelopment4. A third

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group claim that the new security agenda is ethnocentric, given that the prevailing

non- traditional security agenda originated largely from the West5. Where are the

voices of the developing states? It is this third critique of the non- traditional security

agenda that has motivated the concerns behind this thesis.

Of course it is not simply the case that the voices of developing states have not been

heard in this debate, rather it is the case that alternative approaches to security are

being interpreted differently, and less attention is being given to those diverse

interpretations.

In the Asia- Pacific region, some Asian academics claim that the search for

alternative approaches to security began long before the end of Cold War6. They argue

that such deviation from the traditional concept of security arose from the need to

struggle simultaneously with a multitude of security problems divided between

domestic and international arenas. For many developing states in the region, their

successive governments have been bedevilled with internal strife that has threatened

the structural integrity of the state since its inception. In Malaysia and Indonesia, for

example, the concept of security has been expanded to include regional stability and

regime survival7. Several Asian developing states have also developed their own

version of ‘comprehensive security’ promoted by the Japanese in the 1980s as a way

of focusing attention on economic concerns such as the international supply of energy

and food8.

These non- Western approaches to non- traditional security remain essentially

statist and tend to differ from the human security approach that is becoming

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increasing popular at the international level. Moreover, military defence remains a

core component of comprehensive security. While the Asian approaches outlined

above attempt to broaden the traditional approach to security horizontally, the human

security approach seeks to expand the understanding of security vertically. Human

security calls for ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’, focusing on both the

rights of individuals and communities9. Only Japan has developed its non- traditional

security approach further by developing an indigenous version of the human security

agenda10. It is the contention of this thesis that the way in which the idea of security is

evolving amongst the developing states of the Asia- Pacific is worthy of greater

scholarly attention. In particular, as China re- emerges as a major world power, it is

imperative that we gain a deeper understanding of the way in which the Chinese

government interprets the non- traditional security agenda, in order to gain insights

into its foreign policy.

The recent debate between respective advocates of state- centric and human-

centric security has aroused tremendous interest inside China, as numerous study both

Chinese and foreign in origin, laying out pessimistic claims and severe warnings

about the shortcomings in China’s capacity to secure its population’s need, especially

in the realm of food security due to serious environmental degradation and the

continuing increase in population11. These trends are unlikely to subside in the near

future, hence Chinese non- traditional security concerns are likely to directly affect its

behaviour at the international level12.

Central Research Questions:

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 Security related studies about the rise of China have proliferated in recent years in

keeping with the considerable influences that China now enjoys in the international

arena, thanks to over twenty- five years of economic growth. Many of these studies

have focused attention on non- traditional security issues. A prime example is the

upsurge of interest in the issue of resource security, especially in relation to oil supply

and certain metal ores13. Moreover, public health concerns such as the 2003 SARS

epidemic and subsequent Avian Flu epidemic have caught the attention of security

analysts14. However, international studies that seek to explore non- traditional security

from a Chinese perspective are rare and narrow in scope at best. The limited studies

that are available are more concerned with domestic affairs and are largely technical

in nature, very little attention has been given by IR scholars.

This thesis aims to address this gap in the literature. In doing so it seeks to address

two central questions.

How has the Chinese concept of food security evolved over time?

And to what extent has it been influenced by external forces?

I propose the aforementioned research questions in order to investigate in- depth the

Chinese idea of food security and how it has been shaped by both domestic and

international influences. In doing so, this thesis shall offer insights into the likely

implications to Chinese foreign policy behaviour.

Methodology:

Given that the research questions require an investigation into the effect and

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influences of ideational factors, upon the perceptions of Chinese elites, I shall draw

upon the constructivist approach to the study of international relations. In particular,

such an approach allows me to gain deeper insights into the formulation of the idea of

food security by looking at the way in which identity affects interests and behaviour.

Moreover, the constructivist approach allows me to work at the nexus of domestic and

international levels of analysis15.

At the same time, it is also important to ‘return to history’, as no comprehensive

understanding of the Chinese conception of non- traditional security can be obtained

without an acknowledgement of the way in which history has subtlely shaped the

Chinese elites’ perceptions of security. In this thesis, I confine myself to the fifty- odd

years of the history of the PRC. From the viewpoint of non- traditional security, this

can be divided into three phases. The first phase is the Mao era (1949- 1976), early

years of the new communist regimes which includes the turbulent years of the ‘Great

Leap Forward’ and the Great Cultural Revolution. The second phase is the Deng era

(1977- 1990s), the years of opening and reform, which triggered great changes in the

perception of security among Chinese elites. The last phase is the contemporary era, a

period in which non- traditional security issues such as the 2003 SARS epidemic have

taken a central position on the non- traditional security agenda and in which China is

becoming a more active participant in international cooperation.

From a domestic perspective, reviewing this history, attention will be given to the

dramatic and sometimes catastrophic events that have shaped Chinese conceptions of

food security over time. Furthermore, the effect of external events such as the Cold

War will also be taken into consideration. From an international perspective, I shall

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focus in particular on the concept of identity in seeking to arrive at some conclusions

about China’s current foreign policy behaviour.

Why is the concept of national identity important in the thesis? Alastair Iain

Johnston suggests that national identities both constitute and are constituted by

normative structures at the international level, hence international normative

structures can affect actor behaviour in two ways: (i) internalization of norms that

influence on actors’ self- identification via dialogue and persuasion; (ii) actors that

have internalized a particular norm will constrain the behaviour of actors have not

accomplished internalization16. Hence, the concept of national identity allows us to

understand the effects of external influences on the evolution of the Chinese

understanding of food security.

Moreover, Johnston suggests that the foreign policy of a state is critical to the

construction of a national identity. Hence, changes in foreign policy reflected changes

in a state’s self- identification17. Furthermore, the changes in national identity

influence the perception towards responsibility at international level. In effect,

studying of changes in Chinese foreign policy related to food security enables us to

observe the changes and continuities in China’s self- identification.

Primary sources, especially Chinese sources, will feature prominently in this thesis

in the form of media reports and the speeches of the ruling elites, from which the

analysis of the Chinese understanding of non- traditional security will be derived. I

shall also draw upon secondary sources, especially Chinese research works which are

seldom published in English, as well as investigative journalist reports in order to

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produce a wide and comprehensive picture.

Significance of this Study:

This study aims to mitigate the lack of literature in this area. Most of the existing

literature on resource or non- traditional security has failed to provide sufficient

coverage of China. The issue of resource security in China is being intensely studied,

but most of the literature concerns energy security only. It seems that food security, a

very significant and integral part of the concept of non- traditional security, is not

considered to be a significant issue in IR, amongst scholars of IR, as contrasted with

environmental science and development studies. This thesis suggests otherwise.

Despite the magnificent growth of PRC in the past twenty- five years, a large portion

of China’s population remain relatively underdeveloped in terms of access to food.

This thesis reveals that food security is not a new issue to China, rather it has long

considered to be an key and integral part of the Chinese elites’ understanding of

security. It also demonstrates that China’s increasing engagement in food security at

the international level has been largely influenced by changes in its identity. This has

broader implications on how we understand Chinese foreign policy behaviour.

The rise of the PRC means that it is imperative for IR scholars to study the way that

the current ruling regime perceives the non- traditional security agenda. As the PRC

continues to rise in power and tackle the undesirable side effects of its rapid

development, the issue of non- traditional security is likely to assume increased

significance not only in the domestic realm but also in the arena of foreign relations of

PRC18.

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Structure of the Thesis:

The thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter one reviews the ongoing debate

over what constitutes security with a particular focus on the non- traditional security

agenda and its relevance to China. In chapter two, attention shifts to the domestic

level, reviewing the history of the PRC’s perception of security among the Chinese

elites, with a specific focus to food security. The particular events that shaped ideas

about food security will be discussed. Ideational differences between different leaders

will also be examined too. The third chapter returns the focus back to the international

realm. With the international community gradually adopting the non- traditional

security agenda, how is the Chinese government responding? I shall conclude the

thesis by assessing the shifts in foreign policy behaviour on the basis of two

explanations. The first explanation focuses on the significance of identity change, and

the second focuses on the importance of responsibility.

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 Chapter One:
Evolving Theories of Security and the relevance to China

The question of ‘What is Security?’ has bedevilled and intrigued scholars of

International relations (IR) and its sub- field, Security Studies (SS) since the inception

of the discipline after the First World War. In retrospect, it can be claimed that the

original purpose behind the founding of the discipline was to understand the causes of

war in order to avoid another disastrous conflict in the future19. Academics have

proposed numerous contending definitions and theories of security which, in turn,

have had serious policy implications at the international level.

This chapter reviews the ongoing debate over what constitutes security. How did this

debate emerge? What are the underlying theoretical foundations? And how are current

conceptions relevant to the developing states of Asia?

While most scholars agree that security is a ‘sharply contested concept’20, it is

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possible to identify the common structure and terms of the security discourse. All

theories of security tend to consist of three defining elements: the referent of security

(Who needs to be secured?), the scope of security (What needs to be secured?) and the

approach of security (How to secure?). Most arguments between supporters of

contending theories of security revolve around these three elements21. While it is

possible to outline a definition with reference to specific threats, such as terrorist

attacks and derives a theory of security from it, such a theory would be too narrow in

scope to guide domestic and international policy making. Instead, security analysts

have focused their attention on trying to understand the broader structure of power

within the international system.

The Traditional Approach to Security:

A prominent researcher of security, John Herz, has defined the realist concept of

security as,

... the self- help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend,
regardless of intention to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets
its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially
threatening22.

During the Cold War, the dominant concept of security centred on the sovereign

state. The logical approach to security was that of self- help as the referents could not

rely on each other for assistance to achieve security.

At the time, IR scholars also placed a strong emphasis upon security in a strictly

military sense. Academic interests were largely focused on issues of high politics: War

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and peace, nuclear deterrence, arms control and alliance politics23. Poverty, food

supply and environmental degradation were relegated to the field of Development

Studies and considered to be domestic issues that had little significance to the study of

international relations. Development aid merely produced political levers to expand

and maintain the bloc system by both America and the Soviet Union24.

This concept of security can be attributed to the dominance of the realist school of

international relations during the Cold War. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,

sovereign states have been considered as the most important component in the

contemporary international system. Both classical political scholars such as

Machiavelli and contemporary realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenenth

Waltz view national security as the highest priority of all sovereign states 25. An

emphasis on national security was further reinforced by the power- centric discourse

of classical realism and neo- realism.

In contemporary international politics, the system of states is considered as

anarchical in nature because there is no ‘common government’ that can act as a

central controlling authority in world politics26. The anarchical system of states is

accepted as the foundation of the realist school27. Realists consider cooperation

between states to be largely short- term and unstable because they assume that states

are concerned about relative gains.

In the words of Waltz,

A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour others more
than itself. This is the first way in which the structure of international politics

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 limits the cooperation of states.28

Realists argue that states are predominantly concerned about their own security in

this self- help, anarchical system of states and that this concern govern the behaviour

of states, in spite of their different internal political structures. They point out that in

order to promote their respective self- interests they need to secure themselves against

other states, by enhancing their relative power29.

As the relentless pursuit of self- interest and security is inherent in the anarchical

structure of international politics, realists argue that the possibility of conflict between

states is ever- present as the possibility of a state being coerced or even attacked by

other states could never be eliminated, all states have to prepare themselves for a

‘struggle for existence’, by countering military force with military force30.

Therefore, realists claim that the primary goal of sovereign states in the

international system is to secure survival through attempts to maximize the power of

the state, so that relations between states can be conducted according to the

distribution of power between them.

The Non- Traditional Approach to Security:

In the 1990s, the end of Cold War triggered a challenge to the traditional approach

to security. Critics argued that the traditionalist, realist approach to world politics,

with its focus on military power and interstate conflict, was too narrow to deal with

new security threats, even though these threats do affect the survival and relative

power of states. Epidemics, environmental pollution and terrorism, are just some of

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the emerging threats that force states to cooperate more because no single states can

deal with these threats alone.

A number of contemporary IR scholars argued for the expanded conception of

security outward from the limits of national security, leading to the rise of the non-

traditional security agenda. Barry Buzan, a proponent of the new agenda, argues that

security should be considered from a multi- dimensional perspective. In is words,

security is:

… primarily about the fate of human collectivities… about the pursuit of

freedom from threat. The bottom line is about survival, but it also includes a
substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence… Security… is
affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal
and environmental31.

However, it should be duly noted here that the expanded notion of security adopted

in the non- traditional security approach does not necessarily reject the state- centric

basic of traditional security concerns.

Rather it is those IR scholars concerned about the globalization of security

threats that quash the continuing relevance of the state. They argue that the organized

use of force in pursuit of national interests by sovereign states will cease to be the

major security threat to both states and individuals during the post- Cold War era.

Instead, in their view, threats associated with transnational or even global effects are

likely to rise to prominence.

The introduction of another new concept, ‘Human Security’, which first

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appeared in the 1994 Human Development Report published by the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP), muddles the water further32. This identifies the

people as the key referent of security, thus human security is about securing basic

physical, economic and social needs for individuals and communities:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly… Forgotten
were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their
daily lives. For many of them, security symbolizes the protection from the threat
of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and
environmental hazards33.

The human security agenda has been defined as having four essential

characteristics: (i) It is a universal concern; (ii) the components are interdependent;

(iii) it is best ensured through early prevention than later intervention; (iv) it is people-

centred34.

Advocates of the human- centric security perspective argue that despite the

decrease in the chance of a catastrophic nuclear exchange, numerous nuclear weapons

are still scattered around the globe, increasing the chances of their use at the regional

or local levels. Furthermore, the threat to humanity’s survival has not abated and the

global population is bedevilled with insecurity, as illustrated in the spread of internal

violence, the increase in economic disparities between the developed and developing

world, and the gradual depletion of natural resources35. Therefore, a new

understanding of security is required in order to formulate a proper and coherent

response to the new global threats, which threaten the survival of individuals more

than the survival of sovereign states.

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 Numerous empirical studies have investigated the validity of human- centric

approaches to security. For example, Thomas Homer- Dixon has argued that

‘environmental scarcities’ are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts

of the developing world and that the situation is likely to escalate as scarcities

increases. As the population continues to increase in the developing world, the

demand for natural resources and food is likely to overwhelm the available supply,

leading to the unequal social distribution of resources, thus further aggravating the

problem. A vicious cycle of poverty could lead to further scarcity, inhibiting self-

empowerment36.

It is possible to improve the situation via social and technological ingenuity, but

these measures usually require substantial financial aid. This research provides ample

empirical evidence to suggest a causal link between scarcities and physical insecurity.

In scenarios of environmental scarcities, access to food is one of the greatest threats to

human security.

It can be readily observed that secure access to food is a key and integral part of the

concept of human security which, in turn, links to the concept of environmental

security, as food production depends on optimal environmental conditions. However,

the concept of food security was not formerly defined until the 1996 World Food

Summit:

Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life37.

In the human security agenda, food security is more than just the elimination of

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hunger among individuals and communities. It acts as the basis of achieving the

ultimate goal of the agenda, which is ‘human survival, well- being and freedom’ 38. In

the 2005 State of Food Insecurity in the World report, the relationship between food

security and overall human development, in terms of the Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs) has been positively defined:

… without rapid progress in reducing hunger, achieving all of the other

MDGs will be difficult, if not Impossible… hunger and malnutrition are
major causes of the deprivation and suffering targeted by all of the other
MDGs39.

Therefore, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say food security is one of the

most important non- traditional security issues.

As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the non- traditional security agenda is

not without its critics. Traditionalists and realists argue that studies on security should

remain confined to the relationships and capabilities of sovereign states, because

states continue to be the dominant actor in the military realm at both the domestic and

international levels. Also, the introduction of non- traditional factors such as food

insecurity, diseases, and financial instability has been criticized as being too board in

its scope with too much definitional elasticity, thus generating difficulties in the

prioritization of the different goals and principles for policy-making and analysis40.

Some critics argue against the securitization of development and poverty reduction.

Mark Duffield, for example, argues that underdevelopment becomes a synonym with

poverty and conflicts under the new agendas of non- traditional and human security.

As liberal peace become the primary rhetoric for promoting ‘developmentalism’, the

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discourse of development is reinvented as a form of conflict prevention in a process of

radicalisation41. Other critics argue that the new security agenda is ethnocentric in

nature and because it has neglected the opinion of the developing world?

How does the developing world, especially the PRC, perceive the new security

agenda? How relevant are the studies outlined above to the situation in developing

states?

Unfortunately, addressing this question in a systematic manner is beyond the scope

of this thesis. We shall narrow our focus here to the developing states in Asia. As

noted in the introduction, both Malaysia and Indonesia, have attempted to expand the

traditional security agenda long before the end of Cold War. Most of the changes have

involved the identification of new threats to state sovereignty and integrity, in addition

to the recognition of the importance of resource and economic stability. A key feature

observed in all these attempts is the concern of domestic unrests.

Both these states have experienced domestic unrest arisen from external influences,

such as the communist insurgency in the Cold War and religious extremism today. At

the same time, these states are multi- ethnic and multi- religious in nature, adding

domestic factors such as racial inequality which complicate the problem of internal

strife even more.

The 1997 Malaysian defence policy paper Malaysian Defence provided an example

of how the developing states in Asia perceive the non- traditional security agenda.

Four main security concerns are identified, these include: (1) Overlapping claims and

territorial disputes; (2) Pollution and congestion in the Straits of Malacca; (3) Piracy;

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(4) Illegal Immigrants42.

It can be readily observed that the Malaysian government considers that have

values under threat include national sovereignty, economic wellbeing via trade and

domestic racial balance. Most of the threats are non-military and external in nature,

apart from the issue of territorial disputes. However, the concerns outlined above

indicate that the Malaysian government is aware of the potential security threats from

other ASEAN members, even though the government has downplayed this issue in its

foreign policy. It seems that the government is very concerned about the spill-over

effects of instability and poor governance in neighbouring states, a worry well-

justified as demonstrated by the internal racial strife and subsequent regime change in

Indonesia in 1998.

Following this line of argument, Malaysia has always been highly interested in

regionalism in order to secure its volatile neighbours and to counter the threats

outlined above. It is one of the founding members of ASEAN in 1967 and a stanch

supporters of other regional approaches such as Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation

(APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ‘ASEAN plus Three’43.

The Malaysia example allows me to gain an insight into the evolution of the non-

traditional security agenda from the perspective of the developing states in the Asia-

Pacific region. Does this model match the Chinese perspective of non- traditional

security?

Over the past decade, the Chinese concept of Security has evolved in line with

China’s growing interdependence with the outside world. The Chinese government

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put forward the ‘New Security Concept’ (NSC) that focused on regional and global

cooperation on security issues in 1997. The major points of the NSC are as follows:

 Cooperation should be based upon mutual trust.

 Cooperation should be assured by mutual benefits. All countries should meet

the objective needs of social development in the era of globalization, respect
each other’s security interests, and create conditions for other’s security while
ensuring their own security interests with a view to achieving common security.

 Cooperation should be approached through dialogues and coordination on an

equal footing44.

Chinese scholars argue that the NSC is distinguished from earlier Chinese

understandings of security, as it is more comprehensive in nature. The NSC advocated

peaceful co- existence and cooperation between neighbouring states to improve

political and economic relations, as a means to secure regional and international

stability for economic development45. However, the NSC was not designed for non-

traditional security issues.

The formal introduction and adoption of the concept of non- traditional security in

the PRC is fairly recent. It was officially adopted in 2003 at the 16th Chinese

Communist Party Congress46. The official Chinese definition of non- traditional

security claims that:

…non- traditional security issues, which is termed in contrast to traditional

security threats, refers to the factors other than military, political and
diplomatic conflicts but can pose threats to the survival and development of a
sovereign state and human[sic] as a whole47.

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 It should be noted here that the official Chinese definition differs from that of other

developing states in the region, as it is broader in scope and not entirely statist in

nature. The Chinese definition does not entirely match the UNDP understanding of

non- traditional security either, which is based on the human security perspective that

stresses the importance of human development, proper governance and global

diplomatic cooperation, as listed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration48.

Many scholar argued that the Chinese conception of non- traditional security remains

largely statist and that the human dimension is missing due to Chinese sensitivity on

the issues of sovereignty and human rights49. It would also be possible to interpret the

Chinese understanding of non- traditional security is occupying a middle position

between the statist concept of comprehensive security and the UN understanding of

human security.

I argue in this thesis, however, that non- traditional security issues have long been

perceived as an integral part of China’s national security. In particular, food security, a

key and integral part of the non- traditional security concept, has received serious

attention from the Chinese government. This contrasts with the relative lack of

attention given to food security at the international level until the end of Cold War.

How does the Chinese idea non- traditional security, in particular food security,

evolved over time? In order to gain a deeper understanding of the domestic and

international forces at work in shaping the Chinese perception, we need to review the

fifty- odds years of the history of the PRC.

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 Chapter Two:
Understanding Food Security in China:
From Self- Reliance to Interdependence

‘Our policy is to take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the

leading factor. Pursuant to this policy, when we map out a plan we first see
what quantity of food grains can be produced, then estimate how much
fertilizer, pesticides, machinery, iron and steel, and so on are needed.’
--- Mao Tse Tung, 195850.

Let us now turn to the history of the idea of food security in China in order to obtain

a deeper perspective. In order to understand how the communist ruling elites

understand the concept of non- traditional security, we need to ‘return to history’ to

look at how the rules, norms and institutional changes have shaped ideas about

security through out the fifty- seven years of communist party rule51. This chapter will

focus particularly on the issue of food security and it is divided into three parts. The

first part briefly reviews the situation of food security in China since ancient times.

Then, the second section focuses on the Mao era, a period of time that has been

27
symbolised by mass mobilization and great political upheaval. The Deng era is

studied in the third section, as the time under his leadership proved to be the

fundamental transition point for China’s economic development with important

implications for food security. The post- Deng period will be covered in the final

chapter of this thesis that discusses a broader international perspective.

(i) The Early Years:

Since the beginning of Chinese civilization, various governments have been

concerned with securing food supply for the huge population based upon the limited

availability of arable land. Such ancient concerns over food supply have, in turn, led

to an interest in securing the best environmental conditions for agriculture via manual

intervention. Massive irrigation, the cultivation of wastelands, and flood controls

projects became symbols of Chinese civilization52.

However, the tremendous efforts spent on agriculture were often wasted or negated

due to the unrelenting growth of the population. It is frequently the case that as human

populations increase in size they overwhelm the limit of the ‘carrying capacity’ of the

local environment53. Simply put, the increase in population tends to outstrip the

increase in available arable land. Despite improvements in technology and

government planned internal migrations to unsettled areas, Chinese people still had to

contend with unfavourable weather patterns and natural disasters. Even in the early

20th century, before the food crisis brought on by the Great Leap Forward, Chinese

28
peasants experienced frequent famines, which then lead to massive migration in

search of food54.

The need for more arable land led to environmental degradation in the process of

exploiting the natural environment, which created a vicious cycle of degradation and

decrease in the availability of arable land: Arable land created through ‘slash and

burn’ method, massive deforestation for fuel and building material, and population

growth led to a rapid reduction of the carrying capacity of the environment55. Food

security has frequently been compromised in the history of China.

(ii) The Mao Era (1949- 1976)

After the founding of the People's Republic, the feudal ownership of land
was abolished. Under the leadership of their government, the Chinese
people devoted themselves to developing grain production through self-
reliance and hard work. As a result, China is now able to feed 22 percent of
the world's population on about seven percent of the world's cultivated land.
Total grain output in 1995 more than quadrupled the 1949 figure, or an
average increase of 3.1 percent a year… China's significant achievements in
developing grain production have not only basically eradicated the problem
of people not having enough to eat and wear and gradually raised the living
standards of the Chinese people, but also made great contributions to the
worldwide efforts to eliminate starvation and poverty.56--- The Grain Issue
in China, 1996 Chinese Government White Paper.

The passage quoted above seems to indicate that all has gone well since the China

Communist party took over the country in 1949. However, this official standpoint

neglected the human, social and ecological costs paid by the Chinese population along

with the repercussions that linger today, in the process of rapid modernization and

industrialization of the PRC. Most of the great upheaval and losses happened during

the Mao era, a period of time symbolized by mass movements, massive death due to

29
famine, and the large scale degradation of the environment. Why did the ruling elites

adopt such disastrous policies despite its intention to modernize the state and lift the

Chinese people out of poverty? In order to fully understand the evolving concept of

food security during this era, we need to review both the international and domestic

considerations of the PRC, with special reference to Mao during the Cold War.

As noted in the introduction, Johnston suggests that one of the international norms

that affected China’s international behaviour is the norm of national sovereignty57.

The concept of sovereignty has been deeply internalized as the sole legitimate way of

political and territorial division in the international system. The PRC has adopted a

particularly absolute form of the concept of sovereignty which affects both its self-

identification and foreign policy strongly. One of the reasons behind such a strong

internalization of the sovereignty norm is that China has suffered much since the

Opium War initiated by the British Empire in 1840 which triggered the subsequent

humiliations in the hands of Western powers in the ensuing century. Successive

leaders and intellectuals aim to restore China to its former glories, including the

communists. Collective memories of China being humiliated by ‘Imperial’ powers has

imprinted both a deep fear of further loss of China’s integrity and a dream of returning

China back to its proper ‘place in the sun’ in the minds of the founding members of

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The PRC was engaged in conflict with the

Western bloc almost as soon as the Communists took over the country, symbolized by

the Korean War. Later on, the PRC also clashed with the Soviets, leading to a serious

security threat to both its land and maritime borders58.

Facing such an adverse international security situation, early party leaders

30
recognized that merely ‘revolutionizing’ China was not enough to avoid future foreign

encroachment of sovereignty, China needed to be modernized on a par with the great

powers. In order to accomplish the aforementioned goal, the CCP leaders decided that

the PRC should develop according to the principle of self reliance, while exploiting

the contradictions between imperialist states to promote the revolutionary enterprise.

The PRC should therefore abandon its dependency on foreign resources- material,

intellectual and spiritual- in order to achieve true independence59. The adoption of the

principle of self reliance reflected the impact that the norm of sovereignty had on

China’s behaviour at both domestic and international levels.

The aforementioned approach and policy decisions to security in the early years of

the PRC illustrated how the history of contemporary China and the power structure of

the Cold War constructed a ‘victim’ identity in the self- perception of the Chinese

leaders, thus leading to the conscious decision to prioritize industry development,

especially heavy industry.

However, this did not mean that the CCP failed to understand the importance of

food production and agriculture in a nation that experienced frequent and serious

famines. The CCP differs and deviates much from the orthodox Marxism- Leninism.

The prominent example is the attitudes towards the revolutionary potential of the rural

population. The CCP established itself and won over the nationalist government

largely relying on the support from the Chinese peasants by promising land reforms60.

Therefore, the CCP had a reasonably good understanding of the importance of

securing food supply, as reflected by the following statement from Mao in 1957:

… We should strive for a good harvest this year. A good harvest this year will
give people a sense of security and significantly consolidate the co-operatives.

31
 The whole Party should attach great importance to agriculture. Agriculture has
vital bearing on the nation's economy and the people's livelihood. Take heed, for
it is very dangerous not to grasp grain production. If this is ignored, there will be
widespread disorder some day... If agriculture is in good shape and the peasants
are self-supporting, then 500 million people will feel secure61.

In the quoted speech, Mao demonstrated a clear understanding of the connection

between security and food supply, however, such an understanding differed from the

modern usage of food security as discussed in the previous chapter.

For Mao and other CCP leaders, agriculture was seen as a strategic sector that

provided capital for further industrialization and they perceived the issue of food

security as a matter of national security on a statist basis. In the same speech that Mao

proclaimed the importance of securing food for the population, he then went on to

elucidate his understanding between agriculture and modern industry known:

…Agriculture is the chief source of raw materials for light industry, for which
the countryside provides an important market. Only when agriculture is
developed can light industry get enough raw materials and find a vast market for
its goods…. Here again the countryside is an important market for heavy
industry… chemical fertilizer, farm machinery of all kinds and part of our
electric power, coal and petroleum are all supplied to the rural areas, and the
railways, the highways and the large water conservancy projects all serve
agriculture… Now that we have built up a socialist agricultural economy, the
countryside is becoming an immense market for our growing heavy and light
industries.62.

Such a approach to food security can be attributed back to the aforementioned self-

perception as ‘victim’ by the CCP leaders. Food security was subsumed under the

broader issue of national security which maintained the focus on the military arena.

32
 In practice, the aim of building a prosperous and economically independent PRC

was a highly daunting task because the existing base of modern industry in the early

years of the PRC was insignificant. The modern industrial sector of the Chinese

economy was less than half the size of the Tsarist Russian Empire, even at the peak

pre- 1949 levels. After years of civil conflicts and eight years of Sino- Japanese war,

the industrial sector of China was devastated. The agriculture output in PRC in 1952

was only about twenty percent of the historical result attained by the Soviets twenty-

five years earlier63. As the modernization and industrialization of the PRC required

enormous input of capital, the CCP leaders decided to ‘sacrifice’ the development of

agriculture.

In order to extract the most from the agriculture sector, the state implemented

agricultural collectivization and enforced low prices for agricultural products. These

two measures ensured centralized state control of essential food supplies, which could

then be redirected to the urban areas for the purpose of industrialization. A large

proportion of the costs of heavy- industry development were transferred via such a

mechanism to traditional economic sectors64. The centralized planned economic

system may well have been inefficient and heavily privileged the urban population,

but food security for both urban and rural populations was realized, due to the planned

resource- allocation system and improved motivation for the Chinese peasants. The

growth of Chinese industry outpaced even the most ambitious government planning.

Between 1952 and 1957, China achieved sixteen percent growth per annum. Even the

heavily extracted agriculture sector managed to achieve an annual growth rate of

nearly three percent for staple grains, keeping up with the population growth rate65.

33
 However, the remarkable growth achieved by the PRC in its early years was

completely overshadowed during the subsequent disastrous years from 1958- 1977. A

series of ill- considered and primarily ideologically driven policy decisions seriously

compromised food security during the ensuing two decades. As Mao Zedong was the

major guiding force behind the PRC’s domestic policies, understanding of his

thoughts is essential in interpreting the PRC’s approach to security during this chaotic

era.

In 1958, Mao initiated the Great Leap Forward at the Hankow conference with a

speech that foreshadowed the serious assault on food security from 1959 to 1961. He

proclaimed that:

The Monkey King disregarded the laws and the heavens. Why don’t we all
emulate him? His anti-dogmatism was demonstrated in his courage to do
whatever he wanted66.

Per capita availability of food energy decreased by thirty percent during those three

years. Western estimates of excess deaths due to famine and other famine- related

mortality range from 16.5 million to about 30 million while official mortalities

claimed 15 million deaths67.

How can the ruling elites, most of them coming from rural backgrounds have made

such insensible decisions? To address this question, we need to take into consideration

both ideological concerns and the broader international security environment.

At the domestic level, serious ideological concerns over the consequence of

modernization and industrialization outweighed prudent economic consideration. Mao

34
considered the communist revolution to be under threat as the process of

modernization created a ‘class’ of bureaucracy and the CCP itself was transformed

into a giant bureaucratic organization. The revolutionary spirit was eroded as the CCP

and the Chinese government were filled up with ‘new cadres’ that embraced the

values associated with modernization68. This is the ideological background that

prompted Mao to unleash the Great Leap Forward campaign in order to ensure the

ideological purity of the CCP and safeguard the fruits of the communist revolution69.

The decision to ‘sacrifice’ agriculture in the interests of rapid industrialization can

also be attributed to the adoption of the self- reliance approach to secure the new

China in the hostile environment of the Cold War. In the late 1950s, this was further

reinforced by the gradually deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union.

Before 1955, no signs of readjustment of the Sino- Soviet relationship could be

observed. However, success in economic development in the mid- 1950’s led to

smugness and self- confidence in China’s capability, providing a boost of self-

reliance nationalism. Reconsideration of the applicability of the Soviet experience

began. Furthermore, Khrushchev’s de- Stalinization also increased Mao’s self-

confidence. Suggestion of further military cooperation offended the Chinese

sensitivities and provided fuel for Mao’s suspicions of Soviet attempts to control the

development of China, just like the imperialist. Mao declared attenuation of Sino-

Soviet relations was needed to preserve China’s sovereignty70. The anti- Soviet

polemics of the early 1960s marked the end of the special relationship by

transforming the USSR from friend to foe--- a “Social Imperialist” 71. In short, the

Great Leap Forward can be explained on the basis of a mix of domestic and

35
international factors. In order to protect its sovereignty, China strove to modernize

overnight.

It can be argued, that the deteriorating security environment that China experienced

during the 1950s and 1960s, in addition to domestic political and ideological

concerns, reinforced the self- perception of China as a ‘victim’ of foreign power,

which in turn prompted the acceleration in modernization and industrialization,

leading to the Great Leap Forward. Mao once claimed that:

… [T] he world situation will have greatly changed by the end of the
century… In our country, on the average, everybody will have 100 tons of
steel and 2000 to 3000 catties of grain and feed, and the majority of people
will have a college education72.

It can be argued that the early leaders of the PRC did possess a concept of food

security, albeit one that was embedded in a traditional, statist understanding of

security. The combined influences of the Cold War structure of power and the

collective Chinese memory of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers led to the

adoption of a particular conception of national security, that was arguably broader

than the traditional approach to security that existed at the international level.

(iii) Deng Era (1978- 1990s)

With his immortal words, ‘Get rich is glorious.’, Deng Xiaoping is credited for his

brave abandonment of Maoist economic policies which triggered the transformation

of the PRC from an obsolete communist power to today’s market- driven, export-

oriented economy73.

36
 However, the core of Deng’s economic reform is not the often praised liberalization

of economic policies, it is the abandonment of the prioritization of industrial

development and agricultural collectivization, with a continuing interest in ensuring

food security, thus it should be noted that the importance of the Deng era lies not only

in the realm of the economy, but also is the beginning of a new understanding of

security in the minds of PRC leaders. It serves as an importance period of transition

between PRC’s early communist years and the market- driven society that we see

today

Deng took great strides in promoting an ideological shift away from Maoism that

was highly contested between PRC leaders, as not all of the post- Mao leaders agreed

to such radical changes. In his 1977 famous article, ‘The “Two Whatevers” do not

accord with Marxism’, Deng proclaimed an official ideological shift from Maoism:

We cannot mechanically apply what Comrade Mao Zedong said about a

particular question to another question, what he said in a particular place to
another place, what he said at a particular time to another time, or what he
said under particular circumstances to other circumstances. Comrade Mao
Zedong said that he too had made mistakes and that there had never been a
person whose statements were all correct or who was always absolutely
right. This is an important theoretical question, a question of whether or not
we are adhering to historical materialism74.

Deng’s proclamation should be considered as the origin of all subsequent measures

of reform, because a comprehensive reform of the Chinese economic system required

a rethinking of the formal communist ideology. From then onwards, China proceeded

towards a market- driven economy without a backpaddle.

37
 Apart from ideological reforms, another key aspect of Deng’s reform that directly

affected the issue of food security is the official adoption of the household

responsibility system (HRS), which contracted out land and allowed a portion of the

agriculture surplus to be retained by the peasants, instead of being held in a

centralized resource allocation system, thus increasing incentives for agriculture

production and the securing of food supply which is important to the purpose of this

thesis is that75. Deng justified such drastic departure from Maoist traditions in terms of

stability and security:

Proceeding from the realities in China, we must first of all solve the
problem of the countryside. Eighty per cent of the population lives in rural
areas, and China's stability depends on the stability of those areas. No
matter how successful our work is in the cities, it won't mean much without
a stable base in the countryside. We therefore began by invigorating the
economy and adopting an open policy there, so as to bring the initiative of
80 per cent of the population into full play76.

Furthermore, Deng abandoned another Maoist maxim on the issue of

industrialization. He decided to reverse the priority of agriculture in the official

planning of economic development.

We should establish the concept that agriculture is the foundation of the national
economy and that industry must serve it. A major task for industry is to support
agriculture and promote its modernization…I have written a letter to comrades in
Sichuan Province telling them that the more industry is developed, the more we
should adhere to the principle of giving first place to agriculture77.

How can such a remarkable change in the perception of food security be accounted

for? As I have discussed in the Mao era section, it is imperative to review both the

38
international and domestic security environment, in order to understand the changes

and continuities in the perception of the ruling elites on food security.

One of the key changes in the Deng era is the improvement of the security situation

at the international level. Despite the horrendous loss in lives and resources during the

Mao era, the PRC did succeeded in accomplishing rudimentary industrialization and

modernization, starting with an industrial base smaller than that of Belgium in the

1950s. When Deng took over, the PRC was one of the six largest industrial states in

the world. National income increased by 63 percent from 1957 to 1975 78. China’s

ability to defend itself was also greatly enhanced, leading to a shift in self- perception

as the PRC became more reassured of its own power. Sino- American relations

improved, as both states were worried about the Soviet Union becoming a serious

military threat due to Brezhnev’s great expansion of the Soviet armed forces 79. Deng

argued in 1985 that the international situation had improved for China:

Generally speaking, the forces for world peace are growing, but the danger of
war still exists. Not much progress has been made in the talks on control of
nuclear arms and of weapons in outer space. That's why for many years we
emphasized the danger of war. Recently, however, there have been some changes
in our views. We now think that although there is still the danger of war, the
forces that can deter it are growing, and we find that encouraging.

Consequently, it can be readily observed that the major security problems in the

Deng era were mostly domestic in nature. Food security, in particular was one of the

most important domestic issues at the time, along with a devastated economy, polluted

environment and lingering internal ideological confrontations with hardcore Maoists.

Therefore, Deng and other CCP leaders decided to put most of their efforts into

domestic security concerns, to take advantage of the improvement of the international

39
security environment. The shift in security priorities did not mean that the Deng era

leaders were less influenced by the sovereignty norm. Instead, the issue still remained

of seeking to achieve self- reliance in order to secure China’s sovereignty. Deng

considered that strengthening other economic sectors and returning the country to

normalcy after a decade of chaos were more important to protect China than the

reckless modernization and ‘permanent revolution’ promoted by Mao80.

Furthermore, the chaotic last years of the Mao era demonstrated a serious deficiency

in the Maoist concept of security, which prompted his successors to look for a new

approach to security. Food security remained integral and important to the Chinese

concept of security during the Deng era, despite dramatic changes in the international

and domestic security environment. Also, the Chinese concept of security continued

to broaden. It was arguably more flexible to changes than the contemporary Western

notion, which remained realist and statist in nature, without consideration of the non-

traditional security agenda.

As China continues to develop economically and open up to the world, the

perceptions of the ruling elites continue to evolve too. Moreover, increased

cooperation at the international level is leading to changes in perception. The

following chapter will investigate the idea of food security in relation to China’s

international engagement.

40
 Chapter Three:
Understanding Food Security in China:
Changing identities and Great Power Responsibility

(i) The Changing International Security Environment

As the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, symbolized by the disintegration of the

Soviet Union, the international security environment has undergone significant

changes. Only one superpower, the United States, remains and the possibility of a

world war involving the remaining great powers significantly decreases. However, the

decrease in inter- state violent conflicts was not matched by a similar reduction in

intra- state or civil violent conflicts. A series of virulently violent intra-state conflicts,

such as Rwanda and Kosovo, occurred soon after the end of Cold War. As more and

more episodes of internal violence and unrest emerged in the developing world, the

international security community--- academics, statesmen and international

policymakers strove to keep up with the fluid and chaotic international security

environment, leading to the formulation of the non- traditional security agenda in the

41
1990s and 2000s.

Amid all the changes in the security environment at the international level, China

continued to reform its economy and infrastructure, transforming itself from a

developing state with an balanced economy to the ‘great factory’ of the world which

improved the quality of life of the Chinese people greatly. Moreover, traditional

security threats to China diminished significantly in the post- Cold War world. The

dissolution of the Soviet Union eased the military threat on the northern border. At the

same time, improved relations with the USA also reduced the military threat on the

maritime border, despite the unresolved issue of Taiwan. The Chinese defence white

book, China’s National Defense in 2004, officially claimed that the international

security environment was reasonably peaceful:

Peace and development remain the dominating themes of the times. Although the
international situation as a whole tends to be stable, factors of uncertainty,
instability and insecurity are on the increase81.

As for the non- traditional security issues in China, the food security situation in the

1990s improved greatly. During the Deng era agricultural reforms proved to be highly

successful and food productivity increased sharply in the 1980s and 1990s. From

1984 to 1995, the total yield of staple grain increased by fifteen percent and the total

yield of meat increased by two hundred percent82. Both the quality and quantity of

Chinese food supply improved remarkably.

However, the security achievements of the PRC were challenged after a decade of

successes. In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis led to stagnations and reverses in

economic development in the Asia- Pacific region.83 China did not suffer seriously in

42
the Crisis, but this was the first time the ruling elites of the PRC observed the effects

of an international non- traditional security crisis in the region. The internal racial

strife and subsequent regime change in Indonesia in 1998 illustrated the threats to

national and human security from non- traditional security issues such as financial

instability and poor governance84.

Six years later, the PRC experienced a significant international non- traditional

security crisis itself. In 2003, a worldwide outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory

Syndrome (SARS) began from Guangdong Province of China. Since the initial index

case, the SARS virus transmitted across the globe with unprecedented speed,

overwhelming the public health systems of many states in a matter of weeks. The

World Health Organization declared the first global alert in its 55- year history and

issued advice against travel to China, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and Vietnam.

The subsequent political and economic effect was devastating as Asian markets and

business sectors plummeted. The Western states declared strict quarantine measures at

ports of entry to stop the disease from infecting their citizens, which caused great

congestion and slowed down the global economic process85. China suffered serious

loss in terms of human lives and economic development during the SARS epidemic.

Furthermore, the epidemic was the first major non- traditional security crisis

experienced by the PRC since the Deng era.

At the same time, the food security of China was challenged after enjoying a

decade of self- reliance in food production from 1980s to 1990s. The increase in

consumption and difficulties in increasing the productivity of agriculture due to

43
environmental constraints forced China to import a significant amount of food after a

decade of self- reliance:

China's annual grain production is expected to hit a new high of 520 million tons
in five years but rising consumption will still leave a shortfall… Consumption
may surge to 550 million tons in 2010, when the population is projected to reach
1.345 billion. In addition to soybeans, the country may need to import around 20
million tons of grain in 2010…86

Furthermore, the entry of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) means

China has to open up its domestic market to foreign agricultural exports and reduce

support to the Chinese peasants, decreasing the domestic agricultural capacity and

subject the food supply of China to fluctuations of international food market when

China increase its reliance on food import87.

(ii) Non- Traditional Security and Globalization

This series of non- traditional security crises prompted an interest in the non-

traditional security agendas among the ruling elites and Chinese academics, which

lead to the formulation of the New Security Concept (NSC) that focused on regional

and global cooperation on security issues in 1997, as noted in Chapter 188. The

Chinese government officially adopted the non- traditional security agenda into its

security doctrines in 2003. At the 16th Chinese Communist Party, the then President of

the PRC, Jiang Zemin, discussed the Chinese understanding of the non- traditional

security agenda:

Uncertainties affecting peace and development are on the rise. The elements
of traditional and non-traditional threats to security are intertwined, and the

44
 scourge of terrorism is more acutely felt. Hegemonism and power politics
have new manifestations. Local conflicts triggered by ethnic or religious
contradictions and border or territorial disputes have cropped up from time
to time. The North-South gap is widening…

This new official Chinese understanding of non- traditional security reflected an

emphasis on the relations between globalization and the rise of non- traditional

security issues. Wang Yong, a leading IR scholar in China, explained the rise in non-

traditional security threats as being partly attributed ‘to fragmentation effects caused

by globalization, and under-regulated market forces’89.

Chinese academics considered globalization as an irreversible trend in the post-

Cold War world which complicated the international security environment. They

argued that globalization escalates the North- South divide and facilitates the rapid

spread of security threats, especially the non- traditional ones, around the world, due

to globalization of communication and transport technologies90.

Wang then further elaborated on the Chinese understanding of the nature and origins

of non- traditional security threats in the increasingly globalized world:

Comparing with traditional security issues, mainly the interstate security

interactions or security matters, non- traditional security can be defined as
transnational security matters and intrastate sources of security threat. Major
actors in non- traditional security issues is not state but terrorist [sic],
extreme nationalists, drug trafficking and population trafficking groups…
The transnational sources of security threat, is mainly non-military threat,
but in a globalizing world, these security threats can produce damages to
international community as powerful as any military threat91.

It should be noted here that food security is not mentioned in the aforementioned

new Chinese understanding of non- traditional security. In Chapter two, the

45
importance of food security in the ruling elites’ understanding of security has been

reviewed. I have suggested that the CCP ruling elites consistently held the issue of

food security in high regard, despite the differences in interpretation of the Marxist

ideology between Mao and Deng. How do we account for the absence of food

security in the post- Cold War on the Chinese non- traditional security agenda? What

is the situation of food security today? And how do we account for the changes in the

understanding to security among the ruling elites?

During the Mao and Deng eras, food security has been considered as an important

domestic non- traditional security issue by the ruling elites, despite the fact that their

perception and understanding of its importance was heavily shaped by the traditional,

realist perspective of security. The emphasis of self- reliance in Chinese agricultural

policies was the result of combination of a hostile international security environment

and the Chinese elites’ self- perception as ‘victim’, which matches the combined

effect of the international norm of sovereignty and collective memory of Chinese as

suggested by Johnston92.

However, the issue of food security in China ceases to be a purely domestic concern.

During this period, foreign influence on the Chinese idea of food security was limited.

In the contemporary era, today’s ruling elites have to face the reality that the PRC

today is deeply embedded in the international economy, and that China’s food security

therefore is deeply intertwined with the international community. Self- reliance in

food, albeit still proclaimed as a official goal by the Chinese government, has to be

supplemented complemented by substantial imports via international trade in the

globalized world. This, in turn, has reinforced the importance of international

46
cooperation in relation to non- traditional security concerns.

In the PRC’s defence white book, China’s National Defense in 2004, the Chinese

government stated that the PRC aims to resolve non- traditional security issues

through cooperation with other states and intenational organizations (IOs),

China attaches great importance to security cooperation in the non-

traditional security fields with other countries, maintaining that in jointly
combating non-traditional security threats, it is imperative to address both
the symptoms and root causes and to adopt comprehensive measures93.

The international norm of sovereignty is still deeply internalized and respected

among Chinese elites as reflected by the fact that the Chinese government has yet to

fully adopt the concept of human security because the relations between human

security, international human right norms and international interventions are too

sensitive for the ruling elites. However, the contemporary ruling elites are becoming

more flexible in their approaches in securing China’s sovereignty, as isolation and

self-reliance is no longer an option for today’s China. China is deeply involved in

globalization , and the ruling elites understand that China need to cooperate at the

international level in order secure itself at the domestic level, as non- traditional

security issues are multi- faceted in nature94.

Furthermore, the self- identification of Chinese elites is different from the Mao and

Deng era. Twenty- five years of economic growth have improved China’s material

power significantly and the PRC is no longer surrounded by hostile states as it was

during the era of Cold War. The ‘victim’ identity has gradually been replaced by self-

confidence, as reflected in a government document, published in 2005:

47
 Peace is the foundation for development while development is fundamental for
peace. For years, the Chinese government and people have made unremitting
efforts to create a peaceful international environment. They cherish dearly the
peaceful international environment jointly created by the peace-loving and
progress-seeking countries and peoples, concentrate on their own construction
and whole-heartedly seek development, and strive constantly to make positive
contributions to world peace and development with their own growth, and
promote human civilization and progress95. --- China’s Peaceful Development
Road, 2005 Chinese Government White Paper.

(iii) China’s Participation in cooperation related International Food Security

Such changes in the ruling elites’ responses to a new security environment can also

be observed in the issue of food security. The absence of speech references to food

security in the new official Chinese non- traditional security agenda does not

necessarily indicate that today’s ruling elites have failed to understand importance of

food security. In face China is becoming much more assertive in its foreign policy

behaviour, and it is attempting to present itself as a responsible great power in

international affairs related to food security. In fact, China is becoming much more

assertive in its international cooperation, in particular on the issue of food security at

the international level.

China’s new stance on international food security can be traced back to 1996. At

the 1996 World Food Summit, Premier Li Peng pledged enormous support for China’s

active participation in promoting international cooperation related to food security.

Five years later, the then Vice-Premier of the State Council, Wen Jiabao, reaffirmed

the PRC’s commitment pledged by his predecessor:

48
 Since the 1996 World Food Summit, the Chinese Government has earnestly
honoured its relevant commitments and further consolidated the fundamental
standing of agriculture, bringing China's food production and its level of food
security to a new high. We shall continue to act in accordance with the Plan of
Action of the 1996 Summit and take effective measures to protect our food
production capacity so as to lay a good foundation for economic growth and
social progress…China has established good cooperative relations with United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, World Food Programme and other
international organizations and agencies… On our part, China has also provided
assistance within its capacity to some developing countries one way or the other
over the years96.

Since then, the PRC has participated the relevant international organizations (IOs)

such as the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food & Agriculture Organization

(FAO), the UNDP and the World Bank to cooperate in projects that aim to alleviate

food insecurity in both China and other developing states. It should be noted that the

PRC is no longer the recipient of food aid from the World Food Programme, which

indicates international recognition of the success it has achieved in securing its own

food supply97. Now it seems that the PRC is attempting to promote its own successful

experience to other developing states. The PRC, for example, has signed several aid

agreements with African and Pacific states. In Sierra Leone, the PRC has agreed to

cooperate with the FAO to provide technical aid:

This project entails the fielding of technical assistance services by the People's
Republic of China in consultation with the FAO for the identification, designing
and implementation of the Special Programme for Food Security for a period of
two to four years in two phases98.

As for the aid in Oceania region,

49
 [China]… will send 36 agricultural experts and technicians specialized in
agronomy, irrigation, livestock and fisheries, to eight Pacific Island nations, FAO
announced today… The initiative is part of FAO's South-South Cooperation
Programme that aims to strengthen cooperation among developing countries to
improve agricultural productivity and ensure access to food for all99.

Furthermore, China has become the third largest food donor in the world, lagging
behind only the United States of America and the combined efforts of the European
Union:

In the same year it stopped receiving food aid from the World Food Programme
(WFP), China emerged as the globe's third largest food aid donor in 2005,
according to the organization's latest annual Food Aid Monitor 100.

(iv) What does this mean to Chinese Foreign Policy?

The above trends seem to indicate that China’s identity as a major power is

undergoing significant transformation. China is increasing its participation in global

governance that aims to improve the international food security situation. In so doing,

it is gradually transforming itself into a new international identity of a responsible

power. In his work on relations between normative changes and Chinese foreign

policy, Alastair Iain Johnston suggests that,

Over the 1980s and 1990s China’s self- identification has undergone a
change, a blurring. The traditional sovereign- centric, autonomous major
power identity--- rooted at the very least in the myths of modern Chinese
nationalism--- has been uneasily linked to newer identity as a responsible
major power, one whose status is measured in part by participation in
institutions that increasingly regulate interstate behaviour… Chinese leaders
are more sensitive to China being portrayed as an isolated, obstructionist
player in international institutions, since such accusations clash with this
evolving new- identity, an identity that is supported by other actors in the

50
 system101.

It should be duly noted that Johnston’s remarks were articulated in late 1990s and the

focus of his discussion of the time was not non- traditional security, as the concept of

non- traditional security has only been introduced recently. However, I would argue

that the way in whcich Chinese elites understand and act upon the issue of food

security does match Johnston’s argument on the relationship between identity changes

and foreign policy behaviour. The difference between my thesis and Johnston’s

argument is that I place a stronger emphasis upon changes in the domestic security

environment as being equally important to the changes in national identity as the

improvements in China’s engagement at the international level, while Johnston’s

argument largely focused on the effect of national identity from international

normative structures only.

The new Chinese national identity of being a major responsible power provides

further explanations to the contemporary Chinese behaviour at the international level.

What does responsibility mean for China? In order to account for this, I am turning to

the English School approach to international relations. Hedley Bull argues that

management by the great powers is one of the principal institutions that sustain order

in international society102.

For Bull, there are five ways that great powers should act in order to maintain the

international social order: (1) Preservation of the general balance of power;

(2)Avoidance and Control of Crises; (3)Limitation of War; (4)The Unilateral Exercise

of local Preponderance; and (5) [Maintenance of] Spheres of Influence, Interest or

51
Responsibility103.

These five issues outlined above can be generalized into two principles of action:

careful management of relations between great powers themselves and careful

exploitation of their preponderance in a way that encourages the rest of international

society to abide by the shared norms, rules and values104. From the five issues outlined

above, it can be readily observed that Bull considers great power management of key

importance in maintaining the international social order.

Despite Bull’s own warning about the limitations of his theory to international

society, his theory remains valid for more than twenty years after the Cold War. The

foundation of his theory, preservation of elementary social goals (‘life’, ‘truth’,

‘property’) remains accepted by most of the states as observed by frequent reassertion

of the inviolable nature of national sovereignty. At the same time, other aspects of the

international society have been strengthened as various international institutions have

demonstrated higher vitality in the post Cold War world105.

The new assertiveness of China in international affairs related to food security

matches Bull’s argument on great power responsibility well. The difference between

Bull’s scenario and the contemporary case is that the issues that a major power needs

to contend with are mainly non- traditional security issues, as contrasted with the

52
traditional security threats in the era of the Cold War.

Furthermore, Bull’s theory on great power responsibility complements Johnston’s

arguments. As China becomes more involved in the globalized world and participates

more in non- traditional security affairs, China’s national identity is likely to continue

to evolve. In effect, it seems that China is gradually adopting the emerging

international norm of non- traditional security and China’s foreign behaviour is

affected by such adoption, in addition to the elementary social goals suggested by

Bull. In the turbulent post- Cold War world, the PRC’s national identity continues to

evolve flexibly, as the fluid domestic and international security environments

fluctuate, leading to changes in Chinese foreign policy, as observed in the changes in

understanding of food security among Chinese elites.

53
 Conclusions

China's national security environment in this pluralistic, diversified and

interdependent world has on the whole improved, but new challenges keep
cropping up106--- China’s National Defense in 2004, Chinese Government
White Paper.

This thesis has been an effort to observe, articulate and analyze the effects of

national identity on the Chinese understanding of non- traditional security and related

foreign policy behaviour. As I noted at the start, food security, a key and integral part

of the non- traditional security agenda, has not received enough attention as other

aspects on the non- traditional security agenda. Moreover, the existing studies on non-

traditional security remain largely Western in origin, and the voice of the developing

states has also not received due attention.

The thesis has attempted to address the gap in the literature by bringing in a Chinese

perspective. In the fifty- odd years history of the PRC, the issue of food security has

been given important and consistent attention by the ruling elites. From the

unglamorous beginning of the Mao era, a time that food security were often

compromised despite the best intentions of the ruling elites, to the dramatic changes in

54
the Deng era which the Chinese population were protected from famine for the first

time in contemporary China history, and finally today’s rapidly developing, market-

driven economy. The changes and shifts in the understanding of non- traditional

security, in particular food security, among the ruling elites closely match the ebbs

and flows of the domestic and international security environment.

As China has increased its participation with the international society, the effects of

contending international norms--- sovereignty versus interdependence, upon the

Chinese concept of non- traditional security has also increased. In the beginning, the

Chinese understanding of non- traditional security mainly focused of food security

and was largely statist in nature, matching the concept of comprehensive security.

Today, both the material wealth and the intellectual development of the PRC are

gradually reaching on a par with other world powers, reflecting the gradual evolution

of the China’s national identity. Through the lens of food security, I have articulated

the changes and continuities in the Chinese concept of non- traditional security in the

history of the PRC. Food security remains a central concern in the Chinese non-

traditional security agenda, but other concerns such as economic security, public

health security and environmental security have also receives serious attention, as

both the domestic and international security environments have became more

vulnerable to these non- traditional security threats.

What does the new approach to security tell us about Chinese foreign policy

behaviour in the era of globalization? This thesis has attempted this question, by

drawing upon the arguments of Alastair Iain Johnston and Hedley Bull. I have taken a

constructivist approach in my review of the PRC’s history and its contemporary

55
behaviour, because changes in national identity are related to both international

normative structures, as argued by Johnston, and the history of a nation, as argued by

Bull.

As China continues to evolve and embbed itself within the international society,

Johnston claims that it has become a status quo power, instead of a threat to

international stability and security107. This thesis has demonstrated that the PRC, is

indeed, gradually adapting and internalizing the international norm of non- traditional

security despite the hesitations of the government in confronting the conflicts between

sovereignty, intervention and human rights, that permeate the discourse at the

international level. Furthermore, this process of China’s entry into the international

society is reinforcing the shift in its changing national identity from ‘victim’ to being

a responsible great power.

At the same time at the domestic level, China continues to struggle in its quest to

secure food supply to its growing population. Despite achieving food security at the

national level, household and regional food security is still a concern, especially in the

less developed Western provinces108. It is also important to consider that the food

security situation at the international level is even more dire, as other regions of the

world have failed to achieve the spectacular success in Asia- Pacific. According to a

recent report by the Food and Agricultural Organization:

Ten years after the 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) in Rome, which
promised to reduce the number of undernourished people by half by 2015,
there were more hungry people in the developing countries today – 820
million – than there were in 1996…Far from decreasing, the number of
hungry people in the world is currently increasing – at the rate of four

56
 million a year109.

It is imperative for the IR community to devote more attention to food security

instead of lumping the issue together with other issues on the non- traditional security

agenda. The different issues of food, energy, environment, and health\ are, of course,

interconnected, but the entanglement of these issues both theoretically and empirically

is not necessarily lead to an improvement in understanding. Therefore, a future

research direction is to develop the research agenda of food security as a singleissue

area.

Furthermore, the lack of voice from the developing world is disconcerting as it is

the developing world that is the vulnerable to non- traditional security threats, which

will are then likely to escalate into global problems due to the interconnected nature

patterns of global engagement. The study of the Chinese concept of non- traditional

security provides a starting point in a series of studies on the concept and perception

of the non- traditional security agenda in other developing states.

In today’s chaotic post- Cold War world, issues of non- traditional security,

especially food security have assumed higher significance than traditional military

concerns due to globalization. The fact that food security, a key and integral part of

the non- traditional security, has received so little attention within the discipline of IR,

should be reflected upon, because such negligence leads to poor understanding of

multi- faceted nature of the varied non- traditional security threats, clearly reduces the

potential to formulate an effective policy response. I shall conclude this thesis by a

quote from the Rome Declaration and Plan of Action, to remind us of the importance

of food security and the global implications of failure:

57
The problems of hunger and food insecurity have global dimensions and are
likely to persist, and even increase dramatically in some regions, unless urgent,
determined and concerted action is taken, given the anticipated increase in the
world's population and the stress on natural resources110…We must step up
dramatically our efforts to reach the WFS hunger reduction target. If the political
will is there we can reach it111.

58
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101

Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 77.
102
Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 23- 38.
103
Ibid, pp. 200- 201.
104
Ibid, p. 200
105
Dunne, Tim, Inventing International Society, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), pp. 152- 154.
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October 2006, [http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Ejohnston/cornellpaper.pdf].

108
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