Lukas y Durán (2020) PDF

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The International Political
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Economy of cities and urbanization
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11 Insights from Latin America
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14 Michael Lukas and Gustavo DuránF1
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19 Introduction
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Entering the third decade of the twenty-first century, it has been widely accepted that Henri
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22 Lefebvre was right when in 1968 he proclaimed a coming urban revolution. Indeed, today
23 humanity is a majority urban species and by 2050 even more than three-quarters of the world’s
24 population is predicted to be living in urban areas (United Nations, Department of Economic
25 and Social Affairs, Population Division 2019). However, far more important than this quant-
26 itative aspect of global urbanization is the qualitative shift whereby, following Lefebvre, urbani-
27 zation rather than industrialization has become the major driving force of capitalist development.
28 Today, from Berlin to Santiago, from Lagos to Manaus and from Shenzen to Dubai, the world
29 is seeing a planetary construction boom, hyper-densification in global city-centers and the rapid
30 sprawling of urban peripheries, facilitated through the increasing integration and globalization
31 of real estate and finance capital. However, it is not only in and around cities where urbanization
32 unfolds. Through the construction of transnational infrastructural networks the urban fabric
33 extends into the most remote areas of planetary space. The Initiative for the Integration of
34 Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), for instance, is by far the most ambitious
35 project of infrastructure roll-out South America has seen since colonization. The construction
36 of roads, waterways, ports, energy and communications networks seeks to increase and acceler-
37 ate commodity exports (soybeans, timber and minerals, for instance) especially to the rapidly
38 growing Asian and Chinese markets. In all, 335 projects have been identified as part of IIRSA,
39 with an overall budget of US$37.4 billion.1 Of course, this already gigantic and for South
40 America unprecedented project looks tiny compared to Chinas “project of the century,” the
41 “New Silk road” where intercontinental infrastructure projects are planned to be built for up to
42 US$1.3 trillion by 2027.2
43 The issue of urbanization thus today is of ever increasing economic, political and environ-
44 mental relevance and it does not surprise that there is a renewed interest to make sense of
45 urbanization from an International Political Economy (IPE) perspective, that means to analyze
46 the dialectical relationship of planetary urbanization and global capitalist development. In this
47 chapter we focus on Latin America. Latin America is of particular interest because it has been
48 the forerunner of massive urbanization in the developing world. The region hosts some of the
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M. Lukas and G. Durán
largest mega-cities in the world and today 80 percent of its population are living in urban areas. 1
Since the times of colonial domination Latin America has been integrated into the world 2
economy as a provider of natural resources with in most countries only incipient processes of 3
industrialization throughout the twentieth century. This form of dependent development in 4
the urban realm led to what Caldeira (2017) has called peripheral urbanization, a mode of space 5
production whereby cities have been largely constructed by their residents, giving way to 6
widespread informal settlements characterizing the region’s urban condition in important ways 7
until today. With globalization and the neoliberal turn in the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American 8
cities, citizens and territories became ever deeper integrated into global capitalism and its new 9
financialized regime of accumulation. Through structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms 10
pushing free trade, liberalization, flexibilization and privatization, national and transnational 11
corporate capital not only got access to the abundant national resources in the region’s hinter- 12
lands, extending the extractive frontiers, but also began to invest heavily in the modernization 13
of all types of urban infrastructure, from super-modern highway systems, high-rise condos, 14
office parks and shopping malls, to huge gated communities on the urban outskirts. With 15
Swyngedouw (2018), what we see here is the Latin American expression a new “financialized 16
capitalist urbanity.” 17
In this chapter we provide an overview of recent research into this new financialized capital- 18
ist urbanity from an IPE perspective at the intersection of Marxist human geography, urban 19
studies, economic geography and planning theory. First, we construct a theoretical framework 20
based on the most influential theoretical approaches on capitalist urbanization: geo-historical 21
materialism, world-systems analysis and global city theory, planetary urbanization and global 22
urbanism. In the next section, we revise the recent literature on cities and urbanization in Latin 23
America based on the outlined theoretical framework. We present evidence of global city for- 24
mation in Latina America, the role of different types of megaprojects in urban restructuring and 25
coupling urban space to financialized capital circuits, discuss the fast growing literature on urban 26
financialization, especially housing, and new forms and conceptualizations of extended urbani- 27
zation, that is, the operationalization of hinterlands. In the last section we conclude that there is 28
a need to strengthen IPE research on Latin America in general and particularly the integration 29
of different theoretical perspectives to overcome a certain fragmentation. We also state that what 30
is missing in the literature is to take into account more strongly the specificity of Latin American 31
political economies. 32
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Conceptualizing the IPE of cities and urbanization: a theoretical
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framework
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In this section we present what we consider to be the most important theoretical approaches on 37
the IPE of cities and urbanization and that taken together provide a framework for the analysis 38
of the entanglements of urbanization and global capitalism in Latin America. We start with 39
David Harvey’s formulations on the urban process under capitalism since his work on capital 40
switching and the spatial fix has become a sort of common sense for the studying of the IPE of 41
cities and urbanization in the international research community. Thereafter, we present work 42
that approaches urbanization from a world-systems perspective, especially world and global city 43
theory, particularly influential in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s. Finally, we present the 44
more recently emerging work on planetary urbanization and global urbanism which seeks to 45
overcome the city-centered earlier approaches and makes urban research more relational and 46
much broader in scope, bringing together cities and hinterlands on a planetary scale. 47
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The IPE of cities and urbanization
1 The urban process under capitalism

2
3 In the 1970s David Harvey (1973) and Manuel Castells (1977) revolutionized the study of
4 urbanization: ever since “the city was no longer to be interpreted as a social ecology, subject to
5 natural forces inherent in the dynamics of population and space,” rather “it came to be viewed
6 instead as a product of specifically social forces set in motion by capitalist relations of produc-
7 tion” (Friedmann 1986: 69). Especially Harvey (1973; 1978; 1982/2006) with his theoretical
8 work on the urbanization of capital created a whole new field from where until today some of
9 the most intriguing insights into capitalist urbanization can be drawn. In his geo-historical mate-
10 rialism, Harvey (1978) analyzes “the urban process under capitalism” based on Marx’ theory of
11 capitalist accumulation and class struggle and develops three major concepts of interest here: the
12 three circuits of capital, capital switching and the spatial fix.
13 In his dialectical analysis of “the structure of flows within a system of production and realiza-
14 tion of value” (ibid.: 103), Harvey identifies three closely interwoven but distinct circuits of
15 capital. The primary circuit is that of commodity production where capitalists create surplus
16 value through the exploitation of labor power and the organization of the work process. Due to
17 inner contradictions of the capitalist mode of production there is a tendency towards overac-
18 cumulation at the level of the primary circuit, that means, that “too much capital is produced in
19 aggregate relative to the opportunities to employ that capital” (ibid.: 106). Particularly in times
20 of overaccumulation, capital is being switched from the primary to the secondary (or tertiary3)
21 circuit, which is made up of urban infrastructure and what he calls the built environment:
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23 a vast, humanly created resource system, comprising use values embedded in the physical
24 landscape, which can be utilized for production, exchange and consumption … [and] com-
25 prises a whole host of diverse elements: factories, dams, offices, shops, warehouses, roads,
26 railways, docks, power stations, water supply and sewage disposal systems, schools, hos-
27 pitals, parks, cinemas, restaurants – the list is endless.
28 (Harvey 1982/2000: 233)
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30 An important aspect of the built environment is that it is “essential to both creating and
31 storing surplus value” (Aalbers 2019: 15). It is essential to the creation of surplus value in the sense
32 that industrial commodity production needs a particular physical infrastructure of fixed assets
33 within and through that the production, exchange and consumption processes take place. When
34 the factory system appeared in the nineteenth century, cities such as Manchester and London
35 were the first to be adjusted to make space for the physical infrastructure of a new mode of
36 production (and reproduction). Today, in the time of late capitalism and postmodern consumer
37 culture, the ruins of industrial capitalism (warehouses, ports, railway stations) are transformed
38 into lofts, cultural centers and new consumption spaces. Similarly, as global capitalism in the
39 1970s turned towards a new international division of labor and complex global production net-
40 works, in cities around the world new physical infrastructure had to be installed to host and
41 spatially organize this new round of capitalist modernization in global city-centers. Second, the
42 built environment is essential for storing and investing surplus value, both in times of “regular”
43 capitalist accumulation and when capital seeks an (ultimately impossible) solution to the problem
44 of overaccumulation. Surplus capital is flowing into real estate production and the construction
45 industry, that means into fixed assets and the creation of new spatial configurations. Because for
46 individual capitalists it is very difficult to organize this kind of “spatial fix” to capital’s crisis tend-
47 ency, what is needed is a functioning capital market for the expansion of credit and fictitious
48 capital and state institutions that together work, in the words of Harvey, as “a kind of collective
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nerve center governing and mediating the relations between the primary and secondary circuits 1
of capital” (Harvey 1978: 107). As Harvey (1978; 1982; 2011) and many other authors follow- 2
ing in his line (Wu 1997; Christophers 2011; Shin and Kim 2015) have shown, these spatial fixes 3
take place at different moments and at different spatial scales, from city-regions, to national 4
urban systems, to the planetary scale. 5
To explain the principles of capital switching and the spatial fix, Harvey (1978; 2011) himself 6
has given various historical–empirical examples, from the large-scale transformation of Second 7
Empire Paris under Baron Haussmann in the nineteenth century, over Robert Moses “meat 8
axe-urbanism” in New York and the subsequent generalization of suburbanization in the United 9
States. It was through credit-financed construction of highways and other large-scale infrastruc- 10
ture projects that Moses ushered in “the total re-engineering (using new construction technolo- 11
gies pioneered during the war) not just the city but the whole metropolitan region” and “defined 12
a way to absorb the capital and labor surpluses profitably … where would the capital sur-plus 13
have gone had it not been for the making of the New York metropolitan region, Chicago, Los 14
Angeles and other places of their ilk after 1945?” (Harvey 2011: 169). Thus, in the United States 15
an overaccumulation crisis (the Great Depression) necessitated a new spatial fix initiated by 16
government infrastructure and housing programs, and then developed a life of its own as a “sub- 17
urban way of life” which provided for many years of economic prosperity and political stability. 18
Neither Paris nor New York nor suburbanization generalized were all about new infrastructure 19
and buildings for surplus absorption, but the new spatial structures established new lifestyles that 20
in turn made new products necessary: houses, refrigerators, automobiles, air conditioning and 21
much more (Harvey 2008). 22
With the crisis of the Fordist-regime of accumulation in the 1970s, “urbanization underwent 23
yet another transformation of scale. It went global. […] This transformation in scale makes it 24
hard to grasp that what may be going on globally is in principle similar to the processes that 25
Haussmann managed so expertly for a while in Second Empire Paris” (Harvey 2011: 172, 174). 26
It is this global process of the generalization of credit-financed intensification of urbanization 27
that Lefebvre (1968/2011) called an urban revolution and Merrifield (2013) the principle of 28
“Neo-Haussmanization.” The new planetary scale and scope of urbanization implies that, unlike 29
in previous rounds of capitalist modernization, cities in Asia, Latin America and parts of Africa 30
now play a central role in the absorption of capital: “These metropolitan economies are becom- 31
ing the production hearths of a new globalism” (Smith 2002: 89). Following the principle of 32
Haussmann (or Moses), credit-financed urbanization processes are now on the rise worldwide, 33
be it in Dubai, Sao Paulo, Santiago, Madrid, Mumbai, Hong Kong or London. And while 34
Chinese banks have been investing in the subprime market in the US, Goldman Sachs is active 35
in Mumbai, capital from Hong Kong in Baltimore and German real estate funds in Santiago de 36
Chile. There is a real estate boom today that spans the globe: 37
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Building booms have been evident in Mexico City, Santiago de Chile, in Mumbai, Johan- 39
nesburg, Seoul, Taipei, Moscow, and all over Europe (Spain and Ireland being the most 40
dramatic), as well as in the cities of core capitalist countries such as London, Los Angeles, 41
San Diego and New York. 42
(Harvey 2011: 173) 43
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As in previous rounds of urbanization-centered crisis strategies, the massive investments cur- 45
rently being made in the built environment are credit-financed and closely linked to financial– 46
market innovations and global neoliberalization. Only through these innovations and deregulation 47
policies in relation to capital movements, investment opportunities are comparable and available 48
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1 worldwide today, and (excess) capital can globally search for viable investment opportunities. It
2 is in that context that financialization has become one of the major research arenas in urban
3 studies and that for Soederberg and Walks (2018: 109)4 “finance is a key reason for increasing
4 inequalities” and “the key way that urbanization is supplanting industrialization as the key driver
5 of capitalist development.”
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World-systems analysis and global city networks
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9 A different entry point into the study of cities and urbanization processes in global capitalism
10 has been inspired by world-systems research.5 Distinctive of world-systems approaches is that
11 at its core lies the analysis of the integrated world economy in which the international spatial
12 division of labor is structured by core-periphery relations, that means, economic and political
13 relations that are marked by power asymmetries and unequal exchange between core and
14 peripheral economies, between developed and underdeveloped societies. In the 1960s and
15 1970s in dependency theory this general framework has been applied to conceptualize urbani-
16 zation processes and patterns in Latin America. From that perspective, the explosive growth of
17 the metropolitan cities through rural-to-urban migration was interpreted as “dependent urban-
18 ization” (Castells 1977: 40). The structure of Latin American economies characterized by a
19 high-productivity export sector, subsistence agriculture and the lack of endogenous industriali-
20 zation here lead to dependent urbanization in the form of overurbanization, new urban popu-
21 lation that could not be absorbed by the formal labor nor housing markets. As Maricato (2017)
22 states for the Brazilian context, the dependent form of Latin America’s integration to the world
23 economy meant that “industrialization and low wages resulted in urbanization and low wages,”
24 the auto-construction of housing and entire parts of the city being an important contribution
25 to the accumulation of capital throughout the period of industrialization in Latin America and
26 until today. While influential in urban studies throughout the region in the 1960s and 1970s,
27 the theories of dependent urbanization were criticized already at the time from a theoretical
28 point of view, mainly because of its extreme structuralism (Pradilla 1982) and ever since have
29 lost ground.
30 Inspired by dependency theory and Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis, urban planner John
31 Friedmann (1986) in a highly influential article pioneered the conceptualization of the role of
32 cities in the changing international division of labor that set in with the crisis of Fordist capit-
33 alism in the 1970s. In the late 1980s it had become clear that capitalist restructuring led to the
34 relocation of production processes from core western countries to peripheral economies in the
35 Global South and East, leading to production processes that were organized on a truly global
36 scale, but with a distinct geography. Friedmann (1986: 70) stated that within that new
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38 single (spatial) division of labour different localities – national, regional, and urban sub
39 systems – perform specialized roles. Focusing only on metropolitan economies, some carry
40 out headquarter functions, others serve primarily as a financial centre, and still others have
41 as their main function the articulation of regional and/or national economies with the
42 global system.
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44 Importantly, Friedmann claimed that most of “contemporary urban change” in terms of metro-
45 politan functions, labor relations and the physical form of cities are externally induced adaptations
46 to worldwide processes such as the direction and volume of “transnational capital flows,” “the
47 spatial division of the functions of finance, management and production” and “the employment
48 structure of economic base activities” (ibid.).
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It was Saskia Sassen (1991) who took the world–city hypothesis a step further by relating it 1
more directly to the emerging discourse on economic globalization. She analyzed how far “glo- 2
balization has reasserted the centrality of cities” in global capitalism (Rossi 2017: 52) and showed 3
that logistical functions and decision making power increasingly became concentrated in leading 4
global cities as New York, London, Tokyo and Paris, relying however on a hierarchically struc- 5
tured inter-urban network that also integrates second and third-tier global cities in the Global 6
South. A defining feature of global city theory is the centrality it gives to the transnational flows 7
of information, money and capital. The fact that these flows transcend national boundaries of 8
control and regulation and are managed through a cross-border network of global cities pro- 9
foundly affects economic, political and spatial aspects of urban development in many cities 10
around the world (Parnreiter 2015a: 21). 11
The restructuring of global capitalism and the heightened role for cities has had its correlate 12
in the emergence of new city functions and new city forms. For instance, with the rise of the 13
significance of advanced producer services there is a new demand for premium-networked 14
office space and on the supply side a massive influx of transnational capital into the real estate 15
and construction sector is taking place. As can be observed in cities around the world, global city 16
functions are clustering in expanding Central Business Districts (CBDs) in inner-city locations 17
and new industrial and technological districts are emerging on the outskirts of cities. In that 18
sense, new city functions, in political and economic terms, and new city forms, are only two 19
sides of the same coin of urban rescaling under globalization (Lukas 2018). In sum, global city 20
theory and global city formation works on two scales: that of the networked-hierarchy of func- 21
tional linkages between cities on the global inter-urban scale and that of socio-spatial trans- 22
formation on the intra-urban scale. On the global scale of analysis, it is analyzed in how far some 23
cities operate as the command and control centers of economic globalization, as headquarters for 24
transnational corporations and clusters of advanced producer and financial service firms. On the 25
intra-urban scale, it is analyzed how the socio-spatial configuration of cities changes with its 26
integration into the globalizing world economy.6 27
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Planetary urbanization and global urbanism
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A recent body of work of high influence in Latin America is that on planetary urbanization, 31
principally put forward by Neil Brenner (2014) and colleagues and which draws on Lefebvre’s 32
hypothesis of the generalization of capitalist urbanization and the “implosion–explosion” of 33
spaces. With this metaphor derived from nuclear physics, Lefebvre described the simultaneous 34
and dialectically related processes of agglomeration and territorial concentration of capital, 35
people and infrastructure in urban centers and metropolitan regions on the one hand (under- 36
stood as the moment of concentrated urbanization), and the dispersion of disjunct urban frag- 37
ments, infrastructures and practices throughout a previously non-urban realm, that means, 38
metropolitan hinterlands, the countryside and remote peripheral locations of planetary space 39
(understood as the moment of extended urbanization). As Brenner (2014: 17) states, 40
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the notion of implosion-explosion thus comes to describe the production and continual 42
transformation of an industrialized urban fabric in which centers of agglomeration and their 43
operational landscapes are woven together in mutually transformative ways while being 44
co-articulated into a worldwide capitalist system. 45
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This agenda has many implications for urban research and also IPE, the most important being 47
on the one hand, to overcome “methodological cityism,” that means to put cities as bounded 48
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1 entities as main research interests. As Harvey (1996; cited in Brenner 2014) said, “the ‘thing’ we
2 call a city is the outcome of a process we call urbanization.” On the other hand, planetary
3 urbanization addresses the need to overcome the urban–rural dualism, where the urban and the
4 rural as societal and territorial realms historically have been understood as separate entities and
5 not part of the same process of capitalist territorial development.
6 Rooted in the same epistemological turn towards processual and relational thinking which
7 informs the concept of planetary urbanization (and other theoretical developments as global
8 production networks), in the last decade there has been a huge output on the transnational
9 dynamics of urban policy making (McCann and Ward 2011; Baker and McGuirk 2016). The
10 focus in that literature is on the globally interconnected processes of assembling policies, plans
11 and programs and the actor networks and epistemic communities that sustain it. In empirical
12 terms, this research has shown that a tightly networked global informational infrastructure exists
13 today, through which ideas, policy fragments and best practice models are produced and dif-
14 fused. A crucial role in this circulatory process is exercised by the “global intelligence corps”
15 (Rapoport 2015: 111) of urban development expertise, consisting of a loose and expanding
16 network of politicians, planners, consultants and activists who not only mobilize ideas, practices
17 and models, but are themselves globally mobile. These “traveling technocrats” (Larner and
18 Laurie 2010), “international masterplanners” (Rapoport 2015) and “persuasive practitioners”
19 (Montero 2017) specialize in diagnosing urban problems and providing solutions to urban deci-
20 sion makers in cities that increasingly try to enhance their cities’ competitiveness and global
21 visibility. A characteristic of this emerging field of global urbanism is a strong simplification in
22 the rhetorical packaging of the problems to be addressed, the solutions recommended and the
23 policy processes that are mobilized as best practices. The network re-produces itself and its
24 knowledge at the international meetings and conferences – together with the resulting docu-
25 ments and policy recommendations – of international organizations such as OECD, World
26 Bank or UN-Habitat (Kaika 2017). The fact that UN-Habitat’s World Urban Forum in 2014
27 was held in Medellín, the Habitat III-conference 2016 in Quito and that Chilean architect Ale-
28 jandro Aravena in the same year received the Pritzker Prize indicates that Latin American cities
29 and their planners are an integral part of the global circuits of urban knowledge production and
30 policy diffusion. As Justin McGuirk (2015: 25) shows, Latin American cities and its persuasive
31 practitioners have been particularly successful in positioning themselves as oriented towards
32 issues of socio-spatial inclusion, social urbanism and participatory planning, offering a whole
33 new “urban repertoire.” From another perspective, however, they are part of the “global urban
34 intellectual and professional technocracy (that) has spurred a frantic search for a ‘smart’ socio-
35 ecological urbanity … under the banner of radical techno-managerial restructuring, the focus is
36 squarely on how to sustain capitalist urbanity so that nothing really has to change!” (Swynge-
37 douw and Kaika 2014).
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Research arenas on the IPE of cities and urbanization in Latin America
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41 In this section we present some of the major lines of research into contemporary urbanization
42 processes in Latin America. While not being exhaustive, taken together these lines might give a
43 good picture of the IPE of urbanization in Latin America. First, we present work on globaliza-
44 tion and global city formation that has been particularly influential throughout the 1990s and
45 2000s, but continues to be important today. Second, we focus on the related topic of urban
46 megaprojects. We identify four types of urban megaprojects of particular importance in Latin
47 America and that provide clues of how urban space in Latin America is plugged in to global
48 capitalism. Third, we present research on urban financialization that has burgeoned in the last
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ten years or so. Both the demand and supply sides of housing provision in Latin America have 1
changed dramatically in the last 30 years through the expansion of (mortgage) credits to ever 2
wider segments of society on the one hand and the integration of the real estate and finance 3
industries on the other. Fourth, we revise what is maybe the most stimulating field of IPE work 4
on urbanization in Latin America, that of planetary and extended urbanization and global urban- 5
ism. Here links are made between the specifically Latin American development model of neo- 6
extractivism, territorial transformations at different scales, and the political and planning dynamics 7
emerging around the extension of extractive frontiers in a world economy organized through 8
global production networks. 9
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Globalization and global city formation
12
Especially throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the study of urban development in Latin America 13
was highly influenced by the international debate on economic globalization in general and 14
global city theory in particular. Latin American authors as De Mattos (1999) and Ciccollela 15
(1999), among many others, observed the emergence of new city functions and the transforma- 16
tion of the economic base of cities leading to new urban forms and projects. In general terms, 17
from the 1990s onwards, urban transformation in Latin America has been understood as “inti- 18
mately related to the flows of foreign capital and the production of new urban objects, materially 19
and symbolically related to the process of economic globalization and the socio-cultural para- 20
digm of postmodernism” (Ciccolella 1999: 24). For cities like Mexico City, Santiago and 21
Buenos Aires the appearance of “artefacts of globalization and transformations in metropolitan 22
landscapes” (Ciccolella 1999: 13) have been described, being the major features shifting centrali- 23
ties in the form of new urban downtowns, business parks, luxury hotels and the upsurge of gated 24
communities on the urban outskirts. 25
In a highly influential study with impact in Latin America, Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor 26
(1999) grounded world and global city theory in empirical terms. Studying the world–city 27
network based on the capacity of cities to provide advanced producer services (accounting, 28
advertising, banking and law), they identified 55 world cities – which they classified hierarchic- 29
ally into alpha, beta and gamma in terms of their degree of world–city-ness – and 67 further 30
cities that showed some evidence of world–city formation. While all the alpha world cities at 31
that time were found to be located in the developed and rapidly industrializing world (New 32
York, Chicago, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Frankfurt, Milán, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singa- 33
pore), five Latin American cities were considered to be beta and gamma world cities (Mexico 34
City and Sao Paulo in the beta and Caracas, Santiago and Buenos Aires in the gamma category), 35
and the other six cities as being in a state of world–city formation (Rio de Janeiro, Bogotá, 36
Lima, Montevideo, Brasilia and Tijuana). While Latin American cities at the end of the 1990s 37
were actually in a process of articulation to the dynamic of globalization, this was taking place 38
in a secondary role, thus “in its fundamental aspects not representing big changes with respect 39
to the international division of labor that existed at the end of the Keynesian–Fordist phase” (De 40
Mattos 2010). 41
In a more recent study Parnreiter (2015a) updated the analysis of the role of Latin American 42
cities in the global economy, combining conceptual insights of global city theory, world-systems 43
analysis and the work on global production chains, also extending the indicators being con- 44
sidered in the analysis of economic centrality.7 In general terms, the study confirms the ongoing 45
exceptional importance of New York, London, Tokyo and Paris as the urban powerhouses of 46
global capitalism. Unsurprisingly, Asian and especially Chinese cities do show ever higher levels 47
of economic centrality, the most important cities in that context being Peking, Hong Kong, 48
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1 Singapore and Shanghai. With a view to Latin America, the most important cities in the region
2 were found to be Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, Santiago de Chile and Bogotá, ana-
3 lyzed in terms of the location of headquarters of transnational companies (TNCs). While being
4 marginal in terms of sales and profits of TNCs (2.5 percent of worldwide sales), it is interesting
5 that some Latin American cities show very high growth rates of sales between 2006 and 2014,
6 above all Bogotá and Medellín, with 6162 percent and 907 percent, respectively. In terms of
7 aggregated value in producer services, the second indicator analyzed, Latin American cities
8 generate 5.6 percent of all aggregated value. Here São Paulo, Mexico City, Santiago de Chile
9 and Buenos Aires lead the regional ranking. However, again cities considered as peripheral to
10 the world economy show the highest growth rates, such as San José, Santa Cruz, Montevideo,
11 Bogotá, Lima, Santo Domingo and Caracas (Parnreiter 2015a: 15). With a view to global con-
12 nectivity, the third indicator, Sao Paulo and Mexico City show very high numbers, as do, on a
13 minor scale, Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile. As alpha World Cities these urban centers link
14 major economic regions and states into the world economy. Lima, Bogotá, Caracas, Montevi-
15 deo, Rio de Janeiro, Guatemala, Panamá, San José and Quito are considered to be “beta World
16 Cities,” that means as “important world cities that are instrumental in linking their region or
17 state into the world economy.” Again, the highest growth rates are shown in smaller and less
18 central cities, such as Querétaro y Puebla, Cali, San Salvador, Cordoba, Guatemala and Lima.
19 In general terms then, what has been confirmed is that Latin American cities still play a sec-
20 ondary role in the world economy, especially with a view to formal economic power (sales and
21 headquarters),8 but are important in terms of what Parnreiter (2015a) calls organizing and glo-
22 balizing power. Especially Sao Paulo and Mexico are heavily integrated into the global city
23 network through their strong producer service sectors, but many other cities are showing strong
24 growth rates with a view to producer services and global inter-urban connectivity. However,
25 while the work on global cities highlights very important aspects of the integration of Latin
26 American cities into the world economy, it has a bias. In the words of Coe et al. (2010: 143)
27
28 an excessive concentration on APS or, for that matter, any other sector produces a carica-
29 tured view of complex organizational ecologies and sector dynamics that not only produce
30 the underlying dynamics of contemporary cities, but also enable these cities to be intercon-
31 nected and thus constitute global networks.
32
33 Especially, the crucial role of many Latin American cities for resource extraction cannot be
34 addressed, neither can the links between capital cities and their hinterlands (Scholvin, Breul and
35 Revilla Diez 2019). Here, establishing links with the emerging field of planetary urbanization
36 might be helpful, as will be developed below.
37
38
Urban megaprojects
39
40 A central insight of global city theory – and research inspired by it on Latin America – is that
41 economic globalization leads to “a [new] geography of centralities and marginalities at different
42 geographical scales” (Rossi 2017: 58). While at the global inter-urban scale some cities are much
43 more central than others to the organization of economic globalization, at the intra-urban scale
44 the dialectic of centrality and marginality – or integration and exclusion – can be seen between
45 globally integrated parts of cities, and parts of the same city that are excluded from globalizing
46 dynamics, or almost any dynamism of formal economic activity at all. As particularly important
47 vehicles for the integration of Latin American cities into the world economy, different types of
48 urban megaprojects have been identified (Lungo 2005). While there is not one definition of what
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is a megaproject, based on the existing empirical research for Latin America four types of meg- 1
aprojects can be identified (see Table 45.1): new urban downtowns, urban regeneration projects, 2
transportation and logistics projects and integrated peri-urban projects. While all four types of 3
projects are highly complex and serve multiple functions and rationales, it can be stated that new 4
urban downtowns and transportation and logistics projects are more closely related to the loca- 5
tion of new global city functions and global production networks, while urban regeneration and 6
integrated peri-urban projects have their basic purpose in capital switching and the appropriation 7
of ground rents. From a different angle, new urban downtowns and urban regeneration projects 8
are tendentially located in city-centers, while transportation and logistics and peri-urban projects 9
are part of the drivers of urban outward growth. The former two, thus, being an expression and 10
vehicle of implosion and the latter two being vehicles of the explosion of urban space. What most 11
of these projects have in common is that they invoke global imaginaries and are part and parcel 12
of the transnational circulation of policy and planning ideas. More often than not, they are based 13
on exceptional planning measures and some sort of formal or informal partnership between 14
public and private sector. Sometimes megaprojects are related to megaevents, as in the case of the 15
soccer world cup and Olympic Games in Brazil (see Box 45.1). 16
With view to new urban downtowns, Parnreiter (2015b: 22) states that 17
18
because all the financial institutions, legal and accountancy firms and business consultancies 19
that have followed their clients to Latin American, African or Asian cities require high 20
quality office spaces, and because existing inventory in the cities could neither quantita- 21
tively nor qualitatively accommodate this demand, the need to literally house the global 22
city led to the production of new downtowns. 23
24
In Mexico City for instance, one of the best documented cases of new downtown formation, a 25
new corporate geography has emerged since the 1980s when Mexico embarked on the strategy 26
27
Table 45.1 Different types of urban megaprojects in Latin America 28
29
Type Primary function Geographical location Examples 30
31
New urban Host corporate headquarters, City centre Santa Fe, Mexico City; 32
downtowns advanced producer services Avenida Paulista, 33
and other globalization Sao Paulo; Nuevas Las
34
related functions Condes, Santiago de Chile
35
36
Urban Appropriation of land rents, City centre and peri- Puerto Madero,
regeneration new consumption practices central areas Buenos Aires; el Malecón,
37
projects Guayaquil; Costanera 38
Center, Santiago de Chile 39
40
Transportation Organization of flows, Peri-central areas and Airports, Container ports;
41
and logistics transnational connectivity and peri-urban spaces highway systems, logistic
42
projects the circulation of information, parks, retail; Iranduba
goods and people University City, Manaus
43
44
Integrated peri- Appropriation of land rents, Peri-urban spaces Nordelta, Buenos Aires; 45
urban projects new consumption practices Piedra Roja, Santiago de
46
Chile
47
Source: own elaboration. 48
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1
2 Box 45.1 Porto Maravilha (Rio de Janeiro – Brazil)
3
4 Despite being the main gateway to the city for customs and the tourism industry (arrival of cruise
5 ships), the port area of Rio de Janeiro has been in constant decline for most of the twentieth
6 century. Faced with this situation, the Porto Maravilha project, a private–public operation led by
7 the Federal Government of Rio de Janeiro based on the Barcelona model of urban regeneration
8
through international megaevents, seeks to induce urban revitalization and the empowerment of
9
public space. The project covers an area of five million square meters of mostly public assets under
10
the Federal Government’s concession to the port administration Companhia DOCAS. It seeks to
11
materialize through a public–private investment alliance through the re-functionalization of the
12
territory in question, generating self-financing potential mechanisms from the private sector,
13
with state support, in this case the city of Rio de Janeiro. The overall stated objective in terms of
14
15 financial managements has been to promote economic viability in the management of urban
16 land through private investment. Contreras (2014: 11) explains that the Porto Maravilha
17 megaproject
18
19 is carried out through of the Operação Urbana Consorciada da Região do Porto do Rio de
20 Janeiro 2009 (OUCPRJ), financed through the issuance of Certificates of Additional Potential
21 of Construção (CEPACS) – necessary titles for anyone wishing to build in the port and who
22 are negotiated in the market-, issued by a fund created especially for this transaction, the
23 Imobiliário Porto Maravilha investment fund (FII PM).
24
25 To date, more than US$3,000 million have been invested by public and private actors, in addition
26 to the overall more than 13,000 million invested for the Olympic Games of 2016 (Sarue 2018).
27 The revitalization of the port area, one of the main legacies of the 2016 Olympic Games, has
28 since its inception been marked by various controversies, and public opinion has been highly crit-
29 ical about the operation. The permanent use value of many of the sites constructed for the sports
30 event has been questioned since the beginning and during the process corruption cases appeared.
31 For example, the former managers of la Caixa involved in the Porto Maravilha project were sum-
32 moned in corruption cases in Operation Lava Jato, as the construction companies Odebrecht,
33
OAS and Carioca Christiani-Nielsen are shareholders of the Porto Novo Concessionaire in charge
34
of the project. The consortium (Porto Novo among others) instrumentalized land and public
35
resources of the workers’ fund (FGTS) to take advantage of real estate bonds with a minimum
36
margin of value capture by the public sector (Contreras 2014: 12). After the Olympic Games of
37
2016 much of the sports equipment and infrastructure in fact has been abandoned and the local
38
administration is not capable of taking charge of it (as an example the sports facilities of Barra de
39
Tijuca are now abandoned). On the other hand, the public–private agreement established for the
40
41 realization of the project has suffered severe problems due to the inability of the private sector to
42 realize the committed investment committed. In reaction, the Prefecture of Rio de Janeiro has
43 transferred public resources to the Porto Novo Concessionaire (in charge of the execution) so that
44 works could be continued. This situation has alarmed public opinion, thus the Porto Maravilha
45 project highlights a general feature of urban megaprojects throughout the region and beyond,
46 that private investors seek to capture ground rents while the public sector takes the financial risk
47 and the citizens’ new public spaces do not meet real popular demand.
48
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of liberalization and globalization culminating in the NAFTA-agreement in 1994. Parnreiter 1

(2015b) in that context describes the enormous growth of downtown office space from 3.7 2
million square meters in 1997 to 7.1 million square meters in 2011, concentrated in several busi- 3
ness districts as Santa Fe, Paseo de la Reforma and Polanco, all located in the center of the vast 4
metropolitan region which is Mexico City. Especially the development of Santa Fe has been 5
spectacular; the area transformed from a garbage dump in the 1950s to a new globally connected 6
Central Business District (Jones and Moreno-Carranco 2007). The decisive factor explaining 7
that growth according to Parnreiter is global city formation and thus particularly a strong growth 8
and geographical concentration of the producer service sector: 9
10
In the last decade, financial and real estate services together increased their participation in 11
the product of the Federal District by 65.9% (from 21.4 to 35.5%) and in urban employ- 12
ment by 47.7% (from 7.7 to 11.5%) (INEGI 1999; 2009). This growth has been pushed by 13
the massive influx of global firms. In 2010, of the 175 global producer firms analyzed by 14
GaWC (Globalization and World Cities Research Network), 89 had offices in Mexico 15
City (Taylor et al. 2013). 16
(Parnreiter 2015b: 24) 17
18
While thus there is a highly increased demand of global firms for premium-networked spaces in 19
the secondary global city Mexico City, requiring an “externally induced adaptation” to world- 20
wide processes in Friedmann’s (1986) terms, this adaptation is organized locally through modi- 21
fications of the planning system. In Mexico the exceptional measures for site-specific planning 22
have been, first, the Specific Zones for Controlled Development (ZEDEC), and later the Cor- 23
ridors of Integration and Development (CIDs). What Parnreiter (2015b: 26) describes for 24
Mexico, that “the geographical orientation of planning shifted scales, from ‘planning for all’ (the 25
whole city) to ‘planning for the exceptions’, the so-called strategic projects” which relied fur- 26
thermore on concerted public–private partnership backed up by authoritarian top-down plan- 27
ning, is a very common trait of the planning for competitiveness and transnational capital in 28
globalizing cities in Latin America. 29
Probably the best-known case of urban regeneration megaprojects in Latin America is Puerto 30
Madero, the redevelopment of a 170-hectare de-industrialized waterfront located right in the 31
administrative and financial city center of Buenos Aires. In the early 1990s the site sparked the 32
interest of real estate developers and in 1992 one of its 16 old docks was used for the Exhibition 33
of the Americas and a public–private development corporation was set up. As Guano (2002: 34
188) described, 35
36
the success of the exhibition struck the imagination of investors. In no time the old ware- 37
houses were transformed into offices and lofts, which were sold in even less time for astro- 38
nomic figures. An irresistible Puerto Madero fever spread to the city’s wealthiest companies 39
and businesses and property prices escalated rapidly. 40
41
By 2009, in Puerto Madero 2.3 million square meters had been constructed and total public 42
and private investment totaled US$1.7 million. For Guano (2002) and Cuenya and Corral 43
(2011), Puerto Madero is a paradigmatic case of how urban megaprojects become symbols for 44
the world–cityness and modernity of Latin American metropolises and also the entrepreneurial 45
governance and planning logic of the neoliberal state that foments land speculation through the 46
flexibilization of planning and urban marketing, as mentioned above. Through these pro- 47
growth urban politics, over 20 years the defunct Puerto Madero site was transformed into one 48
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1 of the most expensive real estate locations in Latin America and allowed the appropriation of
2 monopoly-land rents by private developers, that is, the extraction of rents without redistribu-
3 tion (Guano 2002). Furthermore, “the Manhattan on the Río de la Plata” serves as one of the
4 most important areas for the new consumer culture of local middle classes and elites, that at
5 Puerto Madero “admire the spectacle of transnational modernity surrounding them” (Guano
6 2002: 190).
7 An example for the combination of transportation and integrated peri-urban megaprojects is
8 the northern periphery of Santiago de Chile (Lukas 2014). Especially in the Chicureo sector an
9 unprecedented modernization process of urban–regional infrastructure took place, based on
10 large private investments enacted through new planning and financing schemes. The most strik-
11 ing features have been, on the one hand, the layout of a hypermodern grid of intra- and inter-
12 urban toll roads through a system of franchising highway concessions and, on the other, huge
13 master-planned, new urbanist-style communities grouping residential, retail, recreational and
14 educational functions in a single land plot (Lukas and López-Morales 2018). It is important to
15 note that the urbanization of the former rural zone was strategically conceived and actively
16 produced by a coalition of large economic groups with access to financial capital, traditional
17 large-scale land holders and the state. While the economic groups-cum-developers since the
18 1980s bought up cheap agricultural and by-then non-urbanizable land, developing master plans
19 for their integrated peri-urban megaprojects, in 1997 the state provided a new zoning orienta-
20 tion named “conditional planning” (planificación por condiciones). This major institutional and
21 political adjustment and the production of urbanizable land for the financialized development
22 industry implied a whole new way of organizing peri-urban growth and particularly a new way
23 of linking land use and transportation planning and its financing. In fact, a toll-road was designed
24 by the land developers, subsidized by transnational infrastructure contractors and heavily subsi-
25 dized by public coffers, in essence the state enabling monopoly rents for the economic-groups-
26 cum-developers. By now, the Chicureo area has turned not only into the new upper-class
27 district of Santiago where land prices exploded, as had been conceived by the developers, it is
28 also a highly fragmented and financialized landscape that is expanding according to the rhythms
29 of financial investors as pension funds and investment trusts.
30 To sum up, the study of urban megaprojects in Latin America serves “to understand global
31 processes from a localized and spatialized perspective,” one that is largely lacking in the global
32 inter-urban accounts of the global cities literature (Moreno-Carranco 2013: 188). What has
33 been shown in urban megaproject research is that they are key instruments for the creative
34 destruction of city space, and are necessary for the spatial location of new logistical functions of
35 cities and the global organization of transnational flows of money, information and goods. Meg-
36 aprojects also work as sinks for excess capital, as sites for the appropriation of ground rents and
37 the location of new consumption spaces. Furthermore, megaprojects respond to specific mod-
38 ernizing imaginaries of political elites and the state.
39
40
Urban financialization
41
42 The described urban megaprojects are only the most iconic expressions of a massive building
43 and speculation boom in Latin America which is linked to the privatization and financialization
44 of many crucial aspects of urbanization such as (social) housing provision, highway systems and
45 natural resources such as land and water.
46 One of the major fields of financialization in Latin America is that of housing provision,
47 whereby “a shift from an incremental development process towards a large-scale speculative
48 homebuilding system” (Monkkonen 2011: 2) has taken place, very much in line with what
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Rolnik (2013) describes as “a glob al U-turn” in housing and urban policy agendas. Under the 1
driving forces of globalization and neoliberalism and highlighting the strategic role of the real 2
estate industry for economic growth, states have withdrawn from the direct provision of social 3
housing and instead installed market-based housing finance models. This, “together with the 4
increased use of housing as an investment asset within a globalized financial market, has pro- 5
foundly affected the enjoyment of the right to adequate housing” (Rolnik 2013). For Latin 6
America, the best documented cases of housing financialization through new housing policies 7
are those of Brazil and Mexico. In Brazil, the Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My Life) 8
housing program launched in 2009 is regarded a major subsidy for construction firms with view 9
to the impacts of economic crisis. It resulted “in 3.9 million units by 2014 with the goal of 10
building 27 million units by the end of 2018” and as such is considered to be “the largest home- 11
ownership and construction/mortgage subsidy scheme ever launched in the world” (Aalbers 12
2019: 4). While it has created ownership rights for households that lacked those rights before- 13
hand, thus addressing a pressing social problem similar in many other Latin American societies, 14
it also pushed low-income households into mortgage debts that in future economic crisis might 15
become an economic burden too heavy to handle. Also in Mexico the scale of subsidized 16
housing production is impressive (see Box 45.2). In the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City 17
“between 2000 and 2015, an overall number of 686.926 housing units were authorized in 409 18
different residential developments,” targeting low-income population in low-quality projects in 19
peripheral locations that often lack basic urban infrastructure (Soederberg 2015; Janoschka and 20
Salinas 2017). 21
22
23
Box 45.2 Infonavit (Mexico) 24
25
The Institute of the National Housing Fund for Workers (Infonavit) is a decentralized agency 26
founded in 1972 with the enactment of the Infonavit Law. Its goal is to guarantee the constitu- 27
tional right to the access to housing by Mexican workers. The backbone of the Infonavit system is 28
a national fund where employers contribute with 5 percent of the salary of each worker in order 29
to obtain a housing loan or the right to have their savings returned to them. To make the access 30
of housing effective, the government partnered with private developers to develop affordable 31
housing on a large scale. From 2001 to 2012, an estimated 20 million people – one-sixth of the 32
population of Mexico – took refuge in this housing policy led by the Mexican state, especially in 33
poorly equipped large-scale housing colonies on the outskirts of large Mexican cities. In a study 34
of 2010, Infonavit determined that only in the period between 2006 and 2009 26 percent of the 35
homes delivered have been abandoned. Despite this situation of abandonment and non-payment 36
of credits, the institution delivered further loans for 1.8 million homes in the following years. In an 37
investigative article the Los Angeles Times highlighted that in the period from 2001 to 2012 about 38
14.8 million housing solutions have been delivered, reaching its peak in the year 2008 (moment 39
of the financial crisis of the United States). The Mexico housing policy with Infonavit as its back 40
bone is thus an example of how the financialization of housing leads to the massive relocation of 41
the popular sectors to the urban peripheries, and is not meeting needs in terms of access to urban
42
43
infrastructure or the financial realities of workers.
44
45
But financialization does not only affect the demand-side of housing production through new 46
subsidy- and mortgage schemes, it also affects the development industry and its business and 47
location strategies. At least for Mexico, Brazil and Chile it has been described how the neoliberal 48
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1 policies of flexibilization and liberalization of capital flows have facilitated the emergence of a
2 powerful real estate and development industry (Lukas 2014; Sanfelici and Halbert 2015; Jano-
3 schka and Salinas 2017). As Sanfelici and Halbert (2015: 3) state,
4
5 in so-called ‘emerging’ countries that adopted neoliberal reforms, the role of financial
6 markets in the financing of firms increased, while, at the same time, global capital avail-
7 ability has escalated, especially in the 2000s. The development industry is no exception:
8 cash-consuming developers are eager to resort to private equity funds and stock markets to
9 boost their growth.
10 (Rouanet and Halbert 2015)
11
12 Where previously small and medium-sized real estate and construction firms operated in local
13 markets, today there is a tendency towards market concentration and vertical integration of the
14 different moments in the development process, leading to ever larger corporations and further
15 triggering the integration of real estate and finance capital. There are different ways that con-
16 centration and integration proceeds: through mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and partner-
17 ships between developers; developers partnering with international private equity firms at the
18 corporate level; developers attracting financial investors by issuing stocks and bonds; and finance
19 capital entering the direct ownership of properties or financing of specific development opera-
20 tions (Sanfelici and Halbert 2015).
21 These processes of concentration and integration with finance capital in the development
22 industry lead to “spatial oligopolies,” whereby “the real estate market has become dominated by
23 a reduced number of companies that cluster in specific cities and regions,” as Janoschka and
24 Salinas (2017: 45) describe for Mexico City.
25
26 In the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City, concentration is alarming: For instance, the
27 company Desarrollos Inmobiliarios Sadasi was granted permission for building 62,700
28 housing units in the municipality of Tecámac, equivalent to more than two-thirds of the
29 aggregate. On the other hand, in the neighboring Zumpango municipality, another big
30 player in the housing market, GEO Hogares Ideales (Casas GEO), dominates the local
31 market with 71,780 housing units approved by local authorities – nearly 80 percent of the
32 total sum. Similar concentrations exist in other municipalities, thus indicating the existence
33 of market agreements.
34 (Ibid.)
35
36 Also Sanfelici and Halbert (2015: 3) mention that “four developers were responsible for one-
37 quarter of all new housing launchings in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo” and López-Morales
38 (2016: 91) identifies in Santiago de Chile “a semi-monopoly of property-firms that control land
39 supply” in the market of urban regeneration. Another effect of horizontal and vertical integra-
40 tion is a push towards economies of scale and ever bigger development projects, the new urban
41 periphery of Santiago described above being only one of many examples, similar projects can be
42 found in the major urban centers of Brazil, Mexico and Buenos Aires. As Gasic (2018) describes
43 for Santiago de Chile, especially on the urban peripheries we see a special sort of peri-urban land
44 grabbing, whereby institutional investors buy up large-scale land banks. Here, with Harvey,
45 “the land becomes a form of fictitious capital, and the land market functions simply as a par-
46 ticular branch— albeit with some special characteristics—of the circulation of interest-bearing
47 capital. Under such conditions the land is treated as a pure financial asset which is bought and
48 sold according to the rent it yields” (1982/2006: 347).
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Extended urbanization and transnational planning 1

2
In a certain way, research on planetary urbanization and the entanglements of concentrated and 3
extended forms of urbanization has the potential to bring several of the aforementioned research 4
fields together and, at the same time, broaden and deepen the analysis of the IPE of urbanization 5
in Latin America. First of all, expanding the notion of the urban and urbanization beyond what 6
previously was the central focus of urban research, the bounded entity called city and what 7
happens within and between cities, allows for an understanding of the multi-scalar and multi- 8
dimensional aspects of uneven territorial development that is characterizing the region. With 9
the expansion of the extractive frontiers in the agro-industry, mining, fishing and forestry 10
sectors, it becomes clear that urbanization processes are reaching far beyond the confines of the 11
mega-cities and their peripheries. In a quite similar way to what has been argued in the phase of 12
the debate on dependent urbanization, Brazil Monte-Mór and Castriota (2018: 341) see a 13
“double process of industrialization and urbanization of the agrarian world,” whereby “the 14
contemporary rural submerges either in industrial processes (like agribusinesses) and their pro- 15
ductive logic, or else in urban extensive processes focused on everyday life and the quality of 16
collective reproduction” (Monte-Mór and Castriota 2018: 342). Other authors stretch “the 17
notion of extended urbanization to the mines and fields in all corners of the earth from where 18
concentrated forms of urbanization (i.e. cities and suburbs) are being provisioned” (Keil 2017: 19
176). Arboleda (2016) for instance, working on the small Chilean mining town Huasco, sheds 20
light on the operational landscapes that function as “metabolic vehicles of planetary urbaniza- 21
tion” and thus deepens the understanding of “the combined process of metropolization and 22
extended urbanization” (Monte-Mór 2014: 112). Related to this kind of reasoning and the ana- 23
lysis of the entanglements of expanding extractive frontiers and urbanization processes are studies 24
that focus on the extension of infrastructural networks and logistic chains – as the Initiative for 25
the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA in Spanish, see Box 26
45.3) – into regions that where previously not part of urban studies, such as the rainforests in 27
Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela (Kanai 2014; 2016; Wilson 2014; Wilson and Bayón 28
2017). 29
Thus, if one looks at extended urbanization as the current form of explosion of capitalist 30
investments inexorably related to the location of infrastructures in previously remote spaces, a 31
new way of understanding the urban peripheries of Latin America is opened. The enclaves based 32
on the extraction of land rent through agroindustrial, mining, oil, fishing or forestry complexes 33
are connected by increasingly ambitious plans for new roads, ports, waterways or airports 34
throughout the region. In the case of Ecuador, two emerging axes of urbanization show the 35
configuration of new nodes linked to resource extraction. In the coastal region, a new inner- 36
coastal urban axis has emerged from the existence of service cities and the commercialization of 37
agrarian goods such as bananas, rice and palm, with high rates of migration from the countryside 38
to new cities in rhythms consistent with the expansion of agribusiness that have led to extensive 39
urban peripheries. In the Amazon region, multimodal infrastructure plans are combined with 40
the expansion of capital flows in the opening of the oil, mining and agroindustrial frontiers, so 41
that small service towns have become new cities, as well as new enclave ports are boosting new 42
urbanization areas (Bayón 2019). In both cases, the new production and connectivity nodes 43
generate new forms of urbanization in the peripheries, new spaces of capital, that have as their 44
counterpart new forms of precarious living conditions for new urban dwellers. 45
An example of how to bring together different IPE approaches through the combined con- 46
sideration of concentrated and extended forms of urbanization and its relation to global urban- 47
ism can be derived from recent research on the territorial organization and spatial division of 48
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1
2 Box 45.3 IIRSA
3
4 The IIRSA South American Regional Integration Initiative project was formed in 2000 as an agree-
5 ment of the 12 countries of the region (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Guyana, Chile, Para-
6 guay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Surinam, Argentina and Brazil, member countries of the Union of South
7 American Nations (UNASUR)). With the support of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),
8
the Andean Development Corporation (CAF ) and the Financial Fund for the Development of the
9
Plata Basin, IIRSA includes 335 infrastructure projects worth US$37.5 billion. It seeks to enhance
10
the continents’ integration into the world economy by breaking up the geographical isolation of
11
its peripheries. As its backbone, major development corridors are projected, such as the Montero
12
Bulo Buloque Railway Bioceanic Corridor that links Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Chile, or the Campo
13
Grande highway corridor that seeks to link Sao Paulo in Brazil with Argentina, Paraguay and
14
15 Chile. Also a range of hydroelectric plants are projected in or close to environmentally fragile
16 places such as national parks and indigenous territories, areas protected by the laws of the coun-
17 tries themselves. No wonder that many of IIRSA’s projects have espoused social and environ-
18 mental conflicts. At the citizen level, indigenous communities close to these projects have been
19 identified as those most affected, such as the cases of hydroelectric plants and road development
20 in the Amazon basin, who have also established resistance to deforestation, state corruption and
21 bad practices of the private sector that executes these projects. In the southern part of South
22 America, criticisms also emerge regarding the development of monocultures that desertify and
23 exacerbate the drought of extensive territories, such as soy in Argentina. The development of
24 hydroelectric projects on the other hand generates large human displacements due to the flood-
25 ing of valleys and streams for the generation of energy, in addition to the environmental effects
26 of the energy interconnection processes (high voltage cables). However, the main threat of IIRSA
27 might be the accumulated effect of all associated activities, a definite change of the region’s
28 integration into the world economy and the subsumption of until now remote places and indi-
29 genous communities to resource extraction and capital accumulation. Unsurprisingly, the IIRSA
30 projects are highly prone to corruption so pervasive in the construction sector and, in fact, several
31 projects have been linked to the continent-wide Odebrecht corruption scandal.
32
33
34
35 labor of the transnational mining industry in Chile (Phelps, Atienza and Arias 2015; Lukas and
36 Brueck 2018; Vergara-Perucich 2018). There national and transnational corporations of the
37 extractive industries (such as the Chilean state enterprise CODELCO, the Chilean Luksic group
38 and the BHP Billiton, the world’s largest private mining company) operate complex logistic
39 chains that entail copper mines high in the Andean mountains in the region of Antofagasta,
40 different transport infrastructures (railway systems, road networks, pipelines) that connect the
41 mines in the hinterlands to port facilities in the coastal city of Antofagasta and shipping com-
42 panies that transport the mineral from Antofagasta to the mostly Asian markets. While the
43 region of Antofagasta thus is operationalized by the transnational extractive industries, local eco-
44 nomic development and agglomeration dynamics in the city of Antofagasta is very poor. Rather,
45 it is in Santiago where there “are signs of something of an agglomeration of mining services
46 suppliers in Santiago” (Phelps, Atienza and Arias 2015). It is a “spatially delimited quarter in the
47 capital city” that plays “the main intermediary role in the global supply chain of mining produc-
48 tion and firms can benefit from the existence of urbanization economies” (Phelps, Atienza and
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Arias 2015). Here the mining companies have their headquarters and mining suppliers and pro- 1
ducer services are concentrated. The extractive regions and their gateway cities such as Antofa- 2
gasta serve mere logistical functions for global production networks and their lead firms, while 3
command and control functions and wealth derived from research extraction are concentrated 4
in Santiago (Vergara-Perucich 2018). However, in order to make Antofagasta more competitive 5
in the attraction of advanced human capital and to pacify social protest against mining-related 6
urban precariousness and mineral pollution, in 2013 BHP Billiton set up one of the most ambi- 7
tious initiatives of strategic urban planning in Latin America (CREO Antofagasta), showing 8
emerging links between the transnational circuits of resource extraction and global urbanism. 9
10
Conclusion 11
12
In this chapter we have provided a brief overview of recent lines of research of the IPE of cities 13
and planetary urbanization, with special regard to contributions from and on urbanization in 14
Latin America. What has been addressed are the multiple ways in which Latin American cities 15
and regions are integrated into the global economy and are shaped by the latest rounds of capi- 16
talist modernization. The large metropolises that saw massive urbanization in the period of 17
import substitution industrialization (ISI in the twentieth century are still the dominating urban 18
centers, today providing global city functions for the integration of national extractive eco- 19
nomies to the world economy. Beyond these global logistical and operational functions, which 20
lead to the creation of specific sites and zones for their realization as in the form of new urban 21
downtowns, it has also been shown how the deep neoliberalization since the 1970s and 1980s 22
led to the financialization of housing supply and demand, this in turn leading to socio-spatial 23
transformation processes as the installation of megaprojects of urban regeneration, large-scale 24
low-quality housing projects and new financialized peri-urban landscapes for the appropriation 25
of ground rents on the urban peripheries. What is only recently beginning to be addressed is 26
how concentrated and extended forms of financialized urbanization are dialectically intertwined 27
and together facilitate the extraction of value and the increasing and combined assumption of 28
urban and rural space under the rule of financialized capital accumulation. 29
What, from our point of view, could significantly strengthen IPE research on cities and 30
urbanization in Latin America is its integration with theories that help to address the regional 31
specificity of its integration into the world economy. Global city formation, urban megaprojects, 32
urban financialization and extended urbanization in Latin America take place in a post-colonial 33
context of very high concentration of economic and political power and in weak democracies 34
that are characterized by the capture of the state through transnational-oriented local elites. 35
36
Footnote 37
38
1 Acknowledgements: Felipe Hernández, Manuel Bayón, Daniel Zárate, Caridad Santelices, Isaac
Araujo. 39
40
41
Notes 42
1 See: www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/initiative-for-the-integration-of-regional-infrastructure- 43
in-south-america. 44
2 See: www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/china-s-silk-road. 45
3 The tertiary capital cycle at Harvey includes social spending in relation to the reproduction of labor
power (education, health and ideological cooptation and overt repression, among others), development 46
and research. Again, the potential for productive investment is exhausted after some time, and neither 47
in this area the fundamental crisis of capitalism can be overcome (Harvey 1978: 108). 48
794
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1 4 Broadly understood, financialization is “the increasing predominance of financial instruments, practices

2 and mechanisms over the actual production of goods or services in order to yield profits” (Arboleda
2016:4).
3
5 There are different variants of the world system discussion, with maybe Braudel, Cardoso and Faletto,
4 Wallerstein and Arrighi representing the major foundational works more urbanization-centered
5 accounts were based on.
6 6 Global city theory has been criticized from various angles: the lack of real relational thinking, under-
7 standing the city as bounded entity. Another critique to global city research is that its vocabulary was
taken over by city boosters around the world. City leaders look at and cite the international rankings,
8
since to be of global relevance gives prestige to political leaders and attracts more investment.
9 However, global city theory in itself can hardly be blamed for that partial and abusive appropriation of
10 its arguments.
11 7 Parnreiter (2015b) considers three indicators in order to address the centrality of Latin American eco-
12 nomies and its major cities: first, the location of headquarters of lead firms in global production net-
works (GPN) (that informs about the geography of “formal corporate power” in the global economy);
13
second, the added value in advanced producer services (that informs about the geography of “organiza-
14 tional power”); and, third, the geography of global network connectivity as calculated by the Globali-
15 zation and World Cities (GaWC) research group which analyzes inter-urban connectivity in terms of
16 the flows of information, capital, professionals, among other aspects (and that informs over the geo-
17 graphy of “globalizing power”).
8 The most important sectors are banking and finance (with the Brazilian Banco Bradesco, Banco do
18
Brasil and Itau Unibanco Holding leading), mining and petroleum (Petrobas y Ecopetrol) and tele-
19 communications (América Móvil, former Telmex, in Mexico).
20
21
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1

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1 The urban process under capitalism

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of liberalization and globalization culminating in the NAFTA-­agreement in 1994. Parnreiter 1

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Extended urbanization and transnational planning 1

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1 4 Broadly understood, financialization is “the increasing predominance of financial instruments, practices

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of liberalization and globalization culminating in the NAFTA-agreement in 1994. Parnreiter 1