United States Africa Command

Public Affairs Office

5 January 2011

USAFRICOM - related news stories

TOP NEWS RELATED TO U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND AFRICA

Soft Power Warriors (The World Today - Chatham House)

(Pan Africa) Throughout the past year Africa has experienced a range of highs and
lows; from crowds thronging newly-built football stadiums in support of the World
Cup to expanding militant activity, terrorist incidents and governmental corruption.
Step forward the United States military, a one-stop shop for dealing with African ills.

Obama likely to visit Africa this year (Daily Nation)

(Pan Africa) Whether President Barack Obama visits his father's homeland this year
will depend on how the United States gauges Kenya's adherence to democratic norms.

After Sudan vote on partition, Obama cannot rest (Christian Science Monitor)
(Sudan) Every US president since Ronald Reagan has sent the military into a new
trouble spot somewhere in the world – except Barack Obama. And now he is trying
hard to keep that record of no new intervention in the case of Sudan.

US Senator Kerry in Sudan for referendum (AFP)

(Sudan) Senior US Senator John Kerry arrived in Sudan Tuesday, promising
Washington will stay engaged with the strife-torn country after an independence
referendum in southern Sudan this weekend.

Sudan's President Opens to South's Succession (Wall Street Journal)

(Sudan) Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir pledged to respect the outcome of this
week's referendum on whether the south should become an independent nation, raising
hopes that Africa's biggest country can avoid more bloodshed even if it breaks apart.

US cable leaks' collateral damage in Zimbabwe (Guardian)

(Zimbabwe) With the recent release of sensitive diplomatic cables, WikiLeaks may
have committed its own collateral murder, upending the precarious balance of power in
a fragile African state and signing the death warrant of its pro-western premier.

U.S. envoy to Libya in Washington for talks on ties (Reuters)

(Libya) The U.S. ambassador to Libya has returned to Washington for consultations on
bilateral ties including the question of when he will return to Tripoli, an embassy
spokesman said Tuesday.

New Partnership Frameworks Combat HIV/AIDS (Voice of America)

(South Africa/Botswana) Two new agreements will further the Obama
administration's fight against HIV/AIDs in Africa. U.S. State Department officials have
recently signed Partnership Frameworks with the governments of South Africa and
Botswana under the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief or PEPFAR.

Military needs response plan to genocide (CNN)

(Pan Africa) In one week, the mostly Christian people of South Sudan will cast a
historic vote to secede or not from the Muslim North. While the United States rightly
pursues diplomatic solutions to what most believe will be a vote to secede, prudence
demands military preparations for violence -- to include mass killings that could be
carried out simultaneously by varied groups.

Gbagbo Agrees to End Ivory Coast Political Stalemate (Voice of America)

(Ivory Coast) The West African regional bloc ECOWAS says Ivory Coast President
Laurent Gbagbo has agreed to negotiate a "peaceful end" to the country's political crisis
without any preconditions.

Africa's Top Flash Points in 2011 (Family Security Matters)

(Pan Africa) This first piece of the year is dedicated to laying out what are likely to be
the leading flash points on the African continent during 2011 in something of an
approximate order of their geopolitical significance, both as security challenges and
strategic opportunities.

UN News Service Africa Briefs

Full Articles on UN Website
 Amidst efforts to solve Ivorian political deadlock, UN agencies prepare aid
 Sudan: UN in final push to deliver ballots for independence referendum in south
 Darfur: UN-African mission protects thousands displaced by recent clashes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
UPCOMING EVENTS OF INTEREST:

WHEN/WHERE: Thursday, January 6, 2011; Brookings Institution

WHAT: Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and the Prospects for Sudan’s Future
WHO: Hilde F. Johnson, author and former Minister of International Development of
Norway; Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ); Gayle Smith, National Security Council senior
director for development and democracy; Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Rich
Williamson
Info: https://www.cvent.com/EVENTS/Register/IdentityConfirmation.aspx?
e=998af087-00b2-4e56-a2b7-9e9b46877662

WHEN/WHERE: Tuesday and Wednesday, February 8-9, 2011; National Defense

Industrial Association, Marriott Wardman Park Hotel, Washington, DC
WHAT: Defense, Diplomacy, and Development: Translating Policy into Operational
Capability
WHO: Keynote Speakers include ADM Michael Mullen, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff; BG Simon Hutchinson, GBR, Deputy Commander, NATO Special Operations
Forces Headquarters; ADM Eric T. Olson, USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command; Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
Info: http://www.ndia.org/meetings/1880/Pages/default.aspx
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FULL ARTICLE TEXT

Soft Power Warriors (The World Today - Chatham House)

Throughout the past year Africa has experienced a range of highs and lows; from
crowds thronging newly-built football stadiums in support of the World Cup to
expanding militant activity, terrorist incidents and governmental corruption.

On top of all this, piracy thrives off the Horn of Africa, fragile states grow brittle and
crack and Al-Qaeda franchises thrive in the north and east. Will no one rid the continent
of these troublesome issues?

Step forward the United States military, a one-stop shop for dealing with African ills. In
the aftermath of the 2009 Christmas Day airplane bomb scare, and in response to
predictable knee-jerk reactions calling for prompt military action, US President Barack
Obama declared that he had 'no intention of sending US boots on the ground in these
regions', meaning Somalia and Yemen. Yet domestic tensions remain high, and were
further exacerbated in August 2010 when fourteen US citizens and residents were
charged with providing support to al-Shabab militants in Somalia. The fact remains that
American military activity in Africa is on the rise, coordinated by the fledgling African
Command (Africom).

Africom became fully operational in October 2008 and consolidated US military

operations on the continent under a single command instead of three. Its formationwas
evidence of growing US awareness of Africa's strategic value to both established and
rising global powers.

Africom has been called a combatant command plus, meaning that in addition to its
traditional war-fighting tasks, it will have a broader 'soft-power' role including
'stability' operations that seek to prevent conflict. To accomplish this, it has integrated
civilians from US government agencies into its command.
Hard Or Soft?
Serious concerns remain, however, that Africom's soft-power aspirations may be
overwhelmed by America's post- September 11 bias towards hard power in pursuit of
security objectives, leading to a militarisation of US foreign policy on the continent.

The worry is that the lines between diplomacy, development and defence may become
blurred, and tasks done by Africom civilians may supplant work that would otherwise
be carried out by the State Department or the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID).

These civilian agencies cannot compete with the might of the Pentagon, and members of
Congress have more to gain politically by funding soldiers and costly weaponry instead
of diplomats and aid workers. As a result, the mix of incentives in US Africa policy is
unbalanced: military influence will assert itself as civilian agencies struggle to regain
relevance, and Africa may suffer as a result.

Contingency planning is already taking place for potential armed US intervention. In

2008, US war games included Africa for the first time, with one scenario examining
Africom's potential response to a crisis caused by escalating insurgency and piracy.
Although theremay be no plans to station American troops in Somalia, the political will
exists to use themfor incursions, as seen in September 2009 when Special Operations
Forces carried out a raid targeting a suspected Al-Qaeda operative. More recently the
US has become increasingly concerned about extremist links between Somalia and
Yemen, and has also provided intelligence and logistical support to the beleaguered
Somali government in its fight against opposition forces.

In addition, plans have been considered to assign a quick response Marine task force to
Africom, and US Special Operations Forces have started training Congolese troops in
military tactics and 'internal security operations'. The 2010 budget requests from the
Obama administration show significantly increased amounts for military training
programmes and arms sales to African countries. Overall, it is increasingly clear that US
armed forces are Washington's most visible and well-funded representatives on the
continent.

Shape The Message

At its launch, Africom faced criticism that the command was ignoring important
African security issues in its quest to prosecute the so-called 'war' on terror. There were
fears it might be used as the US spearhead of a new 'scramble for Africa' in competition
with China and other rising powers.

These fears are not without foundation: in 2008 Africom Commander General William
Ward noted that combating terrorism is the command's 'number one theatre-wide goal',
and in 2002 US President George Bush's administration had declared that US access to
Africa's oil supplies was considered to be a 'strategic national interest'.

The level of criticism nevertheless surprised Africom officials, and in response they
launched a concerted public relations effort to 'shape the message' and rebrand the
command as a strictly military mission - bolstered by soft power - in support of
largerUS foreign policy goals.

Lily Pads
Gaining African support for more US troops on the ground is difficult enough, but the
possibility that Africom headquarters would be located on the continent proved highly
contentious.

When the command was launched the Pentagon was vague about its headquarters,
creating a vacuum that was quickly filled with suspicion, anger and conspiracy
theories. In November 2008, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates attempted to defuse
the tension by announcing that the base would initially be a continent away in
Stuttgart,Germany,with a decision on the permanent location delayed until early 2012.

Africom's most visible presence comes through two inherited initiatives: Operation
Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara and the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa.
Both are focussed on counter-terror operations, though under Africom this has been
rhetorically softened to 'security cooperation' and 'cooperative conflict prevention'.

The command has avoided establishing large bases, which are expensive to maintain
and often generate local discontent. Instead it is pursuing a 'light footprint' strategy that
relies on Cooperative Security Locations.

These so-called 'lily pads' are bare-bones facilities maintained at air bases and ports in at
least a dozen countries. The US has negotiated access to the sites, which can be rapidly
expanded for urgent operations, and because they are owned by the host country they
are not technically aUS 'base'.

New Command, Now Twice As Soft

Africom's objectives may look 'hard', and indeed they are, but the ways and means
often appear different. Winning hearts and minds is about much more than bullets and
bombs, and current conflicts have taught the US military the value of soft power.

In February 2007, Bush announced the new command would promote 'development,
health, education, democracy and economic growth'. This led to concerns in Africa and
among development and aid organisations over what stabilisation, development or
humanitarian assistance might look like when delivered by military forces.
Obama amended his predecessor's position slightly when he visited Ghana in July 2009,
framing Africom's purpose less in terms of democracy promotion and more in terms of
confronting common security issues. It should be remembered, however, that Africom's
mandate allows for 'stability' operations, permiting a broad spectrum of actions, both
hard and soft.

Concerns over militarisation were meant to be alleviated by Africom's interagency

structure. Instead of a single deputy commander it has two, one military, the other
civilian, and approximately half of the 1,300 headquarters staff are drawn from civilian
US government agencies.

It was hoped this would provide a wide range of perspectives, and better equip the
command to address the pervasive and persistent challenges of fragile and failing
states,many of which were judged capable of threatening US national security.

The need for this civil-military command structure largely stems from the fact that the
capabilities of US civilian agencies such as the State Department and USAID remain
feeble incomparison with the military, leaving the Pentagon to pick up the slack.

Given the US track record in Iraq and Afghanistan, African worries regarding
militarisation of aid and development appear justifiable. Although civilians integrated
into Africom may provide alternative insights, they are still part of a military structure
that quite naturally tends to take a military perspective in everything it does.

Building Capacity, Making Friends?

There is no denying that Africom can draw on technical and financial resources far
superior to those of any African nation. The constant American emphasis on
'partnership' and 'capacity-building' belies an unspoken truth: there is nothing equal
about this relationship. When the US Navy greets the rusty gunboats of small African
coastal countries, it does so in sophisticated futuristic-looking vessels that could be from
the set of a science fiction movie.

In addition, the nebulous concept of strengthening 'capacity' has become a catch-all to

justify almost any intervention. The question is: 'building capacity for what?'. In many
cases what is being strengthened are the balance sheets of private military companies
carrying out work for the US military, and the armed forces of regimes whose interests
are not shared by their citizens and who have no qualms about employing tools of
repression. General Ward insists the armed forces Africom engages with should remain
apolitical, but is this realistic or just wishful thinking?

Becoming a partner with undemocratic governments and bolstering their capacity also
increases the militarisation of US foreign policy. Authoritarian regimes have little
interest in what the State Department or USAID can offer; they are much more receptive
to the Pentagon's financial largesse and advanced military hardware.
There is a distinct possibility that some African leaders view US military and security
assistance as a golden opportunity to strengthen their grip on power,while
simultaneously satisfying America's desire for political 'stability'. In addition, US
civilian agencies are less able than their military counterparts to operate freely in
repressive environments. These agencies have been systematically under-resourced by
Washington, placing the US military more firmly in charge.

High-profile acts of piracy and terrorism in Africa only encourage talk of military action
as a one-size-fits-all solution. While this may have the short-term effect of frightening
the US Congress into increasing funding - to both theUS and African militaries - African
public opinion is unlikely to feel that the US is truly focusing on the issues that afflict
the continent most severely, such as poverty, inter- and intra-state conflict and
corruption.

The 2010 US Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment confirmed this

gloomy outlook by forecasting that the short-term future of a number of African
countries will be filled with 'political instability, economic distress, and humanitarian
crises'.

In spite of the criticism, some aspects of Africom's formation are logical from both a US
and an African perspective. The command gives African leaders one central point of
contact with the US military, as opposed to three, and eliminates the possibility of gaps
between areas of responsibility. The consolidation of military functions also increases
efficiency and coherence over a wide range of activities including security sector
reform, military mentoring, maritime security and counter-narcotics training.

The US military offers a wide range of skills that can contribute to the
professionalisation of African armed forces. But all this must be done with cultural and
historical sensitivity, and a realisation that cooperation with repressive regimes does
not exemplify American ideals, and has frequently led to unintended consequences.

American troops are gradually leaving Iraq, and the conflict in Afghanistan is likely to
ebb in the next decade. As this happens, more US resources and attention are likely to
be directed towards Africa and its vast, loosely-governed spaces, viewed by
Washington as a breeding ground for a host of undesirable activities. This dynamic will
only increase suspicions surrounding Africom and American military-led strategic
objectives; suspicions which remain difficult to dispel.

Obama's tone is less strident and more inclusive than his predecessor's, leading some
critics to lower their guard, and General Ward (soon to be replaced) has worked
tirelessly to rehabilitate the command's image on the continent, but it is too early to
judge whether Africom's presence will be a net gain for Africa.
------------------
Obama likely to visit Africa this year (Daily Nation)

Whether President Barack Obama visits his father's homeland this year will depend on
how the United States gauges Kenya's adherence to democratic norms.

Citing sources in the White House, the Associated Press reported on Monday that Mr
Obama will “almost certainly” visit Africa in 2011.

“No decision has been made on which countries Obama will visit, but deputy national
security adviser Ben Rhodes said stops will reflect positive democratic models,” the AP
added.

The New York-based news agency did not specifically mention Kenya as a potential
destination for Mr Obama. But the AP noted that he has a “personal connection to
Africa and that his father and other family members have been affected by the
corruption that plagues many countries there.”

The president intends to increase his engagement with Africa in 2011, which so far in
his tenure “has taken a backseat to other foreign policy goals,” the AP observed. The
White House believes progress has been made on those primary agenda items, such as
winding down the war in Iraq, fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and improving
relations with Russia.

“He will focus in Africa on good governance and supporting nations with strong
democratic institutions,” the AP added.

Mr Rhodes told the news agency that the White House understands that increased US
involvement with Africa can be viewed as meddling. “But he said Obama can speak to
African leaders with a unique level of candour.”

The president has already intensified his focus on Sudan and is playing a direct role in
efforts to resolve the stalemate in Ivory Coast, the AP reported.
------------------
After Sudan vote on partition, Obama cannot rest (Christian Science Monitor)

Every US president since Ronald Reagan has sent the military into a new trouble spot
somewhere in the world – except Barack Obama. And now he is trying hard to keep
that record of no new intervention in the case of Sudan. This year, Africa’s largest
country may be split into two.

A referendum is set for Jan. 9 in southern Sudan that will probably result in a partition
between the largely Arab, Islamic north and the largely black, Christian, and animist
south. If this national divorce goes as planned, it could finally put an end to a conflict
that resulted in the loss of more than 2 million lives.
The task of peacefully breaking up Sudan, however, remains far from finished and is a
test of Mr. Obama’s attempt to avoid more military deployments. His secretary of State,
Hillary Rodham Clinton, only recently called Sudan “a ticking time bomb.” And his
former director of national intelligence, Dennis Blair, stated last year that of all the
world’s trouble spots, “a new mass killing or genocide is most likely to occur in
southern Sudan” within five years.

It is a mark of US diplomacy – that began with a 2005 agreement between the north and
south – that the regime of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir in Khartoum now
appears willing to let the referendum take place without stirring up militias in the
south. Mr. Bashir and his ruling National Congress Party even appear resigned to the
south overwhelmingly voting for secession, as is widely expected.

Both sides have strong incentives to make this split-up work. Each government is
highly dependent on money from Sudan’s oil exports. And each has enough foes within
their own camps not to again fight each other.

Still, a strong American hand is needed through 2011 to ensure that the north and south
negotiate a postreferendum deal on border demarcation, oil sharing, foreign debt, the
status of southern refugees, and the future of the oil-rich Abyei territory. (The latter is
home to both a tribe of farmers supported by the south and a northern-backed Arab
nomadic tribe.)

Any number of players with guns has the potential to turn this tinderbox into a place
that might require US intervention. Sudan has also drawn the attention of big names,
such as actor George Clooney and singer Alicia Keys, as well as Christian activist
groups in the United States.

One complication for the US is the fact that Bashir has been indicted by the
International Criminal Court on genocide charges for his actions in Sudan’s other hot
spot, Darfur. Negotiating with such a wanted figure is awkward. Yet the Obama
administration has wisely used incentives rather than threats to persuade Bashir to keep
the peace process moving along.

The US, for instance, may remove Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism if
Bashir honors the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement mediated between the north
and south by the Bush administration. (Sudan was once home to Osama bin Laden.)

Bashir may have only agreed to the 2005 pact after seeing the US invade Afghanistan
and Iraq. With the US now more war-averse and money-strapped, he may demand a
bushel of diplomatic carrots to make the necessary concessions on the toughest issues of
oil sharing and the status of Abyei.
The south, too, needs expert hand-holding by the US during the coming negotiations so
as not to force a renewal of the conflict. And if a new country does emerge – one that
would be the size of Texas – it must not be allowed to become a failed state with its own
internal strife. Many more years of US aid will be required for the landlocked south.

The world has witnessed several messy, violent partitions before: post-British India and
later the break-off of Bangladesh from Pakistan; and lately Yugoslavia. Sudan can be
different and avoid foreign military intervention if the United States and the West,
along with African and Arab states, see the wisdom of separating peoples who never
really wanted to be put together when colonial powers carved up Africa. The two parts
of Sudan may yet set an example for resolving other ethnic or religious strife in Africa –
if they can separate peacefully.
------------------
US Senator Kerry in Sudan for referendum (AFP)

WASHINGTON – Senior US Senator John Kerry arrived in Sudan Tuesday, promising

Washington will stay engaged with the strife-torn country after an independence
referendum in southern Sudan this weekend.

"Sudan is at a pivotal moment," Kerry, a Democrat who chairs the US Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, said in a statement released by his office in Washington at the
start of what was scheduled to be a week-long visit.

"The United States played an important role in ending the civil war in Sudan and
making the vote this Sunday possible. Our commitment to the Sudanese people will
extend beyond the referendum, whatever its outcome, as we work to improve economic
and humanitarian conditions in the region," he pledged.

Kerry was to meet with Sudanese officials in Khartoum and Juba and press all parties to
ensure that the weekend vote goes smoothly and without violence, as well as urge the
full implementation of a broad North-South peace accord.

North and south Sudan signed the agreement in 2005 after a devastating 22-year civil
war, which included holding a referendum on whether the south secedes or remains
part of a united country.

Almost four million people have signed up to vote in southern Sudan's independence
referendum due to begin on Sunday and last until January 15, organizers said Monday.

Observers believe an overwhelming majority will vote in favor of breaking away from
the north.
------------------
Sudan's President Opens to South's Succession (Wall Street Journal)
JUBA—Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir pledged to respect the outcome of this week's
referendum on whether the south should become an independent nation, raising hopes
that Africa's biggest country can avoid more bloodshed even if it breaks apart.

"If secession is the end result, we will come and congratulate and celebrate with you,"
Mr. Bashir said Tuesday beside the south's president, Salva Kiir. Mr. Bashir also
promised technical and logistical aid to help the south make the transition to
independence.

Soldiers and police blocked most of Juba's few paved roads for Mr. Bashir's arrival
Tuesday morning. While the official welcome was cordial, the south also made clear its
determination to secede. People lining a major road to greet the leader waved small
white flags stamped with a thumbprint and the word "separation," as well as the flag of
southern Sudan.

The referendum vote, scheduled for Sunday Jan. 9, is the culmination of a peace
agreement between the north and south that was forged in 2005. That agreement
followed a civil war that left at least two million dead and millions more displaced.

Under the peace pact, both sides agreed on a transitional government for five years,
after which the south would vote on whether to secede. Mr. Bashir, who is wanted by
the International Criminal Court for war crimes related to massacres in the Darfur
region, has suggested as recently as December that his government might not recognize
a vote for secession if the southern government didn't campaign for unity as well as
separation.

Now that the south's independence appears to be a fait accompli, however, Mr. Bashir
has shifted course and sought to allay tensions that could lead to more unrest and
disrupt oil supplies. "Imposing unity by force failed," said Mr. Bashir in his remarks.
"The end result was more hatred, more division, more enmity. … We all are in dire need
of peace."

Sudan is rich in oil, which comes mainly from the south through a pipeline to the north,
where it is refined and sold. The two sides currently share revenue from the oil—now
pumping at about 500,000 barrels a day—as part of the peace agreement. Both rely
heavily on oil to fund their respective governments.

The United States, Norway and Britain—the three Western countries that pledged to
help make the peace accord work—have encouraged Mr. Bashir to support the
referendum. The U.S., for example, offered to remove Sudan from its list of state
sponsors of terrorism, if Mr. Bashir helped to ensure a peaceful vote. But a top official
from Mr. Bashir's party rejected that offer, saying that the U.S. doesn't have any power
to negotiate with its government.
Southerners have long been wary of the north, which in the past has failed to keep
promises. But on Tuesday, officials were more receptive to the remarks of President
Bashir. "He said he would be the first to recognize an independent southern Sudan,"
said Barnaba Marial Benjamin, the southern government spokesman. "That has made
the people of southern Sudan very happy."
------------------
US cable leaks' collateral damage in Zimbabwe (Guardian)

When WikiLeaks whistleblowers began circulating in April footage of a 2007 Iraq war
incursion in which US military personnel unwittingly killed two war correspondents
and several civilians, the international community was aghast at the apparent murder.
With sobering questions on the material's full context largely falling on deaf ears, the
group was free to editorialise the scene as it pleased: "collateral murder".

But now, with the recent release of sensitive diplomatic cables, WikiLeaks may have
committed its own collateral murder, upending the precarious balance of power in a
fragile African state and signing the death warrant of its pro-western premier.

Zimbabwe's Morgan Tsvangirai's call to public service has been a tortured one,
punctuated by death and indignity.

His numerous arrests and brushes with death began in 1997, when he emerged as the
unlikely face of opposition to President Robert Mugabe. That year, Mugabe's henchmen
nearly threw Tsvangirai from the window of his tenth floor office. He would be arrested
on four separate occasions in the years to follow. During one such arrest, in 2007, he
was severely beaten and tortured by Zimbabwean special forces at the behest of the
ruling political party.

After Zimbabwe's 2008 presidential contest – featuring incumbent Mugabe, Tsvangirai

and independent Simba Makoni – failed to award any candidate with the majority
necessary to claim victory, the election defaulted to a runoff between the two highest
vote-getters, Mugabe and Tsvangirai.

In the days succeeding the first round of balloting, Tsvangirai was the alleged target of
an assassination plot and subsequently taken into the custody of Mugabe's police, for
which American and German diplomats demanded his immediate release. After
initially committing to pursuing a second challenge to Mugabe, Tsvangirai withdrew in
protest, lambasting the election as a "violent sham" in which his supporters were risking
their lives to cast ballots in his favour. Indeed, it is estimated that over 100 MDC
supporters met an untimely demise in the period following the election.

Following intense negotiations, the two parties agreed in February 2009 to a coalition
government, in which Mugabe would remain head of state – a post he had held
uninterrupted for 30 years – and Tsvangirai would assume the premiership. Not one
month later, Tsvangirai and his wife were involved in a suspicious collision with a
lorry. Though the prime minister survived, his wife for 31 years died.

With little regard for the nuances and subtlety of soft international diplomacy,
WikiLeaks released last week a classified US state department cable relating a 2009
meeting between Tsvangirai and American and European ambassadors, whose
countries imposed travel sanctions and asset freezes on Mugabe and his top political
lieutenants on the eve of Zimbabwe's 2002 presidential election.

Though western sanctions don't prohibit foreign trade and investment or affect
international aid – it's said that Zimbabwe's 2009 cholera epidemic topped 100,000
cases, registering some 4,300 deaths – the Mugabe administration effectively
characterised the sanctions as an affront to the common Zimbabwean, further crippling
the nation's already hobbled economy. (Zimbabwe's national unemployment figure
hovers somewhere near 90%.)

Publicly, Tsvangirai opposed the measures out of political necessity. In private

conversations with western diplomats, however, the ascendant Tsvangirai praised its
utility in forcing Mugabe's hand in the new unity government.

Now, in the wake of the WikiLeaks' release, one of the men targeted by US and EU
travel and asset freezes, Mugabe's appointed attorney general, has launched a probe to
investigate Tsvangirai's involvement in sustained western sanctions. If found guilty,
Tsvangirai will face the death penalty.

And so, where Mugabe's strong-arming, torture and assassination attempts have failed
to eliminate the leading figure of Zimbabwe's democratic opposition, WikiLeaks may
yet succeed. Twenty years of sacrifice and suffering by Tsvangirai all for naught, as
WikiLeaks risks "collateral murder" in the name of transparency.

Before more political carnage is wrought and more blood spilled – in Africa and
elsewhere, with special concern for those US-sympathising Afghans fingered in its last
war document dump – WikiLeaks ought to leave international relations to those who
understand it – at least to those who understand the value of a life.
------------------
U.S. envoy to Libya in Washington for talks on ties (Reuters)

ALGIERS – The U.S. ambassador to Libya has returned to Washington for consultations
on bilateral ties including the question of when he will return to Tripoli, an embassy
spokesman said Tuesday.

"Ambassador (Gene A.) Cretz is in Washington for consultations ... The question of
when Ambassador Cretz returns to Libya will be one of the many subjects of his
consultations," the spokesman said, adding that Cretz had gone to Washington at the
request of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

The consultations "will cover a number of important issues related to our bilateral
relationship as well as regional developments," the spokesman said, without
elaborating.

Some secret U.S. embassy cables released by WikiLeaks are expected to have upset
Libyan authorities, though the Libyans have made no public comments about them.

In one of the cables, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was said to have caused a
month-long nuclear scare in 2009 when he delayed the return to Russia of radioactive
material in an apparent fit of diplomatic pique.
------------------
New Partnership Frameworks Combat HIV/AIDS (Voice of America)

Two new agreements will further the Obama administration's fight against HIV/AIDs
in Africa. U.S. State Department officials have recently signed Partnership Frameworks
with the governments of South Africa and Botswana under the U.S. President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief or PEPFAR. These five-year joint strategic plans aim to
promote a sustainable approach to combating HIV/AIDS in the partner countries
through service delivery, policy reform and coordinated financial commitments.

During the singing of the Partnership Framework with South Africa, U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton lauded South Africa for their prevention efforts, renewed
leadership, and for responding by committing 60 percent of their country's spending to
HIV/AIDS.

"There is so much being done at the grassroots level on prevention, efforts against
discrimination, treating people with HIV, and doing so much more to put together a
comprehensive strategy," she noted.

Secretary Clinton said the U.S. and South Africa have also collaborated on new
scientific developments:

"We together have worked on the development of a promising microbicide that could
prevent the transmission of the HIV virus," she said. "That was led by South African
scientists, and it's the kind of new partnership we want to see more of together."

In Botswana, at the signing of their Partnership Framework, U.S. Ambassador Stephen

J. Nolan discussed the success to date in fighting AIDS with America’s support.

"Now over 93 percent of people in Botswana who need antiretroviral treatment receive
it, and they have an opportunity to live healthy, productive lives," he said. He also
noted that nearly all HIV-positive mothers are now able to access treatment to prevent
mother-to-child transmission, so very few babies are being born HIV-positive.

Ambassador Nolan said that under the Framework "roadmap," the two countries will
place a major emphasis on HIV prevention and strengthening the health system going
forward.

PEPFAR's Partnership Frameworks are one way the U.S. works with partner countries
to promote country ownership and establish sustainable means to combat HIV/AIDS.
The U.S. has signed 18 similar Partnership Frameworks with countries around the
globe. This emphasis on support for country ownership reflects the vision of President
Obama's Policy Directive on Development and his Global Health Initiative.
------------------
Military needs response plan to genocide (CNN)

In the past 75 years, the world has been witness to genocide in Cambodia, Rwanda,
Srebrenica, Darfur and the Holocaust.

In a few weeks, the next mass atrocity could happen in East Africa.

As retired Adm. Dennis Blair, former U.S. director of National Intelligence, testified in
2010: "A number of countries in Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new
outbreak of mass killing. Among these countries, a new mass killing or genocide is most
likely to occur in southern Sudan."

In one week, the mostly Christian people of South Sudan will cast a historic vote to
secede or not from the Muslim North. While the United States rightly pursues
diplomatic solutions to what most believe will be a vote to secede, prudence demands
military preparations for violence -- to include mass killings that could be carried out
simultaneously by varied groups.

Should South Sudan vote to secede, North-on-South violence is probable. A secession

vote could also create a scramble for power and retribution by marginalized tribes in
the South, while posturing by outside provocateurs and regional states could also lead
to unintended violence.

Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army could exploit violence in Sudan to cover its own
killing of civilians, as could al-Shabaab in Somalia. All could result in mass killings, and
all could require military responses.

But so could a withdrawal from Iraq, unrest in Central Asia, or cartel violence in Mexico
-- and the United States is unprepared to respond to genocide or mass atrocities in any
of these cases. Failing to respond to barbaric events of human slaughter is more than
just a matter of political will or legal authority -- it is a result of the manifest lack of
critical thinking about how military forces could respond when prevention fails.

The Obama administration has said many of the right things. The 2010 National
Security Strategy proclaims the United States will "in certain instances ... use military
means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities." The Pentagon's 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review says the military will "prepare to defeat adversaries and
succeed in a wide range of contingencies," to include "preventing human suffering due
to mass atrocities." Even so, the United States has done little in the way of concrete
planning should mass violence against civilians break out.

A concept and doctrine for response is long overdue. Genocide and mass atrocities
present military planners with a unique set of challenges that have not been adequately
addressed.

Should South Sudan vote to secede, North-on-South violence is probable.

This gap leaves a critical void of information for geographic combatant commanders if
they must deliver credible military options to the secretary of defense and the president.

Fortunately, the Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project addresses these challenges
directly. Founded by Harvard professor Sarah Sewall, the MARO Project provides
operational concepts and a planning framework for military response to mass violence
against civilians.

The MARO Project joined with the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute to develop the operational concepts and planning tools, detailed in the MARO
Handbook, that are required to create a wider range of response options.

President Dwight Eisenhower famously said: "The plan is useless; it's the planning
that's important." The MARO planning framework forces planners, commanders and
policymakers to consider the distinct operational and moral challenges they will
encounter in the face of mass killing of civilians, and fleshes out the unique nuances
specific to MARO.

It's not "us against them." In MARO, victims, perpetrators, interveners, and others
(bystanders, other agencies, political missions, and NGOs) are the key figures. Making
MARO significantly more complex is that other actors can become victims, perpetrators,
or interveners; and victims can become perpetrators, and interveners can become
victims.

It is essential to understand the critical impact these intertwining relationships can have
on the scope and speed of violence or planning and carrying out an intervention.
Genocide and mass atrocities can escalate quickly (Srebrenica) and in large numbers
(Rwanda) or they can be slow and periodically flare (Darfur). In many cases,
perpetrators have sped up their killing knowing they've been discovered and will be
stopped.

Designed to be an ecumenical platform for adoption and adaptation by other militaries

and international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European
and African Unions, the MARO planning framework offers greater cooperation and a
common operational picture when planning and responding.

Perhaps most important, by providing more clarity as to the complexity of responding

militarily to mass killing of civilians, MARO may drive policymakers to pay more
attention to the value of prevention efforts and provide them with the proper resources.

The MARO Project isn't just academic. It provides practical tools that governments have
been unable to generate, but that are necessary to plan for real-world challenges like
Sudan, and it also offers a more permanent framework for future government planning
to halt mass atrocities.

Genocides don't follow bureaucratic policy timelines, they prey on them. The MARO
framework provides clarity, increases the number of credible options, naturally attracts
coalition partners, reduces decision times, and can deter perpetrators, ultimately saving
lives.

MARO must become enshrined in military doctrine to be successful. Until that time,
geographic combatant commanders should adopt the MARO planning framework, and
they can do so without policies or directives. By leading the adoption process, they
make it easier and more acceptable for international organizations and militaries to
follow their lead.

We applaud the U.S. government for taking seriously the U.S. role in preventing and
responding to genocide and mass atrocities. Prevention should always be the primary
goal, but because it sometimes fails, we implore geographic combatant commanders to
lead the way by adopting MARO now so that "never again" might become a reality.
------------------
Gbagbo Agrees to End Ivory Coast Political Stalemate (Voice of America)

The West African regional bloc ECOWAS says Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo
has agreed to negotiate a "peaceful end" to the country's political crisis without any
preconditions.

The 15-nation bloc released a statement Tuesday that said Gbagbo's forces will lift a
blockade around the Abidjan hotel where his political rival, Alassane Ouattara, has
been holed up for weeks.
The announcement came a few hours after ECOWAS head and Nigerian President
Goodluck Jonathan said the situation was deadlocked and would take time to resolve.

Raid reported

In another development, members of the Ivory Coast Democratic Party said security
forces raided the headquarters Tuesday and accused them of hiding weapons. They say
an unknown number of people were injured in the raid.

The party is part of the coalition that supported Ouattara in the November presidential
election.

ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations all recognize results showing
Ouattara as the winner of that election and have called on Gbagbo to step down

The 15-member Economic Community of West African States has threatened to remove
Gbagbo by force if he does not leave office.?
------------------
Africa's Top Flash Points in 2011 (Family Security Matters)

As has become customary with this column, this first piece of the year is dedicated to
laying out what are likely to be the leading flash points on the African continent during
2011 in something of an approximate order of their geopolitical significance, both as
security challenges and strategic opportunities.

Sudan. Without a doubt the biggest story out of Africa this year will be the break up,
whether peaceful or violent, of the largest African country of them all, the Sudan, and
the subsequent emergence of two states in its place. In less than a week, voters in the ten
states of southern Sudan as well as their fellows in the southern diaspora in the North
and abroad will go to the polls to choose if they will remain part of a united country or
secede to form their own independent state. The vote is a central feature of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which the United States helped to broker
between the Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) regime in Khartoum and rebels
from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), ending nearly half a
century of civil war that left at least two million people, mostly southerners, dead and
millions others displaced.

By every indication, the southerners will vote overwhelmingly for secession, which is
entirely comprehensible given the long-term social and political marginalization they
have endured—to say nothing of the violence they and their forefathers have suffered—
at the hands of successive northern regimes. However, between the vote to secede and
the actual independence of South Sudan, a myriad of highly contentious issues need to
be resolved between the two states which will emerge from the wreckage of Sudan,
including the highly emotive dispute over the status of the Abyei border district, which
I wrote about in this column last month. There is always the danger that, despite the
fact that it has grudgingly cooperated so far, the Khartoum regime of self-appointed
Field Marshal Omar Hassan al-Bashir will resort to violence rather than let the
southerners go free since the secession will mean the loss of more than 80 percent of the
country’s proved oil reserves, which account for some 90 percent of Sudan’s foreign
currency earnings (to say nothing of their contribution to the International Criminal
Court-indicted war criminal’s multibillion-dollar personal skimming, according to a
Wikileaks-inspired report in Sunday’s New York Times).

After the break up, which should take place in early July when the interim period
mandated by the CPA expires, the two states which emerge, South Sudan and the rump
of the northern state, will each face their own challenges. As I noted recently in The
National Interest Online, given its lack of development and other problems, a great deal
needs to be done in order to ensure that southern independence “is not followed by
state failure, bur rather that the South Sudanese, in acquiring their political
independence, have at least a fighting chance to win the battle for economic and social
development and thus achieving the security and stability which are the true raison
d’être for countenancing their secession in the first place.” As for the north, as I wrote in
another National Interest Online commentary, Khartoum’s dénouement presents “the
prospect of additional turmoil, economic collapse, radical ascendency, and even
outright state failure in a strategic region already struggling for a sustainable modicum
of stability.” In either scenario, there is the risk of renewed conflict and, possibly, an
even wider conflagration.

The former Somalia. The only reason that the former Somalia does not top this year’s
list of African “hot spots” is the scale of the potential geopolitical upheaval in the
Sudan. It is a relative thing since, in absolute terms, the southern and central parts of the
former Somali Democratic Republic are not only worse off than they were a year ago,
they also constitute the most failed state in the world, bar none. Despite the doubling of
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) force protecting, the appointment of a
new prime minister (see my analysis of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo”,
pictured above), and hundreds of millions of dollars in international assistance, the
rather ironically named “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) of Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed is not a whit closer to being the municipal government of its putative
capital, much less the “federal government” of the Somali territories. Its many
ministers, when they are not off on globetrotting tours to tell donors about all their
great plans, are good only for whiling away their days camped out in the lobby of
Mogadishu’s Nassa Nablood II Hotel—effectively the only choice left to them since
insurgents bombed the Shamo and the Muna—drinking tea and stiffing its owners for
the bill.

Despite wishful reports every few months—undoubtedly fed by the public relations
firm which one European donor government hired for the TFG—the extremist Islamist
insurgents, spearheaded by the al-Qaeda-linked Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
(“Movement of Warrior Youth,” al-Shabaab), have shown no signs of disintegrating. To
the contrary, this past year saw them operate abroad for the first time, mounting suicide
bombings on two locations in Kampala, capital of Uganda, the country that has
provided most of the AMISOM peacekeepers. The attacks, which took place during the
broadcast of the FIFA World Cup Final, left 74 dead and dozens more wounded.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding the deployment of an unprecedented multinational flotilla

against them, Somali pirates continue their predations unabated, shifting operations
and tactics in response to the naval patrols. In fact, 2010 saw the payment of a record
ransom to the marauders, $9.5 million in November for the release of the South Korean
oil tanker MV Samho Dream, as well as attacks more than 1,000 nautical miles from the
Somali coast, including the seizure last month of the Panamanian-flagged, Liberian-
owned cargo ship MV Renuar just 500 miles off the coast of India. The pirates kicked off
2011 by hijacking the Algerian bulk carrier MV Blinda and her crew of twenty-seven
some 150 nautical miles off the Omani port of Salalah from where the boat was heading
to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The latest heist brings to twenty-eight the number of
vessels the pirates currently hold along with 654 hostages.

On the positive side, this past year saw the holding of a peaceful presidential election in
the northwest region of Somaliland which, despite the conduct of a poll that
international observers acknowledged met global standards and an orderly transition to
a new administration under President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud “Silanyo,” has yet
to achieve recognition of its de facto independence (see my report on the election, which
I observed as part of the International Republican Institute delegation). Moreover, in
September, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson unveiled
a recalibrated policy for Somalia that included a “second-track strategy” of increased
engagement of the governments of Somaliland and Puntland as well as outreach to
various local authorities and other groups which oppose the extremists in southern and
central Somalia irrespective of whether or not they are formally aligned with the TFG
(see my analysis of this policy shift).

The biggest question—assuming the TFG survives that long—is what to do when its
mandate expires in August 2011. While one would think that the failure of no fewer
than fourteen of its predecessor and the TFG’s own impending ignominious end that
the international community would think twice about pursuing the same failed top-
down approach for a sixteenth time, it remains to be seen if enough courage and vision
exist, together with some basic common sense to avoid perpetuating the vicious cycle
that has only increased the level of chaos, violence, and extremism in the Horn of
Africa.

Nigeria. The populous African country as well as the fourth largest supplier of
America’s oil imports, Nigeria deserves a great deal more attention than it usual gets. It
may well get it 2011, albeit for all the wrong reasons. In a little over a week, the ruling
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) will hold its presidential nominating convention.
Seeking the nomination with all the advantages of incumbency is Goodluck Jonathan,
who acceded to the presidency this past year when his long moribund predecessor,
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, finally expired, thus saving the country from a constitutional
crisis that was a preoccupation of mine in last year’s list of brewing crises.

The problem is, as I noted in September when Jonathan announced his intentions, is
that the president’s bid for a term in his own right bucks the principle of “zoning” that,
by alternating the PDP’s standard bearer between northern Muslims and southern
Christians after every eight years (the constitutional limit is two four-year terms), has
up to now kept the fragile peace among the country’s elites and prevented presidential
elections from adding to the already nasty divisions between regions and religions. An
influential group, the Northern Political Leaders Forum (NPLF), arguing that since
Yar’Adua, a northerner, died before even completing his first term, the nod should go
to another northerner. The NPLF has thrown its weight behind a consensus candidate,
former Vice President Atiku Abubakar.

A former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, Dr. John Campbell of the Council on Foreign
Relations, recently warned that if the zoning arrangement fell apart, northern politicians
may withdraw from the PDP, fragmenting the party and the elites who have hitherto
dominated Nigeria along regional and religious lines, a development which would “not
bode well for political stability or for credible elections in 2011.” The problem is that the
last polls, in April 2007, were so marred by massive violence, fraud, and other
irregularities (see my report at the time, which includes photographs of some of the
abuses I personally witnessed), that the country can hardly afford for the vote, currently
slated for April after being originally schedule for this month, to go awry.

If the country’s electoral politics were not enough cause for concern, Nigeria has also
been experiencing an uptick in sectarian violence. Exacerbating the already fraught
communal tensions between Christians and Muslims in the central city of Jos, where up
to 1,000 people have been killed in sectarian clashes during 2010, a militant Islamist
group called Boko Haram (in Hausa, literally “[Western] book-learning is forbidden”)
set off bombs outside of several Christmas Eve celebrations, killing more than eighty
people. The group followed up with a string of attacks in the northeastern city of
Maiduguri which killed another dozen and a half people. Meanwhile, New Year’s Eve
saw the bombing of a market near military barracks in the federal capital of Abuja. No
one has yet claimed responsibility for the blast, which claimed four lives, although
President Jonathan blamed it on Islamist militants.

The potential negative impact on global and regional security should things begin to fall
apart in Nigeria can hardly be understated.

Côte d’Ivoire. While this is the African crisis that is currently in the headlines—I have
given more than three dozen interviews since Christmas on this topic alone—it ranks
fourth on this list because the potential fallout, while undoubtedly grave, would not
amount to the geopolitical earthquake that the preceding three would constitute should
things go very wrong. That being said, it is nonetheless a tragedy the year that was
supposed to be Côte d’Ivoire’s “année de la paix” may well see the restart of the
country’s civil war, with potentially devastating impacts on neighboring countries,
global commodities markets, and the credibility of international organizations from the
United Nations to the African Union to the subregional Economical Community of
West African States (ECOWAS).

Despite the fact that many of the conditions stipulated in the 2007 Ouagadougou peace
accords—including the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the rebel
Forces Nouvelles (FN) and the reestablishment of the civil administration throughout
the country (see my report nearly four years ago on the deal)—had yet to be met, much
less that some of the issues at the root of the civil war that broke out in 2002 had even
begun to be addressed, the international community pushed for elections this past year.
The first round in October had incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo, whose primary
base of support is among the mainly Christian southern part of the country, leading
American-educated former International Monetary Fund executive Alassane Ouattara
38 percent to 32 percent. In the runoff at the end of November, the tally announced by
the opposition-dominated Independent Electoral Commission gave Ouattara a 54.1
percent to 45.9 percent victory over Gbagbo, a result which the Constitutional Council,
led by a Gbagbo ally, overruled, disqualifying for reasons of alleged fraud votes from a
number of constituencies in the FN-controlled northern part of the country and giving
the incumbent a 51.5 percent to 48.5 percent win. The United Nations, ECOWAS, and
most Western nations endorsed the initial electoral commission results favoring
Ouattara, although some experts, including veteran Senegalese statesman, Pierre Sané,
former secretary-general of Amnesty International, raised serious questions about it.

Since then, the situation has quickly spiraled. Both men have proclaimed themselves
head of state of the West African country that produces some 40 percent of the world’s
cocoa. For now, Ouattara is barricaded inside Abidjan’s Golf Hotel, protected by UN
peacekeepers, while Gbagbo, retaining the allegiance of the military and civil service,
remains in control of most of the southern part of the country. Ouattara gained the
support of the FN rebels, who still control the northern part of the country, by
appointing their leader, Guillaume Soro, as his prime minister.

Just before Christmas, an emergency ECOWAS summit resulted in a ultimatum that

Gbagbo give up power or be removed by force by the subregional group, a threat that it
would be hard pressed to actually follow through on, even if the political consensus for
it was not already dissipating (Ghana’s democratically-elected government has already
stated it will not participate in a military intervention, joining The Gambia’s eccentric
ruler in breaking ranks on the decision). Various UN officials have added to the
tensions by sounding alarms about “genocide.” A three-man delegation from ECOWAS
—Presidents Thomas Yayi Boni of Benin, Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone, and Pedro
Pires of Cape Verde—together with the African Union envoy, Prime Minister Raila
Odinga of Kenya, met with Gbagbo on Monday, but were unsuccessful in convincing
him to cede power.
While the threat of intervention does create pressure, there are serious doubts about
whether ECOWAS is capable of actually making good on it. None of the ECOWAS
countries has anything approaching the ability to provide real-time operational
intelligence on the whereabouts at any given moment of the Ivorian leader or his closest
collaborators, much less the type of elite commando units capable of carrying out such a
“decapitation strike” on the regime. That leaves the less-than-desirable option of
mounting a full-scale invasion of the sort that would inevitably involve urban fighting
and civilian casualties. It is not clear that any West African countries are prepared for
that, especially Nigeria, which has an estimated two million citizens living in Côte
d’Ivoire, most of whom are small traders and entrepreneurs. So far, these civilians have
not been specifically targeted, but they could well be if there is a military intervention.

Even if somehow the political agreement could be reached among the West African
states for a military operation, there are serious doubts that ECOWAS could actually
carry it out. First, there is the question of where ECOWAS would actually find the
troops with which to intervene given that it has already committed its best personnel
elsewhere on various UN peacekeeping operations. Second, even if the troops were
found for an intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, how would they get to Abidjan? The type of
transport capability required simply does not exist in the region. Third, even if an
intervention force made it to Abidjan, assuming Gbagbo continued to resist, would it be
prepared, both politically and operationally, to engage in pitched street battles in the
midst of a city of nearly four million people just to get to him? Would the UN forces
currently there join them? If so, what precedent would this set and how would it impact
future UN peacekeeping missions? Would either of the two military forces, the
hypothetical ECOWAS interveners and the UN peacekeepers, be prepared to protect
civilians who might be targeted in the event violence breaks out?

The problem is that the current standoff, coming on top of the nearly decade-long
division of the country by civil war which only worsened preexistent fault lines, could
very well lead to a renewed civil war, one which would almost inevitably spill over to
Côte d’Ivoire’s porous borders with its neighbors, including Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
Guinea, which have emerged—or, in the case of the latter is just exiting—from their
own crises. And even if the a peaceful resolution is found for the immediate challenge,
presumably by Gbagbo agreeing to give way to Ouattara, it is not altogether clear that,
political posturing aside, there is sufficient international interest to provide the massive
support that the new president would desperately need if he is not to simply preside
over a more gradual slide back into the same chaos.

Maghreb and Sahel. Several months ago, I voiced the concern that al-Qaeda’s franchise
in northwest Africa, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), seemed to be
“increasingly willing to make common cause with criminal elements in the interest of
both augmenting its tactical and operational capabilities and extending its strategic
reach.” Developments continue to confirm the reality of the threat.
First, it is clear that terrorist activity in the region is on the rise. Despite repeated reports
of its demise, the group continues to reemerge, even in areas it was thought to have
been cleared out, as the fact that just last month Algerian officials had to launch their
biggest offensive in several years against the militants in the Sidi Ali Bounab forests east
of Algiers underscored.

Second, alongside the increase in terrorist activity, there has been a rise in smuggling
activities in the region, involving both legal and illegal commodities, especially drugs.
The region has, in fact, become the preferred route for Latin American cartels to move
cocaine to Western Europe. While no evidence has yet emerged of AQIM getting
directly involved in the drug trafficking, considerable evidence suggests that that it has
earned money by facilitating the movement of contraband through areas under its
control. This stream of funding has not only helped to fund AQIM, but it also gives the
group the opportunity to come into contact with South American terrorist organizations
which have long been involved in the drug trade. In fact, in October, Moroccan
authorities broke up an international drug trafficking ring which they claimed proved
just that: its members had links to South American cartels as well as AQIM and were
caught transporting cocaine and marijuana between Latin America and Europe. In early
December, acting in tandem, the Mauritanian army and Malian security services broke
up another gang, arresting six major traffickers who, according to a report by Agence
France-Presse, came from the ranks of the Polisario Front, which contests Morocco’s
sovereignty over the former Spanish Sahara, and had links with AQIM.

Third, AQIM has drawn closer to al-Qaeda to point where the head of AQIM,
Abdelmalek Droukdel, in November, issued a videotape statement in which he
declared that France should negotiate directly with Osama bin Laden for the release of
the five French hostages that the North African group has held since September. The
concern among authorities is that AQIM has links with African diaspora communities
in Europe which might give it the opportunity to either carry out attacks there or allow
them to be used by al-Qaeda to do so.

In short, expect the terrorist activity, drug trafficking, and extremist networking to
continue and worsen in 2011, especially in the absence of comprehensive regional
cooperation.

Democratic Republic of the Congo. Last year, I chronicled here the misgovernment and
other malfeasance of the regime of Joseph Kabila in the rather poorly named
Democratic Republic of the Congo—the appellation is rather ironic since, after fifty
years of independence which its elites celebrated in June with lavishness the
government could ill afford, the country has yet to hold a complete set of free and fair
local, provincial, and national elections. The security and political environments have
only worsened with presidential and parliamentary elections due this before the end of
2011.
In November, a report by a group of experts mandated by the UN Security Council
essentially charged the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
(FRDC), of which the incumbent Kabila is commander-in-chief, with being a massive
criminal enterprise involved in everything from the plundering of mineral resources to
using rape as a tool of political terror. Rather diplomatically, the report concluded that
“officers at different levels of the FARDC hierarchy jostle for control over mineral rich
areas at the expense of civilian protection.” No wonder the incumbent, who for all
intents and purposes inherited his job from his warlord father, wants the United
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO) gone by the end of this year: no more inconvenient snooping and, most
definitely, a freer hand to extend his tenure.

As for the politics, it is only January, but the irregularities are already mounting. To
begin with the very existence of the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) is legally
problematic: its mandate was supposed to expire in February 2007, when the elected
parliament convened. But since neither Kabila, père or fils, ever let such niceties get in
their way, none of their followers has bothered to take care of the issue and the CEI’s
head, a priest named Apollinaire Malu Malu, has invoked “force majeure” to justify
staying on. Moreover, the calendar published for the $715 million electoral exercise is
no less problematic than the CEI’s legal standing to put out: Joseph Kabila’s current
term of office is, according to the constitution he promulgated, expires on December 6,
2011, the fifth anniversary of his inauguration; however the CEI election calendar
doesn’t envision a first-round vote until November 27, with a potential second round
on February 26, 2012. The strange calendar has left one wondering if the good abbé
intends to simply proclaim Kabila “reelected” immediately after the polls close in
November or what would happen if the incumbent failed to get a majority the first time
around.

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the little development that has taken
place has stalled with investors unsure about the security of their holdings in the
country given the predatory behavior of that the Kabila regime has exhibited over the
course of the last year, to say nothing of the upcoming political battles. In one indication
of how bad things had become, at the end of December, Vodacom, the largest mobile
telephone service provider in the Congo, announced that it was exploring the sale of its
unit in the country, which had become a significant loss-maker due to a dispute with its
politically-connected local partner, and the abandonment of the Congolese market
altogether.

With the virtually unlimited wealth of the Congo at stake and no great democratic
tradition to fall back upon, expect the fight for power to get increasingly bitter and
desperate as the year goes along with, sadly enough, the peoples of the Congolese left
to pay the price.

In addition to the flash points mentioned above, there are all too many more localized
crises which are likely to come to the fore at one point or another, including the
increasingly untenable situation in Zimbabwe, saddled with a “unity government” of
octogenarian despot Robert Mugabe and the man he cheated out of the presidency in
2008, Morgan Tsvangirai, and Kenya, which heads toward another general election with
contentious ethnic “rights” now enshrined in the constitution and some of its most
important power brokers—including Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister
Uhuru Kenyatta, Head of the Civil Service and Cabinet Secretary Francis Muthaura,
and suspended Higher Education Minister William Ruto—facing indictment by the
International Criminal Court for their part in the campaign of violence and ethnic
cleansing after the last poll (see my report at the time).

In short, over the course of the next twelve months, there will be no shortage of crises,
expected and unexpected, affecting both the well-being and security of Africans as well
as international order in general and the interests of the United States in particular. It
should nonetheless be remembered that these challenges can either pose threats or
present unique opportunities for promoting cooperation and strengthening relations—
how they are viewed will, more often than not, be a matter of strategic perspective.
------------------
UN News Service Africa Briefs
Full Articles on UN Website

Amidst efforts to solve Ivorian political deadlock, UN agencies prepare aid

4 January – Amidst efforts to solve Côte d’Ivoire’s political gridlock, UN humanitarian
agencies are gearing up to deal with the humanitarian repercussions of the country’s
ongoing crisis.

Sudan: UN in final push to deliver ballots for independence referendum in south

4 January – With preparations for next week’s independence referendum in Southern
Sudan in their final stages, the United Nations is seeking to ensure that every last voter
in the more than four-million-strong electorate will have a ballot, no matter how remote
and inaccessible the location.

Darfur: UN-African mission protects thousands displaced by recent clashes

4 January – The joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission in Sudan’s
war-torn Darfur region (UNAMID) is maintaining “a robust presence on the ground” to
ensure the safety of thousands of people displaced by recent clashes.