Republic of the Philippines In the meantime, Dr.
Fernando Melendres (Melendres), one of the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 170093               April 29, 2009
JOSE PEPITO M. AMORES, M.D., Petitioner, 
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by Hon.
MANUEL M. DAYRIT, and FERNANDO A. MELENDRES,
M.D., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Jose Pepito M. Amores assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80971, dated September 23, 2004, as well as its
Resolution2dated September 20, 2005 which denied reconsideration. The
assailed Decision affirmed the October 14, 2003 Resolution 3 of the Civil
Service Commission which, in turn, ordered petitioner’s separation from
service as Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services at the Lung
Center of the Philippines on account of his lack of the necessary civil
service eligibility.
Well established are the facts of the case.
Petitioner Jose Pepito M. Amores was the Deputy Director for Hospital
Support Services at the Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP). His civil
service career began in 1982 when he was initially engaged at the LCP
as a resident physician.4 In the course of his service, he had been
promoted to the position of Medical Specialist, 5 then to Department
Manager,6 and finally to Deputy Director. Dr. Calixto Zaldivar was then
the Executive Director of the LCP and when he retired from service in
1999, petitioner was designated as officer-in-charge of the LCP by the
Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Alberto Romualdez, Jr.7
Petitioner had taken charge of the LCP in the interim that the DOH
selection board was in the process of selecting a new executive director.
respondents in this case, was appointed by then President Joseph
Estrada as Executive Director of the LCP. Melendres was holding the
office of the Deputy Director for Medical Support Services before his
appointment as Executive Director, and although petitioner claims that he
was not challenging Melendres’ right to the office, he nevertheless
believed that he himself was the rightful person to be appointed as
executive director inasmuch as he had top-billed the evaluation results of
the DOH Selection Board, with Melendres tailing behind in second place. 8
It seems that the controversy started when petitioner and the other
doctors and rank-and-file employees at the LCP drafted a
manifesto9 which supposedly ventilated their collective dismay and
demoralization at Melendres’ appointment and leadership, and at some of
his "unjustified and questionable acts" as Executive Director of the LCP.
In a nutshell, the said manifesto boldly exposed the alleged anomalous
circumstances surrounding Melendres’ appointment; the reassignment of
some of the members of the LCP personnel which amounted to demotion
in their rank and status; the anomalies in the procurement of property and
supplies; his abusive conduct in publicly accusing some of the doctors of
having caused the fire that gutted the center in May 1998; in accusing
Zaldivar of having entered into anomalous contracts and negotiations
with the DPWH relative to certain projects; and in practicing favoritism
and nepotism. The tenor of the manifesto even went as far as to be
deeply personal as it likewise questioned Melendres’ fitness to act as
executive director on the ground of his previous brush with substance
abuse and the fact that he could no longer keep his marriage from
failing.10
The seriousness of these allegations led the DOH to create a Fact-finding
Committee to conduct an investigation. 11But at the proceedings before the
said Committee, Melendres filed charges of dishonesty and double
compensation against petitioner alleging that the latter had been
engaging in the private practice of medicine within the LCP’s premises
during official hours.12 At the close of the investigation, the Fact-finding
Committee issued a report declaring Melendres guilty of the charges
against him.13 As for petitioner, the Committee absolved him of the charge
of receiving double compensation, but nevertheless found him guilty of
having committed dishonesty by engaging in the private practice of his
profession during the hours that he should be engaging in public service
in violation of the Civil Service Law.14
1avvphil.net
Petitioner was caught by surprise when, on August 27, 2002, he received
a letter from the LCP Board of Trustees informing him of his separation
from service as Deputy Director effective September 30, 2002. 15 To the
said letter was attached a copy of the Board’s Resolution 16 dated August
23, 2002, principally directing petitioner’s termination from service after
consultation with the Career Executive Service Board (CES
Board).17 Petitioner brought an appeal from the resolution to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC).18
Resolving the appeal, the CSC declared that the LCP Board of Trustees
had properly and validly separated petitioner from his post as Deputy
Director. In its Resolution No. 031050, 19 the CSC declined to pass upon
the charge of dishonesty on the ground of pre-maturity as the issue had
not yet been finally determined in a proper proceeding and the Board had
not yet in fact made a definite finding of guilt from which petitioner might
as a matter of course appeal.20 However, it pointed out that petitioner’s
separation from service was anchored on his lack of a CES eligibility
which is required for the position of deputy director and, as such, he
enjoyed no security in his tenure. 21
Petitioner lodged an Appeal22 with the Court of Appeals. However, it was
dismissed and CSC Resolution No. 031050 was affirmed. 23
This present petition for review imputes error to the Court of Appeals.
First, in missing the fact that petitioner had been denied due process
when his separation from office was ordered on a ground not raised
before the DOH Fact-finding Committee24 and, second, in failing to
appreciate the fact that his rights to equal protection had likewise been
violated inasmuch as he was similarly situated with other department
managers in the LCP who had no CES eligibility but who, however, had
not been separated from service.25 He theorizes that his right to security
of tenure had been breached and that he was entitled to remain as
deputy director because his promotion to the said position supposedly
issued by Zaldivar — which was a recognition of his competence — was
permanent in character.26
The LCP, the CSC and the DOH, all represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, and Melendres, are one in asserting that there can be
no question as to the validity of petitioner’s removal from office for the
basic fact that he enjoyed no security of tenure on account of his lack of
eligibility. In his Comment27 on the petition, Melendres capitalizes on the
fact that the LCP Board of Trustees arrived at the resolution to separate
petitioner from service upon consultation with the CES Board and the
CSC; thus, concludes Melendres, it can only be surmised that the cause
for the removal of petitioner from office is actually his lack of eligibility and
not his commission of dishonesty. The LCP, for its part, is more to the
point. It posits that petitioner’s separation from office did not result from
an administrative disciplinary action, but rather from his failure to qualify
for the office of Deputy Director on account of lack of eligibility. For their
part, the CSC and the DOH characterizes petitioner as a third-level
appointee who, again, must be in possession of the corresponding third-
level eligibility; but since petitioner has none, then he enjoys no security
of tenure and may thus be removed at a moment’s notice even without
cause.
There is merit in the arguments of respondents.
What at the outset weighs heavily on petitioner’s case is the fact that the
position of Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services at the LCP
belongs to the career executive service appointments to which by law
require that the appointees possess the corresponding CES eligibility.
Petitioner, however, does not profess that at any time he was holding the
said position he was able to acquire the required eligibility therefor by
taking the CES examinations and, subsequently, conferred such eligibility
upon passing the said examinations. In fact, no slightest suggestion can
be derived from the records of this case which would tend to show that in
his entire tenure at the LCP he, at any given point, had been conferred a
CES eligibility. It is thus as much surprising as it is absurd why petitioner,
despite the limitations in his qualifications known to him, would insist that
he had served as Deputy Director at the LCP in a permanent capacity.
We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence,
that a permanent appointment in the civil service is issued to a person
who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is
made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto. 28 An
appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee
meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate
civil service eligibility.29
Under Section 730 of the Civil Service Law,31 positions in the civil service
are classified into open career positions, closed career positions and
positions in the career service. In turn, positions in the career service are
tiered in three levels as follows:
SECTION 8. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. - (1) Classes of
positions in the career service appointment to which requires
examinations which shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:
 (a) The first level shall include the clerical, trades, crafts and
custodial service positions which involve non-professional or
subprofessional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory
capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical and
scientific positions which involve professional, technical or
scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity
requiring at least four years of college work up to the Division
Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive
Service.
With particular reference to positions in the career executive service
(CES), the requisite civil service eligibility is acquired upon passing the
CES examinations administered by the CES Board and the subsequent
conferment of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. 32 Once a
person acquires eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent
appointee to the CES position to which he has previously been
appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that
position provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications
for the position.33 Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required
CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career
executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such
eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his appointment to the position
was permanent.
Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-
CES eligibles to CES positions in the government34 in the absence of
appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public
service to fill vacancies in the government.35 But in all such cases, the
appointment is at best merely temporary36 as it is said to be conditioned
on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. 37 This rule,
according to De Leon v. Court of Appeals,38 Dimayuga v.
Benedicto,39 Caringal v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, 40 and
Achacoso v. Macaraig,41 is invariable even though the given appointment
may have been designated as permanent by the appointing authority.
We now come to address the issue of whether petitioner’s separation
from service violated his right to security of tenure.
Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a
permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations
administered by the CES Board. It is that which entitles the examinee to
conferment of CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of
CES eligibles.42 Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES
Board, conferment of the CES eligibility is done by the CES Board
through a formal board resolution after an evaluation has been done of
the examinee’s performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility
examinations. Upon conferment of CES eligibility and compliance with
the other requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES
position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a
CES rank is made by the President upon the Board’s recommendation. It
is this process which completes the official’s membership in the CES and
confers on him security of tenure in the CES.43 Petitioner does not seem
to have gone through this definitive process.
At this juncture, what comes unmistakably clear is the fact that because
petitioner lacked the proper CES eligibility and therefore had not held the
subject office in a permanent capacity, there could not have been any
violation of petitioner’s supposed right to security of tenure inasmuch as
he had never been in possession of the said right at least during his
tenure as Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services. Hence, no
challenge may be offered against his separation from office even if it be
for no cause and at a moment’s notice.44 Not even his own self-serving
claim that he was competent to continue serving as Deputy Director may
actually and legally give even the slightest semblance of authority to his
thesis that he should remain in office. Be that as it may, it bears
emphasis that, in any case, the mere fact that an employee is a CES
eligible does not automatically operate to vest security of tenure on the
appointee inasmuch as the security of tenure of employees in the career
executive service, except first and second-level employees, pertains only
to rank and not to the office or position to which they may be appointed. 45
Anent the other issues raised in this petition, we find the same to be
merely petitioner’s last-ditch attempts, futile as they are, to remain in
office. Suffice it to say that no further good may be served in needlessly
expounding on them.
All told, we reiterate the long-standing rule that the mere fact that a
particular position belongs to the career service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend
on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility
or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for
the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it in an acting capacity in the CERTIFICATION
absence of appropriate eligibles. 46
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80971, dated September 23, 2004, affirming consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
Resolution No. 031050 of the Civil Service Commission, dated October the Court.
14, 2003, is AFFIRMED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
SO ORDERED. Chief Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: Footnotes

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate
Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Hakim S. Abdulwahid,
concurring; rollo, pp. 51-58.
CONSUELO YNARES-
SANTIAGO
2
 Id. at 49.
Associate Justice
3
 The Resolution was signed by CSC Chairman Karina
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- Constantino-David and Commissioners Jose Erestain, Jr. and
MARTINEZ J.Waldemar Valmores; rollo, pp. 174-181.
Associate Justice
4
 Records, pp. 57-59, 73-74.
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
5
 Id.; id. at 71-72.
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

6
 Id.; id. at 65-68.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
7
 See Department Order No. 344, s. 1999, dated August 26,
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. 1999; rollo, p. 100.
JR. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice 8
 Records, p. 76.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
ARTURO D. BRION 9
 The manifesto was signed by Jose Pepito Amores, Vincent
DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Balanag, Rey Desales, David Geollegue, Cynthia Habaluyas, Ma.
Associate Justice
Victoria Idolor, Theresa Alcantara, Guillermo Barroa, Jr., Norberto
Francisco, Benilda Galvez, Luisito Idolor, Buenaventura Medina,
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Jr., Raoul Villarete and Guillermo Madlang-awa; records, pp. 78-
Associate Justice 85.
10
 Records, pp. 78-85. Civil Service Commission, 442 SCRA 507 (2004) and Achacoso
v. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235 (1991).
11
 Id. at 87-88.
29
 Section 27 of the Civil Service Law.
 See Affidavit-Complaint of Fernando Melendres, dated April 12,
12

2002; id. at 91-92. 30
 SECTION 7. x x x The Career Service shall include:

13
 Records, pp. 154-155. (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior
qualification in an appropriate examination is required;
14
 Id. at 155-156.
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly
15
 Id. at 172. technical in nature; these include the faculty and
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and
16
 Id. at 173-177. scientific and technical positions in scientific or research
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own
merit systems;
 The Resolution likewise recommended the filing of
17

administrative charges against Melendres; id. at 176.

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service, namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
18
 Records, pp. 37-50.
Assistant Regional Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
19
 Supra note 3. officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
20
 Records, p. 12. appointed by the President.
21
 Id. at 12-13.  The Civil Service Law is found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of
31

Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised

22
 Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; CA rollo, pp. 2-13. Administrative Code of 1987.

23
 CA rollo, p. 277.  Caringal v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, supra note
32

28, at 585.
24
 Rollo, p. 33.
 Cuevas v. Bacal, G.R. No. 139382, December 6, 2000, 347
33

25
 Id. at 38-40. SCRA 338, 351.

26
 Id. at 40-41.  General v. Roco, G.R. No. 143366 & 143524, January 29,
34

2001, 350 SCRA 528, 536.

27
 Id. at 215-223.
35
 See Section 27 of the Civil Service Law.
 Caringal v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No.
28

161942, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 577, 578, citing Abella v.  See Erasmo v. Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation, G.R.
36

No. 139251, August 29, 2002, 388 SCRA 112.

37
 General v. Roco, supra note 34, at 536.

38
 G.R. No. 127182, January 22, 2001, 350 SCRA 1.

39
 G.R. No. 144153, January 16, 2002, 373 SCRA 652.

40
 Supra note 28, at 585-586.

41
 Supra note 28, at 239-240.

 Caringal v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, supra note

42

28, at 584.

43
 CES Handbook, pp. 5-6.

44
 Cuevas v. Bacal, supra note 33, at 347.

 Ignacio v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 163573, July 27,

45

2005, 464 SCRA 220, 227.

46
 Achacoso v. Macaraig, supra note 28, at 239-240.