Oliveros v.

Lopez ISSUES:
168 SCRA 431
DOCTRINE: Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should
not exceed twenty years, while the agreement to keep a thing undivided should not exceed
ten years. When parties stipulated a definite period to keep a thing undivided which
HELD:
exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period
beyond such maximum. Thus, co-ownership of an estate cannot exceed twenty years so
property should be divided after twenty years. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Article 494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
1. Whether or not the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void since the lot had
not yet been partitioned. -- NO
2. Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed. -- NO
1. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not
exceed twenty years, while the agreement to keep a thing undivided should not exceed
ten years. When parties stipulated a definite period to keep a thing undivided which
exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period
beyond such maximum. Thus, co-ownership of an estate cannot exceed twenty years so
property should be divided after twenty years. Each co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.

FACTS: In this case, the heirs maintained the co-ownership beyond 20 years so when the widow
and Candido sold definite portions of the lot, they validly exercised dominion over them
Upon his death, Lopez left the lot he owned to his widow and six children; the heirs did not
because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint
initiate any move to legally partition the property. After many years, the widow and the
for partition by the Oliveras spouses who are legally considered as subrogated to the
eldest son, Candido, executed a deed of absolute sale of the undivided eastern portion of
rights over the partitions of lot in their possession merely served as formality on the
their interests in favor of spouses Oliveras & Minor; another deed of absolute sale of the
widow and Candido’s act of terminating co-ownership.
undivided eastern part in favor of spouses Oliveras & Gaspar. The two Oliveras spouses had
since possessed the properties.
2. Prescription may have barred the filing of complaint under Article 1144 (a) of the
Civil Code; however, Article 494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may demand
After many years, the counsel of the two Oliveras spouses wrote to the remaining heirs of
at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
Lopez reminding them of the Oliveras spouses’ demand to partition the property so they
concerned. In this case, although the complaint was filed after thirteen years from the
could acquire their titles without court action. The heirs didn’t answer so the Oliveras
execution of the deeds of sale, the Oliveras spouses’ action for partition was timely and
spouses filed a complaint for partition and damages.
properly filed.

According to the Oliveras spouses, possession of the disputed properties was delivered to
them with the knowledge and consent of the heirs; however, according to the heirs, no sale
transpired as the vendors, the widow and Candido, could not sold specific portions of the
property making Oliveras spouses’ possession and occupation of specific portions of the
properties illegal. Trial court ruled that the deeds of absolute sale are valid and ordered the
segregation of the lot.
 DELIMA V. CA- Repudiation of Co-ownership
Cancellation of old title and issuance of new one constituted an open and clear repudiation
of the trust or co-ownership which would start the running of prescription.
FACTS:
This case is another story of sibling war over a Friar Land Estate inherited from their parent
who had acquired said land from the Government. When the parents died, Respondent
Galileo allegedly paid the remaining balance of the purchase price, and the estate tax. Later
on, he executed an affidavit declaring himself as sole owner and acquired TCT over it. 10
years after the TCT was issued, the other heirs instituted this action for reconveyance
claiming their part as co-owners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the other heirs are still entitled to the land or are they barred by
prescription.
RULING:
The other heirs are barred by prescription. How did this happen? Galileo was able to prove
the 4 requirements: (1) clear and convincing evidence of repudiation (2) made known to the
other owners (3) adverse possession and open repudiation (4) for over 10 years.
What is important in this case is that the Court ruled that registration of the land would be
sufficient compliance with the notice requirement above.
MARIATEGUI V. CA - Prescription of an Action for Partition
Prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co-owner. Petitioner’s registration of the properties in their names in 1971
did not operate as a valid repudiation of co-ownership, especially since there was fraud
involved.
FACTS:
Lupo Mariateguie died without a will on June 15, 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo contracted
3 marriages. He had 8 children all in all: 4 with his first wife, Eusebia; 1 daughter with his
second wife, Flaviana; and 3 with his third wife, Felipe.
Lupo left four properties which he acquired while he was still unmarried. On December 2,
1967, Lupo’s descendants by his 1st and 2nd marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated one of the lots unto themselves. An OCT was issued in
the names of these heirs. Subsequently, this lot was subdivided into two, for which separate
TCTs were issued to the respective parties.
Lupo’s children with the third wife, who were claiming continuous enjoyment and
possession of the land, protested. They went to court saying that when the court
adjudicated one of the four lots to their co-heirs, they were deprived of their respective
shares in the lot. They prayed for the partition of the entire estate (all 4 lots) and the
annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition.
The defendants (other heirs) filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action and prescription. The trial court dismissed the case while the CA declared that all the
heirs were entitled to equal shares in the estate. CA directed the heirs who had acquired
TCTs to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor of the heirs with the third wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription barred private respondents’ right to demand partition of the
estate
[The court established that the heirs had successional rights as their father had, during his
lifetime, repeatedly acknowledged them as his children; that they enjoyed that status since
birth  legitimate children & heirs indeed]
RULING:
No. Prescription does not run against private respondents wrt the filing of the action for
partition so long as the heirs/co-owners for whose benefit the prescription is invoked have
not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership.
The registration was not a valid act of repudiation because it was not clearly made known to
the other heirs. For prescription to run, the act of repudiation is subject to certain
conditions:
1. a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership
2. such act is clearly made known to the other co-owners
3. the evidence is clear and conclusive
4. OCEN possession of the property
Assuming that it was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set
in when the respondents filed the action for partition. The reason is because there was
fraud involved in obtaining registration. Earlier the respondent heirs were assured by the
petitioner-heirs no to worry about their share in their inheritance; their existence as co-
owners was recognized and in fact, they constructed a house on the registered lot without
objection from the petitioner-heirs. In as much as petitioners registered the properties in
their names in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to have commenced
from the time respondents discovered the fraud. In this case, respondents immediately
commenced an action two months after they learned of the fraud.
Salvador v. CA
G.R. No. 109910, April 5, 1995
FACTS:
AlipioYabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Barrio Bulua,
Cagayan de Oro City, whose title devolved upon his nine children, including Maria, upon his
death sometime before or during the second world war.
In 1976, Pastor Makibalo, who is the husband of Maria, filed a complaint against the
spouses Alberto and ElpiaYabo for "Quieting of Title, Annulment of Documents, and
Damages." In the complaint, he alleged that he owned a total of eight shares of the subject
lots, having purchased the shares of seven of Alipio's children and inherited the share of his
wife, Maria, and that except for the portion corresponding to Gaudencia's share which he
did not buy, he occupied, cultivated, and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully, and
exclusively the two parcels of land. He then prayed that he be declared the absolute owner
of 8/9 of the lots in question.
On 8 October 1976, the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the late
AlipioYabo lodged a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages against Pastor
Makibalo, Enecia Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. They alleged that
Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 are the common property of the heirs of AlipioYabo, namely,
the plaintiffs, defendant Enecia Cristal, Maria Yabo and Jose Yabo, whose share had been
sold to Alberto Yabo; that after Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor and Maria Makibalo,
Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo became the de facto administrators of the said properties; and
that much to their surprise, they discovered that the Salvador spouses, who were strangers
to the family, have been harvesting coconuts from the lots, which act as a cloud on the
plaintiffs' title over the lots.
The plaintiffs then prayed that (a) they, as well as defendant Pastor Makibalo, in
representation of his wife, and Enecia Cristal, in representation of Gaudencia, be declared as
the owners of the lots; (b) the Salvador spouses be declared as having no rights thereto
except as possible assignees of their co-defendants, Pastor Makibalo and Enecia Cristal; (c)
the lots be partitioned according to law among the aforementioned co-owners; and (d) the
defendants be made to pay for the value of the fruits they harvested from the lots and for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of the litigation, and costs of the
suit.
To cut the story short, the trial court decided in favor of the plaintiffs; thus, the
defendants appealed trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA held, among
others, that prescription and laches have not run against the private respondents with
respect to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share
in the portions acquired from her brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:WON prescription and lachescan be applied against the co-heirs of Pastor Makibalo?
RULING:
NO.
Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property, implies that an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. The imprescriptibility of the action cannot,
however, be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive
owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription.
What needs to be addressed first is whether or not Pastor Makibalo has acquired by
prescription the shares of his other co-heirs or co-owners. Prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership requires a continuous, open, peaceful, public, and adverse possession
for a period of time fixed by law.
This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and
shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of
them. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse
insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of
rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the
planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive
ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of
possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the
other co-owners.
Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the
cestuique trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestuique
trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestuique trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon
must be clear and convincing.
The records do not show that Pastor Makibalo adjudicated to himself the whole
estate of his wife by means of an affidavit filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds as
allowed under Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, or that he caused the issuance of a
certificate of title in his name or the cancellation of the tax declaration in Alipio's name and
the issuance of a new one in his own name. The only act which may be deemed as a
repudiation by Pastor of the co-ownership over the lots is his filing on 28 April 1976 of an
action to quiet title (Civil Case No. 5000). The period of prescription started to run only from
this repudiation. However, this was tolled when his co-heirs, the private respondents herein,
instituted on 8 October 1976 an action for partition (Civil Case No. 5174) of the lots.Hence,
the adverse possession by Pastor being for only about six months would not vest in him
exclusive ownership of his wife's estate, and absent acquisitive prescription of ownership,
laches and prescription of the action for partition will not lie in favor of Pastor.
Mercado vs. Spouses Espinocilla
Facts:
Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, (570 sq. m.) at Sorsogon. After he
died, his five children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided it equally
among themselves. Later, Dionisia died (no descendants) and Macario took possession of
Dionisia’s share. In an affidavit of transfer of real property dated November 1948, Macario
claimed that Dionisia had donated her share to him in May 1945.
August 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty and Saida sold 225 sq. m. to his son Roger,
husband of respondent Belen and father of respondent Ferdinand. March 1985, Roger
Espinocilla sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. (So in Lot No. 552: Belen Espinocilla= 109 sq.
m., Caridad Atienza = 120 sq. m., Caroline Yu = 209 sq. m., and petitioner, Salvacion’s son =
132 sq. m).
Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions: an area of 28.58 sq. m. which he
bought from Aspren and another 28.5 sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him but was. He
claims it must be returned to him. He avers that he is entitled to own and possess 171 sq. m.
having inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother Salvacion (Doroteo= 114sq m + Dionisia 28.5
sq m) and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. He occupies only 132 sq. m., he claims
that respondents encroach on his share by 39 sq. m.
Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of acquisitive
prescription and that there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of encroachment.
RTC:
1. Petitioner entitled to 171 sq. m. The RTC computed that Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel and
Macario each inherited 114 sq. m. from Doroteo and 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia.
2. Macario was not entitled to 228 sq. m. Thus, respondents must return 39 sq. m. to
petitioner who occupies only 132 sq. m.13
3. Macario’s affidavit is void (no public document of donation)
4. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire said shares by prescription.
5. Partially declared the nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale by Macario, Betty and Saida to
Roger as it affects the portion or the share belonging to Salvacion
CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the ground that
extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of respondents since
petitioner’s complaint was filed only on July 13, 2000.
Issue:
The core issue to be resolved is whether petitioner’s action to recover the subject portion is
barred by prescription.
Petitioner concludes that if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment,
courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the
defrauded party.
Held:
We affirm the CA ruling dismissing petitioner’s complaint on the ground of prescription.
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by
law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years
without need of title or of good faith.
Respondents’ uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552
was established. Macario occupied Dionisia’s share in 1945 although his claim that Dionisia
donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit. We also agree with the CA that
Macario’s possession of Dionisia’s share was public and adverse since his other co-owners,
his three other sisters, also occupied portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale made by
Macario and his two daughters in favor of his son Roger confirms the adverse nature of
Macario’s possession because said sale of 225 sq. m. was an act of ownership. Roger also
exercised an act of ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It was only in the
year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer petitioner’s complaint, that
respondents’ peaceful possession of the remaining portion was interrupted. By then,
however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of respondents.
That the RTC found Macario’s 1948 affidavit void is of no moment. Extraordinary
prescription is unconcerned with Macario’s title or good faith.
Petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents’ possession with his assertion
that Macario’s fraudulent acquisition of Dionisia’s share created a constructive trust.
Prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship.
Moreover, the CA correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint as an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from the time the right of
action accrues( extinctive prescription), where rights and actions are lost by the lapse of
time. Petitioner’s action for recovery of possession having been filed 55 years after Macario
occupied Dionisia’s share, it is also barred by extinctive prescription. The CA while
condemning Macario’s fraudulent act of depriving his three sisters of their shares in
Dionisia’s share, equally emphasized the fact that Macario’s sisters wasted their opportunity
to question his acts.