2.PCIB vs.

Escolin

Facts:

Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, made a will in 1952. She died in 1957
while she was domiciled in Iloilo City.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie,
however, also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned
over to her siblings.

Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnie’s estate, which
includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the Hodges, Avelina
Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for
Charles’). Magno was appointed, and Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew, as Co-Special
Administrator. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator, and an order of
probate and letters of administration were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.

PCIB became the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his estate, including
those properties/assets that passed to him upon Linnie Jane’s death. Avelina naturally opposed
this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs (the HIGDONS) would be prejudiced, so she continued acting
in her capacity as administrator (entering into sales and other such conveyances). For these acts,
the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’ estate, to which she responded by locking up
the premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were among the estate’s properties.

Issue: WON there was substitution.

Ruling:

No. Linnie’s will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the
Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar
substitution because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the
designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required
by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation
is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But
from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the
testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.

The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in
the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2,
Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is
appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they
are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not
dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted
simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory
insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers
and sisters. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only
during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa,
and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence
of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters to the inheritance,
although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative
upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of
her estate then.