KARL LAURENZ Q.

MAGNO

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

General Principles

Central Bank vs Ablaza

GR number L-33022 April 22, 1975

Facts: Central Bank of the Philippines invited Construction Corporations to bid for the general
construction of Central Bank’s regional offices. Ablaza Construction and Finance Corporation was
awarded of the contract for the said general construction. Actual construction work on the project
commenced. A meeting was called by the defendant and announced the reduction of the
appropriations for the construction of the proposed regional offices. The defendant also advised the
plaintiff to stop its construction work on the Central Bank Regional office building in San Fernando,
La Union. This was immediately complied with by the plaintiff. The plaintiff agreed to accept the
return of the cash bond, without prejudice. However, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant about
his claims and with further reservation regarding payment of the corresponding interest thereon.

Issue: whether or not there was a perfected contract.

Held: No. There has been no showing of compliance with the requirement that there must be a
certification of the availability of funds by the Auditor General pursuant to Section 607 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Except in the case of a contract for personal service or for supplies to be carried
in stock, no contract involving an expenditure by the National Government of three thousand pesos or
more shall be entered into or authorized until the Auditor General shall have certified to the officer
entering into such obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the
amount necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof.

It is contended that in view of such omission and considering the provisions of Section 608 of the
same code to the effect that "a purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the
next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void".
Bacani vs NACOCO
GR number L-9657 November 29, 1956

Facts: Plaintiffs are stenographers CFI Manila. A civil case is pending in the said court, to which,
NACOCO is 1 of the parties to the case. Defendant’s counsel requested for copies of the transcript of
the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. NACOCO paid for the copies of the
transcript of the stenographic notes. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said
amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a
government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees.

Issue: whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.

Held: No. NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the
stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the
simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation.
While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better
curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our
government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power
separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the
Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned. The term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by
which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to
enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by
those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them”.
MCIAA vs Marcos
GR number 120082 September 11, 1996

Facts: MCIAA, under its charter, shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National
Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The LGU of Cebu City
demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to MCIAA. MCIAA objected
and cites the LGC stating that LGUs taxing power does not extend to taxes, fees or charges of any kind
on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units. LGU
Cebu City countered, citing Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC which withdraw tax exemptions of
GOCCs and realty tax exemptions previously granted to ore presently enjoyed by all persons, whether
natural or juridical, including GOCCs.

Issue: whether or not MCIAA should be taxed.

Held: Yes. The exemption enjoyed by the MCIAA was withdrawn by the LGC and this exemption
extended only to said tax, not to other taxes. While it is true that LGUs cannot levy tax on property of
the Republic of the Philippines or the National Government, the beneficial use of property should not
be given to a taxable person. MCIAA, owner of the parcels of land in question, is a taxable person.
MIAA vs CA
GR number 155650 July 20, 2006

Facts: MIAA operates the NAIA. It administers the land, improvements and equipment within the
NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be
disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the
Philippines. The City of Parañaque demanded MIAA to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City.
Issue: whether or not MIAA is exempted from real estate tax.
Held: Yes. MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. MIAA is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus
exempt from local taxation. The real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. It
exercises governmental powers of eminent domain, police power and levying of fees and charges.
Maceda vs Macaraig
GR number 88291 June 8, 1993

Facts: NPC a public corporation was created, mainly to develop hydraulic power from all water
sources in the Philippines. Issued under the authority of this Act shall be exempt from the payment of
all taxes by the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or by any authority, branch, division or political
subdivision thereof and subject to the provisions of the Act of Congress. R.A. No. 987 was enacted
specifically to withdraw NPC's tax exemption for real estate taxes. R.A. No 2641 was enacted
converting the NPC from a public corporation into a stock corporation. No tax exemption was
incorporated in said Act. R.A. No. 6395 added a new section to the charter which declares the non-
profit character and tax exemptions of NPC. P.D. No. 40 was issued declaring that the electrification
of the entire country was one of the primary concerns of the country. The setting up of transmission
line grids and the construction of associated generation facilities in the country shall be the
responsibility of the NPC as the authorized implementing agency of the State.
Issue: whether or not NPC is exempted from direct and indirect taxation.

Held: Yes. A chronological review of the NPC laws will show that it has been the lawmaker's
intention that the NPC was to be completely tax exempt from all forms of taxes — direct and indirect.
Section 13, R.A. No. 6395, was very comprehensive in its enumeration of the tax exemptions allowed
NPC. Its section 13(d) is the starting point of this bone of contention among the parties - (d) From all
taxes, duties, fees, imposts and all other charges imposed directly or indirectly by the Republic of the
Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities,
on all petroleum products used by the Corporation in the generation, transmission, utilization, and
sale of electric power.
Fontanilla vs Maliaman
GR number L-55963 & 61045 February 29, 1991

Facts: NIA owned a pick up and is driven officially by Hugo Garcia. Garcia bumped Fontanilla which
resulted to the death of the latter. The parents of Fontanilla filed a suit against Garcia and NIA, as
Garcia’s employer.

Issue: whether or not NIA is liable for the negligent act of Garcia who was not its special
agent.

Held: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. NIA is not an agency performing governmental
functions. The functions of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere
optional functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the community as a
whole and the goal is for the general interest of society. NIA was not created for purposes of local
government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government
aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially
and purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines,
including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a
whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental
to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
Iron & Steel Authority vs CA
GR number 102976 October 25, 1995

Facts: ISA was created in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines. The NSC then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which
is an entity wholly owned by the National Government embarked on an expansion program which
includes the construction of a steel mill in Iligan City. LOI No. 1277 was issued directing NSC to
negotiate with the owners of MCFC for and on behalf of the Government for the compensation of
MCFC’s present occupancy rights on a land. The LOI directed that ISA may exercise the power of
eminent domain should the negotiations fail. The negotiations failed and ISA commenced
expropriation proceedings against MCFC. While trial was on-going the statutory existence of ISA had
expired.

Issue: whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA.

Held: Yes. There is no provision recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. ISA appears to be a non-incorporated
agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court considers
that ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic
itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with full panoply of powers and attributes which
are compendiously described as “legal personality.” When the statutory term of a non-incorporated
agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert
back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of
law specifying some other disposition thereof such as e.g. devolution or transmission of such powers,
duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of
the Philippines. The expiration of ISA’s statutory did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings. Further, no new legislative act is necessary should the Republic decide,
upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings.
Gatchalian vs OMB
GR number 229288 August 1, 2018

Facts: 6 criminal complaints were filed by the FIO of the Office of the Ombudsman against several
individuals including Gatchalian. In a Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
Gatchalian. Gatchalian filed with the CA a petition for Certiorari and sought to annul the Joint
Resolution and the Joint Order of the Ombudsman for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

Issue: whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for Certiorari filed by
Gatchalian for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: No. CA has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. The
appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. It cannot be taken into account where an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in
a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present petition should have been filed with this Court.
Administrative Due Process

Villa vs Lazaro
GR number L-69871 August 24, 1990

Facts: Villa was granted a building permit to construct a funeral parlor. As the funeral parlor was
nearing completion, a suit for injunction was brought by Dr. Veneracion, the owner of St. Elizabeth
Hospital, few meters from the funeral parlor. The genuine Zoning Ordinance of General Santos City
contained no prohibition whatever relative to such parlors’ “distance from hospitals, whether public
or private”. Villa then resumed construction of her building and completed it. Dr. Veneracion brought
the matter up with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Villa received a “show cause”
from the Commission requiring her to show cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a cease-
and-desist order issued against her for her failure to show proof of locational clearance. Later on, Villa
received an order from the Commissioner imposing on her a fine of P10,000.00 and requiring her to
cease operations until further orders from his office.

Issue: whether or not Villa was denied of due process.

Held: Yes. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials.
And this administrative process is recognized to include: (a) the right to notice, be it actual or
constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s legal right; (b) reasonable
opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor;
(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one
of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties
affected. And it being clear that some, at least, of those essential elements did not obtain or were not
present in the proceedings complained of, any judgment rendered, or order issued, therein was null
and void, could never become final and could be attacked in any appropriate proceeding. What the
record shows is that the petitioner responded promptly to orders and communications sent to her.
Zambales Chromite Mining vs CA
GR number 49711 November 7, 1979

Facts: ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be declared
the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are
asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabilona. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez
et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During
pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He did not inhibit
himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the
director of mines.

Issue: whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision.

Held: No. The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted
with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might
not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision
is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same
view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
Singson vs NLRC
GR number 122389 June 19, 1997

Facts: Singson was employed by PAL as Traffic Representative Passenger, Handling Division. His
duty consisted of checking in passengers and baggage for a particular flight. Singson was assigned in
the check-in counter of JAL. Ms. Kondo, JAL passenger, lodged a complaint against Singson for not
issuing a receipt after she paid for the alleged excess baggage to Singson. Singson was dismissed from
work. Petitioner lodged a complaint against the PAL before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, attorney’s
fees and damages. The case was raffled off to then Labor Arbiter Aquino. Aquino declared the
evidences adduced by the PAL as insufficient and declared the petitioner’s dismissal as illegal and
ordered his reinstatement with backwages. PAL appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Aquino,
now as presiding commissioner, is 1 of the commissioners in NLRC to which the case of PAL was
appealed. NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissing the complaint against PAL.

Issue: whether or not Singson was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino
participated as presiding commissioner of the NLRC.

Held: Yes. It is self-evident from the ruling case law that the officer who reviews a case on appeal
should not be the same person whose decision is the subject of review. Thus, we have ruled that "the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review.
Commissioner Aquino was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. He should have
inhibited himself from any participation in this case. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of
his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in
the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three
commissioners. The denial of petitioner's right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an
innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
Civil Service Commission vs. Lucas
G.R. No. 127838, January 21, 1999

Facts:
Raquel Linatok filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture an affidavit-
complaint against respondent Jose Lucas, a photographer of the same agency for misconduct. The
complaint stemmed from the alleged act of Jose Lucas of touching and caressing complainant's thigh
running down to her ankle. After a formal investigation by the Board of Personnel Inquiry, it issued a
resolution finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty of suspension
for one month and one day. The CSC, however, found him guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on
him the penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court of Appeals set aside the CSC resolution and
reinstated that of the board and ruled that respondent was denied due process as he came to know of
the modification of the charge against him only when he received notice of the CSC resolution
dismissing him from the service.

Issue:
WON respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct
on the charge of simple misconduct

Held:

Yes. As Lucas was merely charged with simple misconduct but was convicted of grave misconduct, he
was deprived of his right to due process. In which the Court held that “We sustain the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed
of the charges against him and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and proceedings.”
CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE
SYSTEM (MWSS) vs Ombudsman Vasquez, GR No. 109113, January 25, 1995

Facts:
Private respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturer’s Association
(PLDPPMA) filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on the public bidding conducted
by MWSS for projects of its Angat Water Supply Optimization Project (AWSOP). The letter of
complaint accused the MWSS of an apparent plan even before the bidding to favor suppliers of
fiberglass pipes and urged the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation to hold in abeyance the award
of contracts.

The Ombudsman issued an injunction to MWSS.

Petitioner MWSS assailed the order of the Ombudsman for lack of jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
over PLDPPMA’s complaint and for issuing the challenged order contrary to PD 1818 prohibiting the
issuance of restraining orders/injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects.

Issue: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over PLDPPMA’s complaint and has the power to
issue orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to set aside the recommendation of PBAC-
CSTE and to instead award the contract to a complying and responsive bidder.

Held:
No. While recognizing the investigatory and public assistance duties of the Ombudsman, the assailed
orders were an undue interference in the adjudicatory responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees
rather than a mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law. The
Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman reveals a predisposition against
the use of fiberglass pipes, a technical, rather than a legal matter.

As a GOCC, MWSS is charged with the construction, maintenance, and operation of waterwork
system to insure uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution of potable water. Therefore, it is
the agency that should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the
bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its development plans. The exercise of this
discretion to reject a bid and to award contracts, which is a purely technical matter, is
vested in the MWSS entrusted with such function that even courts or the Ombudsman
cannot unduly interfere from.
CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001

FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service Commission that
Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz after the
latter had previously failed in the said examination three times. The CSC found after a fact finding
investigation that a prima facie case exists for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and
CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BESTINTEREST OF THE SERVICE. The petitioners filed
their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal
Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The
petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue,
they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the
complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. O n N o v e m b e r 1 6 , 1 9 9 5 ,
D u l c e J . C o c h o n i s s u e d a n " I n v e s t i g a t i o n R e p o r t a n d Recommendation" finding
the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government
service Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7,Subtitle A, Title
1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction
only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from
the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government
employee.

ISSUE: WON petitioners’ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time.

HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not
be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings.
Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, are binding on
the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the
CSC. After a careful examination of the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty as
charged. The photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during
the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. In addition, the
signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is very different from the signature of
Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the
CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the
petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide
administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal.
LACSON vs Hon. Sec. of Pres. Anti-Graph Commission
G.R. NO. 165399, MAY 30, 2011
Doctrine: The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not
exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to
the offense charged.
Facts: Petitioners Theron V. Lacson, Jaime R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray were non-presidential
appointee’s and career service officials of respondent Philippine Estates Authority. Sulficio O. Tagud
filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman accusing petitioners for overpricing, by
P600m the contract for the construction of the President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard. The
Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation of both the criminal and the administrative aspects of
the case. The Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) requested the Ombudsman for authority to
conduct administrative disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners. The basic complaint has not
been further docketed as an administrative case. Thus, the same did not preclude the subsequent
filing with the PAGC of an administrative complaint against the concerned PEA officials. A formal
complaint was filed by the Investigation Office of PAGC charging several employees of PEA, including
petitioners. PAGC issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of petitioners with the imposition
of the corresponding accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from
employment in the government. The President approved the recommendation.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman should conduct the investigation on the charge of overpricing of the
project against petitioners.
Held: The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with similarly authorized agencies. Petitioners
argue that because they are not presidential appointees, it is only the Ombudsman which has
jurisdiction over them. In this regard, the petitioners are not correct. The Court has repeatedly ruled
that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive,
but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense
charged. Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the Ombudsman may share its authority to conduct an
investigation concerning administrative charges against them with other agencies. At any rate, this
issue is already moot and academic as the Ombudsman has terminated its investigation of petitioners.
It appears therefrom that the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative case against the petitioners
because the charges had already been passed upon by PAGC.
Republic vs Extelcom, Bayantel
GR No. 147096, January 15, 2002

Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional authority
to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative applying Rule 15,
Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures. Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC
should have applied the Revised Rules, which were
filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase “on its own initiative”
were deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.

Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force and
effect in granting provisional authority.

Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the
rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National
Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and regulations can
take effect.
FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN, Petitioner, v. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA
G.R. NO. 150178 : November 26, 2004
FACTS: On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with the CHED against petitioner Gaoiran,
Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the Angadanan Agro-Industrial College (AAIC),2 a
state-supervised school in Angadanan, Isabela. In his letter-complaint, respondent Edmond M.
Castillejo, Administrative Officer II, also of the same school, charged the petitioner with mauling him
while he was performing his duties therein. Appended to the letter-complaint were the verified
criminal complaint filed by respondent Castillejo against the petitioner and the sworn statements of
his witnesses. The criminal complaint for assault to a person in authority was filed with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.
After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie case against the
petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the charges against him.

The petitioner sought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive suspension order,
contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath and that he was not informed nor apprised of
the complaint against him before, during and after the preliminary fact-finding investigation.

Thereafter, Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of the
CHED, issued the Resolution dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the administrative complaint
against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not under
oath.

However, respondent Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of the CHED, apparently unaware of the
existence of Director Mayo's resolution, issued another Resolution dated June 3, 1999, finding the
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
dismissing him therefrom.
February 15, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner as it declared the June 3,
1999 Resolution of respondent Alcala null and void.
The CA declared as valid respondent Alcala's June 3, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the petitioner from
the service.
ISSUE: WON the letter-complaint should be deemed inexistent as it was not made under oath.
RULLING: It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not
concededly verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that he filed against the
petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well be
considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the Court
Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous
complaints filed against court employees or officials for violations of the Code of Ethical
Conduct.12 Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the
scope and exercise of its investigative powers.13 After all, in administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
In any case, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo is not a
"complaint" within the purview of the provisions mentioned above. In the fairly recent case of Civil
Service Commission v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court held that the "complaint" under E.O. No. 292
and CSC rules on administrative cases "both refer to the actual charge to which the person
complained of is required to answer and indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation
should his answer be deemed not satisfactory."
The said letter-complaint did not, by itself, commence the administrative proceedings against the
petitioner, requiring an answer from him, but, as already mentioned, merely triggered a fact-finding
investigation by the CHED.
Third, respondent Alcala, by reason of his position as then Chairman of the CHED, had the authority
to reverse and set aside the acts or issuances of his subordinates. His June 3, 1999 Resolution
dismissing the petitioner from the service, in effect, reversed and set aside the Resolution dated
February 20, 1999 of Director Mayo, his subordinate.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. RANULFO P. ALBAO, GR NO. 155784, 2005-10-13
Facts:
Office of the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines issued an original and permanent
appointment for the position of Executive Assistant IV to respondent Ranulfo P. Albao. Respondent
was then a contractual employee
Office of the Vice President requested the retrieval of the said appointment paper. Instead of heeding
the request, petitioner
CSC-NCR disapproved the appointment.
petitioner issued an Order holding that it has found, after a fact-finding investigation, that a prima facie
case exists against respondent Albao for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents,... stated in
his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) accomplished on July 1, 1998 that he took and passed the Assistant
Electrical Engineer Examination held on October 15 and
16, 1988 with a rating of 71.64%... submitted a Report of Rating showing he obtained a rating of 71.64%
during the aforesaid Assistant Electrical Engineering Examination, all purportedly issued by the
Professional Regulation Commission
PRC) has informed CSC-NCR that the name Ranulfo P. Albao does not appear in the Table of Results
and Masterlists of examinee... examinee number appearing in his Report of Rating is assigned to one
Bienvenido Aniño, Jr... respondent Albao filed on February 18, 1999 an "Urgent Motion to Resolve" the
issue of whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original jurisdiction
Respondent contended that the Commission has no jurisdiction over... the same for the following
reasons:... permanent appointment issued to him never became effective, even if it was later
disapproved, because he never assumed such position... he is already out of government service since
he resigned from his position... no longer with the civil service, the Commission has no disciplinary
jurisdiction over him as a private person.
Commission hereby rules that the Civil Service Commission - National Capital Region has jurisdiction
Respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals alleging that the Civil Service
Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
Court of Appeals found merit in the petition. It held that based on Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 12 (11), Section 47 (1), (2) and Section
48, Title 1 (A), Book V thereof, the CSC-NCR does not have... jurisdiction to investigate and decide the
case of respondent. Consequently, the CSC-NCR exceeded its authority
Hence, this petition
Issues:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original jurisdiction to institute the instant
administrative case against respondent Albao through its regional office, the CSC-NCR
Ruling:
Petition is GRANTED... jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.
Section 12. Powers and Functions -- The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
...
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.- (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine
in an amount exceeding... thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from office... complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against
a government official or employee in which case it may hear and... decide the case or it may deputize
any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation.
Section 48, Title 1(A), Book V of EO No. 292 provides for the procedure in administrative cases against
non-presidential appointees, thus:
Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. -- (1) Administrative
proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of
office of equivalent rank, or head of local... government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or
upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.
Albao was a contractual employee in the Office of the Vice President before his appointment to a
permanent position, which appointment was, however, requested to be retrieved by the Office of the
Vice President and at the same time disapproved
Court does not agree that petitioner is helpless to act directly and motuproprio, on the alleged acts of
dishonesty and falsification of official document committed by respondent in connection with his
appointment to a permanent position... true that Section 47 (2), Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292 gives
the heads of government offices original disciplinary jurisdiction over their own subordinates. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty... days or fine
in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. It is only when the penalty imposed exceeds the
aforementioned penalties that an appeal may be brought before the Civil Service Commission... present
case, however, partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the integrity of the civil service system, and
does not fall under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of
Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by... it directly.
An integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its
integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles
those who falsified their qualifications. This... is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings
intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service
Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005

Fact: The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated petitioner as persons involved in the
irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
ordered petitioner to file their respective counter-affidavits. Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G.
Canton recommended the filing of the proper information against petitioner and was thereafter
referred for review to the Office of the Special Prosecutor who affirmed the resolution of Graft
Investigation Officer, Deputy Special Prosecutor recommended the approval of the memorandum of
Special Prosecution Officer.Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred in the approval.
Ombudsman concurred thereto. Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed
with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File Motion
for Reinvestigation.The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner filed his
motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office
of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was assigned to Special
Prosecution Officer. Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Special Prosecutor
Micael recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special
Prosecutor Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Tamayo. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto,
who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the
recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note “assign the case to another
prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.” Special Prosecutor Micael filed a Manifestation, to which
was attached a copy of his memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by
Ombudsman Desierto of his recommendation to dismiss the case. On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of
Micael. Apparently, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on
27 June 2000, Special Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case for
Arraignment alleging therein that the prosecution did not give due course to the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it was the second motion which is prohibited under the Ombudsman
Act of 1989. He added that the results of the reinvestigation were already submitted to the respondent
court before receiving the motion for reconsideration.Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan
the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s failure to resolve his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a
resolution13 dated 24 March 2003, the respondent court directed the Office of the Ombudsman to
resolve the said motion.In a memorandum14 dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer
recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special
Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos changed his previous position and recommended that the memorandum
for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration be approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M.
Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman
Desierto when he retired, approved Joselito Ferrer’s memorandum recommending the denial of the
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal
Case. The First Division of this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.The instant
petition was transferred to the Second Division of this Court.

Issue: where Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion?

Held: Yes, attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for
the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. Having participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of appropriate information, it
behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during
the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies
OMB vs Estandarte GR. No. 168670 , April 13, 2007

Facts: On Aug. 17, 1998, People’s Graftwatch, through its chairman, Dr. Patricio Y. Tan, referedto
the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), for immediate investigation, a complaint of the Faculty Club
and Department Heads of the Ramon Torres National High School against Heidi Estandarte, the
school principal.

The complaint consisted of 33 allegations of improprieties raging from illegal handling of

school funds, irregular financial transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority.

Issue: WON the office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over public school officers.

Held: NO. the jurisdiction of the ombudsman over disciplinary cases involving public school teachers
has been modified by section 9 of RA 4670, otherwise known as the magna carta of public school
teachers, which says that such cases must first go to a committee appointed by the secretary of
education
RUIVIVAR VS OMB GR. No. 165012 , Sept. 16, 2008

Facts

The petitioner before the Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a public official, abuse of authority,
and violations of the RPC and of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Respondent went to the LTO to meet with representatives from the DOTC and to file a copy of the Association’s request to
lift the moratorium imposed by the LTO on the accreditation of drug testing clinics. It was alleged that the petitioner shouted
at her in a very arrogant and insulting manner, hurled invectives upon her person, and prevented her from entering the
office of the LTO Commissioner. The petitioner also accused the private respondent of causing intrigues against her at the
DOTC. To prove her allegations, the private respondent presented the affidavits of three witnesses.

The Ombudsman found the petitioner liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions and imposed on her the
penalty of reprimand.

The Ombudsman ruled that the petitioner's verbal assault on the private respondent was sufficiently established by the
affidavits of the private respondent’s witnesses who had not been shown by evidence to have any motive to falsely testify
against petitioner. In contrast, the petitioner’s witnesses, as her officemates, were likely to testify in her favor. Given that
the incident happened at the LTO and that the petitioner had authority to act on the private respondent’s application for
accreditation, the Ombudsman also found that the petitioner's ascendancy over the private respondent made the petitioner’s
verbal assault more likely.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that she was deprived of due process because she was not
furnished copies of the affidavits of the private respondent’s witnesses. In the same motion, petitioner questioned the
Ombudsman’s disregard of the evidence she had presented, and disagreed with the Ombudsman’s statement that she has
ascendancy over the private respondent.

Respondent was given the affidavit of witnesses against her.

The petitioner received copies of the private respondent’s witnesses’ affidavits but she did not choose to controvert these
affidavits or to file a supplement to her motion for reconsideration. She simply maintained in her Manifestation that her
receipt of the affidavits did not alter the fact the she was deprived of due process nor cure the irregularity.

Issue: W/N petitioner was denied due process when she was deprived of her right to confront the evidence submitted before
the office of the Ombudsman.

HELD

NO. The CA Decision dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust all the
administrative remedies available to her before the Ombudsman. This ruling is legally correct as exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a requisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Other than this legal significance, however,
the ruling necessarily carries the direct and immediate implication that the petitioner has been granted the opportunity to
be heard and has refused to avail of this opportunity; hence, she cannot claim denial of due process. In the words of the CA
ruling itself: "Petitioner was given the opportunity by public respondent to rebut the affidavits submitted by private
respondent. . . and had a speedy and adequate administrative remedy but she failed to avail thereof for reasons only known
to her."

For a fuller appreciation of our above conclusion, we clarify that although they are separate and distinct concepts, exhaustion
of administrative remedies and due process embody linked and related principles. The "exhaustion" principle applies when
the ruling court or tribunal is not given the opportunity to re-examine its findings and conclusions because of an available
opportunity that a party seeking recourse against the court or the tribunal’s ruling omitted to take. Under the concept of
"due process," on the other hand, a violation occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without giving him or her
the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the exhaustion principle is based on the perspective of the ruling court or tribunal, while
due process is considered from the point of view of the litigating party against whom a ruling was made. The commonality
they share is in the same "opportunity" that underlies both. In the context of the present case, the available opportunity to
consider and appreciate the petitioner’s counter-statement of facts was denied the Ombudsman; hence, the petitioner is
barred from seeking recourse at the CA because the ground she would invoke was not considered at all at the Ombudsman
level. At the same time, the petitioner – who had the same opportunity to rebut the belatedly-furnished affidavits of the
private respondent’s witnesses – was not denied and cannot now claim denial of due process because she did not take
advantage of the opportunity opened to her at the Ombudsman level.

Given this opportunity to act on the belatedly-furnished affidavits, the petitioner simply chose to file a "Manifestation"
where she took the position that "The order of the Ombudsman supplying her with the affidavits of the complainant does
not cure the order," and on this basis prayed that the Ombudsman’s decision "be reconsidered and the complaint dismissed
for lack of merit."

"Undoubtedly, the respondent herein has been furnished by this Office with copies of the affidavits, which she claims she
has not received. Furthermore, the respondent has been given the opportunity to present her side relative thereto, however,
she chose not to submit countervailing evidence or argument. The respondent, therefore (sic), cannot claim denial of due
process for purposes of assailing the Decision issued in the present case. A party cannot feign denial of due process where
he had the opportunity to present his side. This becomes all the more important since, as correctly pointed out by the
complainant, the decision issued in the present case is deemed final and unappealable. Despite the clear provisions of the
law and the rules, the respondent herein was given the opportunity not normally accorded, to present her side, but she opted
not to do so which is evidently fatal to her cause."

Under these circumstances, we cannot help but recognize that the petitioner’s cause is a lost one, not only for her failure to
exhaust her available administrative remedy, but also on due process grounds. The law can no longer help one who had been
given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance.
Hadji-Sirad vs. CSC, GR No. 182267 , Aug. 28, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner, who was an employee of COA in the ARMM, was charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service, for the anomaly found in her examination files for the Career Service Personal
Examination held on Oct.1993, where she passed with a 88.31% score. The examination files (1993) were compared with
her personal data sheet (1994). I t was found:

That the image included in the personal data sheet of petitioner bears no resemblance with the examinee petitioner. The
signatures were also vastly different.

Based on these facts, it was then alleged that petitioner allowed a different person to take the exam for her.

A full investigation followed. The hearings were repeatedly postponed as per Petitioner’s request, but eventually the hearing
materialized and both sides (the prosecutor and petitioner) were able to present their evidence.

CSCRO: Found petitioner guilty of the charges and was meted with dismissal from service.

CSC: affirmed the findings and the resolution of CSCRO.

Petitioner coursed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RoC before the CA.

CA: dismissed the petition for being the wrong mode of appeal. Petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule
43, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner also failed to indicate the material date of filing of her MR to the
CSC, and to include the said MR to the petition, in violation of Rule 43.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON petitioner was granted due process

Held: Yes.

First, petitioner was granted due process. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings, which may affect a
respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted
as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding
by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in
the records or made known to the parties affected.

▪ Petitioner prayed for and was granted the postponement of the hearings several times, and she was also able to appeal her
case numerous times.

Second, there is substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusion of CSCRO and CSC. Perusal of the pictures and
signatures of the documents (the examination documents as well as others) clearly show that the one who took the exam on
October 1993 is not petitioner. Petition Denied; Resolution Affirmed.
G.R. No. 156063. November 18, 2003
MELECIO ALCALA, PERLA ALCALA, ROQUE BORINAGA, DIOSDADA BORINAGA,
HELEN LENDIO, and MARY BABETH MAGNO BORINAGA, HELEN LENDIO, and MARY
BABETH MAGNO, petitioners, vs. JOVENCIO VILLAR, respondent.

FACTS: Complainants filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative complaint against
respondent for dishonesty alleging that complainants discovered that each of them were issued checks
in the amount of P312.00 as reimbursement, and that respondent received the same by forging their
signature. Further, they received from respondent P1,500.00 each representing Loyalty Benefits when
in fact they were entitled to receive P2,000.00 each. The Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution
finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and dismissing him from service. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals nullified and set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the
latter was without jurisdiction over administrative complaints against public school teachers.

ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative complaints against
public school teachers.

HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Indeed, the question of jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio on appeal even if none
of the parties raised the same. This rule, however, is not absolute. In Emin v. De Leon, a public school
teacher was administratively charged with and found guilty of dishonesty under P.D. No. 807 (Civil
Service Law). The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
is the applicable law and that the Civil Service Commission does not have jurisdiction over the
administrative case.
In the case at bar, respondent was amply afforded due process in an administrative proceeding,
the essence of which is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. Not only did respondent le a counter-affidavit and a motion for
reconsideration, he also participated in the hearings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and
was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Verily, participation in the
administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto amounts to a waiver of jurisdictional
infirmities.
G.R. No. 157684. April 27, 2005
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, petitioner, vs. PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L.
PEREZ, and IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN, respondents.

FACTS: Some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident
Ombudsman against Dir. IV Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera,
and respondents, arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR from Lumar
Pharmaceutical Laboratory. The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents and
their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. On May 8, 1998, the
Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against respondents, whereby dismissing the
same.

ISSUE: 1. WON PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate anomalous transactions involving the
respondents.
2. WON the decision of the DOH Secretary is valid.

HELD: 1. Yes. Executive Order (EO) No. 151 10 10 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate
administrative complaints against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption.
On the basis of the foregoing verba legis approach, respondents claim that the PCAGC did not
have jurisdiction over them, because they were not presidential appointees. The Court notes, however,
that respondents were not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The investigation was authorized under
Administrative Order No. 298, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the administrative
charges filed against Majarais, Camposano, Cabrera, Agustin and Perez.
With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

2. No, the health secretary's twin Orders were patently void for want of due process. The Order
of Secretary Reodica denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration also failed to correct the
deficiency in the initial Order. She improperly relied on the President's findings in AO 390 which,
however, pertained only to the administrative charge against Dr. Majarais, not against respondents. To
repeat, the Chief Executive recognized that the disciplinary jurisdiction over respondents belonged to
the health secretary, who should have followed the manner in which the President had rendered his
action on the recommendation.
The President's endorsement of the records of the case for the "appropriate action" of the health
secretary did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents. Like that of
President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a legal
assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and
thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.
G.R. No. 139794. February 27, 2002
MARTIN S. EMIN, petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON,
COMMISSIONERS THELMA P. GAMINDE and RAMON P. ERENETA, JR., of the CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Martin S. Emin was a Non-Formal Education (NFE) Supervisor of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) of Kidapawan, Cotabato. He was dismissed from the service
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
interest of the service. His dismissal was based on the testimonies of teachers who pointed to him as
the person who gave them the fake R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility that they attached to their
appointment for fee. Thus, Emin led the instant petition.

ISSUE: 1. WON the CSC has original jurisdiction over the case against him as a public school teacher.
2. WON he was accorded due process.

HELD: 1. No. The Court ruled that as petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670 ( M a g n a C a r t a of Public
School Teachers), it is the Investigating Committee that should have investigated his case conformably
with Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33,
S. 1999, otherwise known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. However, at this late hour, the proceedings
conducted by the public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the
principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC's jurisdiction over his
case.
2. No. Equally unmeritorious is petitioner's contention that he was denied due process. He
averred that he was not allowed cross-examination. It is well to remember that in the administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Nothing on record showed
that he asked for cross-examination, as most of the submissions were written. In our view, petitioner
cannot argue that he had been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place.
G.R. No. 110379. November 28, 1997
HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS; DR. NILO ROSAS, in his capacity as REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR. BIENVENIDO ICASIANO, in his capacity as the
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON CITY SCHOOLS and DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O.
BAUTISTA, AURORA C. VALENZUELA and TERESITA V. DIMAGMALIW, Petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO, ERLINDA B. DE LEON,
CLARISSA T. DIMAANO, WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA R. VIVAR, VICTORIA S.
UBALDO, JENNIE L. DOGWE, NORMA L. RONGCALES, EDITA C. SEPTIMO, TERESITA
E. EVANGELISTA, CATALINA R. FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG, MARILYNNA C.
KU, MARISSA M. SAMSON, HENEDINA B.CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO, RUTH F.
LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD, FELISA S. VILLACRUEL, MA. VIOLETA
ELIZABETH Y. HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, ADRIANO S. VALENCIA and
ELEUTERIO S. VARGAS, Respondents.

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño issued a return to work order to all
public school teachers who had participated in walkouts and strikes. Secretary Cariño filed
administrative charges against the striking teachers. The Secretary also placed the teachers under
preventive suspension. The teachers filed an injunctive suit with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit. The trial court
rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of the teachers null and void. The trial court held that
Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers," is the
primary law that governs the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against public school
teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law. As a result, the committee tasked to
investigate the charges filed against the teachers was illegally constituted and all acts done by said body
possess no legal color whatsoever. From this adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS Secretary
Cariño filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals armed the trial court's decision
holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in the administrative proceedings
instituted against them.

ISSUE: Whether private respondents were denied due process of law.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher's organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, said
committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction and all proceedings undertaken by them
were necessarily void. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees
was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal and gives substance and meaning to the fundamental
right to be heard. Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no amount of
delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. The Court ordered the DECS to
reinstate the private respondents and award all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them
during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal.
G.R. No. 153155. September 30, 2005
MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR., Petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
EVANGELINE URSAL, HON. JOSE E. LINA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and HON. FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as City Mayor of Quezon City, Respondent.

FACTS: Evangeline Ursal, filed with the NBI a complaint for attempted rape against petitioner who was
subsequently charged with sexual harassment before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Ursal
brought before the DILG a complaint-affidavit charging petitioner with grave misconduct for the
alleged attempted rape. Further, Ursal filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a similar complaint-
affidavit charging petitioner with grave misconduct. The Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman exonerated petitioner from the charge, dismissing the complaint for lack of
substantial evidence. However, upon review, and with the approval of the Ombudsman, petitioner was
found guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of material
benefits, per its Memorandum Order.

ISSUE: 1. WON the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since the City Council had earlier
acquired jurisdiction over the matter
2. WON petitioner was deprived of administrative due process when the Ombudsman refused to
consider his evidence and rendered a decision that is not supported by substantial evidence.

HELD: 1. The mandate of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints against erring public officials,
derived from both the Constitution and the law gives it jurisdiction over the complaint against
petitioner. The Constitution has named the Ombudsman and his Deputies as the protectors of the
people who shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government. To fulfill this mandate, R.A. No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
was enacted, giving the Ombudsman or his Deputies jurisdiction over complaints on all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance against officers or employees of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality therefor, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and the disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, except those who
may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary. On the other
hand, under R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official. Without a doubt, the Office of the
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the Quezon City Council over administrative cases
against elective officials such as petitioner.
The Ombudsman was not aware of the pending case before the Quezon City Council when the
administrative complaint was filed before it. There was no mention of such complaint either in the
complaint-affidavit or in the counter-affidavit of petitioner. Thus, the Ombudsman, in compliance with
its duty to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government, took cognizance of
the case, made its investigation, and rendered its decision accordingly.
2. No. Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the formal
charge and given a chance to present evidence in his behalf. He was not denied due process. More
importantly, the decision of the Ombudsman is well supported by substantial evidence.
There is no basis for believing petitioner's claim that the Ombudsman had refused to consider
his evidence. As properly observed by the CA, the Ombudsman passed upon petitioner's evidence
which, however, was found bereft of credibility. In fact, unfortunately for petitioner at that, the
Ombudsman and the CA discovered Ursal's allegations more credible, supported and corroborated as
they were by the medical findings, the NBI reports and the surrounding circumstances.
G.R. No. 117618. March 29, 1996
VIRGINIA MALINAO, Petitioner, v. HON. LUISITO REYES, in his capacity as Governor
of the Province of Marinduque, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF MARINDUQUE
and WILFREDO RED, in his capacity as Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, Respondents.

FACTS: Virginia Malinao is Human Resource Manager III of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. Respondent
Mayor filed a case against her in the Office of the Ombudsman for gross neglect of duty, inefficiency
and incompetence. While the case was pending, he appointed a replacement for petitioner. Petitioner
then filed an administrative case against respondent Mayor in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Marinduque, charging him with abuse of authority and denial of due process.
In an executive session of the Sanggunian, a vote of 5-3 found respondent Mayor guilty of the
charge and imposed on him the penalty of one-month suspension, which decision was signed by only
one member, Rodrigo Sotto, who was also the Presiding Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. As a result, respondent Mayor questioned said decision and alleged that
since only Sotto alone signed the decision it can only be considered as a recommendation of the Blue
Ribbon Committee and he was not bound by it. Respondent Mayor also sent a letter to the Secretary of
the DILG regarding the decision of the committee to which the Secretary opined that it does not appear
to be in accordance with Section 66 of the Local Government Code of 1991. On the other hand, petitioner
sent a letter to respondent Governor Reyes, demanding that the "Decision" suspending respondent
Mayor from office be implemented without further delay, but Reyes declined since he agreed with the
opinion of the Secretary. Thus, respondent Mayor was acquitted from the charges by the Sanggunian
in a vote of 7-2.

ISSUE: WON the "Decision" had become final and executory, for failure of respondent Mayor to appeal,
thus it was beyond the power of the Sanggunian to render another decision.

HELD: These contentions are without merit. What petitioner claims to be the "Decision" of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan bore the signature of only one member (Rodrigo V. Sotto) who signed the
"Decision" as "Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan.”
Contrary to petitioner's claim, what the minutes only show is that on August 12, 1994 the
Sanggunian took a vote on the administrative case of respondent Mayor and not that it then rendered
a decision as required by Section 66(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).
In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local officials, the decision
of the Sanggunian must thus be "in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for
such decision." What the Sanggunian, therefore, did on August 12, 1994 was not to render a decision.
Neither may the so-called "Decision" prepared by Sanggunian Member Rodrigo V. Sotto on September
5, 1994 be regarded as the decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority.
G.R. No. 172635. October 20, 2010
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. PEDRO DELIJERO, JR, respondent.

FACTS: A complaint against respondent was filed before petitioner Office of the Ombudsman regarding
his romantic relationship with his 12-year old student. Petitioner called the parties to a preliminary
conference and, after which, ordered them to submit their respective position papers. Respondent,
however, did not submit a position paper but instead submitted a Manifestation stating that the
administrative aspect of the complaint was likewise the subject of a complaint filed by complainant
before the Office of the Regional Director, DepEd. Petitioner rendered a Decision finding respondent
guilty of Grave Misconduct and meted him the penalty of dismissal.

ISSUE: WON Ombudsman’s administrative disciplinary authority over public school teachers is
concurrent with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disciplining authority.

HELD: Yes. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, this Court ruled that the administrative
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is
concurrent with the proper committee of the DECS.
Based on the foregoing, while petitioner has concurrent administrative disciplinary authority
with the DECS over public school teachers, Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the
Ombudsman may refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under the circumstances
obtaining herein, it would have been more prudent for petitioner to have referred the complaint to the
DECS given that it would have been in a better position to serve the interest of justice considering the
nature of the controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is covered by RA 4670, therefore,
the proceedings before the DECS would have been the more appropriate venue to resolve the dispute.
In any case, the foregoing pronouncement does not automatically mean that this Court is
nullifying the proceedings before the Ombudsman as estoppel has already set in. In Medrano, this Court
ruled that the active participation of an individual before the administrative proceedings and the
belated challenge to the jurisdiction of the said body bars him from assailing such acts under the
principle of estoppel.
G.R. No. 165416, January 22, 2008.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. FLORITA A. MASING and JOCELYN A.
TAYACTAC, respondents.

FACTS: Complainants were parents of children studying at the DCISS. Respondents were
administratively charged before the Oce of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly collecting
unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds. Respondents filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over them. Respondents
alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a committee to
be constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the "The Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers."

ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and
employees.

HELD: Yes, since, the acts and omissions complained of relate to respondents' conduct as public official
and employee, if not to outright graft and corruption. The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to
conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. As the principal and primary complaints and
principal and primary complaints and action center action center against erring public officers and
employees, it is mandated by no less than Section 13 (1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction
therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all
administrative complaints.
G.R. No. 177580. October 17, 2008
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. VICTORIO N. MEDRANO, respondent.

FACTS: The administrative complaint, in essence, alleged that in the afternoon of March 28, 2003,
respondent made sexual advances on Ma. Ruby and abused her sexually. In his Counter-Adavit,
respondent denied the charge, claiming that it was "maliciously designed to harass and threaten him to
succumb to Ma. Ruby's demand that she be given a regular teaching post." He thus prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint. While the administrative case was pending investigation, Ma. Ruby filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension, alleging that respondent was "using the powers of
his office by utilizing his subordinates in harassing her." By Order, petitioner granted the motion and
ordered the preventive suspension of respondent for six (6) months without pay and was subsequently
adjudged respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from
the service.

ISSUE: WON Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the DepEd over the administrative
complaint against respondent.

HELD: Yes. The constitution and statutory provisions taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow upon the petitioner full administrative disciplinary power over public officials and
employees except those impeachable officials, Members of Congress and of the Judiciary.
In the instant case, respondent, although designated as then OIC of a public school and
concurrently the school principal of another public school, is undoubtedly covered by the definition of
the term "teacher" under the second paragraph of Section 2 of the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers.
Thus, the administrative complaint against respondent should have been referred by petitioner
to the proper committee of the DepEd for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings, in
light of Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989. However, respondent is now barred from assailing
petitioner's acts under the principle of estoppel since he had actively participated in the administrative
proceedings before petitioner.
G.R. No. 141949. October 14, 2002.
CEFERINO PADUA, Petitioner, v. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF
MAKATI, RTC, BRANCH 137, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP., TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll
rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway, effective January 1, 2002. Petitioners assailed before this
Court the validity and legality of the TRB Resolution.

ISSUE: WON the TRB Resolution is valid.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Letter of Instruction No. 1334-A expressly allowed the TRB
to grant ex-parte provisional or temporary increase in toll rates. It directs, orders and instructs the TRB
to issue provisional toll rates adjustment ex-parte without the need of notice, hearing and publication.
All that is necessary is that it be issued upon (1) a finding that the main petition is sufficient in form
and substance; (2) the submission of an affidavit showing that the increase in rates substantially
conforms to the formula, if any is stipulated in the franchise or toll operation agreement, and that
failure to immediately impose and collect the increase in rates would result in great irreparable injury
to the petitioner; and (3) the submission of a bond.
The Court has ruled in a number of cases that an administrative agency may be empowered to
approve provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of public utilities without a hearing.
The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary, and
subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing. The Court
likewise ruled that in the case at bar the initial proper recourse is to file a petition for review of the
adjusted toll rates with the TRB. The TRB, as the agency assigned to supervise the collection of toll fees
and the operation of toll facilities, has the necessary expertise, training and skills to judiciously decide
matters of this kind.
G.R. No. 92008. July 30, 1990
RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner, vs. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.

FACTS: Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of the Board of
Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager.
He complains, though, that his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new
Secretary of Tourism. Binamira's demurrer led to an unpleasant exchange that led to his ling of a
complaint against the Secretary with the Commission on Human Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation.

HELD: No. Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot
sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that
the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the
President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion,
which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister
Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or
designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly
performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
The petitioner's claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation
being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder
to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation
signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in
fact it was (albeit for a different reason). In either case, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must
be rejected.
PEREZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN Gr. No. 92008 July 30, 1990
Facts:
Salvador Perez and Juanita ApostolZapanta are Mayor and Treasurer of San Manuel, Pangasinan,
respectively. They willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the purchase of 1 computer unit costing
P120,000 acquisition by personal canvass, violating Sec 362and 267 of the Local Government Code. No
public bidding occurred and no Committee award was constituted to approve the procurement.
Salvador and Juanita gave Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center undue advantage or preference
through manifest partiality, showing evident of bad faith and gross, inexcusable negligence, but this
was not include in the original information, so it was recommended by the Special Prosecutor that the
information be amended to show the manner of the commission of the offence, based on the
Ombudsman’s margin notes in the original information. The amended information was admitted. The
petitioners challenge this, saying it was the Sandiganbayan committed GAD in accepting the amended
information, which had no approval from the Ombudsman, amounting to denial of due process. The
SC granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Special has the authority to file information without approval of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
No.
The Ombudsman’s margin notes order was to "study whether the accused, assuming arguendo that
there was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the seller of the subject
computer” and “submit your recommendation soonest.” It is clear that the recommendation must be
submitted to one who has authority to implement such recommendation. The Ombudsman has the
power to file information, as well as the power to delegate his powers.
JOSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. NO. 131255. MAY 20, 1998]

FACTS
Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging violently
into the session hall of the SangguniangPanlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was
endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared
in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct
Formal Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers
substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings.
Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation
of the DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six
(6) months without pay.
ISSUES
Whether or not:
(a) Preventive suspension is proper;
(b) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the
President who is the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;
RULING
a. Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the
issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there
is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The act of respondent in
allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the SangguniangPanlalawigan in the company of
armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-
affidavit of two (2) employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive
of the province is in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational
politics in the province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.
b. No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is
delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently
includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived
from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23,
however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may
be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner
Joson’s claim.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE VS PROVINCE OF QUEZON # 80796 11 OCT 2001
FACTS:
Historical records disclose that the Camarines region in the Island of Luzon had been divided originally
into the two (2) separate provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, which division was
maintained until 19 May 1893, when the two (2) provinces were consolidated by the Spanish colonial
administration to constitute a single entity, the Province of Ambos Camarines. Adjacent to Camarines
Norte in the northeast (i.e., the northern portion of Ambos Camarines), upon the other hand, lay the
Province of Tayabas. At the time of arrival of the United States flag in the Philippines, there was thus
existing the Province of Ambos Camarines.
ISSUES:
Whether or not therewas legal authority for the 16 June 1922 decision of the Chief of the Executive
Bureau? Was such prior legislative authorization given?
RULING:
1. It has been stated that Section 42 does set out a definition or description of the boundary line
between Ambos Camarines and Quezon Province. We note, however, that Section 42 does not
describe or define the entirety of that line in such a manner as to permit the whole boundary line
to be located on the ground by a surveyor. Close examination of Section 42 will show that it is
not the whole boundary line that is disputed but only a segment thereof. The boundary line from
the peak of Mt. Cadig eastward to the peak of Mt. Labo and from there to a stone monument at
the head-waters of the Pasay River and thence along the course of that river to the Gulf of Ragay,
is described in terms which are sufficiently precise to permit a surveyor to locate that boundary
line on the surface of the earth. It is the western portion of the boundary line — from the peak of
Mt. Cadig westward to a point on the eastern shore of Basiad Bay — which is the subject of the
boundary dispute.

2. The legislative authority was nonetheless necessary for the legal effectivity and enforceability of
the 16 June 1922 decision of the Chief of the Executive Bureau, we believe and so hold that prior
legislative authority was supplied by Act No. 2809. The spelling out of a "survey-able" and
"monumentable" Basiad Bay — Mt. Cadig segment of the Ambos Camarines — Tayabas boundary
line, was necessary and incidental to the authority of the Governor-General to re-establish as an
independent province the former Province of Camarines Norte and to ensure that it would have
the same territory which it had prior to its consolidation into the then Province of Ambos
Camarines.
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS VS NPC Gr. No. 1562068 November 21, 2017
Facts:
Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction which assails the validity of the NPBResolutions by
maintaining that no quorum existed during the NPB Resolutions meeting.Petitioners argue that of the
seven persons present in the meeting, only three are NPBmembers. The remaining four are merely
representatives of other NPB members not present inthe said meeting thus, rendering the said
Resolutions void.
Issue:
Whether or not NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly enacted.
Ruling:
No, it was not. The legislature is the one who vested the power to exercise judgment and discretion
inrunning the affairs to the NPB. Discretion means a power or right conferred tothem by law of acting
officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience,
uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.Hence, the court held that the department
secretaries cannot delegate their duties asmembers of the NPB, much less their power to vote and
approve board resolutions because it istheir personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment
of such responsibility.
DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES G.R. No. 149724 August 19, 2003
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional
Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from
Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued
by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the
President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the
DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the
latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
GAUDENCIODEMAISIP V. THE COURT OF APPEALS #8939 JANUARY 25, 1991
FACTS:
The late Geronimo Destacamento filed his application for a fishpond permit on 01 April 1927. Before
his death, Destacamento, without the knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a
deed of sale covering the lots in question in gavor of Seragin Villanueva – an act which was illegal and
contrary to the rules of the permit granted him. Nevertheless, the Director of Forestry requested
Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots, but the latter neglected and failed to do
so.
GaudencioDemaisip then filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit application
for the same lots. He complied with all the prerequisites necessary for the issuance of a fishpond permit,
namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting a surety bond in the sum of P350. When said
fishpond permit was ready to be issued to Demaisip, Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the
lots in question in favour of Luis Buenaflor who started to occupy the land and introduced
improvements thereon consisting of a big dam.
The Director of Fish and Game Administration decided that Demaisip be given due course upon
payment of an additional rental of P16 which is 1% of the value of improvements assessed at P1,600.
However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the said decision. Demaisip then
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over the said case, due to the fact that Demaisip
had not exhausted all administrative remedies before approaching the judiciary.
HELD:
It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agreculture and Natural
Resources to the President, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in
view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The
presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President, unless
disapproved by the latter. It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff’s action should not be
entertained.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that there is interference of the courts with the acts of executive officers
for such defense might only be valid in special civil actions – this is not one – wherein the petitioner
must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.
CALO VS FUERTES 5 SCRA 399 29JUNE 1962
FACTS:
In Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City entitled Francis C. Calo, claimant-contestant, vs. Delfin C.
Fuertes,applicant-respondent, the Director of Lands rendered an opinion denying and dismissing
former's claim andcontest against the homestead application of Delfin C. Fuertes and ordered him to
vacate the premises within60 days from receipt of a copy of the opinion and stating that, upon finality
thereof, the homestead patentwould be issued to Fuertes. His request for reconsideration having been
denied by the Director of Lands,Francisco C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources the case, who modified theopinion of the Director of Lands, ordering Fuertes to reimburse
Calo of the difference between the value of theimprovements that the latter introduced on the land in
controversy and the value of the consequentialbenefits derived by him therefrom.Still dissatisfied with
the opinion, Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines, but withdrew it before thePresident could
act thereon. He later filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for writs of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of the opinions of theDirector of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined among others. For failureto
state a cause of action, for lack of jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the administrative
remediesavailable to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the Court resolves to dismiss as it
hereby dismissesthe herein petition with costs against petitioner. The petitioner then appeals to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:Whether the appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeal to the Courts of
Justice.
HELD:Yes. The appellant’s contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal
from the decision oropinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the
Director of Lands, he had exhausted allthe administrative remedies, is untenable. The withdrawal of
the appeal taken to the President of thePhilippines is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such
withdrawal is fatal because the appeal to thePresident is the last step he should take in an administrative
case. Furthermore, a special civil action forcertiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain,speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion ororder by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines is the plain,speedy and adequate remedy available
to the petitioner. Therefore, the judgment appealed from had alreadybecome final and cannot be
reviewed. The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.
LOURDES R. QUISUMBING v. MANUEL LUIS GUMBAN GR No. 85156, Feb 05, 1991
FACTS:
On February 11, 1987, in view of the agitation of teachers and concerned citizens of Glan, then Secretary
Lourdes Quisumbing issued a Memorandum Order, directing Regional Director Teofilo E. Gomez to
reassign or transfer Esther B. Yap to another district, which was effected by Director Teofilo E. Gomez
in his Memorandum Order dated February 12, 1987, ordering the transfer of private respondent Esther
B. Yap as public school district supervisor from Glan District to Malapatan District and for Crisanto B.
Delamin, another public school district supervisor, to assume that of respondent's position at Glan. The
latter in turn issued a Memorandum Order to the principals and head teachers of different public
schools at Glan informing them of his assumption of office. However, private respondent Esther B. Yap
defied the orders of her superiors and she continued to perform the functions of public school district
supervisor of Glan.
On February 20, 1987, Yap filed a petition (docketed as Special Civil Case No. 230) for prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction/restraining order with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General
Santos City, against the Hon. Lourdes R. Quisumbing, et al. who filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss,
which was denied by respondent Judge Manuel Luis Gumban in his order dated August 17, 1987. On
August 25, 1987, said Judge issued another order granting the Writ of Preliminary injunction and
denied Quisumbing et al.'s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
whether or not the transfer of private respondent is in violation of the election ban has become moot
and academic.
HELD:
The lower court did not err in taking cognizance of the case. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly held that the principle
requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one: where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as
an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent has acted in
utter disregard of due process. The rule does not also apply where insistence on its observance would
result in nullification of the claim being asserted: and when the rule does not provided plain, speedy
and adequate remedy.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 80719 September 26, 1989
FACTS:
On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her riceland or for
exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR), Regional Office in Tabaco, Albay. After due hearing, Atty. CidarmindaArresgado of the
said office filed an investigation report dated June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of the Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be petitioner's tenant over her riceland.
Upon failure of the Ministry to take the necessary action, petitioner reiterated her application sometime
in 1979-1985 alleging that her tenant deliberately failed and refused to deliver her landowner's share
from 1975 up to the time of the filing of the said application and that the latter had distributed his
landholding to his children. A reinvestigation was conducted this time by Atty. Seth Evasco who on
October 31, 1985 filed his report recommending the cancellation of private respondent's CLT Said
report was elevated to the MAR. In an endorsement dated November 25, 1985, Regional Director
Salvador Pejo manifested his concurrence with the report of Atty. Evasco holding that the properties of
the petitioner consist of 4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 27167, 27168
and 27344 and hence not covered by the Operation Land Transfer Program. Juanito L. Lorena, the
Officer-in-Charge of MAR likewise concurred therewith. However, in the order dated February 13,
1986, then Minister ConradoEstrella denied petitioner's application for retention.
ISSUE:
WON a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings are exclusively cognizable
by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose decision may be appealed to the Office of
the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations?
HELD:
The court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of certiorari
brought before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his
discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform.
The Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over
petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The failure to
appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case
is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the
President .
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 167324 AUGUST 15, 2007
Facts:
In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general areas
of reform: to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; secure funding for priority public health
programs; promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance;
strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; expand the coverage of the National Health
Insurance Program (NHIP). On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which
provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the
assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services
to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of
basic services to local government units. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform
Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No.
102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” The Court of Appeals
ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II;
Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of
the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote
the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the
Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can
only provide guidelines for legislation. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is
detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the
HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the
political department.
Issue:
Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution?
Held:
The Court finds the present petition to be without merit. As a general rule, the provisions of the
Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement.
For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified
by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this
Court as non self-executing. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were
taken from Article II of the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the
provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the afore cited case of
Tañada v. Angara, wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled
that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented. Moreover, the
records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and
due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no
allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they
failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful
in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still not
invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the
DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No.
312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by
an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is
meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102
would, nevertheless, remain unaffected.
CHAVEZ V. NHA (2007)
Facts:
In his capacity as taxpayer, the Solicitor General Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court directly for,
among other things, access to all documents and information relating to the Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (the “Project”), including its underlying Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) between the National Housing Authority (NHA), a government body, and R-II
Builders, Inc. (RBI).
With Congress having approved the Project as a boost to infrastructure through its development of low-
cost housing projects, a private sector joint venture scheme was pursued in accordance with the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Law whereby “the contractor undertakes the construction . . . [for] the
government agency or local government unit concerned which shall pay the contractor its total
investment expended on the project, plus reasonable rate of return”. After multiple design changes, cost
overruns, and corresponding amendments to the JVA, the Project was ultimately suspended, and RBI
made demands for payment. A few years later, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council initiated a bidding process for the work remaining on the Project, and the NHA reached a
settlement with RBI to terminate the original JVA. Raising constitutional issues and asserting his right
to all information related to the Project, Mr. Chavez filed a petition directly with the Court.
Issues:
WON the NHA must be compelled to disclose all information related to the Project, the Court ruled that
relief must be granted because the right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that the 1987 Constitution provides that there is a duty on
the government to permit access to information related to government projects and policies even
though there is no enabling law that imposes a duty on government bodies to publicly disclose such
information. The Solicitor General petitioned the Court for, among other things, access to all documents
and information relating to a state sponsored infrastructure development project that had gone awry.
The Court ruled that access must be granted because of twin provisions of the Constitution which seek
to promote transparency in government operations, as well as provide the people sufficient information
to effectively exercise their constitutional rights.
Qualified Political Agency
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
G.R. No. 193036 December 7, 2010
Facts:

Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC).

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President, which is tasked to investigate
reports of graft and corruption and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners filed a case alleging the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 for it violates the equal protection
clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. It does not apply equally to all members of
the same class such that the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its sole object
makes the PTC an “adventure in partisan hostility.
They argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must
encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also
during prior administrations where the “same magnitude of controversies and anomalies” were
reported to have been committed against the Filipino people.
They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognised
exceptions because first, “there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for
investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for
personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive
Order No. 1 to end corruption.”
Issue:
WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
Held:
Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” The intent
to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB v ZAMORA
G.R. NO. 142801
10 July 2001

FACTS:

On June 1987 Pres. Cory issued EO 127, establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) as part of the Ministry of Finance. Aquino issued another memo providing that the
EIIB shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti smuggling operations in all land areas and
inland water and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On
January 2000 Pres. Estrada issued EO 191 entitled “Deactivation of the EIIB.” The order of
deactivation was motivated by the fact that the designated functions of the EIIB are also being
performed by the other exiting agencies of the government. On March 200, Estrada issued EO 223
providing for the separation from the service of all personnel of EIIB pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization resulting in the abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions.

ISSUES: Does the president have the authority to reorganize the executive
department?How shall the reorganization be carried out?

RULING:

YES, the President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. Bureaus, agencies, or
offices in the executive department are under the President’s power of control. Hence he is justified in
deactivating the functions of a particular office, or in carrying out reorganizations when a certain law
grants him such power. Sec. 31, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code provides the President
with the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President
in order to achieve economy and efficiency. b. The reorganization should be carried out in good faith.
The EOs issued by Estrada was motivated by the fact that the functions of EIIB are also being
performed by other agencies. The Court also pointed out that the deactivation of EIIB was intended to
lessen the expenses of the government.
Domingo v. Zamora
GR NO. 142283
February 6, 2003

Facts: President Estrada issued EO entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the
DECS to the Philippine Sports Commission in School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS
Secretary Gonzales issued a Memorandum which temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the
service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS.

Issue: Is the reassignment valid?

Ruling: Yes. Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and (3)
of EO 292, it is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize the Office of the
President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of
the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems
fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of
the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to reorganise the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION

UST, et. al vs. Danes B. Sanchez

G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010

A for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent) against the University of
Complaint Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the
UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the
respondents Transcript of Records (ToR).

In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2, 2002 with a Bachelors
Degree of Science in Nursing. He was included in the list of candidates for graduation and attended
graduation ceremonies. Respondent sought to secure a copy of his ToR with the UST Registrars
Office, paid the required fees, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation by the Registrar. Despite
repeated attempts by the respondent to secure a copy of his ToR, and submission of his class cards as
proof of his enrolment, UST refused to release his records, making it impossible for him to take the
nursing board examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living. The respondent
prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they refused to release respondents ToR
because he was not a registered student, since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last
three semesters. They claimed that the respondents graduation, attendance in classes, and
taking/passing of examinations were immaterial because he ceased to be a student when he failed to
enrol during the second semester of school year 2000-2001.

Petitioners then filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought
administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-
complaint. Petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining
to school controversies.
Issue:
1) The CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies involving school
matters and has primary jurisdiction over respondents demand for the release of his
ToR. Thus, respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies;
Held:
1. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an
administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the
opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the courts.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action.

In this case, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that recourse to the
CHED is mandatory or even possible in an action such as that brought by the respondent, which is
essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where the issues are purely legal and well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present case. Petitioners liability if any for damages will have to
be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation
of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with.
Dagudag vs Paderanga
A.M. NO. RTJ -06-2017 June 19, 2010
Facts:
Sometime in 2005, forest products were confiscated by the representatives of PNPRMG, DENR and
the Philippine Coast Guard for non-compliance of pertinent documents, and since no one claimed
ownership of the said items for a reasonable time, it was confiscated in favour of the government.
Respondent-judge, in a case for issuance of writ of replevin, instituted by plaintiff Edma, issued and
decided in favour of the plaintiff, for the return of the undocumented forest products. DENR, CENRO
and herein petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of replevin but was thereafter denied by herein
respondent. The DENR counsel was also lambasted in the courtroom by herein respondent.

Issue(s):
1) Whether or not replevin is a proper remedy where the confiscated items were
undocumented forest products under the custody of the DENR.
2) Whether or not the acts of herein respondent constitutes gross ignorance of the law
and unbecoming of a judge.

Ruling:
1) No, The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. That since the case is
for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 is under the jurisdiction of DENR. That
respondent should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons, to wit:

That courts cannot take cognisance of cases pending before administrative agencies, under the
doctrine of administrative exhaustion;
That also, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction courts cannot take cognisance of the cases
pending before administrative agencies of special competence. That since the undocumented forest
products are in the custody of the DENR, an administrative proceeding may have already been
commenced; and,
That the forest products are already in custody of law and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.
2) Yes, respondent, in taking cognisance of the replevin suit and thereafter issuing the said writ
constitute gross ignorance of the law. Respondent also is liable for using inappropriate language in
court, and repeated interruption of the lawyers and refusal to consider the motion to quash are
undignified and very unbecoming of a judge. Considering also that this is his third offence.
Beautifont vs. CA
GR NO. L-50141 January 29, 1988
Facts:

Petitioner Aura Laboratories Inc and Beautifont Inc. are domestic corporations engaged in
manufacturing cosmetics and marketing their products. Both applied with the Board of Investments
for authority to accept permissible investments of 2 American – owned firms, Avon Products and
Manila Manufacturing Co., filed in accordance with RA 5455, Permissive Investments Law, requires
approval by BOI of a foreign national in a local corporation which would exceed 30 % outstanding
capital. BOI prepared the notice of application which was published in Official Gazette and
newspapers of general circulation. Rustan Marketing Corporation and Holiday Cosmetics opposed it:
1) would conflict with the Retail Trade Nationalisation Act, 2)would pose a clear and present danger
of a monopoly in the cosmetics industry, 3) would be made in an enterprise already adequately
exploited by Philippine national (4) were inconsistent with the Government’s Investment Priorities
Plans as well as declared national policies, and (5) would not contribute to a sound and balanced
development of the national economy. Notice of hearing published, inviting all interested parties. At
the hearing, Rustan and Holiday (R) alleged fatal jurisdictional defect in proceedings, violation by the
BOI of Section 7 of RA 5455 in that instead of requiring and causing publication of the applications
themselves, which is what in their view the cited provision directs- only notice thereof had actually
been published and posted. Officer of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry also
appeared to oppose the applications. Applications were eventually approved, Certificate-of Authority
was issued. Petitioner accepted the foreign equity investment and transfer of stock made.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board of Investments has committed jurisdictional defect in
proceedings?

Held: No. The Supreme Court decided that the Court of First Instance was right and Court of Appeal
was wrong because the BOI wasn’t acting in GAOD ( basis for the injunction issued) when it overruled
respondents objections to how they approved the application.

Doctrine: The consequent policy and practice underlying our administrative law is that of justice
courts should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no
evidence in support thereof of such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.
Director of Lands vs. CA and B.A. Gonzales
G.R. NO. 79684 February 19, 1991
Facts:

The petitioners the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
entered into contracts on June 30, 1973 with the private respondent B.A. Gonzales Surveying
Company for public land subdivision mapping (Plsm) of the alienable and disposable lands in the
Municipality of Valderama, Antique, and to do the photo cadastral mapping (Pcadm) of Project (
January 28, 1974) In
Numancia, Aklan.

However, B.A. Gonzales failed to commence the Aklan project despite written demands from the
Bureau of Lands, consequently, the latter cancelled the contract with regards to the said project and
forfeited the the performance bond. B.A. Gonzales failed filed a motion and the Director of Lands
reinstated the said contract on June 20, 1977 without however granting the company’s request for a
price adjustment, which denial the private respondent seasonably appealed to the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources. This appeal is pending.

On April 14, 1983 the Director of Lands likewise scrapped the Valderama Plsm contract because of the
non-completion of the project despite the grant of repeated extensions totalling 1,200 days. Private
Respondent also appealed and both appeals were pending.

Meanwhile, without both appeals being resolved, the Direction of Lands conducted a public bidding
for the cadastral survey of several municipalities including the Municipality of a Nomancia, Aklan and
the Municipality of Valderama, Antique. In the said bidding,Armando Villamayor an Cristina Matuod
were declared as the successful bidders for the both projects.

Thereupon, respondent filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for TRO, alleging
that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in awarding the said cadastral
survey projects to other persons while the appeals of the private respondent pending.And the
respondent the Court of Appeals granted the said petition, petitioners file motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA violates the doctrine of primary justification when it issued writ of
injunction against the Director of Lands in granting award of cadastral survey project
to new contractors involving lands subject to prior mapping projects with another
contractor ( the private respondent) whose contracts are involved in a pending appeal
to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources?

HELD:

Respondent court committed a reversible error in stopping the implementation of the results of the
bidding for the cadastral survey projects conducted by the Director of Lands. The said injunction
issued by the respondent court institutes a violation of the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction and defeats the very purpose thereof, which is, “not only to give the administrative agency
the opportunity to decide the controversy by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the courts.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Troadio Tecson
[G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990
FACTS:

The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be
prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as
amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. The Board opposed. Private respondent filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro
Manila. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent because he is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos. Respondent alleged
that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the
alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means
while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his
being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the
PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent acted as a “subordinate” under E.O. No.1 and
related executive orders.

HELD:

NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent.

RATIO:

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is – [w]here general words
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. The term “subordinate” as
used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in
E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.

The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private
respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecution
agency.
GUILLES VS CA
G.R.No.77098 November 27, 1990
Facts:

On September 2, 1980, the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision declaring and
recognising the preferential rights of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to explore, develop and exploit
and lease the area covered by her “MAMAKAR” mining claims situated at Sitio Palasaan, Benguet.
This decision was appealed by respondent to the Ministry of Natural Resources. On October 6, 1982,
respondent Minister of Natural Resources dismissed the appeal. From this dismissal, heirs of John
and Maria Guilles interposed an appeal on November 4, 1982 to the Office of the President, docketed
therein as MNR Case No. 5096, but failed to prosecute the same. Private respondents later filed their
respective motions for reconsideration which however, proved to be belated as the decision of
respondent Minister had already become final and executory. The finality of decision of respondent
Minister of Natural Resources rendered another decision in the same MNR case number 5096 on
June 25, 1984 reversing and setting aside the decision of October 6, 1982 and declaring petitioner’s
“MAMAKAR” claims as null and void ab initio.

On July 25, 1984, petitioner sought the reconsideration of the decision and prayed for a statuesque
order. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the Minister of Natural Resources
issued the status quo order on August 20,1984 and directed the respondents to answer the motion
within five days from the receipt of the order. However, none of the respondents complied therewith.

On February 19, 1985, with the motion for reconsideration still unresolved, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, before this Court, docketed as
G.R. no. 69937, for the nullification of the decision of respondent Minister of Natural Resources dated
June 25, 1984 and to restrain public respondent from further proceeding in the said case. Petitioner
contended that respondent Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction .

ISSUE:
WON the respondent Court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s original action for
certiorari on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

RULING:

Yes. It is true that in our jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by law or required by public interest,
before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of justice, all remedies of administrative
character affecting or determinative of the controversy at the level should first be exhausted by the
aggrieved party. It is likewise true, however, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not a hard and fast rule. Foremost among the exceptions is when the assailed act, order or decision is
patently illegal or was performed or issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court ruled that the decision in question, datedJune 25, 1984, is of such a defective
nature. The decision it superseded, dated October 6, 1982, was already final and executory, the
belated motions for reconsideration by all the private respondents in G.R. no. 74223 being patently
time-barred. The heirs of Guilles did file a timely appeal but they likewise failed to prosecute the
same. It is obvious and indisputable, therefore, that respondent Minister Pena gravely abuse his
discretion in reversing his original decision which precisely prompted June Prill Brett to forthwith
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts.
JUNE PRILL BRETT VS IAC
G.R. No. 74223 November 27, 1990
FACTS:

The director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision declaring and recognising the
preferential right of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to explore, develop, exploit and lease an area
covered by “MAMAKAR” mining claims. The said decision was appealed by respondents to the
thenMinistry of Natural Resources where the appeal was dismissed. Still the respondents filed an
appeal to-the office of the president but failed to prosecute the same. And yet again they filed motions
for reconsideration which were already late as the decision of the Minister had become final and
executory.But despite the finality of the decision, the minister reversed the previous decision and
rendered the “MAMAKAR” claims as null and void ab initio which lead the petitioner
to seek reconsideration. A change in the minister of the Natural Resources lead to an appeal by the
petitioner to reinstate decision of the former minister which then leads to a series of motions and
petitions until it ultimately leads to this petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:
WON Respondent court erred in dismissing petitioner’s original action for certiorari
on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

WON respondent court erred in invoking Presidential No. 605 to deny petitioner’s
prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Ruling:

It is true that in the court’s jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided

by law or required by public interest, before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of justice,
all remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level
should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party.In the case at bar it is our considered opinion that the
decision in question, is of such a defective nature. The decision it superseded was already final and
executory, the belated motions for reconsideration by the private respondents being patently time-
barred. Although the respondents did file a timely appeal, they failed to likewise prosecute the same.
It is obvious that the respondent minister gravely abused his discretion in reversing his original
decision which prompted petitioner to forthwith invoke the jurisdiction of the courts.Wherefore,
judgment is hereby rendered affirming the assailed decision. Also the assailed decision of respondent
minister is also reinstated without prejudice to the appeal in the Office of thePresident taking its due
course and the consequent adjudication thereof.
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs CA
G.R. No. 88550 (184 SCRA 462) April 18, 1990

Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Facts:
· Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry
of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks.
· IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign
all its rights and interests to MMIC.
· IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of
Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal
blocks prior to finalisation of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the operation be
granted back.
· Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favour
of MMIC. It was dismissed
· Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.
· RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in
favour of IEI.
· CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil
contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be
rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to
develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal
operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national
program for coal-development and with the objective of rationalising the country's over-all coal-
supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the
reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering
the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-
operating contract in IEI's favour and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for
three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may
occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognisance of a particular case, which means that the
matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialised skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where
a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"
Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what
coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating
contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency
in possession of the specialised expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the
competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation,
development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial
determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power
to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
 PRIMARY JURISDICTION – ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGESTS

G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive

Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO
and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

FACTS: May 19, 1989. The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because the driver of
the truck was not able to produce the required documents for the forest products. Jovitio Layugan, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), issued an order of confiscation of
the truck and gave the owner 15 days to submit an explanation. Owner was not able to submit an
explanation and the order of the CENRO was enforced. The issue was brought to the secretary of the
DENR. While pending, the owner filed a suit for replevin against the Layugan. Layugan filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Trial court ruled in
favor of the owner. CA sustained Trial Court’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction.
RULING: No. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of
action.
G.R. No. 79886 November 22, 1989
QUALITRANS LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ROYAL CLASS LIMOUSINE SERVICE, LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS: Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc., was the grantee of a certificate of public convenience
issued by the defunct Board of Transportation to operate a "garage (tourist) air-conditioned service"
from Manila t any point in Luzon. A decision by the BOT amended the certificate for garage service into
one for limousine tourist service for the transportation of all outgoing passengers of the Manila
International Airport. On December 27, 1985, upon application filed for the approval of aforementioned
sale, an Order was issued by the Land Transportation Commission granting a provisional permit in
favor of private respondent (Annexes C and 3, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049); Annexes B and 3 CA-G.R. No.
10370-SP). The prefatory portion thereof states: The application filed in this case is for the approval of
sale made by TRANSCARE, INC., in favor of ROYAL CLASS LIMOUSINE SERVICE of the Certificate
of Public Convenience issued in Case Nos. 81-4405 and 82-415 authorizing the operation of a TOURIST
CAR (AIR-CONDITIONED) SERVICE within the New Manila International Airport and from said place
to any point in the Island of Luzon accessible to motor vehicle traffic and vice-versa, involving the right
to operate forty (40) units authorized therein. Petitioner claims that respondent has been soliciting
passengers from the New Manila International Airport to transport them to any point in Luzon to the
prejudice of petitioner's business.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court is correct in dismissing the suit.
RULING: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) had acted correctly in dismissing Qualitrans' damage suit.
Ramos v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas,[22] in which we sustained the jurisdiction of the CFI (now,
RTC) at the expense of Public Service Commission (now, the Land Transportation Commission), has
no application. In that case, the aggrieved party had denounced his adversary's action before the
PSC. The latter, however, had failed to act. We stamped our imprimatur on the CFI's jurisdiction
because of temporal constraints. ("Damages pile up day by day as infringement continues. The Public
Service Commission has been afforded an opportunity to give relief and has not done so. In addition,
there is a need to square the functioning of administrative bodies vis-a-vis contemporary realities. As
we have observed, the increasing pattern of law and legal development has been to entrust "special
cases" to "special bodies" rather than the courts. As we have also held, the shift of emphasis is
attributed to the need to slacken the encumbered dockets of the judiciary and so also, to leave "special
cases" to specialists and persons trained therefor. There is no merit in the claims that Royal Class has
been guilty of unfair competition. For starters, its CPC has been duly issued. It (CPC) cannot therefore
be said to have been acquired through duress or deceit to warrant such a charge.
[G.R. No. 108846. October 26, 1999.]

MOOMBA MINING EXPLORATION COMPANY, represented by Minimax Mineral

Exploration Corporation, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CORNELIO TUMULAK and TERESA C. CORPUS,
represented by JOAQUIN P. CORPUZ, respondents.
FACTS: Moomba filed an availment application of the rights and privileges over the said 'Rocky 1-100'
claims pursuant to Section 100 of Presidential Decree 463, as amended. In an Order dated November
6, 1979, the availment was rejected by the Director of Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS) for
failure to comply with the call-up letters of the BMGS requiring Moomba to submit affidavit of annual
work obligations and official receipts evidencing payment of occupation fees.
Meanwhile, the 'Baby Jackie' mining claims of private respondent Teresa Corpus was registered on
March 27, 1981 while the 'Golden Bay 1' and 'Golden Bay-2' mining claims of private respondent
Cornelio Tumulak were registered on August 28, 1987, covering the areas previously covered by the
claim of Francisco de la Fuente registered on March 20, 1980, after the rejection of Moomba's availment
application. Moomba, thru Minimax, appealed the case to the Secretary of DENR. On February 17,
1989, Moomba filed a motion to withdraw appeal reiterating the same grounds in its manifestation
earlier filed. On June 1, 1989, the DENR issued a Decision dismissing the appeal.
On appeal by Minimax to (the) Office of the President, the same was dismissed in a Decision dated
December 29, 1989.
Subsequent motion for reconsideration by Minimax was again denied in an Order dated April 10, 1980
issued by public respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction.
RULING: We must point out that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies and that findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but finality except when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on
record to support the findings, a situation that does not obtain in this case. The instant petition is one
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and the Court is empowered to review only errors of law
committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine the evidence
submitted by the parties or analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. This Court is definitely not the
proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts.
 EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES – ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE
DIGESTS

G.R. No. 87437 May 29, 1991

JOAQUIN M. TEOTICO, petitioner,

vs.
DEMOCRITO O. AGDA, SR., and HON. JUDGE IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Regional Trial
Court, Branch No. 134, Makati, Metro Manila, respondents.

FACTS: Democrito Agda Sr. was appointed on June 16, 1984, as Chief, Fiber Industry Development
Authority by Cesar C. Lanuza, former Administrator of FIDA and was designated Acting Regional
Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II. On November 13, 1987, three months before the local
elections, which was held on January 18, 1987, Agda was reassigned by former FIDA Administrator
Lanuza to the FIDA main office and designated Epitacio E. Lanuza, Jr. as officer-in-charge (OIC) of
FIDA Region 1. On December 15, 1987, Agda requested the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to stay the
implementation of Special Order No. 219. On January 7, 1988, Teotico implemented said Special Order
219, despite the fact that Agda requested the Civil Service Commission to stop the implementation of
the said Special Order 219. On January 12, 1988, Agda requested Teotico to defer the implementation
of said Special Order No. 219. Teotico again implemented Special Order 219, requiring petitioner to
submit his accomplishment report. Agda requested Teotico to defer the implementation of said special
order, considering that the same has not yet been resolved by the Secretary of Agriculture. On December
11, 1987, former FIDA Administrator designated Wilfredo G. Siguritan as officer-in-charge of FIDA
Region 1 Onn March 9, 1988, FIDA Region 1 administrator Siguritan requested the Agda through
Teotico to require Agda to turn over to him the keys of the vault in FIDA Region 1 and on March 14,
1988, Teotico implemented Special Order No. 219, requiring Agda to turn over said keys to OIC
Seguritan. On March 16, 1988, Agda requested the Secretary of Agriculture to defer the implementation
of said special order pending resolution of said office. On March 23, 1988, Teotico implemented Special
Order 219 by instituting administrative charges against Agdape for insubordination prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. On April 4, 1988, Teotico placed Agda under preventive suspension, effective
April 6, 1988. Agda requested respondent Teotico to give him twenty (20) days from April 11, 1988,
within which to submit his explanation to the formal administrative charges. Teotico granted him an
extension of only five days from receipt of memorandum. Agda sent a letter to the Commission on
Elections, inquiring if Special Order No. 219, series of 1987, of Administrator Lanuza was referred and
submitted to it for approval three days before its implementation. The Commission, informed private
respondent that records of the Department do not show that aforesaid Special Order was submitted or
referred to this Commission for approval. Agda filed with the court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Injunction with preliminary injunction and restraining order against Teotico and the three (3)
members of the FIDA-AC. The court granted said petition and ordered to immediately reinstate
Democrito O. Agda, Sr., from his previous position as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I,
with full back wages and allowances mandated by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Agda failed to exhaust administrative remedy as mandated by P. D. 807.
RULING: Yes. Agda made no attempt to avail of this remedy. The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807,
allows transfer, detail and re-assignment. If the employee concerned believes that there is no
justification therefore, he "may appeal his case to" the Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise
ordered by the Commission, the decision to detail an employee shall be executory. Agda invoked the
appellate jurisdiction of the Commission when he filed his Urgent Petition to Stay Implementation and
Nullify the Special Order in question with the Civil Service Commission. It does not, however, appear
to that he exerted genuine and sincere efforts to obtain an expeditious resolution thereof. What appears
to be clear is that he used its pendency as an excuse for his refusal to comply with the memorandum of
Teotico of 7 January 1988 and the routing slip request of 11 March 1988 for the key to the safety vault.
Furthermore, even in the cases of transfer or detail within the probihited period prior to an election, an
aggrieved party is provided an appropriate administrative remedy. Again Agda made no attempt to avail
of this remedy. In his Urgent Petition to Stay Implementation and Nullify Special Order No. 219,
nothing is mentioned about a violation of the ban on transfer or detail. The reason seems too obvious.
Until he filed the Amended Petition before the court below he did not consider his re-assignment per
Special Order No. 219 as a violation of the ban on transfer or detail during the three-month period
before the election. Not having yet fully exhausted the existing adequate administrative remedy which
he already took advantage of, Agda cannot be permitted to abandon it at his chosen time and leisure
and invoke the jurisdiction of regular courts.
G.R. Nos. 112708-09 March 29, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON

GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, SIPALAY TRADING CORPORATION and ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading
Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect
their sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before this Court
assailing the sequestration orders. After the consolidation of these petitions and the filing of the
comments, other pleadings and certain motions by the parties, this Court referred the cases to public
respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition. SIPALAY was forced to litigate after the PCGG
sought to implement the sequestration without acting on its motions ". . . To Lift Sequestration Order"
and ". . . For Hearing for Specification of Charges And For Copies Of Evidence". SIPALAY maintained
that the sequestration was without evidentiary substantiation, violative of due process, and deemed
automatically lifted when no judicial proceeding was brought against it within the period mandated
under Article XVIII, Section 26 of the Constitution. Admittedly, this motion to dismiss came nearly
seven (7) years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally filed their petitions before this Court on
September 16, 1986 and August 26, 1986, respectively. The ground was SIPALAY's and ALLIED's
alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED
should have first appealed the sequestration orders to the Office of the President before challenging
them in court, invoking Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. An "Opposition" and a
"Reply" were filed in relation to the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss proper
without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RULING: Yes. Hardly can it be disputed that a direct action in court without prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss
grounded on lack of cause of action. As a general rule, a motion to dismiss is interposed before the
defendant pleads (Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting the
defendant from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been filed. On the contrary, Section 2 of
Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion at any stage of the proceedings when it is based
upon failure to state a cause of action. Neither an initial request before the PCGG for the lifting of the
sequestration orders nor an appeal to the Office of the President was made by SIPALAY and ALLIED
before they filed their respective petitions in court. The PCGG's motion to dismiss was anchored on lack
of cause of action, albeit filed beyond the period to answer.
G.R. Nos. 115239-40 March 2, 2000

MARIO C.V. JALANDONI, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HONORABLE PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, ROBERT COYIUTO, JR., JAIME LEDESMA, RAMON GARCIA,
ANTONIO OZAETA, AMPARO BARCELON and CARLOS DYHONGPO, respondents.

FACTS: Ledesma, private respondent, filed an administrative complaint for violation of the RPC
and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the petitioner with the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG). A full-page paid advertisement was caused to be published by private
respondents in five major daily newspapers (Manila Chronicle, Business World, Malaya, Philippine
Daily Globe and The Manila Times). The advertisement contained allegations against Jalandoni (then
a PCGG Commissioner) of having committed illegal and unauthorized acts constituting graft and
corruption relating to a dacion en pago financing arrangement entered into by Piedras Petroleum Co.,
Inc. with RCBC. It was about the unauthorized selling of OPMC shares held by Piedras to RCBC for low
prices. Petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of libel before the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
against the respondents who were OPM Cofficials and directors. An open letter addressed to
the stockholders of OPMC was written by respondent Coyiuto Jr. as Chairman of the Board and
President of OPMC. It contained remarks regarding the same deal as stated above.
Again, Jalandoni filed a complaint for libel before the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The prosecutors
issued memoranda on both cases recommending the indictment of the respondents and information
for libel was filed with theRTC of Makati against the respondents. All of the respondents appealed to
then Secretary of Justice, Franklin Drilon. Drilon issued an order dismissing the resolutions of
the prosecutors and directing them to withdraw the information filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Secretary of Justice, Franklin Drilon exercised the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

RULING: Yes. In the case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 12 it was held that review as an act of
supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be
corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after
administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed. In administrative law,
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power
of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
G.R. No. 127139 February 19, 1999

JAIME C. LOPEZ, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF MANILA and HON. BENJAMIN A.G. VEGA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila,
Branch 39, respondents.

FACTS:
Section 219 of Republic Act 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the
conduct of the general revision of real property. The revision of real property assessments prescribed
therein was not yet enforced in the City of Manila. Upon receipt of Memorandum Circular No. 04-95
from the Bureau of Local Government Finance relating to the failure of most of the cities and
municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, including the City of Manila, to conduct the general revision of
real property and after obtaining the necessary funds from the City Council, the City Assessor began
the process of general revision based on the updated fair market values of the real properties. The City
Assessor’s Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market values to the City Council for its
appropriate action. The council then enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894 which was approved. With
the implementation of the ordinance, the tax on the land owned by the petitioner was increase hence
he filed a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 for
being “unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.” Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect thereafter,
reducing by fifty percent (50%) the assessment levels (depending on the use of property, e.g.,
residential, commercial) for the computation of tax due. The new ordinance amended the assessment
levels provided by Section 74, paragraph (A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794. Despite the amendment
brought about by Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the controversy proceeded. The trial court dismissed the
case for failure of the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with
in the instant case.

HELD: No. As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies
provided. The reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to
correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Therefore,
where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before
resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide
the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.
“One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers which enjoins upon the
judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily within the competence
of other department. x x x

There are however a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action
validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: (1) when the question raised is
purely legal, (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently
illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of controversy is private land;
and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding (citation omitted). In the court’s opinion, however, the instant
petition does not fall within any of the exceptions above-mentioned.
G.R. No. 116025 February 22, 1996.

SUNSHINE TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and REALUCIO R. SANTOS, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Sunshine Transportation, Inc. hired private respondent Realucio R. Santos
(hereinafter Santos) as a bus driver on a probationary basis. After six months, the former then extended
the latter a regular appointment as "Bus Driver Class C" on 16 March 1990. On 7 January 1992, Santos
received a memorandum 4 dated 4 January 1992 from the petitioner directing him to submit a written
explanation within 48 hours as to why he failed to report for his trip scheduled on 28 December 1991.
However, Santos claimed that on 2 January 1992, he applied for a leave of absence with the petitioner’s
Operations Manager Danilo Alvarado; but Alvarado tore the leave application, verbally terminated his
services, and even forced him off the premises. Santos then opted to mail his application for leave, also
on 2 January 1992. Subsequently, Santos received a letter of termination dated 22 January 1992 6
premised on the grounds that: (1) he committed insubordination to a lawful order of his superior by
failing to submit the required written explanation; and (2) such failure amounted to an admission of
his guilt. Nonetheless, he kept reporting for work, but was not allowed entry into the company’s
premises, prompting him to believe that he had been either suspended or dismissed. Santos filed with
the Labor Arbiter a complaint for (a) illegal suspension, (b) illegal dismissal, (c) illegal deduction of
Bicol trip allowance, (d) non-payment of salaries, overtime pay, premiums for holidays, rest day and
night shift, allowances, and separation pay. He also prayed for reinstatement with back wages and
moral damages. Santos appealed to the NLRC and, in its decision 11 of 21 April 1994, the NLRC upheld
the Labor Arbiter’s finding, but granted Santos’ money claims in the amount of P158,000.00, as the
petitioner "failed to refute the complainant’s claim that he was underpaid. Unsatisfied with the NLRC
decision, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari charging the NLRC with
having acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision. More concretely, it imputes to
the NLRC the commission of the following errors: (1) in not dismissing the patently defective appeal of
Santos due to his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for perfecting an appeal; (2) in
modifying the Labor Arbiter’s decision by granting the private respondent’s money claim without any
factual nor legal basis; (3) in ruling that the private respondent’s money claims for the year 1989 have
not yet prescribed; and (4) in failing to give consideration to the waiver/quitclaim executed by the
private respondent on 20 October 1992 discharging the petitioner from any obligation arising from his
(private respondent’s) claim for overtime pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special civil action
for certiorari may be availed of.

RULING: Yes. In the first place, the petitioner has not shown that other than this special civil action
under Rule 65, it has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its
perceived grievance. It is now settled in our jurisdiction that while it is true that the only way by which
a labor case may reach this Court is through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
it must, however, be shown that the NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which allows an
aggrieved party to file a motion for reconsideration of any order, resolution, or decision of the NLRC,
constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy which the said party may avail of. Accordingly, and
in the light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a motion for reconsideration must
first be filed before the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of. In the case at bench, the
records do not show and neither does the petitioner make a claim that it filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision before it came to us through this action. It has not, as well,
suggested any plausible reason for direct recourse to this Court against the decision in question.
G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO, in

his personal capacity and as President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association,
Inc., Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, in
his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), MR.
PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Chairman of the Presidential Commission for the
Urban Poor (PCUP), MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Mayor of
Quezon City, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and SECRETARY
FLORENTE SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
CENTER ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, Respondents.

FACTS: President Arroyo signed into law RA 9207 (The National Government Center Housing and
Land Utilization Act.) – The National Housing Authority (NHA) formulated the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9207 which sought to effect the orderly disposition of certain portions of
the National Government Center Site, Quezon City to bona fide residents. The IRR would then see to it
that portions of the East and West side of Commonwealth Avenue would be open for disposition to
bona fide residents of the area. The petitioners seek to prevent the respondents from enforcing the IRR
by a petition for prohibition. The Office of the Solicitor General claims that the petition for prohibition
is an improper remedy because the writ does not lie against the exercise of quasi-legislative functions.
Likewise, the OSG contends that the Homeowners Association violated the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts as it filed the petition with the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable on this
case.

RULING: No. In questioning the validity of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a
party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle however applies
only where the act of administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-legislative
power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the committee expressly
authorized by RA 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it
seeks to implement.
G.R. No. 121587 March 9, 1999

SOLEDAD DY, doing business under the name and style RONWOOD
LUMBER, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ODEL BERNARDO LAUSA, respondent.

FACTS: On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01 creating Task
Force Kalikasan to combat "illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of and/or transport of illegally
cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest products" in that city. 2 The team was composed
of personnel of the Philippine Army Philippine National Police (PNP), the Department of Natural
Resources (DENR), and the Office of the City Mayor of Butuan. Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who
was the acting chief of civilian security in the mayor's office, was a member of the team. On July 1, 1993,
the members of the task force received confidential information that two truckloads of illegally cut
lumber would be brought to Butuan City from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area. Accordingly, the
team set up a check-point along kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan City. The seized lumber and vehicles were
then taken to the City motorpol and placed in the custody of respondent Lausa. The next day, July 2,
1993, Maxilom submitted a memorandum-report to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) of Butuan City on the seizure of the lumber and the two vehicles. 5 On July
6, the CENRO issued a notice of confiscation which was duly posted for three days. For lack of
claimants, DENR Regional Technical Director Raoul Geollegue recommended to the Secretary on July
29, 1993 the forfeiture of the lumber and the two vehicles. 6 Accordingly, on July 30, 1993, DENR
Regional Director De la Rosa ordered the CENRO of Butuan City to issue the requisite forfeiture
orders,7 which CENRO Angelita Orcasitas issued on August 15, 1993. On October 20, 1993, more than
two months after the lumber had been forfeited, petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the lumber,
filed a suit for replevin in the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch 5) for its recovery. The next
day, October 21, 1993, the trial court issued a preliminary writ of replevin.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.

RULING: Yes. petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of
Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioner's application for a
replevin writ and denying private respondent's motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to
P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR and all actions
seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency. The appellate court's directive
to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent of the DENR to file a counter bond in order to
recover custody of the lumber should be disregarded as being contrary to its order to dismiss the
replevin suit of petitioner. For, indeed, what it should have done was to dismiss the case without
prejudice to petitioner filing her claim before the Department of Natural Resources (DENR). The rule
is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In a long line
of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the
administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted
to by giving the administrative officer concerned even opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before a court's judicial power can
be sought. The premature invocation is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
G.R. No. 139382 June 19, 2001

SEC. OF JUSTICE CUEVAS et al., petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. BACAL, respondent,

FACTS: Respondent Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career Executive Service Examinations in 1989. On
July 28, 1994, she was conferred CES eligibility and appointed Regional Director of the Public
Attorney’s Office. On January 5, 1995, she was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos to the rank
of CESO III. On November 5, 1997, she was designated by the Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public
Attorney. On February 5, 1998, her appointment was confirmed by President Ramos so that, on
February 20, 1998, she took her oath and assumed office. On July 1, 1998, petitioner Carina J. Demaisip
was appointed "chief public defender" by President Joseph Estrada. Apparently because the position
was held by respondent, another appointment paper was issued by the President on July 6, 1998
designating petitioner Demaisip as "chief public defender (formerly chief public attorney), PUBLIC
DEFENDER'S OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE vice ATTY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL, effective July
1, 1998."On the other hand, respondent was appointed "Regional Director, Public Defender’s Office" by
the President. On July 17, 1998, respondent filed a petition for quo warranto questioning her
replacement as Chief Public Attorney. The petition, which was filed directly with this Court, was
dismissed without prejudice to its refiling in the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, respondent brought her
case in the Court of Appeals which, on March 25, 1999, ruled in her favor, finding her to be lawfully
entitled to the Office of Chief Public Attorney.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed fir failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
RULING: No. If, as has been held, no appeal need be taken to the Office of the President from the
decision of a department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former,4 there is greater
reason for not requiring prior resort to the Office of the President in this case since the administrative
decision sought to be reviewed is that of the President himself. Indeed, we have granted review in other
cases involving the removal of the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration5 and the Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office6 without requiring the
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies considering that the administrative actions in question
were those of the President. In any event, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply when the question raised is purely legal. In this case, the question is whether respondent’s
transfer to the position of Regional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office, which was made without
her consent, amounts to a removal without cause.
ARIMAO vs TAHER #152651 07 August2006
FACTS:
On 22 March 1995, petitioner was appointed as Director II, Bureau of Non-formal Education,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS-ARMM). Thereafter, on 17 July 1995, respondent
was appointed Education Supervisor II. Petitioner's appointment, however, was protested by a certain
Alibai T. Benito, who claimed that said appointment did not pass through any evaluation by the
personnel selection board.[1] Petitioner's appointment was eventually disapproved by the Civil Service
Commission-Field Office (CSC-FO), Cotabato City, for failure to meet the experience required for the
position. On 02 May 1996, the CSC, through Resolution No. 96- 3101, affirmed the findings of the CSC-
FO and ordered petitioner to be reverted to her former position of Education Supervisor II. Petitioner
sought reconsideration of the decision.

Arimao was granted a study for 1 year but she came back as Supervisor II about a year after the
expiration of her leave. Her motion was denied. Arimao and Taher both reported as relative to her
continued absence. She was declared AWOL and was dropped from the payroll. The Regional Vice
Governor/ Acting Governor ordered her reassume her former position as Supervisor.

Taher thus filed a Petition for Prohibition as she stand to suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury if
she is removed from the office which she has held for more than five years.

ISSUE:
Who, as between Arimao and Taher, is entitled to the position of Education Supervisor II.

HELD:
Neither Arimao and Taher is entitled to the position of Education Supervisor II.

Arimao cannot be reinstated by mere directive of the ARMM Regional Governor. With the finality of
the AWOL order and having been dropped from the rolls, is no longer disputed. Thus, as found by CSC
in its Resolution No. 020743, TESDA has no legal obligation to reinstate Arimao to the position of
Supervisor II. This however should not be construe as declaration that Taher is entitled as Supervisor
II.

Section 13, Rule 6 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, E.O. 292, provides:

All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for approval by
the Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position
invalidates the promotion of those in lower positions and automatically restores them to their former
positions. However, the affected persons are entitled to the payment of salaries for services actually
rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments.
As a chain reaction of the disapproval of the petitioner’s promotional appointments Director II
respondents’ appointment to Education Supervisor II was likewise invalidated. The efficacy of the
respondent was dependent on the validity of the petitioner’s promotional appointment which in turn
was subject to the outcome of the protest against it

Thus, as of 17 October 1998 or the date of finality of the denial of the petition questioning the
disapproval of petitioner's appointment as Director II both petitioner and respondent were reverted to
their former positions. Petitioner should have been allowed to re-assume her position of Education
Supervisor II as of the said date, and thereafter remain in the said office until she was dropped from
the rolls in 1999. Respondent, in turn, should have been made to return to her former position.
LASTIMOSO vs ASAYO #154243 06March2007

FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the
I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l o f t h e P N P f o r a b u s e o f authority/harassment against the
respondent. The latter allegedly obstructed police officers from arresting his brother
Lamberto Asayo one of the suspects in the shooting of petitioner’s son. The complaint was referred to
the Inspector General for pre-charge investigation. When summoned, respondent did not
appear but filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was the People’s Law Enforcement
Board (PLB)which had jurisdiction over the case Me a n w h i l e ,
the Inspector General submitted a report to the PNP Chief recommending the c
ommencement o f summary dismissal proceedings against respondent.
Upon approval of said recommendation, the administrative complaint was referred to the PNP
Legal Service for summary hearing, The PNP Chief, then Deputy Director General Roberto Lastimoso,
rendered a decision dismissing respondent from police service

ISSUE:
WON the respondent failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to the filing of the
petition.

HELD:
With regard to the first issue, the respondent rightfully invoked the jurisdiction of the court without
first going through all administrative remedies because the principle of exhaustion of the administrative
remedies admit of exception such as when the issue involved purely legal question. The only issue
presented by respondent in his petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC was whether or
not the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by a private citizen against
him. Said issue being a purely legal one the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not
apply to the case.
CASTRO vs. GLORIA G.R. N0. 132174. August 20,2001

FACTS
Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) a complaint
for disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner Gualberto Castro, a teacher in Guibuangan
Central School, Barili, Cebu. It was alleged that he has an illicit affair with Gutang's wife, petitioner's
co-teacher at the same school.

DECS Regional Office VII, Through Assistant Superintendent Francisco b. concillo , rendered a
decision declaring petioner guilty of the offense charged. He was meted the penalty of dismissal from
service.

Petitioner filed a MR. The DECS Central Office then directed the School Division of Cebu to comment
on the motion be resolved favorably. However, the recommendation was opposed by the DECS
Region VII.

Thereafter , petitioner asked theDECS Secretary to resolve his motion for reconsideration. But this
letter remained unheeded, thus, he filled with the DECS Central Office a “ motion for Reiew Setting
aside/ Modifying the Decision of Regional Director of DECS Region VII.”

DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria(respondent) referred the motion to the regional director of Region VII
who issued a 2nd Indorsement sustaining the decision of Assistant Superintendent Concillo that castro
is guilty of his conduct.

In his 3rd Indorsement, respondent Secretary denied petitioner’s motion for review.

The Trial court rendered the herein assailed decision dismissing the petition on the ground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It rule that petitioner should have appealed the Civil Service
Commission before coming to court stating administrative machinery. This should be resorted to
before recourse can be made to the courts and that Special Civil Actions against administrative officer
could grant relief.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari

ISSUE
WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applied in this case.

HELD:
Yes, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is settled that non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court
for the dismissal of the complaint.

The doctrine is not absolute. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action
may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) When the question raised is
purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is
small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO vs PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE, G.R. No. 156109,
2004-11-18
FACTS:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST).
She enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa
Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the proceeds of
which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was
required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The... project was allegedly implemented by
recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who
refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations,
Regino refused to pay for the tickets.
The scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers –
Respondents.Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the
tests.
Petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint... for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad.
Petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary, because her
action was not administrative in nature, but one purely for damages arising from respondents' breach
of the laws on human relations.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a civil action
exclusively for damages based on violation of the human relation provisions of the Civil Code, filed by
a student against her former school.
HELD:
The Petition is meritorious. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on
the present case.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained of.
The CHED does not have the power to award damages.
The contractual relationship between the school and the student is not only semestral in duration, but
for the entire period the latter... are expected to complete it.
The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony... and
"demoralization of unimaginable proportions" in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code.
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents,
and that it should not have been summarily dismissed.
Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will have
to be... ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.
Malabanan vs. Ramento 129 SCRA 359 G.R. No.62270 May 21, 1984

FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and
were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27,
1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary
Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball
court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous
language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was
outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain
on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982,
they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an
illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent
Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of
the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for
one academic year. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there
was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.

HELD: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally
they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school
premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without
prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger
to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded
the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit
must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of
its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
TRISTE vs LEYTE STATE COLLEGE #L-62270 21May1984

FACTS:
For 2 years, Petitioner’s discharged her duties and functions as Vice-President of the college. However,
from Magdalina S. Remo retired as President of the college, there was a total revamp in the composition
of the Board and Trustees. Dr. Purification M. Flores was designated officer-in-charge and later
appointed as new College President. Anticipating moves to replace her as Vice-President, petitioner
submitted to the Board of Trustees a position paper, asserting that the Board could not appoint that
because the position was not vacant the Vice-President’s term was not co-terminous with that of the
recommending President who had retired, and the incumbent was not replaceable at the pleasure of
the Board. In fact, she stated threin that she is qualified for the college Presidency. Petitioner’s
apprehension were proved right by the later development.
She received a letter from President Flores assigning her to another position. Alleging that the
appointment of Dr. Crescencia V. Chan-Gonzaga to the position of Vice-President in effect eased her
out of said position. She contended that her constitutional and legal rights to the security of tenure had
been violated. She allege therein that since the ouster as Vice-President, she had been demoted
to the position of Director of Research and that 20% salary increase granted to all academic personnel
of government schools was not given to her because under the plantilla approved by the Office of Budget
and Management, her salary was reduced by 1 step since she was no longer Vice-President. She argued
that she was terminated and stripped of her rank and status without legal cause and due process.
Private respondent Dr. Gonzaga and public respondent Dr. Flores contend that petitioner was merely
“designated” and not “appointed” to the college Vice-President. They aver that the petitioner’s
“designation” to said position was “purely” an internal arrangement which does not require the
approval or confirmation by the Civil service Commission.”. They maintain that petitioner’s term of
office being co-terminous that of the retired college President, petitioner may not complain that she
was illegally dismissed from the Vice-presidency.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner was merely designated or permanently appointed.

HELD:
While in a line of cases, the term “APPOINT” applied to the nomination or designation of an individual.
Common usage, however oftentimes puts a distinction in such that “APPOINTMENT” cannotes
permanency, “DESIGNATION” implies temporariness. A public officer to another position may mean
to vest him with additional duties while he perform the function of hid permanent office; or in
some cases, public officer may be “designated” to a position in an acting capacity.

However in this case, the court ruled that the law contemplate of a duly appointed Vice-president. As
such, petitioner could be removed only for justifiable reason and such and after she was accorded due
process.

Executive Order No. 17 was issued by the President on May 28, 1986 "to obviate unnecessary anxiety
and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service"
(82 O.G. 2423-2424). Section 1 thereof provides that separation or replacement of officers and
employees shall be made "only for justifiable reasons". For its purposes, a state college is considered a
ministry.
MADRIGAL vs LECAROZ #L-46218 23October 1990

FACTS:
On November 25, 1971, public respondents Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Celso Zoleta,
Jr., Provincial Board of Marinduque members Domingo Riego and Marcial Principe abolished
petitioner-appellat Joventino Madrigal's position a permanent construction capataz in the office of the
Provincial Engineer from the annual Roads Bridges Fund Budget for fiscal year 1971-1972 (p.2,
Records) by virtue of Resolution No. 204. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial
condition of the province and it appearing that his position was not essential.

On April 22, 1972, Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission. On August 7, 1973, he
transmitted a follow-up letter to the Commission regarding his appeal. On January 7, 1974, the
Commission in its 1st Indorsement declared the removal of Madrigal from the service illegal.

On August 4, 1975, Madrigal sent a letter to the Provincial Board requesting implementation of the
resolution of the Commission and consequently, reinstatement to his former position.

On August 18, 1975, the Provincial Board, through Resolution No. 93, denied Madrigal's request for
reinstatement because his former posistion no longer exists. In the same resolution, it ordered the
appropriation of the amount of P4,200.00 as his back salaries covering the period December 1, 1971 up
to June 30, 1973.

Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Marinduque against public respondents
Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Celso Zoleta, Jr., Provincial Board Members Domingo
Riego and Marcial Principe, Provincial Engineer Enrique M. Isidro, Abraham I. Taduran and the
Province of Marinduque for mandamus and damages seeking, inter alia, (1) restoration of his
abolished position in the Roads and Bridges Fund Budget of the Province; (2) reinstatement to such
position; and (3) payment of his back salaries plus damages.

On March 16, 1976, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition on the ground that Madrigal's
cause of action was barred by laches.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner may still entitled to reinstatement.

HELD:

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo
warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date
the petitioner is ousted from his position.

The court noted that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be
instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having
been originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190).The court finds this
provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office
of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if
they do not do so within a period of 1 year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption
of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability
in the service so that public business may (sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right
to positions in the service must be discouraged.
Salinas vs NLRC# 114671 24November 1990

FACTS:
Petitioner Alejandro Alonzo had been employed with AG & P in the several construction projects of the
latter from 1982 to 1989, in the course of which he essentially performed the same job, initially as a
laborer, and later as bulk cement operator, bulk cement plant/carrier operator, and crane driver. Under
similar circumstances, petitioner Avelino Cortez had been employed with AG & P from 1979 to 1988 as
carpenter/forklift operator; petitioner Armando Samulde served as lubeman/stationary operator from
1982 to 1989; while petitioner Aurelio Salinas, Jr., used to work as carpenter/finishing carpenter from
1983 to 1988.

On May 29, June 6, July 4 and July 5 of 1989, respectively, petitioners Salinas, Samulde, Alonzo and
Cortez filed against the respondent corporation separate complaints for illegal dismissal, which cases
were consolidated and jointly heard by Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion.

In his Order of dismissal, Labor Arbiter Asuncion found that petitioners are project employees whose
work contracts with AG & P indicate that they were employed in such category; that they have been
assigned to different work projects, not just to one and that their work relation with AG & P, relative
to termination, is governed by Policy Instruction No. 20.

On appeal, NLRC affirmed the said findings of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for
want of merit, ratiocinating thus:

"In the first place, examining the contract of employment of complainants herein presented as evidence
by respondent, we found that a) they were employed for a specific project and for a specific period; b)
that they were assigned to different projects and not just one as earlier claimed by them. In short, from
the evidence adduced by respondent which complainants miserably failed to rebut with their one page
position paper containing sweeping statements, there appears to be no doubt that they are project
employees hired for a specific project. Their subsequent separation from service, therefore, as a result
of the completion of the project or its phase did not result in illegal dismissal."

ISSUE:
WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applied in this case.

HELD:
With regard to the issue on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court hold that the failure
of petitioners to interpose a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision before coming to this
Court was not a fatal omission. The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is not a hard and
fast rule and does not apply where the issue is purely a legal one. A motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite for the bringing of an action under Rule 65 may be dispensed with where the issue is purely
of law, as in this case. At all events and in the interest of substantial justice, especially in cases involving
the rights of workers, procedural lapses, if any, may be disregarded to enable the Court to examine and
resolve the conflicting rights and responsibilities of the parties. This liberality is warranted in the case
at bar, especially since it has been shown that the intervention of the Court is necessary for the
protection of the herein petitioner(s).

The court ordered the respondent corporation to reinstate petitioners without loss of seniority and with
full backwages. Costs against the respondent corporation.
Mendoza vs. Laxina [G.R. No. 146875. July 14, 2003] Public Officers Case No. 8

FACTS:
On May 27, 1997, respondent took his oath and thereafter assumed office as the duly proclaimed and
elected barangay captain of Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay Elections.
Meanwhile, Roque Fermo, his rival candidate, filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. On January 18, 1999, Fermo was declared as the winner in the
Barangay Elections. Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC while Fermo filed a
motion for execution pending appeal.

Thereafter, respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC questioning the January 20, 1999 order of
the trial court. On September 16, 1999, the COMELEC issued a resolution annulling the order which
granted the execution of the decision pending appeal on the ground that there ex isted no good
reasons to justify execution.The dispositive portion thereof reads: ...the January 20, 1999 Order of
the Court a quo is hereby ANNULLED. Private respondent ROQUE FERMO is hereby ORDERED to
CEASE and DESIST from further performing the functions of Punong Barangay of Barangay Batasan
Hills, District II, Quezon City and to relinquish the same to Petitioner MANUEL LAXINA, SR,
pending final resolution of appeal. On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution
directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Batasan Hills.

ISSUE:
Is the taking of an oath of office a new by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective
official a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office where the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) orders the relinquishment of the contested position?

HELD:
No.In the case at bar, respondent was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 Barangay Elections in
Batasan Hills, Quezon City; he took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office. He is
therefore vested with all the rights to discharge the functions of his office. Although in the interim, he
was unseated by virtue of a decision in an election protest decided against him, the execution of said
decision was annulled by the COMELEC in its September 16, 1999 Resolution which, incidentally, was
sustained by this Court on March 13, 2000, in Fermo v. Commission on Elections . It was held therein
that “when the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of FERMO, the
decision of the MTC proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed and the ‘status quo’
or the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy was restored…”The status
quo referred to the stage when respondent was occupying the office of Barangay Captain and
discharging its functions. For purposes of determining the continuity and affectivity of the rights
arising from respondent’s proclamation and oath taken on May 27, 1997, it is as if the said writ of
execution pending appeal was not issued and he was not ousted from office. The re-taking of his oath
of office on November 16, 1999 was a mere formality considering that his oath taken on May 27, 1997
operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the office. Hence, the taking a new of his oath of
office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was not a condition sine qua non to the
validity of his reassumption in office and to the exercise of the functions thereof.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs PRESIDING JUDGE #72477 16October1990

FACTS:
On October 10, 1984, the Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint[1] with
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of
real property tax and special
respectively, covering the period 1978 to 1984. Petitioner NAPOCOR then defendant therein, filed a
motion to dismiss dated January 12, 1985 on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the
action or suit and that it is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the case. In support of this
motion NAPOCOR cited Presidential Decree No. 242 dated July 9, 1973 which provides that disputes
between agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations shall be
administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice
The court through Judge Pablito C. Pielago issued an order dated January 28, 1985 denying the motion
to dismiss. NAPOCOR filed a supplemental motion to dismiss[4] on February 22, 1985 citing a
resolution of the Fiscal Incentive Review Board, No. 10-85 effective January 11, 1984, restoring the tax
and duty exemption privileges of petitioner.
On March 27, 1985, NAPOCOR filed its answer to the complaint with counterclaim. Treating the same
as a second motion to dismiss and finding the affirmative defenses therein stated to be unmeritorious,
the court a quo issued an order on June 27, 1985, denying the second motion to dismiss and requiring
both parties to appear before the court for the purpose of submitting a stipulation of facts.
Petitioner alleges that what has been withdrawn is its exemption from taxes, duties, and fees which are
payable to the national government while its exemption from taxes, duties and fees payable to
government branches, agencies and instrumentalities remains unaffected. Considering that real
property taxes are payable to the local government, NAPOCOR maintains that it is exempt therefrom.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV has jurisdiction to hear Civil Case No. 9901 filed by
respondents Province of Misamis Oriental and Municipality of Jasaan for the collection of real property
tax and special education fund tax from petitioner covering the years 1978 to 79

HELD:
Yes,the RTC has jurisdiction to hear case. An examination of these two decrees shows that P.D. 242 is
a general law which deals with administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes, claims and
controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. The coverage is broad and sweeping, encompassing all
disputes, claims and controversies.
The conflict in the provisions on jurisdiction between P.D. 242 and P.D. 464 should be resolved in favor
of the latter law, since it is a special law and of later enactment. P.D. 242 must yield to P.D. 464 on the
matter of who or which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real
property taxes. Therefore, respondent court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 9901.
Judicial Review

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT vs SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. No. 103144.

April 4, 2001

FACTS:
Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson, who were recruited by Philsa for employment in Saudi
Arabia, were required to pay placement fees. After the execution of their respective work contracts,
private respondents left for Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, de Mesa and Leyson were allegedly
made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract
resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. Their foreign employerforced them
to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without
any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign the third
contract, the services of private respondents were terminated and they were repatriated to the
Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, they demanded from Philsa the return of their
placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contract.When Philsa refused, they filed a case before the POEA against Philsa on the grounds ofillega
l dismissal, payment of salary differentials, illegal deduction/withholding of salaries,illegal
exactions/refund of placement fees, and contract substitution. Philsa insists that it cannot be held
liable for the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11 and 2, Series of 1983, which enumerated the
allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Philsa can be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum CircularNo. 11,
Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants.

HELD:

No. The administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to
a valid delegation.
Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has notas yet been
published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffectiveand
may not be enforced.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group,namely private employment
agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in

Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrative
circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong
Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein
that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.

The court pronouncement in Tañada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature,
or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative
Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.
JUDICIAL REVIEW

#3 NEUGENE MARKETING INC vs COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Neugene was duly registered with SEC to engage in trading business. Private Respondents Sy,
Yang, and Suen, holders of 5250 shares or 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock sent notice to the BoD
for a board meeting. In this meeting, they approved a resolution dissolving Neugene. SEC thus issued
a Certificate of Dissolution of Neugene. Petitioners Tan, Martin, Moreno and Lee brought an action to
annul said SEC Certification contending that they were the majority stockholders of the corporation,
and that prior to the board meeting, the private respondents had already divested themselves of their
stockholdings by endorsing them in blank and delivering them to the Uy family. The latter in turn
awarded said stock certificates to Johnny Uy, who in turn sold the same to petitioners. Hence, private
respondents could no longer validly vote for the dissolution of Neugene at the time of the board
meeting. Private respondents contend that the assignment of shares were simulated and fraudulently
effected since the endorsement in blank by them of the stock certificates to the Uy family was only for
safekeeping when they were stolen from a vault by Johnny Uy. SEC nullified the Certificate of
Dissolution. CA, on the other hand, upheld Neugene’s dissolution. Hence, this petition with the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred on the finding and conclusion that the certificates of stock of the
private respondents were stolen and therefore not validly transferred.

Held:
No. In light of the foregoing and after a careful examination of the evidence on record, and a
judicious study of the provisions of law and jurisprudence in point, we are with the Court of Appeals on
the finding and conclusion that the certificates of stock of the private respondents were stolen and
therefore not validly transferred, and the transfers of stock relied upon by petitioners were fraudulently
recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book of NEUGENE under the column "Certificates Cancelled".
Although well-established is the rule that the appellate court will not generally disturb the factual
findings by the trial court for the reason that the trial court heard the testimonies of the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial and was afforded the singular
chance to assess the probative value of the evidence. The rule does not apply where, as in this case, the
SEC overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered would affect the result of the
case. (Tomas vs. CA, 185 SCRA 627 [1990]; People vs. Alforte, 219 SCRA 458 [1993])
In the case under consideration, records reveal that the SEC En Banc and its Panel Of Hearing
Officers misappreciated the true nature of the relationship between the stockholders of NEUGENE and
the Uy family, who had the understanding that the beneficial ownership of NEUGENE would remain
with the Uy family, such that subject shares of stock were, immediately upon issuance, endorsed in
blank by the shareholders and entrusted to the Uy family, through Ban Ha Chua, for safekeeping. Such
beneficial ownership of the Uy family is admitted not only in the testimonies of private respondents but
also of the petitioners, Sonny Moreno and Johnson Lee.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED, in its entirety, No pronouncement as to costs.
#4 REYNALDO MALONZO VS COMELEC

Facts:
Reynaldo Malonzo was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995, winning over former
Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into his term, Malonzo's office as Mayor was put to serious
question when 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and Sangguniang
Kabataan chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA)
of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of PRA
Resolution No. 01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of
recall proceedings against him. Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed
with the COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with the
respondent Commission alleging, principally, that the recall process was deficient in form and
substance, and therefore, illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the petition devoid of merit and
declared the recall proceedings to be in order.
Due to the importance of the matters in issue, and the proximity of the Recall Election date declared by
the COMELEC, the Court issued a Resolution3 ordering the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist
from proceeding with the recall election and directing the respondents to file their respective
Comments. Private respondents Liga ng mga Barangay (Caloocan Chapter), filed their Comment
alleging that all the requirements for the holding of a recall election were duly complied with and that
the petition is therefore without basis. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in lieu of Comment, with the surprising submission that the COMELEC was amiss in its
duties as enforcer of election laws.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment,
with the surprising submission that the COMELEC was amiss in its duties as enforcer of election laws.
According to the Solicitor General, the veracity of notices sent to 42 members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly were not directly passed upon by the COMELEC before it issued the questioned Resolution.
It thus submits that the propriety of notices sent to said PRA members must first be determined by the
COMELEC, after giving private respondents the chance to prove the same, otherwise, a discussion of
the other issues in the present petition would be premature.

Issue: Whether or Not there is need to refer the matter of the veracity of the questioned notices sent
to certain members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly back to the COMELEC.

Held:
No. The COMELEC has already conducted an investigation, and has found the proceedings
instituting the recall to be in accord with law.

As member of the PRA, the President of Liga can legally exercise the prerogatives attached to his
membership in the Preparatory Recall Assembly, sending notices to the other members of its scheduled
convening. It is evident from the foregoing and, therefore, the Commission so holds that the
requirements of notice had been fully complied with. Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the
notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a
function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the
Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments
and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same. In sum, the Supreme Court is persuaded strongly by
the principle that the findings of fact of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of
expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such
findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in
the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.
#5 ALEJA SIBAYAN VDA. DE PINEDA v. TEODORO PENA

Facts:
The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in January, 1932. After Sibayan's death,
his heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement wherein they waived
their rights and interest over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir Feliza Sibayan. Feliza
then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes. The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo
in February, 1932, and was subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.
In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21 Mining Association, later
converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to which the members conveyed their respective
mining claims, including the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims were assigned to the
Baguio Gold Mining Company for operation. During this time, an amended declaration of location for
the "Ullmann" claim was registered. On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. Q-
17136 against Feliza Sibayan, Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, et. al., with the
Court of First Instance. Petitioners claimed that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement from which
private respondents derived their ownership and possession over the "Ped" claim was maliciously
falsified and prayed for annulment of all subsequent transfers involving the mining claims.
During the pre-trial of Civil Case No. Q-17136, the parties entered into an amicable settlement.
Thus, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on November 11, 1974 ordering the parties to
comply with the above settlement. On July 20, 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter-
complaint against private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann"
claim over the "Ped" claim. On January 10, 1977, the Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring
that there was no conflict between the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims.
Issue: Whether or not the Director, or the Secretary, in case of appeals, may motu proprio look into
the validity of mining claims, whether raised as an issue or not.

Held:
Yes. It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative
agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies. In order to be valid, the administrative regulation must be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the law prescribes, and must relate solely to
carrying into effect the general provisions of the law.
With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as
basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head
pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions of
Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a
procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does not amend or extend
the provisions of the statute. Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect of
law. Thus, public respondents were duly empowered to inquire into the validity of the mining claims
involved in the protest case, even if not raised in issue.
#6 TERESITA FABIAN VS NESTOR AGUSTIN (GR No. 143092 Feb 14, 2003)

Facts:
The instant controversy arose from the verified letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995 filed by
Teresita Fabian, petitioner, with the Office of the Ombudsman, charging Nestor Agustin, herein
respondent, with grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral acts, and oppression. Petitioner alleged
therein that she was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction and Development
Corporation (PROMAT) engaged in construction business. In 1986, PROMAT participated in the
various biddings for the construction of government projects within the First Metro Manila Engineering
District (FMED) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Respondent is the
incumbent District Engineer of the FMED.

Petitioner further averred that "respondent became a persistent suitor" and refused to deal with
PROMATs liaison officer, insisting that she personally attend to her companys projects with FMED,
otherwise, her papers "would get stuck in his office." Respondent relentlessly pursued her and one time
invited her to a snack at the Philippine Plaza Hotel. After finishing her drink, she felt dizzy. Taking
advantage of her "semi-conscious state," he brought her to a motel and raped her. That was the
beginning of a hateful relationship. Her attempts to extricate herself proved futile since he constantly
warned her that PROMAT would no longer do business with FMED unless the relationship continues.
Whenever she tried to avoid him, he would go to her house in the middle of the night and create a scene
by blowing the horn of his car, pounding at the gate, shouting on top of his voice and pelting her
windows with stones. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led
an appeal to the Ombudsman, but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. The case was
later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he
said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), however, the Court later on declared
this to be invalid.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the respondent that the petition raises only questions of fact
which are not proper for review by the SC is with merit.

Held:

No. While we agree with respondent that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari, however, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which, is when there
is a conflict between the factual findings of the trial court and that of the appellate court. 9 In such case,
this Court is bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. Here, it is undisputed that the discord in the factual findings existed not only at the
Ombudsman level, but even at the Appellate Court. Such conflict in the factual findings compels this
Court to deviate from the general rule and review the evidence obtaining in this case. In administrative
proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to hold respondent liable for the charges against him.
Here, we are convinced that petitioners charges are supported by substantial evidence jurisprudentially
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
May 8, 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Nestor V. Agustin, District Engineer of the
FMED, DPWH is found guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral acts and oppression and
is ordered DISMISSED from the service.
#7 University of Santo Tomas vs NLRC

Facts:

University of Sto. Tomas (UST) terminated the employment of 16 union officers and directors of
UST Faculty Union for grave misconduct, serious disrespect to a superior and conduct unbecoming a
faculty member on the ground that "in publishing or causing to be published in Strike Bulletin No. 5
the libelous and defamatory attacks against the Father Rector. Some faculty members staged mass
leaves of absence disrupting classes in all levels at the University. The faculty union filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the DOLE. The labor arbiter, on a prima facie showing
that the termination was causing a serious labor dispute, certified the matter to the Secretary of DOLE
for a possible suspension of the effects of termination.
Secretary Franklin Drilon issued an order to accept the 16 terminated employess back to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal in the interest of industrial
peace. Secretary Drilon issued another order which certifies the labor dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration.
NLRC issued a resolution directing UST to comply and faithfully abide with the Orders of the
Secretary Drilon by immediately reinstating or readmitting the 16 faculty members under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to the present dispute or merely reinstate them in the payroll. SC
issued a TRO enjoining NLRC from enforcing or executing the NLRC resolution. UST argues that actual
reinstatement of the dismissed faculty members whose teaching assignments were previously taken
over by new faculty members is not feasible nor practicable since this would compel UST to violate and
terminate its contracts with the faculty members who were assigned to and had actually taken over the
courses. UST contended that it has the sole and exclusive right and prerogative to determine the nature
and kind of work of its employees and to control and manage its own operations.
Issue: Whether or not the order of readmission by the NLRC granting substantially equivalent
academic assignments to dismissed faculty members valid
Held:
No. Pursuant to Article 263 (g), 1st paragraph, of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 27 of
RA 6715, the NLRC was charged with the task of implementing a valid return-to-work order of the
Secretary of Labor. As the implementing body, its authority did not include the power to amend the
Secretary's order. Since the Secretary's order specifically provided that the dismissed faculty members
shall be readmitted under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the present dispute, the
NLRC should have directed the actual reinstatement of the concerned faculty members.
It therefore erred in granting the alternative remedy of payroll reinstatement. The grant of
substantially equivalent academic assignments cannot be sustained. The giving of substantially
equivalent academic assignments, without actual teaching loads, cannot be considered a reinstatement
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. The phrase "under the same terms
and conditions" contemplates actual reinstatement or the return of actual teaching loads to the
dismissed faculty members. Article 263(g) was devised to maintain the status quo between the workers
and management in a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, pending adjudication of the controversy. The grant of
substantially equivalent academic assignments would evidently alter the existing status quo since the
temporarily reinstated teachers will not be given their usual teaching loads.
#8 BAUTISTA VS ARANETA

Facts:
Petitioner herein claimed tto be a rightful tenant over the subject parcel of land and prayed for
temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant’s alleged harassment towards the petitioner.
Meanwhile, defendant denied all the petitioner’s allegation and averred that the subject land was
leased to defendant for purposes of developing a bio-dynamic farm. And that sometime prior to the
effectivity of the contract of lease, defendant, together with her co-lessee conducted an ocular
inspections of the property. It was during this time that she first met the plaintiff.

Defendant offered to petitioner a work but the latter declined and offered to leave the premise
instead. Upon such representation, defendant instructed her assistant to commence cultivation of the
leased premises. However, the work stopped because the plaintiff cursed, threatened and shouted at
defendant’s workers.

On 1993, the Provincial Adjudicator ruled in favor of petitioner which was also affirmed by
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board on appeal. It held that such decision was grounded
by evidence including a certification of tenancy issued by Agrarian Reform Program Technician (ARPT)
noted by Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer [MARO].

However, the CA reversed the DARAB ruling contending that “tenancy is not purely a factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship that
can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder.

Issue: Whether or not, the CA erred in reversing the DARAB ruling.

Held:

No. we can not sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding
of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of
petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals,15 we
held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are
merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings
specially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.

In view whereof, the petition for review is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
SP No. 45466 is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
#9 MOISES SAMSON VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Facts:

On April 21, 1993, petitioner Moises S. Samson, on behalf of unidentified complainants, charged
private respondents Dr. Leonito L. Catarroja and Norma Sanchez, Chiefs of the Quezon City Health
Sanitation and Food and Drugs Divisions, respectively, with violation of paragraphs (b), (e) and (h) of
Section 3 of RA 3019, essentially, as follows:

1. That respondent Leonito Catarroja caused the printing of health certificates without serial numbers
at his own expense and thereafter, he sold and parted with the said blank and already signed health
certificates at P20.00 each to co-respondent Norma Sanchez and likewise to an unnamed employee of
the Business Permits and Licenses Office (BPLO), Office of the Mayor, Quezon City, who then re-sold
the same to fixers. In turn, the said fixers disposed of the health certificates to applicants for P70.00
each without official receipts;

2. That on February 10, 1993, respondent Catarroja signed and issued twenty (20) health certificates to
employees of the Max restaurant even without the required physical and medical examinations and
immunizations, in consideration of the amount of P400.00 which was paid by Pons Sepulveda for and
in behalf of said employees.

Private respondents counter-alleged that petitioner had neither the personality to sue nor
personal knowledge of the veracity of the complaint, which was mere hearsay, not having been
supported by any affidavit from the purportedly affected, if not fictitious, health certificate applicants
or sanitary inspectors. Also, petitioner did not present any of his witnesses before the investigating
committee created by then Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay. Thus, private respondents filed counter-
charges against petitioner for libel, falsification and perjury.

Issue: Whether or not the public respondent is guilty of grave abuse of discretion for dismissing OMB-
0-93-0920, a supposedly prima facie graft case against private respondents.

Held:

No. The public respondent did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed joint resolution and
order. Neither can it be compelled by mandamus to reverse its findings and dispositions.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the power of discretion is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.7

In this case, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent in
dismissing OMB-0-93-0920 for lack of evidence to establish a probable cause against private
respondents.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
#10 TERESITA FABIAN VS NESTOR AGUSTIN

Facts:
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the
incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which
he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and
unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when Fabian tried to terminate their
relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case
against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman – who inhibited himself
– later the case led to the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the
decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that -In all administrative
diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not Sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

Held:

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
#11 MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD vs COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under
her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders.
Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE
be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLE’s petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a
complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has encroached upon
the area allotted for DAVENCOR’s timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty
as charged and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the
case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. Â During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from
MIWPI.

Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding,
DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling
to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of execution
against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor
of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR
appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original
case (as it was MLE that was sued – a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by
the Minister has been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued
patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPI’s constitutional rights
under the due process clause.

Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI
Held:
There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the petitioner. The same was
issued without giving the petitioner an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of
DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. It does not appear that petitioner was at
all furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR’ss letter requesting for the Execution of the Honorable
Secretary’s decision against it. Petitioner was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the
respondent Secretary’s expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently
on the basis merely of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading
MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, petitioner was not included or mentioned in the
proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession.
Essentially, Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. As we held
in Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Ople, et al, in a certiorari or prohibition case, only issues affecting
the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board and offices involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed
facts. The issue of whether or not petitioner is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one of fact,
and which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings, and not in the prohibition
proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the respondent Minister of Natural
Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the execution of its order which is under scrutiny.
#12 MARITA C BERNALDO VS THE OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
Petitioner Bernaldo was the DPWH Region III Project Engineer of one of the projects,
particularly, The Almacen River II Project. When the contractor finished the project, a Statement of
Work Accomplished and Certificate of Final Inspection and Certificate of Final Acceptance certified
that the Almacen River II Project was 100% completed by the contractor and the DPWH Region III
Engineers. The contractor was eventually paid 93.58% of the contract price cost. However, the Survey
and Investigation Team of the Bureau of Design of the DPWH, in its Field Survey and Investigation
Report, indicated that the amount of work accomplished by the contractor on the Project was only about
21% completed. Moreover, in a Letter-Report to the OMB, the equipments utilized on the Project were
evaluated and it was stated therein that the same could not possibly accomplish the reported full
completion of the said project. Based on the foregoing reports, the DPWH Region III Engineers
connected with the Projects were all administratively charged for Falsification, Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau
(AAB) of the OMB. Later, the respondent DPWH Region III Engineers, including petitioner Bernaldo,
were ordered by the OMB for their suspension for a period of nine (9) months without pay and other
benefits. The case was elevated for review in the CA which granted the petition and the assailed orders
of the OMB were annulled and set aside. However, the CA held that the factual findings of the OMB
were supported by substantial evidence to hold petitioner Bernaldo administratively liable. Hence, the
instant petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of Petitioner Bernaldo that these findings dwell on the same
factual issues raised before the CA which already attained finality and, therefore, should be taken into
account in the adjudication of her administrative charge valid.
Held:
We find merit in the petition. Anent the preliminary matter regarding the mode of appeal to this
Court, the well-settled principle under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is that only questions of law shall
be raised in an appeal by certiorari before this Court. But, it recognizes of certain exceptions, namely:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
To be sure, when the lower court or the administrative tribunal fails to take into account certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion is likewise an accepted
exception to the prescription under Rule 45.
CONDONATION DOCTRINE
#1 OMBUDSMAN VS JOEL SAMANIEGO(October 5, 2010) GR 175573
Facts:

This is a resolution of the second motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner Office of
the Ombudsman to our decision dated September 11, 2008, 2 particularly our pronouncement with
respect to the stay of the decision of the Ombudsman during the pendency of an appeal:

Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, we hold that the mere filing by respondent of an appeal
sufficed to stay the execution of the joint decision against him. Respondent’s prayer for the issuance of
a writ of a preliminary injunction (for purposes of staying the execution of the decision against him)
was therefore a superfluity. The execution of petitioner’s joint decision against respondent should be
stayed during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.

Issue: Whether or not filing of an appeal to the CA can stop the decision from being executory.

Held:

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of
the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter
of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order
of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against such officer.

The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately
executory pending appeal.4 It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA. This rule is
similar to that provided under Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.
#2 THE OMBUDSMAN VS JEJOMAR BINAY

Facts:

Binay, Jr. was charged with administrative and criminal cases in connection with the allegation
that he is involved in anomalous activities attending the procurement and construction phases of the
Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of
Makati. Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable since Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati and Phases III to V transpired during his first term.
His reelection as mayor for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if
any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. The Ombudsman issued
an order placing Binay, et al. under preventive suspension.

The CA granted Binay’s prayer for TRO enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order. According to the CA, it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO considering that
if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election
meant that he can no longer be administratively charged. Under the Condonation Doctrine, which
applies only to administrative cases, (1) the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term
in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; (2) an elective official's re-
election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and (3) courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and
character of candidates, of their right to elect officers.

Issue: Whether or not Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and the
WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine

Held:

No. The CA's resolutions were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. By
merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based
on its legal attribution. However, the condonation doctrine should be abandoned. There is no
constitutional or statutory basis to support it. The continued application of the condonation doctrine is
simply inconsistent and impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly
mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people
at all times. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense. In fact the LGC and the
RRACCS precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the
penalty of removal could not be reelected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification
from running for such post.

There is no presumption in any statute or procedural rule that the electorate, when re-electing a
local official, do so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his
faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. In reality, most corrupt acts by public officers are
shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Condonation presupposes that the condoner has
actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown. However, the Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application. It should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected.