Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

An integrated holistic approach to health and safety in confined spaces T

a,∗ b b a
Lucia Botti , Vincenzo Duraccio , Maria Grazia Gnoni , Cristina Mora
a
University of Bologna, Italy
b
University of Salento, Italy

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Confined space work is a high-risk activity, posing a significant hazard for both workers and rescuers involved in
Confined space the emergency response. Risks due to working in confined spaces can be extremely dangerous. The leading cause
Risk assessment of accidents and fatalities in confined spaces is atmospheric condition. Further common causes are fire, explo-
Risk management sion, ignition of flammable contaminants, spontaneous combustion and contact with temperature extremes.
Safety procedure
Although confined space work is a high-risk activity, few studies have been oriented aiming to define structured
Industrial safety
procedures or comprehensive tools to identify and manage the risks of work in confined space. An organized and
Job hazard analysis
reliable methodology to assess and control risks associated with working in confined spaces in the process
industry is missing.
The aim of this paper is to propose a structured procedure for analyzing and managing risks in confined
spaces in the process industry. After a first literature review on the topic and an historical analysis on accidents
in confined spaces, the authors conceptualize a framework to prevent and manage the risks from working in
confined spaces. The tool collects the concepts and requirements from the fragmented regulations on safe work
in confined spaces, aiming to support both the assessment and the risk management. Two test cases show the
application of the proposed framework showing an ex-post analysis carried out on a real accident occurred
during a task execution in a confined space and an ex-ante assessment for risk prevention.

1. Introduction
Every year, confined space work causes fatal accidents and injuries,
despite the in force regulatory and standards on such activity. Confined
spaces are defined as limited or restricted areas not designed for con-
tinuous occupancy where employees enter and perform a specific task.
Examples of confined spaces include, but are not limited to tanks,
vessels, silos and pipelines. The high risk of confined space work can
lead to extremely dangerous situations. Several publications, reports
and recent news describe the impact of such risks on workers’ safety
and health, showing high accident rates and multiple-fatality incidents
(Burlet-Vienney, Chinniah, Bahloul and Roberge, 2015a; NIOSH, 1994;
OSHA, 2015b; Sahli and Armstrong, 1992; Wilson and Madison, 2008).
Common causes of accident in confined spaces are fire, explosion,
spontaneous combustion and contact with high temperature extremes
(Botti, Ferrari and Mora, 2017a; Riaz et al., 2014). As an example, in
case of fire in a storage tank, the hot smoky gases rising from the fire
reach the upper part of the confined space, heating the upper surfaces.
The smoke layer resulting from the fire and the hot surfaces of the tank
radiate down to the lower part of the enclosure, hitting the worker
inside the confined space. Experience shows that the activity of the
victim within the space is a factor contributing to cause the unfortunate
event. Furthermore, ex-post analysis of accidents in confined spaces has
revealed that the victim causes the presence of toxic gas or oxygen
deficiency in several accidents due to hazardous atmospheric condi-
tions, while accidents with entrapment are typically due to the attempt
to unclog an accumulated deposit of materials. Several phenomena
occurring in confined space greatly enhance deflagration and detona-
tion processes (Salzano, 2014; Salvado et al., 2017). A metal tank
containing a flammable mixture is capable of generating over pressures
of 7e10 times the initial pressure (McAllister et al., 2011). This is due to
several reasons, such as turbulence inducing acoustic wave reverbera-
tions and continuous compression and heating of the unburned mixture
occurring from the burned products (Kolbe et al., 2017).
Recent pilot projects have been developed focusing on the appli-
cation of Internet of Things technologies for improving safety and
emergency management in complex production systems (Elia and
Gnoni, 2013; Yang et al., 2013). Few applications have demonstrated
the potential of such technologies for managing hazards in confined
spaces. As an example, portable wireless gas detection systems provide
real data on atmospheric conditions within the confined area, allowing
a quicker and a more efficient emergency response by alerting workers

∗
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: lucia.botti5@unibo.it (L. Botti).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2018.05.013
Received 14 March 2017; Received in revised form 30 January 2018; Accepted 22 May 2018
Available online 23 May 2018
0950-4230/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
L. Botti et al.
and safety managers in the case of toxic or flammable gas detection.
Riaz et al. (2014) have developed a Building Information Modeling
(BIM) platform aiming to improve visualization for effective monitoring
of confined spaces on construction sites. The platform adopts numerous
sensors to monitor real-time temperature and oxygen values, sending
alerts and notifications to the health and safety manager.
Although confined space work is a high-risk activity, few studies
have been oriented to define how to treat and manage the risks of work
in confined space (Botti et al., 2016; Botti et al., 2015; Burlet-Vienney
et al., 2015a). Standard job hazard analysis methods do not specifically
address the complex risks of working within confined spaces. A struc-
tured comprehensive methodology to assess and control risks associated
with working in confined spaces, based on confined space regulations
and standards, is missing. Worldwide regulation and standard-setting
efforts provide fragmented procedures and recommendations for safe
confined space work. However, the recent statistics show that several
fatal incidents still occur.
This paper aims to contribute to such issue by introducing and
testing a procedure, based on a holistic approach, for analyzing and
managing risks in confined spaces. Following the structure of generic
job hazard analysis defined by the Occupational Health and Safety
Agency (OSHA 3071, 2002), the proposed tool gathers the fragmented
regulations on safety in confined spaces.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. After the literature review
and the legislative overview on the confined space regulations in
Section 2, Section 3 describes an accident that involved two workers
who perished into a confined space. Furthermore, a brief historical
analysis investigates the major causes of accidents in confined spaces
and the industries exposed to the risks associated with working in
confined spaces. The proposed procedure for the prevention and man-
agement of risks in confined spaces is in Section 4, while two applica-
tions are in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 and Section 7 discuss the results
of the case studies and provide the conclusions and the future devel-
opments of this research.
2. Literature review
Confined space work is a high-risk activity, posing a serious life-
threatening hazard to the workers. Hazards in confined spaces are
difficult to evaluate and manage, due to the complex characteristics of
such particular work environments (Nano and Derudi, 2012). Both the
features of the confined area and the characteristics of the performed
task have direct impact on the overall risk level of a specific confined
space activity.
Several accidents and injuries related to confined space work
showed that workers access to confined areas without proper training
and personal protective equipment, exposing themselves to high levels
of hazards (Botti et al., 2015). The lack of situation awareness is an
underlying cause of human errors, especially when workers access to
areas not designed for continuous occupancy as confined spaces. Rescue
attempts in confined spaces are also hazardous situations, since emer-
gency response is a low-frequency, high-risk operation. Rescuing a
worker from a confined space is a time sensitive and technically chal-
lenging operation (Wilson et al., 2012). Many would-be rescuers perish
while trying to rescue a victim after a confined space accident. Ex-
perience and historical data on accidents in confined space show that a
unplanned and hurriedly executed rescue increases the probability that
would-be rescuers will become victims (Wilson and Madison, 2008).
Would-be rescuers victims include trained fire-fighters and competent
personnel who had years of experience in emergency response. How-
ever, first-responding firefighters are not trained or equipped to effect a
confined space rescue (Wilson et al., 2012). Data and statistics reveal
that the 60% of confined space fatalities in U.S. occur among would-be
rescuers (NIOSH, 1986). The chain of would-be rescuer deaths is an on-
going phenomenon globally challenging. The Canadian Center for Oc-
cupational Health and Safety and the European Agency for Safety and
26
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35
Health at Work (EU-OSHA) state the same 60-percent statistic (Muncy,
2013). These data reveal a hidden phenomenon, i.e. both employers
and workers fail to identify confined space work hazards (Burlet-
Vienney, Chinniah, Bahloul and Roberge, 2015b). In 2017 (Botti, Mora
and Ferrari, 2017b), developed the first version of a tool for the iden-
tification of confined spaces in industry. The aim was to realize an ef-
fective tool to prevent workers entry into high-risk confined spaces. The
tool addresses workers during the complex identification of high-risk
confined spaces. Furthermore, the tool supports the mandatory risk
assessment for confined spaces computing the risk index for the ana-
lyzed confined space and task.
Despite the worldwide regulation and standard-setting efforts in
outlining procedures and recommendations for safe confined space
work, the recent statistics show that several fatal incidents still occur
(Burlet-Vienney et al., 2014). Confined space work procedures are not
internationally standardized. Industrialized countries adopt different
approaches to address such issue. The local legislation in force reflects
the local strategy for addressing the risk of confined space work.
American standards and regulations define the confined space
geometric characteristics, together with the guidelines for job hazard
analysis, hazard elimination, and the procedures for safe confined space
work. The U.S. legislation widely investigates the risk of activities
within confined spaces, providing exhaustive guidelines and procedures
for safe confined space work. Table 1 shows a brief overview of the
worldwide rules and standards con confined spaces.
The 29 CFR 1910.146 (1993) standard of the American
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) is widely
known as the Permit-Required Confined Spaces (PRCS) standard for
confined space work in general industry. Such standard provides a
general definition of “confined space”, together with requirements for
practices and procedures to protect employees in general industry from
the hazards of entry into permit-required confined spaces. The PRCS
defines “Confined space” as a space that is large enough and configured
that an employee can enter and perform work, has limited openings of
entry or exit and is not designed for continuous occupancy (OSHA,
1993). The OSHA 29 CFR 1910.146 is considered one of the most dif-
ficult OSHA's standards to comprehend, likely is the hardest with which
to comply (Taylor, 2011). Confined spaces are not limited to enclosed
spaces as storage tanks, process vessels, sewers and pipelines. The
OSHA 1926.21 enlarges the definition of confined spaces. For purposes
of such standard, confined or enclosed space means any space having a
limited means of egress, which is subject to the accumulation of toxic or
flammable contaminants or has an oxygen deficient atmosphere. Con-
sequently, confined or enclosed spaces include open top spaces more
than 4 feet in depth such as pits, tubs, vaults, and vessels.
The 29 CFR 1910.146 protects employees who enter confined spaces
while engaged in general industry work. This standard has not been
extended to cover employees entering confined spaces while engaged in
specific industries, as construction work or confined space workers in
agriculture because of unique characteristics of such worksites. The US
legislation provides precise standards for industries exempt form
OSHA's 29 CFR 1910.146, such as construction, agriculture and ship-
yard work. For example, the OSHA 29 CFR 1926 Subpart AA (2015)
protects construction workers in confined spaces, while the OSHA
1910.272 (1996) applies to grain handling facilities and the OSHA 29
CFR 1915 is for confined spaces in shipyard employment.
Despite the numerous directions of the OSHA's standards, employers
in general industry have difficulty determining if spaces are permit-
required confined spaces. The OSHA 3138-01R (2004) provides a de-
cision flow chart to help identifying permit-required confined spaces
and providing signage requirements.
The main cause of accidents in confined spaces is the need of en-
tering the high-risk area. The most effective risk control measure for
work in confined space is not to enter the confined area. A recent study
has collected innovative non-man entry technologies for work in con-
fined spaces. The research focused on automated entry technologies for
L. Botti et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35

Table 1
Standards for work in confined space.
Nation Standard/Guideline Field of intervention

USA OSHA 1910.146 (1993) Definition of confined space in general industry, requirements for practices and procedures to protect employees from the
hazards of permit-required confined spaces.
OSHA 1926.21(b)(6)(ii) (1987) Construction. Extension of the definition of confined space, including open top spaces more than 4 feet in depth.
OSHA 29 CFR 1926 Subpart AA Standard on confined spaces in construction.
(2015)
OSHA 29 CFR 1910.272 (1996) Grain handling facilities.
OSHA 29 CFR 1915 Subpart B (2011) Confined and enclosed spaces and other dangerous atmospheres in shipyard employment.
OSHA 3138-01R (2004) Informational booklet including a decision flow chart to help in identifying permit-required confined spaces and providing
signage requirements.
OSHA 3071 (2002) Requirements and guidelines for the job hazard analysis.
NIOSH 80-106 (1979) Criteria for working in confined spaces, investigating the atmosphere characteristics of the confined areas.
NIOSH 86-110 (1986) Case reports of fatal incidents concerning confined space work.
NIOSH 87-113 (1987) Guidelines for safe confined space work.
NIOSH 94-103 (1994) Data and investigative reports of fatal incidents involving workers who entered confined spaces.
ANSI/ISA 92.04.01 Part I-2007 (2007) Requirements for instruments used to provide a warning of the presence of oxygen-deficient or oxygen-enriched atmospheres.
ANSI/ASSE Z117.1–2009 (2009) Safety requirements to be followed while entering, exiting and working in confined spaces at normal atmospheric pressure.
ASTM D4276-02 (2012) Procedures to protect the health and safety of workers required to enter confined spaces, and practice with specific safety steps
to be taken for entry into confined spaces.
UK HSE (1997) Requirements for safe confined space work. Apply where the assessment identifies risks of serious injury from work in confined
spaces.
HSE (1999) Require employers and self-employed people to identify the hazards present in confined spaces, assessing the risks and
determining what precautions to take.
HSE (2014) Approved Code of Practice (ACOP) and guidance for those involved in work within confined spaces, those who employ or train
such people and those that represent them.
Swiss SUVA 01416 (2004) Guidelines for safe confined space work.
SUVA 44040.i (2010a) Guidelines and checklist for maintenance activities in enclosed areas.
SUVA 44062.i (2010b) Guidelines for activities in pits, sewers and pipelines.
SUVA CFSL:6806i (2012) Checklists for inspection and maintenance in confined spaces.
SUVA 67103.i (2013) Checklist for welding, cutting and other hot work.
Italy TU D.Lgs. 81/2008 (2008) Regulation on occupational safety and health in general industry.
DPR 177/2011 (2011) Requirements for confined space personnel and operating companies.

high-risk activities as cleaning, inspecting and maintenance (Botti et al.,
2017a). However, effective and affordable non-man entry technologies
are available for a limited number of industrial operations. Experience
shows that several industrial applications require man entry into the
confined space. When entry is not avoidable, organizations are required
to perform a risk assessment. The US legislation explores the risk of
confined space work from multiple perspectives, to help employers and
employees in recognizing such hazardous workplaces. The risk of con-
fined spaces is due to both the characteristics of the confined area and
the characteristics of the task to be performed. Activities such as
cleaning, repairing and welding can create a hazardous environment,
when performed within the confined area.
The American National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) provides criteria and guidelines for preventing occupational
fatalities in confined spaces (see in Table 1). The NIOSH publication 80-
106 (1979) outlines a classification system for confined spaces, in-
vestigating the atmosphere characteristics of the confined area. The
publication provides a checklist of factors to consider for the analysis of
hazardous atmospheres, based on the content of oxygen, flammable
substances and potential or toxic air contaminants. Further NIOSH
publications provide guidelines for the recognition of confined spaces
and their general physical hazards, together with statistics and findings
on fatalities in confined spaces (NIOSH, 1986; NIOSH, 1987; NIOSH,
1994). The American National Standard Institute (ANSI) and the
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) provide further
standard practices for confined spaces and performance requirements
for instruments used to detect the atmosphere of confined areas.
A European Standard for confined space work is not yet available.
The European Regulation on confined spaces is fragmented. The pro-
cedures and practices for safe confined space work apply to the country
where the rules are published. The Britain legislation on confined
spaces is based on The Management of Health and Safety at Work
Regulations (1999) and the Confined Spaces Regulations (1997), which
require workers to identify the hazards present, to assess the risks and
to determine what precautions to take. The Swiss approach to confined
space issues is based on the type of confined space and activity to
perform. The Swiss National Accident Insurance Fund (SUVA) provides
several checklists for different confined space activities. Such checklists
help confined space workers to analyze the hazard of typical confined
spaces and activities to perform (SUVA, 2004; SUVA, 2010a; SUVA,
2010b; SUVA, 2012; SUVA, 2013). The Italian legislation does not
provide a specific regulation addressing the multiple risks of confined
space work as it provides general requirements for work in polluted-
suspected environments. Italian employers and employees are required
to follow the directions of the TU D.Lgs. 81/2008 (2010), the Italian
regulation on occupational safety and health. Such regulation provides
requirements for occupational safety and risk assessment methods in
general industry. The Italian specific rule for confined spaces defines
the requirements for confined space personnel and operating compa-
nies, but no guidelines for safe confined space work are provided.
3. Accidents in confined spaces
Incidents in confined spaces frequently lead to multiple fatalities as
would-be rescuers perish while trying to rescue the first victim of the
accident. Two major risks associated with working in confined spaces
are asphyxiation and intoxication (Frensh ministry for sustainable de-
velopment -SRT/BARPI, 2009). These risks are present in several sec-
tors, e.g. chemical industry, agricultural industry, food processing and
wastewater industry. Accidents in chemical processing and refining
frequently implicate the introduction of nitrogen for inerting purposes
or toxic gases (H2S, NH3, Cl2, etc.) used or released during the various
processes. Specifically, gaseous releases might occur during process
implementation.
Before introducing an historical analysis of accidents in confined
spaces, this section describes a tragic event in which two workers were
asphyxiated inside a nitrogen filled confined space in a U.S. refinery in
2005. The event is sadly known as the “Valero Refinery Asphyxiation

27
L. Botti et al.
Incident”.
The workers were engaged in reinstalling a large pipe elbow on the
top of a pressure vessel, called a hydrocracker reactor, during the
overnight shift. The uninstalled pipe left an opening on a work platform
24 inches in diameter, surrounded by two-foot high steel bolts. The
reactor was performing a purification process which removes oxygen
and hazardous gas from equipment by flowing nitrogen through it. The
investigations revealed that the workers decided to attempt to remove a
roll of duct tape lying inside the reactor with a long wire hook. The roll
was five feet below the opening. The workers repeated numerous at-
tempts to remove the tape with no success. Investigators concluded that
one worker stepped over the bolts and sat on the narrow ledge around
the opening, to improve his chance of hooking and removing the tape
(see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Reactor opening (CSB, 2006).
The worker intentionally entered or fell into the reactor, where the
oxygen-depleted environment created by the nitrogen flow overcame
him (see Fig. 2). He immediately collapsed. The second worker quickly
inserted a ladder through the opening and climbed inside, trying to
rescue the colleague. He too was overcome by the oxygen-depleted
environment and also succumbed. The oxygen content in the atmo-
sphere was less than one percent. Efforts by properly-equipped emer-
gency responders to revive the men were unsuccessful and the men
were declared dead at the hospital (CSB, 2006).
Fig. 2. Reactor work platform (CSB, 2006).
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) stated that the accident could
have been avoided through better hazard awareness training and
proper confined space rescue actions. The Valero incident shows that
28
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35
workers are not properly trained on the dangers of confined spaces in
the complex plants of process industry. Nitrogen asphyxiation caused
80 deaths and 50 injuries in U.S. from 1992 to 2002 (CSB, 2006).
This section shows a quantitative analysis on incidents in con-
fined spaces, aiming to identify the major causes of accidents and
fatalities. The main databases and archives collecting data on occupa-
tional safety have been verified to gather and analyse accidents and
fatalities due to work in confined space. Such databanks include the
CSB, Facts (Failure and ACcidents Technical information System), the
OSHA (US Occupational Safety and Health Administration), CRED
(International Disaster Database), ARIA (Analysis, Recherche et
Information sur les Accidents) and the NIOSH (The National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health) archives, which provided the most
updated data on confined space fatalities. In particular, NIOSH data
report that the total number of accidents in confined spaces in US be-
tween 1985 and 2015 was 141, which have caused 197 fatalities and a
consequent average fatality rate per accident of 1.39 (NIOSH, 2016) .
Data have been arranged in relation to the type of industry: che-
mical (e.g. accidents in reaction vessels), food (e.g. accidents in silos)
and utility (e.g. accidents in sewers). Fig. 3 shows the results of the
accident analysis. Left side of Fig. 3 (A) refers to NIOSH data (NIOSH,
2016) while right side (B) shows Italian accidents in confined spaces by
industry (Botti et al., 2015).
Both US and Italian data in Fig. 3 show that the highest number of
accidents in confined spaces are in wastewater industry. The collection
and treatment of industrial or agricultural wastes, in addition to their
associated wastewater networks, causes the production of gaseous ef-
fluent by means of physicochemical reactions or fermentation (H2S).
Furthermore, wastewater treatment technologies and plants are located
below ground level. Workers enter into such confined areas by access
stairways to perform routine maintenance, inspection, testing, sampling
and repairing operations.
NIOSH data (Fig. 3A) revealed high prevalence of confined space
fatalities in agriculture, i.e. farming activities use tanks and silos as-
sociated with the phenomena of normal or accidental evaporation or
fermentation (e.g. CO, CH4, CO2, alcohol) of organic materials. The
analysis of Italian data (Fig. 3B) revealed a significant number of ac-
cidents in confined spaces in the food industry, that involved workers in
storage tanks, grape presses, fermentation tanks, utility vaults and
vessels. Accidents in food processing industries are due to intoxications
from ammonia used in refrigeration installations, accidental mixes of
incompatible chemical substances (e.g. acid and bleach) and fermen-
tation phenomena (CH4, H2S, etc).
Seven main causes of accident have been identified as asphyxiation,
engulfment, poisoning, oxygen deficiency, drowning, explosion, and
electrocution. Data classification is proposed in Fig. 4. Specifically,
when the total number of occurrence is less than 3, data have been
grouped in the “Other” category. Results show that Asphyxiation is the
most frequent cause of death when an accident in confined space oc-
curs.
These results confirm the statistics reported by Wilson et al. (2012)
L. Botti et al.
Fig. 3. Classification of accidents in confined spaces by industry (A: NIOSH data, B: Italian data).
on confined space emergency response. Italian statistics on accidents in
confined spaces from 2001 to 2016 show similar results. Specifically,
the total number of accidents in the analyzed period is equal to 20
accidents, which have caused 60 fatalities; in this case, the average
fatality rate is equal to 2.25 fatalities per accident. Results are in Fig. 5.
Aiming to provide a reference tool for the prevention and man-
agement of the risks associated with working in a confined space,
Section 4 introduces a procedure for safe work in confined space.
4. The procedure for safe work in confined space
Structured procedures and technical guidelines on risk assessment
and management for confined space work are not standardized and not
effectively integrated. Thus, a stepwise procedure for the prevention
and management of confined spaces risks is now discussed in detail
aiming to provide technicians, practitioners as well as researchers with
a reliable tool for the analysis of the dangerous scenario in confined
spaces. Specifically, the procedure consists of a framework that collects
the concepts and requirements from the fragmented regulations for safe
confined space work. The aim is to support both the assessment and the
risk management phases.
The stepwise approach in Fig. 6 addresses safety managers and risk
analysts during the design of work procedures and risk assessment for
work in confined space. Firstly, the framework proposes the analysis of
the characteristics of the confined area, the characteristics of the task
and the requirements of the emergency response plan. Next, the overall
risks that could affect a confined space work are analyzed in detail. The
risk assessment includes the analysis of both the causes and the con-
sequences of the activities performed within the confined area. The
procedure terminates with the analysis of the engineering and
Fig. 4. NIOSH accidents classification based on causes and number of fatalities occurred in confined space from 1985 to 2015.
29
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35
administrative controls for risk elimination or reduction.
4.1. Phase 1: analysis
The first step of the procedure guides safety specialists and practi-
tioners through the analysis of the confined space characteristics. The
analysis investigates the characteristics of the confined space, the
characteristics of the task and the requirements for safe emergency
response in case of accident. The first analysis includes the analysis of
the characteristics of the confined space. Both the geometric char-
acteristics and the atmospheric characteristics of the confined space
affect the safety conditions of the confined area. Particularly, confined
spaces are restricted areas with limited openings for entry and exit.
Consequently, the restricted airflow and the hazardous contents may
determine atmospheric conditions immediately dangerous to life or
health (OSHA, 1993). The second analysis investigates the character-
istics of the task performed in the confined space. Both the adopted
equipment and the performed activity may affect the atmospheric
conditions of the confined area and contaminate the atmosphere. Fi-
nally, the third analysis includes the study of the requirements for safe
emergency and rescue operations. The emergency response plan ana-
lysis aims to ensure high performances of both the emergency response
plan and the emergency and rescue procedures, in case of accident in
the confined area. Particularly, the preplan of the confined space in-
cident helps emergency response team in identifying the causes and the
consequences of possible incidents. The analysis of emergency and re-
sponse plan concludes with the preplan of the emergency and rescue
operations. The aim is to identify an effective approach for confined
space rescue operations. This phase involves the design of a standard
emergency and rescue procedure, and the phases from the request for
L. Botti et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35

Fig. 5. Italian accidents classification based on causes and number of fatalities occurred in confined space from 2001 to 2016.

Fig. 6. The proposed framework.

30
L. Botti et al.
emergency response to the termination of the emergency intervention
(Hansen, 1999).
4.2. Phase 2: risk assessment
Risk identification and assessment for work in confined spaces are
difficult and complex. The second step of the framework analyses the
multiple risks of confined space work. The aim is to identify the leading
causes of confined space incidents and the possible hazards in such
workplaces. Three main types of risk characterize confined spaces:
electrical, mechanical and chemical risk. Electric shock injuries and
deaths are frequent consequence of electrocution in confined spaces.
Mechanical risks include the risk of entrapment, asphyxiation and en-
gulfment due to drowning or falling objects. Finally, hazardous atmo-
spheric conditions lead to fire, explosion, poisoning and other ha-
zardous consequences of the chemical risk in confined spaces. Other
possible risks of work activity in confined spaces include temperature
extremes, noise, vibration and communication problems (see Fig. 6).
4.3. Phase 3: risk elimination or reduction
The information obtained from the hazard analysis in Phase 1 and
the risk assessment in Phase 2 allow to identify the control measures for
risk prevention. The aim of Phase 3 is to define the control methods to
eliminate or to reduce the risks identified in the first two phases of the
framework. The most effective control methods are engineering con-
trols, which physically change the characteristics of the work activity
preventing the exposure of the workers to the risks arising from work in
confined space. Engineering controls for risk elimination are preferred
control methods, rather than engineering controls for risk minimiza-
tion, enclosure, isolation or redirection. Such control measures include
the use of static electricity for the risk elimination or the use of con-
tinuous forced air ventilation for risk redirection (Garrison and Erig,
1991). If engineering controls are not feasible, administrative controls
may be appropriate. Such controls involve operating procedures or
organizational methods, e.g. written operating procedures, safe work
practices and training. Finally, PPE is an acceptable control method if
engineering controls are not feasible or when administrative controls do
not provide adequate additional protection. Safety plans and proce-
dures may include engineering control methods rather than adminis-
trative controls or PPE, aiming to provide protection and to abate the
hazards in confined spaces. If engineering controls can not eliminate
the risk, the optimal control measure is a combination of all the three
types of control method.
Section 5 introduces the application of the proposed framework to
two test cases. Specifically, the first test case shows data and informa-
tion from the investigative report on a fatal accident involving an
Fig. 7. Oil storage tank (on the left) and the extractor fan (on the right) (NIOSH, 2014).
31
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35
employee while he was working into a confined space. The second test
case describes the manufacturing process of a metal tank and the phases
in which the worker is required to enter into the tank.
5. Test of the proposed framework
Two test cases are discussed to show the application of the frame-
work described in previous Section 4. The aim is to validate the global
effectiveness of the proposed tool by its application in two different
case studies: an ex-post analysis carried out on a real accident occurred
during a task execution in a confined space and an ex-ante assessment
for risk prevention.
5.1. Test case 1: fatal incident in a tank
This Section introduces summary data and investigative reports of a
fatal accident involving a worker who entered an oil storage tank.
Specifically, the following case study is from the NIOSH State Face
Report (NIOSH, 2014). The investigations revealed the wrong appli-
cation of safety procedures during maintenance activity in an oil sto-
rage tank. The unsafe operations caused the death of a welder who was
repairing the tank. The worker was inside the confined space to weld a
defect that caused the oil leakage from the tank. After detecting the leak
position, the site manager activated the procedure for the tank re-
covery. The recovery process included four different phases:
• Aspiration of the liquids in the four tank compartments;
• High pressure steam cleaning (90 min);
• Inspection of the tank (worker entry);
• Maintenance and repair operations inside the tank (worker entry).
During the first two phases, the welder prepared the welding
equipment. A fan was introduced inside the damaged compartment of
the tank to decrease the inner temperature. The welder entered the tank
to set the fan when an explosion killed him instantly. The investigation
reported the cause of the explosion as lack of refrigeration of the ad-
jacent compartment. Consequently, the temperature increased trig-
gering the residual vapours inside the tank.
The proposed framework suggests analysing the characteristics of
the confined space and the task to be performed, aiming to identify and
manage the risks of confined space work.
5.1.1. Phase 1: analysis
The tank capacity is about 50,800 l, divided in four compartments of
15,990 l, 6430 l, 9460 l and 18,930 l. Four manholes (0.45 m diameter)
allow the access to each compartment. Furthermore, each compartment
is provided with an inspecting hatch (0.25 m diameter) on the top.
L. Botti et al.
Repair and maintenance are performed inside a building with four
garage doors. The characteristics of the tank identify a confined space.
Different maintenance operations may be performed. Welding tasks are
performed with an MIG welding torch.
The first two phases of the recovery process (aspiration of residual
liquids and high pressure steam cleaning) are completed outside the
building (Fig. 7) and prior to inspection.
A metal canopy protects the tank outside the building (Fig. 7). A
supervisor oversees the whole recovery process and the actuation of
each phase.
5.1.2. Phase 2: risk assessment
The worker enters the tank to perform inspecting operations. During
such activity, the tank can contain vapour and liquid residuals poten-
tially harmful. These agents may cause worker asphyxiation.
Furthermore, fumes and gas from welding operations may displace the
oxygen in the tank to the extent that it will asphyxiate workers almost
immediately. Finally, the high temperature inside the tank and the
adoption of electric equipment (e.g., welding torch) expose the worker
to the risk of explosion, fire, thermal shock and electrical shock.
5.1.3. Phase 3: risk elimination or reduction
The risk elimination or reduction is obtained through residuals as-
piration and high pressure steam cleaning. In case of worker entry, an
extractor fan is placed inside the tank (see Fig. 7 on the right side). The
extractor provides mechanical ventilation, refrigerates materials after
steam cleaning and increases the air content inside the tank compart-
ment. The investigative report showed that no preventive measures for
explosion hazard triggering were taken. Internal procedures require the
adoption of air monitoring equipment inside the tank. Such tool was not
available when the accident occurred. Further possible risks concerning
electrocution have been considered.
The accident and the related investigative reports have shown lack
of confined space risk management. The company did not include the
recovery operation among the activities performed in confined space.
No documents described the operations performed by the workers and
no air monitoring equipment was available during the operations.
Finally, workers were not prepared to work in confined space.
Consequently, specific safety procedures and operations for safe con-
fined space work were omitted. The result was the explosion of the tank
(Fig. 8).
5.2. Test case 2: metal tank manufacturing process
This Section shows an application of the proposed procedure to a
Fig. 8. Tank conditions after the explosion (NIOSH, 2014).
32
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35
test case concerning the manufacturing process of a big-sized metal
tank (Fig. 9). The tank is included in the filtration process for the
treatment of potable water. Once the treatment system is in service, raw
water goes through the filtering layers contained within the tank.
The tank manufacturing process requires a worker to enter a cy-
lindrical tank to perform welding of the metal components of the tank
(e.g. top, lateral metal sheet, bottom and other small components).
Specifically, the worker accesses inside the confined space twice for
performing welding operations (see Fig. 9 right side).
Following the step-wise procedure of the framework in Fig. 6, the
characteristics of the tank and the characteristics of the welding op-
erations are analyzed to identify the risks of the introduced confined
space work and the risk control measures to adopt.
5.2.1. Phase 1: analysis
The tank diameter is 3 m. During welding operations, a positioning
device sustains the tank with the diameter perpendicular to the floor, as
in Fig. 9. The width of the internal space where worker welds compo-
nents is about 1.3 m, while the height is 3 m (tank diameter). The
worker accesses the tank through a manhole of DN 500. The manhole is
the same for both the entry and the exit. Such features identify a con-
dition of high confinement for both the confined space and the access.
An additional opening is positioned on the top of the tank. The di-
mensions are 420 × 320 mm. The airflow is restricted.
The welder performs welding operations by means of a welding
torch. A pipe positioned on the additional opening is connected to an
artificial ventilation system to suck the welding fumes. The temperature
inside the tank and close to the welding point is about 40 °C. The
worker keeps a kneeling or crouching position for the whole duration of
the welding operations. Specifically, the welding task inside the con-
fined space requires up to 45 min. The worker accesses the confined
space wearing proper protections (e.g., gloves, leather clothes, mask,
kneepads and ear plugs) and equipment to monitor the atmosphere (e.g.
portable multi gas detector). A second worker, the attendant (OSHA,
1993), is stationed outside the tank, monitoring the entrant and the
position of the pipe connected to the ventilation system. The victim
removal equipment is a pulley arranged on a removable metal base. The
connections on the ground for the installation of the metal base are
arranged close to the point where the worker accesses the tank. During
the welding operations, the pulley and the base are stored close to the
tank. In case of emergency, the attendant retrieves the rescue equip-
ment and fixes the rescue equipment with the connections on the
ground, hooks the worker inside the tank and pulls by means of the
pulley.
5.2.2. Phase 2: risk assessment
The welder assumes awkward and static postures for extended
periods of time while welding. Consequently, welding inside the tank
exposes the welder to ergonomic risk factors. Such conditions are as-
sociated with the development of work-related musculoskeletal injuries
and disorders (Stack et al., 2016). Welding operations produce fumes
and gases that could cause a reduction in the oxygen percentage content
inside the tank and asphyxiate the worker. Furthermore, the high
temperature inside the tank and the use of an electric device expose the
welder to the risks of fire, explosions, thermal shock and electric shock.
5.2.3. Phase 3: risk elimination or reduction
The complete elimination of the hazard is possible by preventing
worker entry, as required by regulations on confined space work. Non-
man entry technologies are automated solutions that replace the
workers for activities in confined spaces. Examples of non-man entry
technologies for welding operations in confined spaces are automated
welding robots. Welding robots are widely adopted in industry. Such
robots consist of a programmable manipulator arm equipped with
welding automation equipment. The welding task is pre-programmed
by the worker outside the confined area or guided by machine vision, or
L. Botti et al.
Fig. 9. Metal tank for water treatment (on the left side) and worker entry into the metal tank (on the right side).
by a combination of the two methods. Either way, the welder is not
required to enter the confined space and the risk of confined space work
is eliminated. The adoption of written operating procedures and per-
mits for work in confined space are further effective risk control
methods. Specifically, the PRCS standard defines “Permit-required
confined space” a confined space that has one or more of the following
characteristics: contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous at-
mosphere; contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an
entrant; has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be
trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor
which slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or con-
tains any other recognized serious safety or health hazard. The permit-
to-work certificate identifies the tools allowed in the confined space and
the requirements for work implementation. The issue of the permit
ensures a safe atmosphere inside the confined space prior to entry and
during work in progress. The validity of the permit is limited to the time
stipulated on the certificate, after which workers are required to leave
the confined space. Permit-to-work certificates and risk assessment re-
ports should be accessible and visible within the immediate vicinity of
the confined space. Leather and flame-resistant treated cotton clothing
is recommended in welding environments, as they provide durability
and fire resistance. PPE protect welding operators from injury, such as
burns, which are the most common welding injury. The use of hearing
devices and protective gloves reduces the exposure of the worker to
noise and to the risk of electrocution. Furthermore, the welder should
wear a respiratory mask for welding operations, provided with a self
contained breathing apparatus. Finally, proper and adequate PPE allow
freedom of movement while providing sufficient protection from
welding hazards.
6. Discussion
This paper has conceptualized a procedure for preventing and
managing confined space risks.
Although confined space work is a high-risk activity, few studies
and technical reports have been oriented to define how to treat and
manage the risks of work in confined space. Regulations on occupa-
tional safety and health provide directions and stepwise procedures to
identify hazards before they occur and to eliminate or reduce them to
an acceptable risk level. As an example, the OSHA 3071 (2002) Stan-
dard proposes a stepwise procedure for the job hazard analysis in
general occupational workplaces: task description, hazard description
and hazard controls. After reviewing the task characteristics and the
types of hazard, the procedure considers the control methods for the
elimination or the reduction of the identified hazards. Control methods
include engineering controls, administrative controls and Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE), such as respirators and protective
clothing. Engineering controls physically change a machine or work
environment to prevent employee exposure to the hazard. If
33
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35
engineering controls are not feasible, the OSHA 3071 encourages the
adoption of administrative controls, e.g. written operating procedures,
work permits, and safe work practices. Finally, PPE is an acceptable
control method when engineering controls do not totally eliminate the
hazard or when safe work practices do not provide sufficient additional
protection.
Job hazard analysis aims to identify hazards before they occur,
eliminating or reducing them to an acceptable risk level. However, a
structured and reliable methodology to assess and control risks of
confined space work is missing. Recent statistics on accidents in con-
fined spaces has shown that, despite current job hazard analysis pro-
cedures and risk assessment methods, confined space fatalities still
occur. Confined spaces regulations widely address the problem of safety
and risks in confined spaces. Table 1 has provided a list of world-wide
regulations on work in confined spaces.
Previous studies have investigated the problem of safety in confined
spaces, aiming to realize a comprehensive risk identification and to
categorize interventions by means of checklists and questioners (Burlet-
Vienney et al., 2015a). This paper has introduced a framework to ad-
dress risks of confined space work adopting a holistic approach to safety
in confined spaces. The aim is to help employers and safety profes-
sionals during the design of work activity in confined spaces, sup-
porting the risk management and addressing critical aspects of safety in
confined spaces. The proposed framework collects the concepts and
requirements from the fragmented regulations for safe confined space
work. As required from regulations on general job hazard analysis, risk
analysis and risk assessment are addressed in the first step of the fra-
mework. Specifically, Step 1 includes the analysis of three critical as-
pects of safety in confined spaces, i.e. the characteristics of the area, the
characteristics of the task and the analysis of the emergency response
plan. Step 2 investigates causes and consequences of risks in confined
spaces. Finally, the third step of the framework addresses the choice of
engineering and administrative risk control measures, and PPE to
eliminate or reduce the identified risks. The application of the proposed
framework to two case studies from industry has proved its effective-
ness in preventing hazardous situations and accidents in confined
space.
7. Conclusions
This paper has introduced a structured and effective procedure for
risk assessment and risk management of work activity in confined
spaces. Every year, this activity causes fatal accidents and injuries.
Incidents in confined spaces frequently lead to multiple fatalities as
would-be rescuers perish while trying to rescue the first victim of the
accident. The results of historical analysis on accidents in confined
spaces in Section 3 show that the major cause of fatalities in confined
spaces is asphyxiation.
Despite the rising accident rates and the statistics on multiple-
L. Botti et al.
fatality incidents, confined space work procedures are not inter-
nationally standardized. Industrialized countries adopt several stan-
dards, regulations and codes of practice on confined space work, based
on their local legislation: a unified methodology to analyze and control
the risks of confined space work is missing. This paper has introduced a
structured procedure to address the risks associated with working in
confined space. The procedure adopts a holistic approach to safety in
confined spaces in the process industry. Specifically, the framework
proposed in Section 4 gathers the directions and the guidelines from the
fragmented regulations, addressing safety managers and practitioners
during the design of work procedures for safe work in confined spaces.
Three phases define the structure of the framework: analysis, risk as-
sessment, and risk elimination and reduction. The first phase includes
the analysis of the characteristics of the confined area, the character-
istics of the task and the characteristics of the emergency and response
plan. The second phase investigates the causes and consequences of
risks in confined spaces. Finally, the third phase analyses the risk
control measures (e.g., engineering controls, administrative controls
and personal protective equipment).
Two test cases have been introduced to verify the effectiveness of
proposed procedure: an ex-post analysis carried out on a real accident
occurred during a task execution in a oil storage tank, and an ex-ante
assessment for risk prevention during the manufacturing process of a
metal tank. Specifically, the ex-post analysis shows that essential safety
parameters and requirements were omitted during the planning and the
design of the intervention in the first confined space. The application of
the proposed framework ensures the identification of high-risk confined
spaces in industry and the proper application of control measures for
the elimination or the reduction of the risk. The application of the
proposed methodology ensures the recognition of high-risks of confined
spaces in industry and the proper identification of control measures for
the elimination or the reduction of the risk of confined space work.
Employers, employers and safety professional should adopt the pro-
posed framework during planning activities in confined spaces.
Future developments of this study include the validation of the
proposed framework through its application to multiple case studies
from different industries. Many workplaces contain areas that are
considered “confined space”, from agriculture to construction industry.
Future developments of this study include the test with different work
environments, e.g. to investigate the risks of cleaning a grain storage
silo and to study the risk of inspecting the hull of a ship. Specifically,
the framework will be tested in different types of confined spaces, e.g.
sewers, tunnels and vessels, to ensure its effectiveness and validation in
a wide field of applications.
Acknowledgement
This research has been partially funded by the Azienda Unità
Sanitaria Locale (AUSL) of Bologna, Italy. The authors are grateful for
this support.
References
ANSI/ASS, 2009. Safety Requirements for Confined Spaces with Comparison Document
for Versions 1995, 2003 and 2009. ANSI Z117.1-2009. American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE), Des Plaines, IL.
ANSI/ISA, 2007. Performance Requirements for Instruments Used to Detect Oxygen-de-
ficient/oxygen-enriched Atmospheres. ANSI/ISA-92.04.01, Part I-2007 (R2013).
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), Instrumentation Systems and
Automation Society (ISA).
ASTM, 2012. Standard Practice for Confined Area Entry. ASTM D4276-02(2012).
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International, West
Conshohocken, PA.
Botti, L., Duraccio, V., Gnoni, M.G., Mora, C., 2015. A framework for preventing and
managing risks in confined spaces through IOT technologies. In: Safety and
Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems - Proceedings of the 25th European Safety
and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2015.
Botti, L., Ferrari, E., Mora, C., 2017a. Automated entry technologies for confined space
work activities: a survey. J. Occup. Environ. Hyg. 14 (4). https://doi.org/10.1080/
34
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35
15459624.2016.1250003.
Botti, L., Mora, C., Ferrari, E., 2017b. A methodology for the identification of confined
spaces in industry. Smart. Innovat. Syst. Technol. 68, 701–709. https://doi.org/10.
1007/978-3-319-57078-5_66.
Botti, L., Bragatto, P.A., Duraccio, V., Gnoni, M.G.G., Mora, C., 2016. Adopting IOT
technologies to control risks in confined space: a multi-criteria decision tool. Chem.
Eng. Trans. 53, 127–132.
Burlet-Vienney, D., Chinniah, Y., Bahloul, A., Roberge, B., 2015a. Design and application
of a 5 step risk assessment tool for confined space entries. Saf. Sci. 80, 144–155 ISSN
0925-7535.
Burlet-Vienney, D., Chinniah, Y., Bahloul, A., Roberge, B., 2015b. Occupational safety
during interventions in confined spaces. Saf. Sci. 79, 19–28. https://doi.org///dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.05.003.
Burlet-Vienney, D., Chinniah, Y., Bahloul, A., 2014. The need for a comprehensive ap-
proach to managing confined space entry: summary of the literature and re-
commendations for next steps. J. Occup. Environ. Hyg. 11 (8), 485–498.
CSB, 2006. CSB Issues Case Study in 2005 Valero Refinery Delaware City, DE, Accident;
Report Notes Inadequate Nitrogen Asphyxiation Hazard Awareness Training and
Improper Confined Space Rescue Actions - Investigations - News. The U.S. Chemical
Safety Board Retrieved January 24, 2018, from. http://www.csb.gov/csb-issues-
case-study-in-2005-valero-refinery-delaware-city-de-accident-report-notes-
inadequate-nitrogen-asphyxiation-hazard-awareness-training-and-improper-
confined-space-rescue-actions/.
Elia, V., Gnoni, M.G., 2013. Pervasiveness of RFID technology: a survey based on case
studies analysis. Int. J. RF Technol. Res. Appl. 5 (1), 41–61.
Frensh ministry for sustainable development -SRT/BARPI, 2009. Accidents in confined
spaces. Retrieved from. https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/wp-
content/files_mf/ACCIDENTSCONFINED_SPACES.pdf.
Garrison, R.P., Erig, M., 1991. Ventilation to eliminate oxygen deficiency in a confined
space. Part III: heavier-than-air characteristics. Appl. Occup. Environ. Hyg 6 (2),
131–140.
Hansen, S., 1999. Confined Space Rescue Operations Standard Operating Procedures.
National Fire Academy, Executive Fire Officer Program, Emmitsburg, MD.
Health and Safety Executer (HSE), 1997. Confined Spaces Regulations. Health and Safety
Executer (HSE).
Health and Safety Executer (HSE), 1999. The Management of Health and Safety at Work
Regulations. Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
Health and Safety Executer (HSE), 2014. Confined Spaces Regulations 1997, Approved
Code of Practice, Regulations and Guidance, third ed. Health and Safety Executer
(HSE).
Kolbe, M., Simoes, V., Salzano, E., 2017. Including Detonations in Industrial Safety and
Risk Assessments. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2017.06.015.
McAllister, S., Chen, J.-Y., Fernandez-Pello, A.C., 2011. Fundamentals of Combustion
Processes. Springer Retrieved from. https://books.google.it/books/about/
Fundamentals_of_Combustion_Processes.html?id=-onCX7u4_VcC&redir_esc=y.
Ministero Del Lavoro E Delle Politiche Sociali, 2008. D.lgs 9 aprile 2008, n.81 Testo unico
sulla salute e sicurezza sul lavoro.
Ministero Del Lavoro E Delle Politiche Sociali, 2011. DPR 177/2011 Regolamento recante
norme per la qualificazione delle imprese e dei lavoratori autonomi operanti in
ambienti sospetti di inquinamento o confinanti.
Muncy, C., 2013. The Sixty Percent Statistic. How to break the chain of would-be rescuer
deaths in confined spaces. The Synergist 24 (2), 25–26. Retrieved from. http://www.
aihasynergist-digital.org/aihasynergist/201302?pg=6#pg6.
Nano, G., Derudi, M., 2012. Evaluation of workers accidents through risk analysis. Chem.
Eng. Trans. 26, 495–500. https://doi.org/10.3303/CET1226083.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 1979. Criteria for a re-
commended standard: working in confined spaces. Publication No. 80–106. U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Centers for
Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, DHEW
(NIOSH), Morgantown, WV.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 1986. NIOSH Alert:
Request for Assistance in Preventing Occupational Fatalities in Confined Spaces.
Publication No. 86-110. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public
Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, DHHS (NIOSH), Cincinnati, Ohio.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 1987. A Guide to Safety in
Confined Spaces. Publication No. 87-113. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH), Cincinnati, OH.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 1994. Worker Deaths in
Confined Spaces. A Summary of NIOSH Surveillance and Investigative Findings.
Publication No. 94–103. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public
Health Service, Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention, National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Cincinnati, OH.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 2014. Welder Dies during
Welding Repair inside of Cargo Tank Compartment. NIOSH, Cincinnati, OH. http://
www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/stateface/mi/06MI188.html accessed December, 2016.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 2016. Fatality Assessment
and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program: Confined Space. https://wwwn.cdc.gov/
NIOSH-FACE/Default.cshtml?Category=0004&Category2=ALL accessed Januray,
2017.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 1987. Safety and Health
Regulations for Construction. General Safety and Health Provisions. Safety Training
and Education. Publication No. 1926.21. U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 1993. Occupational Safety and
L. Botti et al.
Health Standards. General Environmental Controls. Permit-required Confined Spaces.
Publication No. 29 CFR 1910.146. U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA).
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 1996. Occupational Safety and
Health Standards. Special Industries. Grain Handling Facilities. Publication No. 29
CFR 1910.272. U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA).
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 2002. Job Hazard Analysis.
Publication No. 3071. U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA).
Occupational Safety And Health Administration (OSHA), 2004. Permit-required Confined
Spaces. OSHA 3138–01R 2004. U.S. Department Of Labor, Occupational Safety And
Health Administration (OSHA).
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 2011. Occup. Safety and Health
Standards for Shipyard Employment. Confined and Enclosed Spaces and Other
Dangerous Atmospheres in Shipyard Employment. Publication No. 29 CFR 1915
Subpart B. U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA).
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 2015a. Safety and Health
Regulations for Construction. Confined Spaces in Construction. Authority for 1926
Subpart AA. Publication No. 1926 Subpart AA. U.S. Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 2015b. reportAccident Report
Detail, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Retrieved December 22,
2017, from. https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=
201320439.
Riaz, Z., Arslan, M., Kiani, A.K., Azhar, S., 2014. CoSMoS: a BIM and wireless sensor based
integrated solution for worker safety in confined spaces. Autom. ConStruct. 45,
96–106. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.AUTCON.2014.05.010.
Sahli, B.P., Armstrong, C.W., 1992. Confined space fatalities in Virginia. J. Occup. Med.
34 (9), 910–917.
Salvado, F.C., Tavares, A.J., Teixeira-Dias, F., Cardoso, J.B., 2017. Confined explosions:
35
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 25–35
the effect of compartment geometry. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 48, 126–144. https://
doi.org/10.1016/J.JLP.2017.04.013.
Salzano, E., 2014. Confined gas and dust explosions. In: Reference Module in Chemistry,
Molecular Sciences and Chemical Engineering. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/
B978-0-12-409547-2.11031-5.
Stack, T., Ostrom, L.T., Wilhelmsen, C.A., 2016. Occupational Ergonomics: a Practical
Approach. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
SUVA, 2004. Direttive concernenti i lavori all'interno di recipienti e locali stretti.
Publication No. 01416. Istituto Nazionale Svizzero di Assicurazione contro gli
Infortuni, Sicurezza sul Lavoro (SUVA).
SUVA, 2010a. Ambienti di lavoro ristretti: cosa fare contro il pericolo di esplosione, in-
tossicazione e asfissia? Publication No. 44040.i. Istituto nazionale svizzero di assi-
curazione contro gli infortuni, Sicurezza sul lavoro (SUVA).
SUVA, 2010b. Sicurezza nei lavori all’interno di pozzi, fosse e canalizzazioni. Publication
No. 44062.i. Istituto nazionale svizzero di assicurazione contro gli infortuni,
Sicurezza sul Lavoro (SUVA).
SUVA, 2012. Lista di controllo CFSL. Fosse d’ispezione e manutenzione. Publication No.
CFSL:6806i. Istituto nazionale svizzero di assicurazione contro gli infortuni,
Sicurezza sul lavoro (SUVA).
SUVA, 2013. Lista di controllo. Saldatura, taglio, brasatura e riscaldo: procedimento a
fiamma. Publication No. 67103.i. Istituto nazionale svizzero di assicurazione contro
gli infortuni, Sicurezza sul lavoro (SUVA).
Taylor, B., 2011. Confined Spaces. Common Misconceptions & Errors in Complying with
OSHA's Standard. Professional Safety, July. vol 2011. pp. 42–46.
Wilson, M.P., Madison, H.N., 2008. Protecting Workers in Industrial Confined Spaces.
Report to the Los Angeles District Attorney and the California Occupational Safety
and Health Standards Board.
Wilson, M.P., Madison, H.N., Healy, S.B., 2012. Confined space emergency response:
assessing employer and fire department practices. J. Occup. Environ. Hyg. 9 (2), 120.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15459624.2011.646644.
Yang, L., Yang, S.H., Plotnick, L., 2013. How the internet of things technology enhances
emergency response operations. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 80 (9), 1854–1867.