David Hume – Causation and

Induction
 Causation – David Hume

 Hume – lack of necessary connection

 Causation – regularity of events.
 Counter examples to the regularity account of
causation
 Problem of Induction
 What is induction?
 Hume worked with a picture, widespread in the early modern
period, in which the mind was populated with mental entities
called “ideas”.
 Hume thought that ultimately all our ideas could be traced back
to the “impressions” of sense experience. In the simplest case, an
idea enters the mind by being “copied” from the corresponding
impression.
 More complex ideas are then created by the combination of
simple ideas.
 Hume took there to be a number of relations between ideas,
including the relation of causation (E. 3.2; for more on Hume’s
philosophy in general, see Morris & Brown 2014).
 For Hume, the relation of causation is the only relation by means
of which “we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and
senses”
 Suppose we have an object present to our senses: say
gunpowder. We may then infer to an effect of that object:
say, the explosion.
 The causal relation links our past and present experience
to our expectations about the future.
 Hume argues that we cannot make a causal inference by
purely a priori means.
 Rather, he claims, it is based on experience, and specifically
experience of constant conjunction. We infer that the gun-
powder will explode on the basis of past experience of an
association between gun-powder and explosions.
 Hume wants to know more about the basis for this kind of
inference. If such an inference is made by a “chain of
reasoning” (E. 4.2.16), he says, he would like to know what
that reasoning is.
 Inference: I have found that such an object has always been
attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other
objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended
with similar effects.
 Hume: “All reasonings may be divided into two kinds,
namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning
relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning
matter of fact and existence”
 Moral reasoning = reasoning about matters of fact (no
connotation of ethics as we understand the word today)
 Demonstrative = all bachelors are unmarried men, truths
about geometry. I am identical with myself.
 Reasoning of Matters of fact
 Hume - it is impossible for it to supply an argument for the
Uniformity Principle.
 Hume - the reasoning cannot be demonstrative, because
demonstrative reasoning only establishes conclusions
which cannot be conceived to be false.
 Hume: “…it implies no contradiction that the course of
nature may change, and that an object seemingly like
those which we have experienced, may be attended with
different or contrary effects”.
 Hume: It is possible to clearly and distinctly conceive of a
situation where the unobserved case does not follow the
regularity so far observed.
 “Thus, not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the
ultimate connexion of causes and effects, but even after
experience has inform’d us of their constant conjunction,
’tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why
we shou’d extend that experience beyond those particular
instances, which have fallen under our observation.”
 The conclusion then is that our tendency to project past
regularities into the future is not underpinned by reason.
 “When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or
impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it
is not determin’d by reason, but by certain principles,
which associate together the ideas of these objects, and
unite them in the imagination”.
 Thus, it is the imagination which is taken to be responsible
for underpinning the inductive inference, rather than
reason.
 Custom, habit, animal instinct.
Reconstruction of Hume’s arguments
 Hume’s argument concerns specific inductive inferences
such as:
 All observed instances of A have been B.
 The next instance of A will be B.
 Let us call this “inference I”. Inferences which fall under
this type of schema are now often referred to as cases of
“simple enumerative induction”.
 Hume’s own example is:
 All observed instances of bread (of a particular
appearance) have been nourishing.
 The next instance of bread (of that appearance) will be
nourishing.
 Hume’s argument then proceeds as follows (premises are
labeled as P, and sub conclusions and conclusions as C):
 P1. There are only two kinds of arguments: demonstrative
and probable (Hume’s fork).
 P2. Inference I presupposes the Uniformity Principle (UP).
 1st horn:
 P3. A demonstrative argument establishes a conclusion
whose negation is a contradiction.
 P4. The negation of the UP is not a contradiction.
 C1. There is no demonstrative argument for the UP (by P3
and P4).
 2nd horn:
 P5. Any probable argument for UP presupposes
UP.
 P6. An argument for a principle may not
presuppose the same principle (Non-circularity).
 C2. There is no probable argument for the UP (By
P5 and P6).
 C3. There is no argument for the UP (By P1, C1 and
C2).
 Consequences:
 P7. If there is no argument for the UP, there is no chain of
reasoning from the premises to the conclusion of
inference I.
 C4. There is no chain of reasoning from the premises to
the conclusion of inference I. (By C3 and P7)
 P8. If there is no chain of reasoning from the premises to
the conclusion of inference I, the inference is not justified.
 C5. Inference I is not justified (By C4 and P8).
Scientific rationality and induction

 Rationality of science? – Inductive rationality?

 Karl Popper.
 Falsification.
 Testing – not verification
 Modus Tollens.