1) Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.

P, (2010) 10 SCC 259

Facts : 17 accused including 5 appellants armed with deadly weapons came from the mosque
way; stopped Chand Khan and started beating him with weapons with an intention to kill him.
After some time Zaira Banu (wife) and sons Shabir and Ashfaq tried to rescue Chand Khan.
Shabir was also assaulted, he was seriously injured and died on the spot. Ashfaq and his mother
Zaira Banu also got injuries on their persons at the hands of the accused.
Judgement: para 45 - Section 34 IPC carves out an exception from general law that a person is
responsible for his own act, as it provides that a person can also be held vicariously responsible
for the act of others if he has the "common intention" to commit the offence. The phrase
"common intention" implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan.
Para 47 -  In Gopi Nath @ Jhallar v. State of U.P., (2001) 6 SCC 620, this court observed as under:
"8.....Even the doing of separate, similar or diverse acts by several persons, so long as they are
done in furtherance of a common intention, render each of such persons liable for the result of
them all, as if he had done them himself, for the whole of the criminal action -- be it that it was
not overt or was only a covert act or merely an omission constituting an illegal omission. 
2) Aizaz v. State of U.P, (2008) 12 SCC 198
Facts : the deceased Ismail and informant Bashir Mohammad started from village Ikla Rasoolpur
for attending the meeting on a motor cycle. The deceased was driving the motor cycle while the
informant was a pillion rider. At about 12 noon when they reached near the field of Prakash
Khazoori there was a turning of the road. The deceased slowed down the speed of the motor
cycle. At that very time, all the four accused persons emerged from the field of Prakash.
Appellants Aizaz, Ahmad Hasan and Jan Alam who were armed with country made pistols fired
towards the informant and the deceased on exhortation of Imlak. Imlak was armed with spear.
The gun shot did not hit either the deceased or the informant. However, the deceased became
panicky and motor cycle fell down on the road. The deceased left the motor cycle and his
chappal and ran from the field of Khairati towards the village. All the four accused persons
chased him. Informant, Bashir Mohammad also ran towards them raising cry for help. After
pursuing the deceased for about 100 yards, the accused persons caught hold of the deceased
and pushed him to the ground. The three appellants pushed him to the ground, while appellant
Aizaz fired at the deceased on the neck. Ismail died instantaneously and blood had also fallen at
the place.
Judgement : para 7 - In most cases it has to be inferred from the act, conduct or other relevant
circumstances of the case in hand. The totality of the circumstances must be taken into
consideration in arriving at a conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to
commit offence for which they can be convicted. The facts and circumstances of cases vary and
each case has to be decided keeping in view of the facts involved. Whether an act is in
furtherance of the common intention is an incident of fact and not of law.
3) Ashok Datta Naik & Others v. State, 1979 Cri. L.J. (N.O.C) 95
4) Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961)
Facts and Judgement: Adolf Eichmann (defendant) was a German Nazi officer involved in the
internment and extermination of Jewish people during World War II. When the war ended,
Eichmann escaped to Argentina, where years later, he was kidnapped by Israeli officers and
forcibly brought to Israel for trial for war-crime charges. Eichmann challenged the Israeli court’s
jurisdiction, arguing that the court was not empowered to adjudicate the case against Eichmann
because his illegal kidnapping by Israeli agents violated international law. The attorney general
of Israel (plaintiff) contended that the legality of the means of arrest and of the transfer of a
fugitive were not relevant jurisdictional issues for the court to address. Additionally, at the time
of Eichmann’s seizure, Argentina complained to the United Nations Security Council (Security
Council), alleging a violation of Argentina’s sovereignty by Israel’s actions. The Security Council
issued a Resolution, recognizing that Israel’s conduct would disrupt international relations if the
conduct were permitted in the future, and requesting that Argentina and Israel reach an
agreement on the settlement of the dispute. As a result, before Eichmann’s indictment,
Argentina and Israel settled the issue, with Argentina clearing Israel of responsibility for any
violations related to Eichmann’s kidnapping. The Supreme Court of Israel then considered
Eichmann’s challenge to Israel’s jurisdiction.
5) Bhagwandas Keshwani v. State of Rajasthan, (1974) 4 SCC 611
FACTS: Keshwani, an employee of the N. C. C. Directorate at Jaipur, and Vishnu Kumar,
Proprietor of a Medical store, had conspired to fabricate three cash memos dated 22-5-1962,
17-6-1962, and 11-7-1962 for medicines for an amount totalling upto Rs. 31.89 which had not
been purchased at all, and, on the strength of these cash memos, Keshwani had prepared a false
medical reimbursement bill and realised this amount from the Govt.
JUDGEMENT: Para 3 - In cases of conspiracy better evidence than acts and statements of co-
conspirators in pursuance of the conspiracy is hardly ever available.
6) Bradon v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 559
7) Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571
Facts: The petitioner, John Demjanjuk, is a native of the Ukraine. Demjanjuk was admitted to the
United States in 1952 under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and became a naturalized United
States citizen in 1958. He has resided in the Cleveland, Ohio area since his arrival in this
country.In 1981 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio revoked
Demjanjuk's certificate of naturalization and vacated the order admitting him to United States
citizenship.
The district court found that Demjanjuk was conscripted into the Soviet Army in 1940 and was
captured by the Germans in 1942. After short stays in several German POW camps and a
probable tour at the Trawniki SS training camp in Poland, Demjanjuk became a guard at the
Treblinka concentration camp, also in Poland, late in 1942. In his various applications for
immigration to the United States the petitioner misstated his place of residence during the
period 1937-1948 and did not reveal that he had worked for the SS at Treblinka or served in a
German military unit later in the war. In the denaturalization proceedings Demjanjuk admitted
that his statements concerning residence were false and that he had in fact served in a German
military unit. He steadfastly denied that he had been at Trawniki or Treblinka, though
documentary evidence placed him at Trawniki and five Treblinka survivors and one former
German guard at the camp identified Demjanjuk as a Ukrainian guard.
Following the denaturalization order the government began deportation proceedings against
Demjanjuk. While these proceedings were underway the State of Israel filed with the United
States Department of State a request for the extradition of Demjanjuk. The United States
Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio, acting on behalf of the State of Israel, filed a
complaint in the district court seeking the arrest of Demjanjuk and a hearing on the extradition
request. Following a hearing the district court entered an order certifying to the Secretary of
State that Demjanjuk was subject to extradition at the request of the State of Israel pursuant to a
treaty on extradition between the United States and Israel signed December 10, 1962, effective
December 5, 1963. Bond previously granted Demjanjuk was revoked and he was committed to
the custody of the Attorney General of the United States pending the issuance of a warrant of
surrender by the Secretary of State.
8) Drewry v. Onassis, 39 N.Y.S 2d 688, 179
9) Ex parte Elliot, (1949) 1 ALL E.R
Facts: a deserter from the R.A.S.C. was arrested in Belgium by British officers accompanied by
two Belgian police officers. He was brought to this country where he was charged with
desertion and detained in Colchester barracks. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus which was
issued and on the return of the writ he submitted that his arrest was illegal because the British
authorities had no power to arrest him in Belgium and his arrest was contrary to Belgian law.
Judgement: The court has jurisdiction to try any person found within the jurisdiction for any
offence committed within the jurisdiction.The court has no power to inquire into the
circumstances in which a person is found within the jurisdiction for the purpose of refusing to
try him.
10) Ex parte Zenzo Arakawa,79 F. Supp. 468
Facts: Wayne M. Collins, George G. Olshausen, and Theodore Tamba, all of San Francisco, Cal., for
petitioners.
James P. McCormick, Asst. U. S. Atty. and Gerald A. Gleeson, U. S. Atty., both of Philadelphia, Pa.,
for
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Alien Enemy Act of 1798,[1] the President
of the United States on December 7, 1941, issued Proclamation No. 2525,[2] which concerned
Japanese alien enemies. *470 Following this proclamation, the relators were placed in various
zones within the continental limits of the United States. On July 14, 1945, the President of the
United States issued Proclamation No. 2655,[3] known as the Alien Enemy Removal
Proclamation, which provided, in part, as follows:
"All alien enemies now or hereafter interned within the continental limits of the United States
pursuant to the aforesaid proclamation of the President of the United States who shall be
deemed by the Attorney General to be dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United
States because they adhered to the aforesaid enemy governments or to the principles of
government thereof shall be subject upon the order of the Attorney General to removal from the
United States and may be required to depart therefrom in accordance with such regulations as
he may prescribe."
Judgement: Finally the relators contend that their detention and threatened removal by the
respondent are in violation of their constitutional rights. An alien enemy, in time of war, has
only those rights which are not taken away from him by the President of the United States
acting within the authority conferred upon him by law. Therefore, when a relator, hostile or
otherwise, has been detained and ordered removed from this country pursuant to executive
orders, this court is without power to review the orders or the means by or the manner in
which, he was detained and ordered removed except with respect to the question whether the
relator is other than an alien enemy. United States ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, supra, 137 F.2d at
page 900; United States ex rel. Schleuter v. Watkins, supra, 67 F.Supp. at page 565.
11) Firozuddin Basheerudin & Ors. v. State of Kerala, (2001) 7 SCC 596
Facts: The notorious criminal abdul rehman was involved in the sumggling to gold. He had two
agents hamza and aboobaker. In a consingment a abdul gave only 16000 rs to agents against the
promised sum of 25000 rs. So agents gave information of next consignment to Directorate of
Revenue Intelligence (DRI). Entire consignment was ceased and taken and agents were give
rewards. the first accused was greatly enraged by the breach of trust committed by Hamza and
Aboobacker and threatened to kill them. Thereafter a criminal conspiracy was hatched whose
aftermath was the murder of Hamza. According to the prosecution case, Hamza was shot dead at
Poinachi while he was returning from Mangalore on the night of 29.4.1989. Kasaragod Police,
after getting the telephonic message from K. Moideen Kunhi PW 13 who used to reside nearby
Poinachi, swung into action, the Sub-Inspector of Police Raj Mohan T.K. PW-87 who recorded
the information in the general diary rushed to the spot and found Hamza riddled with bullets
and lying bleeding in the driver's seat of the Maruti car. He was immediately rushed to the
Government hospital at Kasargod. PW 64 Dr. K.P. Ali who examined the injured found him dead.
PW87 took PW 6 Narayanan Nair who was present at the scene of incident to the Police Station
and recorded his statement Exh. P22 which was stated as the FIR and Crime No. 229/89 was
registered.
Judgement: Like most crimes, conspiracy requires an act (actus reus) and an accompanying
mental state (mens rea). The agreement constitutes the act, and the intention to achieve the
unlawful objective of that agreement constitutes the required mental state. In the face of
modern organised crime, complex business arrangements in restraint of trade, and subversive
political activity, conspiracy law has witnessed expansion in many forms. Conspiracy
criminalizes an agreement to commit a crime. All conspirators are liable for crimes committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy by any member of the group, regardless of whether liability
would be established by the law of complicity. To put it differently, the law punishes conduct
that threatens to produce the harm, as well as conduct that has actually produced it. Contrary to
the usual rule that an attempt to commit a crime merges with the completed offense,
conspirators may be tried and punished for both the conspiracy and the completed crime. The
rationale of conspiracy is that the required objective manifestation of disposition to criminality
is provided by the act of agreement. Conspiracy is a clandestine activity. Persons generally do
not form illegal covenants openly. In the interests of security, a person may carry out his part of
a conspiracy without even being informed of the identity of his co-conspirators. Since an
agreement of this kind can rarely be shown by direct proof, it must be inferred from
circumstantial evidence of co-operation between the accused. What people do is, of course,
evidence of what lies in their minds. To convict a person of conspiracy, the prosecution must
show that he agreed with others that together they would accomplish the unlawful object of the
conspiracy.
Another major problem which arises in connection with the requirement of an agreement is
that of determining the scope of a conspiracy - who are the parties and what are their
objectives. The determination is critical, since it defines the potential liability of each accused.
The law has developed several different models with which to approach the question of scope.
One such model is that of a chain, where each party performs a role that aids succeeding parties
in accomplishing the criminal objectives of the conspiracy. No matter how diverse the goals of a
large criminal organisation, there is but one objective : to promote the furtherance of the
enterprise. So far as the mental state is concerned, two elements required by conspiracy are the
intent to agree and the intent to promote the unlawful objective of the conspiracy. It is the
intention to promote a crime that lends conspiracy its criminal cast.
Conspiracy is not only a substantive crime. It also serves as a basis for holding one person liable
for the crimes of others in cases where application of the usual doctrines of complicity would
not render that person liable. Thus, one who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is liable
for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by every other member of the conspiracy in
furtherance of its objectives, whether or not he knew of the crimes or aided in their commission.
The rationale is that criminal acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy may be sufficiently
dependent upon the encouragement and support of the group as a whole to warrant treating
each member as a causal agent to each act. Under this view, which of the conspirators
committed the substantive offence would be less significant in determining the defendant's
liability than the fact that the crime was performed as a part of a larger division of labour to
which the accused had also contributed his efforts.
Regarding admissibility of evidence, loosened standards prevail in a conspiracy trial. Contrary
to the usual rule, in conspiracy prosecutions any declaration by one conspirator, made in
furtherance of a conspiracy and during its pendency, is admissible against each co-conspirator.
Despite the unreliability of hearsay evidence, it is admissible in conspiracy prosecutions.
Explaining this rule, Judge Hand said :"Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the
law of evidence, but of the substantive law of crime. When men enter into an agreement for an
unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another, and have made `a partnership in
crime'. What one does pursuant to their common purpose, all do, and as declarations may be
such acts, they are competent against all. (Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2nd Cir.
1926)."
Thus conspirators are liable on an agency theory for statements of co-conspirators, just as they
are for the overt acts and crimes committed by their confreres.
12) Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952)
Facts: The Respondent, Shirley Collins (the “Respondent”), filed a petition for Habeus Corpus in
United States District Court. The Respondent was in jail for murder. The Respondent alleged
that while he was living in Chicago, police officers from Michigan forcibly seized, handcuffed,
blackjacked and brought him to Michigan. The Respondent argued that this conduct violated the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Federal Kidnapping Act. The District Court
denied the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Judgement: This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436, 444, 7 S.Ct. 225, 229, 30 L.Ed. 421, that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not
impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a
'forcible abduction.' [7] No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line
of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in
court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after
a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the
Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice
because he was brought to trial against his will.
Despite our prior decisions, the Court of Appeals, relying on the Federal Kidnaping Act, held that
respondent was entitled to the writ if he could prove the facts he alleged. The Court thought that
to hold otherwise after the passage of the Kidnaping Act 'would in practical effect lend
encouragement to the commission of criminal acts by those sworn to enforce the law.' (189 F.2d
468) In considering whether the law of our prior cases has been changed by the Federal
Kidnaping Act, we assume, without intimating that it is so, that the Michigan officers would have
violated it if the facts are as alleged. This Act prescribes in some detail the severe sanctions
Congress wanted it to have. Persons who have violated it can be imprisoned for a term of years
or for life; under some circumstances violators can be given the death sentence. We think the
Act cannot fairly be construed so as to add to the list of sanctions detailed a sanction barring a
state from prosecuting persons wrongfully brought to it by its officers. It may be that Congress
could add such a sanction. [8] We cannot.
13) Goudappa and ors. v State of Karnataka, (2013) 3 SCC 675
Facts: Matrimonial discord between deceased Channappa and Kalavathi, daughter of accused
no. 1, Basappa is the cause of the crime. All the accused are brothers and reside in Village
Navalur within Dharwad District of the State of Karnataka. The deceased Channappa at that
time was chewing paan and came out of the house to spit. Accused Basappa started abusing him
alleging that he failed to keep his daughter, whereupon all the accused entered the house and
accused no. 3 Goudappa and accused No. 4 Ajjappa caught hold of the deceased and accused no.
5 Mahadevappa stabbed him with jambia over the left side of the chest. The blow was so severe
that it penetrated into the heart and liver.
Judgement: Ordinarily, every man is responsible criminally for a criminal act done by him. No
man can be held responsible for an independent act and wrong committed by another. The
principle of criminal liability is that the person who commits an offence is responsible for that
and he can only be held guilty. However, Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code makes an
exception to this principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act.
The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention, animating the
accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. It deals with the
doing of separate acts, similar or adverse by several persons, if all are done in furtherance of
common intention. In such situation, each person is liable for the result of that as if he had done
that act himself. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code thus lays down a principle of joint criminal
liability which is only a rule of evidence but does not create a substantive offence. Therefore, if
the act is the result of a common intention that every person who did the criminal act share, that
common intention would make him liable for the offence committed irrespective of the role
which he had in its perpetration. Then how to gather common intention. The common intention
is gathered from the manner in which the crime has been committed, the conduct of the accused
soon before and after the occurrence, the determination and concern with which the crime was
committed, the weapon carried by the accused and from the nature and injury caused by one or
some of them. Therefore, for arriving at a conclusion whether the accused had the common
intention to commit an offence of which they could be convicted, the totality of circumstances
must be taken into consideration.
14) Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana, AIR 2005 SC 2989
Facts: It was about 11.00 a.m. on 9.11.1989 when deceased was coming from the village after
purchasing vegetables. When he reached near the house of Janta Singh, son of Dharam Singh,
Harbans Kaur (A-1) armed with a Gandasa and Mitta Singh (A-2) armed with a lathi were
present there. Mitta made an obscene gesture. At this Mitta Singh and the deceased exchanged
hot words and abused each other. Harbans Kaur gave a Gandasi blow on the right hand of the
deceased, which caused a grievous injury. Mitta Singh gave a lathi blow on the left foot of the
deceased and also gave a thrust blow of lathi on the left side of his head. Deceased fell down on
the ground. The occurrence was witnessed by Piara Singh (PW-6) and Sitto (PW-7).
Judgement: In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to
establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind
of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of
Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but is must necessarily be before the
commission of the crime. The true contents of the Section are that if two or more persons
intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it
individually by himself.
15) The State v. Hira Dubey and Anr., (1951) 30 Pat 1264 (see no.11)
16) Breuer v. Berry, 194 Iowa 243; 189 N.W. Rep. 717, 718, 
the court remarked: "An alien in this country is a person born out of the United States and
unnaturalized under our constitution and laws. An alien enemy is a person who owes allegiance
to the adverse belligerent; a foreigner whose country is at war with the country of his
residence."
17) John Pandian v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, T.N, (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 550
Facts: In this case venkataraman was in love with sunitha but she gor married to vivek. He
developed grudge with vivek but remained near him. Veknkataraman along with his employee
contacted sivakumar contacted yusuf, Abdul Karim and ubaiadulla as they had political
background. These three contacted Jhon Pandian leader of an organization called Porur Union
Dravidar Kazhagam, in order to arrange assaissns for his purpose. He hired 3 assaissins and
they assaulted deceased Vivekanandan mercilessly with aruval and murdered him on the spot.
Judgement: In K.R. Purushothaman v. State of Kerala [2005 (12) SCC 631] a specific observation
was made to the effect that all conspirators need not take active part in the commission of each
and every conspiratorial act but, mere knowledge, even discussion, of the plan would not
constitute conspiracy.
18) Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
Facts: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Respondents, who are nonresident enemy aliens, were captured in China by the United States
Army and tried and convicted in China by an American military commission for violations of the
laws of war committed in China prior to their capture. They were transported to the American-
occupied part of Germany and imprisoned there in the custody of the Army. At no time were
they within the territorial jurisdiction of any American civil court. Claiming that their trial,
conviction, and imprisonment violated Articles I and III, the Fifth Amendment, and other
provisions of our Constitution, laws of the United States, and provisions of the Geneva
Convention, they petitioned the District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas
corpus directed to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and several officers of
the Army having directive power over their custodian.
19) K. R. Purushothaman v. State, (2005) 12 SCC 17
Facts: Chottanikkara Bhagvathy Temple at Chottanikkara is administered by Cochin Devaswom
Board. Ornament "Golaka" was used in the temple on certain special ceremonial occasions and
the other "Golaka" was used day-to-day. The Temple Board found that Golaka, which was being
used throughout the year, was rendered unfit for adorning the deity and, therefore, a decision
was taken by the Board on 13.4.82 to make a new Golaka and for the said purpose, sanction was
accorded to use 3 Kg. and 499 Gm. of gold from the gold stock available with the Devaswom but
this gold was not sufficient and permission was sought to use 1.5 kg of more gold. the work of
making the Golaka was directed to be supervised by the Assistant Commissioner of the
Tripunithura group, K.S. Chakrapani Marar, J.S., D.Cs Office., T.S. Rajan Devaswom Officer, and
other officials. the Local Fund Audit, audited the accounts of the Devaswom Board and
submitted reports before the High Court of Kerala. The first report dealt with details of loss of
gold sustained, to the illegalities in the work, and it was pointed out that wastage of 332 Gm. of
gold was un- reasonable; whereas the second report had named the persons responsible for the
loss.
Judgement: In State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Ors., JT (1999) 4 SC
106 it is observed by SSM Quadri J. at paragraph 677:
"In reaching the stage of meeting of minds, two or more persons share information about doing
an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. This is the first stage where each is said to have
knowledge of a plan for committing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. Among those
sharing the information some or all may form an intention to do an illegal act or a legal act by
illegal means. Those who do form the requisite intention would be parties to the agreement and
would be conspirators but those who drop out cannot be roped in as collaborators on the basis
of mere knowledge unless they commit acts or omissions from which a guilty common intention
can be inferred. It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from the
inception to the end of the conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time when such
intention was first entertained by any one of them and some others may quit from the
conspiracy. All of them cannot but be treated as conspirators. Where in pursuance of the
agreement the conspirators commit offences individually or adopt illegal means to do a legal act
which has a nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of them will be liable for such offences even if
some of them have not actively participated in the commission of those offences."
To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or
an act by illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the
conspirators must know each and every detail of conspiracy. Neither it is necessary that every
one of the conspirators takes active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial
acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implications. In
most of the cases, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy
is seldom an open affair. The existence of conspiracy and its objects are usually deducted from
the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the accused involved in the conspiracy. While
appreciating the evidence of the conspiracy, it is incumbent on the Court to keep in mind the
well-known rule governing circumstantial evidence viz., each and every incriminating
circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence and the circumstances proved
must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the
accused can be safely drawn, and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. The criminal
conspiracy is an independent offence in Indian Penal Code. The unlawful agreement is sine quo
non for constituting offence under Indian Penal Code and not an accomplishment. Conspiracy
consists of the scheme or adjustment between two or more persons which may be express or
implied or partly express and partly implied. Mere knowledge, even discussion, of the Plan
would not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy shall continue till the
termination of agreement.
20) Ker V. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1866)
Facts: It was the first case that brought up the abduction by United States authorities of criminal
suspects from other countries for cases in America. The case was about a man named Frederick
M. Ker who was a U.S. citizen living in Peru. He was trying to avoid the charges
of larceny and embezzlement. The US president at the time, President Chester Arthur, sent an
agent to work with Peruvian authorities to file for extradition of Ker from Peru back to the US.
However, the agent from decided to forcibly abduct Ker before the extradition was processed.
Ker fought in court saying that the US committed extraterritorial abduction.
Judgement: he grounds upon which the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked may be said to be
three, though from the briefs and arguments of counsel it is doubtful whether, in point of fact,
more than one is relied upon. It is contended in several places in the brief that the proceedings
in the arrest in Peru, and the extradition and delivery to the authorities of Cook County, were
not "due process of law," and we may suppose, although
Page 119 U. S. 440
it is not so alleged, that this reference is to that clause of Article XIV of the amendments to the
Constitution of the United States which declares that no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property "without due process of law." The "due process of law" here guaranteed is
complied with when the party is regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the state court,
has a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when, in that trial
and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he is lawfully entitled. We do not intend to
say that there may not be proceedings previous to the trial in regard to which the prisoner could
invoke in some manner the provisions of this clause of the Constitution, but, for mere
irregularities in the manner in which he may be brought into custody of the law, we do not think
he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a
regular indictment. He may be arrested for a very heinous offense by persons without any
warrant, or without any previous complaint, and brought before a proper officer, and this may
be in some sense said to be "without due process of law." But it would hardly be claimed that,
after the case had been investigated and the defendant held by the proper authorities to answer
for the crime, he could plead that he was first arrested "without due process of law." So here,
when found within the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois and liable to answer for a crime
against the laws of that state, unless there was some positive provision of the Constitution or of
the laws of this country violated in bringing him into court, it is not easy to see how he can say
that he is there "without due process of law" within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
Page 119 U. S. 444
The question of how far his forcible seizure in another country and transfer by violence, force,
or fraud to this country could be made available to resist trial in the state court for the offense
now charged upon him is one which we do not feel called upon to decide, for in that transaction
we do not see that the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States guarantee him any
protection. There are authorities of the highest respectability which hold that such forcible
abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the
jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offense, and presents no valid
objection to his trial in such court. Among the authorities which support the proposition are the
following: Ex Parte Scott, 9 B. & C. 446 (1829); Lopez & Sattler's Case, 1 Dearsly & Bell's Crown
Cases 525; State v. Smith, 1 Bailey 283 (1829); State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835); Dow's
Case, 18 Penn.St. 37 (1851); State v. Ross, 21 Ia. 467 (1866); The Richmond v. United States, 9
Cranch 102. However this may be, the decision of that question is as much within the province
of the state court as a question of common law or of the law of nations of which that court is
bound to take notice, as it is of the courts of the United States. And though we might or might
not differ with the Illinois court on that subject, it is one in which we have no right to review
their decision.
21) Lala Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2007) 10 SCC 225
Facts: Bhonr Singh in the FIR lodged by him stated that between 4 to 5 in the evening on
1.4.2000, his brother Prabhu and Raghuveer were coming back from Thanagazhi after attending
hearing of a case. When they were going from Mandawara to Talvriksha, on the outskirts of the
village, because of personal enmity, Accused had killed them by beating from lathis etc.
Judgement: Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention
can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the
proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution
has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of
mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of
Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the
commission of the crime. The true contents of the Section are that if two or more persons
intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it
individually by himself.

22) Maharashtra state Elactricity Distribution Co. Ltd. V. Datar Switch Gerar Ltd., (2010) 10
SCC 47
Facts: Pursuant to various contracts entered into between respondent No. 1 and MSEB in the
year 1993-94 for installation of “Low Tension Load Management Systems” (for short “LTLMS”),
MSEB issued a work order on 27th March 1997 whereby respondent No. 1 was required to
instal at various locations and lease out 47,987 LTLMS to MSEB . During the validity period of
the contract, various disputes arose between respondent No. 1 and MSEB. On 19th February
1999, respondent No. 1 partially terminated the contract, conveying to MSEB that it would not
install any more LTLMS, and would only maintain the installed items.
On 21st April 1999, respondent No. 1 terminated the contract in entirety. Nevertheless, they
offered to maintain the installed objects provided MSEB continued to pay rent during the
duration of the work order. As the dispute arose between respondent No. 1 and MSEBvide order
dated 5th May 1999, the High Court of Bombay referred the disputes to Arbitral Tribunal.
Judgement: It is trite that Section 34, IPC does not constitute a substantive offence, and is
merely in the nature of a rule of evidence, and liability is fastened on a person who may have
not been directly involved in the commission of the offence on the basis of a pre-arranged plan
between that person and the persons who actually committed the offence. In order to attract
Section 34, IPC, the following ingredients must be established:

“(i) there was common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan;

(ii) the person sought to be so held liable had participated in some manner in the act
constituting the offence.”
23) Mahbub shah v. Emperor, (1945) 47 BOM. LR. 941
Facts: On August 25, 1943, at sunrise, Allah Dad, deceased, with a few others left their village
Khanda Kel by boat for cutting reeds growing on the banks of the Indus river. When they had
travelled for about a mile downstream, they saw Mohammad Shah, father of Wali Shah
(absconder) bathing on the bank of the river. On being told that they were going to collect reeds,
he warned them against collecting reeds from land belonging: to him. Ignoring his warning they
collected about sixteen bundles of reeds, and then started for the return journey. While the boat
was being pulled upstream by means of a rope Ghulam Quasim Shah, nephew of Mohammad
Hussain Shah-acquitted by the High Court-who was standing on the bank of the river asked
Ahah Dad to give him the reeds that had been collected from his uncle's land. He refused Quasim
Shah then caught the rope and tried to snatch it away. He then pushed Allah Dad and gave a
blow to Allah Dad with a small stick but it was warded off on the rope. Allah Dad then picked up
the Iari from the boat and struck Quasim Shah. Quasim Shah then shouted out for help and Wali
Shah and Mahbub Shah came up. They had guns in their hands. When Allah Dad and Hamidullah
tried to run away, Wali Shah and Mahbub Shah came in front of them and Wali Shah fired at
Allah Dad who fell down dead and Mahbub Shah fired at Hamidullah, causing injuries to hint.
Judgement: Their Lordships will now proceed to consider whether the above reasoning is
correct, and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code has been rightly applied to the facts of the case.
Attention has already been drawn to the words of the section. As it originally stood, the section
was in the
following terms: When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such persons is liable
for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone.
In 1870, it was amended by the insertion of the words "in furtherance of the common: intention
of all" after the word "persons" and before the word "each," so as to make the object of the
section clear. Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The
section does not say "the common intentions of all" nor does it say "an intention common to all."
Under the section, the essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a common
intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such
intention. To invoke the aid of Section 34 successfully, it must be shown that the criminal act
complained against was done by one of the accused persons in the furtherance of the common
intention of all; if this is shown, then liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of the
persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone. This being the principle, it is
clear to their Lordships that common intention within the meaning of the section implies a pre-
arranged plan, and to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be proved
that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. As has been often
observed, it is difficult if not impossible to procure direct evidence to prove the intention of an
individual; in most cases it has to be inferred from his act or conduct or other relevant
circumstances of the case.
In their Lordships' view, the inference of common intention within the meaning of the term in
Section 34 should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the
circumstances of the case.

24) Maqsoodan v. State of U.P, AIR 1983 SC 126

Facts: On 8 6.1972 at about 5.45 or 600 a.m, when deceased with three others were going from their
house in Neem Gali, Mathura, to their Dharamshala in Mohalla Bengali Ghat, via Vishram Ghat and
reached the area called Shyam Ghat, they were waylaid by the twelve persons accused in the case
and were assaulted. According to the prosecution, the accused persons were variously armed with
Ballams, phrases and lathis. Another group of twelve or thirteen persons who were associates of the
accused was standing at Vishram Ghat and some one was constantly inciting the accused persons
with the expression, "kill, kill" whereupon the accused persons attacked and assaulted Jadon, Vijay
Kumar, Rajendra and Sulley. Jadon and P.W. 3 were severely injured. Jadon died next morning.

Judgement: Common intention is a question of fact and is subjective. It can be inferred from facts
and circumstances. In the instant case the appellants who were related to one another were armed
with deadly weapons when they waylaid and attacked the deceased and his companions, someone
incited them to "kill", and after the assault they left the scene of occurrence together and they
were arrested from the same place. There was the therefore common intention and the High Court
was justified in convicting them under s. 302/34, IPC . [52 A-C]
 25) Menchu Tum v. Montt, The Guatemala Genocide Case, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 207 (2006)
Facts: General Efraín Ríos Montt came to power in Guatemala through a coup in March 1982. A
month later, he launched a “scorched earth” operation against the country’s Ixil Maya population.
Under Ríos Montt’s dictatorship, the army and its paramilitary units systematically annihilated over
600 villages.
Armed forces cordoned off each village, rounded up the inhabitants, separated the men from the
women and then killed them all. Those who managed to escape were hunted from the air by
helicopters. The Ixil Maya faced extreme torture, mutilation, sexual violence, and violence against
their children.
Today, this dark period is referred to as the “Silent Holocaust.” Ríos Montt was Guatemala’s head of
state for just 17 months but his short reign stands out as the bloodiest period in Guatemala’s history.
In 1999, three years after the peace accords of 1996, the first efforts to hold the genocide’s
ringleaders accountable took place in Spain. The Rigoberta Menchú Foundation filed a criminal
complaint before the Spanish National Court against Ríos Montt and other senior officials. CJA joined
the case as lead counsel in 2006. In a historic move, CJA brought over 40 indigenous Guatemalans to
Madrid to testify about the atrocities they faced, marking the first time a national court had heard
evidence from Maya survivors on Guatemala’s “Silent Holocaust.”
The Spanish legal proceedings later helped form a case in Guatemala. In 2012, a Guatemalan court –
with CJA acting as a key advisor –indicted Ríos Montt on accusations of torture, genocide, forced
disappearances, state terrorism, and crimes against humanity. The trial resulted in Ríos Montt’s
conviction and he was sentenced to 80 years in prison.
This was the first time that a former head of state had been convicted of genocide by a national
court. The ruling was also the state’s first official acknowledgment that the genocide had occurred.
However, just weeks later, the judgment was overturned.
A retrial was ordered, but suspended in a ruling on May 6, 2016.  On March 31, 2017, in a separate
case, a court ruled that Rios Montt could stand trial for genocide in the Dos Erres Massacre, in which
more than 200 civilians were killed. As the national courts of Guatemala prove their intent to
prosecute grave crimes, the Spanish National Court will not likely proceed. CJA supports the efforts
of Guatemalan courts to prosecute the historic crimes that occurred within their borders.
26) Mohd. Usman Modh. Hussain, AIR 1981 SC 1062

Facts: On 11.9.1964, P.W.17, Bendre, P.S.I, who was attached to the local crime branch at Sholapur
received an information that the firm known as M. F. Maniyar &Sons was selling potassium chlorate
which is a highly explosive substance. From there shop and godowns many arms and explosives were
seized. All 4 of the accusedwere charged with he allegations against the appellants in substance
were that they agreed to do the following illegal acts; (i) to acquire and prepare explosives
unauthorisedly and to possess and supply explosives for illegal purposes; (ii) to acquire and possess
sulphur unauthorisedly and to sell the same; (iii) to acquire and possess and sell gun-powder and
cartridges in bre ach of the conditions of the licence granted under the Arms Act and Explosives Act;
(iv) to acquire and stock in clandestine godown and illegally sell potassium chlorate in breach of the
conditions of the licence granted under the provisions of the Arms Act; (v) to acquire without licence
percussion caps and to sell them illegally; and (vi) to acquire and posssess without licence poison
and to sell the same illegally. The changes were also to the above effect.’

Judgement: It is true that there is no evidence of any express agreement between the appellants to
do or cause to be done the illegal act. For an offence under section 120B, the prosecution need not
necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act;
the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. In this case, the fact that the appellants
were possessing an d selling explosive substances without a valid licence for a pretty long time leads
to the inference that they agreed to do and/or cause to be done the said illegal act, for, without such
an agreement the act could not have been done for such a long time.

27) Nachimuthu Goundan, and Anr. V. Balasubramania Goundan, (1947) Mad 425
28) Nandu Rastogi v. State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 3443

Facts: At about 6.45 p.m. electricity supply was cut off when he was sitting in his shop along with one
Shambhu Lal, his son Mukund, Manjoor Ansari, PW.1 and Shankar Rastogi (deceased) his son. Since
it was the Diwali day, candles and earthen lamps were lit in his shop and elsewhere. 15 minutes later
appellant Nandji along with his brother appellant Bal Mukund Rastogi, accused Jagdish Chamar and
two other unknown persons entered his shop armed with country made pistols. Nandji and Jagdish
caught hold of his son and took him inside to the residential apartment which is just behind the
shop, at gun point. When the informant and others wanted to intervene, they were prevented by
appellant Bal Mukund Rastogi and his companion who stood guard with country made pistols in
their hands. They threatened them to keep quiet. After Shankar Rastogi was taken inside the house
by Nandji Rastogi, Jagdish Chamar and one other unknown person, he heard the report of gun fire
followed by crying of women inside the house. An alarm was raised and the accused fled away
threatening them. When he went inside he found his son bleeding and unconscious. People who had
gathered there, took the deceased to Kudra Hospital where he was declared dead.

Judgement: The facts of this case are quite different. Appellants along with three others came armed
with country made pistols. They came together, and while two of them stood guard and prevented
the prosecution witnesses from intervening, three of them took the deceased inside and one of
them shot him dead. Thereafter they fled together. To attract Section 34, IPC it is not necessary that
each one of the accused must assault the deceased. It is enough if it is shown that they shared a
common intention to commit the offence and in furtherance thereof each one played his assigned
role by doing separate acts, similar or diverse. The facts of this case are eloquent and the role played
by Bal Mukund Rastogi of preventing the prosecution witnesses from going to the rescue of the
deceased was the role played by him with a view to achieve the ultimate objective of killing Shankar
Rastogi. We, therefore, entertain no doubt that all the five persons who came to the shop of the
informant had a common intention to commit the murder of Shankar Rastogi and they acted
pursuant to a pre-arranged plan. The facts clearly are consistent only with the hypothesis of their
acting in furtherance of a common intention. They have, therefore, rightly been convicted with the
aid of Section 34, IPC.

29) P.Pugalenthi vs State Of Tamil Nadu, MANU\TN\1625\2012

30) Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v. State of Gujrat and Anr, (2013) 1 SCC 613

Facts: They came on a Bajaj motorcycle having registration No. GJ-1-DQ-2482. At the corner of
“Satyamev Complex-I”, Opposite Gujarat High Court at S.G. Highway, they fired at one Amitbhai
Bhikhabhai Jethwa from their country made revolver on the left part of his back and caused injuries
to which he succumbed and they immediately disappeared from the scene of occurrence.

Judgement: In Ram Narayan Popli v. Central Bureau of Investigation[10], while dealing with the
conspiracy the majority opinion laid down that the elements of a criminal conspiracy have been
stated to be: (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish
that object, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons
whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by
the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where
the statute required an overt act. It has been further opined that the essence of a criminal
conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination
is framed. No overt act need be done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object of the
combination need not be accomplished, in order to constitute an indictable offence. Law making
conspiracy a crime is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by a
combination of the means. The encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one
another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been
impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The
conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any
member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design. The two-Judge Bench
proceeded to state that for an offence punishable under Section 120-B, the prosecution need not
necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agree to do or cause to be done illegal act; the
agreement may be proved by necessary implication. Offence of criminal conspiracy has its
foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention
of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means.

In the said case it has been highlighted that in the case of conspiracy there cannot be any direct
evidence. The ingredients of offence are that there should be an agreement between persons who
are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing an illegal act or for doing by
illegal means an act which itself may not be illegal. Therefore, the essence of criminal conspiracy is
an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or
by circumstantial evidence or by both, and it is a matter of common experience that direct evidence
to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after
the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused.

31) PRINCZ V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 307 U.S. App. D.C. 102

Facts: Hugo Princz, a Holocaust survivor, brought suit in the district court against the Federal
Republic of Germany to recover money damages for the injuries he suffered and the slave labor he
performed while a prisoner in Nazi concentration camps.

Judgement: 84Because the Nuremberg Charter's definition of "crimes against humanity" includes
what are now termed jus cogens norms, a state is never entitled to immunity for any act that
contravenes a jus cogens norm, regardless of where or against whom that act was perpetrated. The
rise of jus cogens norms limits state sovereignty "in the sense that the 'general will' of the
international community of states, and other actors, will take precedence over the individual wills of
states to order their relations." Mary Ellen Turpel & Phillipe Sands, Peremptory International Law
and Sovereignty: Some Questions, 3 CONN.J.INT'L L. 364, 365 (1988). Jus cogens norms are by
definition nonderogable, and thus when a state thumbs its nose at such a norm, in effect overriding
the collective will of the entire international community, the state cannot be performing a sovereign
act entitled to immunity. When the Nazis tore off Princz's clothes, exchanged them for a prison
uniform and a tattoo, shoved him behind the spiked barbed wire fences of Auschwitz and Dachau,
and sold him to the German armament industry as fodder for their wartime labor operation,
Germany rescinded any claim under international law to immunity from this court's jurisdiction. See
Belsky, Implied Waiver, 77 CAL.L.REV. at 396.

The exercise of jurisdiction over the Nazi officials at Nuremberg was by no means a single aberration
in international law. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, for certain offenses (including, but
not limited to, jus cogens violations) a state can exercise jurisdiction over an offender in custody
even if that state has neither a territorial link to the offense nor any connection to the nationality of
the victim or offender. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Sec. 404, cmt. a & Reporter's Note 1. While it is
rare for a nation to exercise universal jurisdiction, Israel asserted jurisdiction under such a theory,
among others, when it abducted Adolf Eichmann, the chief executioner of Hitler's "final solution,"
from Argentina and prosecuted him in Israel. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L
L.REP. 277 (Sup.Ct. Israel 1962). The most recent example of a prescription of jurisdiction by the
international community over jus cogens violations carried out within the confines of a state's own
territory is the United Nations' Statute of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("Statute"). Enacted as a response to the appalling atrocities committed against civilians
caught in the brutal conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the Statute vests the War Crimes Tribunal with
jurisdiction over, inter alia, crimes against humanity and genocide committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1993. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704, art. 1, at 36 (1993). The Statute
contains absolutely no indication that foreign sovereign immunity could provide a valid defense to
the exercise of the tribunal's jurisdiction. Thus the clear import of international law is to disavow a
foreign sovereign's claims to immunity where that sovereign is accused of violating universally
accepted norms of conduct essential to the preservation of the international order. In other words,
under international law, a state waives its right to sovereign immunity when it transgresses a jus
cogens norm.

32) R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 3 W.L.R .1456

Facts: Pinochet came to power in a violent 11 September 1973 coup which

deposed Socialist President Salvador Allende. His 17-year regime was responsible for
numerous human rights violations, a number of which committed as part of Operation Condor, an
illegal effort to suppress political opponents in Chile and abroad in coordination with foreign
intelligence agencies. Pinochet was also accused of using his position to pursue personal enrichment
through embezzlement of government funds, the illegal drug trade and illegal arms trade. The Rettig
Report found that at least 2,279 persons were conclusively murdered by the Chilean government for
political reasons during Pinochet's regime, and the Valech Report found that at least 30,000 persons
were tortured by the government for political reasons.

Pinochet was accused by a Spanish judge of torture, a crime under international law which can be
prosecuted in any country under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. The Spanish judge faxed an
INTERPOL arrest warrant to London and Pinochet was arrested later that evening. Pinochet's lawyers
argued that as Pinochet was head of state at the time of the alleged crimes he was immune from the
jurisdiction of British courts. The Divisional Court ruled Pinochet had state immunity.

Judgement: In showing an international intention to prohibit an express practice, such as torture, it

is not necessary that each country prohibits it in the same way, nor is it necessary that each state’s
law prohibits torture wherever it occurs. The various laws of states considered in the light of the fact
that every recent human rights treaty has prohibited torture provide evidence that customary
international law prohibited torture before the Torture Convention and that, under customary
international law, torture was an international crime if committed by a public official. There was no
head of state exception and states other than the state where the offence took place were entitled
to exercise jurisdiction.

The Torture Convention codified existing customary law norms prohibiting torture, but added a duty
to exercise the jurisdiction which existed under customary international law. No signatory to that
Convention can object to the exercise of the jurisdiction by another state as being an interference
with the signatory’s internal affairs. Accordingly, either the Torture Convention establishes that the
applicant can have no immunity from prosecution for acts of torture or alternatively the prohibition
against torture has the status of jus cogens and he can be prosecuted under customary international
law. The applicable law is the present law as evidenced by the Torture Convention. If it is necessary
to show that torture was a crime under international law in 1973 when the acts occurred that
requirement is satisfied because it was a crime under customary international law at that time. Even
if torture itself was not a crime under international law then the widespread and systematic torture
practised in Chile was a crime against humanity, as that concept has developed over the century.

International law recognises international crimes. The oldest is piracy: see In re Piracy Jure
Gentium [1934] A.C. 586. It has long been recognised that individuals may be prosecuted for war
crimes and crimes against humanity under international law. The development since the First World
War of the concept of “war crimes” illuminates the point that for some international crimes there
can be no immunity.

The definition of an international crime is a substantive question. Whether the trial should be before
an international tribunal or a national court is a procedural question. Crimes against humanity are
crimes not against a state but against individuals and are triable anywhere. Until recently there were
almost no international tribunals so international crimes could be tried only before a national court.
State practice shows that there is immunity except for international crimes, namely genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The definition of those crimes requires that they take place in
the context of an armed conflict, even if it is only an internal conflict.

The judgment of this case was controversially set aside in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) (Pinochet II) on the grounds that there was the
possibility of bias.

This resulted in a third case R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), also known as Pinochet III, which confirmed that Pinochet was not entitled to state
immunity but that acts committed outside of British territories could only be prosecuted under
national law if committed after the passing of section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

According to Amnesty International, a proponent of universal jurisdiction, certain crimes pose so

serious a threat to the international community as a whole that states have a logical and moral duty
to prosecute an individual responsible; therefore, no place should be a safe haven for those who
have committed genocide,[2] crimes against humanity, extrajudicial executions, war
crimes, torture and forced disappearances.[3]

Opponents, such as Henry Kissinger, who was himself the subject of war crimes charges in Spain,
[4] argue that universal jurisdiction is a breach of each state's sovereignty: all states being equal in
sovereignty, as affirmed by the United Nations Charter, "[w]idespread agreement that human rights
violations and crimes against humanity must be prosecuted has hindered active consideration of the
proper role of international courts. Universal jurisdiction risks creating universal tyranny – that of
judges."[5][6] According to Kissinger, as a practical matter, since any number of states could set up
such universal jurisdiction tribunals, the process could quickly degenerate into politically
driven show trials to attempt to place a quasi-judicial stamp on a state's enemies or opponents.

33) Rajaram Raghu Patil v. State, AIR 1958 Bom 469

Facts: Accused No. 1 was that on 18-9-1955 accused Nos. 1 and 2 and one Shankar Nalavade hid
themselves in a streamlet & they asked accused No. 1 to post himself in such a way that when Bapu
passed by the road, accused No. 1 should give a signal to accused Nos. 2 and 3 anil Shankar.
According to the confessional statement, accused No. 1 was asked to sit near a hillock. Accused Nos.
2 and 3 sat in hiding in a streamlet and they told accused No. 1 that when Bapu Tukaram came that
way, he should make a sign to them by show of hand. He says he saw Bapu Tukaram coming and he
signalled to them by show of hand. He says Shankar and accused Nos. 2 and 3 assaulted Bapu
Tukaram with axes and spear.

Judgement: "To attract the operation of Section 34, Penal Code, and fix constructive guilt on each of
the several accused under that section, there must be participation in action, with a common
intention, although the different accused might have taken different parts; and unlike under Section
149 before any of them can be convicted for an offence read with Section 34, the Court must arrive
at a finding as to which of the accused took what part, if any, in furtherance of the common
intention. A conviction without such finding is illegal".

34) S.A.R.L., Plaintiff, v. ARISTOTLES S. ONASSIS

The plaintiff is a French corporation. A previous action brought by it against this defendant was
dismissed by order of the Appellate Division in June, 1943, and the order and judgment of the
Appellate Division were subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals ( 266 A.D. 292, affd. 291 N.Y.
779).

The basis of the dismissal was that under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act (U.S.
Code, tit. 50, Appendix, § 1 et seq.) the plaintiff was an enemy and therefore not entitled to
prosecute an action in our courts.

35) Satyavir Singh Rathi v State Thr. C.B.I, AIR 2011 SC 1748

Facts: Pradeep goyal along with two others went to Dena Bank at Cannought Place, delhi. There they
were joined by two others. From there they started moving towards Barakhamba Road in a car then
they stopped at a red Light. Police was under the impression that one of them was Mhod. Yaseen a
very much wanted criminal by delhi police. The car was immediately surrounded by the police
officials who fired from almost all sides killing Pradeep Goyal and Jagjit Singh instantaneously and
causing grievous injuries to Tarunpreet Singh.

Judgement: Section 34 IPC carves out an exception from general law that a person is responsible for
his own act, as it provides that a person can also be held vicariously responsible for the act of others
if he has the "common intention" to commit the offence. The phrase "common intention" implies a
prearranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. Thus, the common intention must be
there prior to the commission of the offence in point of time. The common intention to bring about
a particular result may also well develop on the spot as between a number of persons, with
reference to the facts of the case and circumstances existing thereto. The common intention under
Section 34 IPC is to be understood in a different sense from the "same intention" or "similar
intention" or "common object". The persons having similar intention which is not the result of the
prearranged plan cannot be held guilty of the criminal act with the aid of Section 34 IPC. (See Mohan
Singh v. State of Punjab.) The establishment of an overt act is not a requirement of law to allow
Section 34 to operate inasmuch this section gets attracted when a criminal act is done by several
persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. What has, therefore, to be established by the
prosecution is that all the persons concerned had shared a common intention.

36) Schlueter v. Watkins, 158 F. 2d. 853

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed on behalf of the relator by his attorney, alleged: The
relator was in custody of the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization for the District of
New York. No cause for his detention or restraint had been assigned to the relator other than that
he was a native or citizen of Germany and, therefore, subject to detention under the provisions of
Title 50 of the U.S.C.A., and that the Attorney General had directed his apprehension and removal
from the United States. The detention, restraint and order of removal were illegal.

37) Shankarlal Kachrabhai And Others vs State Of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1260

Facts: The appellants who are 11 in number were accused Nos. 1 to 10 and 12 in the Sessions Court,
Mehsana. The case of the prosecution may be stated thus : In the village of Aithor there are about
300 houses of Kadva Patidars and about 15 to 20 houses of Leva Patidars. On January 16, 1961, at
about 8 P.m. seven persons, who are Leva Patidars, came to the chowk where there is a pan shop
cabin of Girdhar Shanker. These seven persons were, Rama Bhupta, Lakha Madha, Hira Punja, Jetha
Nagar, Parshottam Prabhuva, Manor Madha and Gova Shiva. At the same-time the 12 accused also
came to that place. Accused 1 to 6 were each armed with a muzzle loading gun; accused 7, 8, 11 and
12 were armed with sticks; accused 9 and 10 were armed with dharias. Accused I to 4 fired their
guns and Rama Bhupta fell down and died near the door of the cabin of Girdhar. Accused 5 and 6
fired their guns and Lakha Madha was injured. Accused I fired his gun again and Jetha Nagar received
injuries. Accused 5 and 6 fired again and Hira Punja was injured. Accused 7 to 12 were inciting
accused 1 to 6 to kill all these persons. Other specific acts were attributed to some of the accused.

Judgement: It is, therefore, clear that the criminal act mentioned in s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is
the result of the concerted action of more than one person; if the said result was reached in
furtherance of the common intention, each person is liable for the result as if he had done it himself.
The question is what is the meaning of the expression "in furtherance, of the common intention".
The dictionary meaning of the word "furtherance" is "advancement or promotion"

38) Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda V. State of Maharashtra, 1984 (4) SCC 116

Facts: Manju appears to be an extremely emotional and sensitive girl at the very behest cherished
ideal dreams to be achieved after her marriage, which was solemnised on February 11, 1982
between her and the appellant, Sharad Birdhichand Sarda. Unfortunately, however, to her utter
dismay and disappointment she found that the treatment of her husband and his parents towards
her was cruel and harsh. "she was treated in her husbands house as a labourer or as an unpaid maid-
servant". Finally she committed suicide.

Judgement: "The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be
such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved..... it must be such as to
show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

39) Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 2 SCC 793

Facts: On the ill-starred day, Hariba and Vilas set out to go to the weekly bazar at Bibi after taking
their food at about 10 or 10-30 a.m. They went to P.W. 5's office at Ghadgewadi and proceeded to
Bibi where Hariba did some shopping visiting P. W. 6 a shopkeeper and Shiva Ram, a carpenter. Later
both of them started on their way back finishing their chores. The way lay along a cart track from
Bibi to Ghadgewadi. One Dada also had accompanied them. of course, it was a day of fair and people
from the neighbouring villages going to and fro was not unnatural. While the three men were
trekking back and were at some distance from Ghadgewadi the two accused turned up from behind
and called out to Dada to stop. He obeyed and the other two went along. Thereupon the accused
are alleged to have run and overtaken the deceased and P.W. 5 at the place known as Zamanacha
Mala, Survey No. 8, Hariba, who was asked to stop, Was set upon by the two assailants. Accused No.
8 drew his knife and silenced P. W. 5 by threat of stabbing if he broke into raising alarm. Soon after,
the second accused dealt knife blows on the deceased on the head and eye-brow and accused No. 1
gave heavy strokes with a wire rope to which was attached a leaden ball described as a hunter by
the witnesses. Hariba fell on the ground and the second accused kicked him as he lay. Judgement:

40) State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, 2005 Cr LJ 3950 SC

Facts: : The genesis of this case lies in a macabre incident that took place close to the noon time on
13th December, 2001 in which five heavily armed persons practically stormed the Parliament House
complex and inflicted heavy casualties on the security men on duty. In the gun battle that lasted for
30 minutes or so, these five terrorists who tried to gain entry into the Parliament when it was in
session, were killed. Nine persons including eight security personnel and one gardener succumbed to
the bullets of the terrorists and 16 persons including 13 security men received injuries. revealed the
possible involvement of the four accused persons who are either appellants or respondents herein
and some other proclaimed offenders said to be the leaders of the banned militant organization
known as "Jaish-E-Mohammed".

Judgement: Mostly, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is
seldom an open affair. Usually both the existence of the conspiracy and its objects have to be
inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused. (Per Wadhwa, J. in Nalini's case
(supra) at page 516). The well known rule governing circumstantial evidence is that each and every
incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence and "the circumstances
proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the
accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible." G.N. Ray, J. in
Tanibeert Pankaj Kumar [1997 (7) SCC 156], observed that this Court should not allow the suspicion
to take the place of legal proof. As pointed out by Fazal Ali, J, in V.C. Shukla vs. State [1980 (2) SCC
665], " in most cases it will be difficult to get direct evidence of the agreement, but a conspiracy can
be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an
agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence." In this context, the observations in
the case Noor Mohammad Yusuf Momin vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 885) are worth
nothing: "in most cases proof of conspiracy is largely inferential though the inference must be
founded on solid facts. Surrounding circumstances and antecedent and subsequent conduct, among
other factors, constitute relevant material."

41) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Krishna Lal Pradhan, AIR 1987 SC 77

Facts: the accused had entered into a criminal conspiracy for illicitly felling trees of Kail standing on
Government land and in pursuance of the conspiracy permits for cutting of trees standing on
Government land had been obtained by making use of forged applications and that certain Revenue
Department officials and Forest Department officials had enabled the cutting of trees from
Government land by wrong demarcation of boundaries and issuance of felling permits and that the
trees so cut were being sold as timber along with timber obtained by felling of trees standing on
private land.

Judgement: In the opinion of the Special Judge every one of the conspirators must have taken active
part in the commission of each and every one of the conspiratorial act and only then the offence of
conspiracy will be made out. Such a view is clearly wrong. The offence of criminal conspiracy consists
in a meeting of minds of two or more persons for agreeing to do or causing to be done an illegal act
by illegal means, and the performance of an act in terms thereof. If pursuant to the criminal
conspiracy the conspirators commit several offences, then all of them will be liable for the offences
even if some of them had not actively participated in the commission of the offences.

42) State of MP v. Sheetla Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617

Facts: The Special Judge framed charges against the respondents on or about 29.07.1999; a sample
copy whereof reads as under: "You were working as Minister In-charge, Ministry of Water
Resources, Government of Madhya Pradesh from June 1990 to September 1992. On the
recommendatory note of Shri D.V.S.R. Sharma ignoring the letter dated 14.02.85 of the Finance
Branch of World Bank and earlier decision dated 18.02.85 according to which the case of extra lead
was to be decided within the ambit of the contract in respect of payment of extra lead to the
concerned Tender Contractors for transportation of stones used in construction work of masonry
non-flow dam upstream in Hasdeo Bango Project. You in conspiracy with the employees and Tender
Contractors accorded administrative sanction and payment of one crore two lac forty six thousand
two hundred rupees was made to the Contractors towards extra lead. Hence, you while holding the
post of public servant misusing the position of the post provided financial benefit to the Tender
Contractors without public interest.

Judgement: While saying so, we are not oblivious of the fact that often conspiracy is hatched in
secrecy and for proving the said offence substantial direct evidence may not be possible to be
obtained. An offence of criminal conspiracy can also be proved by circumstantial evidence.

One more principle which deserves notice is that the cumulative effect of the proved circumstances
should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an
isolated approach to each of the circumstances. Of course, each one of the circumstances should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the appreciation of evidence relating to the
conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious
and clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the common design and its execution."

43) State of U.P. v. Girijashankar Misra, 1985 Cr. LJ NOC 79 (Delhi)

Facts: Girja Shankar Misra bore a grudge and he conspired to get Raj Narain Mishra killed as he got
him transferred to a distant location because wife of Raj Narain had made illicit relations with Girija
Shankar Misra. While so they saw four persons, two armed with rifles and two armed with guns
coming out of the gate of Girja Shankar Misra, whose house was nearby and entering the house of
Raj Narain Mishra. They fired at the deceased who cried "run" and so crying he ran inside the house
followed by PW 1. The deceased afte passing the gallery tried to bolt the door but was unable to do
so because of the stoppers. The assailants ran after Raj Narain Mishra and one of the assailants (later
identified as Nathu Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 340 of 1984) fired at Raj Narain Mishra at
close quarters and the bullet hit him on the chest. Another assailant later identified as Girdbari, who
died during the pendency of the appeal, also fired his gun from a close range at the deceased.
Judgement:

44) State through Superintendent of police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini & others, (1999) 5 SCC 793

Facts: On the night of 21.5.1991 a diabolical crime was committed. It stunned the whole nation. Rajiv
Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India, was assassinated by a human bomb. With him 15 persons
including 9 policemen perished and 43 suffered grievous or simple injuries. Assassin Dhanu an LTTE
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam) activist, who detonated the belt bomb concealed under her waist
and Haribabu, a photographer (and also a conspirator) engaged to take photographs of the horrific
sight, also died in the blast. As in any crime, criminals leave some footprints. In this case it was a
camera which was found intact on the body of Haribabu at the scene of the crime. Film in the
camera when developed led to unfolding of the dastardly act committed by the accused and others.
A charge of conspiracy for offences under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
1987 (TADA),Indian Penal Code (IPC), Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Arms Act, 1959, Passport Act,
1967, Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933 was laid against 41
persons, 12 of whom were already dead having committed suicide and three absconded. Out of
these, 26 faced the trial before the Designated Court.

Judgement: It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the
conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so
many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may
be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which
every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be interested. There must be
unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one
another, amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may be committed by
some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant factor is that all means
adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the
conspiracy even though there may be sometimes mis-fire or overshooting by some of the
conspirators. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the
knowledge of the others it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated
with the object of the conspiracy."

45) . Subhas v. State, 1985 Cr. LJ 1807 (Cal)

46) Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406

Facts: A. On 17.10.2007 at about 7.00 P.M., Sultana Begum Khatoon (PW.8), aged 12 years, was
enjoying the celebrations of the festival of Durga Pooja alongwith her sister Sima Khatoon, aged 3
years, at the Nepali Mandir Guwahati. The appellant was alleged to have been standing behind them
at such time. After a shortwhile, Sultana Begum Khatoon (PW.8) noticed that her sister Sima
Khatoon was missing, and she also happened to notice that the appellant had disappeared as well.
Sultana Begum Khatoon (PW.8) thus began to look for her sister, and when she could not find her in
the nearby areas, she went back to her house and informed her brother Gulzar Ali (PW.3) and her
parents etc. of the said incident.

B. Apin Dulal (PW.1) and Gulzar Ali (PW.3) therefore began to search for Sima Khatoon, and while
doing so, they came across the appellant and asked him whether he had seen Sima Khatoon. The
appellant allegedly demanded a sum of Rs.20/- to pay for his evening food, in lieu of showing them
the place where Sima Khatoon could be found. Apin Dulal (PW.1) agreed to pay him the said amount
and thus, the appellant pointed to a place by the side of a municipal canal. Apin Dulal (PW.1) and
Gulzar Ali (PW.3) thus began to approach the said place, and at such time, the appellant ran away
and boarded a bus. Apin Dulal (PW.1) chased him and managed to catch hold of him, forcing him to
get off the bus. Apin Dulal (PW.1) and Gulzar Ali (PW.3) thereafter succeeded in locating the girl,
who they found gasping, wrapped in a jute-sack (gunny bag). The mouth of the bag had been closed.
Sima Khatoon was alive, but in a critical condition. She was then taken by her brother Gulzar Ali
(PW.3) to the house. The appellant was also taken there. Sima Khatoon was taken to a Nursing
Home, and then to the Guwahati Medical College where she breathed her last at about 1.30 A.M.
i.e., in the intervening night of 17/18.10.2007.
Judgement: In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 2773, this Court observed as
under: "Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in
criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case one pointing to
the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases where in the guilt of the accused is
sought to be established by circumstantial evidence."

In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622, this Court held as under: The
facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. There
should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The
circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. There must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of
the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the
accused."

In M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200, this Court held, that if the circumstances
proved in a case are consistent either with the innocence of the accused, or with his guilt, then the
accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. When it is held that a certain fact has been proved, then
the question that arises is whether such a fact leads to the inference of guilt on the part of the
accused person or not, and in dealing with this aspect of the problem, benefit of doubt must be
given to the accused, and a final inference of guilt against him must be drawn only if the proved fact
is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, and is entirely consistent with his guilt.

Similarly, in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Supra), this Court held as under:

Graver the crime, greater should be the standard of proof. An accused may appear to be guilty on
the basis of suspicion but that cannot amount to legal proof. When on the evidence two possibilities
are available or open, one which goes in the favour of the prosecution and the other benefits an
accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt The principle has special
relevance where the guilt or the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence.

Thus, in view of the above, the Court must consider a case of circumstantial evidence in light of the
aforesaid settled legal propositions. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the judgment remains
essentially inferential. Inferences are drawn from established facts, as the circumstances lead to
particular inferences. The Court must draw an inference with respect to whether the chain of
circumstances is complete, and when the circumstances therein are collectively considered, the
same must lead only to the irresistible conclusion, that the accused alone is the perpetrator of the
crime in question. All the circumstances so established must be of a conclusive nature, and
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.

47) Suresh Sakharam Nangre vs State Of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 249

48) Suresh v. State of U.P, (2001) 3 SCC 673

Judgement: Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code recognises the principle of vicarious liability in the
criminal jurisprudence. It makes a person liable for action of an offence not committed by him but by
another person with whom he shared the common intention. It is a rule of evidence and does not
create a substantive offence. The section gives statutory recognition to the commonsense principle
that if more than two persons intentionally do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them
had done it individually. There is no gainsaying that a common intention pre-supposes prior concert,
which requires a pre- arranged plan of the accused participating in an offence. Such a pre- concert or
pre-planning may develop on the spot or during the course of commission of the offence but the
crucial test is that such plan must precede the act constituting an offence. Common intention can be
formed previously or in the course of occurrence and on a spur of moment. The existence of a
common intention is a question of fact in each case to be proved mainly as a matter of inference
from the circumstances of the case.

49) United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992)

Facts: Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnaped from his home and flown
by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnaping and murder of
a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent’s pilot. After concluding that DEA
agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the
ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition
Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent’s repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on
one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction
and since the MexicanGovernment had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper.

Held: The fact of respondent’s forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court
for violations of this country’s criminal laws.

50) Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan

Facts: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

859 F.2d 929 (1988)

In 1986, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an opinion holding that the United States
government support of the Contras in the fight against Nicaragua violated customary international
law, as well as an existing treaty. The ICJ ruled that the United States was required to cease financial
support. However, prior to the issuance of the decision, the United States had withdrawn from ICJ
jurisdiction, and President Reagan cooperated with Congress to allow for continued aid to the
Contras, even after the official ICJ judgment. Organizations and individuals who opposed this policy
(plaintiffs) brought suit, seeking to put a stop to continued U.S. government support for the Contras,
arguing that it violated Article 94 of the United Nations Charter, customary international law, rules
of jus cogens, and their Fifth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ complaint on political question grounds, and the plaintiffs appealed.