Sector DA - AB

DIB v2---Preseason
Notes
Strategy
If reading with a NFU or Don’t Strike CP, then read either the space col impact or AI
impact---I’ve included a version of the 1nc da in the Core section with the AI impact
because space col might be impact turnable
Linear framing is really important for the 1nr
Aerospace impact works really well with an AFF that reduces plane sales
AT: Offsets
I specifically made this file without an econ impact to deal with this argument – offsets
are non responsive to impacts about DIB innovation etc. This DA should not be read with
an econ impact because that is by far the weakest part of the DA
Link
If the 2ac’s only real answer is “no link, the aff is small” reading the entire link wall will kill
the 1a
The large pile of link cards is meant to answer the whole “we don’t link because we’re
cowards and read a small aff” arg
Core
OFF---[S]
Arms sales are key to the defense sector---stopping sales crushes
readiness and causes global instability.
Eaglen and Sayers 9, Mackenzie Eaglen is a resident fellow in the Marilyn Ware Center
for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Eric Sayers is the Defense
Policy Advisor to Congressman J. Randy Forbes (R-VA), Chairman of the House Armed
Services Readiness Subcommittee. 2009 “Maintaining the Superiority of America's
Defense Industrial Base”,
heritage,http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/05/maintaining-the-superiority-of-
americas-defense-industrial-base – BS
America's military strength remains vital to preserving the nation's interests and
sustaining international stability . While much of this strength is derived from the professionalism and skills of
America's armed forces, the technologically superior military platforms that the U.S. has
developed and fielded since World War II are also vital to ensuring a superior fighting force. In both peace and war,
America's defense manufacturing industrial base has allowed the United States to
design and build an advanced array of weapons systems and platforms to meet the full
spectrum of potential missions the military may be called upon to fulfill. Securing America's
military dominance for the decades ahead will require : An industrial base that can retain a highly skilled
workforce with critical skill sets and Sustained investment in platforms that offer future commanders and
civilian leaders a vital set of core military capabilities and equipment to respond to any threat. America's
military may also benefit from a more open international defense market. A 2005 Heritage Foundation study examined the effect of
globalization on the defense market and concluded that access to foreign suppliers would play a significant and positive role in helping the
Pentagon to access a broader industrial base and meet immediate defense needs more efficiently.[1] These findings still hold true today.
While remaining focused on the critical technologies, industries, and skills that are not readily available in the global market, Congress
should also support increased foreign military sales to help complement America's domestic defense industrial base. Following the
sweeping procurement changes proposed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in President Barack Obama's fiscal year (FY) 2010
defense budget, the decisions awaiting congressional review will directly affect America's defense industrial base for years to come. These
funding decisions about what the military will and will not buy are a primary factor in determining whether America will retain its military
primacy a decade from now. The critical workforce ingredients in sustaining an industrial base capable of building next-generation systems
are specialized design, engineering, and manufacturing skills. The consolidation of the defense industry during the 1990s has placed an
increased burden on a small collection of defense companies, and the consolidation of major defense contractors has led to a general
reduction in the number of available workers. Already at a turning point, the potential closure of major defense manufacturing lines in the
next five years with no additional scheduled production could shrink this national asset even further. While the manufacturing workforce
alone should not dictate congressional defense acquisition decisions, the potential defense "brain drain" must be considered when
Congress determines whether or not to permanently shut down major production lines--particularly shipbuilding and aerospace. More often
than not, once these highly skilled workers exit the federal workforce, they are difficult to recruit back and more expensive to retrain with
significant project gaps. Given the inherently unpredictable nature of the international security system, Congress must take a long-term
perspective for defense planning. More specifically, Congress should closely examine the national security implications of the pending
closure of several major production lines, including the F-22 Raptor, C-17 Globemaster III, F/A-18E/F, F-15E Strike Eagle, High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System, Airborne Laser, and various rotary-wing programs when crafting the annual defense bills for FY 2010. The
Foundation of American Military Strength Since World War II, the United States has benefited from the skills of a
robust defense industrial and manufacturing workforce . Over six decades, various U.S.
defense strategies have emphasized the benefits of a technologically superior
military to help deter and win wars . This " technical overmatch " has been pursued by
the U.S. military for decades in an attempt to deter potential enemies from engaging the U.S. in
conflict and to reduce risk and the loss of life on the battlefield. The ability to maintain
America's military technological edge reflects the superior efficiency of America's
defense industry. America's capital-intensive Air Force and Navy operate the world's best fighter aircraft, long-range bombers,
aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, and submarines. Similarly, the Army is building a host of next-generation platforms,
including tanks and attack helicopters, that will allow it to complete its missions. This is also the case in platform
systems and areas such as low-observable and very-low-observable technologies, submarine quieting, acoustic detection, digital-
signal processing for a range of applications, active electronically scanned arrays, near-real-time sensor-to-shooter targeting connectivity,
assured American military superiority, the
and all-weather guided munitions.[2] technology alone has not
defense industry has nevertheless been a potent enabler of American military might. The
base of this power can be found in a series of core capabilities that the U.S. has been able to
maintain and continue to modernize over recent decades. These include, among others, air dominance,
strategic lift, the ability to project power throughout and beyond the world's oceans, counterinsurgency proficiency, and the ability to seize
and control land. Maintaining these capabilities has enabled the soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine to remain adequately prepared for a full spectrum of potential operations. Defense Industrial Base Challenges Following the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. examined the intentions of the Soviet Union and determined that "persistent crisis, conflict, and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin's militancy."[3] Based on this assumption, the U.S.
government invested considerable resources2 in maintaining a large-scale peacetime military force to provide a global military presence that could contain and, if necessary, defeat Soviet aggression. Barry Watts of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has outlined how the defense industry has evolved since this time:[4] Formation and early growth after World War II (1945-1960); Stabilization as a distinct industry during the Cold War (1960-1990); and Post-Cold War
fundamental restructuring (1990-2007). The growth of the defense industry after World War II peaked in the late 1950s when defense production became a leading sector of the national economy, a trend that would continue well into the 1980s. An increased focus on the development of advanced defense technologies also occurred during this period. By 1960, the federal government was responsible for 58 percent of the nation's research and development investments. This emphasis
required a new level of engineering skills and capabilities within the industry to help develop the complex defense systems the government sought to build.[5] When the Cold War ended in 1991, the sudden supposed dissolution of national security threats launched a period of intense downsizing and consolidation. Whereas more than 50 major defense firms dominated the market in the early 1990s, only six prime contractors remained by the end of the decade.[6] Although this trend
started in 1985 when defense spending began to decline, it became more significant in the 1990s under President Bill Clinton and a sustained period of reduced defense spending. The effects of the 1990s procurement holiday and the subsequent consolidation were immediate. From 1990 to 2000, both the number of major surface combatant shipbuilders and the number of fixed-wing aircraft developers fell from eight to three; the number of tactical missile producers fell from 13 to three;
and the number of tracked-combat vehicle developers fell from three to two.[7] Today, there are just two companies--Boeing and Lockheed Martin--that build U.S. fighter aircraft. Because Boeing's F-18E/F fighter production line is set to shut down in the coming years, it is possible that soon only one fighter manufacturer will exist in the entire United States. Further defense spending reductions and industry consolidations would all but eliminate competition for major programs, depriving
the military and taxpayers of the innovative benefits and cost savings that cannot be achieved with sole-source production. Major Congressional Decisions Pending Over the next several years, a series of defense programs are scheduled to complete production, either before the original military requirement is completed or without any immediate follow-on program in place to maintain steady workforce levels between programs. The impact that the loss of these programs will have on
America's highly skilled defense industrial workforce and the nation's ability to retain core military capabilities and technologies is a significant concern that Congress must address. In order to assess the significance of these decisions adequately, Congress must evaluate the history of these programs, the national cost of losing critical capabilities when a line closes permanently, and what would be required to restart production or evaluate alternative options to avoid any dip in production
levels. F-22A Raptor. In January 2008, following the grounding of the entire F-15 fleet, General John Corley, head of the U.S. Air Force's Air Combat Command, commented that he "had a fleet that is 100 percent fatigued and 40 percent of that has bad parts. The long-term future of the F-15 is in question."[8] For decades, the F-15 has served as America's preeminent fourth-generation tactical fighter, ensuring that the nation retains the core capability of air superiority that has served as
a cornerstone of its predominant military position. This remarkable capability has also ensured that not a single soldier or Marine has lost his life in combat due to a threat from the air in over half a century. The Air Force originally planned to purchase 700 F-22As to replace the fleet of 800 F-15A-Ds and the recently retired F-117 Nighthawk bomber, but the required number of F-22s was dramatically reduced over the past two decades to 442 in 1993, to 339 in 1997, and finally to 184 in
President George W. Bush's FY 2009 defense budget request. Although the Air Force has maintained a requirement for 381 Raptors in recent years, Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz recently stated that this level was "too high." He has since noted that the Air Force requirement is for 243 F-22s, but the service can only afford 187 because of a lack of funds. Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also recently stated that the Air Force would like 243
F-22As, approximately 60 more than currently budgeted.[9] On April 6, however, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the Administration's intention to end production of the F-22 at 187 aircraft.[10] Two weeks later, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley and Air Force Chief Norton Schwartz followed suit by concluding that they agreed with Gates's plans and assumptions given the zero-sum budget quandary they face.[11] In fact, unless Congress intervenes, the F-22 program will
end production at 186 fighters as opposed to the 187 program of record. This is because the March 2009 crash of an F-22 at Edwards Air Force Base in California involved a test aircraft that was "not part of the official program of record," according to Air Force spokesman Karen Platt.[12] Building the F-22A fifth-generation fighter takes three years. During the first year, long-lead items, including the radar and electronic warfare subsystems, are funded through advanced procurement. In
the second year of production, the subsystems are completed and the major sub-assemblies of the aircraft are built. Finally, assembly of the aircraft occurs in Marietta, Georgia, in the third year. The FY 2009 defense authorization and appropriations bills provided funding for Lot 7 through Lot 9, with Lot 9 beginning the second year of production in 2010. Congress also provided an additional $523 million to the Air Force either for long-lead items for an additional 20 aircraft in Lot 10 or to
begin permanently closing the production line. Only $140 million of this was to be made available until PresidentObamachose whether to continue or terminate the program. Given that President Obama's FY 2010 budget request ends production at 186 aircraft, the long-lead production that generally takes place in the first year will not occur in 2010, and the entire line will be closed by December 2011.[13] Not releasing the funds for the long-lead production items approved last year has
serious implications for America's defense industrial base. There are more than 25,000 direct American jobs with 1,000 suppliers in 44 states that help build these advanced fighter jets, and more than 70,000 other jobs are tied indirectly to the program. The highly technical jobs that make up the program form the basis for America's specialized aerospace industry. Many of the smaller companies involved in the initial long-lead production phase rely on the program for the bulk of their
business and will be the first to be negatively affected if Congress does not reverse President Obama's proposal and fund Lot 10. Indeed, work for third- and fourth-tier F-22 suppliers is "already drying up."[14] Shutting down the F-22 production line while also potentially closing other lines in the next few years--including the F-18, F-16, and C-17, as well as full-rate production of the F-35, which is not expected to commence until 2012--could further affect America's aerospace workforce
as the market for highly skilled aerospace jobs continues to diminish. The gap between F-22 and F-35 production is of particular concern. Because these programs share approximately 75 percent of suppliers who have specialized in fifth-generation platforms, a two- or three-year gap in production would threaten the supply base and truncate the next generation of aerospace designers, engineers, and manufacturers.[15] Indeed, the supplier base may be most affected by the Pentagon's
decisions to end programs with no follow-on production, yet suppliers are often lost in the shadow of the larger defense firms that are critical to the health of the defense industrial base. The 2009 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress cautions that: [T]he lower-tier supplier industrial base continues to consolidate. Suppliers not associated with future production programs (for example, suppliers not participating in the F-35 or UH-60M) will be impacted the most. These suppliers
will be forced to either exit the business or find new DoD or non-DoD programs for their survival.[16] The deterioration of the supplier base, even if it is determined that, as Secretary Gates has said, "U.S. predominance in conventional warfare...is sustainable for the mediumterm given current trends,"[17] is sure to have a lasting impact on the nation's ability to maintain its predominant position in the decades ahead as U.S. military power inevitably diminishes. During his April 6 press
conference, Secretary Gates addressed the transition between F-22 and F-35 production and how it will affect the workforce. Noting that F-22 jobs will decline to 19,000 in FY 2010 and 13,000 in FY 2011, he emphasized that the F-35 program already directly employs 38,000 people. This number will increase to 64,000 in FY 2010 and 82,000 in FY 2011. What Secretary Gates failed to mention, however, is that these production lines are in different states. The implicit assumption that the
production workforce in Marietta, Georgia, will be willing or able to move to Fort Worth, Texas, in order to work there is flawed. There is no Pentagon guarantee that these jobs can even be shifted on a one-to-one basis. Even if there was a guarantee that no net job losses would occur, there is no reason to believe that workers in Georgia would uproot their families and that they could sell their homes in order to move even if they wanted to do so. For the past three decades, the United
States has maintained two or three active production lines of fighter aircraft at all times. Given the potential closure of the F-18 and F-15 lines, combined with the three-year gap before full-rate production of the F-35, prematurely closing the F-22 line could jeopardize America's ability to hedge against potential miscalculations of the future threat environment. Over the past decade, Congress has put its money where its mouth is by repeatedly emphasizing the importance of competition in
defense production. If additional annual funding for an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter is important to Congress, there is no doubt that Congress should care deeply about maintaining more than a single fighter production line. Competition encourages contractor innovation and produces better products for the warfighter while saving taxpayer money in the long term. If Congress allows President Obama to prevail with the decision to cap F-22s at 186, in reality, this translates to
only roughly 100 "combat-coded" F-22s available for operations at any one time.[18] Yet more than 30 air campaign studies over the past 15 years have confirmed a minimum requirement for 260 Raptors. Even when considering the Air Force's current F-22 and F-35 procurement plans, a likely gap of up to 800 fighters is projected to occur around 2024.[19] Although the F-22A is the world's sole fifth-generation fighter, numerous studies have concluded that the quality of the platform can
be stretched only so far in making up for a lack of quantity, specifically in a Chinese anti-access scenario in the Taiwan Strait.[20] A shortfall of aircraft would also prevent the Air Force from filling out the service's 10 Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs), undermining the stability of the AEFs by ensuring the need to rotate F-22s on an as-needed basis.[21] The considerable investment the U.S. has made in the F-22 program over the past two decades has brought the program to a point where
it is now at its most affordable level. After a development cost of $40 billion, the flyaway cost of one plane has been reduced by 35 percent, to about $191 million per aircraft.[22] There is also an additional and significant cost burden to America's taxpayers to fund new production at a future date if Congress ever chose to reopen the line. As a substitute for the F-22, Secretary Gates and others in the defense and think tank community have advocated purchasing more F-35s. Any such
equation is insufficient, however, because the aircraft are complementary with only some overlapping capabilities. These two fighters are designed and built to complete many unique missions. The F-22, a larger and more maneuverable aircraft, was meant to fulfill air dominance missions, thereby clearing the skies for the multi-role strike mission of the F-35. Indeed, this complementary mission set specifically assumed that the F-22 would be available in sufficient quantity to provide air
cover for the F-35. Without enough F-22s to eliminate any air-to-air and surface-to-air threats, the F-35 will become increasingly and unnecessarily vulnerable. The F-22 also clears the skies for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms otherwise threatened by advanced surface-to-air missiles placed along border regions during combat to provide critical information to commanders on the ground.[23] C-17 Globemaster III. The Pentagon relies on the C-17 Globemaster III,
C-5 Galaxy, and C-130 Hercules aircraft to perform the inter-theater airlift mission.[24] Along with the traditional roles that airlift has played, expanded ground operations as part of global counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions have placed a renewed emphasis on the airlift mission. Strategic airlift has become so important that "preserving global reach in the air," specifically by the C-17 aircraft, was singled out by President Obama as a defense priority on his presidential
campaign Web site and then again on the White House Web site after his inauguration.[25] In direct contradiction to this stated priority, President Obama's first budget request for FY 2010 recommends ending production of the C-17 at 205 aircraft.[26] The C-17--the only remaining military wide-body aircraft still in production in the U.S.--is manufactured by Boeing to carry 169,000 pounds of equipment, including the Abrams tank and Apache helicopter. Although it comprises 60 percent of
the airlift fleet, it flies more than 80 percent of all strategic airlift missions.[27] It has been used in military operations everywhere from Bosnia and Kosovo to Iraq and Afghanistan.[28] The C-17 benefits from its ability to operate from austere airfields, including dirt runways, making it invaluable in the tactical airlift role as well.[29] Following an increase in attacks on U.S. and coalition convoys in Iraq in 2004, for instance, the C-17 was used alongside the C-130 to relieve 350 vehicles per
week.[30] Just this week, two C-17s were used to deliver aid to Pakistan as part of a humanitarian relief effort. The C-17's performance characteristics are also significantly better than those of other cargo-transport aircraft.[31] The C-17 is built by more than 30,000 workers and supported by an additional 700 suppliers. From reaching initial operating capability in 1995 through the FY 2008 emergency supplemental spending bill for Iraq and Afghanistan, 205 C-17s have been purchased.
[32] Canada, the United Kingdom, and Qatar have already placed orders, and the United Arab Emirates has entered negotiations to purchase the aircraft. However, if Congress does not fund the procurement of additional C-17s in the current pending supplemental for the second half of FY 2009 or the FY 2010 defense budget, this line will begin closing this year due to the 34-month supplier lead time to build a C-17.[33] The costs of choosing to restart the line after it has already been
closed are immense. A 2006 U.S. Department of Commerce study on the C-17 found that "the cost of closing down the Long Beach [California] site, restarting at a new site in the United States, and then having to close it down again after a short production run--is about $5.7 billion."[34] Restart costs for any line are significant and are another consideration Congress must take into account when making critical funding decisions in this year's defense bills. F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-
15E Strike Eagle. One of the main consequences of the 1990s defense consolidation has been the increased sensitivity of defense contractors to minor fluctuations in the industrial base. The defense industrial base is indeed interconnected and dependent on multiple programs. Ending the C-17 and F-18 production lines within one year of each other would have a dramatic impact on the defense industrial base. The 2009 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress warned that
"with the announcement of the C-17 program shutdown, coupled with the end of domestic F/A-18E/F production in FY 2012, the industrial base infrastructure at Long Beach, CA, and St. Louis, MO (solely supporting foreign military sales) may have insufficient business to continue in place."[35] The negative consequences of closing even the C-17 line--both for this highly skilled workforce and for U.S. national security--clearly run deeper than the cancellation of a single program. "Over
the next 10 years," warned the 2008 Industrial Capabilities Report, "multiple military aircraft production lines will go cold precipitating the need for a new round of consolidation in order to reduce infrastructure costs."[36] According to Darryl Davis, President of Boeing's Advance Systems unit, "The technology base is eroding for Boeing as [the company] moves late into the next decade."[37] Losing any defense-related technology base within the next year while defense strategies are being
crafted internally at the Pentagon makes little sense. Congress should consider the cost savings that result from leaving the country's options open while additional major defense procurement decisions are made throughout this year. The combined impact of reduced procurement budgets, a dwindling number of aircraft programs, and the delay of new programs like a sixth-generation fighter or long-range bomber places further pressure on Boeing and its workforce. This is why Congress
should be concerned about the potential closure of even just one or two lines and how these closures will relate to Boeing's ability to compete for military aircraft contracts in the future. "While Lockheed Martin and Sikorsky have current programs that will remain in production for the next 20 years, Boeing's future participation in the fighter/ attack and transport segments is more problematic without the support of foreign military sales to keep existing production lines open."[38] Congress
has repeatedly demonstrated its preference for competition for major programs like destroyers. It should consider the potential for increased costs due to lack of competitionwith only one remaining fighter production company left in America, which will be the result if these recommendations are approved. Under current defense authorization plans, the F/A-18E/F production line will shut down in 2013, with long-lead production items and their suppliers affected as early as next year. The
F-18 program employs 100,000 people and depends on 1,900 suppliers across 46 states.[39] The F-15 production line, which employs 55,000 people and has a total of 383 suppliers, also faces potential closure depending on the outcome of a pending sale to Saudi Arabia.[40] When the potential Lockheed-Northrop merger threatened to reduce the number of tactical aircraft providers from two to one in the late 1990s, Congress wisely opposed the plan. Why should today be any
different? The end of the F/A-18E/F and various F-15 lines in the coming years would translate into a deliberate consolidation of the tactical aircraft industrial base to just one manufacturer. A projected gap in tactical aircraft in the next decade, coupled with the potential for instability in the F-35 production program, enhances the prudence of maintaining the current "hot" tactical aircraft production lines, at least into the middle of the decade. High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. The High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) is a wheeled, indirect-fire platform capable of firing the guided multiple-launch rocket system and Army tactical missiles. It is currently used by both the Army and Marine Corps and has been deployed as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. HIMARS is built in Camden, Arkansas, by a workforce of 125 personnel. Other components are produced in Texas, New Jersey, Florida, and Alabama. Although the program is expected to remain in the field
until 2050, funding for additional platforms is set to end in FY 2011, with full closure of the production facility in Arkansas scheduled for 2013.[41] Congress should consider the potential costs of maintaining and repairing a system that will be used by U.S. troops for 40 more years when the line and its spare parts are out of production. Airborne Laser. President Obama's FY 2010 defense budget also cancels the second Airborne Laser (ABL) prototype aircraft and keeps the existing
aircraft while shifting the focus of the program to research and development. In the future, these technologies could provide the U.S. with capabilities in boost-phase missile defense, as well as area-wide anti-air warfare for the Navy, and even function as an anti-satellite system. In addition to its operational role, the ABL program represents one of the primary efforts by the Pentagon to move development of directed-energy technology forward. The ABL program supports more than 1,000
high-tech jobs.[42] A Defense Science Board Task Force report from 2007 found that of the $961 million that was allocated for high-energy laser funding in FY 2007, ABL accounted for $629 million, or 65 percent.[43] The report also found that a "lack of directed energy production programs or the serious prospect of significant production programs has jeopardized the supporting industrial base."[44] Congress must carefully consider the development investment made to date through this
program. This is essential because the directed-energy applications of this effort reach far beyond missile defense to include counter-mortar and counter-artillery applications, making direct-energy technology relevant to winning on today's battlefield. Rotary Wing Programs. President Obama's FY 2010 defense budget proposes terminating both the Combat Search and Rescue helicopter (CSAR-X) and the VH-71 presidential helicopter. Both helicopters are manufactured by Lockheed
Martin. The potential cancellation of these platforms--with the chance of a follow-on program contingent on further review of requirements--will only bring additional disruptions to the already troubled helicopter industry. Rotary-wing aircraft represent the type of counter-insurgency and irregular warfare capability shift that President Obama seeks in his 2010 budget request. Eliminating these two programs with nothing else in the pipeline appears preemptive in nature. Congress should
carefully consider the elimination of the U.S. Air Force's program "to replace HH-60G helicopters that are deficient in range, speed, carrying capacity and other features. The Air Force is the only service that maintains a fleet of search and rescue helicopters, which retrieve an average of 100 warfighters per year from dangerous locations."[45] The open question of whether the mission has been eliminated without a system to operate is a valid one left unanswered by Pentagon officials.
Congress must demand answers quickly while figuring out how to ensure that there is no gap in the ability of the U.S. Air Force to conduct its search and rescue mission. A Strong Defense Industrial Base, Now and in the Future The military is in a crucial phase of recapitalization. The war-related bills will be due for years after a majority of U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq, yet supplemental spending bills are disappearing. There is no appetite for absorbing the entire supplemental
spending topline into the larger defense budget. In the long term, continuing to underfund defense and then allowing wild fluctuations in defense budgets during times of war will only cost the country more and compromise security at home and on the battlefield, including reducing the defense industrial base to an unacceptably low level. An undercapitalized industrial base is less competitive, which increases costs for the government and the U.S. taxpayer.[46] Congress must carefully
and fully evaluate President Obama's FY 2010 defense budget request, taking the long view when determining what is needed to retain a healthy and highly skilled national defense workforce. While the Pentagon budget is by no means a jobs program, Congress should evaluate the costs to American taxpayers and the cost measured in risk to the warfighter when it considers shuttering manufacturing production
lines with no follow-on work--as proposed in this year's defense budget. Specifically, taking a holistic approach, Congress
should : Retain cutting-edge national security skill sets and technologies. Regardless of the specific weapons system purchased,
maintaining a national defense industrial base capable of continuously offering technologically superior products at equitable cost will
remain a primary challenge for policymakers. Although Congress should refrain from decisions focused solely on the impact they may have
on American jobs, ensuring the health and viability of America's highly skilled workforce is a central component of retaining many of
America's technological advantages and ultimately saves lives on the battlefield. Reinvigorate science, technology, engineering, and math
(STEM) education. Because designing and manufacturing cutting-edge military equipment is a generational task, the future stability of the
defense industrial base depends on the development of tomorrow's defense manufacturing workforce. Implementing systemic education
reform--particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics--to foster innovation and increase the number of students
completing secondary and post-secondary education who may join this professional workforce should therefore be a top priority for
Congress. Such an effort would require encouraging and adopting new models for strengthening teacher quality and effectiveness while
also designing a system that rewards teachers who emphasize these subject areas. This renewed focus would also benefit from nationwide
reforms in America's school system, including charter schools that emphasize STEM education.[47] Promote additional
foreign military sales . America's defense industrial base also serves an important role in
helping to build the military capacity of foreign allies while enhancing their
interoperability with the U.S. military . These efforts indirectly save U.S. taxpayer
funds over time and include the advantage of reducing wear and tear on U.S. equipment.
Congress should seek out and evaluate foreign military sales opportunities for pending
production line closures like the F-22, F-18, and F-15. This could create economies of scale , bring
further stability to the industrial base workload , and reduce the per-unit costs of
individual systems. When weighing its decision on the F-22 production line and the impact of closing the line in 2011, Congress
should also consider the interest expressed in the aircraft by Japan in particular. Along with the obvious benefits for
the industrial base , allowing the building and sale of an allied variant of this fighter jet to a close
American ally like Japan would offer sound geostrategic benefits .[48] Congress would have to waive the Obey
Amendment this year in order to allow this potential F-22 variant sale to move forward.
OFF---AI
Budget cuts make the defense sector reliant on sales for profit---only
way to secure sustainable industry growth.
Webster 18 (Keith, VP of Chamber of Commerce, Pres of Defense and Aerospace
Export Council, "It's time to update US defense export policies", 8/13/18,
https://www.defensenews.com/top-100/2018/08/09/its-time-to-update-us-defense-export-
policies/)
I recently stumbled upon an interesting article dated Oct. 1, 1999, by Loren Thompson with the Lexington Institute titled
“Military Supremacy and How We Keep It.” In this article we are reminded of the February 1776 publication by British
historian Edward Gibbon titled “The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.” We are told George Washington read this
work and its subsequent volumes, and in his first annual message to Congress as president he made reference stating:
“To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” Or to
quote Gibbon: “They preserved the peace by a constant preparation for war.” America’s
defense and aerospace industry is the second-largest gross exporter and retains the
largest positive trade balance of any manufactured goods sector. The sector employs
approximately 2.8 million individuals within the United States. America’s largest defense companies
secure on average 70 percent of their annual revenue from domestic defense spending, with the remaining 30
percent accomplished through international sales to allies and friends. With defense
appropriations at historic highs, our defense and aerospace industries are well-positioned to
equip our military, but headwinds are gathering . In the face of growing budget
deficits , robust annual U.S. defense appropriations may turn out to be unsustainable.
Additionally, trade disputes are causing the cost of raw materials to rise by at least 40 percent, which ultimately increases
the cost of our military hardware and could potentially undermine the ability for U.S. manufacturers to compete in the
global market. Taken one step further, it’s possible that trade disputes could result in our allies slowing or ending
acquisitions of U.S. capability as a way to protest tariffs. See this year’s Top 100 list! Faced
with these
challenges, the U.S. defense industry is focused on increasing international sales.
Companies seek 5 percent to 30 percent growth within five years, while a select few are seeking growth
greater than 50 percent. The benefits of increased global market share include reduced need
for domestic investment, reduced cost to the U.S. military, increased allied capability
globally and greater innovation investments by U.S. industries, minimizing the ability
of emerging competitors in the defense and aerospace sector to capture market share at American industries’
expense. The U.S. defense-industrial sector is primed for rapid and significant growth , but
conventional export policies and lengthy determination processes may be undermining
the future health of the companies that support America’s safety, security and economic
vitality. To do so is to ultimately enable our enemies and their industries to grow ,
and with that growth to develop products that will, if not checked, defeat U.S. military
capability. From aviation platforms to ammo, most allied and friendly nations around the world are unable to fully
support their military forces with their own indigenous industries. Why? Because they are unable to financially sustain the
breadth of industries needed to ensure military readiness, and because their industries were unable to compete effectively
internationally to offset the limited domestic investment by their government.Is this where the United States
intends to be tomorrow — a place where we are unable to equip our military without relying
on friends, allies and not-so-friendly nations for capability and components? For a moment, let us consider our most
worrisome competitors. They are nations that have their own military-industrial complexes,
which are largely self-reliant. Some are well-established while others are rapidly emerging as credible
innovators and suppliers. Their military industries are run as state-owned enterprises. U.S. industries are
publicly held companies that — although receiving considerable U.S. government funding through the annual
defense appropriations — are accountable to shareholders, investors and corporate boards,
meaning they must be profitable or perish. Our enemies control and preserve their military-industrial
complex with an iron fist, while ours must function like any other publicly traded business in the
United States. In order to ensure our continued security and state of readiness, we must pursue ways for the U.S.
government and our defense industries to partner more closely with a goal of achieving the following: a commitment
through legislation, policy and procedures to reduce the regulatory burdens that adversely impact product costs and
innovation investments; and a commitment by our government to reduce and remove barriers to successful competition in
the global markets. For both domestic performance and global competition success, timeliness and cost are critical
Revisiting Cold War-era
success factors often disrupted by excessive U.S. government control and intervention.
policies and procedures can help create a contemporary model for advancing global
sales, which can ensure U.S. readiness, contribute to military-industrial
independence and limit the reach of our adversaries ’ influence. We must ensure through
innovation and domestic production that we can regularly prepare for war to help preserve the peace without being reliant
upon others.
Strong defense sector is key to advancements in AI and winning the

tech race.
Gons et al 18 Eric Gons, 4-10-2018, "How AI and Robotics Will Disrupt the Defense
Industry," https://www.bcg, https://www.bcg.com/en-us/publications/2018/how-ai-
robotics-will-disrupt-defense-industry.aspx - BS
The technologies of the defense industry are in the early stages of a seismic shift:
artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are changing defense now and will enable
intelligent warfare in the decades to come. These technologies will have a
correspondingly tectonic effect on defense contractors. In the near term, incorporating AI into
the design of traditional battle networks will vastly improve performance of current
platforms and forces. Prime contractors will maintain an advantage during this phase. However, as
the capabilities of AI and robotics reach an inflection point, the US Department of Defense (DoD) will shift to smaller AI- and robotics-based
many established defense contractors
systems—and will rely on nontraditional players to provide them. Thus far,
have treated AI and robotics as ancillary markets. But they have underestimated the long-
term threat to their business. AI and robotics specialists are bringing step change
improvements to legacy systems and are building scale, know-how, and trust within the DoD. For now,
they are primarily working through traditional contractors. But as trust in independent autonomous systems
grows, the contractors that provide them will also gain trust—and share. Although the full impact of the AI- and robotics-driven revolution is
How should defense
a decade or more away, it is clear that these technologies will radically disrupt the defense industry.
contractors respond? We believe that they should take the lead in AI and robotics,
making the strategic changes and investments necessary to win in these emerging segments.
The US military has enjoyed superior conventional forces since the end of the Cold War,
but this lead has narrowed in recent years . For example, several countries have developed
“anti-access” technologies, such as long-range air defense systems and precision strike weapons that
deny US military forces the ability to operate in a contested area. And these same countries
are actively developing AI and robotics to further close the gap. To offset those countries’ recent
gains, the DoD has developed a multidecade strategy for applying a suite of advanced
technologies to nearly every facet of its operations. (See Exhibit 1.) In the first phase, the DoD will
create a more intelligent force, using AI to enhance platforms , munitions, and decision
processes . As these technologies mature, the DoD aims to create a more autonomous force, pairing AI-enabled
systems with human military personnel to accentuate the strengths of each, enabling
faster decisions and better combat outcomes . In the more distant future, “swarms” of advanced cognitive
robots may redefine combat operations in the battle space.1
AI advancements solve grid insecurities---ensures total protection

and thwarts potential attacks.
Bowen et al., 18 (Steve Bowen, Charles Butler and Samuel M. Smith, PhD, "Using
Artificial Intelligence to Protect the U.S. Power Grid," 2-1-2018, POWER Magazine,
http://www.powermag.com/using-artificial-intelligence-to-protect-the-u-s-power-grid/ )
The U.S. power grid is wide open for attack. More than 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission
lines, interspersed with hundreds of large electric power transformers and substations span the country,
often in remote locations. In response to growing threats, NERC issued requirements for the physical security of
critical transmission stations and substations, and their associated primary control centers. Meeting these
mandates is costly and complicated for utility owners and operators. Fortunately, new
advancements in technology—particularly in the fields of robotics and a rtificial i ntelligence—can offer
proactive protection against attackers at a reasonable cost and help utilities
ach ieve compliance. ¶ Power Grid Vulnerability¶ An attack on the power grid can cause
significant damage. In fact, the loss of only nine substations could take down the
nation’s entire grid , according to one study. Paul Parfomak, a specialist in energy and infrastructure policy,
noted in a congressional report, “Experts have long asserted that a coordinated and simultaneous attack
on multiple high-voltage transformers could have severe implications for reliable electric service
over a large geographic area, crippling its electricity network and causing widespread, extended blackouts.
Such an event would have serious economic and social consequences.”¶ Especially
vulnerable to attack are what one former Navy SEAL and U.S. intelligence officer called soft targets. “These are
generally remote areas that just have a fence around them, maybe a camera system … they’re not hard at
all to actually take down,” he said in a recent interview. He added, “For a small handful of people to take
down a power grid, it’s just not that hard … this is absolutely one of the easiest possible things you can do to
drive urban areas into total chaos.”¶ The NERC regulations—known as CIP-014—include six basic requirements,
such as a risk assessment to identify critical facilities, independent verification of the risk assessment, and evaluation of
the most
the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack on these critical stations or substations. Perhaps
challenging requirement is to develop and implement a documented physical security
plan. According to the directive, this plan must have the following elements:¶ Resiliency or security measures designed
collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities
identified during the evaluation. ¶ Law enforcement contact and coordination information. ¶ A timeline for executing the
physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan. ¶ Provisions to evaluate evolving
physical threats, and their corresponding security measures.¶ Challenges to Compliance¶ Utility owners
and operators face several barriers to CIP-014 compliance. The biggest one is cost.
Traditionally, security has not been viewed as a sensible investment. A 2006 report from the Electric
Power Research Institute noted: “Security measures, in themselves, are cost items, with no direct
monetary return. The benefits are in the avoided costs of potential attacks whose probability is generally not known.
This makes cost-justification very difficult.”¶ A related concern is the quality of threat
information provided by the federal government and other sources. This information determines what needs to be
protected against and what security measures to take. As Parfomak wrote, “Incomplete or ambiguous threat
information—especially from the federal government—may lead to inconsistency in physical security
among grid owners, inefficient spending of limited security resources at facilities (e.g., that may not really
be under threat), or deployment of security measures against the wrong threat.”¶ A rtificial
I ntelligence Offers Real-World Protection ¶ Meeting CIP-014 requirements takes careful planning and wise
use of limited resources. Ballistic walls around the perimeters of critical substations are not effective, and hiring a full-time
guard force—whether armed or not—is simply not feasible, particularly for remote substations in sparsely populated
areas. A more-reasonable, more-effective approach to fences and firearms is the use of
advanced technology.¶ Among the more innovative solutions are tower-mounted robots powered by artificial
intelligence ( AI ). Such tech nology connected to a high-speed network could transform a
power grid’s passive security system into an active defense-and-denial physical
protection system. Using non-lethal actuators, such as cameras and sensors, the system detects, delays,
and safely thwarts a potential attacker by overwhelming them with directed, high-
intensity sound, lights, and strobes. Figure 1 illustrates how the system delivers these defense mechanisms
to neutralize a target.¶ [Figure Omitted]¶ 1. Defense-and-denial physical protection. Artificial intelligence enables
robots to deliver non-lethal defense mechanisms at a distance, thwarting a potential
attack on a utility asset. Courtesy: PacStar¶ In addition, such a system would deliver actionable
intelligence in real time to law enforcement, so officers can respond appropriately and
effectively. The use of AI -driven robotics technology provides affordable, advanced
protection 24/7.
OFF---Deterrence
Budget cuts make the defense industry reliant on sales for profit —
sustainable industry growth is key to military readiness.
policies/)
with these
upon others.
Nuke war
Alan Dowd 15, senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose,
“Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence”,
https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/
Surely, the same principle applies in the realm of nations. Our world teems with violent regimes and vicious men. And something precious
—our notion of peace, sovereignty, liberty, civilization itself—sits exposed to all that danger. In a world where might makes right, the
only thing that keeps the peace , defends our sovereignty and liberty, and upholds civilization is the willingness to
use our resources to keep the dangers at bay. Yet too many policymakers disregard the wisdom of military deterrence , and
too many people of faith forget that the aim of deterrence is, by definition, to prevent wars, not start
them. Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force, because of Christ’s message of peace.
This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep in mind two truths. First, governments are held to a different standard than
individuals, and hence are expected to do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things
individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered by its foes, leaving
countless innocents defenseless. A government that put away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus
jeopardizing its people. Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer is decidedly
different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are
decidedly different from those who plot violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue. Some lament the fact that we live in such
a violent world , but that’s precisely the point. Because we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those
who can be deterred—and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for scholars and
scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He didn’t admonish the military commander to put down his
sword. Instead, He commended him for his faith.[i] “Even in the Gospels,” soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, “it is assumed that
soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary.”[ii] They are necessary not only for waging war but, preferably, for maintaining peace. It’s a
paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace . The Romans had a phrase for it: Si vis pacem, para
bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” President George Washington put it more genteelly: “There is nothing so likely to produce
peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.” Or, in the same way, “We infinitely desire peace,” President Theodore Roosevelt
After the West gambled
declared. “And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war.”
civilization’s very existence in the 1920s and 1930s on hopes that war could somehow
be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the Cold War returned to
peace through strength. Winston Churchill proposed “defense through deterrents.” President Harry Truman called NATO “an
integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength…we devoutly pray that our present course of action will
succeed and maintain peace without war.”[iii] President Dwight Eisenhower explained, “Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action,
so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk its own destruction.” President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our military power
to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.” And President Ronald Reagan steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, “None
of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong.” Reagan also argued, “Our military strength is a prerequisite for
peace.”[iv] Even so, arms alone aren’t enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the teeth in 1914. But since they
weren’t clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither
is clarity alone enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson’s admonitions to the Kaiser were clear, but America lacked the
military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to
deter. “The purpose of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude that the cost of any
particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher than the potential benefit of that act,” explains Gen. Kevin
Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It is a “cost-benefit calculus.”[v] So, given the anemic state of America’s military
before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs.
In order for the adversary not to miscalculate , a few factors
That proved to be a grave miscalculation.
must hold . First, consequences must be clear , which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of
deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World
War II, since the Allies allowed their arsenals to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and
Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote, as alluded to
above, is strength plus clarity. A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary must be rational, which means it can grasp
and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall that deterrence comes from
the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.”[vi] Of course, as Churchill conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-
murderers masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The secondary benefit of the peace-
through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the
status quo ante.) Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and
tangible , which was the case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military arsenals to
deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall
how Eisenhower answered Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage in
Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steely American commander-in-chief fired back, “there will be nothing conventional about our
response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them credibility.
Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not. First,
deterrence is not just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the language of
deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel
who are twenty years old or more and able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service system is a form of military readiness.
Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides detail about the Israelites’ massive standing army: twelve divisions of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17
explains the military preparations made by King Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained
armories in strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men “armed for battle.” Not
surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against
Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament, Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do
wrong…Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country
and who respect codes of conduct between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to explain the
importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What king would go to war against another king without first
sitting down to consider whether his 10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he could win,
he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one
because he recognizes that he’s outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings subscribe to
peace through strength. Again, as with the Centurion earlier, Jesus could have rebuked the martial character of these kings, but he did not.
we
This is not just description but commendation. We ignore their example at our peril. Secondly, it is not incongruent if
understand military deterrence as a means to prevent great-power war — the kind

that kills by the millions , the kind humanity has not endured for seven decades. We know we will not experience the
biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a broken
world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace through hope, peace through violence, or peace through
submission. But these options are inadequate. The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers
and hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest way to invite what Churchill called
the next great-power war would involve
“temptations to a trial of strength.” Moreover, the likelihood that
multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization . Therefore, a

posture that leaves peer adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve
— thus inviting miscalculation — is not only unsound, but immoral and inhumane —
unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official, argues.
“ If we fail to deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed .”[ix] Peace through
violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace
by employing brutal forms of violence. However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish; neither
would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the Christian rejects. Finally, the civilized world could bring
about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the
38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death
creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you
can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x] The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have
been disastrous. After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the war to end all wars. By 1938,
as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been “reduced…from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable
that we never cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness and attacked. In October 1945
—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed
Forces, but apparently…all conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting that same
international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading
Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions in Korea
in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and
the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave
Kim a green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into Korea, and the Korean peninsula
plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250
South Korean troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.[xvi] The North Korean tyranny
— now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of
thousands of battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day since 1953. The lesson of
history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely
disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations, as a
percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace: In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an
average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of GDP. In the decade before
entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average
of 27 percent of GDP to the military annually. During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter
Moscow; it worked. Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book The World America Made, Robert Kagan
explains how “America’s
most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal
tendencies of other great powers to compete and jostle with one another in ways that
historically have led to war.” This role has depended on America’s military might .
“ There is no better recipe for great-power peace ,” Kagan concludes, “ than certainty about
who holds the upper hand .”[xvii]

OFF---[L]
Budget cuts make the defense industry reliant on sales for profit —
sustainable industry growth is key to military readiness.
policies/)
with these
upon others.
Key to deterring a litany of existential threats - extinction

Helprin 15 Mark Helprin, senior fellow of the Claremont Institute, 6/22/15,”Indefensible
Defense”, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419604/indefensible-defense-mark-
helprin - BS
*edited for language – in brackets
Continual warfare in the Middle East , a nuclear Iran , e lectro m agnetic- p ulse weapons ,
emerging pathogens , and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously
threaten the United States , some with catastrophe on a scale we have not experienced since the Civil War.
Nevertheless, these are phenomena that bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we
possess, we are equipped to face , given the wit and will to do so. But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the
news cycle are the currents that lead to world war . In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for
being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how we approach the strength of the American
military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will determine the security , prosperity,
honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE
AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense , all else rests . Without
it, even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form
or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been
reliance on surplus . Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic
depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the
North’s burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of
America’s technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass industrial — and
then scientific — 20th-century warfare . The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations,
cripple [ harm ] the defense industrial base , and we will fail to deter wars that we will then
go on to lose.
Overview---Deterrence---2NC
Readiness decline outweighs the aff – only maintaining a robust
defense capability signals a credible position of strength and deters
great power conflict – otherwise, states will challenge the US and
nuclear use becomes inevitable – that’s Dowd –
Err neg – even small changes in readiness are perceived and cause
war
Jack Spencer 2k, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy Policy at The Heritage
Foundation's Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies. “The Facts About Military
Readiness” Sep. 15, 2k. accessed July 31, 2010
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-Military-
Readiness
Military readiness is vital because declines

in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the
world that the U nited S tates is not prepared to defend its interests . Therefore, potentially
hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests,
inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is
more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of
vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.
Overview---[L]---2NC
Readiness decline outweighs the aff – only maintaining a robust
defense capability signals a credible position of strength and deters
great power conflict – otherwise, states will challenge the US and
nuclear use becomes inevitable – that’s Helprin –
Err neg – even small changes in readiness are perceived and cause
war
Jack Spencer 2k, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy Policy at The Heritage
Foundation's Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies. “The Facts About Military
Readiness” Sep. 15, 2k. accessed July 31, 2010
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-Military-
Readiness
Military readiness is vital because declines

in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the
world that the U nited S tates is not prepared to defend its interests . Therefore, potentially
hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests,
inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is
more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of
vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.
AND Helprin lists several other impacts

Middle east instability---Nuclear war
Michael T. Klare 18. Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at
Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts. 05-14-18. “Gearing Up for the Third Gulf
War.” Common Dreams. https://www.commondreams.org/views/2018/05/14/gearing-
third-gulf-war
A Third Gulf War would distinguish itself from recent Middle Eastern conflicts by the
geographic span of the fighting and the number of major actors that might become
involved. In all likelihood, the field of battle would stretch from the shores of the
Mediterranean , where Lebanon abuts Israel, to the Strait of Hormuz , where the
Persian Gulf empties into the Indian Ocean. Participants could include, on one side, Iran , the regime of
Bashar al-Assad in Syria , Hezbollah in Lebanon, and assorted Shia militias in Iraq and Yemen ; and, on
the other, Israel , Saudi Arabia , the U nited S tates, and the U nited A rab E mirates
( UAE ). If the fighting in Syria were to get out of hand, Russian forces could even become involved. All of these
forces have been equipping themselves with massive arrays of modern weaponry in
recent years, ensuring that any fighting will be intense, bloody, and horrifically destructive . Iran has been
acquiring an assortment of modern weapons from Russia and possesses its own substantial arms industry. It, in turn, has been supplying the Assad regime with modern arms and is suspected of
shipping an array of missiles and other munitions to Hezbollah. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have long been major recipients of tens of billions of dollars of sophisticated American weaponry
once ignited, a Third Gulf War could quickly

and President Trump has promised to supply them with so much more. This means that,
escalate and would undoubtedly generate large numbers of civilian and military
casualties , and new flows of refugees . The United States and its allies would try to quickly cripple Iran’s war-making capabilities, a task that would
require multiple waves of air and missile strikes, some surely directed at facilities in densely populated areas. Iran and its allies would seek to respond by attacking high-value targets in Israel and
Saudi Arabia, including cities and oil facilities. Iran’s Shia allies in Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere could be expected to launch attacks of their own on the U.S.-led alliance. Where all this would lead,
once such fighting began, is of course impossible to predict, but the history of the twenty-first century suggests that, whatever happens, it won’t follow the
careful ly laid plans of commanding generals (or their civilian overseers) and won’t end either
expectably or well . Precisely what kind of incident or series of events would ignite a war of this
sort is similarly unpredictable. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that the world is moving ever closer to a moment when the right (or perhaps the better word is wrong) spark
could set off a chain of events leading to full-scale hostilities in the Middle East in the wake of President Trump’s recent rejection of the nuclear deal. It’s possible, for instance, to
imagine a clash between Israeli and Iranian military contingents in Syria sparking such a conflict. The
Iranians, it is claimed, have set up bases there both to support the Assad regime and to funnel arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. On May 10th, Israeli jets struck several such sites, following a missile
barrage on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights said to have been launched by Iranian soldiers in Syria. More Israeli strikes certainly lie in our future as Iran presses its drive to establish and control
a so-called land bridge through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. Another possible spark could involve collisions or other incidents between American and Iranian naval vessels in the Persian Gulf,
Whatever the nature of the initial clash, rapid

where the two navies frequently approach each other in an aggressive manner.
escalation to full-scale hostilities could occur with very little warning .
WMD terror---Extinction
Robert Creamer 11, Political Organizer and Strategist – Strategic Consulting Group,
“Post-Bin Laden, It's Time to End the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism for Good”, Huffington
Post, 5-12, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/post-bin-laden---it-is-
ti_b_860954.html
Worse, al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have vowed to obtain and actually use
nuclear weapons. The status quo -- the balance of terror -- that for six decades prevented a nuclear
war between the U.S. and Russia is every day being made more unstable by the increasing numbers of
nuclear players -- and by the potential entry of non-state actors. Far from being deterred by the
chaos and human suffering that would ensue from nuclear war -- actors like al Qaeda
actively seek precisely that kind of cataclysm . The more nuclear weapons that exist in the world -- and more
importantly the more weapons-grade fissile material that can be obtained to build a nuclear weapon -- the more likely it is that one, or many
more, will actually be used. In the 1980's the specter of a "Nuclear Winter" helped spur the movement for nuclear arms reduction between
the U.S. and Soviet Union. Studies
showed that smoke caused by fires set off by nuclear
explosions in cities and industrial sites would rise to the stratosphere and envelope the world .
The ash would absorb energy from the sun so that the earth's surface would get cold , dry
and dark. Plants would die . Much of our food supply would disappear . Much of the world's surface
would reach winter temperatures in the summer.
EMP Attacks---extinction
Alice Friedemann 16, transportation expert, founder of EnergySkeptic.com and author
of “When Trucks Stop Running, Energy and the Future of Transportation,” worked at
American Presidential Lines for 22 years, where she developed computer systems to
coordinate the transit of cargo between ships, rail, trucks, and consumers, citing Dr.
Peter Vincent Pry. Pry is executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland
Security, a Congressional advisory board dedicated to achieving protection of the United
States from electromagnetic pulse and other threats. Dr. Pry is also the director of the
United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, an advisory body to Congress on policies to
counter weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Pry has served on the staffs of the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the
Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from an EMP Attack, the House Armed
Services Committee, as an intelligence officer with the CIA, and as a verification analyst
at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1-24-16, “ Electromagnetic pulse
threat to infrastructure (U.S. House hearings)” http://energyskeptic.com/2016/the-
scariest-u-s-house-session-ever-electromagnetic-pulse-and-the-fall-of-civilization/
Modern civilization cannot exist for a protracted period without electricity. Within days of a
blackout across the U.S., a blackout that could encompass the entire planet , emergency
generators would run out of fuel, telecommunications would cease as would
transportation due to gridlock , and eventually no fuel . Cities would have no running water
and soon, within a few days, exhaust their food supplies. Police, Fire, Emergency Services and hospitals
cannot long operate in a blackout . Government and Industry also need electricity in order
to operate. The EMP Commission warns that a natural or nuclear EMP event, given current unpreparedness , would
likely result in societal collapse . Terrorists, criminals, and even lone individuals can build a non-nuclear EMP weapon without great trouble or expense,
working from Unclassified designs publicly available on the internet, and using parts available at any electronics store. In 2000, the Terrorism Panel of the House Armed Services Committee
sponsored an experiment, recruiting a small team of amateur electronics enthusiasts to attempt constructing a radiofrequency weapon, relying only on unclassified design information and parts
purchased from Radio Shack. The team, in 1 year, built two radiofrequency weapons of radically different designs. One was designed to fit inside the shipping crate for a Xerox machine, so it
could be delivered to the Pentagon mail room where (in those more unguarded days before 9/11) it could slowly fry the Pentagon’s computers. The other radiofrequency weapon was designed to
fit inside a small Volkswagon bus, so it could be driven down Wall Street and disrupt computers— and perhaps the National economy. Both designs were demonstrated and tested successfully
during a special Congressional hearing for this purpose at the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground. Radiofrequency weapons are not merely a hypothetical threat. Terrorists, criminals, and
disgruntled individuals have used home-made radiofrequency weapons. The U.S. military and foreign militaries have a wide variety of such weaponry. Moreover, non-nuclear EMP devices that
could be used as radiofrequency weapons are publicly marketed for sale to anyone, usually advertised as ‘‘EMP simulators.’’ For example, one such simulator is advertised for public sale as an
‘‘EMP Suitcase.’’ This EMP simulator is designed to look like a suitcase, can be carried and operated by one person, and is purpose-built with a high energy radiofrequency output to destroy
electronics. However, it has only a short radius of effect. Nonetheless, a terrorist or deranged individual who knows what he is doing, who has studied the electric grid for a major metropolitan
area, could—armed with the ‘‘EMP Suitcase’’— black out a major city. A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. An EMP weapon can be used by state actors who wish to level the battlefield by
neutralizing the great technological advantage enjoyed by U.S. military forces. EMP is also the ideal means, the only means, whereby rogue states or terrorists could use a single nuclear weapon
to destroy the United States and prevail in the War on Terrorism or some other conflict with a single blow. The EMP Commission also warned that states or terrorists could exploit U.S. vulnerability
to EMP attack for coercion or blackmail: ‘‘Therefore, terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear weapons may well calculate that, instead of
destroying a city or military base, they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them—or threatening their use—in an EMP attack.’’ The EMP
Commission found that states such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have incorporated EMP attack into their military doctrines, and openly describe making EMP attacks against the
United States. Indeed, the EMP Commission was established by Congress partly in response to a Russian nuclear EMP threat made to an official Congressional Delegation on May 2, 1999, in the
midst of the Balkans crisis. Vladimir Lukin, head of the Russian delegation and a former Ambassador to the United States, warned: ‘‘Hypothetically, if Russia really wanted to hurt the United States
in retaliation for NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia could fire an SLBM and detonate a single nuclear warhead at high altitude over the United States. The resulting EMP would massively
disrupt U.S. communications and computer systems, shutting down everything.’’ China’s military doctrine also openly describes EMP attack as the ultimate asymmetric weapon, as it strikes at the
very technology that is the basis of U.S. power. Where EMP is concerned, ‘‘The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world’’: ‘‘Some people might think that
things similar to the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ are unlikely to take place during the information age. Yet it could be regarded as the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ of the 21st Century if a surprise attack is
conducted against the enemy’s crucial information systems of command, control, and communications by such means as… electromagnetic pulse weapons… Even a superpower like the United
States, which possesses nuclear missiles and powerful armed forces, cannot guarantee its immunity…In their own words, a highly computerized open society like the United States is extremely
vulnerable to electronic attacks from all sides. This is because the U.S. economy, from banks to telephone systems and from power plants to iron and steel works, relies entirely on computer
networks… When a country grows increasingly powerful economically and technologically…it will become increasingly dependent on modern information systems… The United States is more
vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world.’’ Iran—the world’s leading sponsor of international terrorism—in military writings openly describes EMP as a terrorist weapon, and as the
ultimate weapon for prevailing over the West: ‘‘If the world’s industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate
within a few years… American soldiers would not be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot.’’ The threats are not merely words. The EMP Commission assesses that
Russia has, as it openly declares in military writings, probably developed what Russia describes as a ‘‘Super-EMP’’ nuclear weapon—specifically designed to generate extraordinarily high EMP
fields in order to paralyze even the best protected U.S. strategic and military forces. China probably also has Super-EMP weapons. North Korea too may possess or be developing a Super-EMP
nuclear weapon, as alleged by credible Russian sources to the EMP Commission, and by open-source reporting from South Korean military intelligence. But any nuclear weapon, even a low-yield
first generation device, could suffice to make a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States. Iran, although it is assessed as not yet having the bomb, is actively testing missile delivery systems
and has practiced launches of its best missile, the Shahab–III, fuzing for high- altitude detonations, in exercises that look suspiciously like training for making EMP attacks. As noted earlier, Iran
has also practiced launching from a ship a Scud, the world’s most common missile—possessed by over 60 nations, terrorist groups, and private collectors. A Scud might be the ideal choice for a
ship-launched EMP attack against the United States intended to be executed anonymously, to escape any last-gasp U.S. retaliation. Unlike a nuclear weapon detonated in a city, a high-altitude
EMP attack leaves no bomb debris for forensic analysis, no perpetrator ‘‘fingerprints.’’ Under present levels of preparedness, communications would be severely limited, restricted mainly to those
few military communications networks that are hardened against EMP. Today’s microelectronics are the foundation of our modern civilization, but are over 1 million times more vulnerable to EMP
than the far more primitive and robust electronics of the 1960s, that proved vulnerable during nuclear EMP tests of that era. Tests conducted by the EMP Commission confirmed empirically the
theory that, as modern microelectronics become ever smaller and more efficient, and operate ever faster on lower voltages, they also become ever more vulnerable, and can be destroyed or
disrupted by much lower EMP field strengths. Microelectronics and electronic systems are everywhere, and run virtually everything in the modern world. All of the civilian critical infrastructures that
sustain the economy of the United States, and the lives of 310 million Americans, depend, directly or indirectly, upon electricity and electronic systems. Of special concern is the vulnerability to
EMP of the Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) transformers, that are indispensable to the operation of the electric grid. EHV transformers drive electric current over long distances, from the point of
generation to consumers (from the Niagara Falls hydroelectric facility to New York City, for example). The electric grid cannot operate without EHV transformers—which could be destroyed by an
EMP event. The United States no longer manufactures EHV transformers. They must be manufactured and imported from overseas, from Germany or South Korea, the only two nations in the
world that manufacture such transformers for export. Each EHV transformer must be custom-made for its unique role in the grid. A single EHV transformer typically requires 18 months to
manufacture. The loss of large numbers of EHV transformers to an EMP event would plunge the United States into a protracted blackout lasting years, with perhaps no hope of eventual recovery,
as the society and population probably could not survive for even 1 year without electricity. Another key vulnerability to EMP are Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition systems (SCADAs).
SCADAs essentially are small computers, numbering in the millions and ubiquitous everywhere in the critical infrastructures, that perform jobs previously performed by hundreds of thousands of
human technicians during the 1960s and before, in the era prior to the microelectronics revolution. SCADAs do things like regulating the flow of electricity into a transformer, controlling the flow of
gas through a pipeline, or running traffic control lights. SCADAs enable a few dozen people to run the critical infrastructures for an entire city, whereas previously hundreds or even thousands of
technicians were necessary. Unfortunately, SCADAs are especially vulnerable to EMP. EHV transformers and SCADAs are the most important vulnerabilities to EMP, but are by no means the
only vulnerabilities. Each of the critical infrastructures has their own unique vulnerabilities to EMP: The National electric grid, with its transformers and generators and electronic controls and
the electric grid is the most

thousands of miles of power lines, is a vast electronic machine—more vulnerable to EMP than any other critical infrastructure. Yet
important of all critical infrastructures , and is in fact the keystone supporting

modern civilization , as it powers all the other critical infrastructures . As of now it is
our technological Achilles Heel . The EMP Commission found that, if the electric grid collapses, so
too will collapse all the other critical infrastructures . But, if the electric grid can be protected and
recovered, so too all the other critical infrastructures can also be restored. Transportation is a critical infrastructure because
modern civilization cannot exist without the goods and services moved by road, rail, ship,
and air. Cars, trucks, locomotives, ships, and aircraft all have electronic components, motors, and controls that are potentially
vulnerable to EMP. Gas stations, fuel pipelines, and refineries that make petroleum products depend upon electronic components and
cannot operate without electricity. Given our current state of unpreparedness, in the aftermath of a natural or nuclear EMP event,
transportation systems would be paralyzed. Traffic control systems that avert traffic jams and collisions for road, rail, and
air depend upon electronic systems, that the EMP Commission discovered are especially vulnerable to EMP. Communications
is a critical infrastructure because modern economies and the cohesion and operation of modern societies
depend to a degree unprecedented in history on the rapid movement of information—
accomplished today mostly by electronic means. Telephones, cell phones, personal computers, television, and radio are all directly
vulnerable to EMP, and cannot operate without electricity. Satellites that operate at Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) for communications, weather,
scientific, and military purposes are vulnerable to EMP and to collateral effects from an EMP attack. Within weeks of an EMP event, the
LEO satellites, which comprise most satellites, would probably be inoperable. Banking and finance are the critical
infrastructure that sustain modern economies. Whether it is the stock market, the financial records of a
multinational corporation, or the ATM card of an individual—financial transactions and record keeping all depend now at the macro- and
micro-level upon computers and electronic automated systems. Many of these are directly vulnerable to EMP, and none can operate
without electricity. The EMP Commission found that an EMP event could transform the modern
electronic economy into a feudal economy based on barter . Food has always been
vital to every person and every civilization . The critical infrastructure for producing,
delivering, and storing food depends upon a complex web of technology , including
machines for planting and harvesting and packaging, refrigerated vehicles for long-haul
transportation, and temperature-controlled warehouses. Modern technology enables
over 98 percent of the U.S. National population to be fed by less than 2 percent of the population.
Huge regional warehouses that resupply supermarkets constitute the National food reserves, enough food to feed the Nation for 30–60
days at normal consumption rates, the warehoused food preserved by refrigeration and temperature control systems that typically have
Experience with storm-
enough emergency electrical power (diesel or gas generators) to last only about an average of 3 days.
induced blackouts proves that when these big regional food warehouses lose electrical
power, most of the food supply will rapidly spoil . Farmers, less than 2 percent of the population as
noted above, cannot feed 310 million Americans if deprived of the means that currently
makes possible this technological miracle. Water too has always been a basic necessity to every person and
civilization, even more crucial than food. The critical infrastructure for purifying and delivering potable water, and for disposing of and
treating waste water, is a vast networked machine powered by electricity that uses electrical pumps, screens, filters, paddles, and sprayers
to purify and deliver drinkable water, and to remove and treat waste water. Much of the machinery in the water infrastructure is
directly vulnerable to EMP . The system cannot operate without vast amounts of electricity supplied by the power grid. A
natural or nuclear EMP event would immediately deprive most of the U.S. National population of running water. Many natural sources of
water—lakes, streams, and rivers—would be dangerously polluted by toxic wastes from sewage, industry, and hospitals that would
backflow from or bypass wastewater treatment plants, that could no longer intake and treat pollutants without electric power. Many natural
water sources that would normally be safe to drink, after an EMP event, would be polluted with human wastes including feces, industrial
wastes including arsenic and heavy metals, and hospital wastes including pathogens. Emergency services such as police, fire, and
hospitals are the critical infrastructure that upholds the most basic functions of government and society—preserving law and order,
protecting property and life. Experience from protracted storm-induced blackouts has shown, for example in the aftermath of Hurricanes
Andrew and Katrina, that when the lights go out and communications systems fail and there is no gas for squad cars, fire trucks, and
ambulances, the
worst elements of society and the worst human instincts rapidly takeover .
The EMP Commission found that, given our current state of unpreparedness, a natural or nuclear
EMP event could create anarchic conditions that would profoundly challenge the
existence of social order .
Uniqueness
Uniqueness---T/L---2NC
All their evidence is citing the 2018 DoD report---
It outlined sufficient remedies to fix the base, which the White House
is already undergoing---specifically, creation of a national industrial
policy---only barrier WAS Congress
Jeff Green 18, president of J.A. Green & Company, a government relations firm based in
Washington, D.C. He previously served with the House Armed Services Committee and
the Defense Department, “The decline of the defense industrial base – and what to do
about it”, DefenseNews, Oct 5 2018,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2018/10/05/the-decline-of-the-defense-industrial-
base-and-what-to-do-about-it/ //hhb
A new report released by the White House documents the gravity of the situation facing
the defense industrial base, while also offering solutions to counteract these
challenges . By evaluating seven tiers deep into the supply chain, the report has documented more
than 280 major supply chain vulnerabilities and an alarming dependency on foreign nations, especially
China. The report is not all bad news, however: it notes that a targeted approach involving
funding, policy, legislation, and regulation could combat these declines and
significantly improve the outlook for American defense production. Keen observers of
the defense industrial base have noticed many of the problems identified by the report, classified into ten different
“archetypes,” for years. Foreign dependencies abound within the defense supply chain, especially at the “sub-tier” levels
of component or raw material manufacturing. Even when the U.S. military is not entirely dependent on a foreign source for
these supplies, it is often the case that a sole source or a single source, often fragile, is the only remaining producer of the
material. These
risks are among those clearly identified by the report, which offers
solutions to help them, ranging from additional funding to keep domestic manufacturers in business to sourcing
restrictions, such as the proven Berry and Specialty Metals amendments, that protect manufacturers from hostile foreign
acts. In addressing the prevalence of hostile foreign trade practices and other strategies designed to produce foreign
dependence and weaken the American industrial base, the report goes further than the Department of Defense has
traditionally wanted to venture. The report clearly identifies five macro factors that have weakened the defense industrial
base, including the “Industrial Policies of Competitor Nations.” Though U.S. manufacturing has declined for a variety of
reasons, the report notes that China, in particular, has used illegal means to dominate critical global markets. These
means include espionage, evasion of export controls, market access restrictions, subsidies, and dumping, among others.
Only the hardiest of free-market economists would say that the U.S. should ignore this flouting of the rules of global trade,
and no serious national security analyst should ignore how China has used these techniques to acquire and exert
dominance in sectors of critical concern to the U.S. military, such as rare earths and energetic materials. Fortunately,
the report goes beyond problem identification to provide a Blueprint for Action .
the White House has provided
Though many of these are locked away in a classified annex to the report,
some clues as to how it wishes to proceed. First, and probably most importantly, is
the creation of a national industrial policy to support national security efforts . This
is an area where the Department of Defense has been deficient for decades. Though the
Pentagon retained an office of industrial policy, defense observers will tell you that its resources and power were quite
limited. It had no power over the major program offices, who tended to pursue low-cost globally available options,
sometimes from unreliable foreign suppliers, even at the expense of overall industrial base health. A cohesive
industrial policy that has buy-in from all the major offices in the Department of Defense
will go a long way in restoring needed capabilities within the defense supply
chain , with the potential to actually lower costs in the long run by using the overall purchasing power of the U.S.
military to create economies of scale. Secondly, the report encourages the use of direct funding to
target and support critical sectors of the supply chain. Though the programs available to
carry out this important mission — the Defense Production Act Title III, Manufacturing Technology, and
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment — already exist, they need additional resources to make
significant changes in the industrial base . Congress, to its credit, has provided the Title III
program with $20 to $30 million in additional funds annually, but this has been insignificant compared to the efforts made
by China and other nations to strip industrial capacity away from the United States. If the recommendations in the report
are to be executed, more Title III funds will be required. The report also calls for additional efforts in
education and with allied nations to address workforce shortages and joint industrial challenges. Finally, though not
specifically addressed in the formal Blueprint, the report acknowledges that the Pentagon’s own acquisition processes
continue to pose challenges for innovative manufacturers, with red tape and uncertain funding driving many potential
suppliers away. Supporters
of a strong defense industrial base should view this report as a
significant step forward for the U.S. military . After years of being overlooked, the sub-tiers of
the defense industrial base, in particular, are now being monitored, evaluated, and
supported . The Department of Defense and the White House have started an important
conversation by doing the research to bring these problems to the foreground , and it
will be up to Congress next year to provide the resources and legislation necessary to
cure them.
BUT, Congress has since gotten on board---new funding is sufficient

to keep the base afloat
Jeff Stein and Aaron Gregg 19, policy reporter for The Washington Post; Reporter
covering the defense industry and government contractors, BA in PolySci from Emory,
MA in Public Policy from Georgetown; “U.S. military spending set to increase for fifth
consecutive year, nearing levels during height of Iraq war”, Washington Post, Apr 18
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/04/18/us-military-spending-set-
increase-fifth-consecutive-year-nearing-levels-during-height-iraq-war/ //hhb
The Trump administration has proposed $750 billion in defense spending as part of its budget
request to Congress for next year, as well as steep cuts to domestic programs in health care and education. House
Democrats in their budget proposed increasing defense spending to $733 billion a year
— an increase in line with inflation — in exchange for Republican support for an increase in domestic spending that would
Under either budget plan , the United States is expected to spend more
be twice as large.
on its military in 2020 than at any point since World War II, except for a handful of years
at the height of the Iraq War, said Todd Harrison, a defense budget expert at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a think tank focused on foreign policy. Harrison’s conclusion is supported by the Committee for a
Responsible Federal Budget and William Hartung, a budget expert at the Center for International Policy, a left-leaning
think tank. (In dollar terms, without adjusting for inflation, America’s military budget is set to be the
highest ever .) The increase suggests the U.S. military will continue to expand despite Trump’s calls to limit
America’s involvement overseas. It also contradicts
predictions by some analysts that Democrats
would seek to cut military spending after winning the House in the 2018 midterm
elections. The Pentagon and White House have argued that nearly two decades of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan
have left America’s military arsenal at risk of losing the global preeminence it has enjoyed since World War II.
Pentagon officials have said the additional resources are needed to counter
military escalations in Russia and China , which have invested heavily in next-generation military
weaponry. Russia claims to have already developed a hypersonic missile that can travel faster than the speed of sound,
something some defense hawks warn could threaten U.S. missile defense systems that were designed decades ago. And
A
China has invested heavily in new submarines, warships and other war equipment as its defense budget ballooned.
2018 report put together by the Pentagon in conjunction with the White House stated that “all
facets of the manufacturing and defense industrial base are currently under threat ” and
claimed some entire industries within the military supply chain are “near extinction.” “ This
strategy-driven
budget makes necessary investments in next-generation technology, space, missiles,
and cyber capabilities,” acting secretary of defense Patrick M. Shanahan said in a statement about the military’s
budget request. “ The operations and capabilities supported by this budget will strongly
position the US military for great power competition for decades to come .”
It passed.
Brenden Chainey et. al 8/24/19, also Sean McGlynn and Tim Peckinpaugh, reporters
for JD Supra, a daily source of legal intelligence on all topics business and personal, ;
“Congress and the President Strike a “Huuuge” Budget Deal: What It Means and
Opportunities”, JDSupra, Aug 24 2019, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/congress-
and-the-president-strike-a-40483/ //hhb
On August 2 , 2019, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (P.L.116-37) (“BBA”) was signed
into law . This bill amends the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L.112-25) (“BCA”) by raising discretionary spending caps
for FY2020 and FY2021 and allows for various other budgetary changes, including a debt limit suspension until August 1,
2021. The BBA raises discretionary spending to $1.37 trillion in FY2020 and $1.375 trillion in FY2021. Clients should
expect a return to a more orderly appropriations process for the FY2021 legislation. With the passage of the BBA,
Washington is effectively witnessing the end of the BCA (which was already set to expire in 2021). In preparation for
FY2021, we advise clients to identify their priority requests and begin to develop written justifications. While the increased
funding will likely not result in a large number of new projects in FY2021, we do expect to see a “bump up” in individual
accounts and potentially a limited number of new projects being funded. The Agreement The broad outline of the BBA
sets discretionary spending at $1.37 trillion in FY2020 and slightly more ($1.375 trillion) in FY2021.[1] As summarized in
the table below, for FY2020, the BBA raises the caps above the limits set in the BCA. In FY2020, the nondefense cap
increases to $621.5 billion, while the defense cap is set at $666.5 billion.[2] In FY2021, the nondefense cap increases to
$626.5 billion, while the defense cap is set at $671.5 billion.[3] The bill sets Overseas Contingency Operations (“OCO”)
levels up to $79.5 billion in FY2020[4] and $77 billion in FY2021. The BBA also adds an exemption for the 2020 Census
(capped at $2.5 billion). As a result, the overall real increase in spending compared to FY2019 is approximately $49 billion
for FY2020 and $54 billion for FY2021. [TABLE REMOVED] What This Means for Clients: Open
Issues/Questions While the deal did not result in a huge boost in funding over current FY2019 funding levels, it prevented
the BCA’s automatic spending cuts (also known as sequestration) from taking effect. We advise clients to prepare now for
the FY2021 appropriations season by identifying your priority requests and developing your written justification for
FY2021. While we do not expect a large increase in funding for new projects in FY2021, the additional topline budget
funding provided through this recent budget deal will give appropriators more room in individual bills to bump up existing
projects and potentially start a small number of new projects. Clients should also expect a more orderly appropriations
process in FY2021 (see caveat below) with lawmakers attempting to move bills in smaller batches rather than through an
omnibus package. Below are a list of open questions regarding the FY2020 and FY2021 appropriations season. Riders,
Poison pills, and CHIMPS: According to a statement released by House leadership, the agreement removes “CHIMPS,
poison pills, riders, and other non-appropriations language”[5] from the FY2020 bill that are not agreed to by both
congressional leadership and the White House.[6] However, it is unclear if this agreement also pertains to FY2021.[7] For
clients, this “handshake deal” could result in previously included language or riders (in the House appropriations bills)
being taken out of the final negotiated legislation that is signed by the president. Also there is a possibility that long-
standing riders could be taken out of the FY2020 appropriations bills if congressional leadership and the White House
cannot agree on allowing them to stay in the FY2020 bill. This possibility is remote because if these riders cleared a
divided House/Senate/White House in the past they would presumably do so again. If clients have successfully put a rider
into a House appropriations bill in the past (or for the FY2020 bill), they should work hard to ensure that these provisions
are also included in the Senate appropriations legislation in order to increase the chances of their rider’s (or language)
successful inclusion into the final appropriations legislation. Both Democrats and Republicans argued that this handshake
agreement was a win for their side. Republicans argued that it protected many conservative and Trump-related policy
initiatives from attack in the FY2020 bill. Democrats, on the other hand, argued that most of these partisan riders, poison
pills, and other non-appropriations language would have been removed during conference between the Democrat-
controlled House and the Republican-controlled Senate anyway. Also, House Democrats argued that there were other
bills that they could potentially serve as vehicles for policy riders. According to appropriations leadership, members can
still “negotiate” the inclusion of riders as bills move from committee consideration to floor debate to conference. However,
only those riders that all sides agree to will be included in the final bill. Regular Order and Increased Funding: The
handshake deal also states that the White House, congressional leadership, and appropriations committees will work to
ensure that the appropriations process proceeds according to regular order. If the agreement holds, Congress appears to
be on course for regular order in FY2021. For FY2020, the Senate officially began drafting appropriations bills in August
and will likely begin to hold their first subcommittee markups when the Senate reconvenes on September 9. After initial
subcommittee and full committee markups, the Senate will likely skip a vote on the floor, and congressional leadership will
work to combine both the House and Senate bills into an omnibus bill.[8] House and Senate leadership seem determined
to avoid another government shutdown and will likely push for members to support the final version of the bill. If the
handshake agreement holds, then the bill should receive enough Democratic and Republican votes to guarantee
passage. After a floor vote, the bill should then go to the president’s desk for signing. Census Funding: Although the
budget allows for an additional $2.5 billion increase in funds for the 2020 Census, these funds will have to come out of
existing funds within the Commerce, Justice, Science (“CJS”) appropriations bill and will likely place additional funding
pressure on the big accounts present in the bill (NASA, NOAA satellites, Community Oriented Policing Services program,
etc.). This is not a unique situation, as the final year before the decennial census often places funding stress on the CJS
bill. Veterans Funding: During negotiations, Speaker Nancy Pelosi pushed for $25 billion in funding for a Veterans
Administration healthcare initiative; however, the BBA does not explicitly set aside funds for this purpose. It remains to be
seen how much of the increase in funding will be allocated towards this initiative. Wall Funding: On July 26, the Supreme
Court lifted an injunction blocking the White House from using unspent military funds to build part of the border wall. As
stated above, the BBA included an agreement that no poison pill policy provisions would be included in the FY2020
appropriations legislation. Because the administration retained its right to redirect money from the Department of Defense
to the wall, there remains a strong possibility that the White House could exercise this right within the next few months.
How this plays out during budget negotiations is an open question. Both parties have signaled a wish to avoid a situation
similar to last February’s 35-day partial federal government shutdown. However, wall funding remains a Trump
administration priority, and the budget deal along with the Supreme Court decision may give them the option of pursuing a
Defense: The BBA includes
major policy goal (barring any last-minute court injunction).
approximately $738 billion in defense spending in FY2020 (including OCO). This represents a
3.1% (or $22 billion) increase over current funding levels. Congressional Republicans sought an additional $12 billion in
defense funding during negotiations but were unable to achieve their goal.[9] This reduced amount is disappointing to
defense hawks in light of the recently passed House National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), which included only
$733 billion for defense spending. That bill’s lower funding level caused most Republicans to vote against the bill.
Republican leadership and the White House spun the budget agreement as a win, stating
that the overall spending number was higher than the NDAA number and better than the automatic spending cuts that
would have resulted if a deal had not been reached.
---
Defense industrial base strong – Trump is restoring certainty
Duesterberg 10-16-18 Thomas J., is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Previously, Dr.
Duesterberg was executive director of the Manufacturing and Society in the 21st Century
Program at the Aspen Institute, Trump Administration Gets Serious About Defense
Industrial Base, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasduesterberg/2018/10/16/trump-
administration-gets-serious-about-defense-industrial-base/#6749d9114bdb - BS
Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. manufacturing sector was the defining pillar of the
“Arsenal of Democracy.” The size, technological superiority and continuous innovation in this sector
allowed not only the preservation of democracy in the great conflagrations of the past century, but also the
creation of the global Pax Americana that underlies one of the longest periods of peace
and unprecedented prosperity in world history. The slow decline of that industrial superiority ,
however, is beginning to undermine U.S. economic vitality , as President Trump keeps reminding us, and our ability
to support the national security dominance which has been the backbone of global stability for over a century. A long-awaited report
from the Administration released earlier this month is the most comprehensive overview of this
growing problem and begins to outline a systematic response to the challenge it represents.
The much-anticipated reckoning is among the more significant government reports

in generations . It also provides important guidance for the emerging trade and industrial
renewal policies of the Trump Administration. The document states at the outset that “…the erosion of American
manufacturing over the last two decades has had a negative impact on these [defense] capabilities…and threatens to undermine the ability
of U.S. manufacturing firms to meet security requirements.” The report goes into considerable detail about the loss of U.S. technological
leadership and production infrastructure in such critical sectors as robotics, electronics, semiconductors, advanced communications,
quantum computing, shipbuilding, some elements of aerospace technology, advanced metal forming, nuclear power, and access to critical
raw materials. Another growing concern across many industries is the shortage of skilled production workers and STEM (science,
technology, engineering and mathematics) experts. While many of these issues have been chronicled before, the study marks the first
systematic effort to link the growing global competitive environment to the national security needs of the world’s leading superpower. The
report minces no words that the rise of China, with its mercantilist and often illegal actions (in terms of agreed international trade rules), is
one of the most important factors behind the looming loss of technical leadership so vital to national security. The text states quite
unambiguously: China’s capture of foreign technologies and intellectual property, particularly the systematic theft of U.S. weapons systems
and the illicit and forced transfer of dual-use technology, has eroded the military balance between the U.S. and China…. China’s
aggressive industrial policies have already eliminated some capabilities with critical defense functions…. China’s actions seriously threaten
other capabilities…." TheAdministration’s report helps gives substance and specificity to its
trade policy. It identifies key sectors and key technologies important to defense capabilities, and the actions by the Chinese which
threaten them. The catalogue of industries and technologies also provides guidance to the recently strengthened CFIUS (Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States) law which allows U.S. authorities to review and block, if necessary, foreign acquisitions of key
parts of the defense industrial base. The report’s emphasis on skills training in both the scientific and production jobs in industries like
nuclear power, shipbuilding and large metal forging also is helpful to the work of the President’s new National Council for the American
Worker. Thegroup is charged with leading an interdepartmental, government-wide effort to
find ways to overcome gaps in essential skills. Finally, the report outlines a series of additional
Federal actions to address the problems outlined in the report. These include improving
procurement strategies , strengthening and broadening the domestic supply chain
for domestic production , and using Department of Defense programs to support
specific defense-critical industrial production and technology development . In an
opinion piece accompanying the release of the report, Assistant to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Policy
Peter Navarro rightly argued that the President’s tax reform and deregulatory agenda is also
important in helping renew American manufacturing . There is always some danger that
the clarion call to rebuild specific industries, especially in a time of heightened global
competition from a rising superpower, will be carried too far and the hand of
government will weigh too heavily on the traditional dynamism of the American
private sector . Finding the right balance among all the government tools—including trade, education, regulation and industrial
support programs—is never easy, but the new report gives urgency to addressing the problems and clarity about the industries that are
essential to national security. The
complacency of recent decades needs to be replaced by a new
determination to find the right balance of more activist policies in support of a 21st-
century Arsenal of Democracy.
Trump’s reforms are fixing it now

Navarro 18 Peter Navarro, 10-4-2018, "America’s Military-Industrial Base Is at Risk","
The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/opinion/america-military-
industrial-base.html - BS
President Trump’s maxim that “ economic security is national security ” comes with an
important corollary: A strong manufacturing base is critical to both economic prosperity and
national defense . Policies advanced by the administration under this banner include
corporate tax cuts and a wave of deregulation to stimulate investment and spur innovation;
steel and aluminum tariffs to bolster core industries ; a stout defense against China’s
brazen theft and forced transfers of American intellectual property and technologies; a
significant increase in the military budget ; expansion of Buy American rules for government procurement; and
tough steps on trade to level the playing field for American workers, businesses and
farmers.
Uniqueness---AT: McCormick---2NC
All of that means the base will be fine---they forgot the bottom of this
card!
2AC Rhys McCormick 18, associate fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., “Review
Warns Defense Industrial Base Faces 'Unprecedented Set of Challenges’”, Oct 5 2018,
CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/review-warns-defense-industrial-base-faces-
unprecedented-set-challenges //hhb
Q5: What's next for the defense industrial base?
A5: The Pentagon’s next course of action is to go about implementing these

recommendations and the more detailed action plan found in the classified version of
the report that includes more specific recommendations for solving the almost 300 identified
vulnerabilities. The administration will kick off its implementation of these recommendations
later today when the president is expected to sign off on measures authorizing nearly $30
million of Title III of the Defense Production Act funding for critical cell and battery manufacturing capabilities.
Notably, the allies and partners recommendation suggest an opportunity to build on the momentum of Congress’s 2017
expansion of the National Technology Industrial Base and to address common defense industrial base priorities through
reciprocal steps to build on existing trusted partnerships. Implementing the other recommendations
requires more time and money. Eric Chewning, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy,
has indicated that the forthcoming president’s fiscal year 2020 budget request will ask
for increased funding to address the specific vulnerabilities identified in this
report.
Uniqueness---Profits---2NC
Defense stocks on track for some more booming business---recent
tensions and stock strength ensures profits.
Ross, senior equity analyst at Mauldin Economics, 1/15/20
(Robert, “Middle East Tensions Spell Another Big Year for Defense Stocks”,
https://www.mauldineconomics.com/the-weekly-profit/middle-east-tensions-spell-
another-big-year-for-defense-stocks)//GA
“I can’t remember the last bad year for defense stocks .” One of my Mauldin Economics
colleagues mentioned this last week, and he makes a good point. Defense stocks have returned 17.3%
per year over the last decade—well ahead of the S&P 500’s 13.2% annual return. Yet a lot
of investors have ignored defense stocks. That is, until the US killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani earlier this month.
ETF
Investors rushed into the space after the news came out. Since the strike, the iShares US Aerospace & Defense
(ITA) has jumped 2.5%. That’s more than quadruple the S&P 500 return over the same
period: Meanwhile, big defense players like Northrop Grumman (NOC) have spiked nearly 8%.
Defense Has Been High on My List for Months Longtime readers know I like defense stocks. I shared two defense stocks
high on my buy list back in May: Lockheed Martin (LMT) and BAE Systems (BAESY). Both have more than doubled the
S&P 500 since: And both companies would still make great additions to any income investor’s portfolio. I’ll also share two
more options with you in a moment. But first, let’s look at why the defense industry is so strong. It Starts with a $700
Billion Budget The US military is giant. It employs 2.2 million people. That’s more than the population of Wyoming,
Vermont, and Alaska combined. It takes a lot of money to maintain this massive operation. The US will spend nearly $700
billion on the military this year alone. Even the next biggest military spenders lag far behind: China will spend $168 billion,
and Saudi Arabia $82.9 billion. For perspective, the combined military budgets of China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are
less than half of the US defense budget. And, no surprise, the
US spends 90% of its defense budget on
US companies. That means billions of dollars consistently flow into US defense companies.
It’s a very predictable money train , and there’s almost nothing that could stop it… Defense Spending
Virtually Never Slows When the economy slows—as I expect it to in 18 months or so—people spend less and businesses
scale back. Consider the global financial crisis, for example. Between 2008 and 2009, US consumer spending dropped
8.2% and domestic investment plunged 30.1%. At the same time, the US hiked military spending by 12.2%. This was not
an anomaly. Defense spending grew during five of the six last recessions. You can see this in the next chart, which tracks
US defense spending since the 1970s. Recessions are highlighted in gray. [FIGURE OMITTED] There’s a good reason
for this. A solid 70% of the US economy relies on consumer spending—everything from people buying groceries to paying
their energy bills. During
a recession, consumers feel the pinch and spend less. The defense
industry is immune to all that. There’s no shortage of reasons to spend money on the military. From countering
real and imagined threats abroad to supporting veterans and defense-linked jobs… it’s just politically toxic to cut military
spending. So it almost never happens. That’s why companies that do business with the US military
earn very stable profits .
Huge advancements in defense stocks have made the industry boom

in 2020 and beyond.
Imbert and Macias, Fred Imbert is a CNBC Reporter covering markets, Amanda Macias
covers national security, defense industry and the intelligence community for CNBC. She
joined CNBC’s Washington bureau in 2018 and is based in the Pentagon. Amanda
studied Broadcast Journalism and Finance at the University of Missouri, 12/21/19
(Fred and Amanda, “Defense stocks could soar again in 2020 after massive defense
spending jump”, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/21/defense-stocks-could-soar-in-2020-
after-defense-spending.html)//GA
WASHINGTON — Geopolitical uncertainty coupled with a colossal uptick in U.S. military
spending could make defense stocks a winning trade once again in 2020 . Under the
Trump administration, the space has left the broader stock market in the dust. The iShares U.S.
Aerospace & Defense exchange-traded fund (ITA) has rallied more than 70% since Nov. 8,
2016. The S&P 500, meanwhile, is up around 50% in that time. This year has been no different. The ITA ETF has surged more than
30% in 2019 while the S&P 500 has gained around 27%. Also, a historic boost to the U.S. defense budget should be a boon for defense
stocks in 2020. The Pentagon’s spending power has never been larger at a cool $738 billion, up from $717 billion in 2019. The rise in
defense spending comes as the Trump administration has pulled the United States back from global commitments and pushed forward on
ambitious projects like the denuclearization of North Korea, rising tensions with Iran, a bitter trade war with China and an ongoing effort to
negotiate the end of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. “Global attention is directed toward the US and China but the Gulf is more dangerous for
the world,” said Neil Dwane, global strategist at AllianzGi. “Any escalation in the Middle East can become a full crisis as the effects ripple
through the region.” 2020 election overhype Despite sharp gains, analysts think valuations for defense stocks remain attractive as investors
overestimate the impact a more left-leaning presidency could have on the sector. “Although the 2020 elections remain an overhang on
Defense stocks, we think the risks are way overstated and have hampered Defense multiples from expanding despite continued end-
market growth,” said Buckingham Research Group analyst Richard Safran in a note. Democratic presidential hopefuls Elizabeth Warren
and Bernie Sanders have both spoken out against the $21billion increase to the Pentagon’s 2020 budget. In a tweet, Warren said: “The
Pentagon’s budget has been too large for too long. I cannot support a defense bill that’s a $738 billion Christmas present to giant defense
contractors & undermines our values and security.” Sanders, meanwhile, said earlier this month in a joint statement with congressman
Rohit Khanna, D-Penn., the bill was of “astonishing moral cowardice.” “It’s a widely held view (and we think an overhang on Defense) that
the leading Democratic progressive candidates (Warren and Sanders) would likely slash Defense budgets,” Buckingham’s Safran noted.
However, he also pointed out that President Donald Trump would likely preside over the fiscal 2021
defense budget , meaning Warren or Sanders would not influence the budget
immediately after taking office. Not cheap, but not expensive Nobody spends money on arms like the United States, and it
shows in the bottom lines of the biggest defense contractors. Lockheed Martin’s annual earnings surged by
more than 155% from 2017 to 2018. Northrop Grumman also saw its bottom line
expand by 61.2% in that time . And while defense stocks may not be cheap, they are not expensive either. The ITA’s
price-to-earnings ratio, one of the most widely used valuation metrics on Wall Street, sits around 24.3. That’s well below its 2018 peak of
28.4. However, it’s also above its early 2019 trough of 18.9. “It’s not the start of 2019 when multiples had de-rated on fear of a DoD budget
decline. But its also not post 2016 election when multiples were somewhat stretched,” said Goldman Sachs analyst Noah Poponak in a
note. “We
continue to broadly favor Defense stocks. During periods of budget growth,
which is the current environment, Defense stocks tend to outperform the market.” Lockheed
Martin, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics are among Poponak’s top defense picks for 2020. He pointed out Lockheed’s new order
bookings have “substantially outpaced” those of its peers, “which should lead to much stronger than average growth near-, medium and
long-term.” Lockheed Martin shares have been on fire this year, surging nearly 50% . Last
month, the Pentagon announced a $34 billion F-35 contract with Lockheed, the largest contract yet for the defense company’s costly fighter
program. The F-35 , a fifth-generation stealth jet, is the crown jewel in Lockheed’s portfolio and remains
the Pentagon’s most expensive weapons system. Northrop Grumman’s exposure to weapons “modernization programs,” along with its
favorable pension dynamics and falling capital expenditures make the stock a buy, according to the analyst. Northrop Grumman shares
shot up more than 40% in 2019. As for General Dynamics, the headwinds that led to the stock’s underperformance in recent years have
started to subside and “can start to drive upside to consensus.” General Dynamics shares are only up 15.2% in 2019, well below the ITA’s
gains for the year.
Uniqueness---AT: Trade War---1NR
Not relevant---just says that China could potentially cut off the US
supply of REMs if we were at war, NOT that they will in the status
quo.
Their ev says the trade war MIGHT cause China to cut off REMs---it
just ended lol.
Swanson, reporter for the New York Times, 10/11/19
(Ana, “Trump Reaches ‘Phase 1’ Deal With China and Delays Planned Tariffs”,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/business/economy/us-china-trade-deal.html)//GA
the U nited S tates had reached an interim deal

WASHINGTON — President Trump said Friday that
with China that would forestall a tariff increase slated for next week, providing a
temporary détente in a prolonged and economically painful trade war. Mr. Trump, speaking from
the Oval Office, said negotiators had reached a “Phase 1” agreement that would take several weeks to write and that both
agreement would provide relief to American
sides could officially sign by November. If completed, the
farmers and businesses that have been battered by the trade war. Mr. Trump said the
“substantial” agreement would involve China buying $40 billion to $50 billion worth of
American agricultural products annually, along with guidelines on how it manages its currency, the
renminbi. It would also strengthen Chinese protections for American intellectual
property and give financial services companies more access to China’s market, the president said. In exchange, the
United States will not move ahead next week with plans to raise tariffs on $250 billion worth of Chinese goods to 30
percent. The president has not made a final decision on whether to impose an additional round of tariffs on Dec. 15, as he
has threatened. The announcement is a sharp turn from Mr. Trump’s posture several weeks ago, when the president —
angry over China’s retaliatory tariffs — demanded that American companies stop doing business with China and
threatened to tax every toy, shoe and computer from Beijing before the year’s end. The escalation has rattled investors,
lawmakers and businesses, which have begun delaying investment and hiring amid continuing uncertainty about the trade
war’s trajectory. The economic pain appears to have softened Mr. Trump’s appetite for a fight.
On Friday, the president said the two sides would now work on a deal in phases , a reversal from
his previous position that he was looking for a “complete” China deal, not an interim agreement.
Doesn’t meet the threshold of thumping the link nor uniqueness---has

to say that supply chain vulnerabilities hurt profits, certainty, or
R&D---their ev says none of the three.
AND, new tech and government moves remedy supply chain

vulnerabilities.
Green, president of J.A. Green & Company, a government relations firm based in
Washington, D.C., previously served with the House Armed Services Committee and the
U.S. Defense Department, 5/31/19
(Jeffery, “America must secure its supply chains against a vulnerability of its own
making”, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/05/31/america-must-
secure-its-supply-chains-against-a-vulnerability-of-its-own-making/)//GA
Direct government investment in items used by the U.S. military, starting with rare earth magnets, is also necessary.
Novel rare earth magnet recycling techniques show significant promise in the
near term . Last year, Congress recognized the importance of sourcing domestic magnets
by prohibiting U.S. Defense Department use of Chinese magnets (and tungsten) —
Section 871 of the N ational D efense A uthorization A ct is stimulating defense demand and
encouraging upstream growth of non-Chinese alloys and metals as well. These
were steps needed to reinvigorate an entire supply chain. The current administration
and D epartment o f D efense are taking welcome steps to finally address the issue ,
pursuant to Executive Order 13806; they should work with Congress to fully resource the Defense Production Act Title III
program as well as assist new producers in securing needed qualifications, in addition to other actions to incentivize
production. Implementing
these recommendations will significantly reduce supply chain risk
for the military, improve manufacturing strength and mitigate vulnerability . All these
steps can be implemented but will require readdressing old assumptions about how to maintain our industrial base in a
global economy.
So does the new TCM, or Trusted Capital Marketplace, that shifts

purchases of REMs to allies.
Maucione, reporter for the Federal News Network, 5/10/19
(Scott, “DoD to help trusted companies and investors meet to build industrial base”,
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-main/2019/05/dod-to-help-trusted-companies-
and-investors-meet-to-build-industrial-base/)//GA
The Defense Department (DoD) is setting up a new organization to find trusted companies to
pair with investors to build critical technologies that could be compromised by foreign
influence. The Trusted Capital Marketplace (TCM), announced by Undersecretary for Acquisition and
Sustainment Ellen Lord, will give the United States a medium to build up vulnerable industrial
bases . “TCM will convene trusted sources of private capital with innovative companies
critical to the defense industrial base and national security,” Lord said Friday at the Pentagon.
“TCM will support small- and medium-sized companies to manufacture emerging
defense and commercial technologies.” The announcement comes as DoD’s concerns continue to grow
about companies like Huawei and ZTE using their ubiquitous products to spy on the United States. DoD expects
to roll out the entire program sometime in July and already has about 50 companies in mind that are
trusted enough to join the marketplace. “The first step is to set up a website infrastructure to bring providers of trusted
capital together with businesses looking for capital infusion,” Lord said. “I’m constrained legally from introducing one
company to one venture capitalist; however, what we can do is segment the marketplace and then put in companies that
need capital infusions that we think have critical technology for us. We can also vet critical providers of capital.” Lord said
DoD put out a request for proposals two weeks ago through an other transaction authority to find a provider for the
website. “A lot
of these companies are small innovative companies that don’t have the
resources, sophistication or contacts to reach sources of capital,” Lord said. “What we are trying
to do is enable that, so they don’t have to go through a lot of time and expense with legal firms to find out who is out there.
Likewise, we have some incredible patriots who have come to us and

said ‘We are interested in putting our money somewhere that will make a
difference in our national defense.’ There are two willing sides there and there is an unmet need that
somebody like government can provide the ecosystem to make it work.” Lord said DoD is still deciding how much money
it will put into the program, but she noted TCM will satisfy a requirement made by the 2018 defense authorization act to
help secure the defense supply chain. TCM isn’t the only thing DoD is doing to address the
industrial base and supply chain issue for developing technologies. “We are tightly coupled with
the intelligence community to find out what is out there,” Lord said. “ We will continue not to buy from
sources that are not trusted . A prime supplier to the Department of Defense has responsibility to understand
their supply chain. The security of that supply chain, whether its two or three levels down or six or seven levels down, is
the responsibility of the prime. That’s why we are developing standards that are very, very clear.”
AND, business is BOOMING for the DIB regardless of supply chain

vulnerabilities.
Scott Thompson 19, U.S. Aerospace & Defense Leader, BS in Accounting from Bryant,
“Aerospace and Defense Industry Hits Record Revenues and Profits in 2018”, PWC,
May 16 2019, http://usblogs.pwc.com/industrialinsights/2019/05/16/aerospace-and-
defense-industry-hits-record-revenues-and-profits-in-2018/ //hhb
With an industry revenue of $760 billion – exceeding the previous record of $729
billion in 2014 – and operating profit of $81 billion, surpassing the previous record set in 2017
by 9%, the A&D sector scored record revenues and profits in 2018 . We’ve also seen a very
active M&A environment in 2018 where the industry recorded the third highest deal value in history, causing a number of
the commercial aerospace and
changes in the top 100 list, as well as pending changes for 2019. Both
defense sectors are expected to experience continued strong revenue and
operating profit improvements in 2019 with the help of projected increases in aircraft deliveries, aircraft
aftermarket and increase in defense spending. Commercial Aerospace 2018 Recap Growth in revenue passenger miles
was 6.5% in 2018 and the fifth consecutive year above 6%, about twice the global GDP growth, which is helping to drive
demand for new equipment and aftermarket in the near and long term. We saw another record being set in 2018 with new
aircraft deliveries increasing by 8% for a total of 1,606, 125 more than in 2017, with further production increases planned
for narrowbodies. The sector is also experiencing a healthy aftermarket, as the fleet of aircraft in service continues to
grow. Backlog duration also improved in 2018, falling from an average of 9 years to 8 years, at current rates. Commercial
Commercial aviation has become a critical part of our global infrastructure and it’s
Aerospace Outlook
expected to continue to grow faster than the overall economy. For example, 82% of the global
population has never taken a single aircraft flight, and the global middle class is projected to grow from 25% to 60% by
2030. That in turn will create a huge market of potential new customers for the aviation industry. The commercial
aerospace sector should sustain growth in 2019 and beyond, driven by the continued increase in aircraft deliveries and
Defense 2018 Recap In 2018, we have seen
the consistently strong demand in revenue passenger miles.
defense budget increases around the world, led by the US defense budget at $700
billion , about a 20% increase in two years, in addition to increases in Europe and Asia. Overall, the
defense industry saw an acceleration in revenue and profit growth in 2018 with the top
six US defense contractors reporting a 12% increase in revenue and 6%
improvement in profit and the top five European defense companies reporting a 4% increase in revenue and
21% increase in operating profit. Defense Outlook Defense revenue is expected to show
continued growth in 2019 due to an increased U.S. defense budget , and we also
expect operating profit and margin to improve in 2019. With the high level of tension between the
West and Russia, China and Iran, and improved but continuing tense relationship with North Korea, we could see a shift
as geopolitical uncertainties and other factors
in new defense priorities as well. In terms of M&A,
have contributed to an increase in defense spending, we believe bolstering
military capabilities with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, hypersonic and
more, will be drivers of deal activity next year and beyond.
Uniqueness---AT: Acquisitions
Squo efforts solve acquisitions framework problems <our ev is from
the conclusion of the report their ev cites>
DOD 18, Department of Defense, September 2018, “Assessing and Strengthening the
Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United
States”, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-
STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-
AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF - BS
The DoD-led Interagency Task Force recognizes and supports ongoing efforts to
address the challenges identified in the EO 13806 assessment, including:  Increased
near-term DoD budget stability with the passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, providing stable funding
through FY2019  Modernization of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. and investigations under Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974 into Chinese intellectual property theft, to better combat Chinese industrial policies targeting American intellectual property 
Updates to the Conventional Arms Transfer policy and unmanned aerial systems export
policy to increase U.S. industrial base competitiveness and strengthen international alliances
Reorganization of the former Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics , the work of the “Section 809 panel,” and
development of the adaptive acquisition framework all aim to streamline and improve defense acquisition
processes  Restructuring the Defense Acquisition University to create workforce
education and training resources that will foster increased agility in acquisition
personnel
Uniqueness---AT: Budget Stability
Squo efforts solve budget stability <our ev is from the conclusion of the
report their ev cites>
address the challenges identified in the EO 13806 assessment, including:  Increased
near-term DoD budget stability with the passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of
2018, providing stable funding through FY2019
Uniqueness---AT: Material Dependence/China REM
NDAA solves raw material dependence
Jeffery A. Green, 1-24-2019, (president of J.A. Green & Company, a government
relations firm based in Washington, D.C. He previously served with the House Armed
Services Committee and the Defense Department.) “Industrial Base Gears Up for Great
Power Conflict" National Defense,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/1/24/viewpoint-industrial-base-
gears-up-for-great-power-conflict
The push to secure the defense industrial base was advanced greatly by the recently-passed
N ational D efense A uthorization A ct. For example, section 871 of the NDAA prohibits the Defense
Department and its contractors from acquiring certain sensitive materials, including rare earth magnets,
from non-allied foreign nations including China, Russia and Iran. Once fully implemented in regulations, this
language will help catalyze a resurgence in U.S. domestic production of critical minerals
and components.
Uniqueness---AT: Offshoring
US domestic manufacturing growing now – less offshoring
DOD 17, March 2017, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy REPORT TO CONGRESS Fiscal Year 2016
Annual Industrial Capabilities,
https://www.businessdefense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Resources/2016%20AIC
%20RTC%2006-27-17%20-%20Public%20Release.pdf?ver=2017-06-30-144825-160 -
BS
Positive trends for the U.S. industrial base may indicate a resurgence in investment in
U.S. manufacturing . According to a recent Boston Consulting Group survey, 31% of senior U.S executives
reported their companies were “ most likely ” to add U.S. production capacity within
the next five years. 3 Chinese manufacturing wages have grown an average 12%
annually since 2001 which when combined with U.S. labor productivity gains, is making U.S. labor rates
more competitive relative to its competitors.4 As indicated in Figure 2 it appears the “ offshoring ”
trend is declining and reshoring of jobs is on the rise. Of the 76% who reported likely reshoring, their
primary reason was to “shorten our supply chain.” The U.S. corporate income tax is by far the most
uncompetitive factor cited by chief financial officers in the 2016 Insourcing Survey.
Uniqueness---AT: Workers
US has enough skilled workers
DOD, March 2017, (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy) REPORT TO CONGRESS Fiscal Year 2016
Annual Industrial Capabilities,
https://www.businessdefense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Resources/2016%20AIC
%20RTC%2006-27-17%20-%20Public%20Release.pdf?ver=2017-06-30-144825-160
A&D companies operating in the United States have a large high-skill talent pool upon which to draw.
These companies compete with other sectors of industry for the best talent . The U.S.
student population interest in the A&D market is positive. In 2016, 75% of engineering
students surveyed by Aviation Week indicated an interest in A&D careers due to the
technological challenge and overall interest in the aircraft, defense , and space
sectors .7 The Department is continuing to address talent needs through its strong support of
initiatives such as the Manufacturing USA Institutes, 8 Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental (DIUx), 9 and the MD510 National Security Technology Accelerator.11 These initiatives provide a
place for talent to gain government experience in environments similar to industry.
Training efforts solve <our ev is from the conclusion of the report their ev
cites>
address the challenges identified in the EO 13806 assessment, including :  Increased near-
term DoD budget stability with the passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, providing stable funding through FY2019  Modernization
of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. and investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 into Chinese intellectual
property theft, to better combat Chinese industrial policies targeting American intellectual property  Updates to the Conventional Arms
Transfer policy and unmanned aerial systems export policy to increase U.S. industrial base competitiveness and strengthen international
alliances Reorganization of the former Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the work of the
“Section 809 panel,” and development of the adaptive acquisition framework all aim to streamline and improve defense acquisition
processes  Restructuring the Defense Acquisition University to create workforce
education and training resources that will foster increased agility in acquisition
personnel  Response to Section 1071(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 which requires establishing a
process for enhancing the ability to analyze, assess, and monitor vulnerabilities of the industrial base  Creation of a National
Advanced Manufacturing Strategy by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, focused on
opportunities in advanced manufacturing  Department of Labor’s chairing of a Task
Force on Apprenticeship Expansion to identify strategies and proposals to promote
apprenticeships , particularly in industries where they are insufficient  DoD’s program for
Microelectronics Innovation for National Security and Economic Competitiveness to increase domestic capabilities and enhance technology
adoption  DoD’s cross-functional team for maintaining technology advantage  Implementation of a risk-based methodology for oversight
of contractors in the National Industrial Security Program, founded on risk management framework principles to assess and counter threats
to critical technologies and priority assets
Uniqueness---Sales---2NC
CAT and stats indicate US international sales are increasing.
Alaoui and Gawel, Sarah Alaoui is a contributing writer for The Washington Diplomat,
Anna Gawel is the managing editor of The Washington Diplomat, 12/23/19
(Sarah and Anna, “U.S. Envoy Who Heads Military Sales Seeks to Reassure Partners of
American Reliability”, https://washdiplomat.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=21209:us-envoy-who-heads-military-sales-seeks-
to-reassure-partners-of-american-reliability&catid=1591&Itemid=428)//GA
Military sales are a big — and growing — business. According to the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), the volume of international transfers of major arms between 2014 and
2018 was 7.8% higher than in 2009 to 2013 and 23% higher than in 2004 to 2008. The five
largest exporters were the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China, while the five largest importers were Saudi
Arabia, India, Egypt, Australia and Algeria. According to SIPRI, the U nited S tates accounts for the largest
share of arms exports in the world — 36% between 2014 and 2018 — a figure that has grown
significantly in recent years. Meanwhile, Russia accounted for 21% of global arms exports while China stood at just over
5%, with both countries working to ramp up those numbers. Since 2008, China has exported more arms overseas than it
imported, and as of 2018, it was the fifth-largest arms supplier in the world, with conventional arms sales totaling $1.04
billion (from $645 million in 2008). The bulk of these sales targeted China’s neighbors in Asia, with Pakistan leading the
pack, followed by Bangladesh and Myanmar. However, as China’s economic footprint in Africa expands, so has its military
presence there, with the continent comprising 20 percent of China’s conventional arms sales. Meanwhile, despite a drop
in arms exports to key countries such as Venezuela, Russian companies have experienced significant growth in their
arms sales since 2011, according to SIPRI, which said that in 2017, Russia surpassed the United Kingdom as the world’s
second-largest arms producer. The country’s main recipients include India, China and Algeria, but as it seeks to grab a
larger share of the global weapons market, Russia is increasingly focusing on the Middle East, which has been on a
weapons buying spree over the last decade. In August, Russia delivered an order of S-400 long-range air defense
systems to Turkey, raising the ire of the United States. In response, the U.S. cut off Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet
program, citing interoperability issues and concerns that the S-400 would place U.S. technology at risk. Turkey recently
announced it is in “advanced negotiations” to finalize acquisition of Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft, while India has made an
Despite
advance payment of $800 million as part of a $5 billion deal to buy Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system.
gains by Russia and China, the U.S. is still by far the number-one arms exporter in
the world , sealing more than $41 billion in government-negotiated arms deals in 2017
alone. That same year, commercial arms sales by U.S. companies reached $226.6 billion. (For
comparison’s sake, Russian companies sold $37.7 billion that year.) Increasing U.S. Weapons Sales But President
Trump , true to his business background and his “America First” governing ethos, wants those numbers to
be even bigger . Last year, he introduced a new Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy to
increase American weapons sales by adding U.S. “economic security” as a factor in
considering whether to approve U.S. arms exports. Previously, such exports were approved largely on
the basis of national security interests and foreign policy objectives, but the administration argues that national security
CAT is designed to speed up arms transfers and cut red tape
encompasses economic prosperity.
to make it easier for U.S. defense companies to sell weapons abroad. According to a State
Department fact sheet, the goal is to support America’s defense industrial base, create
more jobs, maintain a technological edge over potential adversaries and strengthen
partnerships with both traditional allies and new partners “that preserve and extend our global influence.” At the Meridian
talk, Cooper — whose bureau has been empowered by CAT to more forcefully advocate for U.S. arms sales — said that
“our competitors are turning to arms sales and security assistance as key tools to build
their own influence around the world, and to weaken ours.” He warned that as countries eagerly
explore arms sales from China and Russia that appear to be more affordable and come with fewer strings, this bargain-
hunting approach could end up jeopardizing their own national security. “We
have seen countries around the
world leap at the chance to obtain high-tech, low-cost defensive capabilities, only to see
their significant investments crumble and rust in their hands,” he argued. Cooper cited several
incidents, including: the crash of a Harbin Z-9 attack helicopter purchased by Cameroon in 2015; the deaths of “dozens of
Kenyan personnel” in Norinco VN4 armored personnel carriers, “vehicles that China’s own sales representative declined
to sit inside during a test firing”; and instances in which Middle East countries purchased CH-4 armed drones from China
only to soon discover their inoperability. Moreover, according to Cooper, joint military training programs at China’s
International Military Education Exchange Center place trainees with counterparts of “varying quality,” whereas the U.S.
Cooper
International Military Education and Training program trains foreign officers directly alongside U.S. personnel.
summed up the appeal of partnering with the U.S. in three words: quality, transparency
and accountability. “U.S. arms transfers are not a matter of secrecy, and rarely are the decisions surrounding them.
Unlike the determinations made in Beijing or Moscow, our major foreign military and direct commercial sales are managed
via a process whose policies are clear and transparent, and whose approvals are public,” he said, noting that CAT publicly
outlines factors taken into consideration during the vetting process. He added that while the U.S. is often criticized for
CAT has made “foreign military
having a costly and lengthy arms transfer process, over the past year,
sales process faster and cheaper,” reducing the time between request to offer by
9% and cutting overhead fees and transportation rates to produce a savings of $180 million for
foreign partners.
Trump’s presidency has ensured massive boosts to arms sales.

Dick, research analyst at the Stimson Center, 1/13/20
(Shannon, “Taking Stock and Looking Ahead for Responsible Policies on U.S. Arms
Sales”, https://www.forumarmstrade.org/blog)//GA
During the last three years, the
United States’ approach to conventional arms sales has been
characterized by its transactional nature and focus on short-term objectives. In this
environment, the Trump administration has repeatedly challenged key tenets of U.S. arms transfer laws and
policies, resulting in increased arms sales to countries of concern. At the same time, Congress has
increasingly spoken out about U.S. arms sales decisions, leading to greater examination of and public discourse on the
opportunities and, importantly, the risks presented by certain arms transfer decisions. Given these dynamics, the
upcoming year presents an opportunity to reevaluate how the United States engages in the global arms trade and identify
During
ways to ensure greater responsibility and accountability in U.S. arms transfer decisions in the years to come.
the Trump administration, expediency, special interests, and perceived economic incentives
have often come at the expense of long-standing approaches to U.S. arms transfer
decisions. In the last year alone, the administration: Released a fact sheet detailing its
implementation plan for the revised Conventional Arms Transfer policy, which places a
primacy on economic considerations and assisting U.S. defense industry , and
seeks to incentivize arms sales as one response to concerns about great power
competition. In so doing, however, the policy and its corresponding implementation plan gloss over considerations of
human rights and international law – issues that serve to mitigate the inherent risks of arms sales. Withdrew America’s
signature from the Arms Trade Treaty – the only legal, international agreement that seeks to promote international
security and reduce human suffering by regulating the global trade in conventional weapons – in a move that was
influenced by and predominately supports special interest groups in the United States, such as the National Rifle
Declared a national emergency to bypass Congress and push through more
Association.
than $8 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other
countries – thereby continuing a pattern of approving arms sales to countries with known
human rights concerns. Members of Congress had previously opposed the sales due to continued human rights
abuses and the growing humanitarian catastrophe resulting from U.S.-backed, Saudi-led coalition bombings in Yemen.
Took additional steps to transfer oversight of firearms exports from the U.S. Department
of State to the Department of Commerce, which would make it easier for U.S. arms
manufacturers to sell their products abroad and increase the risk that U.S. weapons fall into the wrong
hands or are used irresponsibly. The move would likely also result in less transparency around arms sales as well as
the Trump
challenge U.S. investigations of illegal arms transfers – among other concerns. With these activities,
administration has underscored its commitment to boost U.S. arms sales and to
do so more quickly . But such an approach risks overlooking important considerations – such as ensuring
appropriate end use, protecting against deleterious proliferation, and protecting human rights – and could lead to longer-
term consequences for U.S. national security and foreign policy. These trends have already animated some congressional
action and may continue to serve as fuel in underscoring the importance of Congress to hold the administration
accountable and reassert its role in overseeing U.S. arms sales.
Arms sales are growing

Samuel Stebbins, 2-21-2019, "Military spending: 20 companies profiting the most from
war," USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/02/21/military-
spending-defense-contractors-profiting-from-war-weapons-sales/39092315/ - BS
There was a 1 .1 percent increase in global military spending in 2017 , according to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The global rise was driven partially by a
$9 .6 billion hike in U.S. arms expenditure – the United States is the world’s largest
defense spender by a wide margin. Though it is yet unclear what the growing arms investments will mean for
international relations, major defense contractors around the world stand to benefit . Total
arms sales among the world’s 100 largest defense contractors topped $398 billion in 2017
after climbing for the third consecutive year . Notably, Russia, one of the countries with the fastest
growing militaries over the last decade, became the second largest arms-producing country, overtaking the United
The U nited S tates’ position as the top arms-producing
Kingdom for the first time since 2002.
nation in the world remains unchanged, and for now unchallenged . The United States
is home to five of the world’s 10 largest defense contractors , and American
companies account for 57 percent of total arms sales by the world’s 100 largest
defense contractors, based on SIPRI data.
Link
Link---[L]---2NC
Arms sales are key---
1---Profit Margins---declining domestic investment means profit margins that drive
R&D are almost entirely based in Arms sales – that’s Webster
2---The plan cancels a contract – that signals uncertainty which destroys the
industry
Vallone 15 Matt Valone , Defense Platforms manager at Avascent Analytics,3/24/15
HOW CONGRESS IS HAMSTRINGING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, War
on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/how-congress-is-hamstringing-the-
defense-industrial-sector/ - BS
The combination of budget cuts and erratic budgeting has created
What it means for industry
significant challenges for industry planning. New contracts don’t move forward , planned cancellations
may live on in limbo and costs can be driven up as schedules are stretched to reflect new
timelines. Smaller firms that may contribute parts to larger platforms are particularly at risk, as
delays in orders might deprive them of necessary revenue to maintain operations. Beyond
the damage to the industrial base, these recurring failures impose real, meaningful costs on
the government, as per unit costs increase and uncertainty makes reforms and efficiencies difficult to implement. Systems and
platforms that might benefit forces in the field take longer to reach the soldiers, sailors and airmen who need them. According to statistics
from a February 28th, 2013 House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, hearing on the Impacts of
procurement
a Continuing Resolution and Sequestration on Acquisition, Programming, and the Industrial Base, Army
programs experienced a 9 percent reduction across the board under sequestration, while the
continuing resolution prevented beginning any new programs or planning any multi-year procurement.
Similarly, the Navy testified that the sequestration cuts could potentially impact over 100,000 private
sector jobs . The Air Force faced delays in starting a number of projects, such as modifications
to key platforms (B-2, C-5, F-15). Lt. Gen. Charles Davis and Lt. Gen. Michael Moeller also noted
in their testimony the potential damage to the defense industrial base from all this
uncertainty , particularly to smaller firms more vulnerable to lost revenue from delays or
postponed starts. These numbers were backed up by reporting from outside sources; the
Center for Strategic and International Studies produced a report, “U.S. Department of Defense
Contract Spending and the Industrial Base, 2000-2013,” which noted that “Between 2012 and 2013, with the impact of sequestration,
defense-funded contract obligations declined by 16 percent to $314 billion .” Further on, the report notes
that, “The data show that a disproportionate share of the budget reductions under both the
BCA and sequestration has been borne by contracts and by the defense industrial
base .”
Uncertainty destroys R&D

DOD 18, (Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Policy) Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial
Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-
At the macroeconomic level, defense
spending uncertainty makes predicting the overall
market size difficult , impeding forecasting across every tier in the supply chain.
Uncertainty in spending inhibits investment in capabilities even where the overall
sector market size is increasing , impacting defense suppliers and leading to
revenue fluctuation , capital investment shortfalls, and suboptimal investment in
R&D. Over time, spending instability also creates peaks of surge and valleys of drought –
a pernicious, ambiguous pattern in which suppliers who build for scale production are left with excess
capacity when programs end, creating long-term market distortion .
R&D depends on capital from weapons procurement - destroys the

entire investment strategy of the defense industrial base
Erwin 16 Sandra Erwin, editor of National Defense Magazine,1/7/16 “Defense 2016: A
year of big decisions” Bloomberg Government, http://about.bgov.com/blog/defense-
2016-a-year-of-big-decisions/
Investment Dilemmas The

industry’s “core strategy” of boosting stock prices by returning cash
to shareholders and holding back on R&D investment may be sustainable for the next 18
to 24 months, after which companies may have to reassess their options, says Pierre Chao, of Renaissance Strategic Advisors.
There is a chance the Defense Department could introduce new procurement reform measures that may undermine the industry’s current
strategy by discouraging share buybacks, Chao says during a panel discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The
idea that defense contractors’ financial practices are to blame for the Pentagon’s innovation shortfalls ignores economic realities, he says.
“There is a misconception of what the big guys are supposed to do. Big guys are not traditionally the sources of raw technology.” Prime
contractors often wait for the innovation to come from small tech companies and then move to acquire them. The question for defense
CEOs is whether their companies can survive in the long term as “pure play” military contractors. Being entirely dependent on the
government severely restricts a company’s access to capital, Chao says. “You can’t get the debt financing that is more accessible to the
larger innovation economy.” Among the few sources of cash available for defense-centric companies, other than government contracts, are
angel investors who understand the defense market, a handful of venture capitalists who are still bullish on government work, or the spin off
of parts of their business. Chao points out that the defense market today offers scant incentive to put money into independent research and
development, or IRAD. The
calculus in the past has been to “take it on the chin” on low-margin
R&D work on the assumption that double-digit profits would come later in production
deals. That approach no longer works as there are fewer programs to bid for. The recent
Air Force award of a $21 billion R&D contract for a new long-range strike bomber is a once-in-a-generation opportunity, as was the joint
strike fighter two decades ago. This creates huge dilemmas for companies that have to figure out
how to play in a market with declining high-margin hardware contracts and more low-
margin services. In today’s defense market, companies see few places to put IRAD and at the same time they are compelled to
cut cost to compete more aggressively. That is difficult to do when a company must maintain the infrastructure to
be a defense contractor, Chao says. These demands are going to motivate companies to
consolidate and grow larger to gain economies of scale. Mid-tier contractors in the $50
million to $3 billion range are facing the brunt of this, he says . “They need to attract
capital.”
3---Economies of scale---contracts build resiliency into defense

industry supply chains AND reduce domestic production costs, that’s
Key to readiness
Eugene Gholz, 2019 Associate professor of political science at the University of Notre
Dame, and he was awarded the US Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service
Medal for his service as senior advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, “Conventional Arms Transfers and US
Economic Security” https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-
13_Issue-1/Gholz.pdf
CATs have a clearer, direct effect on economic security via their effect on US defense
manufacturing . Because weapon systems tend to stay in the US military inventory for
so long, they often require spare parts for maintenance years after the initial production run is
complete. DOD needs to pay the overhead cost of maintaining the production capacity for
those spare parts, even when the production rate for spares is much slower than the initial production rate during
original manufacture of the defense system. That slower rate tends to drive the unit cost of spare
parts dramatically upward . In some cases, demand for spare parts drops below the minimum technical
sustaining rate, meaning that the workers lose the ability to maintain quality standards even when the buyer is willing to
pay very high unit costs. In other cases, the
government does not realize how much the cost of
production has risen over time and does not invest enough to keep the supplier
interested or able to produce the part profitably , so production drops below the
minimum economic sustaining rate . These situations create potentially very costly
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources or Material Shortage (DMSMS) problems .20 Arms
exports and the expanded demand for future spare parts business that they create can
help reduce the unit cost of spares production by keeping up production rates,
maintaining workers’ skills, and ameliorating the risk of DMSMS by bolstering revenue
for critical and fragile niches in the supply chain . These effects have been observed
in recent years in export sales of M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley infantry fighting
vehicles, among others. Assessing these manufacturing effects of arms sales requires
detailed knowledge of the defense supply chain , including the technical
characteristics of the components that suppliers make, the financial status of each of
those suppliers, and the business strategy of the executives at each supplier—
knowledge that is not often available to the government or defense industry prime
contractors. Finally, CATs can contribute economic benefits to the United States
through the economies of scale that are often available in defense systems production. If foreign sales
are figured into the cost estimates from the start of a project, and foreign buyers contribute to
development and capital investment spending, the cost of a project to the US defense
budget will be proportionately reduced, benefiting US economic security. For example,
the F-35 program claims to have benefited from this dynamic, although the higher overhead cost of
managing a multinational development program and the redundancies of building extra final assembly and sustainment
In some European multinational aircraft
facilities overseas cut against the economies of scale benefits.21
development programs, governments have presumed that programs would gain very
large benefits from economies of scale that have not materialized. This is due to technical
and management challenges in the programs or the countries’ failure to follow
through on their initial purchase commitments. The result in those cases was that including
projected economy of scale benefits of foreign sales in a program’s management baseline added to rather than reduced
program instability and hurt economic security .22 Estimating the net economic effect of expected
economies of scale as part of a CAT decision would require sophisticated, reliable understanding of program dynamics
that might be beyond what the US government should reasonably count on in its decision making. Overall, the new
economic assessment in the CAT policy could meaningfully consider two separate types of
economic benefits that might derive from arms sales: first, macroeconomic effects ,
especially via effects on employment , and second, microeconomic effects on specific firms
and products , such as funding for component upgrades and prevention of DMSMS
challenges. The methods for assessing these two types of effects would likely differ, and each would present its own
challenges to the data collection and analysis process.
4---Stock markets---Investors are shifting to defense stocks now

because of government contracts – that sustains the overall industry
Al Root, Senior Special Writer for Barrons, “Defense Stocks Like Lockheed Martin Offer
a Haven When the Dow Drops”, Barrons, May 6th 2019,
https://www.barrons.com/articles/defense-stocks-lockheed-martin-haven-dow-
51557162289
Companies deriving a majority of revenue from defense contracts were off 0.2% Monday afternoon.
Often times, the defense sector is uncorrelated with the broader stock market. Defense contractor
sales are dependent on conflict and government budgets. They are less dependent on the state of the global
economy. That can be a good thing for investors looking for a haven from global
macroeconomic fears . The back story: Defense stocks have been solid performers over recent
history because of growing U.S. defense budgets as well as continuing global conflict.
Shares of defense primes—the so-called largest U.S. defense contractors— have returned 17% a year on
average over the past 5 years, better than the 13% return of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average. What’s more, the defense primes trade for 16.3 times estimated 2019 earning, in line with historical averages. The defense
primes are generally taken to be: Boeing (ticker: BA), Lockheed Martin (LMT), General Dynamics (GD), Northrop Grumman (NOC),
Raytheon (RTN) and L3 Technologies (LLL). Barron’s excludes Boeing from defense-only calculations because it derives more of its sales
from commercial aerospace. What’s new: The move into the Middle East with more fire power has the potential to escalate tensions there.
For defense stocks, the aggressive move could also mean more funding for overseas contingency operations, or OCO. OCO spending is a
supplement defense dollars dependent on the level of global conflict. According to the Congressional Budget Office, since 2001, the
Department of Defense has received large appropriations to augment the base defense budget totaling about $2.2 trillion, or 20% of total
defense appropriations over that span. Military spending is forecast by Wall Street analysts to rise in
2019— a positive for defense stocks . Additional Middle East operations should add to the amount of money the
government will allocate to defense contractors. Looking ahead: As trade-war fears heat up, defense could
become a haven for industrial investors looking to shift exposure away from China. The
defense prime contractors traded at a 30% premium to the Dow Jones Industrial Average early in 2018.
The defense premium to the overall market is a measure investors can use for two
purposes: as a fear gauge as the trade conflict reemerges, and to determine how much
safety the defense sector can offer investors. At valuation parity, the defense space looks like a
good be t, but at a premium valuation multiple even the solid defense space might not offer investors much additional safety for their
capital
Arms sales are key---decreasing investment causes a stocks to

plummet AND collapses R&D
Watts 8 Barry D. Watts, Senior Fellow, is an expert on a range of topics, including air
power, Air Force transformation, net assessment, and the military use of space. He
headed the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Defense of Department
during 2001–2002. 2008. “The US Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present and Future,
Strategy for the long haul” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
https://www.govexec.com/pdfs/101608kp1.pdf - BS
The US defense industry itself went through major changes in the 1960s and 1970s that
paralleled the increase in purchasing for the Vietnam War and the subsequent decline in
spending as US participation ended . Conglomerates became interested in buying into
the industry in the 1960s because of its large R&D levels , long production runs and counter-
cyclical characteristics. In the mid-1960s firms incurred substantial levels of debt to expand “plant
and tooling” to respond to the demands stemming from the war. When purchases fell
rapidly after the war and interest rates climbed in the 1970s, many firms encountered significant cash flow
problems . Several required assistance from the government to survive (e.g., loan guarantees to Lockheed). Not surprisingly,
Wall Street became pessimistic about the companies and downgraded their
stocks .52 In light of these changes, in the 1970s many defense firms began seeking sales outside
of DoD to reduce their overall dependence on defense contracts while, at the same time, protecting their existing
defense programs. As military procurement declined, DoD encouraged foreign military sales (FMS) by the companies. DoD FMS spending
grew from $1.5 billion in 1970 to about $12 billion by 1975 and remained between $9 and $13 billion for the rest of the decade. Across the
top twenty-five US defense firms, the percentage of foreign defense sales rose from under 4 percent of revenues in 1970 to over 20 percent
by 1976. To protect their existing defense sales, some firms also decreased their
subcontracting in order to keep more revenue in-house. Finally, companies began
to limit their exposure to defense spending . Some acquired firms in
other industries,53 and some isolated their defense businesses from their non-defense
businesses.54 The collective impact of all these actions was that the leading firms
decreased their dependence on government spending, the subcontractor base declined, and the
number of major builders of certain systems declined.55
Link---[S]---2NC
Arms sales are key
1---Profit Margins---declining domestic investment means profit margins that drive
R&D are almost entirely based in Arms sales – that’s Webster
2---The plan cancels a contract – that signals uncertainty which destroys the
industry
Vallone 15 Matt Valone , Defense Platforms manager at Avascent Analytics,3/24/15
HOW CONGRESS IS HAMSTRINGING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, War
on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/how-congress-is-hamstringing-the-
defense-industrial-sector/ - BS
The combination of budget cuts and erratic budgeting has created
What it means for industry
significant challenges for industry planning. New contracts don’t move forward , planned cancellations
may live on in limbo and costs can be driven up as schedules are stretched to reflect new
timelines. Smaller firms that may contribute parts to larger platforms are particularly at risk, as
delays in orders might deprive them of necessary revenue to maintain operations. Beyond
the damage to the industrial base, these recurring failures impose real, meaningful costs on
the government, as per unit costs increase and uncertainty makes reforms and efficiencies difficult to implement. Systems and
platforms that might benefit forces in the field take longer to reach the soldiers, sailors and airmen who need them. According to statistics
from a February 28th, 2013 House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, hearing on the Impacts of
procurement
a Continuing Resolution and Sequestration on Acquisition, Programming, and the Industrial Base, Army
programs experienced a 9 percent reduction across the board under sequestration, while the
continuing resolution prevented beginning any new programs or planning any multi-year procurement.
Similarly, the Navy testified that the sequestration cuts could potentially impact over 100,000 private
sector jobs . The Air Force faced delays in starting a number of projects, such as modifications
to key platforms (B-2, C-5, F-15). Lt. Gen. Charles Davis and Lt. Gen. Michael Moeller also noted
in their testimony the potential damage to the defense industrial base from all this
uncertainty , particularly to smaller firms more vulnerable to lost revenue from delays or
postponed starts. These numbers were backed up by reporting from outside sources; the
Center for Strategic and International Studies produced a report, “U.S. Department of Defense
Contract Spending and the Industrial Base, 2000-2013,” which noted that “Between 2012 and 2013, with the impact of sequestration,
defense-funded contract obligations declined by 16 percent to $314 billion .” Further on, the report notes
that, “The data show that a disproportionate share of the budget reductions under both the
BCA and sequestration has been borne by contracts and by the defense industrial
base .”
3---Economies of scale---Arm sales build resiliency into defense

industry supply chains AND reduce domestic production costs, that’s
Key to readiness
4---Stock markets---Investors are shifting to defense stocks now
because of government contracts – that sustains the overall industry
Al Root, Senior Special Writer for Barrons, “Defense Stocks Like Lockheed Martin Offer
a Haven When the Dow Drops”, Barrons, May 6th 2019,
https://www.barrons.com/articles/defense-stocks-lockheed-martin-haven-dow-
51557162289
Companies deriving a majority of revenue from defense contracts were off 0.2% Monday afternoon.
Often times, the defense sector is uncorrelated with the broader stock market. Defense contractor
sales are dependent on conflict and government budgets. They are less dependent on the state of the global
economy. That can be a good thing for investors looking for a haven from global
macroeconomic fears . The back story: Defense stocks have been solid performers over recent
history because of growing U.S. defense budgets as well as continuing global conflict.
Shares of defense primes—the so-called largest U.S. defense contractors— have returned 17% a year on
average over the past 5 years, better than the 13% return of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average. What’s more, the defense primes trade for 16.3 times estimated 2019 earning, in line with historical averages. The defense
primes are generally taken to be: Boeing (ticker: BA), Lockheed Martin (LMT), General Dynamics (GD), Northrop Grumman (NOC),
Raytheon (RTN) and L3 Technologies (LLL). Barron’s excludes Boeing from defense-only calculations because it derives more of its sales
from commercial aerospace. What’s new: The move into the Middle East with more fire power has the potential to escalate tensions there.
For defense stocks, the aggressive move could also mean more funding for overseas contingency operations, or OCO. OCO spending is a
supplement defense dollars dependent on the level of global conflict. According to the Congressional Budget Office, since 2001, the
Department of Defense has received large appropriations to augment the base defense budget totaling about $2.2 trillion, or 20% of total
defense appropriations over that span. Military spending is forecast by Wall Street analysts to rise in
2019— a positive for defense stocks . Additional Middle East operations should add to the amount of money the
government will allocate to defense contractors. Looking ahead: As trade-war fears heat up, defense could
become a haven for industrial investors looking to shift exposure away from China. The
defense prime contractors traded at a 30% premium to the Dow Jones Industrial Average early in 2018.
The defense premium to the overall market is a measure investors can use for two
purposes: as a fear gauge as the trade conflict reemerges, and to determine how much
safety the defense sector can offer investors. At valuation parity, the defense space looks like a
good be t, but at a premium valuation multiple even the solid defense space might not offer investors much additional safety for their
capital
Link---R&D---2NC
The plan snowballs, causes massive uncertainty – that shreds R&D
AIAA 11 ( Aerospace Industries Association of America, “The Case for a Defense
Industrial Strategy” http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/industrial-print.pdf)
When faced with tough choices and declining budgets in the 1990s, DoD’s senior leadership made a conscious,
considered decision to de-emphasize acquisitions and elevate other priorities (readiness, personnel, science and
most of
technology). It was a reasonable choice in light of the fact that after the procurement build-up of the 1980s,
the U.S. weapons inventory was new and best-in-class while America’s major global
adversary had just disintegrated. Twenty years later, America’s major global competitor is
aggressively modernizing its military while key parts of our weapons inventory are
reaching the end of their service life, are worn out by a decade of war , and are losing their
margin of technological superiority. Given these dramatically different circumstances today, the prudent choice is to
elevate procurement as the top defense budget priority. Otherwise, further reductions will cause more
erosion of industry’s research, development and production capacity and U.S. troops
will be forced to make do with ageing weapons and equipment that, in some cases, may no longer be
superior to those fielded by their potential adversaries. Given the recent showdown over the debt ceiling, industry
leaders are contemplating how many more programs might be cancelled , stretched
out, or cancelled to fit a budget cap imposed at the end of a chaotic and politically charged process. In the
absence of a clear strategy and productive partnership, industry will struggle to maintain
its current production capacity, much less develop the capabilities needed for the future.
Consequently, it is imperative that DoD to determine what U.S. military forces with what attributes and capabilities are
envisioned in the near- and mid-term. Having made that determination, DoD should then make clear, focused decisions
about what kinds of weapons and technologies are central to the long term security of this country, and then do what is
necessary to develop these capabilities. Industry hopes the Comprehensive Review launched earlier this year will provide
answers to these questions.
Link---EOS---2NC
cutting contracts causes defense companies to go to Russia –
independently raises costs of weapons domestically
Gould 17 Joe Gould, 3/13/17, “White House plan to gut foreign military financing would
cost defense jobs, senators warn”
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/13/white-house-plan-to-gut-foreign-
military-financing-would-cost-defense-jobs-senators-warn/ - BS
If the U.S. were to pull the grants , not only would relationships with recipient countries suffer, but defense
business might go to U.S. rivals , who offer less expensive alternatives. In Asia, where the U.S.
uses FMF to promote maritime security for allies, China may step in , and Russia and others " may try
to fill the gap" in the Middle East , Shapiro said. "In effect, we are cutting money that would go
to U.S. defense companies ," Shapiro said of the proposed FMF change. "It helps maintain the U.S.
defense-industrial base , it helps lower the cost for the U.S. to buy systems if there is a
broader base of sales, and that impacts jobs and communities." Foreign policy experts familiar with the FMF program say its beneficiaries
are economically underdeveloped — and would neither be eligible for nor interested in loans.
Link---AT: Small/One Weapon---2NC
Profits are marginal – even small cuts can have devastating effects
MICHAEL O’HANLON, February 2011, (senior fellow Brookings Institution, director of
research, in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S.
defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He co-
directs the Security and Strategy team, the Defense Industrial Base working group, and
the Africa Security Initiative within the Foreign Policy program. Adjunct professor at
Columbia, Georgetown, and Syracuse universities, and a member of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies) The National Security Industrial Base: A Crucial Asset of
the United States, Whose Future May Be in Jeopardy, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/02_defense_ohanlon.pdf
Yet the profit margins of the defense and aerospace sectors of the economy, while hardly bad ,
are often only about half of what is commonly believed due to certain costs that
cannot be billed to the government and related matters. In fact, the sector averages profit margins of
five to nine percent , less than many industries that tend to achieve margins in the teens.40 It
is perhaps partly for this reason (and partly out of expectations of coming defense budget cuts) that defense stocks are
underpriced in the eyes of many. Whether this is a reasonable and fair state of affairs or not is debatable. Some
suggest that companies with a sure customer and dependable market (the U.S. government) should not be entitled to as much profit as
those operating in a more unpredictable marketplace, whereas others counter that the U.S. government is hardly a consistent customer or
Restoring lost assets or capabilities within the
an easy customer to work with. The stakes here are high.
defense industrial base, while generally feasible, can be a slow and uncertain process . It can
also be much harder than enlarging the size of a given military service by a certain
percentage. In other words, the loss of key industrial capabilities may be a greater worry
than having a force structure that proves temporarily too small. (This is not to argue for either a weak industrial base or an
inadequate force structure, only to frame the issue in terms of possible tradeoffs.) The above concern is reinforced by the fact that, today,
many companies are showing greater interest in the most lucrative and least capital-
intensive parts of the DoD acquisition agenda —service contracting, information technology, cybersecurity,
and so on. To the extent they can make money in these areas, they may have less incentive than before to sustain inherently expensive
production facilities and related hardware.41
Link---AT: Domestic Sales Solve---2NC
Arms sales key – 30% of defense industry revenue
Shalal 18 Andrea Shalal 18, journalist from Reuters, 2018, “Lockheed lauds U.S. arms
sales push, sees foreign sales rising”, Reuters, April 24th, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-airshow-lockheed/lockheed-lauds-u-s-arms-
sales-push-sees-foreign-sales-rising-idUSKBN1HV2RA - BS
The Trump administration last week rolled out an overhaul of U.S. arms export policy aimed
at expanding sales to allies, saying it would bolster the American defense industry and
create jobs at home. Rick Edwards, executive vice president of Lockheed Martin International, told Reuters
the initiative should help speed up progress on foreign weapons sales that have already
helped fuel his company’s growth in recent years . “It will reassure some of our allies that we’re going to
move the process faster,” he said in an interview on the eve of the ILA Berlin Air Show. “ They get frustrated with how
long it takes to get through all the wickets.” Foreign sales accounted for about 30
percent of Lockheed’s revenues in 2017 and should expand further in coming years, Edwards said, although he
declined to name a specific target.
International sales are critical to defense industry profits – domestic

sales insufficient
Christopher Harress, Defense Reporter for the International Business Times”, “US
Defense Sales Surge: Is Weapons Spending Increase In Europe, Middle East And Asia
Prompted By Regional Turmoil?”, 9/30/15, https://www.ibtimes.com/us-defense-sales-
surge-weapons-spending-increase-europe-middle-east-asia-prompted-2118034
Overall U.S. defense sales have plummeted in recent years, due in large part to the withdrawal of
U.S. combat forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the forced sequestration in the
federal budget. But continuing conflicts and tensions in parts of the Middle East, Europe and Asia
have still kept international dollars lining the pockets of American military
contractors . Fueled in part by fears over Iran's nuclear program and the rise of the Islamic State
group, also known as ISIS, countries in the Middle East have been aggressively buying U.S.-made weapons. Likewise, North
Korea's nuclear capacity and bellicose rhetoric has prompted South Korea to drop billions of dollars on big-ticket defense
items, while Beijing’s posturing in the South China and East China seas has given Japan and other neighbors serious concerns. The
re-emergence of Russia's military muscle has also forced many countries, including some in long-peaceful
Europe, into America's military showrooms to shop for everything from Patriot missile systems to F-35
fighter jets, spending billions of dollars in the process and helping U.S. arms companies reverse three
consecutive years of losses. “There are increased concerns within NATO countries about what Russia is doing in
Belarus, Ukraine and all across Europe," said Dakota Wood, senior research fellow of defense programs at the Heritage
Foundation, the conservative Washington think tank. "Threats to put nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad [Russia's westernmost territory] have
governments are understandably wanting to review their
really scared many European countries. Because of that,
defense capabilities.” Procuring missiles was apparently high on the list of priorities for
some Middle Eastern countries that took notice of Iran’s arsenal of increasingly advanced ballistic
missiles. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates both opened their wallets to spend $5.6 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively, on U.S.-
Major
built Patriot missiles. Israel has spent nearly $2 billion on a Boeing-built system that converts regular bombs into guided bombs.
deals this year with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Poland, such as Raytheon’s sales of a combined
$5 billion worth of Patriot missile defense systems, have also helped American defense companies generate
international revenue gains after three consecutive years of losses. Lockheed Martin found buyers for
its anti-ballistic missile system in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, after having already made a $1.9 billion
deal with the UAE for the same system, according to statistics from the Defense Security Co-Operation Agency, a federal unit
that monitors military sales by U.S. companies. In addition, Estonia and Norway -- which, along with Poland and
almost every other country in Europe, were looking to defend themselves against renewed
Russian activity that has seen Moscow’s jets and ships consistently enter Western Europe’s international airspace and territorial
waters -- also secured Raytheon-built weaponry, including the shoulder-fired Javelin and aircraft-fired Sidewinder missiles. At this
rate, international military orders in 2015 are on pace to eclipse last year’s figures of
$34.2 billion by at least $10 billion . Amid continuing regional pressures from China and North Korea, Japan and South
Korea have also been stockpiling U.S.-built weapons. Beijing over the last year has attempted to exert greater control of the South China
Sea, where it claims sovereignty over the strategic sea lanes, rich fishing grounds and energy reserves. As China was working to expand
its regional reach, Tokyo has indicated that it will buy dozens of F-35 multirole jet fighters, according to a Reuters report. Likewise, Seoul
was looking to bolster its military with a $2.5 billion upgrade on its KF-16 jet fighters, a $1.4 billion Aegis
Combat System, and a $7 billion deal for 40 F-35 aircraft as North Korea continued exhibiting threatening behavior, including a rocket
Iraq, which is currently battling the ISIS in the north of its
launch and subsequent nuclear test, according to U.S. government records.
country, has signed deals with General Dynamics to buy $2.4 billion worth of Abrams Tanks and $4.8
billion of Apache helicopters. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, which is fighting against a different insurgency in Yemen, has ordered around $500
million of various ammunitions. United Arab Emirates (UAE) F-16 Fighters United Arab Emirates warplanes struck Houthi targets across
Yemen, the state news agency WAM said Saturday, Sept. 26, 2015. Above, this photograph from the official Jordanian news agency Petra
shows a squadron of UAE F-16 fighters stationed at a Jordanian base on Feb 8. to support it in strikes against the Islamic State group.
Photo: Petra via Getty Images While the casual observer could be forgiven for thinking these
purchases are all but knee-jerk reactions, they’ve actually been planned for quite
some time , said Steve Zaloga, an analyst at the Teal Group, a defense industry and aerospace think tank in Fairfax, Virginia.
“Sometimes it seems that defense sales are tied to particular political developments or a particular crisis, but in reality many of
those defense decisions have been in the works for years,” he said. Decline Of U.S. Defense Sales Despite the
recent swell of international military sales, most U.S. defense companies recorded losses in 2014. But that
has more to with the U.S. reducing its own defense budget after winding down wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to reflect forced sequestration, which cuts deeply from across
federal budgets. Of the top 10 defense firms in the U.S., only United Technologies reported higher revenues in 2014 with $13.02
billion, a 9.5 percent increase from 2013, according to the most recent data. Over the same period, Lockheed Martin, the world’s biggest
defense contractor, saw revenues drop $366 million, or 0.1 percent, from $40.494 billion in 2013. Lockheed Martin led the way last year
with more than half of the $34.2 billion in sales. The 2014 figure was up from $30 billion in 2013 but drastically down from the record-
The
breaking $69 billion in 2012, of which more than $30 billion accounted for the sale of 84 Boeing’s F-15 to Saudi Arabia.
reduction in the U.S. defense budget has also pushed nations to spend more, especially within
NATO where the U.S. has reduced its traditional leadership role and urged higher spending among member states. Wood, whose research
focuses on programs, capabilities, operational concepts, and strategies of the U.S. Department of Defense, said that global fears, rooted in
the big regional conflicts in the Middle East, Europe and tension in Southeast Asia, had contributed to a rush of defense buys. "There is a
solid basis for concern by countries that would drive them to review their portfolio of military capabilities and then look to expand or
modernize as a hedge against what is a very uncertain and concerning future,” said Wood.
Domestic demand is unsustainable – foreign sales are key

Loren Thompson, Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown
University, Chief Operating Officer of Lexington Institute, “After Five Years Of Flat
Revenues, Strategies Of Big Defense Companies Begin To Diverge”, National Interest,
June 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/after-five-years-flat-revenues-strategies-
big-defense-16775
The U.S. defense industry is now in the sixth year of a downturn in domestic demand .
Pentagon spending peaked in 2010 at nearly $700 billion, and then began falling as
overseas wars wound down and the Budget Control Act capped military outlays. Industry's biggest
challenge isn't so much the scale of military spending as its composition, which is heavily weighted
In other words, Obama-era defense budgets are
towards personnel and readiness at the expense of modernization.
big on consumption, but neglect investment . The initial response of the biggest defense
contractors was to adopt the standard litany of tactical measures that they always embrace when demand from their main customer
softens. Divest under-performers. Acquire niche businesses to fill out the portfolio. Do more share buybacks to strengthen stock prices.
Increase foreign sales . Grow commercial revenues. And, of course, cut costs through plant consolidations and layoffs. All of
the Pentagon's top suppliers have taken at least some of these steps, and the results have been spectacular .
How spectacular? Every one of the biggest defense companies has seen its share
price rise by over 100% in the midst of a defense downturn. Earnings per share are way up, dividends
are increased regularly, and operating margins are strong. This isn't the way downturns are supposed to go. A combination of investor-
friendly financial moves and a favorable interest-rate environment has enabled the defense industry to weather the downturn quite nicely, if
shareholder returns are any indication of success.
Link---AT: Bailout---2NC
There won’t be bailouts---previous ones were unique.
Kilgore 18 Ed Kilgore, “As Trade War Drags On, the Cry Spreads: ‘Where’s Our
Bailout?’” July 31st 2018, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/07/non-farm-industries-
affected-by-trump-trade-war-want-bailout.html - BS
Thus the trade war has a vast ripple effect, even on industries remote from the initial battleground, as prices rise and overseas markets dry
up. But farm-style
bailouts aren’t really in the cards, either, as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
has pointed out: According to the business organization, the bill for extending a bailout to everyone screwed by the
president’s ongoing trade wars would come in at $39 billion. The Chamber came up with the figure by comparing the amount of aid given to
farmers with the amount of exports affected by the levies, and applying the ratio to other impacted groups. Some industries, like starch and
glue, would only require small packages of around $43 million, while auto, motorcycle, and parts manufacturers would need something in
could get
the range of $7.6 billion. And that’s just in terms of offsetting the initial, anticipated losses. If the trade war drags on, it
really ugly as layoffs and factory closures spread. Trump’s conservative free-market allies in Congress
and among opinion-leading elites already hate his trade war, but have long been accustomed to making an exception for
politically pivotal farmers and the states whose economies depend on them. In addition, Trump’s agribusiness bailout
was facilitated by the existence of New Deal–era income-stabilization programs that

required no congressional action.
HR/CAT---2NC
Trumps CAT policy is key
Arad, 18 Shimon Arad, writer for the National Interest, retired Colonel of the Israeli
Defense Forces, “Trump’s Plan for Selling Weapons to the Middle East,”
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trumps-plan-selling-weapons-the-middle-east-25839 -
BS
The Trump administration has set its sights on expanding America’s substantial arms sales
around the globe. The United States is already the world’s leading arms exporter , accounting
for 34 percent of total arms exports in the world between 2013–2017 according to a
recent release by the authoritative Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ( SIPRI ). Arms sales
constituted 6.2 percent of the value of all U.S. exports in the period from 2007 to 2014. During the Obama
presidency, the administration approved more than $278 billion in foreign-arms sales, more than any administration since World War II. In
the first year of President Trump’s administration, the United States signed arms-export
deals in excess of $ 41 billion and notified Congress of potential deals that total more than
$82 billion , though some of these were initiated under the previous administration. In the effort to increase sales,
President Trump is actively urging foreign leaders he meets to buy U.S.-made military
systems and equipment. He also signed on April 19 a National Security Presidential
Memorandum approving a new Conventional Arms Transfer ( CAT ) policy designed to
ease export restrictions. The recent announcement by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency of the
reduction of the surcharge foreign nations pay when buying American weapon systems from 3.5 to 3.2 percent, is
another step designed to increase the competitiveness of “ buying American ” by this administration.
Bolstering arms sales is seen by the administration not only as a tool to enhance traditional national
security and foreign-policy goals but as serving its “America First ” policy by supporting the
manufacturing and defense industrial base and driving new innovation and creating
American jobs.
3D Printing---1NC
3D printing arms is securing the supply chain now – it’s key going
forward
Sandra Erwin 5/8/17, Defensesystems.com, “Marines take 3D printed drones from the
lab to the field,” https://defensesystems.com/articles/2017/05/08/marinecorpprint.aspx
The Marines
are planning to take their do-it-yourself ethos further and begin prototyping,
manufacturing and deploying full-blown 3D printed systems, such as surveillance drones. The Marines
were the first service to 3D print military-grade ammunition and spare parts for weapon systems. In the coming weeks the service will
deploy a tiny unmanned aircraft dubbed the “Nibbler,” which would become the first 3D printed drone used in combat operations by
just the beginning of a new way of equipping and supplying
conventional forces. Marines see it as
forces in the field. Digital manufacturing is a technology the U.S. military has been
pursuing for some time. The Pentagon made headlines in January when it disclosed an experiment in which swarms of 3D
printed micro-drones were launched successfully from Navy Super Hornet fighter aircraft. The Marines’ Nibbler is significant
because it would operate just like other, far more expensive, portable unmanned aircraft
that are used for “over-the-hill” intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. “Our team
is very enthusiastic about the Nibbler, but even more enthusiastic about what it
represents for the future,” said Capt. Chris J. Wood, who oversees innovation efforts at the Marine
Corps’ installations and logistics branch. 3D printing gained an early following in the military because it was seen
as a solution to the perennial problem of shortages of spare parts for aging weapon
systems. The Marines have embraced the technology, which they see as compatible with their “adapt and overcome” culture. “Imagine
being in a forward deployed environment, and just like Amazon, you can ‘order’ the weapons and equipment you need for the next day’s
mission from an entire catalog of possible solutions,” Wood said. “ These
solutions can all be upgraded literally
overnight, in order to integrate new components or adapt to new requirements. On a very small
scale, Nibbler shows us that this is possible right now with the group 1 UAS family of systems.” Empowering Marines to manufacture
equipment and parts as needed has enormous ramifications, Wood said. “ It represents a revolution in the future
supply chain.” If a unit were to deploy with 12 different UAS, for instance, “Then we would have to take 12 or more different types of
packaging and associated sustainment parts.” The goal is to have a “small manufacturing capability” locally, he said. All that would
be needed is a desktop printer, a box of components, and a spool of plastic 3D printing filament, said Wood. He envisions a “near
infinite set of different UAS that we could produce from those basic elements.” The Nibbler will be
used for surveillance missions, along with several other 3D printed unmanned aircraft that the Marines are still developing, Wood said. “We
can have a backpack-able fixed wing UAS for long endurance ISR. We can have a small quadcopter for building clearing operations,” he
said. “We will forward deploy these capabilities into a combat zone as soon as possible.” From a cost perspective, 3D
printed drones should save the government money in the long run, Wood said. Because the military only buys in small
numbers, the upfront cost of a military 3D printed drone is higher than those $300 drones that are sold commercially. “However, it is orders
of magnitude less expensive than any military-use UAS with similar performance,” Wood said.
3D Printing---2NC
Sustaining hope in 3D printed arms will revolutionize supply chains –
causes micro-factories that affect not only battlefield tech but the
overall defense industry – BUT the aff would crush that industry
momentum
Sandra Erwin 5/8/17, Defensesystems.com, “Marines take 3D printed drones from the
lab to the field,” https://defensesystems.com/articles/2017/05/08/marinecorpprint.aspx
A drone made by Marines in a trailer obviously will not be a substitute for high-end aircraft made by Pentagon contractors, but that is beside
the point. “Ultimately, it's
about optimizing specific mission needs to the equipment we use to
fight those missions,” Wood said. Many of the requirements today could be met with lower
end equipment, and often the priority is to get things fast, which is one reason this
technology is catching on. “Additive manufacturing and localized manufacturing allows us
to do this at a scale and speed never before seen,” said Wood. Deputy Commandant for Installations and
Logistics Lt. Gen. Michael G. Dana has been a champion of 3D printing. Speaking last week at Deloitte’s Additive Manufacturing Forum, he
told industry executives that they should jump on the bandwagon. Marines clearly have ambitious goals but
recognize the technology and the business culture are not there yet. There are no expectations that, today, a Marine will buy a $2,000
they do see a future of “micro-factories” propping up around
printer and make military-compliant axles. But
the United States, in overseas combat zones and even on large Navy ships where
troops will make spare parts and systems like drones, trucks and small radios. “On demand, as needed, closer to
the point of need,” said Marine logistics expert Lt. Col. Howard Marrotto. “That’s something we don’t have. We assume when we forward
deploy, we bring every single thing we might need, just in case.The assumption today is that the supply chain
may or may not support our needs.” Marrotto said at the Deloitte forum that the Marine Corps needs help from the
private sector to better grasp the economic incentives and the potential capabilities of digital manufacturing. “ We need to
understand where the technology is going, the art of the possible,” he said. The good news for the
military is that incoming recruits are likely to be more familiar with 3D printing than their superiors. Kids are learning 3D printing in schools,
which means a “ready workforce.”
AND, the AFF’s court intervention is enough to destabilize

innovation.
Allison Harris 15, Department of Systems and Information Engineering, University of
Virginia, “The Effects of In-home 3D Printing on Product Liability Law,” JSPG., Vol. 6,
Issue 1, February 2015.
http://www.sciencepolicyjournal.org/uploads/5/4/3/4/5434385/harris_new_ta1_1.2.2015_l
b_mg.pdf
The expansion of in-home 3D printing is thus likely to destabilize product liability law by
introducing market externalities and uncertainty in determining the responsible party. The
technology is still new and flawed. The printing process is not perfectly
repeatable and lacks traceability, making it nearly impossible to identify who is
responsible for a product defect . Market externalities arise in the absence of an insurance system that can no longer
spread the cost to the general public. Courts will be faced with the decision to either uphold designer and online platform licenses, or
to deem them invalid. Their decision will disrupt the balance between innovation and consumer safety, and,
without an insurance system in place, market externalities will remain. Regardless of

forthcoming court decisions regarding 3D printing and product liability, there will be no guarantee for sufficient injury compensation.
Just the perception is key – surprise contract cancellations collapse
industry certainty --- wrecks profits
Vallone 15 – defense analyst, defense manager at Avascent Analytics (Matt, “HOW
CONGRESS IS HAMSTRINGING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR,” War on the
Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/how-congress-is-hamstringing-the-defense-
industrial-sector/)
The combination of budget cuts and erratic budgeting has created significant challenges
for industry planning. New contracts don’t move forward, planned cancellations may live
on in limbo and costs can be driven up as schedules are stretched to reflect new
timelines. Smaller firms that may contribute parts to larger platforms are particularly at
risk, as delays in orders might deprive them of necessary revenue to maintain
operations. Beyond the damage to the industrial base, these recurring failures impose
real , meaningful costs on the government, as per unit costs increase and uncertainty
makes reforms and efficiencies difficult to implement. Systems and platforms that might
benefit forces in the field take longer to reach the soldiers, sailors and airmen who need
them.
3D printing is key to the sustainability of defense supply chains

Chris Huskamp 19, Senior Business Unit Manager - Additive Manufacturing, Jabil,
https://www.jabil.com/insights/blog-main/3d-printing-in-aerospace-and-defense-
manufacturing.html)SEM
Benefits of 3D Printing in the Defense and Aerospace Industries Additive manufacturing utilization may be in its infancy in some forms, but we’re seeing adoption for parts that have a higher risk
defense and aerospace industry players are feeling confident enough to

associated with it. Today,
move past polymeric non-structural components parts and into secondary structures and
critical systems applications (space). The benefits of using additive manufacturing for
aerospace and defense are plentiful. Simplify Parts Through Bill of Materials (BOM) Consolidation Nearly half of Jabil survey respondents say their
companies have experienced design freedom thanks to additive manufacturing. From a design perspective, 3D printing brings a lot to the table: but the key is to think beyond individual parts. For
example, a fan within a cooling system is made up of as many as 73 labor-intensive and time-consuming parts. Through design for additive manufacturing, this fan can be consolidated down to a
Utilizing 3D printing reduces the assembly time and possible

single part. But the benefits go beyond design.
failure points . In this way, not only does additive manufacturing simplify the part but
reduces the waste created by traditional, subtractive manufacturing methods. Although
simplification is a key benefit, 3D printing also offers the opportunity to manufacture complex designs that
can’t be made using traditional methods like injection molding. This allows the engineers
to have the design freedom to create parts that can deliver maximum performance. From a manufacturing
perspective, it means you can use smarter design geometries, eliminate tooling
and fixture costs and increase the durability and lifecycle of parts. According to the Jabil survey,
one of the main drivers of faster time-to-market in the aerospace and defense industry is
supply chain innovations that enable quicker production . As you know, time-to-market is
critical for success in any industry . Well, what better way to speed up your
production cycles than to enable on-demand manufacturing? No matter the certifications or qualifications
required, this manufacturing process can utilize common equipment without part-specific
tooling to produce specialized components anywhere in the world. For defense manufacturers, this means accessing
facilities close to vital airbases or producing critical parts at the source . It also means
decreased inventory costs. Nearly half of Jabil survey respondents say additive manufacturing has helped them
speed up production timelines. Since all design files are digital, they can be customized based on specific use cases. As additive manufacturing doesn’t require
tool or mold changes, the process is just focused on updating designs. But mass customization doesn’t have to mean a lot size of one – it can mean going from 10,000 with traditional
Reduce Supply Chain Costs with Additive Manufacturing

manufacturing methods to 100 with additive manufacturing.
Shrinking a component from 73 individual parts to one part has a massive trickle-down
effect throughout your entire supply chain . The part reduction leads to a leaner
supply chain: think of a tighter and improved supply chain with a more reliable and
consistent production level. For example, the industry no longer needs a foundry on the front-
end to produce a metal part that is sent to a machine shop to be finished and shipped to
the destination. Jabil is driving towards a vertical integration where machine shops become self-sustaining by using common, yet certified powders to deliver parts and
components. When the door to localized production is opened, it eliminates the shipping
costs and lead times required by traditional manufacturing methods. 3D Printing Qualification and
Certification in Aerospace and Defense Some of the industries where additive manufacturing can offer the
greatest benefit are the industries that have the biggest qualification and compliance
requirements. For a technology to find its way from niche to industrial use, it needs to go through key stages of maturity: the first one is the required engineering rigor to ensure
stability and repeatability for volume manufacturing. The second is the documentation and characterization that is required for qualification efforts—where additive manufacturing is in currently.
Deloitte characterizes quality needs through their Additive Manufacturing Quality Pyramid, which addresses the differences between 3D printing and traditional processes. The framework
showcases a quality assurance process “derived from build planning and build monitoring/inspection, linked together with feedback control.” The ultimate goal rests at the top of the pyramid and
additive manufacturing can deliver

without the support of the other structural pieces, quality parts just aren’t possible. A good rule of thumb is that
production capability anywhere in the world through distributed manufacturing. But several best
practices must be in place to meet the stringent demands of defense and aerospace before making that capability a reality. There needs to be common processes across multiple locations to
enable true build portability, which includes proper quality certifications, common equipment, a secure transfer mechanism for digital files, proper equipment calibration and consistent input
materials. Aerospace Industry Applications for 3D Printing The first 3D-printed part used was in an Airbus test aircraft – a small titanium bracket, part of the pylon used to secure the engine – sped
down the airstrip in 2014. Since then, usage of additive manufacturing has escalated rapidly, but companies are still learning how to adopt additive manufacturing solutions to glean its many
benefits: maximizing production output, shortening time-to-market, reducing costs and more. The demand for new commercial airplanes is – if you’ll excuse the pun – skyrocketing. Every 15
years, the worldwide fleet doubles. 3D printing can help companies with an intimidating stockpile of orders slash their production time. For example, in November 2018, Airbus reported a backlog
of more than 7,000 aircraft. With its current process, this number is the equivalent of nine years of production. Similarly, at the end of September 2018, Boeing’s backlog of commercial aircraft was
close to 6,000. In aircraft design, there are numerous internal features that typically don’t lend themselves—either by volume or by complexity—to injection composites or other molding processes.
Although creating these parts are cost- and time-consuming by traditional metalworking, additive manufacturing simplifies the process. In the aerospace industry, this capability is particularly
useful in producing engine and turbine parts, cabin interior components and parts with defined aerodynamic properties in a shorter amount of time and at a lower cost. With the on-demand
aerospace manufacturers can significantly

manufacturing, easy customization and part consolidation enabled by additive manufacturing,
shorten their time-to-market. In fact, in our recent Current State of Additive Materials and 3D Printing survey, 91 percent of participants responded that 3D printing
is at least twice as fast as traditional manufacturing methods. In aerospace specifically, Deloitte found that additive manufacturing reduces time-to-market by 64 percent. 3d printing in aerospace
and defense - speed statistic But this aviational influx comes at a cost; twice the number of planes circling the earth means heavier carbon emissions, more fuel consumption and greater noise
roaring from overhead. Thankfully, 3D printing can also mitigate the impact of aircraft on the environment. According to Airbus CTO Grazia Vittadini, 3D printing has the
potential to lighten an aircraft by 55 percent. The Boeing 737-800, an average-sized plane flown by many popular commercial airlines, weighs
90,000 pounds (excluding fuel and passengers), but a reduction of 55 percent would bring it down to a little over 40,000 pounds. Since the weight of an aircraft directly correlates with its fuel
this will decrease the amount of fuel planes consume. In other

consumption over the useful life of the airframe,
words, 3D printing increases the sustainability of the aerospace industry. Defense Industry
Applications for 3D Printing Although the defense sector gleans many of the benefits I’ve already discussed, there are some aspects of 3D printing
that are useful for specific defense applications . For example, 3D printing could enable on-
the-fly forward operating base repairs. It also eliminates hard tooling thereby increasing
the security around a company’s design IP while lowering non-recurring costs and
ensuring life cycle support (no lost or damaged tools). Since Russia sent the first satellite into orbit in October 1957, more than 40 countries have launched
around 8,100 satellites. Currently, there are 1,957 active satellites circling Earth; although it is not possible to know exactly how many are military – partially because of secrecy and partially
because of dual-purpose missions – 422 are registered as military, primarily acting to gather intelligence, navigate and communicate. There are two central challenges in constructing satellite
brackets. First, they require a geometrically specific design to affix the component securely to the body of the satellite. Second, these brackets act as an insulator, withstanding the wide scope of
temperatures outside the earth’s atmosphere, a range of about -274 to 212 degrees Fahrenheit. The barometrical stress on these components is extremely high. Airbus engineers in the defense
and space division found that additive manufacturing is the most efficient approach for creating satellite parts. Using titanium, the designers and engineers actualized many of the benefits of 3D
printing: the lack of waste led to cost savings, part consolidation reduced the hours spent in assembly, the optimized geometry resulted in higher performance without the constraints of traditional
manufacturing and the lightweight components created fuel savings for the entire project. In addition to mechanical parts, 3D printing’s biggest benefit to the defense industry may be its ability to
produce functional electric components. With additive manufacturing, OEMs can churn out circuit boards and antennas at a fraction of the time, cost and materials. Act Locally, Think Globally…
and Beyond An enormous benefit of 3D printing is on-site production. Transporting parts and materials incurs costs of both time and money; with additive manufacturing, customized components
can be printed on location. This potential for a globally distributed manufacturing network improves overall efficiency while providing significant savings, allowing companies to maintain ideal
inventory levels to maximize productivity and open new value chains across industry verticals. As expected, this is also a highly strategic capability for the defense industry. Facilities can be
established near crucial airbases, and printers can be installed anywhere, from Air Force bases to aircraft carriers. Looking into the future, this capability could enable companies to do more than
think and act on a global level…it could allow them to operate beyond the boundaries of Earth. 3D printing may prove to be key for space exploration as well as lunar and planetary colonization.
Since 1960, humankind has piloted dozens of Mars missions. Some of these have been flyby, some have been long-standing orbiters, exploring the planet for years. All have had one goal: to
better understand our planetary neighbor. But even before NASA’s first touchdown on the red planet, people have imagined walking, even living on Mars. However, there are several logistical
challenges standing in the way of a functional Martian society. One key challenge is figuring out how to transport supplies between Earth and Mars, an average difference of 140 million miles. 3D
printing could solve this problem. Instead of relying on supplies to come orbiting around the sun, settlers of the “final frontier” can use additive manufacturing to make their own tools, machine
parts and more. To accomplish this with maximum efficiency, researchers at the European Space Agency and Lithoz, an Austrian manufacturing solutions company, have been experimenting with
using a new material in 3D printing: moon dust. By planting 3D printers, researchers hope to empower a self-sufficient colony on Mars. They’ve developed a simulated regolith, “a type of tiny, far-
out ceramic dust,” that is passed through a sieve and then mixed with a light-reacting, binding agent that holds dust particles together. The process is similar to Direct Metal Laser Sintering
(DMLS) or Selective Laser Melting (SLM). Whether helping an airline complete its backlog of orders or printing a wrench out of lunar dust for the first settlers of Mars, the possibilities of 3D printing
in the aerospace and defense industry extend well beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. It will be interesting to see what new applications arise as additive manufacturing secures its place as an
essential tool in aviation. One thing is certain: without 3D printing, the aircraft of the future will never be able to get off the ground.
It's increasing now and saving aging defense sectors – further

development is needed
Robbin Laird, 8-25-2019, "The Potential Impact of 3D Printing on the Military Supply
Chain," Second Line of Defense, https://sldinfo.com/2019/08/the-potential-impact-of-3d-
printing-on-the-military-supply-chain/)SEM
3D Printing is in its infancy in terms of providing parts for the military. A challenge for the
military is of course the need for parts reliability and ruggedness at very high standards.
This is why the term “military grade” was invented. But as 3D printing becomes part of the sustainment enterprise, there
are very significant impacts to be anticipated. “Just
in time” gets a whole new meaning when one can
build parts locally. This means as well that distribute operations can be facilitated more
effectively. And there is a significant potential reduction on the supply fleet, whether it be
by land, sea or air. What 3D printing can provide is a further enhancement as well of sea
basing for an ability to provide parts produced at sea can be stood up. But we are in early days
of such possibilities. As Michael Gravier noted in an April 12, 2016 article: The specialization and economic benefits of
globalization become outdated in a world where a 3D printer and some spools of wire or other generic inputs can make
inputs require far less negotiation and planning. They also do
nearly any desired product relatively quickly. Generic
not become obsolete and the quality is standardized , meaning that there’s less need
to monitor supplier performance. Since nearly all value is added by the 3D printer and inputs are relatively low
value, standardized commodities, Just in Time Inventory (JIT) and other inventory reduction approaches will
be needed less. And the graphic below highlights how 3D printing will impact the commercial sector and it does
not take much imagination to understand how significant such a transition will be
for military operations as well. What is clear is that 3D printing for the deployed force
will be yet another driver for shifting in the United States from the antiquated depot
system. Our closest allies such as the Brits and the Australians have already demonstrated that advanced
systems need a very different appraoch to logistics support than the use of the rules and
methods of maintaining fixed depots. 3D printing is just the latest driver for change on
the U.S. but can the U.S. follow the path of innovation rather than federal sourcing? Earlier
this year, the USAF installed a metallic 3D printed part on an operational F-22.
It’s key
Robin Brown, 14, 3D Printing How Much Will It Improve the DoD Supply Chain of the
Future?, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1015790.pdf)SEM
Current State of DoD’s Supply Chain As one might imagine, the present DoD supply chain is large and
complex. For many, the sheer size and scope of the operation is beyond comprehension. There are myriad organizations, in both
government and private industry, that are integral to DoD’s supply chain. One organization that plays a pivotal role is the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA). DLA manages an inventory of more than 5 million line items with annual sales in excess of $44 billion. The inventory is
warehoused throughout the world in more than 75 million square feet of storage space (the equivalent of nearly 1,300 football fields). In
the
addition, DLA processes more than 100,000 requirements every day. With budgetary pressures being applied across all of DoD,
supply chain becomes a target-rich environment for identifying efficiencies and

reducing both the logistics footprint and overall costs . When we consider that in fiscal year 2012,
DLA disposed of more than 2.5 million line items of material, it’s easy to understand
the desire for a more efficient chain . Finally, even with such a massive inventory, we still find
ourselves with critical shortages of spare parts . Diminishing manufacturing sources
and material shortages (DMSMS) is a thorn in the side for just about every weapon system,
often leaving the warfighter frustrated with a multibillion-dollar supply chain that
constantly faces challenges in trying to provide a timesensitive “critical” component. All
these factors in the current DoD supply chain naturally drive pressures towards greater
and greater efficiencies. By now you are thinking that the authors can’t possibly be suggesting the elimination of supply
depots and the millions of square feet of storerooms. Surely we can all take a little comfort in knowing that some things on Star Trek, such
as the replicator, exist purely in the realm of science fiction. Nobody is crazy enough to be out there trying to invent such a machine—or
have they already done so? DoD Enters the 3D Printing Arena First let’s set the stage by defining 3D printing. To put it simply, 3D printing
is a manufacturing process in which materials (plastic, metal or other) are laid down, layer by layer, to form a three-dimensional object. It is
deemed an additive process where the object is built up from scratch, which is why 3D printing is also referred to as
“additive manufacturing.” This process is the opposite of the more traditional subtractive manufacturing process, where
material is cut, drilled, milled or machined off. 3D printers employ a variety of techniques and materials, but they share the ability to turn
digital files containing 3D data—whether created on a computer-aided design (CAD) program or from a 3D scanner—into physical objects.
3D printing can be used to create models and prototypes quickly from CAD drawings, but lately they’re increasingly used to make final
products as well. The items made include shoe designs, furniture, wax castings for jewelry, tools, tripods, gift and novelty items, toys and,
Some people in the industry think that
most recently, aviation engine components. Riding the 3D Printing Wave
additive manufacturing will overturn many of the economics of production, because the
process pays no heed to unit labor or traditional economies of scale. Designs can be
quickly changed because the technology enables flexible production and customization.
Software can be used to predict exactly how a part will perform. General Electric is so positive about the capabilities of 3D printing that it is
using the process to make jet engine parts. Morris Technologies (recently acquired by General Electric) uses a number of 3D printing
machines in conjunction with a technology called laser sintering. This involves spreading a thin layer of metallic powder onto a build
platform and then fusing the material with a laser beam. Laser sintering is capable of producing all kinds of metal parts, including
components made from aerospace-grade titanium. Meanwhile, Airbus partnered with the University of Exeter to open a 2.6 million euros
Centre for Additive Layer Manufacturing in 2011. Its mission is to explore the 3D printing opportunities relating to aircraft. Their research
goal is to investigate the production of a plane constructed entirely of 3D printed parts. In the automotive industry, Ford showed off the
latest version of its hybrid car at the Atlanta Auto Show in March 2013. The car’s drive train, transmission, and other key parts were all
produced using 3D technology. The U.S. government has embarked on a $60 million project to form a 3D printing institute. The Air Force
Research Laboratory is serving as the contracting agent for this DoD initiative. The ultimate goal is to help address warfighter requirements
at the best value for the taxpayer while transitioning advanced manufacturing technology into the DoD and commercial supply chains. All in
these developments suggest a very promising future for a technology that has
all,
a great deal to offer. There is speed (design to production), flexibility, elimination

of production run requirements (economies of scale), and what is sure to be far-
reaching effects on transportation pipelines . Exactly what, however, does the average DoD weapon
system program office gain from 3D printing, and how will 3D printing help make the
program office product support manager’s (PSM) job a little easier?
Taiwan---1NC
Taiwan arms sales are key
McCLaran 2000John P. McClaran, former Research Associate at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, East Asia Nonproliferation Project, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, Monterey, California. 2000, “U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN
Implications for the Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship”, University of California Press ,
http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Mclaren%20arm%20sales%20to%20taiwan.pdf/ - BS
Taiwan supplies the U.S. defense industry with a
Another major factor influencing arms sales is that
valuable market at a time when the industry is undergoing significant downsizing amid dwindling
defense budgets. The Clinton administration has long held that the U.S.'s high-tech manufacturing capability
is strategic from both an economic and security standpoint . The administration has
consistently adopted trade policy designed to promote these industries abroad and hence preserve
the strategic rents to labor and capital they provide to the national political economy. In 1995, President Clinton approved a change in arms
export policy, allowing domestic economic concerns to be given equal weight to national security considerations in promoting arms sales
means to lower the unit costs of
abroad.30 The Pentagon views arms exports as essential to expanding markets as a
weapons for U.S. military modernization. Pentagon procurement has fallen from a high of $100 billion during the
Reagan-era to less than half of that at this writing. To accomplish this part of its modernization strategy, the Pentagon is very active in
leveling the playing field as a means to assist U.S. arms makers to compete with their foreign competitors for a shrinking pot of global arms
sales. The total value in 1997 of all global arms transfer agreements with developing nations was $17.2 billion, the lowest level in real terms
since 1990. Similarly, the combined total of all arms agreements worldwide hit its lowest point at $24.2 billion. The U.S. accounted for $5.3
billion or 21.9% of this figure, which gave its arms manufacturers a narrow lead over its foreign competition. However, this was down
considerably from the $8.5 billion worth of agreements the U.S. captured in 1996.31The nearly $1 billion in
agreements that the U.S. reached with Taiwan in 1997 takes on added significance in
this context, demonstrating that Taiwan provides the U.S. with a lucrative market
virtually free of competition. Taiwan , with one of the largest cash reserves in the world
creates a powerful political and economic pull for U.S. weapons. The political pressure on Congress to
preserve the strategic rents derived from arms exports is enormous and the fact that
Taiwan and not the U.S. taxpayer is paying for it creates tremendous incentives . For example, the
survival of the F-16 plant in Ft. Worth Texas, and more than 11,000 jobs, is contingent on a single $5 billion order
from the United Arab Emirates. In the meantime, the U.S. had plans to buy just one F-
16 in 2000.
Taiwan---2NC
Taiwan is key
Tucker and Glaser 11 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser. Nancy Bernkopf
Tucker is Professor of History at Georgetown University and at the Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service. She also is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars and the author of Strait Talk. Bonnie Glaser is a Senior
Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and also a Senior Associate
with the CSIS Pacific Forum. Should the United States Abandon Taiwan? The
Washington Quarterly https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/twq11autumntuckerglaser.pdf - BS
Various U.S. interests support continuing arms sales to , and close economic relations with, an autonomous
Taiwan . For instance, the U.S. defense industry profits from, and so encourages, Taiwan’s
weapons procurement . Diplomats, the Pentagon, scholars, and other analysts have argued that arms sales
help Taiwan defend itself, strengthen morale among Taiwan’s population, deter Beijing, insure
Taipei has the confidence to negotiate with China, and that—if talks go wrong—Taiwan could fight until U.S.
forces arrived. Weapons manufacturers also focus on the money and the jobs to be had for
Americans. F-16 fighter aircraft illustrate the critical significance of defense contractors
in sustaining the Taiwan relationship. George H. W. Bush, ignoring commitments to Beijing as well as objections from
within his administration, decided to sell 150 fighters to Taipei during the 1992 presidential election campaign, hoping to insure
re-election by providing a $ 4 billion contract and 5,800 jobs to General Dynamics’ operations in Texas.7 In
2011, a bipartisan group of 45 U.S. senators advocating new F-16 sales and upgrades of
existing aircraft not only warned President Obama that Taiwan would be forced to
ground some 70 percent of its fighters by 2020 without U.S. action, but that Lockheed Martin’s F-16 production line would
shut down without orders for Taiwan. Industry analysts estimate this would mean the loss of some
11,000 jobs in 43 states.8
Key companies benefit

J.R. Wu, 5-12-2017, "Taiwan to continue buying arms from United States, boosting U.S.
jobs," U.S., Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-usa/taiwan-to-continue-
buying-arms-from-united-states-boosting-u-s-jobs-idUSKBN1880AL
Taiwan will continue to buy arms from the U nited S tates with its purchases boosting
employment in at least six U.S. states and narrowing the bilateral trade gap , the
government has told the United States, in rare public comment sure to anger China, which claims the island as its
own. Taiwan’s military purchases “have boosted the local economy of and
employment in states such as Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Utah, Ohio and

Pennsylvania,” the government said as part of the public comment process for a 90-day trade review being conducted by the
United States. Companies like Raytheon Co, Lockheed Martin Co, Boeing Co, Sikorsky and
BAE Systems PLC have benefited from Taiwan’s purchases of missile defense systems ,
attack helicopters, fighter jets, and other amphibious assault vehicles, it said.
Taiwan---Uniqueness---2NC
Sales to Taiwan are growing
Colby Goodman, 3-1-2017, (director of the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for
International Policy where he leads research and analysis on U.S. foreign security
assistance around the world.) "Commerce Department Boosts Arms Sales Deliveries to
Record High," LobeLog, https://lobelog.com/commerce-department-boosts-arms-sales-
deliveries-to-record-high/
The major jump in U.S. commercial arms sales deliveries from FY 2014 to FY 2015 comes in part
from noticeable increases to the Asian countries of Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan . In FY 2014, for instance, U.S. companies delivered $8.8 million worth of arms to
Taiwan through the Direct Commercial Sales program. In calendar year 2015, U.S. companies
delivered a total of $ 127 million in arms to the country through the 600 Series
program , according to data released by the Commerce Department. U.S. companies also delivered relatively high-dollar amounts of
arms through the 600 Series program to Germany, Israel, Iraq, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab
Emirates in 2015.
Saudi Arabia---1NC
Saudi sales are key
Svet 16 Oleg Svet, completed his doctoral dissertation on security assistance to Iraq,
has analyzed U.S. security cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries 9-
26-2016, "Why Congress Supports Saudi Arms Sales," National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-congress-supports-saudi-arms-sales-17840 - BS
Senators Ran Paul and Chris Murphy recently proposed a congressional resolution to stop a
$1.15 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia. Their measure failed on a 26-71 vote this past Wednesday. Their case rested in large part on the
fact that Riyadh's intervention in Yemen—conducted with American-made weapons—has cost an untold number of innocent lives in the
Arabian Peninsula. While their argument carried weight from a humanitarian perspective, it
did not make sense in terms of the impact it would have on American jobs , U.S. companies ,
and the wider defense industry . On a local level, hundreds of American jobs in the
proposed sale are at stake. The most important aspect of the deal is the proposed purchase of Abrams tanks. Some
of these tanks will be used as "battle damage replacement" for tanks lost by the Saudi
military in Yemen. Riyadh also ordered a General Dynamics-produced system to recover
tanks damaged on the battlefield. The Abrams tanks are produced by General Dynamics’
Combat Systems division in a plant in Lima, Ohio. About a decade ago the Lima plant employed 1,200 workers.
Over the past few years, with declines in Defense Department purchases of weapons
produced at the plant (including a 7 percent decrease in sales this quarter compared to the same period last year), the
number of workers in the plant has dropped to four hundred. Stopping the sale to Saudi
Arabia of such tanks would not only have put in jeopardy the remaining jobs at the Lima plan,
but also put at risk larger deals with Saudi Arabia and our other Gulf allies , which
themselves carry billions of dollars in revenue for American companies and are
associated with tens of thousands of jobs in nearly every state in America. When considering this
particular sale it is important to keep in mind the big picture of U.S. defense exports and
their contribution to America's defense industry . Over the past six years, as U.S. defense spending has
faced considerable budgetary pressures, American defense companies have struggled to maintain
employees and keep production lines open . With tightening defense budgets, highly-
skilled manufacturing jobs on the line, and the prospect of production lines for advanced U.S.
weapons being phased out , American exports of defense articles and services have become
and will continue to be ever more important . Saudi Arabia has emerged as the dominant purchaser of
American arms. In 2010 Riyadh signed a record $60 billion deal to buy defense articles made by American companies. Under the deal, it
agreed to spend $30 billion up front on fighter jets, helicopters, and other systems. That purchase is equivalent to a large chunk of the U.S.
In fact, the contribution is much larger, relatively speaking, when one looks at
defense budget.
how it benefits the smaller defense companies that service American and foreign
defense customers. The 2010 deal with Saudi Arabia entailed purchasing American jet fighters
that will help manufacturers in forty-four states and aid in protecting seventy-seven thousand jobs .
Importantly, the 2010 Saudi deal included the purchase of eighty-four new F-15 fighters. The prime contractor was Boeing, a hundred--
year-old American multinational company that consistently ranks as one of the world's most admired companies. Until recently, Boeing
produced only one F-15 per month, and the production line for F-15s was on the verge of being closed, that is, until the deal with Saudi
Arabia. Riyadh's purchase helped save thousands of jobs for Americans working on Boeing's F-15 production line on the outskirts of
Lambert-St. Louis International Airport. Boeing also makes Apache helicopters, and the Saudi deal included the purchase of seventy
Apaches. As Fortune reported, "Production lines for Boeing's F-15, Harpoon missile, and Apache helicopter are sustained by exports,
Saudi purchases help keep highly-
which support thousands of high-paying, highly skilled manufacturing jobs."
skilled manufacturing jobs in the United States.

Saudi Arabia---2NC
Saudi arms sales are key
Ivanova 18 Irina Ivanova, 10-12-2018, "Saudi Arabia is America's No. 1 weapons
customer," CBS News, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-arabia-is-the-top-buyer-of-
u-s-weapons/ - BS
The U.S. remains the world's largest weapons exporter, a position it has held since the late 1990s. Our
biggest customer ? Saudi Arabia . That business reality came to the forefront this
week in President Donald Trump's refusal to crack down on the kingdom whose royal rulers have been
accused of murdering a Saudi-born, U.S.-based dissident journalist who disappeared after entering the Saudi
consulate in Istanbul. The U.S. sold a total of $ 55.6 billion of weapons worldwide in the fiscal
year that ended Sept. 30 — up 33 percent from the previous fiscal year, and a near record. In
2017, the U.S. cleared some $18 billion in new Saudi arms deals. Mr. Trump has dismissed the idea of
suspending weapons sales to Saudi Arabia to punish its crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman, for any involvement in the alleged murder
of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. "I don't
like the concept of stopping an investment of $ 110 billion into
the United States," Mr. Trump said this week. Last year in May, President Trump used his first foreign trip as an
occasion to visit the kingdom and sign an arms deal advertised as $110 billion — a figure experts have since disputed as inflated, since it
was not based on actual, signed contracts and included at least $23 billion previously approved by the Obama administration, according to
Defense One. But
even before that announcement, Saudi Arabia was by far the U.S.' largest
arms client, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Over the five years ending in 2017, nearly one-
fifth of American weapons exports went to Saudi Arabia , SIPRI reports. Overall, half went to the
Middle East and North Africa. In the 2017 calendar year alone, some $18 billion in new Saudi arms deals were cleared by the U.S.
Ukraine---2NC
Ukraine sales are a huge part of the DIB
Semchuk, 19 [Liana, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of Oxford, The Conversation,
“Ukraine: US arms sales making big business money while ordinary people pay the
price,” https://theconversation.com/ukraine-us-arms-sales-making-big-business-money-
while-ordinary-people-pay-the-price-114238, AC]
Selling lethal weapons to Ukraine is the equivalent of pouring kerosene onto a flame. But ongoing hostilities
between Ukraine and Russia – including the Kerch strait crisis, which began late last year when Russia
intercepted three Ukrainian vessels and took 24 crew members captive – are also a major business
opportunity for the world’s largest defence contractors. Despite the risk of serious escalation,
these companies continue to provide Ukraine with lethal aid so it can defend itself
against Russia – for a price, of course. The US special representative for Ukraine negotiations, Kurt Volker,
stated recently that Washington remains committed to providing support to Ukraine and its military, including anti-tank
systems. He even hinted that the US is considering expanding the types of lethal aid that it could begin selling to Ukraine,
saying: “We also need to be looking at things like air defence and coastal defence.” This is a troubling prospect. In March,
US army general Curtis Scaparrotti said that the US could also bolster the Ukrainian military’s sniper capabilities.
Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, he said: There are other systems, sniper systems, ammunition and,
perhaps looking at the Kerch Strait, perhaps consideration for naval systems, as well, here in the future as we move
forward. This comment has been widely underreported and has not received nearly as much attention as it deserves
considering the potential consequences. At worst, more lethal aid could escalate the conflict further. At best, it will
continue to keep alive a conflict that has already claimed more than 10,000 lives. Finding a straightforward policy
alternative is difficult, but sending more lethal aid to achieve the unattainable goal of Ukraine defeating Russia is certainly
no solution. Impact Despite attempts by Volker and Scaparrotti to market the proposition as a way to help Ukraine defend
itself against Russia,the immediate benefits seem clearer to America’s weapons
manufacturing sector than to Ukrainian civilians, who will undoubtedly get caught in the crossfire. The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that the US is home to five of
the world’s ten largest defence contractors. Lockheed Martin, by far the largest in the
field, in 2017 had an estimated US$44.9 billion in arms contracts globally. The company
was also contracted (with Raytheon) in 2018 to provide Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank
missiles. The US Pentagon said: “The Javelin system will help Ukraine build its long-term defense capacity to defend
its sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to meet its national defense requirements.” But Lockheed Martin
likely profited handsomely from the deal . Meanwhile, the company’s financial reports
showed fourth quarter 2018 net sales of US$14.4 billion, compared to US$13.8 billion in
the fourth quarter of 2017. This year, the company is expecting sales to grow by as
much as 6%. This is unlikely to be the case if the number of conflicts around the world declines.
Aegis Boosters---1NR
The sale is much more than just the battery.
2AC Gady 19 – a Senior Editor with The Diplomat; reported from a wide range of
countries and conflict zones including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. (Franz-Stefan,
“US State Department Approves $2.15 Billion Aegis Ashore Sale to Japan” The
Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/us-state-department-approves-2-15-billion-
aegis-ashore-sale-to-japan)//RP
the sale will include two multimission signal

In addition to the two Aegis batteries,
processors, two command and control processor refreshes, radio navigation
equipment, naval ordnance, two identification friend or foe systems, global
command and control system-maritime hardware, and two inertial navigation
systems .
AND, don’t forget about the extra $6.48 billion dollars for the radar
and maintenance.
Gady, a Senior Editor with The Diplomat; reported from a wide range of countries and
conflict zones including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, 7/31/18
(Franz-Stefan, “Japan Selects Lockheed Martin Solid State Radar for New Ballistic
Missile Defense Systems”, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/japan-selects-lockheed-
martin-solid-state-radar-for-new-ballistic-missile-defense-systems/)//GA
Japan has selected the Lockheed Martin Solid State Radar (SSR) for its two land-
based Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense batteries , the land-based variant of the Aegis
combat system for defense against ballistic and cruise missiles, it plans to install in the 2020s, the Japanese Ministry of
Defense said in a statement on July 30. “By using this new radar we will increase our ability to cope with missiles on lofted
trajectories raising the level of ballistic missile defense,” Japanese Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera told local media
on Monday. Theacquisition and installation costs of the SSR systems will be around
$2.3 billion , while maintenance and operational costs are estimated at around
$4.18 billion over 30 years, according to the MOD.
AND, Lockheed Martin is key to the entire industry---their gains and

losses determine investor perception of the broader industry.
Stone, reporter for Reuters, 4/23/19
(Roger, “Trump's policies lift Lockheed Martin's profit, shares surge”,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lockheed-results/trumps-policies-lift-lockheed-martins-
profit-shares-surge-idUSKCN1RZ16Q)//GA
Lockheed Martin Corp reported better-than-expected quarterly profit on

(Reuters) -
Tuesday as U.S. President Donald Trump’s looser policies on foreign arms sales
boosted demand for missiles and fighter jets. The Pentagon’s biggest weapons supplier is
the first major defense company to report quarterly earnings this week, which Wall Street
expects to be higher than a year ago as global demand for arms rises. Trump’s administration has proposed an increase
in U.S. defense spending for the next fiscal year. Lockheed shares rose nearly 7 percent in their best one-
Investors bet on similar results from
day percentage rise since October 2016.
the whole sector, pushing Northrop Grumman Corp,

Raytheon Co and General Dynamics Corp shares up more
than 2.7 percent .
Offset Answers
AT: Offsets---T/L---2NC
Non-responsive to our impact---even if production is being sourced in
other countries the production is handled by US companies – their
profit margins are still boosted and they still get the benefits of
economies of scale
AT: Offsets---CP---2NC
AND 2nc CP: The United States federal government should not utilize
offset agreements for <arms sales>.
2NC cps are good

1. 2NC counterplans are good—this is key to deter aff sandbagging—
they would always save their best offense for the 2AC
2. Argument under-development—they shift everything back 1

speech, that forces the 2NR to give a 2NC which undermines the
depth of analysis.
3. Key to fully test the aff—they could just read non-intrinsic add-ons
that we could never test the germaneness of—this creates a bad form
of policymaking
4. Neg Flex—the aff can have a 2AC that is immune to counterplans—

2NC counterplans are key to test unpredictable add-ons and avoid
moral high ground
5. It’s still a constructive—getting a cross ex solves—the aff’s

arbitrary distinction between a counterplan and any other argument
is asinine
6. Side Bias—the persuasiveness of the 2AR outweighs any benefit of

the block and they get to pick the focus of the debate
7. At worst, reject the argument not the team

AT: Offsets---Saudi Arabia
Saudi offsets are insignificant
Ramady 19 Dr. Mohamed A. Ramady is Senior Advisor with Partner Energy, and former
Visiting Associate Professor, Finance and Economics, at King Fahd University of
Petroleum and Minerals , Saudi Arabia. He specializes on middle east energy policy, the
Saudi Economy, OPEC, GCC regional geo -political risk assessment, 8-12-2019, "Saudi
Arabia: Local military content and relaunching the Offset Program," No Publication,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/06/26/Saudi-Arabia-Local-
military-content-and-relaunching-the-offset-program.html - BS
Arms sellers may be required to source some of the production locally , to increase
imports from the importing country or to transfer technology . The Kingdom has already
taken the first step to ensure that there is an institutional capacity on the ground to manage this, and has
established the Saudi Military Industries (SAMI), a Public Investment Fund owned entity, to oversee the project. A Saudi Offset Program
can be a powerful tool for domestic investments, for those seeking to enter the lucrative Saudi market. An Offset Program has
been in existence since 1984, when Saudi Arabia was the first country in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to set up
such a program. To date though, despite some commendable efforts by some of the governments involved in arms sales to the Kingdom,
the results have been disappointing and Saudi Crown Prince M ohammed b in S alman
notably Britain,
noted that only around 2 percent of all military purchase are produced in Kingdom.
Impact---Conventional Deterrence
Readiness---AT: Defense---2NC
Readiness is key responding to sudden conflicts in multiple hotspots
Richard Dunn 13, private consultant on international security affairs, retired army
colonel, “The Impact of a Declining Defense Budget on Combat Readiness,” Heritage
Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/the-impact-of-a-declining-
defense-budget-on-combat-readiness
Combat readiness is defined as “[t]he ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military
strategy.”[1] This is the most important factor to our war fighters , but as basic as it is to them, it remains a
complicated subject for others to understand. Due to its multidimensional and somewhat diffuse nature, it also has few natural supporters.
For a state that builds ships, it is easy to support a policy that increases the number of ships in the Navy, but it is difficult to construct a
constituency to support the complex issue of military readiness. Therefore, readiness may suffer significant harm in the increasingly fierce
competition for resources. To fight effectively, the armed forces must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate under dangerous,
complex, uncertain, and austere conditions—often with little warning. They require the right personnel operating the right equipment with
the right training to win. Readiness is like a three-legged stool. The personnel, equipment, and training “legs” need to be balanced and in
sync to support the load. The most modern equipment is useless without highly trained personnel to operate and employ it. Conversely,
outmoded or unreliable equipment can hamper the effectiveness of the most highly motivated and skilled personnel. To fight effectively,
personnel must train with their combat equipment, practicing their combat missions under realistic, demanding conditions. Quality
Failure to maintain an appropriate
personnel, equipment, and training are the essential dimensions of combat readiness.
balance among these dimensions during the current period of budgetary uncertainty will significantly degrade
America’s ability to respond to threats to its interests . This can lead to major
strategic setbacks and significant loss of life. The challenging balancing act requires wise and effective leadership across all
defense-related institutions. History repeatedly shows that unanticipated events often catch us by surprise and that
as a nation, we have paid a high price in blood and treasure to compensate for our lack of preparedness.
Lower levels of defense resourcing have not been the sole cause of unpreparedness. In many cases, there is an inability to answer the
fundamental question of “what are we preparing to do?” Absent an effective answer that guides the allocation of resources, we can end up
with forces that are inadequately manned, equipped, or trained to meet a comprehensive range of threats, some of them unanticipated.
Answering the “what, when, and where” question is particularly challenging and complicated in the current era of strategic uncertainty. The
U.S.
world is still a violent and dangerous place, and major existential threats remain vague and unfocused. In the Pacific,
relationships with emerging powers and the future threats they may pose remain
unclear . In the Middle East, the political instability that accompanied the Arab Spring may
vastly alter the geopolitical landscape established in the 1920s, creating opportunities for a wide spectrum of
Islamist parties to advance their undemocratic agendas. Terrorism by non-state actors like al-Qaeda continues to metastasize.
At the same time, warfare is expanding into the economically vital cyberspace domain, and
revolutionary developments in unmanned systems may be changing the very nature of

conflict. Rapid reductions in the defense budget are leading to the restructuring or elimination of many programs. This will damage
the ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats to vital U.S. national interests. Maintaining a military posture capable of achieving these
aims requires both sufficient forces of various types and the readiness of those forces for combat. History’s Painful Lessons All of these
developments have the potential to harm U.S. interests significantly. Although we know that the future may hold significant dangers, they
remain ill defined, creating a challenging analytical problem for national security policymakers. History can provide useful insights into how
to approach strategic uncertainty. We know we cannot “get it entirely right.” Therefore, we should strive not to get it so far wrong that we
suffer unacceptable consequences when hit by unexpected threats. Under conditions of uncertainty, a hedging strategy that provides a
range of options makes the most sense. Historically, maintaining effective balance among the different dimensions of readiness and having
some ready capability to deal with a wide range of potential threats have been an effective way to hedge strategic bets. In times of defense
budgetary retrenchment, combat readiness of the armed forces often becomes one of the first casualties of fiscal tightening. This was
particularly true of the years between World War I and World War II, when the Great Depression and isolationism made military
preparedness a very low national priority. Despite the threatening war clouds rapidly expanding in Asia and Europe, the U.S. was woefully
unprepared for global conflict. The shock of Pearl Harbor mobilized both the industrial capability and the moral determination to overcome
the early, disastrous reversals in the Pacific and tactical defeats in North Africa. Once focused on military production, the U.S. economy
rapidly produced overwhelming quantities of ships, aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and other matériel needed for America to become the
“Arsenal of Democracy.” However, U.S. forces quickly learned that training for combat, particularly in developing military leaders, was just
as complex and demanding. It took several years of internalizing battlefield lessons learned at high cost to train the leaders at all levels that
brought the war to a victorious conclusion. After the war, “no more Pearl Harbors”[2] became the rallying cry of the supporters of a strong
national defense. Regrettably, the record of U.S. military preparedness following World War II has been rather checkered. Since then, the
U.S. has had less than a year (often much less) to prepare for any of its major conflicts. One of the earliest shocks hit in June 1950 when
Soviet-supported North Korea invaded South Korea. After the Berlin Blockade in 1949, U.S. forces were focused on the Soviet threat to
Europe. Less than five years after the defeat of Germany and Japan, they were ill prepared for more limited wars in areas of less than
strategic interest. When the U.S. recognized that land forces would be required to stem the rout of the South Korean military, a hastily
assembled force from an Army division on occupation duty in Japan was quickly committed to block the advancing North Korean army.
Named after its commander, Task Force Smith was poorly equipped with World War II–era weapons and had no opportunity to train as a
unit. In the opening battle between U.S. and North Korean forces, it was rapidly overrun and suffered disastrous losses.[3] Decades later,
“no more Task Force Smiths” was still an object lesson in preparedness for U.S. Army leaders.[4] After ending the war in Korea, and
concerned with the economic costs of maintaining a large standing army, President Dwight D. Eisenhower relied on strategic air forces to
deter Soviet aggression with the threat of massive nuclear retaliation.[5] The subsequent reduction in ground forces contributed to the
difficulty the U.S. faced in dealing with the “wars of national liberation” that cropped up in the early 1960s, most significantly in Southeast
Asia. Committed to combat in Vietnam, the U.S. Army rapidly increased in size. This rapid expansion strained the Army’s ability to induct
and train new soldiers and junior officers. The conflict also strained the intellectual adaptability of the Army’s senior leaders, most of whom
had their formative combat experiences in the firepower-intensive, large-unit operations prevalent during World War II and the Korean War.
Ultimately, this meant that leaders were slow in adapting to the different counterinsurgency requirements of Vietnam. U.S. forces adapted
relatively quickly to the realities of the post-Vietnam situation and refocused on the massive Soviet conventional threat to Europe, where
combat readiness had suffered significantly during Vietnam. New equipment and doctrine prepared the new all-volunteer force to fight and
win while outnumbered. Most notably, Army and Air Force leaders recognized the high value of synergistic air–land operations and
developed the appropriate war fighting concepts and organizations.[6] The apparent requirement for large conventional forces evaporated
when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, and planning was put in place for significant reductions. However, Saddam Hussein’s unexpected
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 put that on hold. Saddam’s decision not to press forward to seize Saudi Arabia gave the U.S. and its allies
sufficient time to redeploy forces from Europe and elsewhere. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, U.S. air and ground units that were
trained, organized, and equipped to fight the Soviets proved devastatingly effective against Iraqi forces armed with Soviet equipment.[7]
This again proved to be the case in 2003 when U.S. air and ground forces swept into Iraq, seized Baghdad, and toppled Saddam Hussein’s
government. However, when the U.S. occupation proved longer and more complicated than first thought, the U.S. Army was again slow in
adapting to the changing nature of the conflict after having worked hard to put its Vietnam counterinsurgency experiences in its past. While
history never exactly repeats itself, we can draw several useful insights from the historical record. First, our ability to predict rapidly
emerging threats is imperfect at best. Even in cases in which employment of force was optional, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, we have
had well less than a year to prepare. Thus, dependence on having sufficient time to bring forces back up to the desired level of readiness
readiness can degrade very quickly ,
before employing them can be a recipe for disaster. As a corollary to this point,
so maintaining it requires continuous attention . Readiness is also somewhat specific to each scenario.
Forces prepared for one type of conflict may not be as capable in another. Additionally, leaders trained to operate in one type of conflict
may not have the mental agility to perform well in another. The Complexity of Military Operations Understanding the personnel, equipment,
and training dimensions of combat readiness requires some understanding of the operations that military organizations perform. Combat
operations of almost any scale are exceptionally complex, requiring integration and synchronization of myriad activities ranging from
individual actions to coordinated movements by large, geographically dispersed organizations. They are usually executed under dangerous,
uncertain, austere, and urgent conditions that compound the challenge. At the basic level of combat operations, individuals and crews must
operate their equipment, ranging from individual weapons to combat vehicles, aircraft, and ships. This involves operating all of the systems
for communications, situational awareness, etc. Then they must employ their equipment as part of larger unit teams, executing their part in
tactical operations. Each smaller unit is part of an even larger team that incorporates many different functions ranging from fire support to
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to logistical and medical support. As required, these can be combined into joint task forces
that include all of these functions in land, sea, air, space, and even cyberspace dimensions. All of these organizations, from the smallest
units to joint task forces, must be tied together by command, control, and communications networks that provide them with awareness of
the friendly and enemy situations and orchestrate their individual activities to achieve the commander’s intended objectives. At the same
time, they all require support, including transportation, refueling, rearming with ammunition, maintenance, and medical evacuation and care.
Joint forces are composed of interdependent “teams” at many different levels that are only as strong as their weakest members. For
example, the Army may have great airborne paratrooper units, but they are ineffective unless Air Force transport aircraft can deliver them to
the right drop zone. These transports, in turn, may require tanker aircraft to refuel them in flight to reach the drop zone. Therefore, the
readiness of a joint force to conduct major combat operations is determined by the readiness of its individual components, in turn a function
of their manning, equipping, training, and leadership and the balance among these dimensions. Because of their complexity, combat
operations are often vulnerable to single points of failure. The loss to enemy action or equipment failure of a key communications node,
radar, or other “low density” but essential capability at a critical point can put an entire operation at risk.[8] The Dimensions of Readiness
The readiness of military organizations to execute these complex operations is a function of the personnel, equipment, and training
dimensions of combat readiness and an appropriate balance among them. Regardless of service, combat organizations are designed to
accomplish a specific range of tasks. For this purpose, they are allocated specific numbers of personnel of appropriate ranks, skills, and
skill levels to man and maintain the various types and numbers of equipment that they are authorized to have to accomplish those tasks.
They also receive annual budgets to provide the resources (e.g., fuel, ammunition, and replacement parts) to train with their equipment.
Personnel. High-quality, well-trained, and motivated personnel in the necessary numbers and ranks are essential to combat readiness. In
the U.S. all-volunteer force, the first task is to recruit sufficient numbers of citizens with the required motivation and physical and mental
capabilities to perform complex tasks under austere and often dangerous conditions. Here, the services compete with other opportunities
afforded by the civilian economy. The challenge, then, is to provide appropriate incentives to make military careers attractive. While
patriotism should never be underestimated as a motive for service, the armed forces have found it necessary to provide salaries,
educational opportunities, quality of life, retirement benefits, and health care to attract and retain the required numbers of quality recruits.
The recent economic recession has reduced civilian opportunities, and the reductions in force size have reduced the number of recruits
required to sustain personnel numbers and quality. However, if the economy recovers and generates more civilian opportunities, recruiting
and retaining quality personnel may become increasingly more difficult. Once recruited, service personnel must be taught the individual
skills unique to their military missions. Teaching all of these required skill sets is a task of immense scale and scope, ranging from teaching
rifle proficiency to Army privates to training naval aviators to operate high-performance aircraft from aircraft carrier flight decks. This
requires relatively large training organizations staffed with the highest quality instructors, facilities, and equipment. Moreover, personnel
require individual training throughout their careers. Initially, junior officers must be taught basic tactics and leadership skills. As they
become more senior and assume higher-level responsibilities, they must learn advanced skills ranging from organizational management
techniques to national-level strategy. Enlisted personnel must also progress to become effective and mature leaders and managers at
higher and higher levels. As military operations and their enabling technologies become increasingly sophisticated and complex, the
training required to master them demands even more time and resources. Thus, it is more effective and efficient to retain trained personnel
by motivating them to remain in the service than it is to recruit and train replacements. Recruiting and training activities are both resource
and time intensive, and limited assets are available to perform them. This reinforces the requirement to make continued military careers
attractive by providing adequate salaries and benefits, especially for more mature personnel with families. Leadership is the catalyst for the
personnel dimension of combat readiness. It depends on native ability honed by training and experience. Leadership is an irreplaceable
force multiplier. It often spells the difference between disaster and victory under the most trying of circumstances. Thus, the selection,
development, and retention of the best leaders, especially those with combat experience, should be a top priority. Napoleon said, “The
moral is to the physical as three to one.” This remains as absolutely true today as when he said it. Although intangible, morale is essential
to readiness. It is very much a function of leadership, training, and the overall condition of the force. Poorly led and trained personnel trying
to operate unreliable equipment and living in substandard conditions will most likely have low morale and not be very combat effective.
Equipment. Based on their missions, military organizations are authorized to have specific quantities of particular types of equipment. For
example, armor battalions in the Army are authorized to have a certain number of tanks and the necessary support equipment, such as
refueling and maintenance vehicles. Air Force fighter squadrons are authorized to have a certain number of fighter aircraft of specific
models and associated ground support equipment. Equipment readiness depends on two factors: the number and types of equipment in
organizations and the operational status of that equipment. Service regulations authorize organizations to have specific numbers of specific
models of equipment. However, the equipment they actually have (their “equipment fill”) depends upon inventories of existing equipment
and the procurement of new, usually more modern equipment to replace equipment that wears out, is destroyed, or becomes obsolete. As
procurement accounts decline, procurement of new equipment can be delayed, affecting readiness in two ways. First, older generations of
equipment are less effective than the newer generations. Second, delayed modernization means using older existing equipment, which is
less reliable and more difficult and expensive to maintain. This tends to lower the operational status of equipment fleets. Maintenance and
repair of equipment are essential to combat readiness. They are also tremendously time and resource intensive, requiring large numbers of
highly skilled personnel, technically sophisticated tools, and a steady, reliable supply of replacement parts. The scope of maintenance and
repair ranges from the daily checks and services performed by operators and crews to repairs by unit maintenance personnel to detailed
refurbishing done by depots, shipyards, and commercial corporations. As available funding declines, equipment maintenance and repair
can be one of the first bill payers. As such, it is often an early indicator of collapsing combat readiness. For example, reduced funding for
repair parts can lead to a vicious downward spiral in equipment operational readiness rates. Without replacement parts, units are tempted
to cannibalize parts from equipment that is already non-operational. Removing parts to keep other equipment operating or flying not only
places additional demands on maintenance manpower, but also creates “hangar queens” missing so many parts that they become very
expensive to repair. Because most military equipment is designed for a long service life, it usually is scheduled for depot, shipyard, or
commercial refurbishment several times during its “career.” This is essential for corrosion control in aircraft and ships and replacement of
major sub-assemblies, such as suspensions in ground vehicles. It is also economically smart because it can significantly extend the useful
service life of the equipment. As budgets tighten, such maintenance may be deferred, creating large backlogs and leaving organizations
with less reliable equipment that is prone to breakdown. Training. Advocates for demanding, realistic training often quote Field Marshall
Erwin Rommel, who said, “The best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties.”[9] How well
military organizations are trained for the full range of their assigned missions is a major determinant of success in combat. One reason that
the U.S. armed forces have been world-class is that they trained more and better than any other nation’s military. Institutions such as the
Army’s National Training Center, the Navy’s Top Gun program, and the Air Force’s Red Flag have set exceptionally high standards for
realistic, demanding training that incorporates almost all of the functions and conditions of actual combat. Major large-scale joint exercises
that include elements of all of the services and combined exercises with U.S. allies develop and refresh the critical abilities to deploy and
sustain forces and train forces to operate together effectively. Realistic, demanding training is a tremendous confidence builder. It not only
gives personnel confidence in their own units’ capabilities, but also builds confidence in joint and combined teams. It is also a powerful
leader development tool. Absent actual combat, intense training teaches invaluable lessons to junior leaders and gives their superiors
unique opportunities to observe their ability to lead under highly stressful conditions. Training is also very time and resource intensive, a
major consumer of operations and maintenance funding. Although simulators have advanced significantly, there is no substitute for
operating actual equipment, and that can be very expensive. It consumes large amounts of fuel, and the resulting wear and tear
significantly increase the requirement for repair parts. Training ammunition can be expensive as well. The service headquarters provide
their operating organizations with annual budgets authorizing them to operate their equipment for a fixed amount of miles for ground
equipment, flying hours for aircraft, and at-sea time for ships. Operating organizations are then responsible for planning and executing the
training necessary to achieve proficiency in their assigned missions within these budgetary constraints. Time. Time is a major factor in all of
the different dimensions of readiness. Recruiting and training personnel, acquiring and maintaining equipment, and training organizations
from small units to joint task forces all require time. Therefore, the readiness status that an organization maintains should be determined by
Organizations providing strategic deterrence and defense ,
when its capabilities might be required.
immediate response to terrorist threats and attacks , and other capabilities that may be
required on a moment’s notice obviously need to maintain high levels of personnel and
equipment fill and training . The same is true of units that are forward deployed in
crisis areas , such as Korea or the Persian Gulf . Units whose capabilities are not as time sensitive and do not need
to be deployed immediately can be kept at lower states of readiness, depending on the time available to bring them up to full readiness
before they are needed. This is a key factor in determining which missions should be assigned to active-duty forces and which can be
assigned to Reserve components. During peacetime, Reserve forces have less time available to train; therefore, they usually require
The biggest challenge lies in knowing how much time might
additional time to train during mobilization.
be available to raise readiness to required levels before employing a force. Here, the historical
record suggests erring on the side of caution. When we have unexpectedly found it necessary to employ force in defense of vital national
interests, we have had to use the forces available regardless of their readiness. Why Readiness May Be at Risk As noted earlier, the
dimensions of readiness are like the legs of a three-legged stool that must be in balance to be effective. However, the way that we manage
the resourcing for each dimension can make it difficult to maintain this balance. This is compounded by the unpredictable length of time that
might be available to increase readiness in a crisis. Personnel, procurement, and operations and maintenance accounts are managed
separately, making it difficult to assess how reductions in funding for one dimension may affect overall readiness. Additionally, the
managerial and political natures of some aspects of readiness make them easier to reduce than others. For example, equipment
replacement and modernization is largely governed by the procurement accounts. In many cases, these buy large, major pieces of
equipment, such as tanks and fighter aircraft. Expensive as these are, they become increasingly more expensive to produce if production
rates are reduced below a certain economic optimum. This is particularly true in shipbuilding, in which it is impossible to buy a fraction of a
ship. Additionally, manufacturing large equipment often involves interrelated chains of defense-specific industrial activities geographically
spread around the country and employing relatively large numbers of highly skilled people in well-paying jobs. This can create large
congressional constituencies who strongly support those programs. Operations and maintenance accounts are much easier to adjust
downward. It is possible to reduce expenditures for training incrementally by decreasing the amount of fuel or repair parts purchased.
Moreover, these expenditures are widely distributed around the country and do not create the strong constituencies that support
procurement. The same thing is true of the individual training base where much instruction is provided under contract. It is even more
difficult to understand the impact of reductions in personnel accounts. The challenge of sustaining the all-volunteer force through a decade
of continuous conflict and deployment has significantly increased the per-person cost of personnel, not only in terms of salaries, but also in
health care and retirement benefits. These benefits also have powerful constituencies in the widespread and vocal military retiree
communities. Maintaining balance across the dimensions of readiness requires significant personnel reductions, but politically, these are
increasingly difficult to achieve. The challenge, then, is to understand the relationships and interdependencies among the personnel,
Readiness clearly has tipping points unique to each organization,
equipment, and training dimensions of readiness.
but they are difficult to predict . At what point does the lack of funds for training and maintenance so discourage
promising junior leaders that they leave the service? Do salaries and benefits counterbalance this? What is the minimal amount of training
required to sustain proficiency at mission-essential tasks at a sufficient level to avoid putting a unit in jeopardy in a crisis? These are difficult
questions. Quantitative readiness reporting and analysis can help to a degree, but some answers lie only in well-reasoned professional
judgment. What the U.S. Should Do The U.S. has experienced significant downturns in defense spending many times. In almost every
case, we have pledged to avoid repeating past mistakes that compromised the readiness of our armed forces. Our record in honoring those
pledges is imperfect. During World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War, the size of U.S. armed forces increased
significantly to meet the demands of those conflicts. Once those conflicts were resolved, the size of the armed forces and associated
defense budgets declined to meet the perceived lower level of threats. Our approach to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq following the
September 2001 terrorist attacks was different. While defense spending increased significantly, the size of our ground forces increased only
modestly, with few changes in air and maritime forces. Most of the increased spending was in overseas contingency operations funds to
pay for the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These funds represented a significant percentage of the overall funding available to the
services over the past decade, and their drying up has compounded the challenge that the services now face in meeting the requirements
of the Budget Control Act. Attempting to manage this amount of budgetary change over a compressed time frame makes it difficult to
maintain effective balance among the different dimensions of readiness. The exemption of some personnel accounts from sequestration
has exacerbated this problem. Regrettably, world events and potential threats to U.S. strategic national interests are not driven by the same
North Korea’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric
forces that drive the political and budgetary gridlock in Washington.
and actions endanger regional stability in the economically vital Western Pacific. The maelstrom of conflict
in Syria threatens to engulf its neighbors as Iran continues to pursue a destabilizing
nuclear capability in the Middle East. The one-word descriptor for our strategic situation is “uncertain.”
Deterrence solves nuclear war

Henriksen 2012 Thomas, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University,
America and the Rogue States, p6 185-188
warlike polities have for brief periods threatened the international

Throughout the ages, freestanding,
order while existing outside the orbit of great powers. The last quarter of a century witnessed another of these
episodes. The immediate years after the USSR fell apart witnessed a sudden profusion of
rogue states , for which the world was ill-prepared after four decades of reasonably
predictive actions from the two superpowers and their allies. Rogue entities in earlier historical periods possessed similar traits.
The post-Cold War adversarial states fought, subverted, and confronted other countries for their
own nefarious ends. They differed from their historical predecessors by going after
WMD, which exponentially heightens their destructive power and their danger to other
countries. Now, as in the past, heavyweights conspire against small, aggressive , free- lance
states bent on upsetting political order. Taking on all comers alone is a dangerous
game for a pariah, no matter how much a garrison state it is. Cuba, Libya (before its revolution), and Sudan passed from
rogue status to nations less threatening to global peace. At this juncture, Syria's Assad barely clings to power amid a popular revolt.
renegade regimes are
Self-preservation traditionally dictates that outgunned rogues align with stronger protectors. Sometimes
useful to a major state, as when the Soviet Union employed them in its chess match with
the United States. Today, China seems to be in the same business. As the world relapses back
to great power politics, modern-day Machiavellians will look for their "prince" and find
him in personages such as Kim Jong II or Bashar al-Assad . Be this as it may, lone-wolf
states have traditionally succumbed or aligned themselves with a more powerful patron .
Much the same state of affairs is occurring in our period. Syria hunkered behind a resurgent Russia opposed to
the West, North Korea moved under the wing of an ascending China , and an isolated Iran took
advantage of the Sino-Russo pushback against America —all very reminiscent of the
Cold War competition among great powers and their satellites. Some adversarial nations—Sudan, Libya, and Cuba—slipped
from the adversarial column. But as some rogues disappear, others will, no doubt, emerge . It is still too
early to know whether Venezuela is a rogue-in-the- making or merely another Latin American
authoritarian state. At the very least, it has a dangerous linkage to Iran. Currently rouge behavior
sets them against the prevailing international society in the early twenty-first century. Their reliance on
dictatorship, repression, and brutal security forces makes their rule hard but brittle. As with all tyrannies they live and die by the sword.
They are inherently unstable like most police states. Rogue regimes fear internal change.
Externally, they pursue risky approaches at times , in part, to consolidate their rule or exert
their regional presence. The historical trajectory of rogues has pointed toward an axis or at least connections with
a potential guardian power. Present-day adversarial states also are maneuvering from isolation to the protective eaves of a powerful patron,
as Syria fell in with Iran, North Korea draws closer to China, Iran seeks an anti-Western security bloc with China and Russia, and Cuba is
on Venezuelan life support. Without foreign buttressing, the stand-alone rogues must curtail their regional threats, as did Libya in 2003 and
Cuba after the Soviet Union split apart. Or they can suffer the fate of Iraq which the United States militarily crushed, althought it paid a high
price to quell an antiforeign insurgency and furious sectarian violence in the aftermath of its invasion. History’s muse is too scornful and
unpredictable to hazard a confident prophesy, but the historical record augurs against longevity for rogue regimes. Today’s world of instant
communication via the Internet, YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook along with the allure of the youth culture act as powerful solvents eating
Until rogues
away at closed, repressive regimes premised on threats to neighbors in the name of ideological abstractions.
succumb or fall under the sway of a restraining power, the U nited S tates and allied nations must
tackle the challenges they present. Direct conflict , as in the Iraq War, against another rogue nation is far too
expensive in economic and human costs for serial application. Proceeding to invasion, regime change,
and occupation is an option but an unlikely one, especially since the United States amassed staggering debts with a more than SI trillion
price tag for the Iraq and Afghan wars. The human toll likewise was steep with over 6,000 US military deaths, tens of thousands seriously
wounded, and hundreds of thousands of inhabitants killed in the two theaters. America's dark economic picture is
crimping its international endeavors. Intervention-cum-nation-building remedies for derelict countries
are almost beyond consideration, given America's struggling economic recovery, cash-
strapped federal budget, and blooming entitlement debt. The only viable approach is
one embodying containment and deterrence to confront the threats emanating from
rogue states. This approach requires the hard power of military forces to give it credibility.
Armed might, in part, persuaded Libya and perhaps Iran to halt their drive for WMD, as noted earlier.
Libya’s Qaddafi believed President Bush planned to invade his country once the Iraq campaign ended. The
Libyan strongman decided to renounce his nuclear program and open his country to international
arms inspectors. Iran also appears to have suspended the development of weapons in its nuclear-
energy effort at the time of the US invasion into Iraq. Earlier, the North Korean regime seemed awed by
Americas application of electronic, push-button military technology during the Persian Gulf War, the
first time that "smart" weapons had been deployed with devastating effectiveness. The threat of military action, therefore,
can serve as a powerful inducement to some outlaw states to disarm . A "carrots"-

laden approach (without any sticks) comes off as bribery from a weak hand , as North Korea so often
surmised about the American "nice" approach. Hard power also reinforces antirogue alliances and
international sanctions to contain and deter rogue-state aggression. Containment and

deterrence need not be totally pacific. The containment-plus approach against Saddam Hussein following the Persian Gulf War
encompassed air strikes, no-fly zones, and even on-the-ground assistance to Iraqi Kurds for a decade. The US-led NATO military siege
against Slobodan Milosevic" was accompanied by political campaigning training and funds for antiregime dissidents in nearby countries,
who went on to organize demonstrations that toppled the Serbian dictator. Even before the Arab Spring uprisings engulfed Syria, the United
States had secretly financed the political opposition. The US Department of State funded a satellite television channel that beamed in anti-
Assad programming beginning in April 2009.123 South Korean democracy activists have floated balloons into the DPRK laden with
antiregime messages calling for protests among the Northern population to no avail. This angers Pyongyang but so far has been
ineffective. Computer viruses and cyber warfare offer more subtle—and deniable—sabotage instruments than aerial bombardments to
undermine rogue threats.
Readiness---Industry Key---2NC
The DIB is key
1---Economies of scale – large scale production makes equipment
easier to purchase for the DOD domestically
2---Innovation – domestic innovation is most accessible by the US –
that’s key to maintaining technical overmatch – that’s all Webster
3---perceived industrial weakness causes revisionism
DoD 2018 Internal report prepared by the DoD to assess the US industry, “Assessing
and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain
Resiliency of the United States” https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-
1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND
%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF
To provide for our national security , America’s manufacturing and defense industrial
base must be secure , robust , resilient , and ready . To ensure taxpayer dollars are frugally and wisely spent,
the defense industrial base must be cost-effective, cost-efficient, highly productive, and not unduly subsidized. In the event of
contingencies, the industrial base must possess sufficient surge capabilities. Above all,
America’s manufacturing and d efense i ndustrial b ase must support economic prosperity , be
globally competitive , and have the capabilities and capacity to rapidly innovate and arm our military with the lethality
and dominance necessary to prevail in any conflict. As President Trump stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy: “A healthy
defense industrial base is a critical element of U.S. power and the National Security Innovation Base.†
The ability of the military to surge in response to an emergency depends on our Nation’s ability to produce needed parts and systems,
All facets of the manufacturing and
healthy and secure supply chains, and a skilled U.S. workforce.” 2
defense industrial base are currently under threat , at a time when strategic
competitors and revisionist powers appear to be growing in strength and
capability . As stated in the National Defense Strategy: “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and
security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security
Strategy classifies as revisionist powers . It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to
shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over other nations’
economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”3 At least five macro forces cause the risks now threatening America’s industrial base. From
FY2012 through FY2017, sequestration led to lower defense spending relative to levels projected before sequestration was put in
place. Antiquated and counter-productive procurement practices induced contracting delays, deterred market
entry, discouraged innovation, and increased costs to suppliers. Decreases in key production capabilities and
declines in manufacturing employment, relative to the last time the U.S. faced a great power competition, left key
weaknesses that threaten the nation’s manufacturing capabilities . The industrial policies of
foreign competitors have diminished American manufacturing’s global competitiveness – sometimes as collateral damage of globalization,
but also due to specific targeting by great powers like China. Finally, emerging gaps in our skilled workforce, both in terms of STEM as well
as core trade skills (e.g., welding, computer numeric control operation, etc.) pose increasing risk to industrial base capabilities. 4
4---The industrial base supports munitions readiness – that’s key to surges and
threat response.
Veto 19 [Mr. James Veto, Dr. Paul-Thomas Ferguson, and Ms. Aimee Wren, 5-31-2019,
"Ensuring Munitions Readiness through Industrial Base Modernization," Army,
https://www.army.mil/article/222613/ensuring_munitions_readiness_through_industrial_b
ase_modernization]
The organic industrial base (OIB) is a national asset with critical capabilities
supporting readiness for the United States' joint military forces. For more than two centuries, the
industrial base has supported every major US conflict . Today, Joint Munitions Command (JMC)
manages the OIB to provide readiness for current and emerging threats. In the past,
a static approach to maintaining the industrial base was fine for counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism readiness, but more careful planning is required to effectively face today's
near-peer competitors. "While immediate warfighter needs remain the Army's top priority, JMC must focus
on both near term readiness and modernization efforts in anticipation of meeting future
munitions requirements," said Brig. Gen. Michelle Letcher, JMC Commander. JMC's mission is to
provide ready, reliable, and lethal munitions at the speed of war in sustainment of global
readiness. The munitions industrial base, as managed by JMC, consists of 14 subordinate arsenals, depots, and
ammunition plants, which have unique capabilities not always found in the private sector. These assets collectively
provide the conventional ammunition life-cycle functions of production, distribution, storage, and demilitarization of
munitions for U.S. military services, other government agencies, and Allied nations, as directed. In the process, JMC
maintains the ability to surge, thus supplying the warfighter with munitions for every emerging need, from early deterrence
efforts through the end of combat operations. "As we modernize and improve the industrial base,"
Letcher explained, "JMC installations and private industry partners are postured to respond to
surge requirements and other contingencies ," Letcher said. Logistics and sustainment
efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels require synchronization and
proper resourcing to effectively meet Army readiness requirements in support of
operations to win the nation's wars. As needs and resources change, it is critical that JMC manage the OIB
effectively in the face of persistent planning challenges. Transitions to peacetime, and the budgetary constraints
accompanying them, impede the effort to sustain critical capabilities. Such challenges are cyclical --
major wars require a significant supply of munitions, then peacetime transitions involve a drawdown in operations,
including reduction of investments in development, production, support systems, and personnel. Largely a legacy of World
War II, the number of industrial facilities declined drastically after the Vietnam War. At today's remaining locations,
workload ebbs and flows as the demand for munitions fluctuates. With declining demand following each transition to
peacetime, OIB overhead and unit costs increase, leading to reductions in force. Letting skilled workers go further
Budget plans must strive to balance
impedes the OIB's ability to respond rapidly to future contingencies.
current and future readiness. Now more than ever, it is important for JMC to maintain and
modernize the OIB and its critical capabilities in order to maintain and supply the
warfighter. A key component of JMC's efforts is the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept. The MDO defines the
strategic support area as the space where joint logistics and sustainment functions emanate. It is where combat power is
generated and projected into the support, close, and deep areas. Joint Munitions Command (JMC) is committed to
providing munitions readiness in support of Multi-Domain Operations. The increasing complexity of future conflict,
involving multiple actors operating in multiple domains, land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace, requires the OIB to remain
responsive and flexible. To do so, JMC must continue modernizing arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants, improving
Maintaining a deliberate approach to
the ability to produce, store, and distribute ammunition.
investments in the OIB during the wartime to peacetime transition ensures the ability of
JMC to support military forces in future operations. "By maintaining an evolving approach to
modernization, JMC supports the National Security Strategy and ensures munitions readiness for the needs of both today
and tomorrow," Letcher said.
The defense industry is key

Gouré 18 Daniel Gouré PhD, Vice President of the Lexington Institute, a thinktank, and
an analyst on national security and military issues, 10-4-2018, "Winning Future Wars:
Modernization and a 21st Century Defense Industrial Base," Heritage Foundation,
https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/topical-essays/winning-future-wars-
modernization-and-21st-century-defense - BS
The U.S. military’s ability to defeat its opponents in battle depends largely , though not
exclusively, on the equipment , weapons , and supporting capabilities that it possesses. In
turn, these depend on an industrial base that is viable and healthy enough to produce them
and the relative effectiveness of new capabilities that spring from competition in design. All of this
implies some level of competitive redundancy among manufacturers that can come only
from a defense funding stream that is large enough and consistent enough to keep
companies that produce the wherewithal of America’s military power in business . To
be clear: This is not some form of corporate welfare. It is an investment in the nation’s fundamental security.
Modernization requires the ability of the military to keep place with the technological
evolution of the battlefield. A force able to modernize in turn requires an industrial base healthy and diverse enough to
develop and apply emerging technologies that are relevant to war. Failure in either area—a weak, moribund
defense industrial base or obsolete forces— means failure in war and the fatal compromise of the nation’s
security. Conversely, a healthy and effective force, made possible by a healthy and relevant industrial base, means a secure and
prosperous country.
Specifically---arms sales make arms cheaper to produce---that’s Key

to deterrence
Lasers---2NC
Defense industrial development is key to laser weapons
Toobin 3-17-16 Adam, Lockheed Martin Is Ready to Deliver Laser Weaponry,
https://www.inverse.com/article/12972-lockheed-martin-is-ready-to-deliver-laser-
weaponry//BS
Laser weaponry is here, and it’s just heating up. The arsenal of the future is now making its way
onto the ships, planes, and tanks of today. Lockheed Martin is ready to start providing
the U.S. military with laser weapons capable of 30 KW beams as soon as they receive the order, according to
three Lockheed executives in an interview with Defense News. “The technologies now exist,” said Paul Shattuck, company director for
Directed Energy Systems. “They can be packaged into a size, weight, power and thermal which can be fit onto relevant tactical platforms,
Lockheed Martin’s ATHENA (Advanced
whether it’s a ship, whether it’s a ground vehicle or whether it’s an airborne platform.”
Test High Energy Asset) lasers can disable a truck’s engine from over a mile away with only 30
KW of power. It is already in production and capable of up to 120 KW with the right set of modules. Lockheed is also set to deliver
its first 60 KW RELY laser to the Army by the end of this year. “The question is moving from, ‘Do we have the devices?’ to ‘How quickly can
we integrate them on the platform?’” said Daniel Miller, Senior Fellow for Air Vehicle Science and Systems with Lockheed’s Skunk Works
division. The
Navy’s USS Ponce is already equipped with and authorized to use a Laser
Weapon System that can shoot down drones and destroy small landing craft. Its 33 to
105 KW capabilities cost only $1 to fire, highlighting that the military’s next-most
advanced weaponry may also slash costs. Today’s missiles can cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars to fire.
solves all war

Miller 7-15-2
John, contributor to National Review, Our 'Next Manifest Destiny': America should move
to control space -- now, and decisively,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/714383/posts, msm
On the morning of September 13, 1985, Air Force Major Doug Pearson smashed through the sound barrier in his F-15. Pointed almost directly upward more than seven miles above the Pacific Ocean, he tapped a little red button on the side of
his control stick, and released a missile strapped to the belly of his plane. The missile blazed out of sight, leaving the earth's atmosphere quickly and reaching a speed of 13,000 miles per second. Pearson wondered if it would hit anything. The
mission was classified, so Pearson had developed a code with the folks back at Edwards Air Force Base: The radioman would tell him to level off at a certain altitude if his missile struck its target, an obsolete scientific probe orbiting 345 miles
over Hawaii. As it happened, the code wasn't necessary. When Pearson checked in a few minutes after firing, he could hear cheering in the background from the control room. It was the one time an American pilot had ever destroyed an object
in outer space. People still talk about Pearson as the country's first "space ace." He remains its only space ace. A few weeks after the satellite was destroyed, Congress banned further tests. "We had hoped to conduct more," recalls Pearson,
now a general. "But politics were what they were, and the nation decided to go another way." Space is the next great frontier of military innovation , but for
17 years the nation has gone another way. It has squandered a remarkable opportunity that may not be available much longer. Rather than move rapidly to build on the success of Pearson and many others involved in the military use of space,
technologies that will be essential to national security in the 21st century

the United States has refused to develop ,
like space-based lasers that can destroy ICBMs right after they've
from anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles Pearson's to
left their launch pads . Democrats ridiculed Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative as "Star Wars," and not much has changed: Rep. Dennis Kucinich, Democrat of Ohio, recently introduced the
Space Preservation Act of 2002, which would ban weapons from space "for the benefit of all humankind." The language of his bill is so broad that it would effectively reinstate the now-defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It would also block
construction of the limited missile-defense system now underway at Fort Greely in Alaska, as well as a sea-based system whose development the Pentagon says it may now accelerate. That's because ABMs that intercept their targets above the
atmosphere -- all of them, basically -- may reasonably be deemed weapons in space. (ICBMs are weapons in space, too, but they don't engage anything until their warheads dive back into the earth.) With the ABM Treaty at last finding its
deserved place on the ash heap of history, however, we now have an unprecedented occasion to rethink U.S. military strategy in space. What the country needs is an aggressive
commitment to achieving space control -- a kind of Monroe Doctrine for the heavens, opening them to the peaceful purposes of commerce and science but closing
them to anything that threatens American national security. The United States today is the undisputed leader in space technology, but the gap between our capabilities and those of potential adversaries won't remain so wide forever. The time for
bold action is now. The military space age arguably began during the Second World War, when 1,400 German V-2 rockets rained down on England. The V-2s did not do an enormous amount of physical damage, but they did terrify the public
and highlight the revolutionary potential of space weapons. "The significance of this demonstration of German skill and ingenuity lies in the fact that it makes complete nonsense out of strategic frontiers, mountains, and river barriers," said CBS
newsman Edward R. Murrow from London. The Pentagon began to exploit the vast emptiness of space soon after. Military satellites have been in orbit for more than 40 years. In this sense, the militarization of space is old hat. Today, in fact, the
armed services rely on space so much that they simply couldn't function as they currently do without access to it. Satellites facilitate communications, monitor enemy activity, and detect missile launches. Their surveillance capabilities are
astounding: The KH-11 supposedly can spot objects six inches in size from hundreds of miles up. These functions were critical to the success of American campaigns against Iraq and Serbia in the 1990s, and they are essential to operations in
Afghanistan. Even seemingly mundane uses of space have military value. The Global Positioning System is well known to civilian navigators, but it was designed for military navigational purposes, such as helping cruise missiles locate their
targets and special-ops units find their rally points. On June 6, 1944, General Eisenhower surely would have appreciated a weather forecast of the type we now routinely get from satellites via local TV and radio broadcasts. On September 11,
2001, it was the space-enabled transmission of cell-phone signals and instant news that helped Todd Beamer and the other passengers of United Flight 93 prevent an already catastrophic day from turning even worse. These are all examples of
the United States

"force enhancement," to use Pentagon parlance. By generating and channeling information, space-based assets help earthbound soldiers, sailors, and pilots improve their performance. Yet
will also need tools of "force application" -- weapons that act against adversaries directly
in and from space, for both offensive and defensive purposes What our country requires . , in
is the weaponization of outer space.

short, This already would have occurred in at least limited form, but for the mulish opposition of arms-control liberals. Reagan's SDI
routinely struggled for funding in the 1980s and early 1990s, and then went on life support during the Clinton administration. The budget for ground-based ABMs was slashed by nearly 80 percent in Clinton's first year -- defense contractors even
had their system-development bids returned to them unopened. The Brilliant Pebbles program, an outgrowth of SDI that would have placed a swarm of maneuverable interceptors in orbit, was eliminated completely. "These actions effectively
destroyed the nation's space-based missile-defense options for the following decade," says Henry Cooper, who ran the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization at the Pentagon during the first Bush administration. The budgets of other
programs, such as the ASAT technology tested by Pearson in 1985, were essentially trimmed to death. In 1990, Democrats in Congress forbade ASAT laser testing (the Republican majority let the ban lapse in 1995). The Army worked on
ground-based ASAT missiles through the 1990s, and by 1997 its tests were starting to show real promise. The next year, however, Clinton had a test of his own to run -- the line-item veto, since ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court -- and
he used it against the Army program. "We could have had something online," says Steven Lambakis of the National Institute for Public Policy. "Now we'd be forced to cobble together an emergency response if we really needed to knock out a
satellite." The United States soon will have at least a residual ASAT capability -- any national missile-defense system that can shoot down ICBMs also can obliterate satellites. What we don't
have, however, is a growing architecture of space-based weapons along the lines of what Reagan began to describe in his visionary SDI speech in 1983. This May, Senate Democrats passed big cuts to ground-based missile defense, which is
humdrum compared with space-based lasers and the like -- and the White House has not yet beaten back even this challenge. The wrangling over weapons and budgets stems from a fundamental confusion over what space is and how we
should use it. From the standpoint of physics, space begins about 60 miles above sea level, which is roughly the minimum height a satellite must attain to achieve orbit. In this sense, space is just another medium, much like land, water, and air,
with its own special rules of operation. For military purposes, however, space is more: It's the ultimate high ground , a flank from above whose importance, for those able to gain
access to it, may represent the critical difference in future conflicts. For arms-control fanatics, however, space is a kind of sanctuary, and putting weapons in it poses an unconscionable threat. U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan has called for
ensuring "that outer space remains weapons-free." Theresa Hitchens of the Center for Defense Information warns of threats to "global stability" and "the potential for starting a damaging and destabilizing space race." With space, there's always
the sense that weapons violate some pristine nature. This is clearly one of the sentiments behind the Kucinich bill. Yet it is exactly wrong -- there should be weapons way up there because then there will be fewer of them right down here. Space
power is now in its infancy, just as air power was when the First World War erupted in 1914. Back then, military planes initially were used to observe enemy positions. There was an informal camaraderie among pilots; Germans and French would
even wave when they flew by each other. Yet it wasn't long before the reality of war took hold and they began shooting. The skies were not to be a safe haven. The lesson for space is that some country
inevitably will move to seize control of it, no matter how much money the United States sinks into feel-good projects like the International Space Station.
Americans have been caught napping before, as when the Soviet Union shocked the world with Sputnik in 1957. In truth, the United States could have beaten the Soviets to space but for a deliberate slow-down strategy that was meant to foster
sunny relations with the world's other superpower. The United States is the world's frontrunner in space, with about 110 military satellites in operation, compared with about 40 for Russia and 20 for the rest of the world. Yet a leadership role in
space is not the same as dominance, and the United States today lacks the ability to defend its assets against rudimentary ASAT technology or to deny other countries their own weapons in space. No country appears to be particularly close to
putting weapons in orbit, though the Chinese are expected to launch their first astronaut in the next year or two and they're working hard to upgrade their military space capabilities. "It would be a mistake to underestimate the rapidity with which
other states are beginning to use space-based systems to enhance their security," says the just-released annual report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. At a U.N. disarmament conference two years ago, Chinese officials
called for a treaty to keep weapons out of space -- a possible sign that what they really want is some time to play catch-up. The private sector also requires a secure space environment. When the Galaxy IV satellite failed in 1998, paging
services shut down, affecting an estimated 44 million customers. Banks and credit-card companies also were affected, along with a few television and radio stations. Saddam Hussein may lack the rocket power to lob a nuclear warhead halfway
around the world, but he could mount one on top of a Scud and fire it straight upward. A nuclear explosion in low orbit could disable scores of satellites and wreak havoc on modern economies everywhere -- an example of space-age terrorism.
Plenty of people inside the government already recognize how much the United States relies on space. There's a U.S. Space Command headquartered in Colorado Springs, and each branch of the military is to some extent involved in space
power. In 1999, secretary of defense William Cohen called space power "as important to the nation as land, sea, and air power." His successor, Donald Rumsfeld, chaired a commission on space and national security right before joining the
Bush administration. The panel's report, issued last year, warned of a "Space Pearl Harbor" if the country doesn't develop "new military capabilities." While Cohen's rhetoric was fine, his boss, Bill Clinton, didn't seem to agree with it. Rumsfeld is
friendly to the notion of space power, but President Bush so far hasn't talked much about it. When Bush gave his missile-defense speech at the National Defense University a year ago, he spoke of land-, sea-, and air-based defenses -- but made
no mention of space. "A lot of us noticed that," says one Air Force officer. The Rumsfeld commission also emphasized defense: how to protect American satellites from
foreign enemies . It had almost nothing to say about offense: how to use space for projecting American power around the globe. The commission was a creature of consensus, so this does not necessarily represent
litary satellites are tempting targets because they're so crucial to

Rumsfeld's own thinking. And defense certainly is important. Mi
the United States in so many ways. They are protected by their remoteness, but not much else. Their frail bodies and predictable flight paths are a skeet shoot compared with hitting
speedy ICBMs, an ability that the United States is just starting to master. They're also vulnerable to jamming and hacking. Hardening their exteriors, providing them with some maneuverability, and having launch-on-demand replacements
available are all key ingredients to national security. Yet defense doesn't win wars. In the future, the mere act of protecting these assets won't be enough to preserve American military superiority in space. In addition to an assortment of high-tech
hardware, the United States could use an Alfred Thayer Mahan for the 21st century. In 1890, Mahan was a captain in the Navy when the first edition of his book, The Influence of Sea Power on World History, was published. Today it ranks
among the classic texts of military theory. Mahan argued that nations achieve greatness only if they dominate the seas and their various geographic "pressure points," holding up the example of the British Royal Navy. One of Mahan's early
readers was a young man named Theodore Roosevelt, who began to apply these ideas while working in the Department of the Navy during the 1890s, and later as president. Mahanian principles shook the country loose from its traditional
strategy of coastal defense and underwrote a period of national dynamism, which included the annexation of Hawaii, victory in the Spanish-American War, and the construction of the Panama Canal. No writer has clearly become the Mahan of
space, though one candidate is Everett C. Dolman, a professor at the Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies, in Alabama. Dolman's new book Astropolitik offers a grand strategy that would have the United States "endeavor at once to
seize military control of low-Earth orbit" and impose "a police blockade of all current spaceports, monitoring and controlling all traffic both in and out." Dolman identifies low-Earth orbit as a chokepoint in the sense of Mahan -- anybody who wants
access to space must pass through it. "The United States should grab this vital territory now, when there's no real competition for it," Dolman tells me. "Once we're there, we can make sure the entry cost for anybody else wanting to achieve
space control is too high. Whoever takes space will dominate Earth." Dolman would benefit from a political benefactor. Mahan enjoyed the patronage of Roosevelt, who took a scholar's ideas and turned them into policies. Space has a number of
advocates within the military bureaucracy, mostly among its younger members. It does not have a political champion, with the possible exception of Sen. Bob Smith, a New Hampshire Republican who has made the subject a personal passion.
Smith calls space America's "next Manifest Destiny" and believes the Department of Defense should establish an independent Space Force to serve alongside the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Smith, however, may not stay in the Senate much
United States could achieve

longer, facing stiff political challenges at home. With the right mix of intellectual firepower and political muscle, the what Dolman calls
hegemonic control" of space goal would be to

" protect the . The make the heavens safe for capitalism and science while also ing
national security of the United States . "Only those spacecraft that provide advance notice of their mission and flight plan would be permitted in space," writes Dolman. Anything else
Imagine United States maintained

would be shot down. That may sound like 21st-century imperialism, which, in essence, it would be. But is that so bad? that the currently a
space-based lasers India and Pakistan could inch toward nuclear war over
battery of .
Kashmir, only to be told that any attempt by either side to launch a missile would
result in a boost-phase blast from outer space the United States would . Without taking sides,
immediately defuse a tense situation and keep the skies free of above Bombay and Karachi
mushroom clouds Israel would receive protection from Iran and Iraq, Taiwan
. Moreover,
from China, and Japan and South Korea from the mad dictator north of the DMZ .
The United States would be covered as well, able not merely to deter aggression,
but also to defend against it.
Impact---AI
AI Impact---1NC
Strong defense sector is key to winning the AI race
Gons et al 18 Eric Gons, 4-10-2018, "How AI and Robotics Will Disrupt the Defense
Industry," https://www.bcg, https://www.bcg.com/en-us/publications/2018/how-ai-
robotics-will-disrupt-defense-industry.aspx - BS
The technologies of the defense industry are in the early stages of a seismic shift:
artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are changing defense now and will enable
intelligent warfare in the decades to come. These technologies will have a
correspondingly tectonic effect on defense contractors. In the near term, incorporating AI into
the design of traditional battle networks will vastly improve performance of current
platforms and forces. Prime contractors will maintain an advantage during this phase. However, as
the capabilities of AI and robotics reach an inflection point, the US Department of Defense (DoD) will shift to smaller AI- and robotics-based
many established defense contractors
systems—and will rely on nontraditional players to provide them. Thus far,
have treated AI and robotics as ancillary markets. But they have underestimated the long-
term threat to their business. AI and robotics specialists are bringing step change
improvements to legacy systems and are building scale, know-how, and trust within the DoD. For now,
they are primarily working through traditional contractors. But as trust in independent autonomous systems
grows, the contractors that provide them will also gain trust—and share. Although the full impact of the AI- and robotics-driven revolution is
How should defense
a decade or more away, it is clear that these technologies will radically disrupt the defense industry.
contractors respond? We believe that they should take the lead in AI and robotics,
making the strategic changes and investments necessary to win in these emerging segments.
The US military has enjoyed superior conventional forces since the end of the Cold War,
but this lead has narrowed in recent years . For example, several countries have developed
“anti-access” technologies, such as long-range air defense systems and precision strike weapons that
deny US military forces the ability to operate in a contested area. And these same countries
are actively developing AI and robotics to further close the gap. To offset those countries’ recent
gains, the DoD has developed a multidecade strategy for applying a suite of advanced
technologies to nearly every facet of its operations. (See Exhibit 1.) In the first phase, the DoD will
create a more intelligent force, using AI to enhance platforms , munitions, and decision
processes . As these technologies mature, the DoD aims to create a more autonomous force, pairing AI-enabled
systems with human military personnel to accentuate the strengths of each, enabling
faster decisions and better combat outcomes . In the more distant future, “swarms” of advanced cognitive
robots may redefine combat operations in the battle space.1
A.I. dominance is critical to prevent war with Russia and China

Dale & Herbeck, 18 --- *space operations officer in the United States Air Force,
graduate of the Air Force Weapons School and has operational experience in
intercontinental ballistic missiles, space-based intelligence collection, and operational
level planning at the 609th Air and Space Operations Center, AND **space operations
officer in the United States Air Force, graduate of the Air Force Weapons School and
has operational experience in both ground-based and space-based missile warning, and
operational level planning (3/28/18, Aryan & Brendon, “21st Century Strategic
Deterrence: “Beyond Nuclear”” https://othjournal.com/2018/03/26/21st-century-strategic-
deterrence-beyond-nuclear/, accessed on 6/6/18, JMP)
Introduction
For half of the 20th Century, Warsaw Pact and NATO countries alike wrote the book for how deterrence theory
should be applied. In particular, nuclear deterrence played a significant role in the way the U.S.
built its national security strategy. Nuclear deterrence was so pervasive that the very word “deterrence” itself
became synonymous with nuclear deterrence. However, according to General John Hyten, Commander, U.S. Strategic
Strategic
Command, strategic deterrence in the 21st century does not equate to 20th century deterrence.
deterrence is a multi-polar, multi-domain problem and it is fundamentally different now
than it was in last century. The myopic focus on nuclear options in a national deterrence strategy
falls short of the critical thinking required to provide U.S. national leaders with the
options necessary for effective decision making. Today’s complex social-political environment requires
more than just a nuclear element for strategic deterrence to be effective against a diverse set of adversaries. Deterrence
today must leverage all six domains of warfare. So what is deterrence? According to DoD Joint Publication 1, deterrence
“influences potential adversaries not to take threatening actions” for fear of the overwhelming retaliation from U.S. military
might. More simply, deterrence could be any action that convinces an adversary to not act due to perceived unacceptable
costs or because “the probability of success [is assessed to be] extremely low.” For an adversary to believe costs will be
unacceptable or that there is a low probability of success, it must assess the U.S. threat as credible and capable,
Deterrence hinges on the adversary’s
regardless of whether it is nuclear or conventional.
assessment of credibility and capability. During the Cold War the Soviet Union believed that use of
nuclear weapons would lead to an overwhelming retaliation from the U.S.; and therefore, striking any NATO allies with
nuclear weapons was not worth the cost. Effects of a Multi-Polar Environment The end of the Cold War brought to a close
The multi-
50 years of a bi-polar world, and with it the simplicity of employing one strategy to deter a single adversary.
polar world of today brings adversaries who are motivated differently. Both rational and
irrational actors must be considered, which also causes national leaders to question the level of success
strategic deterrence has on an adversary. Generally, it is believed strategic deterrence is effective only against a rational
actor, and not an irrational actor. This is due to the perception that a rational actor will take into account some form of
cost-benefit analysis prior to acting versus the irrational actor who might act without any consideration of the losses.
Further complicating the world environment is that potential adversaries are watching and learning
from U.S actions . This is not a new concept as adversaries have been studying each other for thousands of years
to gain advantage. But General Hyten reminded us in a speech last fall that “in a multi-polar world, everybody watches
since the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has had
you [the U.S.] everywhere.” His point was to highlight that
a spotlight on it where adversaries
have been studying the asymmetric advantages of the U.S.
and creating specific capabilities and methods to counter those advantages. Thus, we must
now recognize that a deterrent method of the past may not be viable in the future . The U.S.
must seek out new deterrent strategies. Nuclear versus Strategic Deterrence Nuclear deterrence
remains the foundation of U.S. deterrence strategy. However, nuclear deterrence cannot be the sole pillar of strategic
deterrence since nuclear deterrence is not a one-size-fits-all solution. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS)
reflects this requirement to expand deterrence. As Brian Willis points out in the recent “Multi-domain ops at the Strategic
Level” article, the recent NSS and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) make strides to extend deterrence to the space and
cyberspace domains. Creating non-nuclear deterrence options for use against potential
adversaries is critical, especially against those actors who do not possess nuclear
weapons. Michael Gerson suggests the nuclear taboo reduces the credibility—and therefore the
utility—of nuclear weapons, especially against regimes not possessing nuclear weapons
or other w eapons of m ass d estruction. This thought process feeds back to the concept of credibility. The
adversary must know the capability exists and the U.S. is willing to use it. The U.S. must
consider a more balanced approach to deterrence as two of its near-peer adversaries
have done. China and Russia are starting to demonstrate new ideas and concepts about
strategic deterrence. This new “deterrence” does not solely focus on nuclear weapons or even the military
instrument of power. China defines this new way of thinking as “Integrated Strategic Deterrence” while the Russians have
called it “Cross-Domain Coercion.” People’s Republic of China Approach to Deterrence The PRC’s approach is not
focused on preventing actions in a given domain but about achieving certain political goals. Around 2001, PRC military
literature started discussing a concept known as “Integrated Strategic Deterrence” which focuses on nonmilitary aspects
of national power—diplomatic, economic, and scientific and technological strength—contributing to strategic deterrence
alongside space and cyber capabilities. These actions could include demonstrating new capabilities through tests and
exercises where international observers are watching, owning the majority of mineral mines that hold a certain type of
element, or working with partner countries to launch a new satellite that helps map future droughts and plots areas that
are farmable. In 2007, the PRC tested an antisatellite (ASAT) technology demonstrator against a non-operational weather
satellite. This test was publicized as a future scientific technology demonstration. This test demonstrated the PRC had a
capability to engage satellites in Low Earth Orbit, which has now been turned over to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
and is considered an operational military capability. It is also now a credible strategic deterrent in the space domain.
Another piece to the PRC’s deterrence is their dam building operations for water control and hydropower. According to
open sources, the PRC owns 45% of the world’s dams with its nearest competitors being the United States at 14% and
India at 9%. Dams have the potential to turn water into political weapons to be wielded in war, or instruments during
peace to influence actions or behaviors of a neighbor. India is currently concerned with a number of China dam projects
and their ability to reduce river flows into India. The PRC’s “Integrated Strategic Deterrence” does not come without
challenges. Unlike the U.S. who has the Department of Defense and Department of State coordinating different types of
deterrent actions, the absence of an entity in the PLA to integrate and coordinate the employment of these capabilities
makes it difficult to execute. However, it would come as no surprise to the casual observer to see the PLA start executing
military, space, and cyber coercive activities in national level exercises in order to move “Integrated Strategic Deterrence”
from theory and conjecture to fully operational in limited regional conflicts. Russia’s Approach to Deterrence The PRC is
not the only competitor thinking about strategic deterrence from a non-nuclear perspective. About 30 years ago, Soviet
literature introduced a concept we now know as Reflexive Control. This notion centers on the idea of driving your
opponent to make decisions that are advantageous to you. This is commonly achieved through misinformation, either via
“leaks” or providing a possible explanation to an unrelated event that causes your opponent to divert attention or respond.
That concept has now evolved into “Cross-Domain Coercion.” “Cross Domain Coercion” is Russia’s ability to orchestrate
non-nuclear and informational influence to coerce an adversary. It maintains opaqueness that clouds the nature of
aggression as well as the aggressor’s identity. This informational influence was apparent during both the United States
elections in 2016 and Catalonia’s bid for independence from Spain in 2017. Multiple United States intelligence agencies
have noted Russian misinformation on social media and mass media outlets. This campaign is a prime example of “Cross
Domain Coercion” and used a soft instrument of power, in this case information, as a form of deterrence on a global scale.
The purpose of this interference is still clouded but it must have satisfied Russian objectives if it was used in Catalonia
months after the United States election. Another form of this type of deterrence is Russia’s cyber-attacks in both Estonia
in 2007, and Georgia in 2008. In both cases, the attacks were not solely focused on military targets but against
government institutions, banks, ministries, newspapers, and broadcasters. These attacks were meant to confuse the
population and drive the government towards compliance with Russian demands. Whatever the objectives, Russia has
telegraphed that future attacks will fall under “Cross Domain Coercion”. The threats against financial and economic
institutions as well as those of energy sources will be activated in conjunction with the military component of coercion,
such as special operations forces and strategic strike systems in order to influence the target country. With both the PRC
and Russia, strategic deterrence is no longer monopolized by nuclear weapons. 21st century deterrence is dam building
that has regional implications on precious resources and misinformation campaigns such as Deepfakes where machine
learning systems can be trained to paste one person’s face onto another person’s body, complete with facial expressions,
and could change the outcome of democratic elections. U.S. Multi-Domain Strategic Deterrence Consideration of
Strategic deterrence “applies to cyber, it
deterrent effects other than kinetic weapons must be explored.
applies to missile defense, and it applies to electronic warfare. It applies to every mission
in U.S. Strategic Command.” Currently, an adversarial attack can come through any
domain, and that is why the U.S. must leverage the multiplicative advantages of all
domains. An adversary who is not deterred by a nuclear response may be deterred by fear of a cyber effect which
degrades or destroys a country’s economic stability. Or it could be negotiations in the human domain which threaten
sanctions against a country’s ability to trade. Maybe it is the threat of an information operations campaign with the goal of
removing a governmental regime from power and destabilizing a nation state. Regardless of deterrence method, the
adversary must perceive the U.S. as capable and willing to commit to the action for it to be an effective deterrent. The first
step for the U.S. is talking about capabilities more openly so adversaries know about our capabilities and the conditions
under which they would be employed. This does not mean we share the technical details of a capability, those should
remain secret, but a general understanding of the effect created by the capability must be understood. Adversaries are not
Technologies on the
deterred by a capability if they do not know it exists. Future Technologies and Deterrence
horizon have huge implications for the future of strategic deterrence. Hypersonic
weapons have the capability of delivering multiple payload types to worldwide targets while rendering missile warning
detection and missile defense programs obsolete. Quantum computing has the ability to make encryption unbreakable
unless you have quantum technology and increase transmission speeds to levels unheard of in today’s environment. This
could deter an adversary from ever trying to break your encryption unless they spend the money to harness quantum
computing. Finally, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and “combat cloud” services allow computers to
easily share information and make decisions involving civil and economic processes to
military tasks without ever needing human interaction. AI comes with colossal opportunities, but also
threats that are difficult to predict. According to Putin , whoever becomes the leader in AI will
become the ruler of the world . Leading the Target The one commonality in the previous paragraph is that
the U.S. is arguably not the leader in any of the technologies listed above. The question is why. The U.S. recognizes the
threat but does not seem to recognize deterrence in the same lenses as our adversaries. With all of the historic examples
above plus the developing technologies, our adversaries are coming up with new deterrence strategies that go beyond
If the U.S. wants credible 21st century strategic deterrence, we need to
nuclear weapons.
look no further than recent PRC and Russian actions. They have shown us that the
blueprint to strategic deterrence lies in economic expansion, information attacks, and
future technologies. The U.S. needs to start rewriting the textbooks on what strategic deterrence means
and start exploring new technologies such as Quantum Computing and AI and how
we can leverage them through all instruments of national power and all domains.
If the U.S. does not act soon, we could be deterred from intervening in future
conflicts that protects our vital interests or closest allies.
Both cause extinction

Steven Starr 17, Starr is the director of the University of Missouri's Clinical Laboratory
Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social
Responsibility, 1-9-2017, "Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders
Reject Nuclear Winter Studies," FAS, https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-
towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/
The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area of
three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the blast, fire, and radiation from a
war fought with 100 atomic bombs could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those
worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the
superpowers. However, the long-term environmental effects of the war could significantly
disrupt the global weather for at least a decade, which would likely result in a vast global
famine . The scientists predicted that nuclear firestorms in the burning cities would cause at least five
million tons of black carbon smoke to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be
rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would form a global stratospheric smoke
layer that would remain for more than a decade . The smoke would absorb warming sunlight , which
would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing ozone losses of 20 to 50
percent over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of
the mid-latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America
and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six
minutes for fair-skinned individuals. As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface, it
would produce the cold est average surface temperatures in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated
that global food production would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a five-year period
following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and
corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to two billion people
to perish from famine. The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly
more powerful modern thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England.
Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an
atomic bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased.
Yet today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to 80
times more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon
has an explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000
tons of TNT. Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a
standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square
miles. A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite
immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. The
scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot and smoke, which would
form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to 20 years, and it
would block as much as 70 percent of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from
the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full
moon at midnight. Under such conditions, it would only require
a matter of days or weeks for daily
minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the
Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two
years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the
Growing seasons
last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%.
would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would be too cold and dark to
grow food crops, which would doom the majority of the human population . NUCLEAR
WINTER IN BRIEF The profound cold and darkness following nuclear war became known as nuclear winter and was first predicted in 1983 by a group of NASA
scientists led by Carl Sagan. During the mid-1980s, a large body of research was done by such groups as the Scientific Committee on Problems of the
Environment (SCOPE), the World Meteorological Organization, and the U.S. National Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; their work
essentially supported the initial findings of the 1983 studies. The idea of nuclear winter, published and supported by prominent scientists, generated extensive
public alarm and put political pressure on the United States and Soviet Union to reverse a runaway nuclear arms race, which, by 1986, had created a global
nuclear arsenal of more than 65,000 nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this created a backlash among many powerful military and industrial interests, who
undertook an extensive media campaign to brand nuclear winter as “bad science” and the scientists who discovered it as “irresponsible.” Critics used various
uncertainties in the studies and the first climate models (which are primitive by today’s standards) as a basis to criticize and reject the concept of nuclear winter. In
1986, the Council on Foreign Relations published an article by scientists from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, who predicted drops in global cooling
about half as large as those first predicted by the 1983 studies and described this as a “nuclear autumn.” The nuclear autumn studies were later shown to be
deeply flawed, but the proof came too late to stop a massive smear campaign that effectively discredited the initial studies. Nuclear winter was subject to criticism
and damning articles in the Wall Street Journal and Time magazine. In 1987, the National Review called nuclear winter a “fraud.” In 2000, Discover Magazine
published an article that described nuclear winter as one of “The Twenty Greatest Scientific Blunders in History.” The endless smear campaign was successful; the
general public, and even most anti-nuclear activists, were left with the idea that nuclear winter had been scientifically disproved. REJECTION BY LEADERS Yet
the scientists did not give up. In 2006, they returned to their labs to perform the research I have previously described. Their new research not only upheld the
previous findings but also found that the earlier studies actually underestimated the environmental effects of nuclear war. Dr. Robock of Rutgers and Dr. Toon of
the University of Colorado have spent years attempting to bring official attention to their work and get follow-up research studies done by appropriate agencies in
the federal government. In a recent (2016) interview, Dr. Toon stated: The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, which should be investigating
this problem, have done absolutely nothing. They have not published a single paper, in the open literature, analyzing this problem … We have made a list of where
we think the important issues are, and we have gone to every [federal] agency we can think of with these lists, and said “Don’t you think someone should study
this?” Basically, everyone we have tried so far has said, “Well that’s not my job.” In the same interview, Dr. Robock also noted: The Department of Homeland
Security really should fund this. They will fund you to study one terrorist bomb in New York City. When you explain to them that a war between India and Pakistan
is a much greater threat to the U.S. homeland than one terrorist bomb, as horrible as that is, they respond with “Oh, well that’s not my job, go talk to some other
program manager” — who, of course, doesn’t exist. After the more recent series of studies were published in 2007 and 2008, Drs. Robock and Toon also made a
number of requests to meet with members of the Obama administration. The scientists offered to brief Cabinet members and the White House staff about their
findings, which they assumed would have a great impact upon nuclear weapons policy. Their offers were met with indifference. Finally, after several years of trying,
Drs. Robock and Toon were allowed an audience with John Holdren, Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama on Science and Technology. Dr. Robock also
eventually met with Rose Gottemoeller, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Dr. Robock has written to me that, after these
meetings, he and Dr. Toon were left with the impression that neither Holdren nor Gottemoeller think the nuclear winter research “is correct.” But it is not only
Holdren and Gottemoeller who reject the nuclear winter research. Greg Mello, of the Los Alamos Study Group, cites a source who confirms that the group that
determines the “full range of activities related to the development, production, maintenance (upkeep) and elimination (retirement, disassembly and disposal) of all
United States nuclear weapons — the members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council — have stated that “the predictions of nuclear winter were disproved years
ago.” The members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council include: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Commander of the United States
Strategic Command It is important to understand that some members of this group — especially the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
— also develop the policies that guide the use of nuclear weapons. Perhaps General John Hyten, Head of USSTRATCOM, who is in charge of the U.S. nuclear
triad, and General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the second highest ranking officer in the United States, have never seen or heard of the
21st century nuclear winter studies. Perhaps when they hear a question about “nuclear winter,” they only remember the smear campaigns done against the early
studies. Or, maybe, they just choose not to accept the new scientific research on nuclear winter, despite the fact that it has withstood the criticism of the global
scientific community. Regardless, the rejection of nuclear winter research by the top leaders of the United States raises some profoundly important questions: Do
U.S. military and political leaders fully understand the consequences of nuclear war? Do they realize that even a “successful” nuclear first-strike against Russia
could cause most Americans to die from nuclear famine? In 2010, Drs. Toon and Robock wrote in Physics Today: We estimate that the direct effects of using the
2012 arsenals would lead to hundreds of millions of fatalities. The indirect effects would likely eliminate the majority of the human population. In 2013, Drs. Toon
and Robock wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that: A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under
New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in Self-Assured Destruction. RENEWED COLD WAR
Although president-elect Trump appears to favor a return to the policy of détente with Russia, many if not most U.S. political leaders appear to support the Obama
direct confrontation with Putin’s Russia. Mainstream corporate media, including the
administration’s policies of
editorial boards of The New York Times and The Washington Post, routinely engage in anti-Russian and anti-Putin
renewed
rhetoric that surpasses the hate speech of the McCarthy era. Under President Obama, the United States has
the Cold War with Russia, with little or no debate or protest, and has subsequently engaged in proxy
wars with Russia in Ukraine and Syria, as well as threatening military action against
China in the South China Sea . In response to what NATO leaders describe as Russia’s “dangerous and
aggressive actions,” NATO has built up a “rapid-response force” of 40,000 troops on the
Russian border in the Baltic States and Poland. This force includes hundreds of tanks, armored
vehicles, and heavy artillery. NATO troops stationed in Estonia are within artillery range of St.
Petersburg , the second largest city of Russia. The United States has deployed its Aegis Ashore Ballistic
Missile Defense ( BMD ) system in Romania and is constructing another such BMD system in
Poland . The Mark 41 launch system used in the Aegis Ashore systems can be used to
launch a variety of missiles, including long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles . In other
words, the United States has built and is building launch sites for nuclear missiles on
the Russian border . This fact has been widely reported on Russian TV and has infuriated the Russian public. In
June, Russian President Putin specifically warned that Russia would be forced to retaliate against this
threat. While Russian officials maintain that its actions are normal and routine, Russia now appears to be
preparing for war . On October 5, 2016, Russia conducted a nation-wide civil defense drill that
included 40 million of its people being directed to fallout shelters. Reuters reported two days later that
Russia had moved its Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad , which borders Poland. While
the United States ignores the danger of nuclear war, Russian scholar Stephen Cohen reports that the danger of war with
the United States is the leading news story in Russia. Cohen states: Just as there is no discussion of the most existential
question of our time, in the American political class — the possibility of war with Russia — it is the only thing being
discussed in the Russian political class . . . These are two different political universes. In Russia, all the discussion in the
newspapers, and there is plenty of free discussion on talk show TV, which echoes what the Kremlin is thinking, online, in
the elite newspapers, and in the popular broadcasts, the number 1, 2, 3, and 4 topics of the day are the possibility of war
with the United States. Cohen goes on to say: I conclude from this that the leadership of Russia actually
believes now, in reaction to what the United States and NATO have said and done over
the last two years, and particularly in reaction to the breakdown of the proposed
cooperation in Syria, and the rhetoric coming out of Washington, that war is a real
possibility . I can’t remember when, since the Cuban Missile Crisis, that the Moscow leadership came to this
conclusion in its collective head. Perhaps this narrative will change under president-elect Trump. However, he is
inheriting a situation fraught with danger , which retains the possibility of direct
military conflict with Russia in Ukraine and Syria , as well as increasingly militarized
confrontation with China in the South China Sea .
AI Impact---DIB Key---2NC
DIB is key
Husain and Cole 6/6 Amir Husain, August Cole, 6-6-2019, "A New Industrial Base Is
Taking Shape. Call It the Military-AI Complex.," Defense One,
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/06/new-industrial-base-taking-shape-call-it-
military-ai-complex/157503/ - BS
The most essential Pentagon suppliers will be the ones that master robotics and
artificial intelligence . Look across the Potomac River toward Rosslyn, where the corporate logos of
government contractors crown a parade of office towers that follows the river past the
Pentagon. The skyline, like America’s defense industrial landscape, is changing . Soon, 25,000
Amazon employees will be climbing the Metro escalators to work in Crystal City each morning along with the tens of thousands of workers
from military, intelligence, and the defense industry organizations. The arrival of Amazon’s HQ2 in the cradle of U.S. government
Technology is altering what makes us
contracting comes at a portentous time for the Defense Department.
strong, prosperous, and secure. The defense industrial base is becoming the strategic
innovation base . Today’s leading digital companies have disrupted every industry they have touched, from publishing to
automotive. Could Amazon and the rest of the “FAANG companies”—Facebook, Apple, Netflix, and Google—or one of a handful of pure-
play artificial-intelligence companies, such as the authors’ SparkCognition, become fixtures of this new industrial base? While that remains
to be seen, the Pentagon supplier that can master robotics and AI will become the most essential of the firms that build America’s arsenal.
Moreover, the Defense Department’s practices will increasingly resemble those of this new wave of strategically important companies
because that is what the current revolution in warfare requires .
The world is on the doorstep of an artificial
intelligence - and robotics-driven revolution in conflict that , after decades of looming just over the
horizon, now is a near-term certainty . Just as industrial-age tanks and machine guns
devastated World War I battlefields and the U.S. Air Force’s GPS-guided weapons headlined the
1991 Gulf War, social media algorithms and AI-equipped robotic swarms will decide
conflicts . Data is not just the new oil, as the saying goes. Data is also the new ammunition. The
Pentagon is preparing accordingly, doing everything from standing up an Army Futures
Command to engaging technology luminaries with the Defense Innovation Board to establishing a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to
if the U.S. military is to prevail in
reforming mid-tier acquisitions policy. But it needs to do more — and do it faster —
future machine-speed conflicts. Fortunately, the Pentagon and its suppliers can learn
from the digital disruptors in areas such as robotics , acquiring groundbreaking capabilities,
software ecosystems , data management, and symbiotic innovation strategies .
AI Impact---Tech---AI Key---2NC
Specifically, China will weaponize AI to expedite military
modernization.
Kania ’17 (Elsa B; Adjunct Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New
American Security, 2018 Fulbright Specialist, Non-Resident Fellow with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s
International Cyber Policy Centre, PhD student in Harvard University's Department of Government, B.A. in Political
Science from Harvard College, co-founder of the China Cyber and Intelligence Studies Institute; 12/5/17; “Artificial
Intelligence and Chinese Power”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-12-05/artificial-intelligence-and-
chinese-power; Foreign Affairs; accessed 11/24/18; TV)
The United States’ technological sophistication has long supported its military
predominance . In the 1990s, the U.S. military started to hold an uncontested
advantage over its adversaries in the technologies of information-age warfare—from stealth
and precision weapons to high-tech sensors and command-and-control systems. Those
technologies remain critical to its forces today. For years, China has closely watched the United
States’ progress, developing asymmetric tools —including space, cyber, and electronic
capabilities—that exploit the U.S. military’s vulnerabilities . Today, however, the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing innovations in many of the same emerging technologies that
the U.S. military has itself prioritized. Artificial intelligence is chief among these. In the
decades ahead, AI could transform warfare , creating disruptive new capabilities and
changing the ways that militaries command, train, and deploy their forces. Those changes will
shape the military balance among the world’s great powers. For now, the United States
remains the world’s leader in AI, thanks mostly to the dynamism of its private sector. But China seeks
to surpass the United States, and it may be close to doing so. The Chinese leadership has
started to prioritize AI at the highest levels . In July, Beijing released the New Generation Artificial
Intelligence Development Plan, articulating an ambitious agenda to “ lead the world ” in artificial
intelligence by 2030. It is backing up that commitment with deep funding for cutting-edge AI
research . As China advances in the field, the United States will face the challenge of a new kind of
peer competitor. BRAIN GAMES By most measures, China is already an AI powerhouse . China
produces more AI-related patent applications than any other country except for the United States, and Chinese scholars
have already published more papers on AI than their American peers. But the country’s ascendance in AI is not a matter
of quantity alone. In 2017, the annual conference of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence accepted
as many papers from Chinese as from American researchers for the first time—a sign of the increasing sophistication of
AI research under way in China. And in November, a Chinese facial recognition start-up took first place in a contest
Thanks to
hosted by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, a U.S. government organization.
China’s billions of dollars in private and government investment, its access to huge amounts of
data, and its efforts to attract and educate top talent , the country is on track to overtake
the United States. So far, China’s big technology firms—notably Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent—
have tended to lead the charge in AI. That could have important implications for the PLA,
which could use the private sector’s progress for military purposes . For example, the technologies
behind self-driving cars could be used for intelligent unmanned military systems , and
advances in computer vision and machine learning could improve weapons systems’
abilities to recognize targets. Chinese military leaders have good reason to draw on the private
sector’s advances, since they believe that AI could transform the nature of war. In the PLA’s
jargon, AI will set off a shift from “ informatized ” to “ intelligentized ” warfare, becoming
as central to future conflicts as more rudimentary forms of information technology are to warfare today. Liu
Guozhi, a lieutenant general in the PLA and the director of its Science and Technology Commission, has
suggested that artificial intelligence will transform militaries’ operational styles, equipment
systems, and more. AI could eventually support autonomous robots , including swarms of drones. It
could improve war-gaming and simulated training exercises by creating clever artificial
adversaries —a major benefit for China’s forces, which largely lack combat experience. And it could
elevate commanders’ abilities to make quick decisions on the battlefield. Indeed, the Central
Military Commission Joint Staff Department, the PLA’s top command organ, has called on the military
to use AI to help commanders do just that. China’s recent advances in swarm intelligence —
which involves autonomous cooperative behavior among masses of distributed robots—have
been on prominent display in official media. In June 2017, China Electronics Technology Group
Corporation, a state-owned defense conglomerate, successfully flight-tested a swarm of 119 drones—a new record. In a
conflict,the PLA could use swarms to cheaply target high-value U.S. weapons platforms, such as
aircraft carriers. As AI and robotics become pervasive in warfare, some PLA thinkers even
anticipate the arrival of a so-called singularity on the battlefield. At that point, human minds might
not be able to keep up with the speed of the decision-making demanded by AI-enabled
combat —and so militaries could start to remove people from the battlefield, place them into
supervisory roles, and let unmanned systems do most of the fighting. Such an inflection point may seem
distant, but militaries are already trending toward more automation . For instance, many air and
missile defense platforms, such as the U.S. military’s Patriot system, can automatically track and
select their targets. Even now, a number of militaries, including the United States’ and China’s, are starting to use AI
to anticipate failures in critical equipment and to analyze intelligence more efficiently. In the foreseeable future, AI will
also have applications in cyber-operations , helping militaries discover and then patch or exploit
vulnerabilities far faster than a human cyberwarrior could. Some observers have suggested that authoritarian
regimes such as China’s could eventually opt for fully automated approaches to war. That could
raise a number of ethical and operational risks: an automated system could, for example, fail to differentiate legitimate
military targets from civilian ones. In fact, Chinese military thinkers seem to value the role that humans will play in the
machine age. Liu, for instance, has suggested that human minds augmented with artificial intelligence will eventually be
more powerful than AI programs on their own. And some aspects of the PLA’s culture—especially its commanders’
interest in preserving centralized control—could encourage officers to keep humans in the loop on important decisions.
ALL TOO HUMAN Despite its advances in military hardware,the PLA has struggled to recruit and retain
highly educated, technologically proficient personnel. PLA officials might see AI as a solution. AI
could help to automate some military specialties and functions, replacing or compensating for missing
human talent. Along with virtual and augmented reality, AI could improve the realism and
sophistication of the PLA’s training programs. But there’s a catch: even as AI mitigates some of the PLA’s
systemic problems, it could exacerbate others. Complex AI systems, for instance, can require highly trained personnel,
and it could be difficult for the PLA to assemble such talent. The introduction of AI to support commanders could also
create new issues of so-called automation bias, encouraging officers to rely on programs that are prone to error. The
trajectory of China’s advances in AI remains to be seen. But in light of the progress that the PLA has already achieved,
the U.S. military should recognize that China is quickly becoming a peer competitor in
AI—and adjust its own plans accordingly.
Only tech dominance defuses competition and mitigates the rivalry.

Heath & Thompson ’18 (Timothy R. & William R; senior international defense researcher at the RAND
Corporation, former senior analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group, Ph.D. in Political Science from
George Mason University, M.A. in Asian studies from George Washington University; Donald A. Rogers Professor of
Political Science at Indiana University, past president of the International Studies Association; April 2018; “Avoiding U.S.-
China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”; https://muse.jhu.edu/article/693206;
National Bureau of Asian Research, Vol. 13, No. 2; accessed 11/24/18; TV)
In the competition for leadership at the global level , the critical contest does not concern which
country possesses the largest economy, the most powerful military, or even the most "soft power," although all of these
competitions are important. Between the two large and powerful countries, the decisive issue is which
country controls the most technologically proficient economy. The Importance of
Technological Leadership A half century of social science on precedents in which rising powers competed
with system leaders underscores the importance of the quality of economic leadership—evaluated primarily in
terms of dominance in technology and energy—over quantity of economic output or other
variables.43 Why is technological predominance so important? The first, most fundamental
reason is that long-term economic growth is predicated on generating radical new
technologies (new products, methods of production, markets, trade routes, fuel sources, and commercial
organizations à la Joseph Schumpeter's intermittent bouts of creative destruction). Whichever economy
masters these new technologies first profits most from its pioneering innovations . In due time, the
world economy's leading innovator is likely to extend its lead to commercial, financial, and military
areas as well. [End Page 105] Ultimately the leading economy can shape the global economy according to its own
preferences and advantage. Second, mastering surges in new technologies thus means that the
leading economy—i.e., the country with the most technologically innovative economy—maintains the most
competitive and lucrative position in the global economy. But it also means that technological
superiority is transferred between the military and civilian economies. Gains made in
military technology can be transferred to the civilian economy, and gains made in the
civilian economy can be transferred to military technology . Examples of the former may
be seen in the transfer of radar technology from the military to the civilian sector, while an example
of the latter can be seen in the way basic research at universities has traditionally fueled advances in
weapons technologies. The country with the leading economy thus is well positioned to also field the most
technologically advanced military. As a consequence, it is likely to develop a command of the global
commons and, for a period of time, unrivaled global reach . Third, technological predominance
generates huge economic gains because corporations in the leading economy are set up to
dominate new markets in the new industries. The expansion of commercial activity abroad to exploit new
markets means that technological leaders profit enormously from a functioning and stable world
economy, and are thus well positioned to provide global military and political leadership. A vivid
example of this may be seen in the expansion of U.S. multinational corporations in the twentieth century, which fueled the
need for a large military force that could police trade routes and the global commons to keep the world economy operating
The global presence of U.S. companies and military forces provided
as smoothly as possible.
a strong incentive for U.S. leaders to focus on solving global issues . It also encouraged
countries around the world to look to the United States as a leader , since it alone had the
resources and reach to address global problems. Finally, a fourth reason technological
predominance matters is that it fuels the soft power that makes the leading economy
attractive. People around the world tend to admire and emulate the wonders of new technology as
manifested in a vibrant and sophisticated economy. The media reinforces the appeal of the leading economy
by delivering messages about how citizens in that country employ new technologies to enhance their quality of life. The
technological superiority of the leading economy also yields soft power because the country's political and military
advantages allow it to exercise influence at levels unattainable by other countries.
Technological predominance cannot [End Page 106] deliver legitimacy, however, and thus a country with attractive
political and cultural values and ideals will be better positioned to maintain its influence than one that relies heavily on
coercion, such as today's authoritarian China. But the main point remains: technological predominance opens
opportunities for a country to increase its soft power. The importance of technological leadership means that the popular
focus on the quantity of China's economic output as the key index of national power is in many ways insufficient. China,
after all, hadthe world's largest economy in the 1700s and 1800s, but its relatively low level of
technology and energy consumption left it at the mercy of much smaller Western countries that
possessed more dynamic economies, fossil fuel-driven energy, and powerful militaries. The United States, by contrast,
built its post–World War II global primacy on the foundation of an impressive
technological-energy prowess . The accelerated rate of technology transfer and energy
consumption in the 21st century, however, has considerably weakened this lead.44 Asia, in particular, has
made rapid gains that pose a challenge to U.S. technological leadership.45 For now,
despite impressive economic and technological gains, China continues to lag behind the United States.
Per capita GDP is regarded as an indicator of the level of technological achievement (albeit an imperfect one), and as of
2014 the United States' per capita GDP was more than eight times that of China.46 But Chinese
officials have made technological leadership a key policy priority and are investing
enormous sums of time and money accordingly. The result is that analysts now debate whether China
could at some point surpass the U nited S tates to become the world leader in technological
innovation.47 [End Page 107] Competition in Other Domains Although competition for technological leadership may
be decisive, the United States and China have also intensified competition across the economic and security domains.
China poses a lesser challenge at the global level in these domains, but the situation could change if China wins the
competition at the regional level and secures the lead position in technology. Economically, China is eager to
upgrade its industrial base and has begun to pursue more technologically advanced manufacturing capabilities
similar to those of the United States. The economic relationship is thus becoming less complementary and
more competitive.48 Chinese leaders recognize that for the economy to grow at a sustainable rate,
China must move beyond old industries and instead establish innovative industries in more
technologically advanced sectors. Reflecting the increasing convergence between the U.S. and Chinese
economies, recrimination over policies in both countries designed to block access to technologies and
markets for security reasons has added another source of tension .49 The persistent Chinese theft of
U.S. intellectual property has further strained relations.50 Other ongoing disputes between the two
countries concern China's status as a market economy and technology standards for trade.51 These disputes fuel China's
efforts to challenge U.S. dominance of global trade rules. In December 2014, Xi directed officials to "have more Chinese
voices in the formulation of international rules" and "inject more Chinese elements" in order to "maintain and expand our
country's developmental interests."52 U.S. officials have responded by demanding that China "follow the rules of the road"
concerning trade and other issues.53 Militarily,
the United States retains superiority at the global
level, but its advantage in a potential conventional conflict in the Indo-Pacific [End Page 108] has
eroded . Thanks in part to its network of alliances , the United States retains an unmatched
ability to project combat power globally and has an extensive military presence abroad. By
contrast, China's ability to project power remains weak. It has no formal allies and only recently has
begun to field small numbers of forces abroad. For example, China carried out its first noncombatant evacuation operation
The U.S. military also retains
using military aircraft in 2011—one of the PLA Air Force's few overseas missions.54
a formidable advantage in overall capabilities across virtually every domain , although the
PLA's rapid modernization is narrowing the gap.55 In the Indo-Pacific, however, China has
developed an impressive counter-intervention capability that has increased the cost and risk to
forward-deployed U.S. forces that might engage in a conventional conflict in the region. Moreover, China's
expanding inventory of weapons across all domains increases the likelihood that any
conventional conflict that begins in Asia might expand worldwide . Already, Chinese military
writers have outlined a doctrine of " integrated deterrence " that recommends the use of space ,
cyber , and nuclear weapons to deter and manage conflict.56
AI Impact---Tech---AT: Russia D---2NC
Once a minor conflict starts, it escalates---neither side has de-
escalation measures in place, and both leaders are conflict-prone
Wood 17 - senior military correspondent for The Huffington Post. His second book,
What Have We Done: the Moral Injury of Our Longest Wars, based on his Pulitzer Prize-
winning reporting on veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, was published by Little, Brown in
November 2016. (David, “THIS IS HOW THE NEXT WORLD WAR STARTS,”
https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/trump-russia-putin-military-crisis/)//BB
Putin’s favored tactic, intelligence officials say, is known as “escalation dominance.” The idea is to
push the other side until you win, a senior officer based in Europe explained—to “escalate to the point where
the adversary stops, won’t go farther. It’s a very destabilizing strategy.” Stavridis cast it in the terms of
an old Russian proverb: “Probe with a bayonet; when you hit steel withdraw, when you hit mush, proceed.” Right now, he
added, “the Russians keep pushing out and hitting mush.” This mindset is basically the opposite of how both American
and Soviet leaders approached each other during the Cold War, even during periods of exceptional stress such as the
1962 Cuban missile crisis. Having endured the devastation of World War II, they understood the horror that lurked on the
far side of a crisis. “When things started to get too close, they would back off,” said Miller, the retired Pentagon official.
The term of art for this constant recalibration of risk is “crisis management”—the “most demanding form of diplomacy,”
writes Sir Lawrence Freedman, an emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London. Leaders had to make
delicate judgments about when to push their opponent and when to create face-saving off-ramps. Perhaps most critically,
they had to possess the confidence to de-escalate when necessary. Skilled crisis management, Freedman writes,
requires “an ability to match deeds with words, to convey threats without appearing reckless, and to offer concessions
without appearing soft, often while under intense media scrutiny and facing severe time pressures.” A recent textbook
example came in January 2016, when Iran seized those 10 U.S. Navy sailors, claiming that they had been spying in
Iranian waters in the eastern Persian Gulf. President Barack Obama’s secretary of state, John Kerry, immediately opened
communications with his counterpart in Tehran, using channels established for negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran. By
the next morning, the sailors had been released. The U.S. acknowledged the sailors had strayed into Iranian waters but
did not apologize, asserting that the transgression had been an innocent error. Iran, meanwhile, acknowledged that the
sailors had not been spying. (The peaceful resolution was not applauded by Breitbart News, headed at the time by
Stephen Bannon, who is now Trump’s chief White House strategist. Obama, a Breitbart writer sneered, has been
Neither Putin nor Trump, it’s safe to say, are crisis
“castrated on the world stage by Iran.”)
managers by nature. Both are notoriously thin-skinned, operate on instinct, and have a
tendency to shun expert advice. (These days, Putin is said to surround himself not with
seasoned diplomats but cronies from his old spy days.) Both are unafraid of brazenly
lying, fueling an atmosphere of extreme distrust on both sides. Stavridis, who has studied
both Putin and Trump and who met with Trump in December, concluded that the two leaders “are
not risk-averse. They are risk-affectionate.” Aron, the Russia expert, said, “I think there is a much more
cavalier attitude by Putin toward war in general and the threat of nuclear weapons. He
continued, “He is not a madman, but he is much more inclined to use the threat of nuclear
weapons in conventional [military] and political confrontation with the West.” Perhaps the most
significant difference between the two is that Putin is far more calculating than Trump. In direct negotiations, he is said to
rely on videotaped analysis of the facial expressions of foreign leaders that signal when the person is bluffing, confused or
lying. At times, Trump has been surprisingly quick to lash out at a perceived slight from
Putin, although these moments have been overshadowed by his effusive praise for the Russian leader. On December
22, Putin promised to strengthen Russia’s strategic nuclear forces in his traditional year-end speech to his officer corps.
Hours later, Trump vowed, via Twitter, to “greatly strengthen and expand” the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. On Morning
Joe the following day, host Mika Brzezinski said that Trump had told her on a phone call, “Let it be an arms race. We will
outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all.” And in late March, the Wall Street Journal reported that Trump was
becoming increasingly frustrated with Russia, throwing up his hands in exasperation when informed that Russia may have
violated an arms treaty. Some in national security circles see Trump’s impulsiveness as a cause for concern but not for
panic. “He can always overreact,” said Anthony Cordesman, senior strategic analyst at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and a veteran of many national security posts throughout the U.S. government. “[But] there are a
lot of people [around the president] to prevent an overreaction with serious consequences.” Let’s
say that Trump acted upon his impulse to tell a fighter pilot to shoot a jet that barrel-rolled an American plane. Such a
response would still have to be carried out by the Pentagon, Cordesman said—a process with lots of room for senior
yet that process
officers to say, “Look, boss, this is a great idea but can we talk about the repercussions?” And
is no longer as robust as it once was . Many senior policymaking positions at the
Pentagon and State Department remain unfilled. A small cabal in the White House, including Bannon,
Jared Kushner and a few others, has asserted a role in foreign policy decisions outside the normal NSC process. It’s not
yet clear how much influence is wielded by Trump’s widely respected national security adviser, Lieutenant General H.R.
McMaster. When lines of authority and influence are so murky, it increases the risk that a
minor incident could boil up into an unintended clash, said retired Marine Corps General John Allen,
who has served in senior military and diplomatic posts. To complicate matters further, the relentless
pace of information in the social media age has destroyed the one precious factor that
helped former leaders safely navigate perilous situations: time. It’s hard to believe now, but during
the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for instance, President Kennedy and his advisers deliberated for a full 10 weeks before
announcing a naval quarantine of the island. In 1969, a U.S. spy plane was shot down by North Korean jets over the Sea
of Japan, killing all 31 Americans on board. It took 26 hours for the Pentagon and State Department to recommend
courses of action to President Richard Nixon, according to a declassified secret assessment. (Nixon eventually decided
not to respond.) Today, thanks to real-time video and data streaming, the men in the Kremlin and White House can know
—or think they know—as much as the guy in the cockpit of a plane or on the bridge of a warship. The president no longer
needs to rely on reports from military leaders that have been filtered through their expertise and deeper knowledge of the
Once news of an
situation on the ground. Instead, he can watch a crisis unfold on a screen and react in real time.
incident hits the internet, the pressure to respond becomes even harder to withstand.
“The ability to recover from early missteps is greatly reduced,” Marine Corps General Joseph
Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has written. “The speed of war has changed, and the
nature of these changes makes the global security environment even more
unpredictable, dangerous, and unforgiving.” And so in the end, no matter how cool and
unflappable the instincts of military men and women like Kevin Webster, what will smother the
inevitable spark is steady, thoughtful leadership from within the White House and the
Kremlin. A recognition that first reports may be wrong; a willingness to absorb new and
perhaps unwelcome information; a thick skin to ward off insults and accusations; an
acknowledgment of the limited value of threats and bluffs; and a willingness to recognize the core
interests of the other side and a willingness to accept a face-saving solution. These qualities are not
notably on display in either capital .
No checks on conflict escalation, and Trump is prone to overreact

Wood 17 - senior military correspondent for The Huffington Post. His second book,
What Have We Done: the Moral Injury of Our Longest Wars, based on his Pulitzer Prize-
winning reporting on veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, was published by Little, Brown in
November 2016. (David, “THIS IS HOW THE NEXT WORLD WAR STARTS,”
https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/trump-russia-putin-military-crisis/)//BB
With these issues in mind, I traveled to Germany this winter to talk with U.S. Air Force General Tod D. Wolters, who
commands American and NATO air operations. We sat in his headquarters at Ramstein Air Base, a gleaming, modern
complex where officers in the uniforms of various NATO nations bustle efficiently through polished corridors. “ The
degree of hair-triggeredness is a concern,” said Wolters, a former fighter pilot who encountered Soviet
bloc pilots during the Cold War. “The possibility of an intercept gone wrong,” he added, is “on my mind 24/7/365.” Admiral
James G. Stavridis, the commander of NATO from 2009 to 2013 and now Dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts University,
The potential for miscalculation “is probably higher than at any other point since
is more blunt.
the end of the Cold War,” he told me. “ We are now at maximum danger .” This may sound
counter-intuitive, given President Donald Trump’s extravagant professions of admiration for
Putin. But the strong consensus inside the U.S. military establishment is that the pattern of Russian
provocation will continue—and not just because the various investigations into the Trump campaign’s links with
Russia make détente politically unlikely. Antagonizing the West is central to one of Putin’s most
cherished ambitions: undermining NATO. By constantly pushing the limits with risky intercepts and other tactics,
Putin forces NATO to make difficult choices about when and how to respond that can sow dissension among its members.
In addition, a certain belligerence towards the U.S. is practically a political necessity for Putin. The Russian leader owes
his popularity to “the tiger of patriotic mobilization,” said Leon Aron, the director of Russian studies at the American
Enterprise Institute. Given the country’s diminished status in the world and its stalled economy, he added, militarized
fervor for the motherland “is the only thing going for his regime.” Meanwhile,[2] 2. According to an analysis by the U.S.
Army War College, “the top leadership is moving the country onto a war footing” in response to what
it sees as “an arc of crisis around Russia and a period of great turbulence in international affairs.” since the departure of
Trump’s first national security adviser, Michael Flynn, his foreign policy team is now dominated by officials who advocate
a hard line on Russia.[3] 3. These include ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, national security adviser H.R.
McMaster, and senior National Security Council Russia adviser Fiona Hill. Secretary of Defense James Mattis predicted at
his confirmation hearing that “there are an increasing number of areas where we are going to have to confront Russia.”
For all these reasons, Philip Breedlove, who retired last summer after three years as supreme
allied commander of NATO, isn’t optimistic that Russia will back off anytime soon. “We’re in a
bad place and it’s getting worse rather than better,” he told me. “The probability of coming up against that
unintended but strategic mess-up is, I think, rising rather than becoming less likely.” When
Breedlove’s successor, General Curtis Scaparrotti, took command in May 2016, he grimly warned a gathering of
diplomats and officers of a “resurgent Russia” and cautioned that NATO must be ready “to fight tonight if deterrence fails.”
All of this is happening at a time when most of the old Cold War safeguards for resolving
tensions with Russia—treaties, gentlemen’s understandings, unofficial back channels—
have fallen away. When a Russian jet barrel-rolls a U.S. aircraft, a senior U.S. official hops in a car and is driven to
the white marble monolith on Wisconsin Avenue that houses the Russian embassy. There, he sits down with Sergey
Kislyak, the ambassador who has recently attained minor fame for his surreptitious meetings with various Trump
associates. A typical conversation, the U.S. official told me, goes something like this: “I say, ‘Look here, Sergey, we had
this incident on April 11, this is getting out of hand, this is dangerous.’” Kislyak, the official said, benignly denies that any
misbehavior has occurred. (When I made my own trip to the embassy late last year, a senior official assured me with a
polite smile that Russian pilots do nothing dangerous—and certainly not barrel-rolls.)Among the many senior
officers I spoke to in Washington and Europe who are worried about Russia, there was
one more factor fueling their anxiety: their new commander-in-chief, and how he might
react in a crisis. After a Russian fighter barrel-rolled an RC-135 over the Baltic Sea last
April, Trump fumed that the Obama administration had only lodged a diplomatic protest.
He considered this to be a weak response. “It just shows how low we’ve gone, where they can toy with us
like that,” he complained on a radio talk show. “It shows a lack of respect.” If he were president, Trump went
on, he would do things differently. “You wanna at least make a phone call or two,” he conceded. “[But] at a
certain point, when that sucker comes by you, you gotta shoot. You gotta shoot. I mean, you gotta shoot.”
AI Impact---Tech---AT: China D---2NC
Absent checks, flashpoints will go nuclear.
Talmadge ’18 (Catilin; Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
at Georgetown University, PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, A.B. in Government
from Harvard College; Nov/Dec 2018; “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control”;
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option; Foreign Affairs; accessed 11/24/18; TV)
As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States.
Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on
Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea , fueling
Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the
region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American
policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese
fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S.
President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war
between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation —resulting,
for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan— no longer seems as implausible as it
once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most
policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns.
Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating
them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former
commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere
If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred
between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided.
style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation . Since the end
of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into
enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost .
But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia,
none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it
has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces , making it difficult to
attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign
targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with
such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were
still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual
suspicion , they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid
into a nuclear confrontation . Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for
the region and the world would be devastating . As long as the United States and China continue to pursue
their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the
illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political,
economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some
reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine .
After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler
Chinese leaders have consistently characterized
nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed.
nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow
purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this
day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect
of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a
Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an
attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-
the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in
the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the
1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of
U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from
the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today.
Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear
bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in
theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a
The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a
nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind.
conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can
threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate —especially when
ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile
nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s
nuclear forces , Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the
conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright,
perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war , Beijing might reluctantly conclude that
limited nuclear escalation —an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was
a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese
war is Taiwan . Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China
is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the
strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the
political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack ,
using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island . Although U.S.
law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the
United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific
area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s
behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the
first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional
military operations would likely threaten , disable , or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear
capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the
style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine
warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese
harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the
U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign , which would likely
threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its
naval nuclear deterrent . China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-
based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the
activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing,
leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic
missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter
jets. If
the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the
very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines , leaving the latter
dramatically more vulnerable . Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could
inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might
be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and
try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the
trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a
Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded , noisy environment
like the Taiwan Strait . Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack
submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and
ask questions later . Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force
means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent . Meanwhile,
any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with
onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that
happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar
onshore , where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing
land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch
ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on
the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force . And once again, it would be virtually
impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed .
Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters,
meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other
supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control
networks , or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks
even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry
either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually
indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants
would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned
aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China,
which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order
Once China was under
to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection.
attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located
deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable . For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s
failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles
are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what
Chinese intercontinental
harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise.
ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to
move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much
more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30
years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an
ongoing , high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional
missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already
reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block
the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That
sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously
China’s real-time awareness of the state
undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that
of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the
U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory
would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether
the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental.
All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened . LESSONS FROM
THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first
use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that
limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and
statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of
capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less
crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then
losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus.
AI Impact---Cyber---2NC
AI innovation is key to developing cybersecurity, counterhacking and
missile defense technology - status quo technology is ineffective and
too slow.
Clark 17 – Founding editor for Breaking Defense, covering defense and space (Colin
Clark; Breaking Defense; 5/31/2017; “The War Algorithm: The Pentagon’s Bet on the
Future of War”; https://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/the-war-algorithm-the-pentagons-
bet-on-the-future-of-war/; Acc. 9/18/2017) KW
Thinking about robots and war often brings to mind HAL, the apparently well-meaning but ultimately destructive computer
in 2001, or the metallic creatures of death in the Terminator series. Today, however, the Pentagon wants to push the
concept in a different direction. With
advanced adversaries like Russia and China copying the
smart weapons, stealth fighters, and networked electronics that were once an American
monopoly, the Defense Department is urgently seeking a new technological edge. They
think they’ve found a key part of it in AI, artificial intelligence. The Pentagon wants to
develop software that can absorb more information from more sources than a
human can, analyze it and either advise the human how to respond or — in
-speed situations like cyber warfare and missile defense — act on its own with
careful limits. The War Algorithm Call it the War Algorithm. Imagine the holy grail of a single
mathematical equation designed to give the US military near-perfect understanding of
what is happening on the battlefield, helping its human designers to react more
quickly than our adversaries and thus win our wars — or better yet, deter the
enemy from attacking at all. Bob Work, Deputy Defense Secretary, helped make our case for the War
Algorithm concept when he issued a memo containing the phrase “Algorithmic Warfare” in an April 26 memo. (We, of
course, thought of our concept before Work did…) Now, no one we’ve spoken with believes one equation can do
everything in a war, but they all agree it’s a powerful concept for considering the risks and rewards of this new push by the
Pentagon, because this is all about the intersection of mathematics and decision-making. Robert Work If you want to
understand what practical effects this is having, look at anything the Pentagon labels part of the Third Offset. In the last
days of the Obama administration, Work and Defense Secretary Ash Carter created a series of offices to develop
weapons for the joint force: the Strategic Capabilities Office, the Rapid Capabilities offices each service has recently
created, and the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, fondly known as the DIUX. Perhaps most importantly, watch the
new unit created by Work in April. Known as the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, these will be the people
trying to build the code. Its first effort? Developing Artificial Intelligence to sort through vast amounts of video collected by
drones .
Intelligence analysis is the logical starting point for military AI, given the
sheer amount of data that leaves human analysts overwhelmed. Another important
battlefront is cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, where attacks can
spread with speed and complexity that no human brain can follow. Visionaries call for
AI cyber defenses that can instantly counter hacking attempts and for “cognitive
electronic warfare” that can sense an enemy radar pulse and immediately figure out
how to jam it.
Cyberattacks cause nuclear miscalculation and escalation – that collapses

deterrence - the risk of an attack is high
Griffin 18 – Technology Editor and Science Writer at Independent (Andrew Griffin,
Independent; 1/11/2018; “Nuclear weapons could be launched by mistake because of
cyberattacks, major report warns”; https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/news/nuclear-weapons-warhead-weapon-hack-cyber-attack-a8153526.html; Acc.
9/19/2018)
Hackers could cause nuclear weapons to be accidentally launched against other
countries , according to a major new report. Systems have a number of vulnerabilities
that could allow cyber attackers to break in and use them to inadvertently trigger deadly
nuclear weapons, defense think tank Chatham House has warned. There is a high chance that
hackers will break into sophisticated nuclear systems , the organization added. If
those hacks allowed attackers to install malware or viruses, it could lead countries to
make decisions using false information. If systems went down, then a country believing it
is under attack, when it isn’t, could launch deadly nuclear warheads by mistake. Life in North
Korea captured with a mobile phone +show all “Nuclear weapons systems were first developed at a time when computer
capabilities were in their infancy and little consideration was given to potential malicious cyber vulnerabilities,” the report’s
cyber attacks on nuclear weapons systems could
authors said. “At times of heightened tension,
cause an escalation , which results in their use. “Inadvertent nuclear launches could
stem from an unwitting reliance on false information and data. Moreover, a system that
is compromised cannot be trusted in decision-making.” READ MORE North Korea ‘accidentally hit its
own city with missile’ The report suggests the likelihood of attempted cyber attacks on nuclear
weapons systems is “relatively high”, and cites information that the US may have infiltrated parts of North
Korea’s missile systems last year and caused test failures. Chatham House warns that a mistaken missile launch could
“ Cyber vulnerabilities within nuclear weapons
result in a “significant loss of life”. The authors added:
systems and structures present a whole set of dangers and risks . “At best, cyber
insecurity in nuclear weapons systems is likely to undermine trust and confidence in
military capabilities and in the nuclear weapons infrastructure. “At worst, cyber attacks
could lead to deliberate misinformation and the inadvertent launch of nuclear weapons. “In
times of crisis, loss of confidence in nuclear weapons capabilities would factor into decision-making and could
undermine beliefs in nuclear deterrence – particularly in extending nuclear
deterrence to allied countries.” The report, titled Cybersecurity of Nuclear Weapons Systems: Threats,
Vulnerabilities and Consequences, said the issue required “urgent attention” from the governments of nuclear-armed
states and those that could be affected by the use of nuclear weapons. Chatham House also urged governments to be
open about their discussions, adding: “After all, it
is the public that will pay the ultimate price for
complacency regarding cyber security of nuclear weapons systems.” According to a Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute report from 2014, nine countries have nuclear forces: the United States, Russia,
UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.
Missile defense solves all nuclear conflict – takes out opposing

weapons on launch
Brookes et al 09 – (Peter Brookes – senior fellow and national security affairs, Douglas
and Sarah Allison center for foreign policy; Kim R. Holmes – executive vice president at
the heritage foundation; James J. Carafano – Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W.
Richardson Fellow; Baker Spring – Former Kirby Research Fellow in National Security
Policy; 6/10/09; The Heritage Foundation; “What Americans Need to Know About Missile
Defense: We’re Not There Yet”; Acc. 9/19/18)
Question: Don'twe already have all the missile defenses we need? No. The truth is that
the United States military today cannot protect all of our citizens or all of our
territory --or, for that matter, all of our troops, allies, and friends abroad--from the range
of possible ballistic missile attacks. Despite recent progress and technological advances, we do not yet have
what we need. We probably could shoot down ten or soballistic missiles launched from North Korea, or from Iran should it
gain long-range capabilities, but not if they coordinated an attack . And we have no protection from
Russia's or China's ballistic missiles or any short-range or Scud missiles launched
from ships off our coast. To shoot down ballistic missiles, especially shortly after launch
to prevent the greatest loss of life and property, we need an array of defensive
interceptors and radar systems on land, at sea, and in space. The Missile Defense
Agency calls this an "integrated ballistic missile defense system."[2] Currently, we have 26
ground-based interceptors (GBIs) stationed in Alaska and California to defend against long-range missile attacks.[3] The
Missile Defense Agency expects to have 28 in place by the end of 2009. Regrettably, the President's budget eliminates
plans to deploy 44 GBIs by 2011, which would enable us to defend against even more missiles and warheads. The U.S.
Navy has equipped 21 Aegis warships with sea-based interceptors and long-range surveillance and tracking systems;
many are stationed in the Pacific and the Sea of Japan. Their interceptors can take out short- and medium-range missiles
in mid-flight. Equipping additional Aegis cruisers will enable us to patrol America's coasts as well. Supporting all of our
defenses are long-range or transportable radar systems located in California, the United Kingdom, Greenland, and Japan;
an upgraded radar in the Aleutian Islands; and one that is being deployed in Israel. Because Iran's missiles can now
reach portions of Europe and because of our treaty obligation to our allies there, we signed agreements in 2008 to station
additional radar and interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland, but the Obama Administration has put these
the Airborne
agreements on hold. Obama's missile defense cuts also put promising boost-phase systems such as
Laser (ABL) on hold. Mounted on modified Boeing 747s, ABLs would enable us to knock down
long-range missiles soon after launch, before the warheads could be deployed .
Boost-phase defenses like this are precisely what we need to defend against nuclear-
armed missiles. Another defensive system falling by the budget wayside is the Multiple
Kill Vehicle that could destroy multiple incoming warheads and decoys. It isn't fully developed
yet, but there aren't any major issues standing in its way. The same can be said for the Space Tracking
and Surveillance System (SSTS) sensor program that would help our defenders
distinguish between real warheads and decoys in space that are meant to
overwhelm our missile defenses. Missile defense needs such capabilities to stay
ahead of our enemies' game.
AI Impact---Cyber---AT: Defense
Escalates to extinction
Gartzke and Lindsay 17 (Erik Gartzke, Department of Political Science,
University of California, San Diego; and Jon R. Lindsay, Munk School of Global
Affairs, University of Toronto; “Thermonuclear Cyberwar,” Journal of
Cybersecurity, 3(1), 3-1-2017, p.37-48, DOI:10.1093/cybsec/tyw017)
Cyber warfare is routinely overhyped as a new weapon of mass destruction, but when used in conjunction with
actual w eapons of m ass d estruction, severe , and underappreciated, dangers
emerge. One side of a stylized debate about cybersecurity in international relations argues that offensive advantages in cyberspace empower weaker nations, terrorist cells, or even lone
rogue operators to paralyze vital infrastructure [4–8]. The other side argues that operational difficulties and effective deterrence restrains the severity of cyber attack, while governments and
Although we have contributed to the skeptical side

cybersecurity firms have a pecuniary interest in exaggerating the threat [9–13].
of this debate [14–16], ***BEGIN FOOTNOTE*** 14. Gartzke E. The myth of cyberwar : bringing war in cyberspace back down to earth.
Int Security 2013;38:41–73. Google ScholarCrossRef 15 Lindsay JR. Stuxnet and the limits of cyber war fare. Security Stud 2013;22:365–404. Google
ScholarCrossRef 16 Lindsay JR. The impact of China on cybersecurity: fiction and friction . Int Security 2014;39:7–47. Google
ScholarCrossRef ***END FOOTNOTE*** the same strategic logic that leads us to view cyberwar as a limited
political instrument in most situations also leads us to view it as incredibly

destabilizing in rare situations. In a recent Israeli wargame of a regional scenario involving the United States and Russia, one participant remarked on “how quickly
localized cyber events can turn dangerously kinetic when leaders are ill-prepared to deal
in the cyber domain” [17]. Importantly, this sort of catalytic instability arises not from the cyber domain itself
but through its interaction with forces and characteristics in other domains (land, sea, air, etc.).
Further, it arises only in situations where actors possess, and are willing to use, robust traditional
military force s to defend their interests. Classical deterrence theory developed to explain nuclear
deterrence with nuclear weapons, but different types of weapons or combinations of operations in different domains can
have differential effects on deterrence and defense [18, 19]. Nuclear weapons and cyber operations are
particularly complementary (i.e. nearly complete opposites) with respect to their strategic characteristics.
Theorists and practitioners have stressed the unprecedented destructiveness of

nuclear weapons in explaining how nuclear deterrence works, but it is equally, if not
more, important for deterrence that capabilities and intentions are clearly
communicated . As quickly became apparent, public displays of their nuclear arsenals improved
deterrence. At the same time, disclosing details of a nation’s nuclear capabilities did not much degrade
the ability to strike or retaliate, given that defense against nuclear attack remains
extremely difficult. Knowledge of nuclear capabilities is necessary to achieve a deterrent effect [20]. Cyber operations, in contrast,
rely on undisclosed vulnerabilities , social engineering, and creative guile to generate indirect effects in the information systems that coordinate
military, economic, and social behavior. Revelation enables crippling countermeasures, while the imperative to conceal capabilities constrains both the scope of cyber operations and their utility for
coercive signaling [21, 22]. The diversity of cyber operations and confusion about their effects also contrast with the obvious destructiveness of nuclear weapons. The problem is that
transparency and deception do not mix well . An attacker who hacks an adversary’s
nuclear c ommand and c ontrol apparatus, or the weapons themselves, will gain an
advantage in warfighting that the attacker cannot reveal , while the adversary will
continue to believe it wields a deterrent that may no longer exist. Most analyses of
inadvertent escalation from cyber or conventional to nuclear war focus on “use it or lose
it” pressures and fog of war created by attacks that become visible to the target [23, 24]. In a US–China conflict scenario, for example, conventional military strikes
in conjunction with cyber attacks that blind sensors and confuse decision making could generate incentives for both sides to rush to preempt or escalate [25–27]. These are plausible concerns, but
the revelation of information about a newly unfavorable balance of power might also cause hesitation and lead to compromise. Cyber blinding could potentially make traditional offensive
operations more difficult, shifting the advantage to defenders and making conflict less likely. Clandestine attacks that remain invisible to
the target potentially present a more insidious threat to crisis stability . There are empirical and theoretical reasons for
taking seriously the effects of offensive cyber operations on nuclear deterrence, and we should expect the dangers to vary with the relative cyber capabilities of the actors in a crisis interaction.
Nuclear command and control vulnerability General Robert Kehler, commander of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in 2013, stated in testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, “we are very concerned with the potential of a cyber-related attack on our nuclear command and control and on the weapons systems themselves” [28]. Nuclear command, control,
and communications ( ) NC3 form the nervous system of the nuclear enterprise spanning intelligence and early warning sensors
located in orbit and on Earth, fixed and mobile command and control centers through which national leadership can order a launch, operational nuclear forces including strategic bombers, land-
based intercontinental missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the communication and transportation networks that tie the whole apparatus together [29, 30].
NC3 should ideally ensure that nuclear forces will always be available if authorized by
the National Command Authority (to enhance deterrence ) and never used without
authorization (to enhance safety and reassurance ). Friendly errors or enemy
interference in NC3 can undermine the “always-never” criterion , weakening
deterrence [31, 32]. NC3 has long been recognized as the weakest link in the US nuclear
enterprise. According to a declassified official history, a Strategic Air Command (SAC) task group in 1979 “reported that tactical warning and communications systems … were ‘fragile’
and susceptible to electronic countermeasures, electromagnetic pulse, and sabotage, which could deny necessary warning and assessment to the National Command Authorities” [33]. Two years
later, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering released a broad-based, multiservice report that doubled down on SAC’s findings: “the United States could
not assure survivability, endurability, or connectivity of the national command authority function” due to: major command, control, and communications deficiencies: in tactical warning and attack
assessment where existing systems were vulnerable to disruption and destruction from electromagnetic pulse, other high altitude nuclear effects, electronic warfare, sabotage, or physical attack;
in decision making where there was inability to assure national command authority survival and connection with the nuclear forces, especially under surprise conditions; and in communications
The
systems, which were susceptible to the same threats above and which could not guarantee availability of even minimum-essential capability during a protracted war. [33]
nuclear weapons safety literature likewise provides a number of troubling examples of NC3
glitches that illustrate some of the vulnerabilities attackers could , in principle, exploit [34–36]. The
SAC history noted that NORAD has received numerous false launch indications from faulty computer components,
loose circuits , and even a nuclear war training tape loaded by mistake into a live
system that produced erroneous Soviet launch indications [33]. In a 1991 briefing to the STRATCOM commander, a Defense
Intelligence Agency targeteer confessed, “Sir, I apologize, but we have found a problem with this target. There is a mistake in the computer code … . Sir, the error has been there for at least the
life of this eighteen-month planning cycle. The nature of the error is such that the target would not have been struck” [37]. It would be a difficult operation to intentionally plant undetected errors like
the presence of bugs does reveal that such a hack is possible . Following many near-
this, but
misses and self-audits during and after the Cold War, American NC3 improved with the addition of new
safeguards and redundancies. As General Kehler pointed out in 2013, “the nuclear deterrent force was designed to operate through the most extreme
circumstances we could possibly imagine” [28]. Yet vulnerabilities remain. In 2010, the US Air Force lost contact with 50 Minuteman III ICBMs for an hour because of a faulty hardware circuit at a
launch control center [38]. If the accident had occurred during a crisis, or the component had been sabotaged, the USAF would have been unable to launch and unable to detect and cancel
unauthorized launch attempts. As Bruce Blair, a former Minuteman missileer, points out, during a control center blackout the antennas at unmanned silos and the cables between them provide
potential surreptitious access vectors [39]. The unclassified summary of a 2015 audit of US NC3 stated that “known capability gaps or deficiencies remain” [40]. Perhaps more worrisome are the
unknown deficiencies. A 2013 Defense Science Board report on military cyber vulnerabilities found that while the: nuclear deterrent is regularly evaluated for reliability and readiness … , most of
the systems have not been assessed (end-to-end) against a [sophisticated state] cyber attack to understand possible weak spots. A 2007 Air Force study addressed portions of this issue for the
If NC3 vulnerabilities are unknown, it is

ICBM leg of the U.S. triad but was still not a complete assessment against a high-tier threat. [41]
also unknown whether an advanced cyber actor would be able to exploit them. As Kehler
notes, “ We don’t know what we don’t know ” [28]. Even if NC3 of nuclear forces narrowly
conceived is a hard target, cyber attacks on other critical infrastructure in preparation to or

during a nuclear crisis could complicate or confuse government decision making .
General Keith Alexander, Director of the NSA in the same Senate hearing with General Kehler, testified that: our infrastructure that we ride on, the
power and the comm unication s grid, are one of the things that is a source of concern
… we can go to backup generators and we can have independent routes, but … our
ability to communicate would be significantly reduced and it would complicate our
governance … . I think what General Kehler has would be intact … [but] the cascading effect … in that kind of
environment … concerns us. [28] Kehler further emphasized that “there’s a continuing need to make sure that we are protected against electromagnetic pulse and any kind of electromagnetic interference” [28]. Many NC3 components are antiquated and hard to upgrade, which is a mixed blessing. Kehler points out, “Much of the nuclear command and control
system today is the legacy system that we’ve had. In some ways that helps us in terms of the cyber threat. In some cases it’s point to point, hard-wired, which makes it very difficult for an external cyber threat to emerge” [28]. The Government Accountability Office notes that the “Department of Defense uses 8-inch floppy disks in a legacy system that coordinates the operational functions of the nation’s nuclear forces” [42]. While this may limit some forms of remote access, it is also
indicative of reliance on an earlier generation of software when security engineering standards were less mature . Upgrades to the digital Strategic Automated Command and Control System planned for 2017 have the potential to correct some problems, but these changes may also introduce new access vectors and vulnerabilities [43]. Admiral Cecil Haney, Kehler’s successor at STRATCOM, highlighted the challenges of NC3 modernization in 2015: Assured and reliable NC3 is
fundamental to the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. The aging NC3 systems continue to meet their intended purpose, but risk to mission success is increasing as key elements of the system age. The unpredictable challenges posed by today’s complex security environment make it increasingly important to optimize our NC3 architecture while leveraging new technologies so that NC3 systems operate together as a core set of survivable and endurable capabilities that underpin a
broader, national command and control system. [44] In no small irony, the internet itself owes its intellectual origin, in part, to the threat to NC3 from large-scale physical attack. A 1962 RAND report by Paul Baran considered “the problem of building digital communication networks using links with less than perfect reliability” to enable “stations surviving a physical attack and remaining in electrical connection … to operate together as a coherent entity after attack” [45]. Baran advocated as
a solution decentralized packet switching protocols, not unlike those realized in the ARPANET program. The emergence of the internet was the result of many other factors that had nothing to do with managing nuclear operations, notably the meritocratic ideals of 1960s counterculture that contributed to the neglect of security in the internet’s founding architecture [46, 47]. Fears of NC3 vulnerability helped to create the internet, which then helped to create the present-day cybersecurity
epidemic, which has come full circle to create new fears about NC3 vulnerability. NC3 vulnerability is not unique to the United States. The NC3 of other nuclear powers may even be easier to compromise, especially in the case of new entrants to the nuclear club like North Korea. Moreover, the United States has already demonstrated both the ability and willingness to infiltrate sensitive foreign nuclear infrastructure through operations such as Olympic Games (Stuxnet), albeit targeting
Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle rather than NC3. It would be surprising to learn that the United States has failed to upgrade its Cold War NC3 attack plans to include offensive cyber operations against a wide variety of national targets. Hacking the deterrent The United States included NC3 attacks in its Cold War counterforce and damage limitation war plans, even as contemporary critics perceived these options to be destabilizing for deterrence [48]. The best known example of these activities
and capabilities is a Special Access Program named Canopy Wing. East German intelligence obtained the highly classified plans from a US Army spy in Berlin, and the details began to emerge publicly after the Cold War. An East German intelligence officer, Markus Wolf, writes in his memoir that Canopy Wing “listed the types of electronic warfare that would be used to neutralize the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact’s command centers in case of all-out war. It detailed the precise method
of depriving the Soviet High Command of its high-frequency communications used to give orders to its armed forces” [49]. It is easy to see why NC3 is such an attractive target in the unlikely event of a nuclear war. If for whatever reason deterrence fails and the enemy decides to push the nuclear button, it would obviously be better to disable or destroy missiles before they launch than to rely on possibly futile efforts to shoot them down, or to accept the loss of millions of lives.
American plans to disable Soviet NC3 with electronic warfare, furthermore, would have been intended to complement plans for decapitating strikes against Soviet nuclear forces. Temporary disabling of information networks in isolation would have failed to achieve any important strategic objective. A blinded adversary would eventually see again and would scramble to reconstitute its ability to launch its weapons, expecting that preemption was inevitable in any case. Reconstitution,
moreover, would invalidate much of the intelligence and some of the tradecraft on which the blinding attack relied. Capabilities fielded through Canopy Wing were presumably intended to facilitate a preemptive military strike on Soviet NC3 to disable the ability to retaliate and limit the damage of any retaliatory force that survived, given credible indications that war was imminent. Canopy Wing included [50]: “Measures for short-circuiting … communications and weapons systems using,
among other things, microscopic carbon-fiber particles and chemical weapons.” “Electronic blocking of communications immediately prior to an attack, thereby rendering a counterattack impossible.” “Deployment of various weapons systems for instantaneous destruction of command centers, including pin-point targeting with precision-guided weapons to destroy ‘hardened bunkers’.” “Use of deception measures, including the use of computer-simulated voices to override and substitute
false commands from ground-control stations to aircraft and from regional command centers to the Soviet submarine fleet.” “Us[e of] the technical installations of ‘Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’ and ‘Voice of America,’ as well as the radio communications installations of the U.S. Armed Forces for creating interference and other electronic effects.” Wolf also ran a spy in the US Air Force who disclosed that the Americans had managed to penetrate the [Soviet air base at Eberswalde]’s
ground-air communications and were working on a method of blocking orders before they reached the Russian pilots and substituting their own from West Berlin. Had this succeeded, the MiG pilots would have received commands from their American enemy. It sounded like science fiction, but, our experts concluded, it was in no way impossible that they could have pulled off such a trick, given the enormous spending and technical power of U.S. military air research. [49] One East
German source claimed that Canopy Wing had a $14.5 billion budget for research and operational costs and a staff of 1570 people, while another claimed that it would take over 4 years and $65 million to develop “a prototype of a sophisticated electronic system for paralyzing Soviet radio traffic in the high-frequency range” [50]. Canopy Wing was not cheap, and even so, it was only a research and prototyping program. Operationalization of its capabilities and integration into NATO war
plans would have been even more expensive. This is suggestive of the level of effort required to craft effective offensive cyber operations against NC3. Preparation comes to naught when a sensitive program is compromised. Canopy Wing was caught in what we describe below as the cyber commitment problem, the inability to disclose a warfighting capability for the sake of deterrence without losing it in the process. According to New York Times reporting on the counterintelligence
investigation of the East German spy in the Army, Warrant Officer James Hall, “officials said that one program rendered useless cost hundreds of millions of dollars and was designed to exploit a Soviet communications vulnerability uncovered in the late 1970's” [51]. This program was probably Canopy Wing. Wolf writes, “Once we passed [Hall’s documents about Canopy Wing] on to the Soviets, they were able to install scrambling devices and other countermeasures” [49]. It is tempting
to speculate that the Soviet deployment of a new NC3 system known as Signal-A to replace Signal-M (which was most likely the one targeted by Canopy Wing) was motivated in part by Hall’s betrayal [50]. Canopy Wing underscores the potential and limitations of NC3 subversion. Modern cyber methods can potentially perform many of the missions Canopy Wing addressed with electronic warfare and other means, but with even greater stealth and precision. Cyber operations might, in
principle, compromise any part of the NC3 system (early warning, command centers, data transport, operational forces, etc.) by blinding sensors, injecting bogus commands or suppressing legitimate ones, monitoring or corrupting data transmissions, or interfering with the reliable launch and guidance of missiles. In practice, the operational feasibility of cyber attack against NC3 or any other target depends on the software and hardware configuration and organizational processes of the
target, the intelligence and planning capacity of the attacker, and the ability and willingness to take advantage of the effects created by cyber attack [52, 53]. Cyber compromise of NC3 is technically plausible though operationally difficult, a point to which we return in a later section. To understand which threats are not only technically possible but also probable under some circumstance, we further need a political logic of cost and benefit [14]. In particular, how is it possible for a crisis to
escalate to levels of destruction more costly than any conceivable political reward? Canopy Wing highlights some of the strategic dangers of NC3 exploitation. Warsaw Pact observers appear to have been deeply concerned that the program reflected an American willingness to undertake a surprise decapitation attack: they said that it “sent ice-cold shivers down our spines” [50]. The Soviets designed a system called Perimeter that, not unlike the Doomsday Device in Dr. Strangelove, was
designed to detect a nuclear attack and retaliate automatically, even if cut off from Soviet high command, through an elaborate system of sensors, underground computers, and command missiles to transmit launch codes [54]. Both Canopy Wing and Perimeter show that the United States and the Soviet Union took nuclear warfighting seriously and were willing to develop secret advantages for such an event. By the same token, they were not able to reveal such capabilities to improve
deterrence to avoid having to fight a nuclear war in the first place. Nuclear deterrence and credible communication Nuclear weapons have some salient political properties. They are singularly and obviously destructive. They kill in more, and more ghastly, ways than conventional munitions through electromagnetic radiation, blast, firestorms, radioactive fallout, and health effects that linger for years. Bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs can project warheads globally without significantly mitigating
their lethality, steeply attenuating the conventional loss-of-strength gradient [55]. Defense against nuclear attack is very difficult, even with modern ballistic missile defenses, given the speed of incoming warheads and use of decoys; multiple warheads and missile volleys further reduce the probability of perfect interception. If one cannot preemptively destroy all of an enemy’s missiles, then there is a nontrivial chance of getting hit by some of them. When one missed missile can incinerate
millions of people, the notion of winning a nuclear war starts to seem meaningless for many politicians. As defense seemed increasingly impractical, early Cold War strategists championed the threat of assured retaliation as the chief mechanism for avoiding war [56–59]. Political actors have issued threats for millennia, but the advent of nuclear weapons brought deterrence as a strategy to center stage. The Cold War was an intense learning experience for both practitioners and students
of international security, rewriting well-worn realities more than once [60–62]. A key conundrum was the practice of brinkmanship. Adversaries who could not compete by “winning” a nuclear war could still compete by manipulating the “risk” of nuclear annihilation, gambling that an opponent would have the good judgment to back down at some point short of the nuclear brink. Brinkmanship crises—conceptualized as games of Chicken where one cannot heighten tensions without
increasing the hazard of the mutually undesired outcome—require that decision makers behave irrationally, or possibly that they act randomly, which is difficult to conceptualize in practical terms [63]. The chief concern in historical episodes of chicken, such as the Berlin Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis, was not whether a certain level of harm was possible, but whether an adversary was resolved enough, possibly, to risk nuclear suicide. The logical inconsistency of the need for illogic to
win led almost from the beginning of the nuclear era to elaborate deductive contortions [64–66]. Both mutually assured destruction (MAD) and successful brinksmanship depend on a less appreciated, but no less fundamental, feature of nuclear weapons: political transparency. Most elements of military power are weakened by disclosure [67]. Military plans are considerably less effective if shared with an enemy. Conventional weapons become less lethal as adversaries learn what
different systems can and cannot do, where they are located, how they are operated, and how to devise countermeasures and array defenses to blunt or disarm an attack. In contrast, relatively little reduction in destruction follows from enemy knowledge of nuclear capabilities. For most of the nuclear era, no effective defense existed against a nuclear attack. Even today, with evolving ABM systems, one ICBM still might get through and annihilate the capital city. Nuclear forces are more
robust to revelation than other weapons, enabling nuclear nations better to advertise the harm they can inflict. The need for transparency to achieve an effective deterrent is driven home by the satirical Cold War film, Dr. Strangelove: “the whole point of a Doomsday Machine is lost, if you keep it a secret! Why didn’t you tell the world, eh?” During the real Cold War, fortunately, Soviet leaders paraded their nuclear weapons through Red Square for the benefit of foreign military attaches and
the international press corps. Satellites photographed missile, bomber, and submarine bases. While other aspects of military affairs on both sides of the Iron Curtain remained closely guarded secrets, the United States and the Soviet Union permitted observers to evaluate their nuclear capabilities. This is especially remarkable given the secrecy that pervaded Soviet society. The relative transparency of nuclear arsenals ensured that the superpowers could calculate risks and
consequences within a first-order approximation, which led to a reduction in severe conflict and instability even as political competition in other arenas was fierce [61, 68]. Recent insights about the causes of war suggest that divergent expectations about the costs and consequences of war are necessary for contests to occur [69–73]. These insights are associated with rationalist theories, such as deterrence theory itself. Empirical studies and psychological critiques of the
rationality assumption have helped to refine models and bring some circumspection into their application, but the formulation of sound strategy (if not the execution ) still requires the articulation of some rational linkage between cause and effect [19, 62, 74]. Many supposedly nonrational factors , moreover, simply manifest as uncertainty in strategic interaction. Our focus here is on the effect of uncertainty and ignorance on the ability of states and other actors
to bargain in lieu of fighting. Many wars are a product of what adversaries do not know or what they misperceive, whether as a result of bluffing , secrecy , or intrinsic uncertainty [75, 76]. If knowledge of capabilities or resolve is a prerequisite for deterrence, then one reason for deterrence failure is the inability or unwillingness to credibly communicate details of the genuine balance of power , threat, or interests. Fighting, conversely, can be understood as a costly
process of discovery that informs adversaries of their actual relative strength and resolve. From this perspective, successful deterrence involves instilling in an adversary perceptions like those that result from fighting, but before fighting actually begins. Agreement about the balance of power can enable states to bargain (tacit or overt) effectively without needing to fight, forging compromises that each prefers to military confrontation or even to the bulk of possible risky brinkmanship crises.
Despite other deficits, nuclear weapons have long been considered to be stabilizing with respect to rational incentives for war (the risk of nuclear accidents is another matter) [77]. If each side has a secure second strike—or even a minimal deterrent with some nonzero chance of launching a few missiles—then each side can expect to gain little and lose much by fighting a nuclear war. Whereas the costs of conventional war can be more mysterious because each side might decide to
hold something back and meter out its punishment due to some internal constraint or a theory of graduated escalation, even a modest initial nuclear exchange is recognized to be extremely costly. As long as both sides understand this and understand (or believe) that the adversary understands this as well, then the relationship is stable. Countries engage nuclear powers with considerable deference, especially over issues of fundamental national or international importance. At the same
time, nuclear weapons appear to be of limited value in prosecuting aggressive action, especially over issues of secondary or tertiary importance, or in response to aggression from others at lower levels of dispute intensity. Nuclear weapons are best used for signaling a willingness to run serious risks to protect or extort some issue that is considered of vital national interest. As mentioned previously, both superpowers in the Cold War considered the warfighting advantages of nuclear
weapons quite apart from any deterrent effect, and the United States and Russia still do. High-altitude bursts for air defense, electromagnetic pulse for frying electronics, underwater detonations for anti-submarine warfare, hardened target penetration, area denial, and so on, have some battlefield utility. Transparency per se is less important than weapon effects for warfighting uses, and can even be deleterious for tactics that depend on stealth and mobility. Even a single tactical nuke,
however, would inevitably be a political event. Survivability of the second strike deterrent can also militate against transparency, as in the case of the Soviet Perimeter system, as mobility, concealment, and deception can make it harder for an observer to track and count respective forces from space. Counterforce strategies, platform diversity and mobility, ballistic missile defense systems, and force employment doctrine can all make it more difficult for one or both sides in a crisis to know
whether an attack is likely to succeed or fail. The resulting uncertainty affects not only estimates of relative capabilities but also the degree of confidence in retaliation. At the same time, there is reason to believe that platform diversity lowers the risk of nuclear or conventional contests, because increasing the number of types of delivery platforms heightens second strike survivability without increasing the lethality of an initial strike [78]. While transparency is not itself a requirement for
nuclear use, stable deterrence benefits to the degree to which retaliation can be anticipated, as well as the likelihood that the consequences of a first strike are more costly than any benefit. Cyber operations, in contrast, are neither robust to revelation nor as obviously destructive. The cyber commitment problem Deterrence (and compellence) uses force or threats of force to “warn” an adversary about consequences if it takes or fails to take an action. In contrast, defense (and conquest)
uses force to “win” a contest of strength and change the material distribution of power. Sometimes militaries can change the distribution of information and power at the same time. Military mobilization in a crisis signifies resolve and displays a credible warning, but it also makes it easier to attack or defend if the warning fails. Persistence in a battle of attrition not only bleeds an adversary but also reveals a willingness to pay a higher price for victory. More often, however, the informational
requirements of winning and warning are in tension. Combat performance often hinges on well-kept secrets, feints, and diversions. Many military plans and capabilities degrade when revealed. National security involves trade-offs between the goals of preventing war, by advertising capabilities or interests, and improving fighting power should war break out, by concealing capabilities and surprising the enemy. The need to conceal details of the true balance of power to preserve battlefield
effectiveness gives rise to the military commitment problem [79, 80]. Japan could not coerce the United States by revealing its plan to attack Pearl Harbor because the United States could not credibly promise to refrain from reorienting defenses and dispersing the Pacific Fleet. War resulted not just because of what opponents did not know but because of what they could not tell each other without paying a severe price in military advantage. The military benefits of surprise (winning)
trumped the diplomatic benefits of coercion (warning). Cyber operations, whether for disruption and intelligence, are extremely constrained by the military commitment problem. Revelation of a cyber threat in advance that is specific enough to convince a target of the validity of the threat also provides enough information potentially to neutralize it. Stuxnet took years and hundreds of millions of dollars to develop but was patched within weeks of its discovery. The Snowden leaks negated a
whole swath of tradecraft that the NSA took years to develop. States may use other forms of covert action, such as publicly disavowed lethal aid or aerial bombing (e.g. Nixon’s Cambodia campaign), to discretely signal their interests, but such cases can only work to the extent that revelation of operational details fails to disarm rebels or prevent airstrikes [81]. Cyber operations, especially against NC3, must be conducted in extreme secrecy as a condition of the efficacy of the attack.
Cyber tradecraft relies on stealth, stratagem, and deception [21]. Operations tailored to compromise complex remote targets require extensive intelligence, planning and preparation, and testing to be effective. Actions that alert a target of an exploit allow the target to patch, reconfigure, or adopt countermeasures that invalidate the plan. As the Defense Science Board points out, competent network defenders: can also be expected to employ highly-trained system and network
administrators, and this operational staff will be equipped with continuously improving network defensive tools and techniques (the same tools we advocate to improve our defenses). Should an adversary discover an implant, it is usually relatively simple to remove or disable. For this reason, offensive cyber will always be a fragile capability. [41] The world’s most advanced cyber powers, the United States, Russia, Israel, China, France, and the United Kingdom, are also nuclear states,
while India, Pakistan, and North Korea also have cyber warfare programs. NC3 is likely to be an especially well defended part of their cyber infrastructures. NC3 is a hard target for offensive operations, which thus requires careful planning, detailed intelligence, and long lead-times to avoid compromise. Cyberspace is further ill-suited for signaling because cyber operations are complex, esoteric, and hard for commanders and policymakers to understand. Most targeted cyber operations
have to be tailored for each unique target (a complex organization not simply a machine), quite unlike a general purpose munition tested on a range. Malware can fail in many ways and produce unintended side effects, as when the Stuxnet code was accidentally released to the public. The category of “cyber” includes tremendous diversity: irritant scams, hacktivist and propaganda operations, intelligence collection, critical infrastructure disruption, etc. Few intrusions create consequences
that rise to the level of attacks such as Stuxnet or BlackEnergy, and even they pale beside the harm imposed by a small war. Vague threats are less credible because they are indistinguishable from casual bluffing. Ambiguity can be useful for concealing a lack of capability or resolve, allowing an actor to pool with more capable or resolved states and acquiring some deterrence success by association. But this works by discounting the costliness of the threat. Nuclear threats, for example,
are usually somewhat veiled because one cannot credibly threaten nuclear suicide. The consistently ambiguous phrasing of US cyber declaratory policy (e.g. “we will respond to cyber-attacks in a manner and at a time and place of our choosing using appropriate instruments of U.S. power” [82]) seeks to operate across domains to mobilize credibility in one area to compensate for a lack of credibility elsewhere, specifically by leveraging the greater robustness to revelation of military
capabilities other than cyber. This does not mean that cyberspace is categorically useless for signaling, just as nuclear weapons are not categorically useless for warfighting. Ransomware attacks work when the money extorted to unlock the compromised host is priced below the cost of an investigation or replacing the system. The United States probably gained some benefits in general deterrence (i.e. discouraging the emergence of challenges as opposed to immediate deterrence in
response to a challenge) through the disclosure of Stuxnet and the Snowden leaks. Both revelations compromised tradecraft, but they also advertised that the NSA probably had more exploits and tradecraft where they came from. Some cyber operations may actually be hard to mitigate within tactically meaningful timelines (e.g. hardware implants installed in hard-to-reach locations). Such operations might be revealed to coerce concessions within the tactical window created by a given
operation, if the attacker can coordinate the window with the application of coercion in other domains. As a general rule, however, the cyber domain on its own is better suited for winning than warning [83]. Cyber and nuclear weapons fall on extreme opposite sides of this spectrum. Dangerous complements Nuclear weapons have been used in anger twice—against the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki—but cyberspace is abused daily. Considered separately, the nuclear domain
is stable and the cyber domain is unstable. In combination, the results are ambiguous. The nuclear domain can bound the intensity of destruction that a cyber attacker is willing to inflict on an adversary. US declaratory policy states that unacceptable cyber attacks may prompt a military response; while nuclear weapons are not explicitly threatened, neither are they withheld. Nuclear threats have no credibility at the low end, where the bulk of cyber attacks occur. This produces a cross-
domain version of the stability–instability paradox, where deterrence works at the high end but is not credible, and thus encourages provocation, at low intensities. Nuclear weapons, and military power generally, create an upper bound on cyber aggression to the degree that retaliation is anticipated and feared [22, 83, 84]. In the other direction, the unstable cyber domain can undermine the stability of nuclear deterrence. Most analysts who argue that the cyber–nuclear combination is a
recipe for danger focus on the fog of crisis decision making [85–87]. Stephen Cimbala points out that today’s relatively smaller nuclear arsenals may perversely magnify the attractiveness of NC3 exploitation in a crisis: “Ironically, the downsizing of U.S. and post-Soviet Russian strategic nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, while a positive development from the perspectives of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, makes the concurrence of cyber and nuclear attack
capabilities more alarming” [88]. Cimbala focuses mainly on the risks of misperception and miscalculation that emerge when a cyber attack muddies the transparent communication required for opponents to understand one another’s interests, redlines, and willingness to use force, and to ensure reliable control over subordinate commanders. Thus a nuclear actor “faced with a sudden burst of holes in its vital warning and response systems might, for example, press the
preemption button instead of waiting to ride out the attack and then retaliate ” [85]. The outcome of fog of decision scenarios such as these depend on how humans react to risk and uncertainty, which in turn depends on bounded rationality and organizational frameworks that might confuse rational decision making [89, 90]. These factors exacerbate a hard problem. Yet within a rationalist framework, cyber attacks that have already created their effects need not trigger an
escalatory spiral. While being handed a fait accompli may trigger an aggressive reaction, it is also plausible that the target’s awareness that its NC3 has been compromised in some way would help to convey new information that the balance of power is not as favorable as previously thought. This in turn could encourage the target to accommodate, rather than escalate. While defects in rational decision making are a serious concern in any cyber–nuclear scenario, the situation becomes
even more hazardous when there are rational incentives to escalate. Although “known unknowns” can create confusion, to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, the “unknown unknowns” are perhaps more dangerous. A successful clandestine penetration of NC3 can defeat the informational symmetry that stabilizes nuclear relationships . Nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence because they impose a degree of consensus about the distribution of power; each side knows the other
can inflict prohibitive levels of damage, even if they may disagree about the precise extent of this damage. Cyber operations are attractive precisely because they can secretly revise the distribution of power . NC3 neutralization may be an expensive and rarified capability in the reach of only a few states with mature signals intelligence agencies, but it is much cheaper than nuclear attack. Yet the very usefulness of cyber operations for nuclear warfighting ensure that deterrence
failure during brinksmanship crises is more likely. Nuclear states may initiate crises of risk and resolve to see who will back down first, which is not always clear in advance. Chicken appears viable, ironically, because each player understands that a nuclear war would be a disaster for all, and thus all can agree that someone can be expected swerve. Nuclear deterrence should ultimately make dealing with an adversary diplomatically more attractive than fighting, provided that fighting is
costly—as would seem evident for the prospect of nuclear war—and assuming that bargains are available to states willing to accept compromise rather than annihilation. If, however, one side knows, but the other does not, that the attacker has disabled the target’s ability to perceive an impending military attack, or to react to one when it is underway, then they will not have a shared understanding of the probable outcome of war, even in broad terms. Consider a brinksmanship crisis
between two nuclear states where only one has realized a successful penetration of the rival’s NC3. The cyber attacker knows that it has a military advantage, but it cannot reveal the advantage to the target, lest the advantage be lost. The target does not know that it is at a disadvantage, and it cannot be told by the attacker for the same reason. The attacker perceives an imbalance of power while the target perceives a balance. A dangerous competition in risk taking ensues. The first
side knows that it does not need to back down. The second side feels confident that it can stand fast and raise the stakes far beyond what it would be willing to if it understood the true balance of power. Each side is willing to escalate to create more risk for the other side, making it more likely that one or the other will conclude that deterrence has failed and move into warfighting mode to attempt to limit the damage the other can inflict. The targeted nature and uncertain effects of offensive
cyber operations put additional pressure on decision makers. An intrusion will probably disable only part of the enemy’s NC3 architecture, not all of it (which is not only operationally formidable to achieve but also more likely to be noticed by the target). Thus the target may retain control over some nuclear forces, or conventional forces. The target may be tempted to use some of them piecemeal to signal a willingness to escalate further, even though it cannot actually escalate because of
the cyber operation. The cyber attacker knows that it has escalation dominance, but when even a minor demonstration by the target can cause great damage, it is tempting to preempt this move or others like it. This situation would be especially unstable if only second strike but not primary strike NC3 was incapacitated. Uncertainty in the efficacy of the clandestine penetration would discount the attacker’s confidence in its escalation dominance, with a range of possible outcomes. Enough
uncertainty would discount the cyber attack to nothing, which would have a stabilizing effect by returning the crisis to the pure nuclear domain. A little bit of uncertainty about cyber effectiveness would heighten risk acceptance while also raising the incentives to preempt as an insurance measure. Adding allies into the mix introduce s additional instability . An ally emboldened by its nuclear umbrella might run provocative risks that it would be much more reluctant to embrace if it
was aware that the umbrella was actually full of holes. Conversely, if the clandestine advantage is held by the state extending the umbrella, allies could become unnerved by the willingness of their defender to run what appear to be outsize risks, oblivious of the reasons for the defender’s confidence, creating discord in the alliance and incentives for self-protective action, leading to greater uncertainty about alliance solidarity. The direction of influence between the cyber and nuclear
realms depends to large degree on which domain is the main arena of action. Planning and conducting cyber operations will be bounded by the ability of aggressors to convince themselves that attacks will remain secret, and by the confidence of nuclear nations in their invulnerability. Fears of cross-domain escalation will tend to keep instability in cyberspace bounded. However, if a crisis has risen to the point where nuclear threats are being seriously considered or made, then NC3
exploitation will be destabilizing. Brinksmanship crises seem to have receded in frequency since the Cuban Missile Crisis but may be more likely than is generally believed. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has insinuated more than once in recent years that his government is willing to use tactical nuclear weapons if necessary to support his policies. Cyber power and nuclear stability Not all crises are the same. Indeed, their very idiosyncrasies create the uncertainties that make
bargaining failure more likely [75]. So far our analysis would be at home in the Cold War, with the technological novelty of cyber operations. Yet not every state has the same cyber capabilities or vulnerabilities. Variation in cyber power relations across dyads should be expected to affect the strategic stability of nuclear states. The so-called second nuclear age differs from superpower rivalry in important ways [91]. There are fewer absolute numbers of warheads in the world, down from a
peak of over 70 000 in the 1980s to about 15 000 today (less than 5000 deployed), but they are distributed very unevenly [92]. The United States and Russia have comparably sized arsenals, each with a fully diversified triad of delivery platforms, while North Korea only has a dozen or so bombs and no meaningful delivery system (for now). China, India, Pakistan, Britain, France, and Israel have modest arsenals in the range of several dozen to a couple hundred weapons, but they have
very different doctrines, conventional force complements, domestic political institutions, and alliance relationships. The recent nuclear powers lack the hard-won experience and shared norms of the Cold War to guide them through crises, and even the United States and Russia have much to relearn. Cyber warfare capacity also varies considerably across contemporary nuclear nations. The United States, Russia, Israel, and Britain are in the top tier, able to run sophisticated, persistent,
clandestine penetrations. China is a uniquely active cyber power with ambitious cyber warfare doctrine, but its operational focus is on economic espionage and political censorship, resulting in less refined tradecraft and more porous defenses for military purposes [16]. France, India, and Pakistan also have active cyber warfare programs, while North Korea is the least developed cyber nation, depending on China for its expertise [93]. It is beyond the scope of this article to assess crisis
dyads in detail, and data on nuclear and cyber power for these countries are shrouded in secrecy. Here, as a way of summing up the arguments above, we offer a few conjectures about how stylized aspects of cyber power affect crisis stability through incentives and key aspects of decision making. We do not stress relative nuclear weapon capabilities on the admittedly strong (and contestable) assumption that nuclear transparency in the absence of cyber operations would render
nuclear asymmetry irrelevant for crisis bargaining because both sides would agree about the terrible consequences of conflict [94]. We also omit domestic or psychological variables that affect relative power assessments, although these are obviously important. Even if neither India nor Pakistan have viable cyber–nuclear capabilities, brinksmanship between them is dangerous for many other reasons, notably compressed decision timelines, Pakistan’s willingness to shoot first, and
domestic regime instability. Our focus is on the impact of offensive and defensive cyber power on nuclear deterrence above and beyond the other factors that certainly play a role in real-world outcomes. First, does the cyber attacker have the organizational capacity, technical expertise, and intelligence support to “compromise” the target’s NC3? Can hackers access critical networks, exploit technical vulnerabilities, and confidently execute a payload to disrupt or exploit strategic sensing,
command, forces, or transport capacity? The result would be some tangible advantage for warfighting, such as tactical warning or control paralysis, but one that cannot be exercised in bargaining. Second, is the target able to “detect” the compromise of its NC3? The more complicated and sensitive the target, the more likely cyber attackers are to make a mistake that undermines the intrusion. Attribution is not likely to be difficult given the constricted pool of potential attackers, but at the
same time the consequences of misattributing “false flag” operations could be severe [95]. At a minimum, detection is assumed to provide information to the target that the balance of power is perhaps not as favorable as imagined previously. We assume that detection without an actual compromise is possible because of false positives or deceptive information operations designed to create pessimism or paranoia. Third, is the target able to “mitigate” the compromise it detects?
Revelation can prompt patching or network reconfiguration to block an attack, but this assumption is not always realistic. The attacker may have multiple pathways open or may have implanted malware that is difficult to remove in tactically meaningful timelines. In such cases the cyber commitment problem is not absolute, since the discovery of the power to hurt does not automatically disarm it. Successful mitigation here is assumed to restore mutual assessments of the balance of power
to what they would be absent the cyber attack. Table 1 shows how these factors combine to produce different deterrence outcomes in a brinksmanship (chicken) crisis. If there is no cyber compromise and the target detects nothing (no false positives) then we have the optimistic ideal case where nuclear transparency affords stable “deterrence.” Transparency about the nuclear balance, including the viability of secure second strike forces, provides strategic stability. We also expect this
box to describe situations where the target has excellent network defense capabilities and thus the prospect of defense, denial or deception successfully deters any attempts to penetrate NC3. This may resemble the Cold War situation (with electronic warfare in lieu of cyber), or even the present day US–Russia dyad, where the odds of either side pulling off a successful compromise against a highly capable defender are not favorable. Alternately the attack may be deemed risky enough
to encourage serious circumspection. However, the existence of Canopy Wing does not encourage optimism in this regard. [[TABLE 1 OMITTED]] Conversely, if there is a compromise that goes undetected, then there is a heightened risk of “war” because of the cyber commitment problem. This box may be particularly relevant for asymmetric dyads such as the United States and North Korea, where one side has real cyber power but the other side is willing to go to the brink where it
believes, falsely, that it has the capability to compel its counterpart to back down. Cyber disruption of NC3 is attractive for damage limitation should deterrence fail, given that the weaker state’s diminutive arsenal makes damage limitation by the stronger state more likely to succeed. The dilemma for the stronger state is that the clandestine counterforce hedge, which makes warfighting success more likely, is precisely what makes deterrence more likely to fail. The United States would
face similar counterforce dilemmas with other dyads like China or even Russia, although even a strong cyber power should be more circumspect when confronted with an adversary with a larger/more capable nuclear and conventional arsenal. More complex and cyber savvy targets, moreover, are more likely to detect a breach in NC3, leading to more ambiguous outcomes depending on how actors cope with risk and uncertainty. Paradoxically, confidence in cyber security may be a
major contributor to failure; believing one is safe from attack increases the chance that an attack is successful. If the successful compromise is detected but not mitigated, then the target learns that the balance of power is not as favorable as thought. This possibility suggests fleeting opportunities for “coercion” by revealing the cyber coup to the target in the midst of a crisis while the cyber attacker maintains or develops a favorable military advantage before the target has the opportunity
to reverse or compensate the NC3 disruption. Recognizing the newly transparent costs of war, a risk neutral or risk averse target should prefer compromise. The coercive advantages (deterrence or compellence) of a detected but unmitigated NC3 compromise will likely be fleeting. This suggests a logical possibility for creating a window of opportunity for using particular cyber operations that are more robust to revelation as a credible signal of superior capability in the midst of a crisis. It
would be important to exploit this fleeting advantage via other credible military threats (e.g. forces mobilized on visible alert or deployed into the crisis area) before the window closes. One side may be able gain an unearned advantage, an opportunity for coercion via a “bluff,” by the same window-of-opportunity logic. A target concerned about NC3 compromise will probably have some network monitoring system and other protections in place. Defensive systems can produce false
positives as a result of internal errors or a deception operation by the attacker to encourage paranoia. It is logically possible that some false positives would appear to the target to be difficult to mitigate. In this situation, the target could believe it is at a disadvantage, even though this is not in fact the case. This gambit would be operationally very difficult to pull off with any reliability in a real nuclear crisis. Cyber–nuclear coercion and bluffing strategies are fraught with danger. Detection
without mitigation might put a risk-acceptant or loss-averse target into a “use-lose” situation, creating pressures to preempt or escalate. The muddling of decision-making heightens the risk of accidents or irrational choices in a crisis scenario. Worry about preemption or accident then heightens the likelihood that the initiator will exercise counterforce options while they remain available. These pressures can be expected to be particularly intense if the target’s detection is only partial or has
not revealed the true extent of damage to its NC3 (i.e. the target does not realize it has already lost some or all of what it hopes to use). These types of scenarios are most usually invoked in analyses of inadvertent escalation [23–27]. The essential distinction between “use-lose” risks and “war” in this typology is the target’s knowledge of some degree of NC3 compromise. Use-lose and other cognitive pressures can certainly result in nuclear war, since the breakdown of deterrence leads
to the release of nuclear weapons, but we distinguish these outcomes to highlight the different decision making processes or rational incentives at work. A “spiral” of mistrust may emerge if one side attempts a compromise but the defender detects and mitigates it. Both sides again have common mutual estimates of the relative balance of power, which superficially resembles the “deterrence” case because the NC3 compromise is negated. Unfortunately, the detection of the compromise
will provide the target with information about the hostile intentions of the cyber attacker. This in turn is likely to exacerbate other political or psychological factors in the crisis itself or in the crisis-proneness of the broader relationship. The strange logical case where there is no compromise but one is detected and mitigated could result from a false positive misperception (including a third-party false flag operation) that could conflict spiraling [96, 97]. The bluff and coercion outcomes are
also likely to encourage spiraling behavior once the fleeting bargaining advantage dissipates or is dispelled (provided anyone survives the interaction). The risk of crisis instability is not the same for all dyads. It is harder to compromise the NC3 of strong states because of the redundancy and active defenses in their arsenal. Likewise, strong states are better able to compromise the NC3 of any states but especially of weaker states, because of strong states’ greater organizational capacity
the U nited S tates and the Soviet Union in the Cold War or Russia today to a lesser extent). Deterrence is
and expertise in cyber operations. Stable deterrence or MAD is most likely to hold in mutually strong dyads (e.g.
slightly less likely in other equally matched dyads ( India–Pakistan ) where defensive vulnerabilities create temptations but offensive capabilities may not be sufficient to exploit
them. Most states can be expected to refrain from targeting American NC3 given a US reputation for cyber power (a general deterrence benefit enhanced by Stuxnet and Snowden). The situation
(United States and North Korea or

is less stable if the United States is the attacker. The most dangerous dyad is a stronger and a weaker state
Israel and Iran ). Dyads involving strong and middle powers are also dangerous (United
States and China ). The stronger side is tempted to disrupt NC3 as a warfighting hedge in
case deterrence breaks down, while the weaker but still formidable side has a
reasonable chance at detection. The marginally weaker may also be tempted to subvert
NC3, particularly for reconnaissance; the stronger side is more likely to detect and
correct the intrusion but will be alarmed by the ambiguity in distinguishing intelligence collection from attack planning [98]. In a
brinksmanship crisis between them, windows for coercion may be available yet fleeting , with
real risks of spiral and war .
Cyberattacks cause nuke war

Robert Tilford 12, US Army veteran, writer for The Examiner,
http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-
grid-for-the-entire-east-coa
“Cyber attackers could all too easily shut down the electric grid for the entire east
coast, the west coast, and the middle part of our country”, said Senator Grassley on July
26, 2012. “Any one attack could leave dozens of major cities and tens of millions of
Americans without power. We know, because we were shown in a room here in the Capitol, how an attack could
take place and what damage it would do, so we know this is not just make believe”, he said. So what would a cyber attack
look like anyway? The Senator explained: “Without ATMs or debit card readers, commerce would
immediately grind to a halt. My daughter, who lives here in the DC area, lost power when the storm hit. They
waited for a number of hours, and then they took all the food out of their freezer, they gave away what they could, and
they threw the rest away. And that was the way it was all over. Their power was out for about a week, and it made it very
Without
difficult. They are fortunate enough to have a basement, and the heat wasn’t oppressive down there.
refrigeration, food would rot on the shelves, the freezers would have to be emptied, and
people could actually go hungry. Without gas pumps, transportation arteries would clog
with abandoned vehicles. Without cell phones or computers, whole regions of the country
would be cut off from communication and families would be unable to reach each other.
Without air conditioning and without lifesaving technology and the service of hospitals
and nursing homes, the elderly and sick would become much sicker and die. Most major
hospitals have backup power, but it is only for a limited amount of time. It depends on how much fuel
they can store, and that is very limited”, Senator Grassley said. The devastation that the Senator describes is truly
unimaginable. To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for
example could also cripple harm the U.S. military . The senator notes that is that the same power
grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart
monitors also power “ every military base in our country.” “Although bases would be
prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days,
fuel supplies would run out ”, he said. Which means military command and control
centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut
Down completely. “Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many
weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley. “So in a few short
hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain
base functions”, he said. We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber
attack is something very real . Top national security officials—including the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense,
and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric
grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional Record). So how
serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start , or end a war over it , for sure
(see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_kVQrp_D0kY&feature=relmfu ).
A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met
with a “ full scale” US military response . That could include the use of “ nuclear
weapons ”, if authorized by the President.
Impact---Aerospace
Arms Sales Key---1NC
Arm sales are critical to the aerospace industry – government
funding has flatlined – only arm exports can fund ventures
Amy Holloway, 2013, CEO of Avalanche Consulting, Inc, Avalanche provides research,
marketing and strategic planning services to economic development organizations,
"Aerospace and Aviation: Finding Opportunities Amid Uncertainty", No Publication,
https://www.tradeandindustrydev.com/industry/aerospace-defense/aerospace-and-
aviation-finding-opportunities-amid-7846
Looking ahead, the

future fortunes of the aerospace and aviation industries are decidedly
mixed . Over the past decade, U.S. military spending supported over 50 percent of
industry sales, but with federal budget concerns and more conservative military
deployment strategies, demand is likely to remain flat or decline in the years ahead. Fiscal
austerity in the U.S. has forced many aerospace companies to look abroad for
growth. Direct commercial sales authorizations , which are granted by the U.S. State
Department to companies seeking to sell military wares to foreign countries, have
jumped dramatically over the past five years . Commercial sales authorizations grew
from $67 billion in 2006 to $154 billion in 2010 . Despite competition and barriers to
entry, U .S. aerospace firms have little choice but to seek overseas military market
opportunities in the years ahead.
Arms Sales Key---2NC
Exports are a critical component of the aerospace industry
Jeremy Leonard, 2017, Director of Industry Services at Oxford Economics, an
independent global advisory firm providing reports, forecasts and analytical tools, "US
Aerospace Industry: Flying High, Soaring Higher?", IndustryWeek,
https://www.industryweek.com/trade/us-aerospace-industry-flying-high-soaring-higher
With so much focus on worries about American products being uncompetitive with those produced elsewhere in the world
there are a number of
and the associated impact on jobs and domestic economic activity, it is easy to forget that
manufacturing sectors for which American dominance has persisted for decades and
shows very few signs of ebbing. Perhaps the best example is the aerospace sector.
The United States currently accounts for half of global production (with Canada adding
another 5%). While this share has declined substantially from close to 70% in the 1980s and 1990s, the reasons for the
decline are mainly due to the expansion of Airbus (particularly since the introduction of the A320 in 1987) and
consolidation in the U.S. when McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing in 1997. This has meant that North America and
Europe accounted for nearly 90% of global production through to the financial crisis, although that has fallen to 82%
today. Another important aspect of aerospace is the defense component . While smaller in size
than the commercial segment (U.S. shipments of defense aerospace equipment amount to about 25% of the national
the U.S. is by many measures more dominant in this space, with U.S.-
sector total),
based firms accounting for nearly 60% of global military sales. The aerospace
industry is a good business in which to be competitive , because the underlying
drivers of demand are very strong . Since the end of the Great Recession, new commercial aircraft orders
have typically been double, and in some years triple the number of annual deliveries. This reflects explosive growth of air
traffic in the emerging world as rising incomes and declines in ticket fares make air travel affordable for increasing
numbers of households. Global air travel has increased by 6.5% per annum since the end of the financial crisis, and this
growth in Asian passenger traffic in particular has accelerated in the past two years. The drop in crude-oil prices has
driven global airline profits to historic highs as operating costs pressures ease and increase scope for further investment
in fleet modernization. Continuation of these trends means that global aerospace production is expected to grow by 3.5%
per annum for the next ten years, almost a percentage point faster than global GDP. These geographic patterns of
production and demand are mirrored in U.S. aerospace trade performance (which includes not only finished aircraft, but
also parts and components that feed into supply chains of aircraft manufacturers). The trade surplus in aerospace
products reached $80 billion in 2015 on exports of $140 billion, both record highs. This surplus, which has widened in the
past 15 years both in absolute terms and as a percentage of aerospace exports, keeps the total U.S. trade deficit 10%
smaller than it otherwise would be. China became the most important single destination in 2013 (passing Japan and the
large European economies), but still only accounts for 10% of the total. But on a regional basis, the Asia-Pacific region
accounts for 40%, with Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan being other important destinations. This is a function
of both stronger short-haul travel within Asia and expansion of longer-haul routes to Europe and North America. Also
noteworthy is the importance of the Middle East and Africa in the export mix . Thanks
to the explosive growth of Persian Gulf-based carriers such as Emirates and Etihad, exports to that region reached 15%
A key question , of course, is the degree
of the sector total in 2015, nearly triple its share just a decade ago.
to which the competitive dominance of the U.S. aerospace industry will persist .
There are many reasons to be optimistic, the first and foremost of which is a well-earned reputation for reliability and
safety. This is a big part of the reason that, despite concerted efforts by China to develop a commercial airliner, its share
of global output is only 3%. Furthermore, test flights of the Comac C919—a short-haul commercial airliner manufactured
by the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China—have been delayed, and most observers agree that its cost-efficiency,
comfort, and safety will be insufficient for it gain significant market share. We do not expect China’s share of global
aerospace production to exceed 5% for the next 15 years. A second factor is history. The U.S. was the birthplace of
aviation, and geography has always favored the sector’s development thanks to a relatively large landmass with a widely
dispersed population that is conducive to air travel. Geopolitical history has only reinforced that advantage, as that has
encouraged heavy investment in the R&D, engineering and production infrastructure to create industrial clusters in
Seattle, southern California, Kansas and elsewhere. This is one of the key reasons why U.S. aerospace manufacturing
remained so dominant against European manufacturers such as de Havilland/Hawker, Fokker, Aérospatiale and the other
predecessors of Airbus. A final point is that more fundamental
indicators of competitiveness (such as
production per unit of capital and labor) have improved dramatically in the U.S. aerospace industry
in the past 15 years. Some of this improvement is common to some other manufacturing industries (automotive and
industrial machinery in particular), such as the use of enterprise-resource-planning systems to reduce inventories,
implementation of lean manufacturing techniques to reduce waste and improve quality. These have contributed to a 40%
improvement in the overall productivity of capital and labor for aerospace sector in the past 15 years, compared to a 10%
improvement for U.S. manufacturing as a whole. It also illustrates a widening competitive advantage against European
manufacturers, which partly explains why Europe’s share of global production has never been able to climb above 25%.
For all of these reasons, the already-soaring U.S. aerospace industry is set to fly higher, with
export growth expected to average a bit more than 3.5 % over the next decade. This demand, along with a
relatively robust outlook for air travel in the domestic market looking ahead, means that U.S. aerospace will maintain, if
not slightly increase, its dominant share of global production.
And even if sales are only a small component of the industry, budget
cuts to NASA means there is an increased reliance on private
companies
Michael Sheetz, 3-11-2019, Reporter, “NASA budget reveals even more reliance on
private companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin”, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/11/nasa-budget-more-reliance-on-private-companies-
like-spacex.html
The White House unveiled NASA’s 2020 budget on Monday and the $21 billion requested from Congress
reveals new opportunities for private space companies to earn lucrative future awards, several
industry analysts told CNBC. This is the first budget request under NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine. On a reference basis alone, the
budget uses the word “commercial” almost twice as much as last year . That is a boon to
companies like SpaceX, as CEO Elon Musk has said his company wants to be a part of returning cargo and humans to the moon’s surface,
as NASA aims to do. “This is potentially good for SpaceX, given it looks like on the lunar side they’re emphasizing commercial companies
more,” Morgan Stanley analyst Adam Jonas told CNBC. Jonas is widely followed due to his early call on electric automaker Tesla and
helped form a team of analysts to focus on investment opportunities from the space industry at Morgan Stanley. In comments on NASA TV
after the budget release, Bridenstine gave the recent SpaceX Demo-1 mission as an example for how reusable rockets and spacecraft are
how NASA can “drive down costs” and “increase access” to space, he said. Bridenstine contends that NASA needs “reusability in the entire
architecture” of its space exploration plans, as SpaceX has shown how re-using rockets for launches to low Earth orbit has proven cost
effective. “I think SpaceX certainly are going to be big winners as a result of this budget,” Chad Anderson, CEO of Space Angels, told
NASA wants to accelerate its plans to establish a permanent
CNBC. “Increase the use of commercial partnerships”
human presence on the surface of the moon . And Bridenstine plans to “increase the use
of commercial partnerships” to do that, the budget said. “Everything to this point has put the moon first in this
administration. It looks like they’re going all in,” Anderson said. NASA’s budget sets aside $363 million specifically to help companies
develop “a large lunar lander” to take cargo and astronauts to the moon’s surface. This funding and development model is similar to the
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services program, Anderson said, “which is incredibly encouraging.” That NASA program ended in
2013, after SpaceX and Orbital Sciences (now a division of Northrop Grumman) successfully developed new spacecraft and rockets for
NASA to send cargo to the International Space Station. Musk’s space company, as well as Jeff Bezos’ venture Blue Origin, are both
developing spacecraft capable of landing on the moon. There is “no doubt” both companies are working with NASA
on landing on the moon and other planetary bodies, Anderson said. Mike French, Bryce Space and Technology senior vice president, also
pointed to SpaceX and Blue Origin as top contenders for NASA lunar lander funds. He said there will be “an interesting mix of traditional
contractors” such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin also competing for NASA awards. Additionally, NASA has
nine companies competing for up to $2.6 billion in lunar transportation contracts. Known as the Commercial Lunar Payload Services
program (CLPS), the effort would send small payloads and robots to the moon’s surface as early as 2021. “CLPS is the most significant
near term revenue stream for startups,” French said. Under CLPS, the agency will award multiple contracts for lunar missions over the next
10 years. “Anyone working on lunar landers is also going to benefit,” Anderson said. Private rockets for exploration missions NASA wants
to set aside $10.7 billion for its lunar plans. But the way NASA expects to execute those plans continues to change, as billions of dollars in
cost overruns and years of delays have made the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and Orion spacecraft less viable. “It sounds like
people are fed up with these big projects like SLS, that are late and over budget,” Anderson said. In the past year
alone, NASA has moved two of its missions from SLS to commercial options: Lunar Gateway’s “power and propulsion element” and the
Europa Clipper mission to Jupiter, planned for 2023. ”[NASA has] had calls to arms for ideas and for the commercial community to be a part
of improving efficiency and reducing waste while achieving a fast time horizon,” Jonas said. “Seems to be the result of a bit of soul-
searching amongst the bodies who determine these budgets.” The door is now open for commercial
rockets to launch these missions . “Europa going commercial is a big deal,” French said, as the launch contract
represents a significant piece of $600 million that’s up for grabs. NASA estimates that switching from SLS to a private rocket will save over
$700 million. SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy rocket is one currently available option but French believes “anyone who thinks they can will come” to
NASA with a proposal for the mission, he said. That means NASA may consider Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket, United Launch Alliance’s
Vulcan rocket or Northrop Grumman’s OmegA rocket, according to French. “The big ship is slowly starting to tack and change course and
these are the early signs that people are paying attention,” Anderson said. “The private companies’ capability is real and comes at a
cheaper price point.” Business in Earth’s orbit NASA still plans to end funding of the International Space Station six years from now. The
administration is looking at making use of privately-built habitats in orbit, a key part of the commercialization of space, French said. Those
include NanoRacks, Bigelow Aerospace and Axiom Space. French also thinks there’s “a slightly different cloud” of space assembly and
manufacturing companies that will benefit from NASA’s budget, he said. Those companies are the likes of Made in Space and Maxar
Technologies-owned SSL, according to French. A small, $3 million line item called the Communications Services Program was a fresh
addition to NASA’s budget. The new program would replace the multi-billion dollar “government-owned Space Network with commercial
communications services and capabilities,” NASA budget said. While it’s not much funding now, TMF Associates analyst Tim Farrar said it
it would involve expenditures
could be a new revenue stream for satellite communications companies. “Ultimately
certainly in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year ,” Farrar told CNBC.
Every single dollar counts

Sheridan, Agence French Press, 13
(Kerry, Every Dollar Must Go to Bridge Gaps to Mars: NASA, 5-6-13,
http://www.industryweek.com/research-amp-development/every-dollar-must-go-bridge-
gaps-mars-nasa?page=2)
Setting foot on Mars by the 2030s is human destiny and a US priority , and every dollar
available must be spent on bridging gaps in knowledge on how to get there, NASA's
chief said Monday. Addressing a conference of space experts at George Washington University, NASA administrator Charles
Bolden said that despite hard economic times the United States is committed to
breaking new boundaries in space exploration. "A human mission to Mars is today the ultimate destination
in our solar system for humanity, and it is a priority for NASA. Our entire exploration program is aligned to support this goal," Bolden said.
President Barack Obama has proposed a $17.7 billion dollar budget for NASA in 2014, and he supports a "vibrant and coordinated strategy
for Mars exploration," Bolden said. Among the first steps to sending astronauts to Mars are NASA's plans to capture and relocate an
asteroid by 2025, a process that should inform future efforts to send humans into deep space, the former astronaut said. Also, US astronaut
Scott Kelly and Russian cosmonaut Mikhail Kornienko have volunteered to spend one year at the International Space Station beginning in
2015 to allow doctors to assess how long-duration zero gravity exposure affects bone density, muscle mass and vision. Currently, a rotating
cast of global astronauts each spend a maximum of six months aboard the orbiting outpost. But despite increasing interest in landing on
Mars, and a newly diverse space race that involves many more countries than old Cold War foes the United States and Russia, there is
plenty that experts do not know about how to reach Mars. For instance, there is no existing space vehicle to carry people on the seven-
month or longer journey there, not to mention no plan for returning people to Earth. Medical experts are unsure what the physical
ramifications would be for people who attempt to travel in high-radiation environments for such extended periods. And just how people
would survive, breathe, eat and drink on the dry, red planet are significant obstacles that have yet to be overcome. "The US has
demonstrated that we know how to get to the Moon," Bolden said. "What we have not demonstrated and what I think everyone in this room
-- well most people in this room will concede, is that there are technological gaps to sending humans to an asteroid and to Mars," he added.
"And so every single moment of our time and every single dollar of our assets must be dedicated to developing those technologies that
The U nited S tates is the only nation that has
allow us to go beyond low Earth orbit, beyond the Moon."
successfully sent robotic explorers to land on Mars, the most recent being Curiosity, which touched
down in August 2012. The first-of-its-kind landing demonstrated that humans have figured out how to send a one-ton package of machinery
to Mars. But many experts believe that the size of the package needed to maintain a human habitat on Mars would weigh more like 40 ton.
There also needs to be a suitable flight vehicle, and a type of fuel potent enough to get it there quickly. Perhaps a precursor to a human
landing on Mars would be another rover that would land at an established site, drill down and hopefully find fresh water, said John
Grunsfeld, NASA associate administrator for the science mission directorate. "That would also be the beacon that allows subsequent
missions to navigate to a very precise landing," said Grunsfeld. The three-day conference aims to offer a forum for experts to discuss the
latest technologies. It will feature discussions on astronaut health concerns Tuesday and an address by retired celebrity astronaut Buzz
Aldrin on Wednesday. "We
can't wait until the technology is available before we go and explore,"
Bolden said. "We now stand on the precipice of a second opportunity to press forward to
what I think is man's destiny, and that is to go to another planet."
Medical Innovation---1NC
Tech spinoffs from the aerospace industry are key to medical
innovation
Thirsk et al 9 Robert Thirsk, MDCM SM, Andre Kuipers, MD, Chiaki Mukai, MD PhD,
and David Williams, MDCM MSck, 2009, "Spinoffs from space," PubMed Central (PMC),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2696528/ - BS
Some of the technological advances required for space travel and the understanding
gained through space research have proved useful in the practice of medicine on
earth . Research into medicine in space , for example, has deepened our understanding of
human physiology . Entire journal issues have been devoted to this topic.1 Many
innovations and techniques for delivering medical care in space have been modified
and applied on earth . Go to: Telemedicine Providing long-distance care can be difficult at the best of times, but
caring for patients in space has added challenges. Spaceflight is the ultimate setting to demonstrate and
evaluate telemedicine concepts and procedures. Astronauts with minimal training can
obtain diagnostic-quality ultrasonography images and can perform other medical and surgical procedures with
remote guidance.2 These protocols are now being adapted for remote clinical settings. For example, a procedure for ultrasonography
developed for spaceflight is now being used in northern Canada to diagnose pneumothoraces following trauma.3 Go to: Innovations
Innovations from space often have applications on earth.4 The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration ( NASA ) has documented over 1500 space technologies that have been
adapted for societal applications, such as protective clothing for fire fighters, sturdy
roofing materials and safer school buses.5 Technologies have been transferred for use in
transportation, public safety, consumer goods, environmental resources, computer technology
and industry. Although Tang, Teflon and Velcro are frequently cited as being spinoffs of the space program, this is untrue. Each of these
products existed before spaceflight, but useful applications for each have been found in space. Health and medicine are perhaps the
biggest beneficiaries of these dual-use technologies. Liquid-cooling garments, originally developed to protect astronauts working on the
surface of the moon from the scorching heat of a lunar day, are now commonly used in many occupational, medical and athletic settings.6
In medicine, these
garments are used to treat many conditions, including spinal injuries,
multiple sclerosis and sports injuries.
That’s key to counter emerging pandemics, specifically ABR

Weatherall 6 David Weatherall, Brian Greenwood, Heng Leng Chee, Prawase Wasi,
2006, "Science and Technology for Disease Control: Past, Present, and Future," NCBI
Bookshelf, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11740/ - BS
Partial Control of Infectious Disease The control of communicable disease has been
the major advance of the 20th century in scientific medicine . It reflects the
combination of improved environmental conditions and public health together with the
development of immunization , antimicrobial chemotherapy, and the increasing ability
to identify new pathogenic organisms. Currently, live or killed viral or bacterial vaccines—or those based on bacterial
polysaccharides or bacterial toxoids—are licensed for the control of 29 common communicable
diseases worldwide. The highlight of the field was the eradication of smallpox by 1977. The next target of the World Health
Organization (WHO) is the global eradication of poliomyelitis. In 1998, the disease was endemic in more than 125 countries. After a
resurgence in 2002, when
the number of cases rose to 1,918, the numbers dropped again in
2003 to 748; by March 2004, only 32 cases had been confirmed (Roberts 2004). The Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI),
launched in 1974, which has been taken up by many countries with slight modification, includes Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) and oral
polio vaccine at birth; diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis at 6, 10, and 14 weeks; measles; and, where relevant, yellow fever at 9 months.
Hepatitis B is added at different times in different communities. By 1998, hepatitis B vaccine
had been incorporated into the national programs of 90 countries, but an estimated 70 percent of the
world's hepatitis B carriers still live in countries without programs (Nossal 1999). Indeed, among 12 million childhood deaths analyzed in
1998, almost 4 million were the result of diseases for which adequate vaccines are available (WHO 2002a). The development of
sulfonamides and penicillin in the period preceding World War II was followed by a remarkable period of progress in the discovery of
antimicrobial agents effective against bacteria, fungi, viruses, protozoa, and helminths. Overall, knowledge of the pharmacological mode of
action of these agents is best established for antibacterial and antiviral drugs. Antibacterial agents may affect cell wall or protein synthesis,
nucleic acid formation, or critical metabolic pathways. Be cause
viruses live and replicate in host cells,
antiviral chemotherapy has presented a much greater challenge. However, particularly with the
challenge posed by HIV/AIDS, a wide range of antiviral agents has been developed, most of which are nucleoside analogues, nucleoside or
nonnucleoside reverse-transcriptase inhibitors, or protease inhibitors. Essentially, those agents interfere with critical self-copying or
Knowledge of the modes of action of antifungal and
assembly functions of viruses or retroviruses.
antiparasitic agents is increasing as well. Resistance to antimicrobial agents has

been recognized since the introduction of effective antibiotics ; within a few years,
penicillin-resistant strains of Staphylococcus aureus became widespread and penicillin-
susceptible strains are now very uncommon (Finch and Williams 1999). At least in part caused by the
indiscriminate use of antibiotics in medical practice, animal husbandry, and agriculture, multiple-antibiotic-resistant bacteria are now
widespread. Resistance to antiviral agents is also occurring with increasing frequency (Perrin and Telenti 1998), and drug resistance to
The
malaria has gradually increased in frequency and distribution across continents (Noedl, Wongsrichanalai, and Wernsdorfer 2003).
critical issue of drug resistance to infectious agents is covered in detail in chapter 55. In
summary, although the 20th century witnessed remarkable advances in the control of
communicable disease , the current position is uncertain . The emergence of new
infectious agents , as evidenced by the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic
in 2002, is a reminder of the constant danger posed by the appearance of novel organisms;
more than 30 new infective agents have been identified since 1970. Effective
vaccines have not yet been developed for some of the most common infections—notably tuberculosis, malaria,
and HIV—and rapidly increasing populations of organisms are resistant to antibacterial and antiviral agents. Furthermore ,
development of new antibiotics and effective antiviral agents with which to control
such agents has declined . The indiscriminate use of antibiotics, both in the community and in the hospital populations of
the industrial countries, has encouraged the emergence of resistance, a phenomenon exacerbated in some of the developing countries by
Finally, public
the use of single antimicrobial agents when combinations would have been less likely to produce resistant strains.
health measures have been hampered by the rapid movement of populations and by
war, famine, and similar social disruptions in developing countries. In short, the war
against communicable disease is far from over.
Diseases cause extinction

Ranu Dhillon 17, instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and
Women’s Hospital in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing
countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic
instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital
in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing countries and served as
an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic, Harvard Business
Review, 3-15-17, “The World Is Completely Unprepared for a Global Pandemic”,
https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-world-is-completely-unprepared-for-a-global-pandemic
We fear it is only a matter of time before we face a deadlier and more contagious
pathogen , yet the threat of a deadly pandemic remains dangerously overlooked.
Pandemics now occur with greater frequency , due to factors such as climate change ,
urbanization , and international travel . Other factors, such as a weak World Health Organization and
potentially massive cuts to funding for U.S. scientific research and foreign aid, including funding for the United
Nations, stand to deepen our vulnerability. We also face the specter of novel and
mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than diseases we have seen
before . With the advent of genome-editing technologies, bioterrorists could artificially engineer new plagues, a threat that Ashton
Carter, the former U.S. secretary of defense, thinks could rival nuclear weapons in deadliness . The two of us have
advised the president of Guinea on stopping Ebola. In addition, we have worked on ways to contain the spread of Zika and have informally
advised U.S. and international organizations on the matter. Our experiences tell us that the world is
unprepared for these threats. We urgently need to change this trajectory. We can start by learning four lessons from the
gaps exposed by the Ebola and Zika pandemics. Faster Vaccine Development The most effective way to stop pandemics is with vaccines.
However, with Ebola there was no vaccine, and only now, years later, has one proven effective. This has been the case with Zika, too.
Though there has been rapid progress in developing and getting a vaccine to market, it is not fast enough, and Zika has already spread
worldwide. Many other diseases do not have vaccines, and developing them takes too long when a pandemic is already under way. We
need faster pipelines, such as the one that the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations is trying to create, to preemptively develop
vaccines for diseases predicted to cause outbreaks in the near future. Point-of-Care Diagnostics Even with such efforts, vaccines will not be
ready for many diseases and would not even be an option for novel or artificially engineered pathogens. With no vaccine for Ebola, our next
best strategy was to identify who was infected as quickly as possible and isolate them before they infected others. Because Ebola’s
symptoms were identical to common illnesses like malaria, diagnosis required laboratory testing that could not be easily scaled. As a result,
many patients were only tested after several days of being contagious and infecting others. Some were never tested at all, and about 40%
of patients in Ebola treatment centers did not actually have Ebola. Many dangerous pathogens similarly require laboratory testing that is
difficult to scale. Florida, for example, has not been able to expand testing for Zika, so pregnant women wait weeks to know if their babies
might be affected. What’s needed are point-of-care diagnostics that, like pregnancy tests, can be used by frontline responders or patients
themselves to detect infection right away, where they live. These tests already exist for many diseases, and the technology behind them is
well-established. However, the process for their validation is slow and messy. Point-of-care diagnostics for Ebola, for example, were
We need stronger global
available but never used because of such bottlenecks. Greater Global Coordination
coordination . The responsibility for controlling pandemics is fragmented, spread

across too many players with no unifying authority . In Guinea we forged a response out of an amalgam
of over 30 organizations, each of which had its own priorities. In Ebola’s aftermath, there have been calls for a
mechanism for responding to pandemics similar to the advance planning and training
that NATO has in place for its numerous members to respond to military threats in a
quick, coordinated fashion. This is the right thinking, but we are far from seeing it happen. The errors that allowed Ebola to
become a crisis replayed with Zika, and the WHO, which should anchor global action, continues to suffer
from a lack of credibility. Stronger Local Health Systems International actors are essential but
cannot parachute into countries and navigate local dynamics quickly enough to
contain outbreaks . In Guinea it took months to establish the ground game needed to stop the pandemic, with Ebola continuing
to spread in the meantime. We need to help developing countries establish health systems that can provide routine care and, when
needed, coordinate with international responders to contain new outbreaks. Local health systems could be established for about half of the
$3.6 billion ultimately spent on creating an Ebola response from scratch. Access to routine care is also essential
for knowing when an outbreak is taking root and establishing trust. For months, Ebola spread before anyone knew it was happening, and
then lingered because communities who had never had basic health care doubted the intentions of foreigners flooding into their villages.
The turning point in the pandemic came when they began to trust what they were hearing about Ebola and understood what they needed to
With Ebola and Zika, we lacked these four things
do to halt its spread: identify those exposed and safely bury the dead.
— vaccines, diagnostics, global coordination, and local health systems — which are still urgently
needed. However, prevailing political headwinds in the United States, which has played a key role in
combatting pandemics around the world , threaten to make things worse. The Trump administration is seeking
drastic budget cuts in funding for foreign aid and scientific research. The U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International
Development may lose over one-third of their budgets, including half of the funding the U.S. usually provides to the UN. The National
Institutes of Health, which has been on the vanguard of vaccines and diagnostics research, may also face cuts. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, which has been at the forefront of responding to outbreaks, remains without a director, and, if the Affordable Care
Act is repealed, would lose $891 million, 12% of its overall budget, provided to it for immunization programs, monitoring and responding to
outbreaks, and other public health initiatives. Investing in our ability to prevent and contain pandemics
through revitalized national and international institutions should be our shared goal. However, if U.S.
agencies become less able to respond to pandemics, leading institutions from other nations, such as Institut Pasteur and the National
Institute of Health and Medical Research in France, the Wellcome Trust and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in the UK,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs have done instrumental research and response work in previous pandemics), would need to
Pandemics are an existential threat on

step in to fill the void. There is no border wall against disease.
par with climate change and nuclear conflict . We are at a critical crossroads, where we must either
take the steps needed to prepare for this threat or become even more vulnerable. It is only a matter of time before we are hit by a deadlier,
more contagious pandemic. Will we be ready?
Medical Innovation---Econ Impact---2NC
Biotech is key to the economy
John Raidt 14, Vice President, Jones Group International Scholar, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Foundation Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council, "Patents and Biotechnology", US
Chamber of Commerce Foundation, https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/patents-and-
biotechnology
BENEFITS: JOB CREATION. As reported in Science magazine, “The North American biotech business
has grown to a behemoth that consists of more than 1,280 companies , with market
capitalization exceeding $200 billion . Last year’s sales of $13.4 billion and revenues of $18.6 billion more
than doubled the industry’s figures for 1993, according to consulting firm Ernst & Young.”3 Moreover, in 2012,
“American biotechnology companies spent $9.9 billion on research and development
( R&D )” to keep the pipeline of solutions and job creation flowing.4 According to the Biotechnology
Industry Organization, the industry is responsible for “ directly employing 1.42 million
Americans in high-quality jobs and indirectly supporting an additional 6.6 million
workers ; [and] the average biotechnology employee makes $77,595 annually, far
above the national average salary .”5 Wages in the field remain “79% greater than the average paid in the
overall national private sector.”6 By some estimates, “ biomedical engineering jobs are expected to
grow a staggering 72% by 2018, the highest percentage growth of any field by far .”7
“The message is clear,” says the Battelle and Biotechnology Industry Organization and Biothreport, “a strong
bioscience industry base offers the United States of America … a high value economic
driver . It stands out in its creation of high quality jobs , the breadth of markets it
serves, and its r esearch and d evelopment.”8
Economic collapse degrades global crisis-response capacity and

causes extinction
Hanna Samir Kassab 17. Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northern
Michigan University, Prioritization Theory and Defensive Foreign Policy. Springer
International Publishing, 2017. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48018-3.
Great powers, with all their resources, power and influence, have inherent weaknesses .
These weaknesses are all part of today’s international system as defined by complex interdependence, but they also emanate from weak
states. Because
weak states are so exposed to shock , vulnerabilities have time to ripen and
become part of the international structure , thereby having what I call systemic reach. While
Structural Realism posits that the system is constructed by states’ distribution of capabilities, I add that other facets of international politics
threats force s
—vulnerabilities—also create the system and the way states interact with each other. The systemic reach of these
states to act to bolster their chances of survival. I missed this point in Weak States in International Relations
Theory. This study then aims to finish what my dissertation started: to theorize how systemic vulnerabilities shape the international system
positive, long-term, sustainable economic
and hence state behavior. The core of this work posits that
development for all states as [is] the only way to correct vulnerabilities. Creating a pragmatic,
stable and sound economic policy for all states who are voluntarily open to the system (barring rogue states and peoples
who prefer traditional living), is at the backbone of neutralizing vulnerability. An economically
developed nation is more prepared to deal with systemic shock than others because it has
theresources to do so. Developed countries are more prepared than others to deal with outbreaks of
disease , financial crises , sudden environmental disaster , terrorism and drug
trafficking and so on than weaker states because they have the resources to do so. Weaker, more underdeveloped states depend
on great powers to bail them out during times of trouble; they know great powers must do so as a part of their hegemonic responsibility.
Using theory and case studies, this work theorizes the structure of international politics in our day. Taking a holistic look at the mechanisms
we are all in this together . While
that guide state behavior, I demonstrate the simple fact that as a global community,
states tend to pursue interests selfishly, the fact remains that one state’s trouble can spread
throughout the globe . States only exist to give people the chance to practice self-determination and to survive against other
states. These are all normative statements and do not reflect reality. This book is an attempt to describe reality divorced from traditional
understandings of the state, taking into account changes in our world. The realists that stubbornly defend their theories (Kassab and Wu
2014) must take these matters seriously.
Medical Innovation---Aerospace Key---2NC
The aerospace industry is key to medical innovations
Brady 11 Bryan Brady, Vice President, Defense/Aerospace, Avnet Electronics
Marketing Americas, 2011, "Defense/Aero Spinoffs Remain an Exceptional Source for
Breakthrough Technology," AvNet,
https://www.avnet.com/wps/portal/apac/resources/technical-
articles/article/markets/aerospace-and-defense/def-aero-spinoffs-remain-exceptional-
src-breakthrough-tech/ - BS
To me, that’s
the part of the story we should focus on. It’s through these programs that
some of the most influential commercial , industrial and medical product
advancements of our time have gotten their start, including cellular phones, personal
computing, jet engines, GPS and medical imaging . Every day companies in the technology
community make decisions about how to position their businesses to capitalize on the
“next big thing ” in high-tech electronics . I believe that a closer look at federally-funded investments in
defense/aerospace research and development (R&D ) could not only uncover
prospects to sell more components and services into the defense sector, but also identify
potential spinoff opportunities . So, let’s take a look at some of the projects and
technologies currently in the pipeline that could be influential to the electronics supply
chain in the years to come. Let me preface this discussion with the acknowledgment that I’m not a technologist. Any of the
following speculations are based solely on my professional observations and experience, not my knowledge of any proprietary information.
Drones Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are a great example of how a military-developed technology can transition into the
civilian sector. Modern drones have become a critical component of U.S. military’s reconnaissance and strike missions over the past
decade, and were reportedly central to the CIA’s tracking of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Since FY2000, DoD spending on UAVs has
increased from $284 million to $3.3 billion in FY2010, and drones now account for 31% of all military aircraft, according to 2012
Congressional Research Report on U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems. Of course, drone technology like the MQ-1 Predator with its 48-ft.
wingspan and $4M+ price tag requires some substantial reengineering to achieve a device of a size and cost that would be feasible in
civilian applications, such as police surveillance and corporate security. (See United States Air Force 2011 Budget report.) But it can, and
has, been done. Another highly promising, and somewhat surprising, use for drones outside defense is in the agriculture sector. Earlier this
year, in an interview with Wired magazine, Chris Mailey, vice president of the drone promotion organization Association for Unmanned
Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), was quoted as saying that agriculture “is going to be the big market” for drones. By enabling more
efficient land surveying and precision crop spraying, drones can help farmers lower costs and increase productivity. Also on the horizon is a
new breed of “micro” drones. DARPA is currently experimenting with micro drones, which simulate the movements of insects and birds to
achieve superior flight capabilities. Setting aside the admittedly sticky privacy issues, the commercial possibilities for smaller, faster and
cheaper drones are almost limitless. Personally, I can easily imagine a world where automobiles are outfitted with a micro drone that can be
launched to scout out traffic conditions, giving drivers a true “eye in the sky.” As a parent, I could also get on board with the idea of having
personal drones that can be launched to keep an eye on the kids as they play down the street at the local playground - these days, you
really can’t be too cautious. In addition, current defense research being done with drones could be truly revolutionary in the field of aviation
safety. Rockwell Collins is experimenting with an adaptive flight control system that uses sensors and algorithms to detect when a drone
sustains catastrophic wing damage, then automatically readjust the aircraft’s aerodynamics to enable it to land safely. Much work is yet to
be done to integrate remote controlled and semi-autonomous aircraft into today’s civil aviation scheme, but clearly the opportunity for civil
and consumer UAV applications is limited only by imagination. Cyberspace Another example of government investment with broad
implications in the commercial sector is cyberspace. Despite calls to reduce budgets, the DoD’s FY14 budget includes approximately $5
billion for cyberspace operations, up 20% from FY12. These investments reflect the reality of our world today, which is that greatest threats
in cyberspace are no longer teenage hackers and social agitators. The cyber world represents the next great battleground between feuding
nations. Use of the Internet to “attack” an adversary’s infrastructure, including power and water supply, currency markets or air traffic
control is an all-to-real threat. Just ask Iran, hose Natanz nuclear enrichment facility was compromised by the Stuxnet worm in 2010. As a
result, the U.S. government is expending a tremendous amount of resource on developing our nation’s defensive and offensive cyber
capabilities. Much of the exact nature of this research is not publicly known, but clearly tools to automate vulnerability detection, network
monitoring and analysis and survivability solutions that enable DoD information systems to operate even if they are attacked would be
among the top priorities. One publically-announced program under development by DARPA is the PROgramming Computation on
EncryptEd DATA or PROCEED. Considered a “big reach” program, the goal is to deploy “fully holomorphic encryption,” to safeguard
assured computations on untrusted hardware by allowing devices to compute with encrypted data without first decrypting it, making it more
difficult for malware programmers to write viruses. Whether you are talking about securing highly classified military intelligence, public
voting systems or cloud computing, this tech is definitely one to watch. Robotics Among the first documented use of robotics in U.S.
defense/aerospace were the robotic arms used on Viking 1 and 2 Mars space probes in 1976 for collecting surface samples. Since then,
robotics like the Mars Rover have made international news with the stunning discovery that at one time – albeit billions of years ago – Mars
could have supported life. In defense circles today, robots are more commonly referred to as unmanned vehicles – either aerial (UAVs)
such as drones or ground (UGVs) like the Packbot, used for route clearance and improvised explosive device detection and disposal. While
UGVs have proven to be true lifesavers for U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, a recent report of the Defense Science Board Task Force
on the Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems concluded, “autonomy technology is being underutilized.” Military leaders are eager for access to
autonomous (i.e. not remote controlled) unmanned ground vehicles to perform tasks including reconnaissance, surveillance and target
acquisition as well as logistics and cargo transportation. To meet this demand, the DoD’s FY 2014 budget includes approximately $300
million for the development of systems that perform complex military missions in dynamic environments. One such program currently under
development is a semi-autonomous four-legged robot called the Legged Squad Support System (LS3), which is designed to carry heavy
loads for dismounted troops in the field. The current LS3 prototype from Boston Dynamics, nicknamed AlphaDog, can haul up to 400 lbs. of
gear and enough fuel for a 20 mile mission lasting 24 hours. It responds to both visual cues and voice commands, it can navigate rugged
terrain and even right itself if it falls over. Another interesting robotic application being tested for ground troops is the HULC robotic
exoskeleton, developed by Lockheed Martin. HULC is a hydraulic-powered anthropomorphic exoskeleton worn by troops to ease the
burden of carrying heavy combat loads. While there might not be a tremendously wide commercial need for this kind of technology, one
company has found a truly commendable application. New Zealand-based Rex Bionics Ltd. has adapted this concept to create a self-
supporting robotic exoskeleton called Rex, which enables mobility-impaired and wheelchair-bound individuals to stand, walk and even climb
stairs. Fighting for Our Future The United States has long enjoyed its leadership position in global technology and innovation, but the
dramatic economic growth of China throughout the past decade has many wondering if the U.S. has what it takes to stay on top. I have no
doubt that we do, but to do so will require that we more aggressively exploit the potential that lies right in front of us. The technologies
discussed here are clearly only a drop of water in an ocean of innovation springing from defense/aerospace R&D, but they illustrate the
vast opportunity for technology transfer and the potential economic multiplier effect of these federally-funded investments. It’s our job, as a
technology community, to identify various spinoff opportunities and act quickly and decisively to bring them to market. Now, I don’t mean to
oversimplify the task at hand. Revolutionary ideas rarely jump out and announce themselves and the technology transfer process can be
Ken
lengthy and costly. However, the payoff, both in terms of corporate revenue and national competitiveness cannot be undervalued.
Gabriel, Deputy Director of DARPA best summed up the significance of federally funded
R&D in his February 2012 statement to the United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: “Some of the Agency’s greatest
contributions – things we now take for granted and as having been inevitable – were , at
their inception, often considered impossible …But these seemingly impossible things were
turned to the improbable and then to the inevitable by people with vision and
determination to make their vision real .” Mil-to-civilian technology transfers have
laid the groundwork for the development of some of our nation’s most influential
commercial, industrial and medical product advancements , such as cellular phones, personal
computing, bar coding and medical imaging .
AND, the aerospace industry is key to medical tech transfers – that’s key
Rouse et al 91 Rouse DJ, Winfield DL, Canada SC., 1991, "NASA spinoffs to
bioengineering and medicine.," Pubmeddev, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?
term=Canada%20SC%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=11540738 - BS
Through the active transfer of technology , the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration ( NASA ) Technology Utilization (TU) Program assists private
companies , associations, and government agencies to make effective use of NASA's technological resources
to improve U.S. economic competitiveness and to provide societal benefit . Aerospace technology
from areas such as digital image processing, space medicine and biology, microelectronics, optics and
electrooptics, and ultrasonic imaging have found many secondary applications in
medicine . Examples of technology spinoffs are briefly discussed to illustrate the benefits
realized through adaptation of aerospace technology to solve health care problems.
Successful implementation of new technologies increasingly requires the collaboration of
industry, universities, and government, and the TU Program serves as the liaison to establish such collaborations with
NASA. NASA technology is an important resource to support the development of new
medical products and techniques that will further advance the quality of health care
available in the U.S. and worldwide .
Medical Innovation---Solves Disease---2NC
Medical research and innovation is key to solve environmental
pathogens
Gerard A. Cangelosi 5, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and
Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD
in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology
and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R.
Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From
Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,”
http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-
from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens - BS
The key difference between environmental pathogens and other human pathogens is
their ability to survive and thrive outside the host . Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult
to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they
a great deal more research is needed . By grouping

exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but
together phylogenetically diverse organisms under the umbrella of "environmental pathogens," it is hoped that the
topic can gain the critical mass needed for sustained progress. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other
research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of
the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion
with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental
The development of improved diagnostic techniques is critical for

engineers, and public health experts.
accurate assessment of health risks and potential human or animal population impact
associated with environmental pathogens. ¶ If the impacts of these diseases are to be
effectively controlled , the techniques used to monitor and control infections by
environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and
vaccines— require improvement . The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special
problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less
potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including
development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools.
It’s key to solve disease

Lois M. Baron 4, Managing Editor for Biotechnology & You, “Coming Soon to a Person
Near You,” http://www.biotechinstitute.org/download/files/YourWorld/yw-141-emerging-
diseases.pdf - BS
Around the world, medical personnel are running up against new forms of familiar
diseases that can’t be prevented by vaccines or treated with drugs. Madeline Drexler, author of
Secret Agents, discusses these “superbugs” (p. 10). When it comes to adapting, viruses, bacteria, fungi, and protozoa—
called “microorganisms”—are way ahead of humans. A generation for us is 20 years. For a bacterium, it’s every 20 or 30
minutes. Even more alarming is that it takes, on average, 17 years to come up with an antibiotic to fight a disease-carrying
bacterium that can develop resistance practically as fast as it replicates. ¶ And, as
if all that wasn’t enough, the
threat of biological warfare looms , dredging up fearsome illnesses. Smallpox, anthrax,
plague, botulism, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers such as the Ebola virus are considered by
the C enters for D isease C ontrol and Prevention to be the likeliest agents of bioterrorism .¶ In the
industrialized world, we’ve come to rely on vaccines and antibiotics to protect us from disease. Our
known monsters seemed taken care of. But with the ease and speed of international travel, it is
more likely that no one will be safe from diseases that are widespread in less developed
countries, such as Chagas disease, dengue fever, rotavirus, and leishmaniasis. ¶ Public health officials agree that
research for a vaccine or treatment ramps up significantly when an illness begins hitting North Americans. West Nile virus
has been circulating in other parts of the world for decades, but now that it’s in the United States, a vaccine for horses is
already on the market and a vaccine for humans is in clinical trials —the last step before it can be approved by the Food
and Drug Administration. ¶ Fighting new and old infectious diseases demands the attention of many disciplines.
Government researchers have to work with those at universities, public organizations, and private companies to find ways
to identify and counter diseases. ¶ Such a multidisciplinary approach is helping, for example, in the global fight on
tuberculosis. A private biotech company funded by the U.S. National Institutes of Health has developed the first
tuberculosis vaccine to be tested in people in the United States in more than 60 years. Using recombinant DNA
technology, the vaccine contains two fused TB proteins combined with substances that further boost the immune system’s
response (adjuvants). ¶ Biotechnology plays a part in the response to any new disease. In this
issue we focus on human health, but animals and plants are also affected. West Nile virus rarely causes death in people,
but about three out of every 10 infected horses die. Plant diseases caused by viruses, fungi, bacteria, and phytoplasmas
Using biotechnology can help scientists quickly detect
are a major constraint on crop production. ¶
and diagnose diseases . At the same time, biotechnology joins basic research in helping develop
medical counter measures , such as surveillance tools, diagnostic tests ,
vaccines , and treatments .
Medical Innovation---AT: Disease Defense
Disease is a non-linear, existential risk---encompasses AND
outweighs other threats
Dennis Pamlin & Stuart Armstrong 15, Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager
Global Risks, Global Challenges Foundation, and Stuart Armstrong, James Martin
Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of
Oxford, February 2015, “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization:
The case for a new risk category,” Global Challenges Foundation, p.30-93,
https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-
impact.pdf
A pandemic (from Greek πᾶν, pan, “all”, and δῆμος demos, “people”) is an epidemic of
3.1 Current risks Pandemic 3.1.4 Global
infectious disease that has spread through human populations across a large region ;
for instance several continents , or even worldwide . Here only worldwide events are included. A
widespread endemic disease that is stable in terms of how many people become sick from it is not a pandemic. 260 84
Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 3.1 Current risks
Infectious diseases have
3.1.4.1 Expected impact disaggregation 3.1.4.2 Probability Influenza subtypes266
been one of the greatest causes of mortality in history . Unlike many other global
challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good
data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to
follow a power law with a small exponent : many plagues have been found to follow a power law with
exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed 262 to a significant degree.263
In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events .264 If this
law holds for future pandemics as well,265 then the majority of people who will die from
epidemics will likely die from the single largest pandemic . Most epidemic fatalities follow a power
law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish Flu – being even more deadly.267 There are other
grounds for suspecting that such a highimpact epidemic will have a greater probability than
usually assumed . All the features of an extremely devastating disease already exist in
nature : essentially incurable (Ebola268), nearly always fatal (rabies269), extremely
infectious (common cold270), and long incubation periods (HIV271). If a pathogen were
to emerge that somehow combined these features (and influenza has demonstrated
antigenic shift , the ability to combine features from different viruses272), its death toll
would be extreme. Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably,
making past comparisons problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and
medical research, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated to combating diseases. Private
insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 Set against this is the fact that modern
transport and dense human population allow infections to spread much more
rapidly274, and there is the potential for urban slums to serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such
as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to
the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated locations. Hence the risk of a civilisation collapse
would come from the
ripple effect of the fatalities and the policy responses. These would include
political and agricultural disruption as well as economic dislocation and damage to
the world’s trade network (including the food trade). Extinction risk is only possible if the
aftermath of the epidemic fragments and diminishes human society to the extent that
recovery becomes impossible277 before humanity succumbs to other risks (such as
climate change or further pandemics ). Five important factors in estimating the
probabilities and impacts of the challenge: 1. What the true probability distribution for pandemics is,
especially at the tail. 2. The capacity of modern international health systems to deal with an
extreme pandemic. 3. How fast medical research can proceed in an emergency. 4. How mobility of goods and
people, as well as population density, will affect pandemic transmission. 5. Whether humans can develop novel and
effective anti-pandemic solutions.
Outweighs climate change and nuclear war.

Ranu Dhillon 17, instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and
Women’s Hospital in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing
countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic
instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital
in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing countries and served as
an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic, Harvard Business
Review, 3-15-17, “The World Is Completely Unprepared for a Global Pandemic”,
https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-world-is-completely-unprepared-for-a-global-pandemic
We fear it is only a matter of time before we face a deadlier and more contagious
pathogen , yet the threat of a deadly pandemic remains dangerously overlooked.
Pandemics now occur with greater frequency , due to factors such as climate change ,
urbanization , and international travel . Other factors, such as a weak World Health Organization and
potentially massive cuts to funding for U.S. scientific research and foreign aid, including funding for the United
Nations, stand to deepen our vulnerability. We also face the specter of novel and
mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than diseases we have seen
before . With the advent of genome-editing technologies, bioterrorists could artificially engineer new plagues, a threat that Ashton
Carter, the former U.S. secretary of defense, thinks could rival nuclear weapons in deadliness . The two of us have
advised the president of Guinea on stopping Ebola. In addition, we have worked on ways to contain the spread of Zika and have informally
Our experiences tell us that the world is
advised U.S. and international organizations on the matter.
unprepared for these threats. We urgently need to change this trajectory. We can start by learning four lessons from the
gaps exposed by the Ebola and Zika pandemics. Faster Vaccine Development The most effective way to stop pandemics is with vaccines.
However, with Ebola there was no vaccine, and only now, years later, has one proven effective. This has been the case with Zika, too.
Though there has been rapid progress in developing and getting a vaccine to market, it is not fast enough, and Zika has already spread
worldwide. Many other diseases do not have vaccines, and developing them takes too long when a pandemic is already under way. We
need faster pipelines, such as the one that the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations is trying to create, to preemptively develop
vaccines for diseases predicted to cause outbreaks in the near future. Poinkt-of-Care Diagnostics Even with such efforts, vaccines will not
be ready for many diseases and would not even be an option for novel or artificially engineered pathogens. With no vaccine for Ebola, our
next best strategy was to identify who was infected as quickly as possible and isolate them before they infected others. Because Ebola’s
symptoms were identical to common illnesses like malaria, diagnosis required laboratory testing that could not be easily scaled. As a result,
many patients were only tested after several days of being contagious and infecting others. Some were never tested at all, and about 40%
of patients in Ebola treatment centers did not actually have Ebola. Many dangerous pathogens similarly require laboratory testing that is
difficult to scale. Florida, for example, has not been able to expand testing for Zika, so pregnant women wait weeks to know if their babies
might be affected. What’s needed are point-of-care diagnostics that, like pregnancy tests, can be used by frontline responders or patients
themselves to detect infection right away, where they live. These tests already exist for many diseases, and the technology behind them is
well-established. However, the process for their validation is slow and messy. Point-of-care diagnostics for Ebola, for example, were
We need stronger global
available but never used because of such bottlenecks. Greater Global Coordination
coordination . The responsibility for controlling pandemics is fragmented, spread

across too many players with no unifying authority . In Guinea we forged a response out of an amalgam
of over 30 organizations, each of which had its own priorities. In Ebola’s aftermath, there have been calls for a
mechanism for responding to pandemics similar to the advance planning and training
that NATO has in place for its numerous members to respond to military threats in a
quick, coordinated fashion. This is the right thinking, but we are far from seeing it happen. The errors that allowed Ebola to
become a crisis replayed with Zika, and the WHO, which should anchor global action, continues to suffer
from a lack of credibility. Stronger Local Health Systems International actors are essential but
cannot parachute into countries and navigate local dynamics quickly enough to
contain outbreaks . In Guinea it took months to establish the ground game needed to stop the pandemic, with Ebola continuing
to spread in the meantime. We need to help developing countries establish health systems that can provide routine care and, when
needed, coordinate with international responders to contain new outbreaks. Local health systems could be established for about half of the
$3.6 billion ultimately spent on creating an Ebola response from scratch. Access to routine care is also essential
for knowing when an outbreak is taking root and establishing trust. For months, Ebola spread before anyone knew it was happening, and
then lingered because communities who had never had basic health care doubted the intentions of foreigners flooding into their villages.
The turning point in the pandemic came when they began to trust what they were hearing about Ebola and understood what they needed to
With Ebola and Zika, we lacked these four things
do to halt its spread: identify those exposed and safely bury the dead.
— vaccines, diagnostics, global coordination, and local health systems — which are still urgently
needed. However, prevailing political headwinds in the United States, which has played a key role in
combatting pandemics around the world , threaten to make things worse. The Trump administration is seeking
drastic budget cuts in funding for foreign aid and scientific research. The U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International
Development may lose over one-third of their budgets, including half of the funding the U.S. usually provides to the UN. The National
Institutes of Health, which has been on the vanguard of vaccines and diagnostics research, may also face cuts. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, which has been at the forefront of responding to outbreaks, remains without a director, and, if the Affordable Care
Act is repealed, would lose $891 million, 12% of its overall budget, provided to it for immunization programs, monitoring and responding to
Investing in our ability to prevent and contain pandemics
outbreaks, and other public health initiatives.
through revitalized national and international institutions should be our shared goal. However, if U.S.
agencies become less able to respond to pandemics, leading institutions from other nations, such as Institut Pasteur and the National
Institute of Health and Medical Research in France, the Wellcome Trust and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in the UK,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs have done instrumental research and response work in previous pandemics), would need to
Pandemics are an existential threat on

step in to fill the void. There is no border wall against disease.
par with climate change and nuclear conflict . We are at a critical crossroads, where we must either
take the steps needed to prepare for this threat or become even more vulnerable. It is only a matter of time before we are hit by a deadlier,
more contagious pandemic. Will we be ready?
Diseases cause extinction

Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and
Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and
Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal
Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology
Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full
it is worthwhile to review the
In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern
known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to
humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii)
infectious disease . To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three
existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is
geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential
threat from microbes recent
decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of
certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease
has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the
finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous
amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously , the view that
infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many
pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was
naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired
directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal
pathogens . For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off
every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its
natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats
environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than
the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al.,
2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution
or bioengineering.
Medical innovation---AT: Burnout
Burnout is wrong for diseases that spread in the US
Yaneer Bar-Yam 16, physicist and complex systems scientist, Founding President of the
New England Complex Systems Institute, Ph.D., S.B., physics, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI, 7-3-
2016, http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition
[ FIGURE 1 OMITTED ] The video (Figure 1) shows a simple model of hosts and pathogens we have used to study evolutionary dynamics.
In the animation, the green are hosts and red are pathogens. As pathogens infect hosts, they spread across the system. If you look closely,
you will see that the red changes tint from time to time — that is the natural mutation of pathogens to become more or less aggressive.
Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does
it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That
the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7].
In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural
means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines
(Figure 2). [ FIGURE 2 OMITTED ] When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the
success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to
find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes
introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and
spread. [ FIGURE 3 OMITTED ] As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which
pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the
same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction
(Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation , human civilization may be
approaching such a critical threshold .
Figure 4: The probability of survival makes a sharp transition (red line) from one to zero
as we add more long range transportaion (horizontal axis). The right line (black) holds
for different model parameters, so we need to study at what point the transition will take
place for our world.
In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk
from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only
because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While
the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in
a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence
analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many
were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity
of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key
point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness . Even a system that
seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and
connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point ? We don’t know but
it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases
outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic
[9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West
might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how
unless we respond fast enough and well
people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be
enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As
the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because
of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social
interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “ superspreaders .”
The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass
outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects
100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very
well prove unstoppable . Watch this mock video of a pathogen spreading globally through land and air transportation. Long
range transportation will continue to pose a threat of pandemic if its impacts cannot be contained.
Space---T/L---2NC
US aerospace industry solves space col
Andrew Tarantola, 6-15-2019, Senior Editor @ End Gadget, "Hitting the Books: We
won't colonize space without a Weyland-Yutani", Engadget,
https://www.engadget.com/2019/06/15/hitting-the-books-space-20-rod-pyle/
The larger goal of human settlements in the solar system depends on the success or
failure of the pathfinder programs outlined above. The process of establishing long-term
bases may be undertaken by governments working with traditional aerospace
contractors , or by private industry alone, but will most likely be achieved through a
combination of both . National governments will continue to pursue space settlements because they think it is
important in the long term, for a variety of both rational and emotional reasons. Corporations will ultimately
undertake such ventures because they know that there is potential profit in them. Extremely
wealthy individuals may pilot such projects for philanthropic reasons, but nobody is wealthy enough to support an ongoing
it's going to take
space settlement—yet. No matter the project's backers or their motivations, though,
individuals willing to venture out into the unknown to make any plan a reality . Jim
Keravala is CEO of OffWorld, a company developing robots that will extract and process space resources. He has a long
history in the space business. In his view, the
traditional motivations for individual migration and
settlement on Earth—access to opportunities and resources—will not apply to much of
the settlement of the moon or Mars, at least early on. Keravala believes that day-to-day life in these places
will be very hard, more akin to working on an oil rig than the luxurious existence foreseen by people such as O'Neil.
the opportunity to improve our circumstances in space lies just over the
However,
horizon , in Keravala's view. He sees much of the heavy lifting for settlements being done by
machines and a few human overseers, but this will lead eventually to the construction of luxuries of which we can
scarcely dream on Earth. "The requisite for a better life in space is to create an oasis . . . the only reason people will settle
in space, post commerce-driven, is to achieve that better life." Note that he said "post commerce-driven." This is an
important point. Mining, resource extraction, and commercial services, such as telecommunications, will drive the first
phase of space exploration, and it is only after this phase has set the infrastructure in place that those who are motivated
primarily by the desire for "a better life" will find the final frontier appealing. "So far, there is no better place to settle than
Earth," Keravala noted. "It's the baseline 1.0 definition of an oasis for now. To close the loop, we must take the issue of
somewhere to live and create luxury living, total creative freedom, abundant cuisine, longevity, unlimited entertainment, an
ability to explore, and [a good system of] regulation." Former NASA deputy administrator Lori Garver drilled down a bit
further into human nature. "Over the long term, as
you evolve space activities to benefit civilization,
ultimately we have to go into space to assure our survival and to benefit civilization . . .
Settling in new lands is what humans have always done, and I think we need to continue to do so,
not only for resources, but for liberty and the human spirit. To be blunt, it is a combination of fear, greed, and glory. The
will to survive is innate in every living thing. In general, people will want to go for their own reasons. These processes are
not usually government driven. I'll add that the people who go on their own are typically the ones who stay." Jeff Greason
emphasized property rights—the "greed" part of Garver's position. "If one could acquire title to portions of other planetary
bodies, one could use the tried and true methods of past colonization efforts on Earth. Many such schemes have been
tried in which the settlers get shares in the settlement. Up front, something like the Hudson Bay Company might put up
the investment, and then offer the opportunity for people to come and work there—and subsidize them to go—but then
[those settlers] have to work for some number of years in order to pay off the cost of their transportation and support."
Former NASA astronaut Franklin Chang-Díaz thinks it is destiny, the oldest of trump cards that will drive settlement: "I
believe it is our destiny to populate space. Space holds the key to our survival as a species. We need to prepare humanity
to embark on that journey before the growing environmental and social stresses of our own planet extinguish our capacity
whatever rationale one selects for seeking a future in space, those
to do so." Ultimately,
reasons must make sense to the stakeholders who count the most: private enterprise ,
government , and perhaps most importantly, you. Any efforts at space settlement must be supported by popular
opinion—governments need it to survive, and private enterprise needs it for investment. As companies like
SpaceX and Blue Origin push the boundaries of what can be accomplished, popular support for these
ventures has been on the rise. The last major survey of public attitudes about spaceflight was conducted in the
US in 2015 by the Pew Research Center. It found that 58 percent of Americans felt that it was essential that the country
remain a leader in space exploration. About 64 percent felt that spaceflight was a good investment for the country. Almost
70 percent held a favorable opinion of NASA. While another major survey has not been conducted since the launch of the
Falcon Heavy, media accounts reported great excitement about the accomplishment worldwide. Public support seems to
This,
be solid and appears to be increasing as people see the aspirations of Space 2.0 becoming achievements.
along with the ever-increasing amounts of private investment in spaceflight, portend
great things ahead.
But arm sales are critical to the aerospace industry – government

funding has flatlined – only arm exports can fund ventures
Amy Holloway, 2013, CEO of Avalanche Consulting, Inc, Avalanche provides research,
marketing and strategic planning services to economic development organizations,
"Aerospace and Aviation: Finding Opportunities Amid Uncertainty", No Publication,
https://www.tradeandindustrydev.com/industry/aerospace-defense/aerospace-and-
aviation-finding-opportunities-amid-7846
Looking ahead, the

future fortunes of the aerospace and aviation industries are decidedly
mixed . Over the past decade, U.S. military spending supported over 50 percent of
industry sales, but with federal budget concerns and more conservative military
deployment strategies, demand is likely to remain flat or decline in the years ahead. Fiscal
austerity in the U.S. has forced many aerospace companies to look abroad for
growth. Direct commercial sales authorizations , which are granted by the U.S. State
Department to companies seeking to sell military wares to foreign countries, have
jumped dramatically over the past five years . Commercial sales authorizations grew
from $67 billion in 2006 to $154 billion in 2010 . Despite competition and barriers to
entry, U .S. aerospace firms have little choice but to seek overseas military market
opportunities in the years ahead.
Try or die NEG – multiple threats make extinction inevitable – only

colonization can solve
Austen, contributing editor of Harper’s Magazine, 11
(Ben Austen, “After Earth: Why, Where, How, and When We Might Leave Our Home
Planet,” popular science, http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2011-02/after-earth-why-
where-how-and-when-we-might-leave-our-home-planet?page=3)
Earth won’t always be fit for occupation . We know that in two billion years or so, an expanding sun
will boil away our oceans, leaving our home in the universe uninhabitable—unless, that is, we haven’t already been wiped
out by the Andromeda galaxy, which is on a multibillion-year collision course with our Milky Way. Moreover, at least a third of the thousand
mile-wide asteroids that hurtle across our orbital path will eventually crash into us, at a rate of about one every 300,000 years. Why?
Indeed, in 1989 a
far smaller asteroid, the impact of which would still have been equivalent in
force to 1,000 nuclear bombs , crossed our orbit just six hours after Earth had passed. A
recent report by the Lifeboat Foundation, whose hundreds of researchers track a dozen different existential risks to
humanity, likens that one-in-300,000 chance of a catastrophic strike to a game of
Russian roulette: “If we keep pulling the trigger long enough we’ll blow our head
off , and there’s no guarantee it won’t be the next pull.” Many of the threats that might lead us to
consider off-Earth living arrangements are actually man-made, and not necessarily in the distant future. The amount we
consume each year already far outstrips what our planet can sustain, and the World Wildlife
Fund estimates that by 2030 we will be consuming two planets’ worth of natural
resources annually . The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, an international humanitarian organization,
reports that the onslaught of droughts, earthquakes, epic rains and floods over the past
decade is triple the number from the 1980s and nearly 54 times that of 1901, when this data was first collected.
Some scenarios have climate change leading to severe water shortages, the submersion of coastal areas, and widespread famine.
Additionally, the world could end by way of deadly pathogen , nuclear war or, as the Lifeboat
Foundation warns, the “misuse of increasingly powerful technologies.” Given the risks humans pose
to the planet, we might also someday leave Earth simply to conserve it, with our planet becoming a kind of nature sanctuary that we visit
now and again, as we might Yosemite. None of the threats we face are especially far-fetched. Climate
change is already a major factor in human affairs, for instance, and our planet has undergone at least one previous mass extinction as a
result of asteroid impact. “The dinosaurs died out because they were too stupid to build an adequate spacefaring civilization,” says Tihamer
Toth-Fejel, a research engineer at the Advanced Information Systems division of defense contractor General Dynamics and one of 85
members of the Lifeboat Foundation’s space-settlement board. “So far, the difference between us and them is barely measurable.” The
Alliance to Rescue Civilization, a project started by New York University chemist Robert Shapiro, contends that the inevitability of any of
several cataclysmic events means that we must prepare a copy of our civilization and move it into outer space and out of harm’s way—a
backup of our cultural achievements and traditions. In 2005, then– NASAadministrator Michael Griffin described the
aims of the national space program in similar terms. “If we humans want to survive for
hundreds of thousands or millions of years, we must ultimately populate other
planets,” he said. “One day, I don’t know when that day is, but there will be more human beings who live off the Earth than on it.”
Space---Sales Key---2NC
Exports are a critical component of the aerospace industry
Jeremy Leonard, 2017, Director of Industry Services at Oxford Economics, an
independent global advisory firm providing reports, forecasts and analytical tools, "US
Aerospace Industry: Flying High, Soaring Higher?", IndustryWeek,
https://www.industryweek.com/trade/us-aerospace-industry-flying-high-soaring-higher
With so much focus on worries about American products being uncompetitive with those produced elsewhere in the world
there are a number of
and the associated impact on jobs and domestic economic activity, it is easy to forget that
manufacturing sectors for which American dominance has persisted for decades and
shows very few signs of ebbing. Perhaps the best example is the aerospace sector.
The United States currently accounts for half of global production (with Canada adding
another 5%). While this share has declined substantially from close to 70% in the 1980s and 1990s, the reasons for the
decline are mainly due to the expansion of Airbus (particularly since the introduction of the A320 in 1987) and
consolidation in the U.S. when McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing in 1997. This has meant that North America and
Europe accounted for nearly 90% of global production through to the financial crisis, although that has fallen to 82%
today. Another important aspect of aerospace is the defense component . While smaller in size
than the commercial segment (U.S. shipments of defense aerospace equipment amount to about 25% of the national
the U.S. is by many measures more dominant in this space, with U.S.-
sector total),
based firms accounting for nearly 60% of global military sales. The aerospace
industry is a good business in which to be competitive , because the underlying
drivers of demand are very strong . Since the end of the Great Recession, new commercial aircraft orders
have typically been double, and in some years triple the number of annual deliveries. This reflects explosive growth of air
traffic in the emerging world as rising incomes and declines in ticket fares make air travel affordable for increasing
numbers of households. Global air travel has increased by 6.5% per annum since the end of the financial crisis, and this
growth in Asian passenger traffic in particular has accelerated in the past two years. The drop in crude-oil prices has
driven global airline profits to historic highs as operating costs pressures ease and increase scope for further investment
in fleet modernization. Continuation of these trends means that global aerospace production is expected to grow by 3.5%
per annum for the next ten years, almost a percentage point faster than global GDP. These geographic patterns of
production and demand are mirrored in U.S. aerospace trade performance (which includes not only finished aircraft, but
also parts and components that feed into supply chains of aircraft manufacturers). The trade surplus in aerospace
products reached $80 billion in 2015 on exports of $140 billion, both record highs. This surplus, which has widened in the
past 15 years both in absolute terms and as a percentage of aerospace exports, keeps the total U.S. trade deficit 10%
smaller than it otherwise would be. China became the most important single destination in 2013 (passing Japan and the
large European economies), but still only accounts for 10% of the total. But on a regional basis, the Asia-Pacific region
accounts for 40%, with Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan being other important destinations. This is a function
of both stronger short-haul travel within Asia and expansion of longer-haul routes to Europe and North America. Also
noteworthy is the importance of the Middle East and Africa in the export mix . Thanks
to the explosive growth of Persian Gulf-based carriers such as Emirates and Etihad, exports to that region reached 15%
A key question , of course, is the degree
of the sector total in 2015, nearly triple its share just a decade ago.
to which the competitive dominance of the U.S. aerospace industry will persist .
There are many reasons to be optimistic, the first and foremost of which is a well-earned reputation for reliability and
safety. This is a big part of the reason that, despite concerted efforts by China to develop a commercial airliner, its share
of global output is only 3%. Furthermore, test flights of the Comac C919—a short-haul commercial airliner manufactured
by the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China—have been delayed, and most observers agree that its cost-efficiency,
comfort, and safety will be insufficient for it gain significant market share. We do not expect China’s share of global
aerospace production to exceed 5% for the next 15 years. A second factor is history. The U.S. was the birthplace of
aviation, and geography has always favored the sector’s development thanks to a relatively large landmass with a widely
dispersed population that is conducive to air travel. Geopolitical history has only reinforced that advantage, as that has
encouraged heavy investment in the R&D, engineering and production infrastructure to create industrial clusters in
Seattle, southern California, Kansas and elsewhere. This is one of the key reasons why U.S. aerospace manufacturing
remained so dominant against European manufacturers such as de Havilland/Hawker, Fokker, Aérospatiale and the other
predecessors of Airbus. A final point is that more fundamental
indicators of competitiveness (such as
production per unit of capital and labor) have improved dramatically in the U.S. aerospace industry
in the past 15 years. Some of this improvement is common to some other manufacturing industries (automotive and
industrial machinery in particular), such as the use of enterprise-resource-planning systems to reduce inventories,
implementation of lean manufacturing techniques to reduce waste and improve quality. These have contributed to a 40%
improvement in the overall productivity of capital and labor for aerospace sector in the past 15 years, compared to a 10%
improvement for U.S. manufacturing as a whole. It also illustrates a widening competitive advantage against European
manufacturers, which partly explains why Europe’s share of global production has never been able to climb above 25%.
For all of these reasons, the already-soaring U.S. aerospace industry is set to fly higher, with
export growth expected to average a bit more than 3.5 % over the next decade. This demand, along with a
relatively robust outlook for air travel in the domestic market looking ahead, means that U.S. aerospace will maintain, if
not slightly increase, its dominant share of global production.
And even if sales are only a small component of the industry, budget
cuts to NASA means there is an increased reliance on private
companies
Michael Sheetz, 3-11-2019, Reporter, “NASA budget reveals even more reliance on
private companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin”, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/11/nasa-budget-more-reliance-on-private-companies-
like-spacex.html
The White House unveiled NASA’s 2020 budget on Monday and the $21 billion requested from Congress
reveals new opportunities for private space companies to earn lucrative future awards, several
industry analysts told CNBC. This is the first budget request under NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine. On a reference basis alone, the
budget uses the word “commercial” almost twice as much as last year . That is a boon to
companies like SpaceX, as CEO Elon Musk has said his company wants to be a part of returning cargo and humans to the moon’s surface,
as NASA aims to do. “This is potentially good for SpaceX, given it looks like on the lunar side they’re emphasizing commercial companies
more,” Morgan Stanley analyst Adam Jonas told CNBC. Jonas is widely followed due to his early call on electric automaker Tesla and
helped form a team of analysts to focus on investment opportunities from the space industry at Morgan Stanley. In comments on NASA TV
after the budget release, Bridenstine gave the recent SpaceX Demo-1 mission as an example for how reusable rockets and spacecraft are
how NASA can “drive down costs” and “increase access” to space, he said. Bridenstine contends that NASA needs “reusability in the entire
architecture” of its space exploration plans, as SpaceX has shown how re-using rockets for launches to low Earth orbit has proven cost
effective. “I think SpaceX certainly are going to be big winners as a result of this budget,” Chad Anderson, CEO of Space Angels, told
NASA wants to accelerate its plans to establish a permanent
CNBC. “Increase the use of commercial partnerships”
human presence on the surface of the moon . And Bridenstine plans to “increase the use
of commercial partnerships” to do that, the budget said. “Everything to this point has put the moon first in this
administration. It looks like they’re going all in,” Anderson said. NASA’s budget sets aside $363 million specifically to help companies
develop “a large lunar lander” to take cargo and astronauts to the moon’s surface. This funding and development model is similar to the
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services program, Anderson said, “which is incredibly encouraging.” That NASA program ended in
2013, after SpaceX and Orbital Sciences (now a division of Northrop Grumman) successfully developed new spacecraft and rockets for
NASA to send cargo to the International Space Station. Musk’s space company, as well as Jeff Bezos’ venture Blue Origin, are both
developing spacecraft capable of landing on the moon. There is “no doubt” both companies are working with NASA
on landing on the moon and other planetary bodies, Anderson said. Mike French, Bryce Space and Technology senior vice president, also
pointed to SpaceX and Blue Origin as top contenders for NASA lunar lander funds. He said there will be “an interesting mix of traditional
contractors” such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin also competing for NASA awards. Additionally, NASA has
nine companies competing for up to $2.6 billion in lunar transportation contracts. Known as the Commercial Lunar Payload Services
program (CLPS), the effort would send small payloads and robots to the moon’s surface as early as 2021. “CLPS is the most significant
near term revenue stream for startups,” French said. Under CLPS, the agency will award multiple contracts for lunar missions over the next
10 years. “Anyone working on lunar landers is also going to benefit,” Anderson said. Private rockets for exploration missions NASA wants
to set aside $10.7 billion for its lunar plans. But the way NASA expects to execute those plans continues to change, as billions of dollars in
cost overruns and years of delays have made the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and Orion spacecraft less viable. “It sounds like
people are fed up with these big projects like SLS, that are late and over budget,” Anderson said. In the past year
alone, NASA has moved two of its missions from SLS to commercial options: Lunar Gateway’s “power and propulsion element” and the
Europa Clipper mission to Jupiter, planned for 2023. ”[NASA has] had calls to arms for ideas and for the commercial community to be a part
of improving efficiency and reducing waste while achieving a fast time horizon,” Jonas said. “Seems to be the result of a bit of soul-
searching amongst the bodies who determine these budgets.” The door is now open for commercial
rockets to launch these missions . “Europa going commercial is a big deal,” French said, as the launch contract
represents a significant piece of $600 million that’s up for grabs. NASA estimates that switching from SLS to a private rocket will save over
$700 million. SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy rocket is one currently available option but French believes “anyone who thinks they can will come” to
NASA with a proposal for the mission, he said. That means NASA may consider Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket, United Launch Alliance’s
Vulcan rocket or Northrop Grumman’s OmegA rocket, according to French. “The big ship is slowly starting to tack and change course and
these are the early signs that people are paying attention,” Anderson said. “The private companies’ capability is real and comes at a
cheaper price point.” Business in Earth’s orbit NASA still plans to end funding of the International Space Station six years from now. The
administration is looking at making use of privately-built habitats in orbit, a key part of the commercialization of space, French said. Those
include NanoRacks, Bigelow Aerospace and Axiom Space. French also thinks there’s “a slightly different cloud” of space assembly and
manufacturing companies that will benefit from NASA’s budget, he said. Those companies are the likes of Made in Space and Maxar
Technologies-owned SSL, according to French. A small, $3 million line item called the Communications Services Program was a fresh
addition to NASA’s budget. The new program would replace the multi-billion dollar “government-owned Space Network with commercial
communications services and capabilities,” NASA budget said. While it’s not much funding now, TMF Associates analyst Tim Farrar said it
it would involve expenditures
could be a new revenue stream for satellite communications companies. “Ultimately
certainly in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year ,” Farrar told CNBC.
Every single dollar counts

Sheridan, Agence French Press, 13
(Kerry, Every Dollar Must Go to Bridge Gaps to Mars: NASA, 5-6-13,
http://www.industryweek.com/research-amp-development/every-dollar-must-go-bridge-
gaps-mars-nasa?page=2)
Setting foot on Mars by the 2030s is human destiny and a US priority , and every dollar
available must be spent on bridging gaps in knowledge on how to get there, NASA's
chief said Monday. Addressing a conference of space experts at George Washington University, NASA administrator Charles
Bolden said that despite hard economic times the United States is committed to
breaking new boundaries in space exploration. "A human mission to Mars is today the ultimate destination
in our solar system for humanity, and it is a priority for NASA. Our entire exploration program is aligned to support this goal," Bolden said.
President Barack Obama has proposed a $17.7 billion dollar budget for NASA in 2014, and he supports a "vibrant and coordinated strategy
for Mars exploration," Bolden said. Among the first steps to sending astronauts to Mars are NASA's plans to capture and relocate an
asteroid by 2025, a process that should inform future efforts to send humans into deep space, the former astronaut said. Also, US astronaut
Scott Kelly and Russian cosmonaut Mikhail Kornienko have volunteered to spend one year at the International Space Station beginning in
2015 to allow doctors to assess how long-duration zero gravity exposure affects bone density, muscle mass and vision. Currently, a rotating
cast of global astronauts each spend a maximum of six months aboard the orbiting outpost. But despite increasing interest in landing on
Mars, and a newly diverse space race that involves many more countries than old Cold War foes the United States and Russia, there is
plenty that experts do not know about how to reach Mars. For instance, there is no existing space vehicle to carry people on the seven-
month or longer journey there, not to mention no plan for returning people to Earth. Medical experts are unsure what the physical
ramifications would be for people who attempt to travel in high-radiation environments for such extended periods. And just how people
would survive, breathe, eat and drink on the dry, red planet are significant obstacles that have yet to be overcome. "The US has
demonstrated that we know how to get to the Moon," Bolden said. "What we have not demonstrated and what I think everyone in this room
-- well most people in this room will concede, is that there are technological gaps to sending humans to an asteroid and to Mars," he added.
"And so every single moment of our time and every single dollar of our assets must be dedicated to developing those technologies that
The U nited S tates is the only nation that has
allow us to go beyond low Earth orbit, beyond the Moon."
successfully sent robotic explorers to land on Mars, the most recent being Curiosity, which touched
down in August 2012. The first-of-its-kind landing demonstrated that humans have figured out how to send a one-ton package of machinery
to Mars. But many experts believe that the size of the package needed to maintain a human habitat on Mars would weigh more like 40 ton.
There also needs to be a suitable flight vehicle, and a type of fuel potent enough to get it there quickly. Perhaps a precursor to a human
landing on Mars would be another rover that would land at an established site, drill down and hopefully find fresh water, said John
Grunsfeld, NASA associate administrator for the science mission directorate. "That would also be the beacon that allows subsequent
missions to navigate to a very precise landing," said Grunsfeld. The three-day conference aims to offer a forum for experts to discuss the
latest technologies. It will feature discussions on astronaut health concerns Tuesday and an address by retired celebrity astronaut Buzz
Aldrin on Wednesday. "We
can't wait until the technology is available before we go and explore,"
Bolden said. "We now stand on the precipice of a second opportunity to press forward to
what I think is man's destiny, and that is to go to another planet."
Space Col---Impact Calc---2NC
Try or die NEG – multiple threats make extinction inevitable – only
colonization can solve
Austen, contributing editor of Harper’s Magazine, 11
(Ben Austen, “After Earth: Why, Where, How, and When We Might Leave Our Home
Planet,” popular science, http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2011-02/after-earth-why-
where-how-and-when-we-might-leave-our-home-planet?page=3)
Earth won’t always be fit for occupation . We know that in two billion years or so, an expanding sun
will boil away our oceans, leaving our home in the universe uninhabitable—unless, that is, we haven’t already been wiped
out by the Andromeda galaxy, which is on a multibillion-year collision course with our Milky Way. Moreover, at least a third of the thousand
mile-wide asteroids that hurtle across our orbital path will eventually crash into us, at a rate of about one every 300,000 years. Why?
Indeed, in 1989 a far smaller asteroid, the impact of which would still have been equivalent in
force to 1,000 nuclear bombs , crossed our orbit just six hours after Earth had passed. A
recent report by the Lifeboat Foundation, whose hundreds of researchers track a dozen different existential risks to
humanity, likens that one-in-300,000 chance of a catastrophic strike to a game of
Russian roulette: “If we keep pulling the trigger long enough we’ll blow our head
off , and there’s no guarantee it won’t be the next pull.” Many of the threats that might lead us to
consider off-Earth living arrangements are actually man-made, and not necessarily in the distant future. The amount we
consume each year already far outstrips what our planet can sustain, and the World Wildlife
Fund estimates that by 2030 we will be consuming two planets’ worth of natural
resources annually . The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, an international humanitarian organization,
reports that the onslaught of droughts, earthquakes, epic rains and floods over the past
decade is triple the number from the 1980s and nearly 54 times that of 1901, when this data was first collected.
Some scenarios have climate change leading to severe water shortages, the submersion of coastal areas, and widespread famine.
Additionally, theworld could end by way of deadly pathogen , nuclear war or, as the Lifeboat
Foundation warns, the “misuse of increasingly powerful technologies.” Given the risks humans pose
to the planet, we might also someday leave Earth simply to conserve it, with our planet becoming a kind of nature sanctuary that we visit
now and again, as we might Yosemite. None of the threats we face are especially far-fetched. Climate
change is already a major factor in human affairs, for instance, and our planet has undergone at least one previous mass extinction as a
result of asteroid impact. “The dinosaurs died out because they were too stupid to build an adequate spacefaring civilization,” says Tihamer
Toth-Fejel, a research engineer at the Advanced Information Systems division of defense contractor General Dynamics and one of 85
members of the Lifeboat Foundation’s space-settlement board. “So far, the difference between us and them is barely measurable.” The
Alliance to Rescue Civilization, a project started by New York University chemist Robert Shapiro, contends that the inevitability of any of
several cataclysmic events means that we must prepare a copy of our civilization and move it into outer space and out of harm’s way—a
backup of our cultural achievements and traditions. In 2005, then– NASAadministrator Michael Griffin described the
aims of the national space program in similar terms. “If we humans want to survive for
hundreds of thousands or millions of years, we must ultimately populate other
planets,” he said. “One day, I don’t know when that day is, but there will be more human beings who live off the Earth than on it.”
Every delay in space colonization risks a hundred trillion lives per

second - funding space exploration now with the carbon tax is the
best way to reduce existential risk
Bostrum, 02 – Department of Philosophy, Yale University, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford
University [Nick, “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development,” Preprint, Utilitas
Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 308-314, http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html]
As I write these words, suns are illuminating and heating empty rooms, unused energy is being
flushed down black holes, and our great common endowment of negentropy is being
irreversibly degraded into entropy on a cosmic scale. These are resources that an advanced
civilization could have used to create value-structures, such as sentient beings living worthwhile lives. The rate
of this loss boggles the mind. One recent paper speculates, using loose theoretical considerations based on
the rate of increase of entropy, that the loss of potential human lives in our own galactic
supercluster is at least ~10^46 per century of delayed colonization.[1] This estimate assumes
that all the lost entropy could have been used for productive purposes, although no currently
known technological mechanisms are even remotely capable of doing that. Since the estimate is meant to be a lower
bound, this radically unconservative assumption is undesirable. We can, however, get a lower bound more
straightforwardly by simply counting the number or stars in our galactic supercluster and multiplying this number with the
amount of computing power that the resources of each star could be used to generate using technologies for whose
feasibility a strong case has already been made. We can then divide this total with the estimated amount of computing
power needed to simulate one human life. As a rough approximation, let us say the Virgo Supercluster contains 10^13
stars. One estimate of the computing power extractable from a star and with an associated planet-sized computational
structure, using advanced molecular nanotechnology[2], is 10^42 operations per second.[3] A typical estimate of the
human brain’s processing power is roughly 10^17 operations per second or less.[4] Not much more seems to be needed to
simulate the relevant parts of the environment in sufficient detail to enable the simulated minds to have experiences
the potential for
indistinguishable from typical current human experiences.[5] Given these estimates, it follows that
approximately 10^38 human lives is lost every century that colonization of our local
supercluster is delayed; or equivalently, about 10^31 potential human lives per second.
While this estimate is conservative in that it assumes only computational mechanisms whose implementation has been at
least outlined in the literature, it is useful to have an even more conservative estimate that does not assume a non-
biological instantiation of the potential persons. Suppose that about 10^10 biological humans could be sustained around
an average star. Then the Virgo Supercluster could contain 10^23 biological humans. This corresponds to a loss of
potential equal to about 10^14 potential human lives per second of delayed colonization. What matters for present
purposes is not the exact numbers but the fact that they are huge. Even
with the most conservative
estimate, assuming a biological implementation of all persons, the potential for one
hundred trillion potential human beings is lost for every second of postponement of
colonization of our supercluster.[6]
Space---AT: Space Col Fails
Key barriers are political and economic – not technical
Walker, urbanism editor @ Gizmodo, 15
(Alissa, What's Stopping Us from Building Cities in Space? No, It's Not Tech.,
http://gizmodo.com/whats-stopping-us-from-building-cities-in-space-no-it-1711985320)
The US has a plan for Americans to live in space . In 2012, the National Research Council was
commissioned by Congress to roadmap the future of human space exploration. Last June, the team published its findings in a massive
report, which called for several action steps to be taken immediately. One year later, are we on track? One of the report’s authors was
Waldman, who works on ways to make technical concepts
designer and Spacehack founder Ariel
around space colonization more accessible to the public. In 2008 Waldman took a job at NASA to
coordinate its CoLab initiative, which allowed NASA scientists to collaborate with outside communities through open-source projects. The
overall response to the report (which you can read in its entirety here) was good, says Waldman. “When the report came out, a lot of
Waldman has witnessed
different parts surprisingly resonated well with Congress,” she told Gizmodo. In the year since,
some encouraging feedback—but also plenty of disheartening trends that are keeping
the roadmap stalled . Of course there are plenty of tech advancements that need to be
made to get humans living in space —gotta figure out that radiation protection!—but those challenges
aren’t the biggest things holding the US back. There are much bigger political , perceptual,
and yes, economic shifts that need to occur to get us thinking about living off-Earth.
Funding solves all hurdles – question of investment

Walker, urbanism editor @ Gizmodo, 15
(Alissa, What's Stopping Us from Building Cities in Space? No, It's Not Tech.,
http://gizmodo.com/whats-stopping-us-from-building-cities-in-space-no-it-1711985320)
So much of what seems to motivate any space exploration is the concept of flag planting, which the US pretty much invented: I HEREBY
CLAIM THIS MOON FOR AMERICA. Take away these imperialistic aspirations and the goals of human spaceflight become unmeshed with
these ideas of nation-building—and a lot more pragmatic. This is the largest task we’ve undertaken as human race and it requires wider
democratization, says Waldman. “If we want to make things like landing humans on Mars happen we will need more collaboration from
more people, from more disciplines, from more countries than we currently have.” What’s incredibly exciting right now is how many
developing nations have access to space thanks to swiftly changing technology. It’s not just China’s speedy space timeline that’s an
indicator of this. Five years ago India sent a mission to the Moon and now has a spacecraft orbiting Mars. This is not just a pursuit of the
wealthy superpowers anymore. More than 70 countries now have space programs—the science that will get us to another solar system
could come from any of them. Just like “saving humanity” is not a good reason to go to Mars, this is not a pursuit to “discover” another
planet—and we’re not taking our geopolitical baggage with us. Scientists need to work towards including more voices in these efforts
without countries getting all wrapped up in the possibility of laying first claim to Martian mining rights. One of the largest criticisms of the
NASA budget that it currently is not adjusted to keep pace with inflation, which is the most often-reported
challenge in getting Americans onto other planets. As the report outlined in a series of charts, if the budget is even
slightly adjusted for inflation each year, a pathway to Mars becomes much more feasible and
much less risky . In the past year, the Obama administration has championed a “re-energized space program” that has certainly
achieved some notable milestones—like a test flight of the Mars-worthy Orion spacecraft and the development of the Space Launch
Where
System (SLS) to get it there, as well as several studies to see what happens to humans when they leave Earth for that long.
the extra funding will come from in the next decade, though, is up to Congress . If the
budget doesn’t increase, we’re not going anywhere . What about corporations like Space X or Virgin
Galactic? Commercial ventures might help in the sense that private companies might finance the spacecrafts themselves, says
Waldman, but the programs themselves still require funding —and vision . “You’re still talking about hundreds of billions
across decades even if it takes zero dollars to build.” And who knows, even companies backed by Elon Musk and Richard Branson
could go bankrupt . Other groups are trying to put numbers together to figure out how to get humans to Mars. Last month, Bill
Nye presented a JPL-developed proposal for an orbital settlement around Mars at the Planetary
Society’s Humans to Mars summit. Astronauts would leave in 2033 for a one-year stay in Martian orbit (the timing would
coincide with the optimal Earth-Mars alignment every 26 months which makes the trip shortest), setting the stage for a landing mission in
2039 or later

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DIB v2---Preseason

Strong defense sector is key to advancements in AI and winning the

AI advancements solve grid insecurities---ensures total protection

understand military deterrence as a means to prevent great-power war — the kind

multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization . Therefore, a

who holds the upper hand .”[xvii]

Key to deterring a litany of existential threats - extinction

Military readiness is vital because declines

Military readiness is vital because declines

AND Helprin lists several other impacts

once ignited, a Third Gulf War could quickly

Whatever the nature of the initial clash, rapid

escalation to full-scale hostilities could occur with very little warning .

would reach winter temperatures in the summer.

the electric grid is the most

important of all critical infrastructures , and is in fact the keystone supporting

BUT, Congress has since gotten on board---new funding is sufficient

The much-anticipated reckoning is among the more significant government reports

Trump’s reforms are fixing it now

Q5: What's next for the defense industrial base?

A5: The Pentagon’s next course of action is to go about implementing these

Huge advancements in defense stocks have made the industry boom

the U nited S tates had reached an interim deal

Doesn’t meet the threshold of thumping the link nor uniqueness---has

AND, new tech and government moves remedy supply chain

So does the new TCM, or Trusted Capital Marketplace, that shifts

Likewise, we have some incredible patriots who have come to us and

AND, business is BOOMING for the DIB regardless of supply chain

Trump’s presidency has ensured massive boosts to arms sales.

Arms sales are growing

Uncertainty destroys R&D

capacity when programs end, creating long-term market distortion .

R&D depends on capital from weapons procurement - destroys the

Investment Dilemmas The

3---Economies of scale---contracts build resiliency into defense

4---Stock markets---Investors are shifting to defense stocks now

Arms sales are key---decreasing investment causes a stocks to

3---Economies of scale---Arm sales build resiliency into defense

International sales are critical to defense industry profits – domestic

Domestic demand is unsustainable – foreign sales are key

was facilitated by the existence of New Deal–era income-stabilization programs that

AND, the AFF’s court intervention is enough to destabilize

without an insurance system in place, market externalities will remain. Regardless of

3D printing is key to the sustainability of defense supply chains

defense and aerospace industry players are feeling confident enough to

Utilizing 3D printing reduces the assembly time and possible

Reduce Supply Chain Costs with Additive Manufacturing

additive manufacturing can deliver

aerospace manufacturers can significantly

this will decrease the amount of fuel planes consume. In other

It's increasing now and saving aging defense sectors – further

supply chain becomes a target-rich environment for identifying efficiencies and

a great deal to offer. There is speed (design to production), flexibility, elimination

11,000 jobs in 43 states.8

Key companies benefit

employment in states such as Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Utah, Ohio and

skilled manufacturing jobs in the United States.

the sale will include two multimission signal

AND, Lockheed Martin is key to the entire industry---their gains and

Lockheed Martin Corp reported better-than-expected quarterly profit on

the whole sector, pushing Northrop Grumman Corp,

2NC cps are good

2. Argument under-development—they shift everything back 1