MANINANG v.
CA (Mika)
June 19, 1982 | J. Melencio1-Herrera | Rule 75
Petitioner: RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as
Judge of the CFI of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA
SUMMARY:
Clemencia died at the Manila Sanitarium. She left a holographic will, leaving all
her properties to Dra. Maninang for the reason that Dra. Maninang and her
husband have been kind and taken care of her. Because of this, Dra. Maninang
filed a Petition for Probate of the Will before the CFI QC (Testate Case). However,
a month after, Bernardo, the apparent adopted son of Clemencia, claimed to be
the sole heir and instituted intestate proceedings before the CFI Pasig. (Intestate
Case)
The two cases were ordered consolidated before the CFI Pasig. Bernardo filed
an MTD for the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and
void, because as the compulsory heir, he was preterited. The lower court
ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case. CA affirmed.
The issue is W/N the lower court acted in excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the Testate Case filed by Dra. Maninang -- the Court said YES.
Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory, and normally, it does not look into
its intrinsic validity. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of
the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceedings because its only purpose is
to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the law.
Bernardo wrongly relied on the Nuguid case, which says that where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue.
According to the SC, Nuguid only states the exception. For the parties in
that case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; that’s
not the case here though. Here, the probate of the Will is insisted on by the
petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will is demanded.
The Nuguid case also stated that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it
completely preterited the parents of the testator. But, in this case, a crucial issue
that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of Clemencia’s will, Bernardo
had been preterited or disinherited, and if it’s the latter, whether it was a valid
inheritance. Because of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination
of that controversial issue was not thoroughly considered. The trial court’s
conclusion that Bernardo was preterited, on the face of the Will, is
questionable. It is a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied
legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation.
In addition to the procedural aspect of the case, given that the Judge had acted
in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari was indeed
the proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its
jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari.  However, the SC emphasized that,
a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not
afford speedy and adequate relief.
DOCTRINE:
Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory, and normally, it does not look into its
intrinsic validity. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of
the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceedings because its only purpose is
to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law. The exception is if practical considerations show that the intrinsic validity
must be dealt with first before the Will is even probated.
Where the probate of the Will is insisted on, and a resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the Will is demanded, the court should not be so quick to dismiss the
Petition for Probate of the Will. The general rule stands.
FACTS:
1. On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta died single at the Manila Sanitarium
Hospital aged 81. She left a holographic will, with the following provision:
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi
City and all my personal properties shall be inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L.
Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra.
Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to me. I have found peace and happiness
with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am
now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy
would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not consider
Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.
2. On June 9, 1977, petitioner Dra. Maninang filed a Petition for probate of
the Will of the decedent with the CFI of Quezon City (Testate Case).
3. More than a month after, respondent Bernardo, the apparent adopted son,
claimed to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia, instituted intestate
proceedings with the CFI of Pasig (Intestate Case).
4. The Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before the
Pasig CFI, presided by respondent Judge Pronove.
5. Respondent Bernardo filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the
ground that the holographic will was null and void because as the only
compulsory heir, he was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.
6. In her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Dra. Maninang averred that:
a. It is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the
extrinsic validity of the will; and
b. Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent.
 7. The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case, finding
Bernardo's arguments meritorious. After filing an MR, the lower court still
denied Dra. Maninang's motion. In the same case, Bernardo was appointed
as administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased, "considering he is a
forced heir and Maninang is not, and considering further that Bernardo has
not been shown to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust."
8. Dra. Maninang, together with her husband, Rafael, elevated the case to the
CA, via certorari, alleging that the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing
the Testate case and denying reconsideration. CA affirmed the CFI
decision.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the lower court acted in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate
Case - YES
RATIO:
On whether or not the lower court acted in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
the Testate Case - YES
1. The lower court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the
Testate Case.
a. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.
b. No will shall pass, either real or personal property, unless it’s
proved and allowed in accordance with the RoC.
2. Unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the
right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered
nugatory.
3. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
a. The authentication of a will decides no other question than the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.
b. It does not determine or prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions.The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.
4. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in Probate proceedings because its only purpose is
to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law
5. Bernardo relies on Nuguid, which says: In a proceeding for probate, the
Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of the will’s extrinsic
validity. But, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should
meet that issue. However, according to the SC, Nuguid only states the
exception.
a. For the parties in that case, the "meat of the controversy" was the
intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted
aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed
probate."
b. That’s not the case here though, where the probate of the Will is
insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity
of the Will demanded.
6. The Nuguid case also stated that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it
completely preterited the parents of the testator. But, in this case, a crucial
issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of
Clemencia’s will, Bernardo had been preterited or disinherited, and if
it’s the latter, whether it was a valid inheritance.
a. Preterition - omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs
b. Disinheritance - testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share
7. The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
a. Preterition annuls the institution of heir
b. In disinheritance, the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate
which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
8. By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that
controversial issue was not thoroughly considered. The trial court’s
conclusion that Bernardo was preterited, on the face of the Will, is
questionable.
9. It is a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied legalization
on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation.
10. For the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of finding that
respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the
Testate Case, certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court
in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari.  
 11. Even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, it is emphasized
that, in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be
entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and
adequate relief.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the Court of
First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980,
are nullified. Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of
First Instance-Branch XI. Rizal, therein to be reinstated and consolidated with
Special Proceeding No. 8569 for further proceedings.