SOLOMON

1. CRISOSTOMO vs. ATTY. NAZARENO (A.C. No. 6677, 10 June 2014)

FACTS:
Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units, the subject properties in a subdivision. In
view of inadequacies, the complainants sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the
HLURB, seeking refund of the monthly amortizations they had paid. In all the rescission cases, the development
company was represented by Atty. Nazareno.
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of rescission cases. Sometime in
August 2003, Rudex filed 3 petitions for review before the HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications against
forum shopping attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its President and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno,
stated that it has not commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues
pending before any court, tribunal or agency – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the representation
of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case against one of the complainants.
Thereafter, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another complaint against one of the complainants
before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s ejectment, similar to its earlier
ejectment complaint. Yet, in the certification against forum shopping attached thereto Rudex declared that it has
not commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court,
tribunal or agency. The said certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself. On February 21, 2005,
complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that
in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed
while Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or
proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or agency
when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission had been filed by herein complainants before the
HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty.
Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as
a notary public since he only assigned (1) document number inall the certifications against forum shopping that
were separately attached to the 6 complaints for rescission and ejectment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty?

RULING:
Yes.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno – as mandated by the
Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have truthfully declared the existence of the
pending related cases in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings.
Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even bother to refute the charges against him despite due notice, the
Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his administrative liability. However, as for
the penalty to be imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public, considering that he
assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications against forum shopping attached to
the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have
been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in
the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document
notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him
a number corresponding to the one in his register. Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing
rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the aforementioned
complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not commenced
any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending actions or proceedings involving the same issues in
any other forum. The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated as a
violation of Rule 1.01,Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio.
As such, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for one year.
SOLOMON

2. ALPAJORA vs. ATTY. CALAYAN (A.C. No. 8208)

FACTS:
This case is a counter-complaint filed by complainant against respondent, which originated from an administrative
complaint filed by respondent against Alpajora for ignorance of the law and/or issuance of undue order.
It stemmed from an intra-corporate case entitled CEFI vs. Atty. Calayan. Respondent was President and
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of CEFI. He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for
himself. Court proceedings ensued despite several inhibitions by judges to whom the case was re-raffled until it
was finally re-raffled to complainant. Thereafter, complainant issued an Omnibus Order,  for the creation of a
management committee and the appointment of its members. That Order prompted the filing of the administrative
case against the Judge Alpajora.
The administrative case was dismissed. Complainant claimed that Atty. Calayan also filed two (2) related intra-
corporate controversy cases - violating the rule on splitting causes of actions - involving the management and
operation of the foundation. According to complainant, these showed the propensity and penchant of respondent
in filing cases, whether or not they are baseless, frivolous or unfounded, with no other intention but to harass,
malign and molest his opposing parties, including the lawyers and the handling judges. Complainant also
disclosed that before his sala, respondent filed eighteen (18) repetitious and prohibited pleadings.  Respondent
continuously filed pleadings after pleadings as if to impress upon the court to finish the main intra-corporate case
with such speed. To complainant's mind, the ultimate and ulterior objective of respondent in filing the numerous
pleadings, motions, manifestation and explanations was to prevent the takeover of the management of CEFI and
to finally dismiss the case at the pre-trial stage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty?

RULING:
Yes.
As noted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not deny filing several cases, both civil and
criminal, against opposing parties and their counsels. In his motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of
Governors' Resolution, he again admitted such acts but expressed that it was not ill-willed. He explained that the
placing of CEFI under receivership and directing the creation of a management committee and the continuation of
the receiver's duties and responsibilities by virtue of the Omnibus Order spurred his filing of various pleadings
and/or motions. It was in his desperation and earnest desire to save CEFI from further damage that he implored
the aid of the courts. The Court is mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal.
However, professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications. The filing of cases by respondent against the adverse parties and their counsels, as correctly
observed by the Investigating Commissioner, manifests his malice in paralyzing the lawyers from exerting their
utmost effort in protecting their client's interest. Even assuming arguendo that such acts were done without
malice, it showed respondent's gross indiscretion as a colleague in the legal profession. As officers of the court,
lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to
abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a
judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
Here, respondent has consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the complainant in his pleadings.
He insisted that complainant antedated the order, dated August 15, 2008, because the envelopes where the order
came from were rubber stamped as having been mailed only on August 26, 2008. He also accused the
complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable close ties with the adverse counsels; and that
complainant irrefutably coached said adverse counsels. However, these bare allegations are absolutely
unsupported by any piece of evidence. Respondent did not present any proof to establish complainant's alleged
partiality or the antedating. The date of mailing indicated on the envelope is not the date of issue of the said order.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing unsupported ill-motives to complainant. It
must be remembered that all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote
confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the
judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. Hence, no matter how
passionate a lawyer is towards defending his client's cause, he must not forget to display the appropriate decorum
expected of him, being a member of the legal profession, and to continue to afford proper and utmost respect due
to the courts.
SOLOMON

As such, respondent is guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and CPR and is hereby ordered suspendeD from the
practice of law for two years.

3. IN RE: ALMACEN (G.R. NO. L-27654)

FACTS:
This case is Atty. Vicente Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title”, filed in protest against
what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity."
His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice,
he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition
with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our
faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty?

RULING:
Yes.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The
vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of
legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public
attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is
not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the
exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in
a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be
intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and
healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the
quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as
a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such
individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office.  So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself,
not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties,
nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
As such, respondent is suspended indefinitely.
SOLOMON

4. RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY (A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC)

FACTS:
On 28 April 2010, the decision in Vinuya v Executive Secretary was promulgated. To this, Atty. Roque and Atty.
Bagares hurled allegations of plagiarism against the ponencia. Thereafter, thirty seven members of the faculty of
the UP COL published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the decision.
They call for the resignation of the ponencia.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the faculty members are guilty?

RULING:
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that the right
to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not
only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have
exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

xxxx

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x x.

xxxx

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates
or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of
people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In
re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]);
or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive,
manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs.
Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers
Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87
[1989]).

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly unfounded and
impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x
x
As such, respondents are warned.
SOLOMON

5. AVIDA vs. ATTY. ARGOSINO (A.C. No.7437)

FACTS:
Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision houses and
lots. Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction & Development Corporation (Rodman).
Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman, under which the latter was to acquire from the former a
subdivision house and lot through bank financing.
After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the property.
In three separate letters , complainant demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding balance. Both parties agreed
that the amount would be paid on a deferred basis within 18 months.
Rodman made a partial payment. It also claimed to have made other payments, which complainant
disputed.Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and demanded that Rodman
vacate the subject property.As Rodman remained in possession of the property, complainant filed an unlawful
detainer case against the former.
Soon after, Rodman filed a Complaint before the (HLURB) seeking the nullification of the rescission of the
Contract to Sell. It also prayed for the accounting of payments and the fixing of the period upon which the balance
of the purchase price should be paid.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Computation of Interest before the HLURB. Complainant filed its
Opposition with Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and Possession. In its Order, the HLURB accordingly
computed the interest due to complainant. It also directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing the
HLURB Board's earlier Resolution.
Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of Execution,  respondent, on behalf of Rodman, filed a
Motion (1) to Quash the Writ of Execution; (2) for Clarification; and (3) to Set the Case for Conference.  The said
motion injected new issues and claims and demanded the inclusion in the Order of a "provision that upon actual
receipt of the amount of ₱2,685,479.64, [complainant] should simultaneously turn-over the duplicate original title
to Rodman."
On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case, complainant filed a Complaint-
Affidavit against respondent for alleged professional misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. The
Complaint alleged that respondent's conduct in relation to the HLURB case manifested a disregard of various
rules of the CPR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of professional misconduct?

RULING:
Yes.
As a lawyer, respondent indeed owes fidelity to the cause of his client and is expected to serve the latter with
competence and diligence. As such, respondent is entitled to employ every honorable means to defend the cause
of his client and secure what is due the latter.
Professional rules, however, impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are required to exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. The Code also obliges lawyers
to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of their client.
What is patent from the acts of respondent - as herein narrated and evident from the records - is that he has
made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and ultimately caused unjust delays in the
administration of justice. These acts are in direct contravention of Rules 10.3 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Under the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline’s Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (IBP Guidelines),
reprimand is generally appropriate as a penalty when a lawyer’s negligence causes injury or potential injury to a
client or a party. In this case, respondent’s injurious court orders. He knowingly abused the legal process and
violated orders of the HLURB Board of Regional Office with the intent of delaying the execution of s judgment that
had long been final and executory. That he continued to do so even if a Complaint was already filed against him
proved that his acts were deliberate.
As such, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.