SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW

CIVIL PROCEDURE SPL2

INDIVIDUAL OUTPUT
COMPILATION OF CASE BRIEFS
RULES 1- 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT

SUBMITTED BY: SUBMITTED TO:

Stephanie Pagdanganan DEAN RICO PAOLO
QUICHO
2018400116
CIVPRO SPL2
CASE MATRIX

CASE FACTS ISSUE RULING ANALYSIS

Rule 2 — Cause of Action

Samson v. Sps. Spouses Gabor own a Whether or not the No. In this case, Section 2, Rule 2 of the
Gabor parcel of land in Rizal. complaint states a aside from the fact Rules of Court provides that
They sold the land to cause of action. the respondent a cause of action is the act
petitioner, who executed a spouses had or omission by which a party
deed of sale to Ramos. mortgaged the violates the right of another.
Respondent filed an action property to
for legal redemption with respondent bank,
the RTC. Petitioner and there is no other
Ramos then executed an allegation of act or
agreement revoking the omission on part of
transfer. Respondent respondent bank in
Spouses Gabor are violation of the right
registered owners of a of petitioner.
parcel of land in Rizal
Province.

Uniwide Holdings Uniwide entered into a Whether or not a No. The restriction When construing with
v. Cruz franchise agreeemnt with case based on should be strictly Section 5, Rule 2 (which
Cruz. It was agreed that it several causes of construed as relating states the general rule
would be five years and it action is solely to the agreement where personal actions
would be that way to dismissible on for which the exclusive may be commenced and
establish and operate a ground of venue stipulation is tried where the plaintiff or
Uniwide Family Store. improper venue? embodied. Expanding defendant resides, at the
Article 10.2 of the the scope of such election of the plaintiff, the
Agreement called for the limitation on a exception being that
 franchisee to pay a monthly
service fee. In case of
delay, it was provided that
there would be charged an
interest. Article 27.5
provided that the
franchisee consented to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of Quezon.
Lourdes Suites v. Two executive contracts
Binaro were executed with
respondent Binaro for room
accomodations for two
groups of students, as
petitioner owns a hotel.
Although respondent paid
the total contract price, it is
claimed that there was an
contracting party will parties may, before filing
create unwarranted of action, validly agree in
restrictions which the writing on an exclusive
parties might find venue) where there is a
unintended or worse, joinder of causes of action
arbitrary and between the same parties
oppressive. one of which does not
arise out of the contract
where the exclusive
venue was stipulated
upon, the complaint, as in
the one at bar, may be
brought before other
venues provided that such
other causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction
of the court and the venue
lies therein. In this case,
the deeds, unlike the
Agreement, bear no
exclusive venue
stipulation with respect to
the causes of action
thereunder.
Whether or not the No. The courts are not On the one hand, failure
MeTC committed precluded from to state cause of action
grave abuse of dismissing a case for refers to insufficiency of
discretion in lack of cause of action. the pleading, and is a
dismissing with In the case of ground for dismissal
prejudice based Macaslang v. Zamora, under Rule 16 of the
on lack of cause the Court provided that Rules of Court. On the
of action. failure to state cause of other hand, lack of cause
action and lack of cause of action refers to a
 unpaid balance for
damages to furniture.
Rule 3, Sections 1 to 3 — Parties to Civil Actions
Iron and Steel Iron and Steel Authority
Authority v. Court was created with the power
of Appeals to initiate expropriation of
land required for basic iron
and steel facilities. The
National Steel Corporation
had an expansion program,
and thus the president
issued a proclamation
withdrawing from sale or
settlement a large track of
public land in Iligan. Since
certain parts of such public
land were occupied by non-
operational fertilizer plants
owned by respondent, an
LOI was issued directing
the National Steel
Corporation to negotiate
with respondent for
compensation of
occupancy rights.
Sps. Oco v. Sabas Limbaring subdivided
Limbaring, his lot and then executed
Deeds of Sale in favor of
Jennifer Limbaring and Sarah
of action are really situation where the
different from each evidence does not prove
other. the cause of action
alleged in the pleading.
Yes.In this case, ISA Rule 3, Section 3 of the
Whether or not the instituted the Rules of Court expressly
Republic of the expropriation recognize the role of
Philippines is proceedings in its representative parties,
entitled to be capacity as an agent or that a party authorized by
substituted for ISA representative of the statute may sue or be
in view of the Republic pursuant to its sued without joining the
expiration of ISA’s authority under PD 272. party for whose benefit
term. From these premises, the action is presented or
the expiration of ISA’s defended.
statutory term did not
justify dismissal of the
eminent domain
proceedings.
No. Absent any clear Interest within the meaning
Whether or not proof that a trust was of the Rules means material
Respondent was a created, he cannot be interest or an interest in
real party in deemed a real party in issue to be affected by the
 Jane Limbaring. Percita Oco,
daughter of Sabas, filed a
case of perjury and
falsification of documents
against her Respondent
Uncle Victor Limbaring, who
was the father of Jennifer and
Sarah Jane. During pre-trial,
the parties agreed that the
two parcels of land should be
reconveyed to petitioner, who
was to pay respondent
expenses incurred to transfer
the title to her name.
Golangco v. Fung Respondent issued an
office memorandum
maliciously imputing
against petitioner that he
had committed bribery.
This was sent to
petitioner’s superiors in
POEA and this casued
prejudice to petitioner.
interest in the suit interest. decree or judgment of the
to rescind the case, as distinguished from
Deeds of mere curiosity about the
Reconvenyance. question involved. One
having no material interest
to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as
the plaintiff in an action.
When the plaintiff is not the
real party in interest, the
case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of
action
Whether or not the Yes. The OSG is to The Administrative Code of
Court of Appeals represent “the 1987 mandates the OSG to
correctly ruled on Government in the represent “the Government
the petition for Supreme Court and the in the Supreme Court and
certiorari of the Court of Appeals in all the Court of Appeals in all
petitioner? criminal proceedings;
criminal proceedings; represent the Government
represent the and its officers in the
Government and its Supreme Court, the Court of
officers in the Supreme Appeals, and all other courts
Court, the Court of or tribunals in all civil actions
Appeals, and all other and special proceedings in
courts or tribunals in all which the Government or
civil actions and special any officer thereof in his
proceedings in which official capacity is a party.
the Government or any
officer thereof in his
official capacity is a
party, according to the
Administrative code. In
this case, the People of
 the Philippines were
indispensable parties,
and petitioner not
joining the People as a
party in his action for
certiorari in the Court of
Appeals was fatal and
enough cause for
summary rejection of
his petition.
Equitable PCI Atonio Tiu wanted to Whether or not the Yes. In this case, since Rule 3, Section 2 of the
Bank, Inc. v. Heirs secure loans obtained by complaint filed by the mortgaged property Rules of Court provides
of Tiu Ching from Petitioner Respondents, is presumed conjugal, that as a general rule,
Equitable Bank, so a real without impleading Matilde is obliged every action must be
estate mortgage in favor of Matilde who must principally under the prosecuted or defended in
petitioner was issued. Tui also be Antonio’s AREM. Therefore, she the name of the real party
also executed an an heir and who was is the real party in in interest. Section 3 of
Amendement to the Real principally obliged interest and hence, the the same Rule provides
Estate Mortgage which under the AREM, action must be that the beneficiary shall
increased the amount is dismissible for prosecuted in her name be included in the title of
secured by the mortgage. lack of cause of as she stands to be the case and shall be
This was signed by his wife action. benefited or injured in deemed to be the real
which said, “with my marital the action. party in interest.
consent”. Tiu died, and the
loan remained unsettled.

Rule 3, Sections 4 to 6 — Parties to Civil Actions

Department of An administrative order Whether or not the Yes. In this case, the As a general rule, a state
Health v. Phil was issued by the DOH. case should be DOH, being an may not be sued.
Pharmawealth, This gave out guidelines dismissed for unincorporated agency However, if it consents,
Inc., and procedures for the being a suit of the government, can either expressly or
accreditation of against the State. validly invoke the impliedly, then it may be
government suppliers for defense of immunity the subject of a suit. An
pharmaceutical products from suit because it has unincorporated
for sale or distribution to not consented to be government agency
the public. This was then sued. The doctrine of without any separate
amended by other state immunity extends juridical personality of its
administrative orders. also to complaints filed own enjoys immunity from
These orders provided that against state officials for suit because it is invested
the accreditation may be acts done in the with an inherent power of
recalled, suspended, or discharge and sovereignty.
revoked after due performance of their
deliberation, hearing, and duties.
notice by the DOH
Accreditation Committee.
The DOH then issued a
Memorandum hearing and
notice by the DOH
accreditation Committee.
Next, a list and category of
sanctions to be imposed on
accredited government
suppliers of
pharmaceuticals. The DOH
then issues a
memorandum which invited
representatives of 24
accredited drug companies
to a meeting where they
were directed to submit
within 10 days their
respective explanations on
the adverse findings
covering their products.
Instead of submitting a
written explanation, PPI
 sent a late letter stating that
it referred the matter to
their lawyers. Usec Galon
then informed PPI that it’s
accreditation had been
suspended.
Air It was discovered by
Transportation Spouses Ramos that a
Office v. Sps. portion of their land was
Ramos being used as part of the
runway of Loakan airport,
operated by petitioner Air
Transportation Office
(ATO). The respondents,
Spouses Ramos, then
agreed to sell the land to
ATO, but ATO did not pay.
Whether or not the Yes. the CA thereby In exercising the right of
ATO could be correctly appreciated eminent domain, the State
sued without the the juridical character of exercises its jus imperii,
State’s consent. the ATO as an agency as distinguished from its
of the Government not proprietary rights, or jus
performing purely gestionis; yet, even in that
governmental or area, where private
sovereign function, but property had been taken
was instead involved in in expropriation without
the management of just compensation being
Loakan Airport, an paid, the defense of
activity that was not immunity from suit could
exclusive prerogative of not be set up by the State
the State in its against an action for
sovereign capacity. payment by the owners.
Furthermore, the Immunity has not been
doctrine of sovereign upheld in favor of the
immunity cannot be proprietary functions
successfully invoked to whose function was not in
defeat a valid claim for pursuit of a necessary
compensation arising function of government,
from the taking without but was essentially a
just compensation and business.
without proper
expropriation
proceedings being first
 resorted to of the
plaintiffs’ property.

Rule 3, Sections 7 to 12 — Parties to Civil Actions

Lotte Phils. v. Petitioner hired Whether or not 7J Yes. No final ruling on What is an indespensible
dela Cruz respondents to work in a is an this matter can be had party? It is important to
confectionery facility. indispensable without impleading 7J, answer this first before we
Petitioner then entered into party and should whose inclusion is delve into the discussion.
a contract with have been necessary for the An indispensable party is
Maintenance and Janitorial impleaded in effective and complete a party in interest without
Services to provide respondents’ resolution of the case whom no final
manpower for needed petition in the and in order to accord determination can be had
maintenance, utility, Court of Appeals. all parties with due of an action. The joinder
janitorial, and other process. of indispensable parties is
services. Respondent then mandatory. The absence
was fired. of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent
actions of the court null
and void. In this case, 7J
is an indispensable party.
It is a party in interest
because it will be affected
by the outcome of the
case.
Chua v. Torres An RBC check in favor of No. The Supreme Court Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Caltex Service Center was Whether or not a held that the RTC erred in Rules of Court makes no
issued by Chua in payment co-plaintiff dismissing the instant distinctions that would
of purchase of oil. But the impleaded only as complaint. expressly exempt a
check was dishonored by necessary party, necessary party from
drawee bank. Beltran did who has no claim executing the certification
not bother to check who for relief, should against forum shopping.
had issued the check and also make a Nevertheless, a misjoined
 instead instituted an action certification
against petitioner Christine against
Chua for BP 22. The shopping.
policce officers went to her
residence, in the auto
repair shop of her brother,
and even her uni.
Office of the City Respondents claim to be
Mayor of the absolute owners of land
Paranaque v. in Paranaque. The land
Ebio was due to an accretion of
Cut-cut creek. It was
asserted by respondents
that the original occupant
was their great grandfather
Jose Vitalez. Jose gave the
land to his son, and his son
continuously and
party plaintiff has no
forum business participating in
the case as a plaintiff in
the first place, and it
would make little sense to
require the misjoined
party in complying with all
the requirement expected
of plaintiff. At the same
time, Section 11, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court
provides that neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder
of parties is ground for
dismissal of action.
Clearly, misjoinder of
parties is not fatal to the
complaint. The rule
prohibits dismissal of a
suit on the ground of non-
joinder or misjoinder of
parties.
No. It is an uncontested The State is neither a
Whether or not the fact that the subject land necessary nor
State is an was formed from the indispensable party to an
indispensable alluvial deposits that have action where no positive
party to gradually settled along the act shall be required from
banks of Cut-cut creek.
respondents’ it or where no obligation
action for shall be imposed. The law
prohibitory that governs over the
injunction. accreted portion is Article
84 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866 and
 exclusively occupied and
possessed such lot.
Respondent married the
son’s daughter, and the
couple made their house
on the lot. Then the son
executed a transfer of
rights in favor of Ebio. So
respondents were
surprised when several
public officers proceeded to
cut 8 coconut trees planted
on such lot.
Bulawan v. Bulawan alleges that she
Aquender is the owner of a certain lot,
and that she had bought
the property from the
Yaptengco brothers, who in
turn claim that they had
inherited the property from
Yap Chin Chun. Yap
claimed ownership also
over the same property.
Yap says that in another
civil case, the trial court
had already declared the
subdivision survey of the
Yaptengco brothers
Article 457 of the New
Civil Code which provide
that alluvial deposits
along banks of a creek do
not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial
property automatically
belongs to the owner of
the estate to which it may
have been added.
Moreover, the action for
prohibition seeks to enjoin
the city government of
Paranaque from
proceeding with its
implementation of the
road construction project.
Whether or not No. . In this case, during Section 7, Rule 3 of the
respondent is an the proceedings before Rules of Court states that
indispensable the trial court, the an indispensable party is
party. answers of Yap and a party in interest without
Register of Deeds whom no final
should have prompted determination can be had
the court to inquire of an action. The absence
further whether there of an indispensable party
were other renders all subsequent
indispensable parties. It actions of the court null
would be the height of and void for want of
inequity to allow authority.
respondent’s title to be
nullified without being
given the opportunity to
 simulated. This means that present any evidence in
Yap Chin Chun is still the support of his
rightful owner. The trial ostensible ownership of
court ruled for Bulawan, property.
This was then affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. When
the decision became final
and executory, the trial
court issued a writ of
execution. This writ was
then questioned, as
Aquende claims that he
was unaware of any
litigation on his property

National Power National Power Corporation Whether or not No. The NPC, therefore, It was held that saying
Corporation v. received a notice of NPC still owned or ceased to operate that that NPC was liable for
Provincial franchise tax delinquency operated the business in Bataan by local franchise tax is a
Government of from the provincial business subject operation of law. nullity. EPIRA created the
Bataan government of Bataan. to local franchise National Transmission
Respondents then sent tax. Corporation (TRANSCO)
again notices of tax due. and transferred to it
The NPC then replied that NPC’s electrical
it had ceased to be liable transmission function. The
for payment of such tax NPC therefore ceased to
ever since the enactment of operate that business in
EPIRA. Ignoring NPC’s Bataan by operation of
view, a warrant of levy was law. Since local franchise
issued on 14 real tax is imposed on the
properties causing their privilege of operating a
sale at public auction. franchise, it is clear that
such tax is not a liability of
the NPC. Further, the
 EPIRA created the Power
Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM
Corp) and transferred to it
all of NPC’s “generation
assets”. It also transferred
all existing liabilities of the
NPC to PSALM Corp,
presumably including the
unpaid liability for local
franchise tax. Since the
subject properties belong
to PSALM Corp and
TRANSCO, they are
certainly indispensable
parties to the case that
must be necessarily
included before it may
properly go forward.

Rule 3, Sections 13 to 19 — Parties to Civil Actions

Chiang Kai Shek Private respondent Oh was Whether or not a Yes. In this case, Under Rule 3, Section 1 of
School v. Court of dismissed from his school that has although the school has the Rules of Court, it
Appeals teaching position in Chian not been not been incorporated, states quite plainly that
Kai Shek school, after incorporated may petitioner cannot now only natural or juridical
having taught for a period be sued. invoke its own non- persons may be parties in
of 33 years, for no reason. compliance with the law a civil action. Act No.
to immunize it from 2706, as amended,
private respondent’s imposes the obligation
complaint. upon schools recognized
by the government to
incorporate under the
 Corporation Law within 90
days from such
recognition.
Gochan v. Young The daughter of Gochan, Whether or not Yes. Cecilia then Section 3, Rule 3 of the
Alice, and the mother of Spouses Uy have remains a stockholder Rules of Court only permit
respondents, had inherited the personality to of the corporation in an executor or administrator
50 shares of stock in the file suit before the view of the nullity of the to represent or bring suits on
corporation Gochan Realty SEC. Contract of Sale. behalf of the deceased, but
this does not prohibit the
from her father. When Alice Although she was no heirs from representing the
died, she left 50 shares to longer registered as a deceased.
her husband, John Young stockholder in the
Sr. The RTC of Cebu records as of filing of
adjudicated 6/14 of these case, the admitted
shares to her children. allegations in the
John Sr requested Gochan complaint made her still
to partition the shares of his a bona fide stockholder
late wife. This would be of Gochan Realty as
done by canceling the between the parties.
stock certificates in his
name. Then, new
certificates would be issued
in the name of
respondents. Gochan
Realty refused, citing the
right of first refusal given to
the remaining stockholders.

Judge Sumaljag A complaint for the nullity of Whether or not the No. In this case, Section 16, Rule 3 likewise
v. Sps. Diosdidit deed of sale of real deceased may be although counsel for expressly provides that "the
property was executed substituted by Josefa did in fact notify heirs of the deceased may
between Josefa and petitioner. the court of the fact of be allowed to be substituted
spouses Diosdidit and her death, he was not for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of
Literato. It was alleged that able to properly give the an executor or
 this deed of sale was court the name and administrator . . .".
spurious. Josefa was the address of the legal
sister of Menendez, and representatives. The
they were two of six heirs person, petitioner
who inherited the property herein, that counsel
in equal parts. gave as substitute was
Respondents filed an not one of those
amended answer with mentioned under
counterclaim, impleading Section 16 of Rule 3.
Petitioner Sumaljag with
Josefa on the allegation
that petitioner, at the
instance of Josefa,
occupied the lots without
respondents’ authority.

O. Ventanilla Alfredo S Tan and private Whether or not the Yes. The CA was correct The reason given by
Enterprises v. Tan responded Adelina Tan were the Court of in ruling that there is no petitioner, that its former
leased to properties by Appeals was extraordinary counsel had died before the
petitioner. The properties in correct. circumstance in this case CA Decision was
question were in Cabanatuan that would merit a recall of promulgated, hence, it was
City. The Tans, however, did the entry of judgment to not properly notified of the
not follow the terms of the reopen the case. judgment, is too tenuous to
lease. Petitioner then filed a be given serious
complaint against the Tans for consideration. In Mojar, et
termination of contract. A al. v. Agro Commercial
case was then filed in the Security Service Agency,
RTC Inc.,[17] the Court explained
that it is the party's duty to
inform the court of its
counsel's demise, and
failure to apprise the court of
such fact shall be
considered negligence on

Sarsaba v. Fe Respondent represented by
vda. De Te her attorney-in-fact, Faustino
Castañeda, filed with the
RTC, a Complaint for
recovery of motor vehicle,
damages with prayerfor the
delivery of the truck pendente
lite against petitioner,
Sereno,Lavarez and the
NLRC of Davao City.
Respondent alleged, among
others, that: (1) she is the wife
of the late Pedro Te, the
registered owner of the truck,
as evidenced by the Official
Receipt and Certificate of
Registration. Petitioner
alleges that that there was no
showing that the heirs have
filed an intestate estate
proceedings of the estate of
Pedro Te, or that respondent
was duly authorized by her
co-heirs to file the case; and
that the truck was already
sold to Gasing on March 11,
1986 by one Jesus Matias,
who bought the same from
the Spouses Te. Corollarily,
Gasing was already the lawful
owner of the truck when it
was levied on execution and,
later on, sold at public
auction. On October 17, 2005,
petitioner filed an Omnibus
the part of said party.
What is the legal No. In the case before Us, When a party to a pending
effect of death it appears that action dies and the claim is
of the plaintiff during respondent's counsel did not extinguished, the Rules
the pendency of the not make any of Court require a
case? manifestation before the substitution of the deceased.
RTC as to her death. In In such cases, a counsel is
fact, he had actively obliged to inform the court of
participated in the the death of his client and
proceedings. Neither had give the name and address
he shown any proof that of the latter's legal
he had been retained by representative. The rule on
respondent's legal substitution of parties is
representative or any governed by Section 16, 46
one who succeeded her. Rule 3 of the 1997Rules of
Civil Procedure, as
amended. The rule on
substitution by heirs is not a
matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process.
The rule on substitution
was crafted to protect every
party's right to due process.
It was designed to ensure
that the deceased party
would continue to be
properly represented in the
suit through his heirs or the
duly appointed legal
representative of his estate.
It is only when there is a
denial of due process, as
when the deceased is not
represented by any legal
representative or heir, that
the court nullifies the trial
 Motion to Dismiss the Case proceedings and the
on the following grounds: (1) resulting judgment therein.
lack of jurisdiction over one of
the principal defendants; and
(2) to discharge respondent's
attorney-in-fact for lack of
legal personality to sue. It
appeared that the respondent,
Fe Vda. de Te, died on April
12, 2005. Respondent,
through her lawyer, argues
that respondent's death did
not render functus officio her
right to sue since her
attorney-in-fact, Faustino
Castañeda, hadlong testified
on the complaint on March
13, 1998 for and on her behalf
and,accordingly, submitted
documentary exhibits in
support of the complaint.
Dagadag v. Respondents were sent a Who may appeal The CSC and the mayor The established rule is that a
Tongnawa memorandum by Dagdag, from the Decision of of Tanudan are real real party in interest is one
the mayor of the municipality the Court of parties in interest in this who would be benefited or
of Tanudan, asking them why Appeals? case and, therefore, can injured by the judgment, or
they should not be contest the decision of the one entitled to the avails of
administratively santioned for CA. the suit. The word "interest,"
acts unbecoming of public as contemplated by the
servants and failure to Rules, means material
perform their duties. They interest or an interest in
were given 72 hours. Michael issue and to be affected by
Tongnawa and Antonio the judgment, as
Gammod, respondents, are distinguished from mere
the municipal engineer and interest in the question
municipal planning and involved or a mere incidental
development coordinator.The interest. Stated differently,
 Municipal Grievance
Committee found respondents
liable for insubordination, non-
performance of duties and
absences without official
leaves. Respondents were
then suspended for two
months.
Rule 3, Sections 18 to 22 — Parties to Civil Actions
Torres v. Rodellas Respondent left her family
and went to Saudi Arabia.
Edwino moved to
Respondent’s house in
Occidental Mondoro. Edwino
occupied the portion vacated
by respondent’s sister. He
claims that respondent sold
him the house, and he has an
affidavit of
relinquishment/sale of right.
Edwino also filed an MSA with
the DENR in his own name
for the property.
Respondent’s MSA
application was turned down
for Edwino. Respondent’s son
returned. He learned of
Edwino’s claim and filed with
the community environment
and natural resources office
Whether or not the Yes. While it is not
counsel of Edwino mentioned when Edwino’s
has the personality exact date of death is in
to file Motion for Motion for
Reconsideration Reconsideration filed
before the Office of the
President, considering
counsel told Office of the
President of Edwino’s
death in a delayed
manner, sec. 16, Rule 3
merely provides for
disciplinary action against
counsel in case of such
failure to comply with its
duty. In said section, one
can find no mention that
counsel would be without
legal personality to appear
for the benefit of the client
or its heirs.
the rule refers to a real or
present substantial interest
as distinguished from a
mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent,
subordinate, or
consequential interest. As a
general rule, one who has
no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as
party-plaintiff in an action.
Because pf A.O No. 18,
s.1987, Rules of Court apply
in a suppletory character
whenever practicable. Sec.
16, Rule 3, Rules of Court, is
applicable here. Substitution
of a deceased party by heirs
is allowed in actions that
survive the death of a party
thereto, particularly, causes
of action that affect primarily
and princippally property
and properety rights, injuries
to the person being merely
incidental. In this case, the
action outlives the death of
Edwino as this case involves
the parties’s respective
rights to acquire property
which is the MSA grant.
 (CENRO) against Edwino’s
MSA on the ground that the
affidavit of relinquishment was
forged as respondent was
abroad
Re: Query of Mr. Good Shepherd Foundation is Can the Courts No. The Good Shepherd Article III, Sec 11 of the
Roger C. an organization which works grant to Good Foundation, not being a 1987 Constitution is clear in
Prioreschi Re for and with indigent persons, Shepherd who natural litigant, cannot be it’s intent , where the bases
exemption from to quote “the poorest among works for indigent exempt. or the exemption from legal
legal and filing the poor, to the newly born and underprivileged and filing fees is the free
fees of the Good and abandoned babies, to people, from access clause. The clear
Shepherd children who never saw the payment of legal intent of the language of the
Foundation, Inc smile of their mother, to old fees? provisions of the Rules of
people who cannot afford a Court show that only a
few pesos to pay for common natural party litigant is
prescriptions, to broken indigent.
families who returned to a
normal life. The administrator
of this asked the Supreme
Court if he could be exempt
from the payment of legal
fees.

Rule 4 — Venue of Actions

Marcos-Araneta The Benedicto group refused Is an affidavit Yes. the signature of any Regarding the certificate of
v. Court of to reconvey 65% enough for forum of the principal petitioners non-forum shopping, the
Appeals stockholdings of FEMII and shopping? or principal parties, as general rule is that all the
UEC as part of their oblidation Francisca is in this case, petitioners or plaintiffs in a
to hold those shares and their would constitute a case should sign it.
fruits in trust and for the substantial compliance However, time and again it
benefit of petitioner. Thus, with the rule on is stressed that the rules on
petitioner instituted two verification and forum shopping, which were
complaints which were later certification of non-forum designed to promote the
consolidated. Respondent shopping. It cannot be orderly administration of
and his daughter tried to have overemphasized that justice, do not interdict
 the cases dismissed, which Francisca herself was a substantial compliance with
the RTC did. Petitioner then principal party. its provisions under
filed an amended complaint. justifiable circumstances.
Julita Benedicto took over
after her husband
Sps. Ang v. Sps. Was the dismissal Yes. The petitioners The rules on the venue of
Ang A $300,000 loan was of the complaint on assert, the said complaint personal actions are fixed
obtained by respondents from the ground that for collection of sum of for the convenience of the
petitioners, as well as a venue was proper? money may be filed in the plaintiffs and their witnesses.
promissory note executed for court of the place where If one were to invoke
the latter, where respondents Atty. Aceron resides, Section 3, Rule 3 of the
promised to pay petitioners which is the RTC of Rules of Court, one would
with interest of 10% per year Quezon City. insist that Atty. Aceron,
upon demand. But being their attorney-in-fact,
respondents failed to pay. is deemed a real party in
The loan already amounted to interest in the case below
720,000 plus interest, and can prosecute the same
petitioners, residents of LA, before the RTC.
executed an SPA to Atty
Aceron to file an action in
court against respondents.

Universal Robina There was a contract of sale WON the trial court No. A court may not A court may not dismiss an
Corporation v. between Universal Robina may dismiss motu dismiss an action motu action motu proprio on the
Lim Corporation and Albert Lim. proprio petitioner’s proprio on the ground of ground of improper venue as
Petitioner sold to Lim grocery complaint on the improper venue as it is not it is not one of the grounds
products amounting to 808k. ground of improper one of the grounds wherein the court may
After tendering partial venue? wherein the court may dismiss an action motu pro
payments, Lim did not settle dismiss an action motu prio on the basis of the
his obligation despite proprio on the basis of the pleadings. Sec. 2. Rule 4 of
demands. pleadings. the Rules of Court provide
that in venue of personal
actions. All other actions
may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the
defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non
resident defendant where he
may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff. Sec.
4 Rule 4 of the same Rules
provide that this Rule shall
not apply. Where the parties
have validly agreed in
writing before the filing of the
action on the exclusive
venue thereof. In personal
actions, the plaintiff may
commence an action either
in the place of his or her
residence or the place
where the defendant
resides. The parties may
agree to a specific venue
which could be in a place
where neither of them
resides. In addition, it is
stated under Sec. 1, Rule 9
of the Rules of court that
improper venue not
impleaded in the motion to
dismiss or in the answer is
deemed waived.The court
may only dismiss an action
motu proprio in case of lack
of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, litis
pendentia, res judicata and
 prescription.

Saludo v. AMEX is a corporation doing WON venue was Yes. The appellate court The rule on venue, like other
American business in The Philippines improperly laid committed reversible error procedural rules, is designed
Express which engages in providing in finding that petitioner to insure a just and orderly
International, credit and other credit Saludo was not a resident administration of justice, or
Inc., facilities. It is situated in of Southern Leyte at the the impartial and
Makati. Plaintiff is a member time of the filing of his evenhanded determination
of the House of complaint of every action and
Representatives who lived in proceeding., so while
Leyte. Petitioners credit card petitioner’s complaint for
from that company was damages against
dishonored as well as his respondents before the court
daughter. He was then is a personal action
charged with late payment, governed by Section 2, Rule
and his cards were cancelled. 4 of the Rules of Courts, the
Petitioner claimed moral choice of venue for personal
damages as a result of actions cognizable by the
AMEX’s act which was RTC is given to plaintiff but
committed in gross and not to plaintiff's whim
evident bad faith. In their because the matter is
answer, respondents regulated by the Rules of
specifically denied the Court.
allegations in the complaint.
Further, they raised the
affirmative defenses of lack of
cause of action and improper
venue. On the latter,
respondents averred that the
complaint should be
dismissed on the ground that
venue was improperly laid
because none of the parties
was a resident of Leyte
San Luis v. San San Luis contracted three Was venue
Luis marriages. The first marriage, properly laid?
there were six children, the
second, one son, the third he
had no son. Respondent
wanted a dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets
and filed a petition for letters
of administration before the
RTC. The heirs from the first
wife filed a motion to dismiss,
but the trial court denied.
Stating at the time of San
Luis’ death, since he was the
governor of Laguna, it should
have been filed there.
United Overseas A mortgage agreement was
Bank v. Rosemor entered between petitioner
Mining and and respondent, wherein
Development respondent mortgaged 6 shopping in filing
parcels of land in Nueva
Ecija. Extrajudicial foreclosure
of the properties was made,
and petitioner was the highest
bidder.
was Yes. The petition for Section 1, Rule 73 of the
letters of administration of Rules of Court. In election
the estate of Felicisimo cases, "residence" and
should be filed in the "domicile" are treated as
Regional Trial Court of the synonymous terms, that is,
province "in which he the fixed permanent
resides at the time of his residence to which when
death. There is a absent, one has the
distinction between intention of returning.
"residence" for purposes However, for purposes of
of election laws and fixing venue under the Rules
"residence" for purposes of Court, the "residence" of a
of fixing the venue of person is his personal,
actions. actual or physical habitation,
or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile
provided he resides therein
with continuity and
consistency.
Whether or not In the present case, there Section 1, Rule 4 of the
Rosemoor is only one proceeding 1997 Rules of Civil
committed forum- sought to be nullified and Procedure, provides that
that is the extra-judicial actions affecting title to or
the two cases mortgage foreclosure possession of real property,
against the bank sale. And there is only or interest therein, shall be
one initial transaction commenced and tried in the
which served as the basis proper court which has
of the foreclosure sale jurisdiction over the area
and that is the mortgage wherein the real property
contract. involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.The

Rule 5 — Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts
Lucas v. Fabros Elenita did not appear the
Preliminary Conference, and
so Judge Fabros dismissed
the case. However, Elenita
filed a motion for
reconsideration and such was
granted. Lucas, who was the
respondent in that case, filed
another case against the
judge for gross ignorance,
stating Section 19 of the
Rules of Summary Procedure,
as a motion for
reconsideration is prohibited.
Respondent explained,
however, that it was granted
in the interest of justice.
Bongato v. Petitioner was accused of
Malvar, unlawfully entering a parcel of
land belonging to the
spouses. Petitioner then filed
a motion for extension of time,
which was denied by the
MTCC, as it was proscribed
under the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Petitioner filed an
answer (with a new counsel)
which the MTCC disregarded,
venue of the action for the
nullification of the
foreclosure sale is properly
laid with the Malolos RTC
WON the motion for Here, the order of As a rule, a motion for
reconsideration filed dismissal issued by reconsideration is a
by Elenita is a respondent judge due to prohibited pleading under
prohibited pleading failure of a party to appear the Rule on Summary
as contemplated during the preliminary Procedure. This rule,
under the Revised conference was obviously however, applies where the
Rules on Summary not a judgment on the judgment sought to be
Proceeding? merits of the case. reconsidered is one
rendered on the merits. As
held by the Court in an
earlier case involving Sec.
19 (c) of the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure:
"The motion prohibited by
this Section is that which
seeks reconsideration of the
judgment rendered by the
court after trial on the
merits of the case."
WON the Court of Yes. The MTCC should Pursuant to Section 36 of
Appeals gravely have squarely ruled on BP 129, the Court on June
abused its the issue of jurisdiction. 16, 1983, promulgated the
discretion in ruling Rule on Summary
that the Motion to Procedure in Special Cases,
Dismiss was a a motion to dismiss or quash
prohibited pleading is a prohibited pleading.
Under the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary
Procedure, however, a
motion to dismiss on the
 as it was filed beyond the ten-
day reglementary period.
Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss with another counsel
which the MTCC denied.
Thereafter, the MTCC
rendered a decision ordering
petitioner to vacate the land in
question, and to pay rentals,
attorneys fees, and the costs
of the suit.
Pascual v. Lorenzo Manaois was
Jovellanos accused of forcible entry, but
the complaint was dismissed
as it was without prejudice for
being insufficient in some
material allegations. Petitioner
then corrected this, but
instead of answer. Manaois
filed a motion to strike out as
he claims the complaint is
false. No answer was
submitted, and the motion to
strike out was granted.
Complainant accused judge
of neglect of duty.
Rule 6 — Kinds of Pleadings
WON Respondent Yes. Verily, judgment
failed to apply the should have been
Rules on Summary rendered based on the
Procedure? allegations of the
Complaint and the
evidence presented
therein, inasmuch as the
defendant failed to file his
answer after the lapse of
ten (10) days from the
service of the summons.
ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter is an
exception to the rule on
prohibited pleadings.
Section 6 of the Rule allows
the trial court to render
judgment, even motu
proprio, upon failure of the
defendant to file an answer
within the reglementary
period. Moreover, under
Section 10 of the Rule,
respondent was duty-bound
to render his decision within
thirty (30) days from receipt
of the last affidavits and
position papers, or the
expiration of the period for
filing them. This
notwithstanding, he has not
yet ruled on the Motion for
Summary Judgment dated
December 15, 1999, filed in
accordance with Section 6 of
the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Victorina v. Filed for a complaint for sum WON the CA erred Yes.
Brewmaster of money against petitioner, in its decision
International Respondent is a marketing
company who sells beer.
Accordingly, petitioner got a
credit of 182. 502 pesos. As
proof, there are sales
invoices. It says that despite
demands, they did not pay.
Petitioner responds, denying
any knowledge of the
obligation.
Mongao v. Pryce Respondent agreed to sell to
Properties the latter for the price of 5
million a parcel of land in
Cotabato. Respondent paid
the 550,000 earnest money,
but after considerable delay,
offered to pay the balance,
but such was rejected.
Respondent did not pay the
check to petitioner Mongao
despite written and oral
demands.
The basic requirement under
the rules of procedure is that
a complaint must make a
plain, concise, and direct
statement of the ultimate
facts on which the plaintiff
relies for his claim. Ultimate
facts: substantial facts which
either directly form the basis
of the plaintiff's primary right
and duty or directly make up
the wrongful acts or
omissions of the defendant.
They refer to the principal,
determinative, constitutive
facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action
rests. Thus, the CA erred.
Whether or not the No. The records reveal Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the ROC
pleadings of the that respondent provides that where an
respondent corporation did not file any answer fails to tender an
corporation did not formal complaint for issue, or otherwise admits
tender an issue? consignation the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading,
the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment
on such pleading.
Respondent’s answer
admitted that there was a
perfected contract of sale
between it and petitioner
and that respondent refused
to tender payment of the
purchase price solely to
petitioner. Now, if an
answer does in fact
 specifically deny the material
averments of the complaint
in the manner indicated by
said Section 10 of Rule 8,
and/or asserts affirmative
defenses in accordance with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 6, a
judgment on the pleadings
would naturally not be
proper.

Buncayao v. Fort Petitioner is one of two Whether or not Yes. The only claim that A compulsory counterclaim
Ilocandia entrepeneurs who added respondent's remained was the claim is any claim for money or
Properties, improvements on the counterclaim is for damages against any relief, which a defending
foreshore area of a beach compulsory? respondent. party may have against an
where a hotel was opposing party, which at the
constructed. The other time of suit arises out of, or
entrepeneurs began setting is necessarily connected
up their own stalls in the area, with, the same transaction or
and formed a Beach Resport occurrence that is the
Owner’s Association. Six subject matter of the
parcels of land in the beach plaintiff's complaint. It is
were transferred to the compulsory in the sense that
Philippine Tourism Authority. it is within the jurisdiction of
Petitioner and other D’Sietro the court, does not require
members then applied for a for its adjudication the
foreshore lease with the presence of third parties
CENRO and was granted a over whom the court cannot
provisional permit. DENR acquire jurisdiction, and will
then denied the lease be barred in the future if not
applications. set up in the answer to the
complaint in the same case.
Any other counterclaim is
permissive.
Philtranco On Felix Paras way home toWhether or not Paras No. The Supreme Court Under the Section 12 Rule 6
Service Manila from Bicol, he boarded acan recover damages does not disturb the of Rules of Court— A third-
Enterprises v. CA vehicle owned and operated bymoral damages in this unanimous findings by the party complaint is a claim
Inland Trailways inc. The bussuit based on quasi- CA and the RTC on the that a defending party may,
was bumped by another vehicledelict negligence of Philtranco with leave of court, file
owned and opearated by and its driver being the against a person not a party
Philtranco. The said accident direct cause of the to the action, called the
brought damage to the vehicles, physical injuries of Paras third-party defendant, for
and caused physiacal injuries to and the material damage contribution, indemnity,
the passengers. Paras was of Inland. subrogation or any other
taken to the hospital, where he relief, in respect of his
was diagnosed with several opponent's claim. In
injuries such as hematoma. Balbastro v. Court of
PAras went to two operations Appeals, Section 12 of Rule
affecting the fractured portions 6 of the Revised Rules of
of his body. Court authorizes a
defendant to bring into a
lawsuit any person "not a
party to the action . . . for
contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other
relief in respect of his
opponent's claim." The
impleader of new parties
under this rule is proper only
when a right to relief exists
under the applicable
substantive law. The
requisites for a third-party
action are, firstly, that the
party to be impleaded must
not yet be a party to the
action; secondly, that the
claim against the third-party
defendant must belong to
the original
 defendant; thirdly, the claim
of the original defendant
against the third-party
defendant must be based
upon the plaintiff's claim
against the original
defendant; and, fourthly, the
defendant is attempting to
transfer to the third-party
defendant the liability
asserted against him by the
original plaintiff.
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides, “Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him,
stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading.
Sameer Overseas Respondent was hired under a Whether or not The award of the three- In Serrano
Placement one year employment contract Cabiles month equivalent of v. Gallant Maritime Services,
Agency Inc with Sameer Overseas was entitled to the respondent’s salary Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Placement Agency Inc. She unexpired portion of should be increased to the Co., Inc., this court ruled that
went to Taiwan to work in Wacol her salary due to amount equivalent to the the clause “or for three (3)
as quality control. There, she illegal dismissal.? unexpired term of the months for every year of the
was asked to work as a cutter. employment unexpired term, whichever is
A certain Mr Huwang then contract.Therefore, the less” is unconstitutional for
informed her without prior notice said pleadings cannot be violating the equal protection
that she was terminated and considered unsigned and clause and substantive due
that “she should immediately without any legal effect. process. Sameer contends
report to their office to get her that both the June 6, 2001
salary and passport.” She was Petition and the July 5, 2001
asked to “prepare for immediate Motion for Reconsideration
repatriation.” She earned only a filed by ASBT before the Court
total of 9k NT because Wacoal of Appeals were signed by
deducted to cover her plane Mildred Santos, as corporate
ticket expense back to Manila. president, who is not a
member of the Bar. As such,
Sameer argues that both the
Petition and the Motion for
 Reconsideration should be
considered unsigned
pleadings which produce no
legal effect, pursuant to the
last paragraph of Section 3,
Rule 7 of rules of court.
Obviously, the rule allows the
pleadings to be signed by
either the party to the case or
the counsel representing that
party

Anderson v. Ho An ejectment case was filedWhether or not the Yes. The Supreme Court The need to abide by the
with the MeTC. This case wasrules on certification held that there is No Rules of Court and the
then dismissed. Later, it wasagainst forum justifiable reason exists in procedural requirements it
appealed to the RTC which alsoshopping may be this case as to relax the imposes has been constantly
dismissed the same. Thus,relaxed in this case. rule on certification underscored by this Court.
petitioner filed a motion for against forum shopping. One of these procedural
reconsideration. This was then requirements is the certificate
denied by the RTC. Wanting to of non-forum shopping which,
file with the CA a petitioner for time and again, has been
review under Rule 42 of the declared as basic necessary
Rules of Court, Atty Oliva, and mandatory for procedural
petitioner’s counsel. Filed a orderliness. In Vda. De
motion for extension of time of Formoso v. Philippine National
15 days. This was granted by Bank the Court reiterated the
the CA. Later, said counsel guidelines respecting non-
sought another extension of 15 compliance with or submission
days as the petition had been of a defective certificate of
finalized and sent to Anderson non-forum shopping, the
in hawaii for her to read as well relevant portions of which are
as sign. as follows: As to certification
against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a
defect therein, is generally not
 curable by its subsequent
submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need
to relax the Rule on the ground
of ‘substantial compliance or
presence of ‘special
circumstances or compelling
reasons’.

Fuentebella v. Respondent engaged the Was the certification Yes.

Castro funeral services of Rolling false because there An omission in the certificate
Hills Memorial Park for the was already a prior of non-forum shopping about
interment of the remains of case before the
her dead husband, Freddie MTCC any event that would not
Castro. As the burial was
constitute res judicata and litis
taking place and the casket of
her deceased husband was to pendentia, as in the present
be lowered, it was discovered
that the dimensions of the case, is not fatal as to merit
vault did not fit with the the dismissal and nullification
measurements of the casket.
Because of this, the casket of the entire proceedings
was lifted and placed under
considering that the evils
the heat of the sun for one
hour in front of all the sought to be prevented by the
mourners. To her humiliation,
the employees of petitioner said certificate are not present.
measured the casket by using Hence, in any event, the trial
a spade.
court correctly held that the
submission of a false
certification shall constitute
indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the
 corresponding administrative
and criminal sanctions.

Cagayan Valley v. Whether Cagayan’s Yes. The president can The following officials or
Commissioner of Petitioner says that it granted president can sign sign the verification and employees of the company
Internal Revenue 20% sales discounts to qualified the subject certification. The Court can sign the verification and
verification and has recognized the certification without need of
senior citizens on purchases of certification sans authority of some a board resolution: (1) the
the approval of its corporate officers to sign Chairperson of the Board of
medicine. This was in Board of Directors. the verification and Directors, (2) the President
certification against forum of a corporation, (3) the
accordance with RA 7432. This shopping General Manager or Acting
was treated as deductions from General Manager, (4)
Personnel Officer, and (5)
the gross sales in order to arrive an Employment Specialist in
a labor case. The rationale
at the net sales instead of applied in the foregoing
cases is to justify the
treating them as tax credit as
authority of corporate
provided. They then filed a officers or representatives of
the corporation to sign the
claim with the BIR for tax verification or certificate
against forum shopping,
refund/ tax credit. BIR did not being “in a position to verify
act on the tax credit so Cagayan the truthfulness and
correctness of the
filed a petition for review before allegations in the petition.
the CTA.

Chua v. Chua was president of theWhether or not Petitioners were unable to If the forum shopping is not
Metropolitan company Chua and Filiden. Thesuccessively filing state in the Certificate of considered willful and
Bank and Trust company got a 4 million pesoCivil Case No. CV-01- Non-Forum Shopping the deliberate, the subsequent
Company loan from metrobank, secured0207 and Civil Case existence of Civil Case case shall be dismissed
by a real estate mortgage.No. CV-05-0402 No. CV-01-0207 pending without prejudice, on the
However, the value of theamounts to forum before RTC-Branch 258. ground of either litis
collateral was more than theshopping. pendentia or res judicata.
loan, so Chua was given an However, if the forum
open credit line for future loans. shopping is willful and
They were unalbe to pay their deliberate, both (or all, if...
obligations, so metrobank there are more than two)
entered into a debt settlement actions shall be dismissed
agreement with them, whereby with prejudice..[43]
the loan was restructured.
Finally, it was demanded that
the company pay their liabilities.
When petitioners were unable to
pay, Metrobank tried to extra-
juducually forcelose the REM
constituted on subject
properties.

Metrobank v. A loan was obtained byWhether or not THE No. The petition is not writ of possession may issue
Santos respondent from Metrobank ofCOURT OF covered by Section 5, either (1) within the one year
the amoung of two millionAPPEALS Rule 7 of the Rules and a redemption period, upon the
pesos. To secure payment, aCOMMITTED A certification against forum filing of a bond, or (2) after the
real estate mortgage over aMISAPPREHENSION shopping is not required. lapse of the redemption
condominium unit in Makati andOF FACTS period, without need of a
all it’s improvements were bond. In order to obtain a writ
issued. When the loan was not of possession, the purchaser
paid despite demand, in a foreclosure sale must file
Metrobank instituted an a petition, in the form of an ex
extrajudicial foreclosure parte motion, in the
proceedings against the real registration or cadastral
estate morgage, where proceedings of the registered
Metrobank was the highest property. The reason why this
bidder. So Metrobank registered pleading, although
the certificate of sale. The denominated as a petition, is
redemption period lapsed actually considered a motion is
 without De Koning redeeming best explained in Sps. Arquiza
the property. Metrobank v. CA, where it is stated that
demanded that possession over the certification against forum
the condominium unit be turned shopping is required only in a
in. complaint or other initiatory
pleading. The ex parte petition
for the issuance of a writ of
possession filed by the
respondent is not an initiatory
pleading.

Rule 8 — Manner of making allegations in a Pleading

Vda. de Daffon v. Petitioner and her husband had Whether or not the Yes. The allegations in In this case, the Court of
CA one child, Joselito, who married Court of Appeals the complaint in the case Appeals was correct. The
respondent and they had six erred at bar are sufficient to Supreme Court ruled that in
children. Joselito dies after his establish respondent's the determination of whether
father. Respondent, with her six right to the estate of a complaint fails to state a
children, instituted an action for Amado. By stating their cause of action, only the
partition against petitioner over relationship to the statements in the complaint
the properties left by petitioner’s deceased, they may be properly considered.
husband which formed part of established their line of The complaint needs only to
his conjugal partnership. succession as the basis allege the ultimate facts on
for their claim. Their rights which the plaintiffs rely for
to succeed as heirs were their claim.
transmitted from the
moment of death of the
decedent.
Titan Spouses David acquired a lot in Whether or not No. It is true that the reply While Section 8, Rule 8 is
Construction v. White Plains, Quezon City, there is a Failure to filed by Manuel alleging mandatory, it is a discovery
David, registered under the name of Deny the that the special power of procedure and must be
“MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal Genuineness and attorney is a forgery was reasonably construed to
age, Filipino, married to Manuel Due Execution of not made under oath. attain its purpose, and in a
A. David". Spouses then the SPA However, the complaint, way as not to effect a denial
separated and no longer which was verified by of substantial justice. The
communicated. Manuel then Manuel under oath, interpretation should be one
 discovered that Martha had
previously sold the property to
Titan Construction Corporation
for 1m through a deed of sale in
the name of Titan. Manuel filed
a Complaint for Annulment of
Contract and Reconveyance
against Titan before the
RTC.Manuel alleges that the
sale executed by Martha in
favor of Titan was without his
knowledge and consent.
Consolidated A complaint for recovery of sum
Bank v. Del of money against respondents
Monte Motor was filed by petitioner, who
Works impleades the spouse of
Morales in order to bind their
conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner says that it extended
a loan to respondents in the
amount of 1 million pesos.
Under the promissory note,
respondents bound themselves
to pay petitioner the full amount
of the loan through twenty five
monthly installments of 40,000 a
month. Respondents defaulted
on their monthly installments
despite demand.
alleged that the sale of the
subject property executed
by his wife, Martha, in
favor of Titan was without
his knowledge, consent,
and approval, express or
implied; and that there is
nothing on the face of the
deed of sale that would
show that he gave his
consent thereto.
Whether or not the Yes. In this case, both the
CA erred when it court a quo and the Court
found that of Appeals erred in ruling
respondents denied that respondents were
the material able to specifically deny
allegations of the allegations in
petitioner’s petitioner's complaint in
complaint? the manner specifically
required by the rules.
which assists the parties in
obtaining a speedy,
inexpensive, and most
important, a just
determination of the
disputed issues..
There can be no dispute to
the fact that the allegations
in the ANSWER of both
defendants, they denied
generally and specifically
under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the
promissory note and by way
of special and affirmative
defenses herein states that
he (MORALES) never
signed the promissory note
attached to the complain in
his personal and/or
individual capacity.
Moreover, what appears in
the record was an admission
of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they
deny generally and
specifically the rest of the
allegations. It would be
considered that there is a
sufficient compliance of the

Luistro v. CA First Gas Power Corporation
entered into a Substation
interconnection agreement with
Meralco and NPC, where First
Gas would finance, construct,
and commission a 230 kilovolt
electric power transmission line.
Under the SIA, First Gas had to
acquire easement of right of
way over certain lands. Frist
Gas entered into a Contract of
Easement of Right of Way with
Luistro, an owner of a parcel of
land in Batangas where First
Gas was granted perpetual
easement. However, Luisitro’s
counsel wrote a letter to Frist
Gas asking for a temporary
stoppage of all kinds of work
within the vicinity of petitioner’s
residential hoouse pending
settlement of petitioner’s
grievance that the house and
other improvements lay
underneath the transmission
wire/line being constructed and
would endanger the life and
health of the persons in the
vicinity.
requirement of the law for
specific denial.
Whether the No. The complaint falls Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997
complaint alleges short of the requirement Rules of Civil Procedure states
fraud with that fraud must be stated that “In all averments of fraud
particularity as with particularity. or mistake, the circumstances
required under constituting fraud or mistake
Section 5, Rule 8 of must be stated with
the 1997 Rules of particularity. Malice, intent,
Civil Procedure knowledge or other condition
of the mind of a person may
be averred generally.” Again,
the complaint falls short of the
requirement that fraud must be
stated with particularity. The
complaint merely states “That
sometime in the year of 1997,
the consolidator-facilitator of
the Defendants FGPC and
Balfour by means of fraud and
machinations of words were
able to convince[] the plaintiff
to enter into ‘CONTRACT OF
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF
WAY’ wherein the latter
granted in favor of the
defendant FGPC the right to
erect [its] Tower No. 98 on the
land of the plaintiff situated at
Barangay Maigsing Dahilig,
Lemery 4209 Batangas
including the right to Install
Transmission Lines over a
portion of the same property
for a consideration therein
stated, a xerox copy of said
 contract is hereto attached as
[] ANNEXES “A” up to “A-4” of
the complaint” AND; “That the
said contract, (Annexes “A” up
to “A-4”) was entered into by
the plaintiff under the
“MISREPRESENTATION,
PROMISES, FALSE AND
FRAUDULENT
ASSURANCES AND TRICKS”
of the defendants”

Rule 9 — Effect of Failure to Plead

Indiana Petitioner, a school, posted anWhether or not the Yes. Certiorari was the In the case of Lina v. Court
Aerospace v. advertisement in the Manilaorder of default is only plain, speedy and of Appeals discussed the
Commission on Bulletin. Engineering (TPRAME)valid adequate remedy in the remedies available to a
Higher Education inquired whether petitioner had ordinary course of law, defendant declared in
acquired university status. Dr because the default Order default, as follows: (1) a
Vera referred the letter to had improvidently been motion to set aside the order
CHED, and CHED to it’s issued. of default under Section
regional director in Cebu, 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of
requesting the office to conduct Court, if the default was
an investigation. As a discovered before judgment
consequence of said Report, could be rendered; (2) a
respondent's Legal Affairs motion for new trial under
Service was requested to take Section 1(a) of Rule 37, if
legal action against petitioner. the default was discovered
Respondent directed petitioner after judgment but while
to desist from using the term appeal is still available; (3) a
University, including the use of petition for relief under Rule
the same in any of its alleged 38, if judgment has become
branches. final and executory; and
(4) an appeal from the
judgment under Section 1,
Rule 41, even if no petition

Monzon v. Spouses Relova and PerezWhether
Spouses Relova allege that Monzon issued aMonzon is declared in effects of a default order
promisory note in their favordefault
worth P600k and secured by a
lot in Tagaytay city. A deed of
absolute sale over the parcel of
land was later executed in favor
of the Perez spouses. The
same thing happened with
spouses Relova where a
promisory note in the amount of
200,000 was issued and
secured by a lot. A deed of
conditional sale over the parcel
of land was later issued in favor
of spouses Relova. Monzon
was indevted to the Coastal
Lending Corporation, who
extrajudically foreclosed the
proeprty of Monzon. The
winning bidder in this
extrajudicial forecloseure was
Addio properties. Of the amount
paid by Addio, there was a
residue of roughlyP1.6M
(indebtedness of Monzon was
only around P3.4M while Addio
paid P5M for the property that‘s
why there‘s an excess). This
residue is in the custody of Atty.
Luna as Branch Clerk of Court.
Monzon argues that she has
already fulfilled her obligation to
the spouses via dacion en pago
to set aside the order of
default has been resorted to.
or not Yes. The RTC applied the Section 3, Rule 9
“(a) Effect of order of
upon petitioner under
default. — A party in default
Section 3, Rule 9 of the
shall be entitled to notice of
Rules of Court which
subsequent proceedings but
states the “If the
not to take part in the trial.”
defending party fails to
answer within the time Failure to file a responsive
allowed therefor, the court pleading within the
shall, upon motion of the reglementary period, and not
claiming party with notice failure to appear at the
to the defending party, hearing, is the sole ground for
and proof of such failure, an order of default, except
declare the defending the failure to appear at a pre-
party in default. trial conference wherein the
effects of a default on the part
of the defendant are
followed, that is, the plaintiff
shall be allowed to present
evidence ex parte and a
judgment based thereon may
be rendered against the
defendant.
 evidenced by the Deed of
Conditional Sale and the Deed
of Absolute Sale.
Rule 10 — Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
Sps. Lambino v. Petitioner, a lawyer, and his wife
Presiding Judge secured a housing loan from
private respondent BPI. The
interest rate was 19% pe annum
payable in 180 monthly
installments. A mortgage loan
agreement was executed by
petitioners over their property as
security. However, petitioners failed
to pay the monthly amortizations
from January 15, 1995 to May 15,
1995. Private respondent filed a
petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the MLA with the Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the RTC of
Valenzuela City and sought to have
the property sold to satisfy the
balance of petitioners' loan
account. The public auction was
set at 10:00 a.m. on July 11, 1995.
Petitioners filed a complaint for
annulment of the MLA and the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale with a
prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) before the RTC of
Valenzuela City.
Philippine Ports After the expiration of the lease
Authority v. contract of Veterans Shipping
Gothong Corporation over the Marine
Slip Way in the North Harbor
then petitioner WG&A
requested respondent PPA for it
Whether or not the No. Before they filed their As a general rule, leave will be
supplemental original complaint, granted to file a supplemental
complaint was petitioners were already complaint which alleges any
proper? aware of the deductions material fact which happened or
came within plaintiff's knowledge
since the original complaint was
filed, such being the office of a
supplemental complaint. The
purpose of the rule is that the
entire controversy might be
settled in one action; to avoid
unnecessary litigation; prevent
delay, unnecessary repetition of
effort; unwarranted expense of
litigants; to broaden the scope of
the issues in an action owing to
the light thrown on it by facts,
events and occurrences which
have accrued after the filing of the
original pleading; to bring into
record the facts enlarging or
charging the kind of relief to which
plaintiff is entitled.
whether the CA No. The CA did not err in The Court has emphasized
erred in ruling that finding that the RTC the import of Section 3, Rule
the RTC committed committed grave abuse of 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Procedure in Valenzuela v.
discretion when it Order dated March 22, Court of Appeals, which
denied the 2002 denying the states that the Section 3,
 to be allowed to lease and admission of the admission of respondent's Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
operate the said facility. second amended second amended Civil Procedure amended
Thereafter, then President complaint. complaint. the former rule in such
Estrada issued a memorandum manner that the phrase "or
addressed to the Secretary of that the cause of action or
the Department of defense is substantially
Transportation and altered" was stricken-off and
Communication (DOTC) and the not retained in the new
General Manager of PPA. rules. The clear import of
such amendment in
Section 3, Rule 10 is that
under the new rules, "the
amendment may (now)
substantially alter the
cause of action or
defense."

Wallem A shipment was made of IndianWhether the filing of No. The order of the lower The settled rule is that the
Philippines Soya Bean meal to Manila. Theamended complaint court dismissing the filing of an amended
Shipping, Inc. v. vessel was owned by Consti-against petitioner amended complaint pleading does not retroact to
S.R Farms, Feed with respondent as it’sshould retroact to the against the said defendant the date of the filing of the
ship agent. The shipmentdate of fling of original on ground of prescription original; hence, the statute
arrived in Manila, and wascomplaint was affirmed by this of limitation runs until the
discharged. All throughout the Court. submission of the
entire period of unloading, good amendment. It is true that,
and dair weather condition as an exception, this Court
prevailed. However, there was a has held that an amendment
shortage of the shipment. which merely supplements
and amplifies facts originally
alleged in the complaint
relates back to the date of
the commencement of the
action and is not barred by
the statute of limitations
which expired after the

Spouses Dionisio
Gorgonio Cruz owned
v. Linsangan
agricultural lands in San
Rafael, Bulacan. The
tenant, Romualdo,
cultivated the lands. When
Romualdo died, his widow
was given permission by
Cruz to stay on the property
provided that she would
vacate it upon demand.
Petitioners bought property
from Cruz. They trued to get
Whether or not the No. Here, both the original
Dionisios' and the amended
amendment of their complaint required
complaint effectively Wilfredo to defend his
changed their cause possession based on the
of action from one allegation that he had
of ejectment to one stayed on the land after
of recovery of Emiliana left out of the
possession owner's mere tolerance
and that the latter had
demanded that he leave.
service of the original
complaint. The exception,
however, would not apply to
the party impleaded for the
first time in the amended
complaint. The rule on the
non-applicability of the
curative and retroactive
effect of an amended
complaint, insofar as newly
impleaded defendants are
concerned, has been
established as early as in
the case of Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation. In the said
case, the defendant Barber
Lines Far East Service was
impleaded for the first time
in the amended complaint
which was filed after the
one-year period of
prescription.
An amended complaint that
changes the plaintiff's cause
of action is technically a new
complaint. Consequently,
the action is deemed filed on
the date of the filing of such
amended pleading, not on
the date of the filing of its
original version. Thus, the
statute of limitation resumes
its run until it is arrested by
the filing of the amended
pleading. The Court
 Romualdo’s widow out. acknowledges, however,
that an amendment which
does not alter the cause of
action but merely
supplements or amplifies the
facts previously alleged,
does not affect the
reckoning date of filing
based on the original
complaint. The cause of
action, unchanged, is not
barred by the statute of
limitations that expired after
the filing of the original
complaint. To determine if
an amendment introduces a
different cause of action, the
test is whether such
amendment now requires
the defendant to answer for
a liability or obligation which
is completely different from
that stated in the original
complaint.
Rule 11 — When to File Responsive Pleadings

Sps. Barraza v. Respondent owned a Was the Order of Yes. Respondent judge There is nothing in the
Campos, Jr. lechon business, however respondent judge granted petitioners a Rules which provide,
petitioner used the trade declaring 15-day extension to file directly or indirectly, that
name in the CFO. petitioners in their answer, or up to the interruption of the
default for failure Nov. 18. Instead of filing running of the period
to file their answer their answer, petitioners within which to file an
within the filed a motion to dismiss answer when a motion to
reglementary complaint on Nov. 17, dismiss the complaint is
period provided by or one (1) day before filed and pending before
 law correct? the expiration of the the court, refers only to
period as extended by the original period of
the court. This is clearly fifteen (15) days and not
allowed under Sec. 1, to the extension of time to
Rule 16. file the answer as granted
by the court. It may be
true that under Section 4
of Rule 16, if the motion to
dismiss is denied or if the
termination thereof is
deferred, the movant shall
file his answer within the
time prescribed by Rule
11, computed from the
time he received notice of
the denial or deferment,
unless the court provides
a different period. This
Section 1 of Rule 11 in
relation to Section 4 of
Rule 16 allows the
defendant to file his
answer not only within the
original fifteen (15) days
period but also within "a
different period (as) fixed
by the court. "
David v. A complaint for accounting, Did the RTC No. Thus, petitioner Petitioners voluntary
Guttierez-Fruelda reconveyance, and commit grave waived any defect in the appearance was
damages with prayer for abuse of service of summons by equivalent to service of
preliminary attachment discretion in publication or even summons. It has cured
against petitioner. It was denying want of process any alleged defect in the
claimed that petitioner petitioner's motion because for the RTC to service of summons.
 fraudulently exceeded his to lift order of validly act on his
special power of attorney to default? motions, it necessarily
put land in his name and acquired jurisdiction
did not remit and account over his person.
any money from the Unfortunately, his claim
transaction involving their that he has meritorious
lands. defenses is
unsubstantiated. He did
not even state what
evidence he intends to
present if his motion is
granted.
Rule 13 — Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers
Republic v. Whether or not the Yes. The present Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Caguioa A petitioner for TRO and procedural rules petition was filed within Rules of Court is clear on
mandatory injunction was were complied the reglementary this point — "In case a
filed against the Finance with? period. Contrary to the
Secretary, seeking to nullify private respondents'
section 6 of RA 9334. position, the 60-day
period within which to
file the petition
for certiorari is counted
from the Republic's
receipt of the July 5,
2006 order denying the
latter's motion for
reconsideration.
UP v. Sison A construction agreement Whether the SC The service of the denial
of the motion for
Petitioner's motions were
not motions to dismiss the
complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over
his person. On the
contrary, the motions
invoked the RTC's
jurisdiction while seeking
the following affirmative
reliefs: to grant extension,
deny the motion to
declare petitioner in
default and lift the order of
default.
motion for
reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60) day
period shall be counted
from notice of the denial
of said motion."
"If any party has appeared
by counsel, service upon
 was entered into with
petitioner and Stern
Builders Corp for a building
in UPLB. UP did not pay all
three buildings and the last
one was disallowed by
COA. Stern Builders sued
UP to collect the unpaid
billing and to recover
damages.
should give due reconsideration upon Atty. him shall be made upon his
course to UP’s Nolasco of the UPLB counsel or one of them,
petition for review Legal Office was invalid unless service upon the
in the name of and ineffectual because party himself is ordered by
equity in order to he was admittedly not the the court. Where one
counsel of record of UP. counsel appears for several
reverse or modify The rule is that it is on the parties, he shall only be
the adverse counsel and not the client entitled to one copy of any
judgment against that the service should be paper served upon him by
it despite its made. the opposite side.”
finality?

Rule 14 — Summons, Sections 1 to 14

Cathay Metal A joint venture was entered
Corp. v. Laguna into with respondent and
West Multi- farmer beneficiaries in
Purpose CAvite. While respondent
Cooperative was negotiating, petitioner
entered into an irrevocable
exclusive right to buy
contracts with the same
farmers, where the farmer
beneficiaries committed
themselves to sell to
petitioner their agricultural
properties upon
conversion. Respondent
caused the annotation of its
adverse claim on the
beneficiaries certificates of
title. Contracts of sale of
the properties were
executed. TCTs were also
issued. A consolidated
Whether petitioner cannot use
respondent was respondent's failure to
validly served with amend its Articles of
summons or Incorporation to reflect
notice of the its new address as an
hearing? excuse from sending or
attempting to send to
respondent copies of
the petition and the
summons.
The Rules of
Court provides that
notices should be sent to
the enumerated officers.
The Cooperative
Code provisions on
notices cannot replace the
rules on summons under
the Rules of Court. Rule
14, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court provides
an exclusive enumeration
of the persons authorized
to receive summons for
juridical entities. These
persons are the juridical
entity's president,
managing partner,
general manager,
corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house
 petition for cancellation of
the adverse claims were
filed. The postman issued a
certification which said that
the reason for the return
was that the cooperative
was inexistent. Therefore,
petition was tried to be filed
personally by petitioner.
This failed for the same
reason. The RTC declared
that the service, by
registered mail, was
effected
Rapid Realty and A declaration of nullity of
Development subdivision plans was filed
Corp. v. Villa by petitioner. Summons
were attempted, but the
first one, which was a
personal service, failed.
Zapanta, the court process
server, then resorted to
substituted service, serving
to the househelp who did
know acknowledge receipt.
Whether Yes. It is settled that if
respondents, in there is no valid service of
filing summons, the court can
the first Motion to still acquire jurisdiction
Lift the Order of over the person of the
defendant by virtue of the
Default, voluntarily latter's voluntary
submitted appearance pursuant to
themselves to the Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the
jurisdiction of the Rules of Court.
court?
counsel. The enumeration
in Section 11 of Rule 14 is
exclusive. Service of
summons upon persons
other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11
is invalid. Even substantial
compliance is not
sufficient service of
summons. This provision
of the rule does not limit
service to the officers'
places of residence or
offices. If summons may
not be served upon these
persons personally at their
residences or offices,
summons may be served
upon any of the officers
wherever they may be
found.
Prescinding from the
foregoing, it is thus clear
that: (1) Special
appearance operates as
an exception to the
general rule on voluntary
appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections
to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of
the defendant must
be explicitly made; and

Green Star Universal Robina Corp
Express, Inc. v. owned a van, which got
Nissin-Universal into a vehicular accident
Robina Corp., which resulted to the death
of the van’s driver. A case
was filed for reckless
imprudence resulting in
homicide, and petitioner
sent a demand letter to
respondent. The criminal
case was dismissed.
Rule 15 — Motions
(3) Failure to do
so constitutes voluntary
submission to the
jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances
where a pleading or
motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and
submitted to the court for
resolution.
Whether or not the No. It is a well- NURC maintains that the
summons was established rule that the RTC did not acquire
properly served on rules on service of jurisdiction over it as the
NURC, vesting the summons upon a summons was received
trial court with domestic private by its cost accountant,
jurisdiction juridical entity must be Tinio. It argues that under
strictly complied with. Section 11, Rule 14 of
Otherwise, the court the 1997 Rules of Court,
cannot be said to have which provides the rule on
acquired jurisdiction service of summons upon
over the person of the a juridical entity, in cases
defendant. where the defendant is a
domestic corporation like
NURC, summons may be
served only through its
officers. Here, Tinio, a
member of NURC's
accounting staff, received
the summons on January
22, 2004.
Dela Reyes v. A favorable decision was Is a hearing At any rate, the trial As a general rule, all
Ramnani rendered for respondent in needed for the court gave petitioner an written motions should be
a civil case. A write of motion? opportunity to oppose set for hearing under
execution was then issued the subject motion as in Section 4, Rule 15 of
by the RTC. The branch fact he filed a the Rules of Court
sheriff then conducted a Comment/Opposition on excepted from this rule
public bidding. Respondent March 1, 2004 before are non-litigious motions
was the highest bidder and the trial court. Petitioner or motions which may be
a write of possession was cannot, therefore, acted upon by the court
issued. The respondent validly claim that he was without prejudicing the
filed an order to the sheriff denied his day in court rights of the adverse
to execute the final party. As already
certificate of sale in her discussed, respondent is
favor. This was opposed by entitled to the issuance of
petitioner. the final certificate of sale
as a matter of right and
petitioner is powerless to
oppose the same. Hence,
the subject motion falls
under the class of non-
litigious motions.
Preysler v. Manila A complaint for forcible Whether the RTC No. In this case, the “The ordinary motion day
Soutcoast Dev. entry was filed by petitioner was correct in petitioner's Omnibus is Friday. Hence, the
Corp against the respondent. dismissing Motion was set for notice should be served
petitioner's hearing on 12 by Tuesday at the latest,
Omnibus Motion November 2004. Thus, in order that the
for allegedly failing to comply with the requirement of the three
to comply with the notice requirement, days may be complied
three-day notice respondent should have with. If notice be given by
requirement? received the notice of ordinary mail, it should be
the hearing at least actually received by
three days before 12 Tuesday, or if not claimed
November 2004, which from the post office, the
 is 9 November 2004. date of the first notice of
the postmaster should be
at least five (5) days
before Tuesday.” Section
4 of Rule 15 provides that
"[e]very written motion
required to be heard and
the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to
ensure its receipt by the
other party at least three
(3) days before the date
of the hearing, unless the
court for good cause sets
the hearing on shorter
notice." Thus, the date of
the hearing should be at
least three days after
receipt of the notice of
hearing by the other
parties.
PNB v. Deang A dacion en pago Whether the CA Yes. In requesting for a The intention to delay was
Marketing Corp arrangement in an was correct in 30-day extension or rather obvious.
agreement forged by declaring until June 11, 2006 to Petitioner's Motion for
petitioners transformed petitioner in file answer, petitioner Extension of Time to File
respondent’ outstanding default? apparently reckoned the Answer was laden with
loan obligations into a date from which the glaring lapses. It filed the
seven year term loan. extension would start Motion for Extension,
Respondents filed before on May 12, 2006, which however, via a private
the RTC a Complaint. was not the last day of courier (without any
Summons was served on the 15-day period explanation for availing for
petitioner. Respondents sought to be such mode) on May 14,
 filed a Motion to Declare
[Petitioner] in Default,
which they set for hearing.
On even date, the trial
court received petitioner's
Motion for Extension of
Time [30 days up to June
11, 2006] to File Answer.
Eight days prior to the
slated hearing of
respondents' Motion to
Declare [Petitioner] in
Default, the trial court
issued an Order denying
said motion and granting
petitioner's Motion for
Extension of Time to File
Answer. To the trial court's
Order respondents filed a
Motion for
Reconsideration. In the
meantime, petitioner filed
its Answer to the Complaint
on May 25, 2006.
Rule 16 — Motion to Dismiss
Conejos v. According to petitioners, Whether the CA The dismissal of the
Boconegra respondents were served erred acted with complaint on the ground grounds the court could
extended, it being May 2006, which was received
5, 2006. By by the RTC on May 15,
computation, petitioner 2006 or ten days late. A
actually sought more motion for extension of
than 30 days, contrary time to file a pleading
to the period of must be filed before the
extension it purportedly expiration of the period
requested. The sought to be
counting of the period extended. The court's
was erroneous, even if discretion to grant a
one uses the material motion for extension is
dates alleged by conditioned upon such
petitioner. No motion's timeliness, the
satisfactory reason was passing of which renders
adduced to justify the the court powerless to
tardiness of the Answer entertain or grant it. Since
and no compelling the motion for extension
reason was given to was filed after the lapse of
justify its admission. the prescribed period,
there was no more period
to extend. Petitioner was
not candid enough to aver
in the Motion for
Extension that the period
had lapsed, as it still toyed
with the idea that it could
get away with it. The
allegations therein were
crafted as if the said
motion was timely filed.
Under the Rules, the only
 with summons and legal grave abuse
processes through Atty discretion?
Piazarri, whose office
address is at 2830 Juan
Luna St, Tondo Manila.
Atty Piazarro wrote a
demand letter on behalf of
respondents to vacate the
land, stating that
respondents owned it.
Panganiban v. A sublease and dealer
Pilipinas Shell agreement was entered
Corp., between Panganiban and
Shell, where Shell leased
to Panganiban a gasoline
station for a period which
would terminate at the
same time as Shell’s lease.
As Shell was not the owner
of the lot, and was leasing
it under a lease agreement,
of of lack of jurisdiction take cognizance of, even
over the person of the if not pleaded in the
respondents after they motion to dismiss or
had voluntarily answer, are: (a) lack of
appeared before the jurisdiction over the
trial court clearly subject matter; (b)
constitutes grave abuse existence of another
of discretion amounting action pending between
to lack of jurisdiction or the same parties for the
in excess of jurisdiction same cause; and (c) bar
on the part of the RTC. by prior judgment or by
Quite apart from their statute of limitations.
voluntary appearance,
respondents'
Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss and Second
Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss were clearly in
violation of Rule 15,
Section 8 in relation to
Rule 9, Section 1 of the
Rules
Whether the CA No. The requirement that The requirement that a
erred in affirming a motion to dismiss motion to dismiss should
RTC-Makati's should be filed within the be filed within the time for
dismissal of Civil time for filing the answer filing the answer is not
Case No. 95-1010 is not absolute. absolute. Even after an
on motion of shell answer has been filed, a
on the ground defendant can still file a
of litis motion to dismiss on the
pendentia which following grounds: (1) lack
was filed long of jurisdiction, (2) litis
after Shell had pendentia (3) lack of
 it notified Panganiban that filed its answer? cause of action, and (4)
the agreement was expiring discovery during trial of
and that Panganiban evidence that would
should wind up her constitute a ground for
business affairs, but as she dismissal. Litis
had believed it would pendentia is also one of
expire later, she still the grounds that authorize
occupied the lots and paid a court to dismiss a
rentals, although Shell did case motu proprio. In this
not accept. case, the bona
fide existence of litis
pendentia is beyond
dispute.
Universal Robina URC and Lim entered into Whether the trial No. Implicit from Sec. 1, Thus, a court may not
Corp. v. Lim a contract of sale where court may Rule 9 of the Rules of dismiss an action motu
URC sold to Lim grocery dismiss motu Court is that improper proprio on the ground of
products totaling proprio petitioner's venue not impleaded in improper venue as it is not
P808,059.88. After complaint on the the motion to dismiss or one of the grounds
tendering partial payments, ground of in the answer is wherein the court may
respondent refused to improper venue? deemed waived. dismiss an action motu
settle his obligation despite proprio on the basis of the
petitioner's repeated pleadings. In Dacoycoy v.
demands. IAC, this Court held that a
trial court may not motu
proprio dismiss a
complaint on the ground
of improper venue. The
court may only dismiss an
action motu proprio in
case of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject
matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata and prescription.
 In the instant case,
respondent, despite
proper service of
summons, failed to file an
answer and was thus
declared in default by the
trial court. Verily, having
been declared in default,
he lost his standing in
court and his right to
adduce evidence and
present his defense,
including his right to
question the propriety of
the venue of the action.

Galindo v. Heirs Galindo possessed a lot of Whether the RTC Yes. Section 1, Rule 3 of An unauthorized
of Roxas land and paid taxes committed a grave the Rules of complaint does not
thereon. When he died, his abuse of its Court provides that only produce any legal
heirs sold their rights and discretion? persons or juridical
persons or entities effect. Section 1, Rule 3 of
interests over the land to the Rules of
authorized by law may be
Roxas. Urbano, one of the parties in a civil action. Court provides that only
heirs of Galindo, was a
persons or juridical
minor then, so he did not
persons or entities
sign the document
(Documento de authorized by law may be
Compromiso) but he parties in a civil
executed an affidavit action. Section 4, Rule
signifying his conformity to 8 of the said Rules further
the sale executed by his provides that facts
siblings; (4) Urbano later showing the capacity of a
ratified the sale by party to sue or be sued or
executing an affidavit the authority of a party to
signifying he was sue or be sued in a
agreeable thereto. The CFI representative capacity
ordered the Galindo heirs must be averred in the
to execute a deed of complaint. In order to
absolute sale in favor of the maintain an action in a
heirs of Roxas. When court of justice, the
Urbano died intestate, his
plaintiff must have an
heirs executed an
actual legal existence,
extrajudicial settlement of
estate where they that is, he or she or it
adjudicated unto must be a person in law
themselves as owners the and possessed of a legal
undivided rights and entity as either a natural
interests of Urbano over or an artificial person, and
the lot. no suit can lawfully be
prosecuted in the name of
that person. The party
bringing suit has the
burden of proving the
sufficiency of the
representative character
that he claims. If a
complaint is filed by one
who claims to represent a
party as plaintiff but who,
in fact, is not authorized to
do so, such complaint is
not deemed filed and the
court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the
complaint.
Chu v. Sps. 5 registered lands were
Cunanan sold to Cunanan for P5m
by Sps Chu. It was
stipulated that the
ownership of the lots were
still with the Chus. Such
would be transferred to
Cunan only upon complete
payment of the total
consideration in the terms
of the deed of sale, A
special power of attorny
was issued authorizing
Cunanan to borrow P5,
161, 090 from any banking
institution. The proceeds of
the net balance would then
be delivered. But Cunanan
transderred the title of the
five lands to her name
without the knowledge of
the spouses Chu, and then
later to spouses Carlos.
Manila Bankers
Life Insurance A life insurance policy was Whether
Corp. v. Aban taken out by Sotero. In it, courts below were regulates the actions of
Was the case Yes. The petitioners
barred by res were not at liberty to
judicata although split their demand to
the compromise enforce or rescind
agreement did not the deed of sale with
expressly include assumption of
Benelda Estate as mortgage and to
a party and prosecute piecemeal or
although present only a portion of
the compromise the grounds upon which
agreement made a special relief was
no reference to sought under the deed
the lots now of sale with assumption
registered in of mortgage, and then
Benelda Estate's to leave the rest to be
name? presented in another
suit; otherwise, there
would be no end to
litigation. Their splitting
violated the policy
against multiplicity of
suits, whose primary
objective was to avoid
unduly burdening the
dockets of the courts.
Their contravention of
the policy merited the
dismissal of Civil Case.
Yes. Section 48 serves
the a noble purpose, as it
A compromise
agreement is a contract
whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to
one already commenced.
The intent of the parties to
settle all their claims
against each other is
expressed. Apparently,
the petitioners were guilty
of splitting their single
cause of action to enforce
or rescind the deed of
sale with assumption of
mortgage.
The self-regulating feature
of Section 48 lies in the
fact that both the insurer
her niece respondent was correct in applying both the insurer and the and the insured are given
beneficiary. Petitioner Sec. 48 of the insured. Under the the assurance that any
issued the insurance policy. Insurance Code? provision, an insurer is dishonest scheme to
Sotero died. However, given two years — from obtain life insurance
upon investigation, the effectivity of a life would be exposed, and
petitioner found that Sotero insurance contract and attempts at unduly
did not personally apply for while the insured is denying a claim would be
insurance, and it was alive — to discover or struck down. Life
respondent who filed the prove that the policy is insurance policies that
insurance application. void ab initio or is pass the statutory two-
rescindible by reason of year period are essentially
the fraudulent treated as legitimate and
concealment or beyond question, and the
misrepresentation of the individuals who wield
insured or his agent. them are made secure by
After the two-year the thought that they will
period lapses, or when be paid promptly upon
the insured dies within claim. Section 48
the period, the insurer contributes to the stability
must make good on the of the insurance industry,
policy, even though the and prevents a situation
policy was obtained by where the insurer
fraud, concealment, or knowingly continues to
misrepresentation. This accept annual premium
is not to say that payments on life
insurance fraud must be insurance, only to later on
rewarded, but that deny a claim on the policy
insurers who recklessly on specious claims of
and indiscriminately fraudulent concealment
solicit and obtain and misrepresentation,
business must be such as what obtains in
penalized, for such the instant case.
recklessness and lack

Vitangcol v. New A land in Calamba, LAguna,
Vista Properties, was owned by both Maria and
Inc., Clemente Alipit. They then
executed a special power of
attorney making Milagros A
De Guzman their attorney-in-
fact to sell their property. De
Guzman then executed a
deed of absolute sale to New
Vista Properties. When New
Vista leanred that the parcel
of land was claimed by
petitioners Vitangcol by a
deed of sale between Maria
and Vitangcol.
of discrimination
ultimately work to the
detriment of bona
fide takers of insurance
and the public in
general.
Whether or not the Yes. The trial court acted The test of sufficiency of
Amended within its discretion in facts alleged in the
Complaint of considering said SPA complaint constituting a
Vitangcol states a relative to the motion to cause of action lies on
cause of action? dismiss the amended whether or not the court,
complaint, as Vitangcol admitting the facts alleged,
duly submitted that piece could render a valid verdict
of document in court in in accordance with the
the course of the June 7, prayer of the complaint. And
2004 hearing on the to sustain a motion to
motion to dismis The trial dismiss for lack of cause of
court, however, erred in action, it must be shown that
ruling that, taking said the claim for relief in the
SPA into account, the complaint does not exist,
amended complaint stated rather than that a claim has
no cause of action. been defectively stated, or is
Indeed, upon a ambiguous, indefinite, or
consideration of the uncertain.
amended complaint, its
annexes, with the June
18, 1989 SPA thus
submitted, the Court is
inclined, in the main, to
agree with the appellate
court that the amended
complaint sufficiently
states a cause of action.
In a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of
action, the focus is on the

Cua v. Wallem Cua sought payment of 2
Phils. Shipping million pesos as reparation for
Inc damage to his shipment of
soybean against respondent.
sufficiency, not the
veracity, of the material
allegations.
Whether or not Cua’s claim for payment
Cua's claim for of damages has not
payment of prescribed due to the
damages against admitted fact that there
the respondents was indeed an extension
has prescribed? of their agreement. Cua
timely filed his claim
before the trial court and
the CA failed to
appreciate the admissions
made by the respondents
in their pleadings that
negate a finding of
prescription of Cua's
claim. It was ruled that the
action has not prescribed
because jurisprudence
recognized the validity of
agreements extending
such period pursuant to
COGSA. The allegation of
an agreement extending
the period to file an action
in Cua's complaint is a
material averment that,
under Section 11, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court,
must be specifically
denied by the
respondents; otherwise,
the allegation is deemed
admitted.
A review of the pleadings
submitted by the
respondents discloses that
they failed to specifically
deny Cua's allegation of an
agreement extending the
period to file an action to
November 12, 1990.
Wallem's motion to dismiss
simply referred to the fact
that Cua's complaint was
filed more than one year
from the arrival of the
vessel, but it did not contain
a denial of the extension.
Since the COGSA is the
applicable law, the
respondents' discussion to
support their claim of
prescription under Article
366 of the Code of
Commerce would, therefore,
not constitute a refutation of
Cua's allegation of
extension.
Swedish Match v. Petitioner had three
CA, subsidiary corporations in The
Philippines. Phimco and Phils
are some of them. Petitioner
decided to sell them, and
several corporations tried to
get Phimco, one of them
being respondent. A case was
filed against petitioners to sell
the Phimco, but petitioner
alleged that there is no cause
of action as there was no
perfected contract between
them.
California and A cargo of soyben meal
Hawaiian Sugar arrived in manila via the
Co. v. C.F Sharp vessel MV Sugarl Islander.
& Co., Such was consigned to
several consignees, one of
them being the Metro Manila
Feed Millers Association. The
cargo from the vessel to
barges were discharged on
Nov 30. Respondent says that
when the cago was weighed,
a shortage was discovered.
Petitioners refused to settle.
Whether or not the Yes. The Court of Appeals
appellate court erred procedurally in motu
erred in reversing propio dismissing the
the trial court's complaint in its entirety for
decision? “lack of a valid cause of
action: without the benefit
of a full blown trial and on
the mere motion to
dismiss.
Whether or not the Yes. The trial court
trial court committed committed grave abuse of
grave abuse of discretion when it denied
discretion when it a preliminary hearing on a
denied petitioners' simple issue of fact that
Motion for a could have possibly
Preliminary settled the entire case.
Hearing? One reason why dockets
of trial courts are clogged
is the unreasonable
refusal to use a process
or procedure, like a
motion to dismiss, which
is designed to abbreviate
the resolution of a case.
Respondents' attempt to
prove the alleged verbal
acceptance of their US$36
million bid becomes futile in
the face of the overwhelming
evidence on record that
there was in the first place
no meeting of the minds with
respect to the price.
Where a preliminary hearing
appears to suffice, there is
no reason to go on to trial.In
the present case, the trial
court did not categorically
resolve petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss, but merely deferred
resolution thereof. Section 6,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules,
specifically provides that a
preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses may be
allowed only when no
motion to dismiss has been
filed. Section 6, however,
must be viewed in the light
of Section 3 of the same
Rule, which requires courts
to resolve a motion to
dismiss and prohibits them
from deferring its resolution
on the ground of

Sps. Rasdas v. A parcel of land in Isabela is Whether or not the
Estenor the subject of this case. complaint is barred
Respondent filed a complaint by res judicata?
for recovery of owndership of
the land, asserting that he
was the owner. The RTC
ruled in favor of petitioners.
Respondent then appealed
the RTC decision before the
Court of Appeals, which
reversed the judgement of the
RTC. Petitioners were
ordered to vacate the land.
Tan v. Tan Petitioner and respondent
were married in Manila
Cathedral. They were blessed
with two sons. Justin was
born in Canada and Russel
was born in The Philippines.
Petitioner then filed a case for
annulment under Article 36.
Yes. The Supreme Court
observed that the causes
of action in the two cases
involved were so glaringly
similar that it had to affirm
the dismissal of the
second case by virtue of
the "bar of former
judgment rule."
Whether or not the Yes. We upheld the
annulment decided judgment of nullity of the
by the trial court marriage even if it was
attained finality? based solely on evidence
presented by therein
private respondent. The
alleged negligence of
counsel resulting in
indubitability. The ground
invoked may still be pleaded
as an affirmative defense
even if the defendant's
Motion to Dismiss has been
filed but not definitely
resolved, or if it has been
deferred as it could be under
the pre-1997 Rules..
It was held that it is the
second kind of res judicata,
conclusiveness of
judgment," that barred the
instant complaint. Any right,
fact, or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the
determination of an action
before a competent court in
which judgment is rendered
on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or
not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same.
It as decided that it was
executory when the husband
failed to appeal during the
reglementary period. The
husband claimed that the
decision of the trial court
was null and void for
violation of his right to due
 The trial court issued a partial
judgement approving the
compromise and declared the
marriage void. On 4 trial court's judgments.
November 2004, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss and
a motion for reconsideration.
She claimed she was no
longer interested in the suit.
Petitioner stated that the
circumstances in her life had
led her to the conclusion that
withdrawing the petition was
for the best interest of the
children. She prayed that an
order be issued vacating all
prior orders and leaving the
parties at the status quo ante
the filing of the suit.
Aldersgate A case was filed against
College, Inc. v. respondents before the SEC.
Gauuan When the SEX was
reorganized pursuant to RA
8799, the case was
transferred to the RTC of
Nueva Vizcaya for further
proceedings. The case was
sought to be dismissed on the
complaint or the issuance of a
summary judgement. The
RTC denied the motion on the
ground that "there are several
issues raised which would still
need the presentation of
evidence to determine the
rights of the parties."
petitioner's loss of the process. He argued he was
right to appeal is not a denied due process when,
ground for vacating the after failing to appear on two
scheduled hearings, the trial
court deemed him to have
waived his right to present
evidence and rendered
judgment based solely on
the evidence presented by
private respondent.
Whether or not the Yes. As this case Moreover, the Court finds no
Regional Trial Court involves an intra- justification for the dismissal
erred in dismissing corporate dispute, the of the case based on the
the case? motion to dismiss is mere issuance of a board
undeniably a prohibited resolution by the incumbent
pleading. members of the Board of
Trustees of petitioner
corporation recommending
its dismissal, especially
considering the various
issues raised by the parties
before the court a quo.
Hence, the RTC should not
have entertained, let alone
have granted the subject
motion to dismiss.
Rule 17 — Dismissal of Actions
Quintos v. Petitioners and respondents
Nicolas are siblings. Their parents
were owners of the subject
property, whcih was located in
Quezon city. When the
parents died, they left to their
ten children the ownership
over the subject property.
Respondent siblings brought
an action against petition
Samson v. Fiel- Benedicta and Marcial Whether or not the Yes. The RTC dismissed
Macaraig Samson obtained a loan of case was dismissed the case with prejudice for
10k pesos from Far East with prejudice?
Bank and Trust Co. The loan
was secured by a real estate
morgage over four parcels of
land in Marikina. When
petitioners did not comply with
the terms of the loan, FEBTC
filed for extra judicial
foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage at the RTC. These
were sold to FEBTC.
Whether or not the No. . The Supreme Court
respondents' held that Art. 494, as
counterclaim for cited, is an exception to
partition is already Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the
barred by laches or Rules of Court to the
res judicata? effect that even if the
order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is
silent on whether or not it
is with prejudice, it shall
be deemed to be without
prejudice
failure to prosecute for an
unreasonable length of
time, pursuant to Section
3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court. The RTC Order
dated 20 June 2003 was a
final judgment which
disposed of the case on
the merits. This was even
clarified in the subsequent
RTC Order of 22
December 2003 which
denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration
wherein the lower court
stated that: "Therefore,
This is not to say, however,
that the action for partition
will never be barred by res
judicata. There can still be
res judicata in partition
cases concerning the same
parties and the same subject
matter once the respective
shares of the co-owners
have been determined with
finality by a competent court
with jurisdiction or if the
court determines that
partition is improper for co-
ownership does not or no
longer exists.
The remedy to obtain
reversal or modification of
the judgment on the merits
is appeal.The availability of
the right to appeal precludes
recourse to the special civil
action for certiorari. The
RTC Order subject of the
petition was a final judgment
which disposed of the case
on the merits; hence, it was
a subject for an ordinary
appeal, not a petition for
certiorari.

Eloisa A real estate mortgage over
Merchandising properties located in Makati
Inc. v. Trebel were executed by petitioner
International Inc., on behalf of respondent. A
continuing suretyship was
executed in favor of BDO to
secure the credit
accomondation. BDO
inisiated foreclosure
proceedings. Petitioners filed
a complaint for annulment of
real estate mortgage. BDO
filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of cause of
action, which can be
determined from the facts
alleged in the complaint.
Heirs of Favis, Sr. Dr. Favis was married to
v. Gonzales Captolina Aguilar. They had
seven children. When
Captilona died, Dr Favis took
a common law wife. They had
one child. Finally, he married
his common law wife, and he
acknowledged their son as
legitimate. When Dr Favis
died, he executed a deed of
the dismissal was 'with
prejudice' or a dismissal
that had the effect of
adjudication upon the
merits in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court."
Whether or not the Yes. Petitioners
dismissal is proper? themselves did nothing to
get the case moving for
nine months
Whether or not the No. The Court of Appeals
appellate court may ignored the facts of the
dismiss the order of case that clearly
dismissal of the demonstrated the refusal
complaint for failure by the respondents to
to allege therein compromise. Instead it
that earnest efforts ordered the dismissal of
towards a petitioner's complaint on
compromise have the ground that it did not
allege what in fact was
Section 3, Rule 17 of the
1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure stated that the
failure on the part of the
plaintiff, without any
justifiable cause, to comply
with any order of the court or
the Rules, or to prosecute
his action for an
unreasonable length of time,
may result in the dismissal
of the complaint either motu
proprio or on motion by the
defendant. However, despite
the trial court's leniency and
admonition, petitioners
continued to exhibit laxity
and inattention in attending
to their case.
The appellate court
committed egregious error in
dismissing the complaint.
The facts of the case show
that compromise was never
an option insofar as the
respondents were
concerned. The impossibility
of compromise instead of
litigation was shown not
 fonation transferring and been made?
conveying properties in favor
of his grandchildren with the
common law wife.
Ching v. Cheng, Antonio Ching owned P Wing
Enterprises. Ching alleged
that he was the only child of
Ramon with his common law
wife. The wife disputed this.
She states that even if
Ramon’s certificate alleges
that he was Antonio’s
illegitimage child, he was just
adopted. Joseph and Jaime,
on the other hand, claim to be
his illegitimage children with
the maid. LAter, Ching was
murdered. Ramon induced
the maid and her children to
sign an agreement that
waived the estate.
Rule 18 — Pre Trial
Paranaque Kings Catalina Santos entered into Whether or not the Yes. the RTC was able to
Enterprises v. a contract of lease with Chua. CA correctly upheld explain to the satisfaction
shown during the trial. alone by the absence of a
The error of the Court of motion to dismiss but on the
Appeals is patent. respondents' insistence on
the validity of the donation in
their favor of the subject
properties Respondents not
only confined their
arguments within the pre-
trial order; after losing their
case, their appeal was
based on the proposition
that it was error for the trial
court to have relied on the
ground of vitiated consent
on the part of Dr. Favis.
Whether or not the No. When respondents Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil
"two-dismissal rule” filed the second case, Procedure governs
is applicable in this they were merely re-filing dismissals of actions at the
case? the same claim that had instance of the plaintiff.
been previously dismissed Hence, the "two-dismissal
on the basis of lack of rule" under Rule 17, Section
jurisdiction. When they 1 of the Rules of Civil
moved to dismiss the Procedure will not apply if
second case, the motion the prior dismissal was done
to dismiss can be at the instance of the
considered as the first defendant. The dismissal of
dismissal at the plaintiff's the first case was done at
instance. The trial court the instance of the
dismissed the first case by defendant under Rule 16,
granting the motion to Section 1 (b) of the Rules of
dismiss filed by the Civil Procedure.
defendants.
The trial court has the
discretion on whether to
Santos, This lease was over land in
Paranaque. Chua was given
the first option to buy. Chua
then caused the construction
of a 6 door commercial
complex on the leased
premise. However, by reason
of business reverses, he was
constrained to assign his
rights to Bing. Bing assumed
all oblications under the lease
contract with Santos. Lee
executed a deed of
assignment over the leased
premises. Petitioner then filed
a complaint before the RTC
against Santos. Respondents
moved to dismiss.
Alarcon v. CA Roberto Alarcon filed a
complaint for the annulment
of a deed of sale agaisnt
respondents. Alacron says
that before he went to Brunei
to work, he left with his father
a special power of attorney to
administer, mortgage, or sell
his properties in Bulacan.
Using the SPA, a cportion of
the land was sold to
respondents.
the RTC's denial of of the Court that the
petitioner's Motion postponement of the pre-
to Cancel Pre-Trial? trial.
Whether or not No. All of the matters
there was intrinsic taken up during the pre-
or collateral fraud trial, including the
attendant, which stipulation of facts and the
would justify the admissions made by the
setting aside of the parties are required to be
partial decision? recorded in a pre-trial
order. Juani cannot now
claim that he was denied
his day in court when
judgment was rendered
on the basis of their
(Juani, Baluyot and Sulit)
counsels' admission
grant or deny a motion to
postpone and/or reschedule
the pre-trial conference in
accordance with the
circumstances obtaining in
the case. This must be so as
it is the trial court which is
able to witness firsthand the
events as they unfold during
the trial of a case.
Postponements, while
permissible, must not be
countenanced except for
clearly meritorious grounds
and in light of the attendant
circumstances.
From the foregoing, the
admissions were clearly
made during the pre-trial
conference and, therefore,
conclusive upon the parties
making it. The purpose of
entering into a stipulation of
facts or admissions of facts
is to expedite trial and to
relieve the parties and the
court, as well, of the costs of
proving facts which will not
be disputed on trial and the
truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable
inquiry. The parties
themselves are required to
attend or their representative

Tiu v. Middleton A complaint for recovery of
possession of real property
was filed against petitioner.
Before the commencement of
the trial, the court a quo sent
a notice of Pre-trial
Conference stating in part:
"The parties are warned that
witnesses whose names and
addresses are not submitted
at the pre-trial may not be
allowed to testify at the
trial . . . ." In his Pre-trial Brief,
petitioner averred that he
would be presenting six
witnesses, but he did not
name them.
Whether or not a Yes. The court proceeded
judge can exclude a with the trial without
witness whose modifying the Order. In
name and synopsis the same vein,
of testimony were respondents did not
not included in the challenge it before the
pre-trial brief? trial. Neither did they
invoke the power of the
trial court to compel the
petitioner to submit the
names of his witnesses
and summaries of their
testimonies. By their
silence, respondents
acquiesced to the Pre-trial
Order allowing the
presentation of petitioner's
unnamed witnesses.
with written authority from
them in order to arrive at a
possible amicable
settlement, to submit to
alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of
facts and documents.
It was emphasized that pre-
trial and its governing rules
are not technicalities which
the parties may ignore. As
earlier stated, pre-trial is
essential in the simplification
and the speedy disposition
of disputes. In light of the
objectives of a pre-trial and
the role of the trial court
therein, it is evident that
judges have the discretion to
exclude witnesses and other
pieces of evidence not listed
in the pre-trial brief, provided
the parties are given prior
notice to this effect. Indeed,
the court and the parties
must pay attention not only
to the pre-trial briefs, but
also to the pre-trial order.
Respondents' failure to
challenge the pre-trial brief
submitted by petitioner
before the trial nor invoke
the power of the trial court to
compel the petitioner to
submit the names of his
 witnesses and summaries of
their testimonies is fatal to
their case. The provision in
the Pre-trial Order allowing
petitioner to present six
witnesses "shall control the
subsequent course of
action."
Saguid v. CA, Gina was married. But then Whether or not the Yes. Under Section 6, Rule 18 of
she petitioner and separated trial court erred in the 1997 Rules of Civil
from her husband. They allowing private Procedure, the failure of the
cohabited as husband and respondent to defendant to file a pre-trial
wife. They had no children. present evidence ex brief shall have the same
When their relationship went parte? effect as failure to appear at
bitter, she went to work as an the pre- trial, i.e., the plaintiff
entertainer in Japan. The may present his evidence ex
couple then separated. parte and the court shall
Respondent filed a complaint render judgment on the
for Partition and Recovery of basis thereof.
Personal Property with
Receivership against the
petitioner with the Regional
Trial Court of Boac,
Marinduque. She alleged that
from her salary of $1,500.00 a
month as entertainer in
Japan, she was able to
contribute P70,000.00 in the
completion of their unfinished
house. She prayed that she
be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and
that the amount of
P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the
construction of their house, be
 reimbursed to her. petitioner
claimed that the expenses for
the construction of their house
were defrayed solely from his
income as a captain of their
fishing vessel.
Tolentino v. Respondents allege that they
Laurel are registered owners of a
parcel of land in Quezon.
However, petitioners have
been in actual possession of
the Western portion of the
said property which they had
tried to develop into
fishponds.
Corpuz v. Corpuz Azucena Corpus had both a
mastercard and VISA of
Citibank, which she paid in full
on December 7, 1998. While
she was in Italy, she dined at
a restaurant. When she tried
to settle her bill, she
presented her VISA which the
Whether or not No. There was no lack of From the foregoing, the
Petitioners were due process claimed by failure of a party to appear at
denied their day in petitioners. On the the pre-trial has adverse
court? contrary, petitioners were consequences. If the absent
given more than ample party is the plaintiff, then his
opportunity to be heard case shall be dismissed. If it
through counsel. is the defendant who fails to
appear, then the plaintiff is
allowed to present his
evidence ex parte and the
court shall render judgment
on the basis thereof. Thus,
the plaintiff is given the
privilege to present his
evidence without objection
from the defendant, the
likelihood being that the
court will decide in favor of
the plaintiff, the defendant
having forfeited the
opportunity to rebut or
present its own evidence.
Whether or not the Yes. The spouses' petition Section 5 of Rule 18
excuse of the for certiorari was thus provides that the dismissal
petitioners is a valid properly dismissed by the of an action due to the
cause under Rule appellate court. plaintiff's failure to appear at
18 of the Rules of Procedural infirmities the pre-trial shall be with
Court. aside, this Court took a prejudice, unless otherwise
considered look at the ordered by the court. In this
spouses' excuse to justify case, the trial court deemed
 restaurant did not honor, but their non-appearance at the plaintiffs — herein
then she presented her the pre-trial but found spouses as non-suited and
MasterCard which was nothing exceptional to ordered the dismissal of
honored. On the same day warrant a reversal of the their Complaint.
she incurred a bill with a store lower courts' disposition
but both her VISA and thereof.
Mastercard were not honored.
Azucena’s husband inquired
why his wife’s credit cards
were not honored, and
Citibank explained that her
check-payments had not yet
been cleared at the time.
When she returned, she wrote
letters to Citibank.Citibank did
not respond to the letter,
however, drawing Azucena to
write Citibank for the
cancellation of the cards. Only
after Azucena's counsel
informed Citibank of imminent
legal remedies on her part did
Citibank indulge Azucena with
a written explanation why her
credit cards were not honored
in Italy.
Kent v. Micarez Petitioner’s parents were Whether the RTC Yes. The Court found the
Since mediation is part of
looking for a residential lot for erred in dismissing sanction too severe to be
Pre-Trial, the trial court
petitioner and her spouse. As Civil Case No. 13- imposed on the petitioner
shall impose the
she was married to an 2007 due to the where the records of the
appropriate sanction
American citizen, she failure of petitioner's case is devoid of evidence
including but not limited
arranged to pay for the duly authorized of willful or flagrant
to censure, reprimand,
purchase price of the representative, disregard of the rules on
contempt and such other
residential lot and register in Manalang, and her mediation proceedings.
sanctions as are provided
the names of Spouses counsel to attend There is no clear
under the Rules of
Micarez, under an implied the mediation demonstration that the
Court for failure to appear
 trust. A deed of absolute sale
was executed between
Spouses Micarez and the
owner. Petitioner sent the
money which was used for
the payment of the lot. Later,
she learned that the Spouses
Micarez sold the lot to
Dionesio.
Aguilar v. Three complaints for sum of
LIghtbringers money were separately filed
Credit by respondent Lightbringers
Cooperative, Credit Cooperative against
petitioners. Petitioners were
members of the cooperative
who borrowed funds.
Petitioners say there was a
discrepancy between the
principal amount of the loans
which show that they never
borrowed. They also claim
that no interest could be had
because there was no written
agreement as to it’s
imposition.
proceedings under absence of petitioner's
the provisions representative during
of A.M. No. 01-10- mediation proceedings on
5-SC-PHILJA and March 1, 2008 was
1997 Rules on Civil intended to perpetuate
Procedure. delay in the litigation of
the case. Neither is it
indicative of lack of
interest on the part of
petitioner to enter into a
possible amicable
settlement of the case.|||
Whether or not the Yes. In the case at bar,
MCTC properly the petitioners failed to
allowed respondent attend the pre-trial
to present evidence conference set on August
ex parte? 25, 2009. They did not
even give any excuse for
their non-appearance,
manifestly ignoring the
importance of the pre-trial
stage. Thus, the MCTC
properly issued the Order,
allowing respondent to
present evidence ex
parte.
for pre-trial, in case any or
both of the parties absent
himself/themselves, or for
abusive conduct during
mediation proceedings.
The case of Philippine
American Life & General
Insurance Company v.
Joseph Enario discussed
the difference between non-
appearance of a defendant
in a pre-trial conference and
the declaration of a
defendant in default in the
present Rules of Civil
Procedure. If the absent
party is the plaintiff, then his
case shall be dismissed. If it
is the defendant who fails to
appear, then the plaintiff is
allowed to present his
evidence ex parte and the
court shall render judgment
on the basis thereof. Thus,
the plaintiff is given the
privilege to present his
evidence without objection
from the defendant, the
likelihood being that the

Sps. Salvador v. There was a dispute wherein
Sps. Rabaja petitioner spouses as the
sellers, the sellers’ agent, and
the buyers, respondents,
were fighting over a parcel of
land. What happened was
that respondent heard that
petitioners were looking for
buyers, so respondent made
the initial payment to the
agent in front of the seller.
The seller had a special
power of attorney. The next
day, there was a contract to
sell. Respondents made
several payments. However,
petitioners said they did not
receive any payment, and
respondents received a notice
to vacate.
Rule 19 — Intervention
Pagtalunan v. A case was filed with the
Tamayo, Court of the First Instance of
Bulacan by the respondent,
who is the Republic of The
Philippines, for expropriation
of a parcel of land. The CFI
gave a writ of posession
placing the Republic in
Whether or not the As a result of their
Court of Appeals inattentiveness, Spouses
erred in not finding Salvador could no longer
that the lower court present any evidence in
gravely abused its their favor. Spouses
discretion in Rabaja, as plaintiffs, were
declaring petitioners properly allowed by the
in default and in RTC to present
depriving them of evidence ex parte against
the opportunity to Spouses Salvador as
cross-examine defendants. Considering
respondents Sps. that Gonzales as co-
Rabaja. defendant was able to
attend the pre-trial
conference, she was
allowed to present her
evidence. The RTC could
only render judgment
based on the evidence
presented during the trial.
Whether or not the Yes. In the present case,
petitioners have a the State in the exercise
right to intervene in of its sovereign power of
the expropriation eminent domain has
proceedings decided to expropriate the
instituted by the subject property for public
State? use as a permanent site
for the Bulacan Area Shop
court will decide in favor of
the plaintiff, the defendant
having forfeited the
opportunity to rebut or
present his own evidence.
Pre-trial is an answer to the
clarion call for the speedy
disposition of cases.
Although it was discretionary
under the 1940 Rules of
Court, it was made
mandatory under the 1964
Rules and the subsequent
amendments in 1997. "The
importance of pre-trial in civil
actions cannot be
overemphasized."
Intervention is not a matter
of right but may be permitted
by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which
satisfy the requirements of
the law authorizing
intervention. Under Section
2, Rule 12 of the Revised
 possession of the land,
Pulgar v. RT of 34 tax declarations on the
Mauban building and machinery in
Mauban Plant were issued
and assessedfor a certain
amount. Later, the QPL tried
to pay first quarter installment
but such was rejected. Thus,
QPL filed a complaint for
consignation and damages
before the RTC against the
province of Quezon.
Rule 20 — Calendar of Cases
Ang Kek Chen v.
Bello Petitioner Ang was charged
before the then Manila City,
with the crimes of
"Maltreatment," "Threats," and
"Slight Physical Injuries,"
committed on December
1977.
of the Department of
Public Works and
Highways. On the other
hand, petitioners have not
been issued
an emancipation
patent. |Petitioners cannot
now successfully argue
that Celso Pagtalunan is
legally entitled to a portion
of the proceeds from the
expropriation proceedings
corresponding to the
value of the landholding.
Whether or not the No. The cessation of the
RTC erred in principal litigation on
dismissing Pulgar's jurisdictional grounds at
motion for that means that Pulgar
intervention as a had, as a matter of
consequence of the course, lost his right to
dismissal of the intervene.
main case.
Whether or not the It is not. When the
issue of alleged respondent judge
grave abuse of conducted the raffle of the
discretion in three criminal cases in
violation of Circular question, apparently in
No. 7 of this Court, violation of the Court's
regarding the Circular No. 7, he did not
manner of raffle of only arouse the suspicion
Rules of Court, what
qualifies a person to
intervene is his possession
of a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the
parties, or an interest
against both, or when he is
so situated as to be
adversely affected by a
distribution or other
disposition of property in the
custody of the court or an
officer thereof.
Jurisdiction over an
intervention is governed by
jurisdiction over the main
action. Accordingly, an
intervention presupposes
the pendency of a suit in a
court of competent
jurisdiction.
A violation or disregard of
the Court's circular on how
the raffle of cases should be
conducted is not to be
countenanced. A party has
the right to be heard by an
impartial and unbiased
tribunal. LThe raffle of cases
 cases, not denied or that he had some ulterior
explained by public motive for doing so, but
respondent, is a he violated the cardinal
trivial one.||. rule that all judicial
processes must be done
above board.
Rule 21 — Subpoena
is of vital importance to the
administration of justice
because it is intended to
insure impartial adjudication
of cases. By raffling the
cases public suspicion
regarding assignment of
cases to predetermined
judges is obviated.

Universal Rubber Petitioner was sued by Whether or not the Yes. The argument that Based on jurisprudence, in
Products, Inc. v. two respondent issuance of the the petitioner should first order to entitle a party to the
CA corporations who "subpoena duces be found guilty of unfair issuance of a
claim unfair tecum" is proper in competition before an "subpoena duces tecum", it
competition. Private a suit for unfair accounting for purposes must appear, by clear and
respondents made a competition? of ascertaining the unequivocal proof, that the
request to the amount of damages book or document sought to
respondent Judge to recoverable can proceed, be produced contains
issue a stands without merit. The evidence relevant and
subpoena duces complaint for unfair material to the issue before
tecum against the competition is basically a the court, and that the
treasurer of herein suit for "injunction and precise book, paper or
petitioner. Acting damages. Hence, the document containing such
favorably on that collection of the evidence has been so
request, said complainant for the designated or described that
respondent Judge accounting of petitioner's it may be identified. A
issued a gross sales as damages "subpoena duces tecum"
subpoena duces per R.A. 166, appears once issued by the court
tecum,Petitioner filed most relevant. For Us, to may be quashed upon
a motion in the court determine the amount of motion if the issuance
below praying that the damages allowable after thereof is unreasonable and
subpoena duces the final determination of oppressive, or the relevancy
tecum dated be the unfair labor case of the books, documents or
quashed on the would not only render things does not appear, or if
grounds that: (1) the nugatory the rights of the persons in whose behalf
 said subpoena is both complainant under Sec. the subpoena is issued fails
unreasonable and 23 of R.A. 166, but would to advance the reasonable
oppressive as the be a repetitious process cost of production thereof.
books and documents causing only unnecessary
called for are delay.
numerous and
voluminous; (2) there
is no good cause
shown for the
issuance thereof; and
(3) the books and
documents are not
relevant to the case
pending below. Acting
on the said motion and
on the opposition
thereto, respondent
Judge denied the
motion to quash the
subpoena duces
tecum. ||

People v. Montejo A petition was alleged by the
City Fiscal of Zamboanga
against Felix Wee Sit for
double homicide and serious
physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. It was
claimed that Ernesto
Salvador, a resident of Rizal,
was a material and important
witness.
Whether or not It was argued that under the
Yes. Upon refusal to
Respondent Judge Rules of Court, a witness is
give bail, the court must
commit any error or not bound to attend a
commit him to prison
abuse his discretion hearing if held outside the
until he complies or is
in refusing to issue province he resides unless
legally discharged.
an order of arrest or the distance be less than 50
to cite said witness kilometers from his
for contempt? residence to the place of
trial. Such contention did not
command the assent of this
Court. Thus: "It is loathe to
clip what undoubtedly is the
inherent power of the Court
to compel the attendance of
persons to testify in a case

Genorga v. Dr Gil Genorga, the former
Quintain, municipal health officer of
Masbate had a warrant of
arrest against him as he did
not appear as medico-legal
witness in a pending murder
case. Accused says that he
sent a letter to respondent
judge asking if he would be
reimbursed but got nor reply.
Thus, he suffered humiliation
from being arrested.
Rule 22 — Computation of Time
Luz v. National The petitioner was charged
Amnesty with violation of illegal
Commission possession of firearms in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati
City.
pending therein. Section 9 of
Rule 23 is thus interpreted to
apply solely to civil cases.
Whether or not a Yes. What was done by It was argued that under the
court of first Judge Quitain was, Rules of Court, a witness is
instance hearing a therefore, within his not bound to attend a
criminal case may discretion. hearing if held outside the
compel by province he resides unless
subpoena the the distance be less than 50
attendance of a kilometers from his
witness in his sala residence to the place of
in Zamboanga City, trial. Such contention did not
when the known command the assent of this
address of such Court. It would follow then
witness is at that respondent Judge
Montalban, Rizal? should decide said motion
without taking into
consideration Section 9 of
Rule 23.
Whether or not the Yes. The Court The extension granted by
petitioner timely Resolves, for the the Court of Appeals should
filed his second guidance of the be tacked to the original
motion for extension Bench and the period and commences
of time to file his Bar, to declare that immediately after the
petition for review? Section 1, Rule 22 expiration of such period.
speaks only of “the Under the Resolution of this
last day of the Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-
period” so that SC, the CA has no
when a party discretion to reckon the
seeks an commencement of the
extension and the extension it granted from a
same is granted, date later than the expiration
the due date of such period, regardless of
ceases to be the the fact that said due date is
 last day and a Saturday, Sunday, or a
hence, the legal holiday.
provision no longer
applies. Any
extension of time
to file the required
pleading should
therefore be
counted from the
expiration of the
period regardless
of the fact that said
due date is a
Saturday, Sunday
or legal holiday.

Neypes v. CA An action for annulment of Whether or not the Yes,Henceforth, this The new rule aims to
judgement and titles of land petition for appeal "fresh period rule" shall regiment or make the appeal
were filed before the RTC of was timely filed? also apply to Rule 40 period uniform, to be
Oriental Mindoro against the governing appeals from counted from receipt of the
Bureau of Forest the Municipal Trial Courts order denying the motion for
Development. In the course of to the Regional Trial new trial, motion for
the proceedings, the parties Courts; Rule 42 on reconsideration (whether full
filed various motions with the petitions for review from or partial) or any final order
trial court. Among these were: the Regional Trial Courts or resolution. The Court thus
(1) the motion filed by to the Court of Appeals; hold that petitioners
petitioners to declare the Rule 43 on appeals from seasonably filed their notice
respondent heirs, the Bureau quasi-judicial agencies to of appeal within the fresh
of Lands and the Bureau of the Court of Appeals and period of 15 days, counted
Forest Development in default Rule 45 governing from July 22, 1998, the date
and (2) the motions to dismiss appeals by certiorari to of the receipt of Motion for
filed by the respondent heirs the Supreme Court. Reconsideration.
and the Land Bank of the
Philippines, respectively.
Rule 23 — Deposition pending action
 Vda. de Respondents were charged
Manguerra v. with Estafa through
Risos Falsification of public
document. The Criminal case
arose from the falsification of
a deed of real estate
mortgage allegedly committed
by respondents where they
made it appear that
Concepcion, the owner of the
mortgaged property known as
the Gorordo property, affixed
her signature to the
document. Hence, the
criminal case. Respondents
filed a Motion for Suspension
of the Proceedings in Criminal
Case on the ground of
prejudicial question. The
RTC granted the aforesaid
motion. Concepcion's motion
for reconsideration was
denied on June 5, 2000
Rule 30 — Trial
Lee v. Romillo, Private respondent filed a
Jr., complaint for accounting with
damages. There was a
contract for arrastre services
in Manila between respondent
and William Lines. In the year
1973, plaintiff Mendioro
Whether or not Rule No. In the case at bench,
23 of the Rules of in issue is the examination
Court applies to the of a prosecution witness,
instant case? who, according to the
petitioners, was too sick to
travel and appear before
the trial court.
Whether or not No default is involved
the delegation of herein. As held in the
the reception of case of Laluan v.
the evidence ex- Manalo, no provision of
parte to the lower law or principle of public
court's legal policy prohibits a Court
researcher is from authorizing its
In criminal cases, the
accused may be afforded
the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional
right to confront the
witnesses face to face. It
also gives the parties and
their counsel the chance to
propound such questions as
they deem material and
necessary to support their
position or to test the
credibility of said
witnesses. Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to
observe the witnesses'
demeanor. As exceptions,
Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules
of Court provide for the
different modes of discovery
that may be resorted to by a
party to an action. These
rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies
of witnesses or as modes of
discovery.
In the case of The National
Housing Authority v.Court of
Appeals, the Court
categorically stated that:
"The contention that the
Trial Court cannot delegate
the reception of evidence to
 conducted arrastre operations illegal.||| Clerk of Court to receive its Clerk of Court, citing the
as per arrastre contract with the evidence of a party case of Lim Tanhu v.
William Lines, Inc, that all the litigant.|| Ramolete is not well taken.
income from the arrastre Suffice it to say, for
operations during the said purposes of this suit, that the
period were received and held said case referred to
in trust for Mendioro by reception of evidence by a
defendants Lee, Tan and Clerk of Court after
Chiongbian who were also declaration of defendant's
tasked with the disbursement default
of the said income for
operational expenses.
Defendants Lee, Tan and
Chiongbian were duty-bound
to turn over to plaintiff
Mendioro the income they
held in trust for him; and they
failed to do so despite
Mendioro's repeated
demands.|||

Rule 31 — Consolidation or Severance

Metropolitan A complaint was filed against Whether or not The Trial Court held the Exceptions to the general
Bank and Trust the Marcoses for ill-gotten holding of a Separate Trials to be rule are permitted only when
Company v. wealth. Later, the Republic separate trial would improper. The Court held there are extraordinary
Sandoval moved for the amendment of deny Metro bank that Sandiganbayan grounds for conducting
the complaint to implead due process, committed grave abuse of separate trials on different
Asian Bank as an additional because Asian its discretion in ordering a issues raised in the same
defendant. This was granted. Bank was entitled to separate trial as to Asian case, or when separate trials
contest the Bank (Metrobank) on the of the issues will avoid
evidence of the ground that the issue prejudice, or when separate
Republic against against Asian Bank was trials of the issues will
the original distinct and separate from further convenience, or
defendants prior to that against the original when separate trials of the
Asian Bank's defendants. Thereby, the issues will promote justice,

Rule 33 — Demurrer to Evidence
Casent Realty Two promissory notes were
Development issued by petitioner to Rare
Corp. v. reality, which were assigned
Philbanking Corp to respondent by a Deed of
Assignment. Petitioner did not
pay, despite demand.
inclusion as an Sandiganbayan veered or when separate trials of
additional away from the general the issues will give a fair trial
defendant.||| rule of having all the to all parties. Otherwise, the
issues in every case tried general rule must apply.
at one time, unreasonably
shunting aside the dictum
in Corrigan, supra, that a
"single trial will generally
lessen the delay,
expense, and
inconvenience to the
parties and the courts."
Did CA err in No. The evidence Rule 33, Section 1 of the
excluding the contemplated by the 1997 Rules of Civil
petitioner’s rule on demurrer is that Procedure: “the defendant
affirmative which pertains to the may move for dismissal on
defenses in its merits of the case, the ground that upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff
answer in excluding technical has shown no right to relief.
resolving a aspects such as The evidence contemplated
demurrer to capacity to sue. by the rule on demurrer is
evidence. that which pertains to the
merits of the case, excluding
technical aspects such as
capacity to sue. The “facts”
referred to in Section 8
should include all the
means sanctioned by the
Rules of Court in
ascertaining matters in
judicial proceedings.
Petitioner, by way of
defense, should have

Uy v. Chua Respondent had an illegal
relationship with Irene and
sired two children. The birth
certificates of the children
were filed out with the
names or Irene’s father and
her mother’s maiden name.
Respondent financially
supported petitioner
presented evidence to
show that the Dacion
includes the promissory
notes.
Was the trial court it was incumbent upon Demurrer to Evidence is
correct in granting RTC to make thegoverned by Rule 33 of the
the demurrer to determination. It did notRules of Court, Section 1
evidence? take into consideration provides that: “After the
any of the evidence plaintiff has completed the
presented by petitioner. presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for
dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is
denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence.”
Demurrer is an aid or
instrument for the
expeditious termination of an
action, similar to a motion to
dismiss, which the court or
tribunal may either grant or
deny. Necessarily, the last
line of Section 1, Rule 33
should not apply herein and
respondent should still be
allowed to present evidence
before the RTC for Special
Proceedings No. 12562-
CEB.
Rule 34 — Judgment on the Pleadings

Wood Technology WTC got a loan from Whether or not the We agree with both the “In a proper case for
Corp. v. Equitable respondent, signed by appellate court trial and the appellate judgment on the
Bank Cordova and Young, which made a mistake courts that this matter pleadings, there is no
bound themselves as when it allowed proferred as a defense ostensible issue at all
surities. When demand was RTCs judgement could be resolved because of the failure of
made by respondent, on the pleadings judiciously by plain the defending party’s
petitioners did not pay. resort to the stipulations answer to raise an issue.
They claim that only one in the promissory note On the other hand, in the
demand letter was made. which was already case of a summary
Plus, the loan had not before the trial court. judgment, issues
matured yet, as the apparently exist.”
maturity date was blank. The judgment rendered
by the trial court is valid
as a summary judgment.
A judgment on the
pleadings is proper when
an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise
admits the material
allegation of the adverse
party’s pleadings.
Municipality of The NPC was found liable If the application a review of the records A motion for judgment on
Tiwi v. Betito for unpaid real estate of the rule of reveal that respondent the pleadings admits the
taxes. This included judgment on the and petitioners set-up truth of all material and
geothermal plants in the pleadings and/or multiple levels of claims relevant allegations of the
Municipality of Tiwi with summary and defenses, opposing party. The
respectively with some judgment must rest on those
substations in Albay (which judgment is failing to tender an issue allegations taken together
were sold in an auction baseless, while others requiring the with such other allegations
sale). In the sale, the improper and presentation of evidence as are admitted in the
Municipality obtained unwarranted for resolution. pleadings. It is proper when
ownership over the an answer fails to tender an
properties. An agreement issue, or otherwise admits
 was entered into between
BPC and Albay where NPC
agreed to settle it’s tax
liabilities.The mayor
requested to remit the
rightful tax share of Tiwi
and its barangays. The
governor stated that the
request cannot be granted.
So NPC requested
clarification from the OP.
Tan v. Dela Vega A complaint for quieting of
title and the declaration of
nullity of free patent was
filed by respondents
against the heirs of
Mencias and the Secretary
of DENR. Petitioner was
later impleaded as
purchasers of the disputed
lot in Rizal.
Adolfo v. Adolfo A petitioner for judicial
separation of property was
filed in the RTC by Adolfo
against his wife. Allegedly,
the parties were married
the material allegation of the
adverse party’s pleading. If it
appears that not all the
material allegations of the
complaint were admitted in
the answer for some of them
were either denied or
disputed, then the defendant
has set up certain special
defenses. Those, if proven,
would have the effect of
nullifying plaintiff's main
cause of action, judgment on
the pleadings cannot be
rendered.
Whether or not a In the case at bar, we In a proper case for
judgment on the find that the trial court judgment on the
pleadings is erred in rendering pleadings, there is no
proper in the judgment on the ostensible issue at all
instant case. pleadings because the because of the failure of
pleadings filed by the the defending party’s
parties generated answer to raise an issue.
ostensible issues that
necessitate the
presentation of
evidence in order to
determine the validity of
the titles from which the
respondent’s title was
derived
Whether or not the Instead of resolving Judgment on the pleadings
CA erred in petitioner's motion for is proper "where an answer
deciding the case judgment on the fails to tender an issue, or
on a question of pleadings, the trial court otherwise admits the
substance not in should have denied it or material allegations of the
 and they had one child.
The acquired a lot in
Mandaue during marriage.
The parties then separated
because of irreconcilable
differences. Petitioner then
suggested separation of
conjugal property, but
respondent refused.
Respondent contended that
she is the sole owner of the
subject property which she
inherited from her mother;
that petitioner is a lazy bum,
gambler, drunkard, wife
abuser, and neglectful father;
that respondent found all
means to support the family.
She caused to be built on a
portion of her mother's land a
house even while petitioner
was bumming around; that
one day, petitioner destroyed
the roof of the house that was
then being built; that petitioner
subsequently abandoned her
and their child in 1968, and
transferred to Davao City
where he took a mistress and
begot four children by her.
Rule 35 — Summary Judgment
accord with law, held it in abeyance. adverse party's pleading."
Rule 26 of the Summary judgment, on the
1997 Rules, and other hand, will be granted
applicable "if the pleadings, supporting
jurisprudence. affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show
that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of
law." If the answer does in
fact specifically deny the
material averments of the
complaint and/or asserts
affirmative defenses, a
judgment on the pleadings
would naturally be improper.
In a case for judgment on
the pleadings, the Answer is
such that no issue is raised
at all. The essential question
in such a case is whether
there are issues generated
by the pleadings. The trial
court however disregarded
the fact that its decision was
then the subject of a
pending appeal. One of the
issues raised in the appeal
is precisely whether the
subject property is conjugal,
or a paraphernal asset of the
respondent.
Calubaquib v. A landholding in Cagayan
Republic was declared by President
Manuel L Quezon as a
military reservation site, under
Proclamation No. 80. It is
subject to private rights, if any
there be. Supposedly,
petitioners unlawfully entered
the military reservation and
demands were made for them
to leave. Petitioners claim that
the land is theirs.
YKR Corp. v. Yulo died. After his death,
Philippine Agri- his late wife Teresa J Yulo
Business Center and their six children
Corp., became substitutes. His
wife then died. The
petitioners have three other
siblings who claim that they
"have gone their own
separate way[s] when Luis A.
Yulo died. [p]etitioners have
no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief if
their siblings are aware of the
proceedings in
(Sandiganbayan), including
respondent's move for a
summary judgment and the
assailed resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan."
Rule 36 — Judgments Final Orders and Entry
Whether or not a Yes. For this case, the The guidelines for summary
propriety of trial court proceeded to judgement was ignored by
rendering a render summary judgment the trial court. Summary
summary with neither of the parties judgment is proper when,
judgment is proper filing a motion therefor it upon motion of the plaintiff
was improper for the trial or the defendant, the court
in this case. court to have persisted in finds that the answer filed by
rendering summary the defendant does not
judgment. tender a genuine issue as to
any material fact and that
one party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
Whether or not the Yes. We cannot thus A prudent examination of
Sandiganbayan properly ascertain the evidence on record
erred in law when whether the facts which yields to no other conclusion
it granted the the latter could not make that there exists a genuine
respondent’s any truthful admission or issue of fact as raised in
denial are so plainly and both petitions. In ruling on
motion for necessarily within their the issue of whether a
summary knowledge. genuine issue of fact exists,
judgment even if there was no mention of any
the same is not circumstance or situation
supported by upon which the court a quo
deposition, derived its conclusion that
affidavit or the matters requested for
admission "ought to be
admission on the
records. within the personal
knowledge" of YKR
Corporation and seven out
of the ten Yulo Heirs.
Sumbilla v. Matrix Petitioner issued Philippine
Finance Corp., Business Bank Checks as
payment for her loan.
However, the checks were
dishonored having been
drawn against a closed
account.
Delfino v. Delfino owned several
Anasao, parcels of agricultural land
in Laguna. He sold some
coconut land, leaving him
with rice land. The tenanted
portion was tilled by
Whether or not the Yes.. Unfortunately, in the Under the doctrine of finality
penalty imposed present case, the MeTC and immutability of
in the MeTC Decision is already final judgments, a decision that
Decision, which is and executory after has acquired finality
already final and petitioner failed to timely becomes immutable and
file a Notice of Appeal. unalterable and may no
executory, may longer be modified in any
still be modified. respect, even if the
modification is meant to
correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law,
and whether it will be made
by the court that rendered it
or by the highest court of the
land. Upon finality of the
judgment, the Court loses its
jurisdiction to amend, modify
or alter the same.
Nonetheless, the Court has
the power and prerogative to
suspend its own rules and to
exempt a case from their
operation if and when justice
requires it. Substantial
justice dictates that the
penalty meted on the
petitioner be accordingly
corrected within the
maximum limits prescribed
under Section 1 of BP 22.
Whether or not the Yes. The clarification The doctrine of finality and
Order of Secretary made by Secretary immutability of judgments is
Pangandaman Pangandaman falls under grounded on fundamental
violated the rule on the fourth exception. considerations of public
immutability of final policy and sound practice to
judgments? the effect that, at the risk of
 respondents, and placed occasional error, the
under Operation land judgments of the courts
transfer. must become final at some
definite date set by law.
There are exceptions to the
general rule, namely: (1) the
correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; (3)
void judgments; and (4)
whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its
execution unjust and
inequitable. The clarification
made by Secretary
Pangandaman falls under
the fourth exception.
Club Filipino, Inc. The employees of Club Whether or not No. In the present case, As a general rule, the filing
v. Bautista, Filipino Inc were Club Filipino, this court granted leave to of second Motions for
represented by a union, Inc.’s filing of the petitioner Club Filipino, Reconsideration of a
CLUFEA. There were Supplemental Inc. to file the judgment or final resolution
Supplemental Motion for is prohibited as provided by
bargaining agreements Motion for
Reconsideration in the Rule 52, Section 2 of the
between the two, and Reconsideration Resolution. The Rules of Court. The
CLUFEA made several prevented the Supplemental Motion for petitioner’s Supplemental
demands for a new Resolution from Reconsideration, Motion for Reconsideration
agreement, which was becoming final therefore, is no longer is in the nature of a second
denied. CLUFEA filed before and executory. prohibited. Motion for Reconsideration.
the NCMB a request for For this court to entertain
preventive mediation. The second Motions for
meeting ended with the Reconsideration, the second
parties' respective panels Motions must present
declaring a deadlock in "extraordinarily persuasive
negotiation. CLUFEA filed reasons and only upon
 with the NCMB a Notice of
Strike on the ground of
bargaining deadlock.
CLUFEA conducted a strike
vote under the Department of
Labor and Employment's
supervision with the majority
of CLUFEA's total union
membership voting to strike.
CLUFEA staged a strike on
the ground of bargaining
deadlock.
NTC v. Public biddings were
Aplhaomega conducted by TRANSCO.
Integrated Corp., AIC was licensed
transmission line
contractor, and was part of
the biddings. They were
awarded 6 government
construction projects.
However, they encountered
difficulties and incurred
losses because TRANSCO
breached contract, so they
gave up the projects to
TRANSCO. AIC, a duly
licensed transmission line
contractor, participated in the
public biddings conducted by
TRANSCO and was awarded
six (6) government
construction projects and
encountered difficulties and
incurred losses allegedly due
to TRANSCO's breach of their
express leave first
obtained." Once leave to file
is granted, the second
Motion for Reconsideration
is no longer prohibited This
case falls under the
exception
Whether or not the Yes. The Court finds no Section 1, Rule 45 of the
CA erred in reason to disturb the Rules of Court provides that
affirming the CIAC factual findings of the a petition for review on
Arbitral Tribunal's CIAC Arbitral Tribunal on certiorari under the said rule,
findings that AIC the matter of AIC's as in this case, "shall raise
was entitled to its entitlement to damages only questions of law which
claims for damages which the CA affirmed as must be distinctly set forth.”
as a result of project being well supported by It is well-settled that findings
delays. evidence and properly of fact of quasi-judicial
referred to in the record. . bodies, which have acquired
expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are
generally accorded not only
respect, but also finality,
especially when affirmed by
the CA. The CIAC
possesses that required
expertise in the field of
construction arbitration and
the factual findings of its
construction arbitrators are
final and conclusive, not
reviewable by this Court on
 contracts, prompting it to
surrender the projects to
TRANSCO under protest.
Charged against TRANSCO:
breached the contracts by its
failure to: (a) furnish the
required Detailed
Engineering; (b) arrange a
well-established right-of-way
to the project areas; (c)
secure the necessary permits
and clearances from the
concerned local government
units (LGUs); (d) ensure a
continuous supply of
construction materials; and
(e) carry out AIC's requests
for power shut down.
DBP v. Guarina DBP gave a loan to GC to
Agricultural and finance the development of
Realty its resort complex in Iloilo,
Development so GC executed a denying
Corp promissory note and real
estate mortgage over
several real properties as
security, plus a chattel
mortgage. The loan was
released in several
installments. GC used to
proceeds to defray costs of
improvements, and
demanded balance on the
loan but DBP refused. DBP
paid some supplies of GC
without it’s approval. It was
appeal. Indeed, the rule is
well entrenched: Specialis
derogat generali. When two
rules apply to a particular
case, that which was
specially designed for the
said case must prevail over
the other.
Whether or not the Under the circumstances, DBP's actuations were
Decision of the CA DBP's foreclosure of the legally unfounded. It is true
and its resolution mortgage and the sale of that loans are often secured
the mortgaged properties by a mortgage constituted
petitioner’s Motion at its instance were on real or personal property
premature, and, therefore, to protect the creditor's
for void and ineffectual. interest in case of the default
Reconsideration of the debtor. In other words,
were issued in GC would not incur in delay
accordance with before DBP fully performed
law. its reciprocal obligation.
Considering that it had yet to
release the entire proceeds
of the loan, DBP could not
yet make an effective
demand for payment upon
GC to perform its obligation
under the loan. Hence, GC
 found by DBP that GC had would not be in default
not completed the without the demand.
construction works, so DBP
demanded that GC
expedite the completion of
the project. Not happy with
the non-action, DBP
initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings. A
notice of foreclosure sale
was sent to GC, which was
published leading the
clients and patrons of GC
to think that the resort had
closed.
Rule 37 — New Trial or Reconsideration

Gonzales v. Solid Gonzales employment was
Cement terminated by his employer,
Corporation, respondent. However, the
LA held that it was an
illegal dismissal. So
Gonzales filed a motion for
execution of reinstatement.
Solid reinstated Gonzales
in the payroll. But the
NLRC modified the
decision be reduing the
amount of damages.
Whether or not the Yes.The matter before As a rule, a second
second motion for us — in the Rule 45 motion for reconsideration
reconsideration is petition questioning the is a prohibited pleading
allowed? CA's Rule 65 under the Rules of Court,
determination — is the and this reason alone is
scope of the benefits sufficient basis for us to
awarded by the LA, as dismiss the present
modified on appeal and second motion for
ultimately affirmed by reconsideration. The
this Court, which ruling ruling in the original case,
has become final and as affirmed by the Court,
which now must be has been expressly
implemented as a declared final. The
matter of law. Given immutability principle,
these considerations, to rather than being
reopen this case on absolute, is subject to

Tadeja v. People Ruben Bernardo had died,
and the witness. Elena and
Jacinta, were watching a
public dance during a
fiesta. There they saw
Ruben being hacked to
death by petitioners.
Petitioners claim that
Ruben and his son went to
the barangay in a drunken
state and was waving a
knife and cursing at the
crowd.
second motion for
reconsideration would
not actually embroil the
Court with changes in
the decision on the
merits of the case, but
would confine itself
solely to the issue of the
CA's actions in the
course of determining
lack or excess of
jurisdiction or the
presence of grave
abuse of discretion in
reviewing the NLRC's
ruling on the execution
aspect of the case.
The confession of
Whether or not to Plaridel does not meet
grant the this requisite. He
petitioner’s motion participated in the trial
to reopen the case before the RTC and
for reception of even gave testimony as
further evidence in to his defense. It was
the trial court. only after he and
petitioners had been
convicted by the trial
court that he
absconded.
well-settled exceptions,
among which is its
inapplicability when a
decision claimed to be
final is not only erroneous,
but null and void
Newly discovered
evidence refers to that
which (a) is discovered
after trial; (b) could not
have been discovered
and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c)
is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative
or impeaching; and (d) is
of such weight that it
would probably change
the judgment if admitted.
The most important
requisite is that the
 evidence could not have
been discovered and
produced at the trial even
with reasonable diligence;
hence, the term "newly
discovered."
SJS Officers v. A comprehensive plan and Whether or not The allegation of The denial of a motion for
Lim relocation plan was there is encroachment on the reconsideration signifies that
submitted to the RTC of interference or policy making power of the grounds relied upon
Manila by Chevron, encroachment the political departments have been found, upon due
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum, with the policy of the government is deliberation, to be without
bereft of merit. The merit, as not being of
and Petron.The presiding making powers of prayer that the submission sufficient weight to warrant a
judge would monitor the the political of an updated modification of the judgment
strict enforcement of the departments of comprehensive plan and or final order. It means not
decision. the government. relocation schedule, only that the grounds relied
including the period for upon are lacking in merit but
relocation, be deferred also that any other, not so
until after the Motion is raised, is deemed waived
resolved with finality is and may no longer be set up
denied. The compliance in a subsequent motion or
period prescribed in the application to overturn the
Decision shall remain. judgment; and this is true,
whatever may be the title
given to such motion or
application, whether it be
"second motion for
reconsideration" or "motion
for clarification" or "plea for
due process" or "prayer for a
second look," or "motion to
defer, or set aside, entry of
judgment," or . . ., etc . This
Resolution is final. Under
pain of contempt, no further
pleadings, motions or

Rule 38 — Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings
Afdal v. Carlos, A complaint for unlawful
detainer against petitioners
Gulbajar and Joh Does was
filed by Carlos. It was alleged
that they were occupying a
parcel of land in respondents
name, and that respondents
had allowed them to stay
there by mere tolerance. It
was claimed that petitioner
sold the property to
respondents but allowed
petitioners to stay in the
property. So respondent
demanded that petitioners
turn over the property to him,
as he needed such for his
personal use. There were
several attempts to serve
summons and complaint on
petitioners, but they still failed
to answer.
papers in the guise of the
above-enumerated
submissions shall, thus, be
entertained in these cases.
Whether or not the Yes. A petition for relief from
RTC erred in judgment in forcible entry
dismissing their and unlawful detainer cases,
petition for relief as in the present case, is a
from judgment? prohibited pleading. The
legal justification is that
Section 13(4) of Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court provides
petitions for relief from
judgment are prohibited. The
same is also provided in the
Rules of Summary
Procedure. The reason for
this is to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases
subject of summary
procedure. Moreover,
Section 1, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court provides that
when a judgment or final
order is entered, or any
other proceeding is
thereafter taken against a
party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, he
may file a petition in such
court and in the same
case praying that the

City of Dagupan The City of Dagpuan caused
v. Maramba the demolition of a lack of notice of
commercial fish center,
without giveing notice to
Maramba. There was also
included a threat of taking
over the property. This made
Maramba file a complaint for
injunction with damages and
a restraining order. According
to Maramba, the demolition
was unlawful and that the
"complete demolition and
destruction of the previously
existing commercial fish
center of plaintiff is valued at
Five Million (₱10,000,000.00)
pesos." The word, "ten," was
handwritten on top of the
word, "five." Maramba asked
for a judgment "ordering
defendant corporation to pay
plaintiff the amount of Ten
Thousand (₱10,000.00)
pesos for the actual and
present value of the
commercial fish center
judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside. A
petition for relief from
judgment, if allowed by the
Rules and not a prohibited
pleading, should be filed
with and resolved by the
court in the same case from
which the petition arose.
Whether or not the Yes. Considering the As a rule, a motion without
circumstances of the a notice of hearing is
hearing in a motion present case, we believe considered pro forma and
for reconsideration that the requirements of does not affect the
is excusable procedural due process reglementary period for the
negligence that were substantially appeal or the filing of the
allows the filing of a complied with, and that requisite pleading. As an
petition for relief of the compliance justified a integral component of
judgment? departure from a literal procedural due process, the
application of the rule on three-day notice required by
notice of hearing. This the Rules is not intended for
court held that "when the the benefit of the movant.
adverse party has actually Rather, the requirement is
had the opportunity to be for the purpose of avoiding
heard, and has indeed surprises that may be
been heard through sprung upon the adverse
pleadings filed in party, who must be given
opposition to the motion, time to study and meet the
the purpose behind the arguments in the motion
rule is deemed duly before a resolution by the
served.” court. The test is the
presence of the opportunity
to be heard, as well as to
have time to study the
motion and meaningfully
oppose or controvert the
grounds upon which it is
 completely demolished by
public defendant." The word,
"million," was handwritten on
top of the word, "thousand,"
and an additional zero was
handwritten at the end of the
numerical figure. The
handwritten intercalation was
notexplained in any part of the
records and in the
proceedings.
Rule 39, Sections 1 to 14 — Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments
Quicho v. Reyes, Petitioner alleged that the
Jr procedure observed by Reyes
in implementing the alias writ
violated the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court.
He cited the manual: "if the
judgment obligor cannot pay
all or part of the obligation in
cash, certified bank check or
other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment
obligee, the officer shall levy
upon the properties of the
judgment obligor of every kind
and nature whatsoever which
may be disposed of for value
and not otherwise exempt
from execution giving the
latter the option to
immediately choose which
property or part thereof may
be levied upon, sufficient to
satisfy the judgment." He
based.
Whether or not Yes. it is clear that the Section 9, Rule 39 of the
Sheriff Reyes sheriff shall demand from Rules of Court provides for
gravely abused his the judgment obligor the the procedure as to how
authority relative to immediate payment in execution of judgments for
the implementation cash, certified bank check money is enforced. The
of the writ of or any other mode of duties of a sheriff are: (1) to
execution? payment acceptable to the first make a demand from
judgment obligee. If the the obligor for the immediate
judgment obligor cannot payment of the full amount
pay by these methods stated in the writ of
immediately or at once, he execution and of all lawful
can exercise his option to fees; (2) to receive payment
choose which of his in the form of cash, certified
property can be levied bank check payable to the
upon. obligee, or any other form of
payment acceptable to the
latter; (3) to levy upon the
properties of the obligor, not
exempt from execution, if
the latter cannot pay all or
part of the obligation; (4)
give the obligor the
opportunity to exercise the
states that as the holder of option to choose which
the assets and properties of property may be levied
Traders Royal Bank (TRB), upon; (5) in case the option
BOC was given the option to is not exercised, to first levy
choose which property to be on the personal properties of
surrendered to satisfy the the obligor, including the
judgment. It was only when garnishment of debts due
BOC was unable to exercise the obligor and other credits,
the option that Reyes could i.e., bank deposits, financial
levy on other properties. BOC interests, royalties,
was forced to surrender under commissions and other
protest a real estate property personal properties not
to satisfy the judgment and capable of manual delivery
preserve its other properties or in the possession or
from being wrongfully levied control of third parties; and
by Reyes. It was argued that (6) to levy on real properties
Reyes did not give BOC a if the personal properties are
chance to exercise that insufficient to answer for the
option. What happened was judgment.
that Reyes blow-torched the
locked grill door of BOC’s
cash vault and forcibly took
the money deposits of its
clients as well as its
computers. Reyes sowed
terror by bringing with him
agents of the NBI who were in
full-battle gear and carrying
high-powered firearms. Atty.
Quicho concluded that these
illegal acts of Reyes
warranted his relief as sheriff
of the RTC. Reyes denied the
charges against him.
According to him, he did not
violate any law when he
 refused to accept BOC’s offer
of a property located in
Paranaque City to satisfy the
judgment debt. Atty. Quicho
refuted Reyes’ argument that
BOC was not entitled to
exercise the option to choose
the properties to be levied;
he explained that under
Section 9, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, it was clear
that if the judgment obligor
could not pay the judgment
debt in cash, certified bank
check or other mode of
payment acceptable to the
judgment oblige, he still had
the option to choose which of
his properties he could offer
to satisfy the obligation.
Rule 40 — Appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts

Heirs of dela There was a previous case,
Rosa v. Calderon- wherein petitioners were said
Bargas to illegally enter a parcel of
land in Rizal, and they were
held to vacate the premises
and pay damages.
Whether or not the No. The alleged failure of
Court of Appeals the clerks of court to
erred in denying the furnish petitioners copies
petitioners' Petition of the letter of transmittal
and and Notice of Appealed
Case that resulted in their
inability to file their
memorandum on time can
no longer be reviewed by
this Court.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court,
states, in part, that a party's
appeal by notice of appeal is
deemed perfected as to him
upon the filing of the notice
of appeal in due time. The
RTC acting as an appellate
court acquired jurisdiction
over the case of the
petitioners upon their filing of
the notice of appeal on
October 5, 1998. The filing
of the notice of appeal in

Encarnacion v. Two lots in Isabela covered
Amigo by TCTs were registered
under the name of
Encarnacion. The lots formed
part of a single track of land
owned by Valiente. But
Valiente sold the same to
Mallapitan, who sold it to
Magpantay. Magpantay died,
and his widow executed an
affidavit of waiver. In this
waiver, she waived her right
over the property in favor of
her son-in-law, Encarnacion.
Respondent allegedly entered
the premises and took
possession of a portion
without the permission of
Magpantay. Despite
Was accion No. After a careful
publiciana and not evaluation of the evidence
unlawful detainer on record of this case, we
proper find that the Court of
Appeals committed no
reversible error in holding
that the proper action in
this case is accion
publiciana; and in ordering
the remand of the case to
the RTC for further
proceedings. The length
of time that the petitioner
was dispossessed of his
property made his cause
of action beyond the ambit
of an accion
interdictal and effectively
made it one for accion
due time and the payment of
the appropriate fees by the
petitioners perfected their
appeal in the RTC. As a
necessary consequence
thereof, the MTC was
divested of jurisdiction over
their case. From the filing of
the written notice of appeal,
petitioners' appeal was
perfected without need of
any further act, and,
consequently, the trial court
lost jurisdiction over the
case, both over the record
and over the subject of the
case.
In this jurisdiction, the three
kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession of
real property are a.) Accion
interdictal, or an ejectment
proceeding which may be
either that for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer, which
is a summary action for
recovery of physical
possession where the
dispossession has not lasted
for more than one year, and
should be brought in the
proper inferior court b.)
Accion publiciana or the
plenary action for the
recovery of the real right of
possession, which should be
 demands, respondent did not publiciana. After the lapse
vacate. of the one-year period, the
suit must be commenced
in the Regional Trial Court
via an accion
publiciana which is a suit
for recovery of the right to
possess.
brought in the proper
Regional Trial Court, and
c.) Accion reinvindicatoria,
which is an action for the
recovery of ownership which
must be brought in the
proper Regional Trial Court.

Canlas v. Tubil Tubil together with her
husband, claim that they are
the owners of a lot. As proof,
she says that before the lot
was titled, it was declared for
tax purposes in her name.
Respondents erected a respondent’s allegations in
residential house on the land
on which they are presently
occupying.
Which court (MTC MTC The allegations in the
or RTC) has complaint are what
jurisdiction over the determines the nature of the
matter? action as well as the court
which has jurisdiction over
the case. In the instant case,
the complaint clearly make a
case for an unlawful
detainer, essential to confer
jurisdiction on the MTC over
the subject matter. She sent
on January 12, 2004 a letter
demanding that petitioners
vacate the property but they
failed and refused to do so.
The complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed on June 9,
2004, or within one year
from the time the last
demand to vacate was
made.

Rule 41 — Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts

Silverio, Jr. v. CA An intestate proceeding was Whether or not the The denial of the motion Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the
filed by Ricardo Silberio for Omnibus orders are for reconsideration of an Rules of Court provides that
 the settlement of his
deceased wife’s estate. While
the case was pending,
petitioner filed a petition to
remove the adminstrator,
Ricardo C Silvero sr. Ricardo
Silberio Sr. filed an intestate
proceeding for the settlement
of his deceased wife’s estate.
During the pendancy of the
case, petitioner Ricardo
Silberio, Jr. filed a petition to
remove Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. as the administrator of the
subject estate.
Lebin v. Mirasol The administrator of the
Estate of L.J. Hodges was
relayed an offer by petitioners
to purchase an asset of the
estate. A deposit of 20% of
the offer was made. The
administrator stated that
Erlinda Lebin was the actual
occupant of Lot. 18. Atty.
Tabares was commissioned
interlocutory orders order of dismissal of a no appeal may be taken
which are not complaint is not an from an order denying a
subject to appeal interlocutory order, motion for reconsideration.
under Sec. 1 of however, but a final order In all the above instances
Rule 41 as it puts an end to the where the judgment or final
particular matter resolved, order is not appealable, the
or settles definitely the aggrieved party may file an
matter therein disposed appropriate special civil
of, and nothing is left for action under Rule 65. The
the trial court to do other rationale behind the rule
than to execute the order. proscribing the remedy of
appeal from an interlocutory
order is to prevent undue
delay, useless appeals and
undue inconvenience to the
appealing party by having to
assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court,
when they can be contested
in a single appeal. The
appropriate remedy is thus
for the party to wait for the
final judgment or order and
assign such interlocutory
order as an error of the court
on appeal.
Whether or not the No. The elimination of the record
RTC erred in on appeal in most cases,
dismissing the retaining the record on
petitioners’ appeal appeal only for appeals in
for their failure to special proceedings and in
timely file a record other cases in which the
on appeal Rules of Court allows
multiple appeals was among
the innovations introduced
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 12.
by the RTC to do an ocular
inspection of Lot 18 to see if it
was true. In the report, it was
confirmed, and the RTC
granted the administrator’s
motion for the approval of the
offer. Mirasol offered to
purchase the lot, but then
found out that her house was
actually standing on Lot 18.
Mirasol then filed a petition for
relief from the order. While
the resolution was pending,
the petitioners made the last
payment for installment, but
the motion for execution of
the deed of sale was not
acted upon by the RTC.
No record on appeal shall be
required to take an appeal.
In lieu thereof, the entire
record shall be transmitted
with all the pages
prominently numbered
consecutively, together with
an index of the contents
thereof. The petition for
review must be filed with the
Court of Appeals within 15
days from notice of the
judgment, and as already
stated, shall point out the
error of fact or law that will
warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision
or judgment sought to be
reviewed. An ordinary
appeal is taken by merely
filing a notice of appeal
within 15 days from notice of
the judgment, except in
special proceedings or
cases where multiple
appeals are allowed in which
event the period of appeal is
30 days and a record on
appeal is necessary. There
is therefore no longer any
common method of appeal
in civil cases to the Supreme
Court and the Court of
Appeals.
Briones v. Ruby J Henson filed a
Henson-Cruz petitioner to allow the will of
her late mother with the RTC
of Manila. One of the
deceased’s daughters, Lilia
Henson-Cruz, opposed the
petition of Ruby. According to
her, Ruby had understated
the value of their late mother’s
estate and acted with
unconscionable bad faith. Lilia
asked that her mother’s
holographic will be disallowed
and that she be appointed as
the intestate administratrix.
Lilia subsequently moved for
the appointment of an interim
special administrator of the
estate of her late mother. The
trial court then made
petitioner Briones the special
administrator of the estate.
Atty Briones submitted the
special administrator’s final
report, and prayed that he be
paid a commission of around
10m. The respondents
opposed the approval of the
final report. Respondents filed
an audit request with the trial
court, which the court granted
Family Savings Pryce Gases is a debtor of
Bank, Inc. v. the IFC and the FMO. The
Pryce Gases, Inc., IFC and the FMO filed a
petitioner for rehabilitation
Whether or not the No. From an estate proceeding
CA erred in not perspective, the Special
dismissing the Administrator's commission
respondent’s is no less a claim against the
petition for estate than a claim that third
mandamus parties may make. Section
8, Rule 86 of the Rules
recognizes this when it
provides for "Claim of
Executor or Administrator
Against an Estate." Hence,
by the express terms of
the Rules, the ruling on
the extent of the Special
Administrator's
commission - effectively, a
claim by the special
administrator against the
estate - is the lower
court's last word on the
matter and one that is
appealable.
Whether or not the No. In this case, BFB did A petition for corporate
Court of Appeals not perfect the appeal rehabilitation is considered a
committed a when it failed to file the special proceeding. Thus,
reversible error in record on appeal. The the period of appeal
 with the RTC of Makati as sustaining the RTC filing of the notice of
Pryce was unable to service decision in appeal was not sufficient
it’s debts. dismissing BFB’s because at the time of its
appeal? filing, the Rules required
the filing of the record on
appeal and not merely a
notice of appeal. Appeal is
not a matter of right but a
mere statutory
privilege. The party who
seeks to exercise the right
to appeal must comply
with the requirements of
the rules, failing in which
the right to appeal is lost.
Rule 42 — Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Courts of Appeals
provided in paragraph 19(b)
of the Interim Rules Relative
to the Implementation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
for special proceedings shall
apply, that is, the period of
appeal shall be 30 days
since a record of appeal is
required. In this case, BFB
filed a notice of appeal on 3
November 2003, before the
effectivity of the AM. Hence,
at the time of filing of BFB’s
appeal, the applicable mode
of appeal is Section 2, Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides
that a party’s appeal by
record on appeal is deemed
perfected as to him with
respect to the subject matter
thereof upon approval of the
record on appeal filed in due
time.

Brgy. Sangalang A case was lodged before the
v. Brgy. Maguihan Sangguinang Bayan. In this
case, petitioner claims that
the lots are within their
territorial jurisdiction, wheras
respondent claims that it is
within their territorial
boundary. The case was then
referred to a hearing
committee. The committee
Whether or not the No. In the case at bar, it
Court should is clear that when the
entertain petitioner’s case was appealed to the
appeal? RTC, the latter took
cognizance of the case in
the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, not
its original jurisdiction.
Hence, any further appeal
from the RTC Decision
On this score, Section 2,
Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that the
appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be
by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.
 said that the properties must conform to the Based on the foregoing, it is
belonged to petitioner. provisions of the Rules of apparent that petitioner has
Court dealing with said availed itself of the wrong
matter. remedy. Since the RTC tried
the case in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction,
petitioner should have filed a
petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, instead of an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41.

Fernandez v. CA Private respondent Whether or not

Concepcion Olivares filed a
complaint against petitioner
for unlawful entry.
Rule 43 — Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals
No. The Court of Appeals . The Rule requires that in
mere filing of a
has not yet acquired an appeal by way of Petition
motion for extension
jurisdiction over the case For Review, the appeal is
of time to file the
because Fernandez deemed perfected as to the
petition for review
merely filed a motion for petitioner upon the timely
automatically
extension of time to file filing of the petition and the
divested the RTC of
petition but not the petition payment of docket and other
its jurisdiction over
itself. In general, in order lawful fees. In the discussion
the case? for a Court to have of the Committee on the
authority to dispose of the revision of the Rules of
case on the merits, it must Court, it was emphasized
acquire jurisdiction over that to perfect the appeal,
the subject matter and the party has to file the
over the parties. petition for review and to pay
Jurisdiction over the the docket fees within the
person is acquired by prescribed period.
service of summons or by
voluntary appearance.

St. Martin Funeral Alleged is that private Whether or not Consequently, all such The Court is of the
Homes v. NLRC respondent worked as an appeals from the petitions should hence considered opinion that ever
operations manager of NLRC can be filed forth be initially filed in the since appeals from the
petitioner. However, there directly with the Court of Appeals in strict NLRC to the Supreme Court
 was no contract of SC? observance of the were eliminated, the
employment executed doctrine on the hierarchy legislative intendment was
between him and petitioner. of courts as the that the special civil action
His name was also not appropriate forum for the of certiorari was and still is
included in the monthly relief desired. the proper vehicle for judicial
payroll. He was then review of decisions of the
dismissed from his NLRC. Therefore, all
employment for references in the amended
misappropriating 38k. Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
Petitioner claims that supposed appeals from the
respondent was not his NLRC to the Supreme Court
employee. are interpreted and hereby
declared to mean and refer
to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Phillips Seafood Philips Seafood Philippines Whether or not the No. E.O. No. 226 contains no
(Philippines) Corporation was granted a tax review by the Office provision specifically
Corporation v. income holiday for six years of the President of governing the remedy of a
Board of for locating in a less the decisions of party whose application for
Investments, developed area. Petitioner respondent BOI is an ITH has been denied by
used to supply semi- allowed? the BOI. The right to appeal
processed raw materials to is not a constitutional,
Philips Seafood, Inc, an natural or inherent right – it
affiliate corporation, before is a statutory privilege and of
the latter closed due to statutory origin and,
financial difficulties. As they therefore, available only if
were unable to recover from granted or provided by
it’s financial reverses. PSPI statute. The BOI was
stopped operations. Petitioner created by virtue of E.O. No.
acquired title to the plant and 226 at the time when then
informed respondent of President Corazon Aquino
transfer. Respondent was exercising legislative
infromed petitioner that it’s powers under the Freedom
ITH would extend. Constitution. E.O. No. 226
apparently allows two
avenues of appeal from an

Rule 44 — Ordinary Appealed Cases
Mercado v. Sps Alleged in the complaint of
Espina petitioners is that they are the
heirs of the late spouses
Santiago and Sofronia
Mercado. Both were owners
of the subject parcel of land.
After the death of Santiago
and Sofronia, petitioners
inherited the lot. Respondents
then claimed that the lot was
theirs, as gthey had bought it
action or decision of the
BOI, depending on the
nature of the controversy.
One mode is to elevate an
appeal to the Office of the
President when the action or
decision pertains to either of
these two instances: first, in
the decisions of the BOI
over controversies
concerning the
implementation of the
relevant provisions of E.O
No. 226 that may arise
between registered
enterprises or investors and
government agencies under
Article 7; and second, in an
action of the BOI over
applications for registration
under the investment
priorities plan under Article
36.
Whether or not the No. Under Section 8, Rule 10 of
Court of Appeals the Rules of Court, an
erred in giving due amended complaint
course to supersedes an original one.
respondents’ As a consequence, the
second motion to original complaint is deemed
dismiss? withdrawn and no longer
considered part of the
record. In the present case,
the Amended Complaint is,
thus, treated as an entirely
 from Josefa, who in turn
bought it from Genivera, who
bought it from Mercado.
Petitioners say that Josefa,
through fraudulent
machinations, obtained title
over the subject property in
her name. A declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale was
prayed for.
Maricalum Mining Marinduque Mining and
Corp. v. Industrial Corporation was
Remington sued by Remington Industrial
Industrial Sales Corporation for
payment of around 900
thousand pesos worth of
construction materials and
other merchandise. The
complaint was amended 4
times, and impleaded other
parties because they were
assigness/transferees of the
real and personal properties,
chattels, machineries,
equipment, and other assets
of Marinduque Mining.
new complaint. As such,
respondents had every right
to move for the dismissal of
the said Amended
Complaint.
Whether the Court's Yes. The general rule is that one
Decisions in DBP v. party's appeal from a
CA and PNB v. judgment will not inure to the
CA inured to the benefit of a co-party who
benefit of petitioner failed to appeal; and as
which was not a against the latter, the
party to either case judgment will continue to run
its course until it becomes
final and executory. To this
general rule, however, one
exception stands out: where
both parties have a
commonality of interests, the
appeal of one is deemed to
be the vicarious appeal of
the other. The adjudication
rendered in DBP v.
CA and PNB v. CA is plain:
private respondent has no
cause of action against
DBP, PNB and their
transferees, including
petitioner, for they are
corporate entities separate
and distinct from
Marinduque Mining, and

Corazon Cruz v. Petitioner Corazon Cruz
MIAA entered into a contract with
MIAA for lease of a 1400
square meter property which
petitioner would use as a
commercial arcade for lease
to other businesses.
However, according to her,
respondent did not inform her
that part of the leased
premises was subject to
public use (easement), and as
a result she suffered losses
such as being unable to
obtain a building permit and
certificate of electrical
inspection from the Manila
Electric Company, tenants not
paying rent, etc. Since her
tenants could not pay, she
was unable to pay her own
rent Dec 2004 onwards. And
as some of Cruz’s stalls were
located in the easement area,
MMDA demolished them,
causing her damages. She
tool this into consideration
when computing her rent,
however MIAA terminated the
lease contract.
Was the dismissal In the case at bar, the
of the case proper? Court finds that the CA
committed a reversible
error in sustaining the
dismissal of the Pasig
case on the ground of
improper venue because
the same was not an error
raised by Cruz who was
the appellant before it.
Jurisprudence dictates
that the appellee’s role in
the appeal process is
confined only to the task
of refuting the assigned
errors interposed by the
appellant.
cannot be held liable for the
latter's obligations to private
respondent.
As held in the case of
Medida v. CA:An appellee
who has not himself
appealed cannot obtain from
the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than
the ones granted in the
decision of the court below.
He cannot impugn the
correctness of a judgment
not appealed from by him.
He cannot assign such
errors as are designed to
have the judgment modified.
All that said appellee can do
is to make a counter-
assignment of errors or to
argue on issues raised at
the trial only for the purpose
of sustaining the judgment in
his favor, even on grounds
not included in the decision
of the court a quo nor raised
in the appellant's
assignment of errors or
arguments.
Rule 45 — Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
DAR v. Berenguer Respondents were registered
owners of several residential
and industrial lands in
Barangay Bibincahan,
Sorsogon. The respondents
received from the Department
of Agrarian Reform that their
land fell under the CARP.
This was protested, and
respondents filed in the office
of the DAR an application for
exclusion of landholdings
from the CARP coverage.
Without acting on the
application, their titles and
certificates were canceled.
Whether or not the No. The CA did not err in there are exceptions to this
CA erred in not treating the petition for rule, to wit: (a) when public
dismissing certiorari as a petition for welfare and the
respondent’s review. There are advancement of public
petition for certiorari precedents in that regard. policy dictates; (b) when the
broader interest of justice so
requires; (c) when the writs
issued are null and void;
or (d) when the questioned
order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of
judicial authority. As will be
shown forthwith, exception
(c) applies to the present
case.Furthermore, while a
motion for reconsideration is
a condition precedent to the
filing of a petition
for certiorari, immediate
recourse to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari is
warranted where the order is
a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no
jurisdiction; where petitioner
was deprived of due process
and there is extreme
urgency for relief; where the
proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of
due process; where the
proceeding was ex parte or
one in which the petitioner
 had no opportunity to object.

Panganiban v. Petitioner was hired by Tara Whether or not the No. Preliminarily, considering the
Tara Trading Ship Trading Shipmanagement on petitioner can file grounds raised by petitioner,
Management Inc., behalf of respondent Shiling both a petition for it appears that he
SDB BHD to work as an oiler. review under Rule denominated this petition as
Aroung 2006, petitioner 45 and a petition for one under Rule 45, but he
started exhibiting signs of certiorari under filed it as both a petition for
mental instability and was Rule 65 review under Rule 45 and a
diagnosed with brief psychotic petition for certiorari under
disorder. DEspite demands Rule 65 of the Rules of
for compensation, Court. The applicable rule is
respondents failed and refued Rule 45, which clearly
to comply with their provides that decisions, final
contractual obligations. orders or resolutions of the
CA in any case, regardless
of the nature of the action or
proceeding involved, may be
appealed to this Court
through a petition for review.
This remedy is a
continuation of the appellate
process over the original
case. Recourse under Rule
65 cannot be allowed either
as an add-on or as a
substitute for appeal.The
procedural infirmity
notwithstanding, the Court
shall treat this petition as
one filed under Rule
45 only and shall consider
the alleged grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the
CA as an allegation of
 reversible error

Rule 47 — Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions

Llamas v. CA On November 1978, Whether or not Rule
petitioners conspired and, 47 may be applied
despite knowing that their to criminal cases
parcel of land in Paranaque
was mortgaged to Rural Bank
of Imus, seel such to Conrado
P Avilla. Petitioners were
doung duilty and sentenced to
two months imprisonment.
Sps. Arcenas v. On January 23, 2002, the
Queen City spouses Dolores and Oscar
Development Arcenas filed with the
Bank Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Roxas City, an Action for
Declaratory Relief against
respondent Queen City
Development Bank, docketed
as Civil Case No. V-006-01-
2002, and was raffled off to
Branch 15. The Spouses
Arcenas prayed for the
No. The remedy cannot
be resorted to when the
RTC judgment being
questioned was rendered
in a criminal case. The
2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure itself
does not permit such
recourse, for it excluded
Rule 47 from the
enumeration of the
provisions of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure which have
suppletory application to
criminal cases.
Whether or not the Yes. Section 1, Rule 47
CA is correct in provides that it does not
dismissing the allow a direct recourse to
petition for a petition for annulment of
annulment of judgment if other
judgement? appropriate remedies are
available, such as a
petition for new trial,
appeal or a petition for
relief.17 If petitioner fails to
avail of these remedies
without sufficient
Section 1, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, limits the
scope of the remedy of
annulment of judgment to
the following:
Section 1. Coverage. — This
Rule shall govern the
annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions
in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer
available through no fault of
the petitioner.
Petitioner's claim that she
was present when
respondent bank's counsel
moved for the issuance of
the order of non-suit against
her was not proven by any
evidence.There was indeed
a failure to show, to our
satisfaction, that petitioner
could not have availed of the
ordinary and appropriate
remedies under the Rules.
 declaration of their rights as
lessors under the contract of
lease.
Genato A lot situated in Caloocan
Investments Inc. city was registered under
v. Barrientos the name of the petitioner.
Due to an alleged
deficiency in real property
taxes, the office of the city
treasurer of Caloocan city
sold the land at public
auction, and respondent
was the highest bidder and
the office of the city
treasurer issued a modify or interfere with
certificate of sale of
delinquent property.
Petitioner was not aware of
any of the proceedings
before the office of the city
treasurer. REspondent
prayed for the
consolidation of ownership
justification, she cannot Thus, she cannot resort to
resort to the action for the remedy under Rule 47 of
annulment of judgment the Rules; otherwise, she
under Rule 47, for would benefit from her
otherwise, she would inaction or negligence.
benefit from her inaction
or negligence Petitioner
tries to justify her failure to
avail of the appropriate
remedies on a promise of
settlement. However,
such promise was not an
excuse for petitioner's
counsel not to lift the
order of non-suit and to
file a petition for relief.
Whether or not We disagree with the Well entrenched in our
the CA was reasoning of the CA and jurisdiction is the doctrine
correct in respondents that that a court has no power to
dismissing on petitioner in this particular do so, as that action may
the grounds that case should have filed lead to confusion and
the petition for either an action for seriously hinder the
annulment of reconveyance or administration of justice
judgement is not annulment of the auction
the proper sale, because to do so
remedy would have required the
court hearing the action to
the judgment or order of
another co-equal court,
especially in this case
where the said judgment
ororder had attained
finality
 of the proper, despite the
fact that the delinquency
sale only involved one lot
of the property.
Rule 51 — Judgment
Natalia Realty v. Petitioner alleged that
CA respondents were
occupying and illegally
squatting on certain
portions of the subject
property. Private
respondents claim that
they are the wners of their
respoective houses and
lots that have been in their
possession before the
outbreak of World War II
Philippine Hawk A vehicular accident
Corp. v. Lee occurred in Quezon which
Whether or not Yes. Judge Querubin
the writ of
could have ended the
execution to
delays had he readily
should have
complied with the
been allowed February 6, 1995
Resolution of the Court of
Appeals ordering him to
execute the final orders
and decision in Civil Case
No. 359-A. Instead, Judge
Querubin wrote a letter to
the Court of Appeals
asking it to specify the
final orders and decision
that should be enforced.
In response to the query,
the Court of Appeals
issued another resolution
identifying these final
orders and decision.While
we agree with petitioner
that Judge Querubin’s
query is not provided for
in the Rules of Court, it is
nevertheless not
prohibited.
Whether or not The procedure in the
the court of Supreme Court being
The general rule is when a
court's judgment or order
becomes final and
executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the trial
court to issue a writ of
execution to enforce the
judgment or order.29 In this
case, because of the
innumerable delays, the
enforcement of the final
orders and decision has
been long overdue. The
delays are partly attributable
to the fact that the case went
through a number of
presiding judges.
Rule 51 SEC. 8. Questions
that may be decided. -- No
killed respondent’s appeals erred in generally the same as that error which does not affect
husband and caused awarding other in the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction over the
respondent physical kinds of unless otherwise indicated subject matter or the validity
injuries. The accident damages in favor (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule of the judgment appealed
involved a motorcycle, a of respondent, 56), it has been held that from or the proceedings
passenger jeek, and a buy. when this was the latter is clothed with therein will be considered
The buy was owned by not appealed ample authority to review unless stated in the
petitioner and was bieng from the trial matters, even if they are assignment of errors, or
driven by Margarito Avila courts decision not assigned as errors on closely related to or
appeal, if it finds that their dependent on an assigned
consideration is error and properly argued in
necessary in arriving at a the brief, save as the court
just decision of the case. pass upon plain errors and
clerical errors.1. Sec. 8,
which is an amendment of
the former Sec. 7 of this
Rule, now includes some
substantial changes in the
rules on assignment of
errors. The basic procedural
rule is that only errors
claimed and assigned by a
party will be considered by
the court, except errors
affecting its jurisdiction over
the subject matter. To this
exception has now been
added errors affecting the
validity of the judgment
appealed from or the
proceedings therein.Also,
even if the error complained
of by a party is not expressly
stated in his assignment of
errors but the same is
closely related to or

Rules 52 and 53 — Motions for Reconsideration and New Trial
Gonzales III v. Christian Kalaw filed separate
Office of the charges with the PNP IAS
President against Manila Police District
Senior Inspector Mendoza
and four others for robbery,
grave threat, robbery
extortion, and physical injury.
Police Senior Superintendent
Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an
administrative charge for
grave isconduct with the
National Police Commission
against Mendoza based on
the allegations of Kalaw.After
preparing a draft decision on
MEdoza’s case, the deputy
obudsman, who found
Mendoza guilty, forwarded the
records to the office of the
ombudsman. This was
approved. Pending action by
ombudsman, Mendoza
hijacked a toursit bus and
held 21 foreign tourists and
four Filipino tour assistants
hostages. Mendoza died.
Ombudsman was found guilty
of gross misconduct in
Whether on not the Yes. Gonzales cannot be
Office of the guilty of gross neglect of
president’s ruling duty and/or inefficiency
that Gonzales had since he acted on the
been grossly case forwarded to him
negligent for taking within nine days. In finding
nine days instead of Gonzales guilty, the
five days to review OP72 relied on Section 8,
the motion for Rule III of Administrative
reconsideration was Order No. 7 (or the Rules
baseless of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, series
of 1990, as amended) in
ruling that Gonzales
should have acted on
Mendoza’s Motion for
Reconsideration within
five days.
dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in
his brief, such error may
now be considered by the
court. These changes are of
jurisprudential origin
Even if we consider this
provision to be mandatory,
the period it requires cannot
apply to Gonzales since he
is a Deputy Ombudsman
whose obligation is to review
the case; he is not simply a
Hearing Officer tasked with
the initial resolution of the
motion. In Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 7
on the resolution of the case
and submission of the
proposed decision, the
period for resolving the case
does not cover the period
within which it should be
reviewed
 handling the case against
Mendoza. Gonzales, the
deputy pmbudsman, was
charged for gross neglect of
duty.
Rule 59 — Receivership
Vivares v. Reyes Severino Reyes was the Whether or
father of respondent Jose receivership
Reyes and Torcuato Reyes. justified
Upon his death, the two came
upon their inheriance and had
an oral partition of properties.
When Torcuato dies, his will
was up for probate. Petitioner,
the executor of the will when
Ignaling (also petitioner ) was
declared a lawful heir to
Torcuato. Believing that
Torcuato did not receive his
full share in the estate of
Severino, petitioners instituted
an action for partition and
recovery of real estate.
not No. We sustain the CA
was ruling that the trial court
acted arbitrarily in
granting the petition for
appointment of a receiver
as "there was no sufficient
cause or reason to justify
placing the disputed
properties under
receivership." Petitioners
cannot now impugn the
oral partition entered into
by Torcuato and
respondent and hence
cannot also assail the
transfers made by
respondent of the lots
which were subject of said
agreement, considering
that Torcuato also sold
properties based on said
verbal arrangement.
Sec. 3, Rule 59 of the 1997
Rules of Civil
Procedure.Anchored on this
rule, the trial court should
have dispensed with the
services of the receiver,
more so considering that the
alleged fraud put forward to
justify the receivership was
not at all
established.Petitioners
advance the issue that the
receivership should not be
recalled simply because the
adverse party offers to post
a counterbond. At the
outset, we find that this
issue is barred by
estoppel.10 While the CA
made a statement that the
trial court should have
discharged the appointed
receiver on the basis of the
proposed counterbond, such
opinion does not jibe with
the import of Sec. 3, Rule
59. The rule states that the
"application may be denied
or the receiver discharged."
 In statutory construction, the
word "may" has always been
construed as permissive. If
the intent is to make it
mandatory or ministerial for
the trial court to order the
recall of the receiver upon
the offer to post a
counterbond, then the court
should have used the word
"shall." Thus, the trial court
has to consider the posting
of the counterbond in
addition to other reasons
presented by the offeror why
the receivership has to be
set aside.
Rule 60 — Replevin

Smart Astorga was employed by Whether or not Yes. Contrary to the CA’s
Communications Smart Communications as the replevin was ratiocination, the RTC
v. Astorga a Distric Sales manager of proper rightfully assumed
the Corporate SAles jurisdiction over the suit
Marketing Group. SMART and acted well within its
launghed an organizational discretion in denying
realignment to achieve Astorga’s motion to
more efficent operations. dismiss. SMART’s
Part of the reorganization demand for payment of
was the outsourcing of the the market value of the
marketing and sales force. car or, in the alternative,
To soften the blow, SNMI the surrender of the car,
agreed to absorb the is not a labor, but a civil,
personnel who would be dispute. It involves the
recommended by SMART, relationship of debtor and
but Astorga landed last in creditor rather than
the performance employee-employer
 evaluation. SMART offered relations.33 As such, the
her a supervisory position dispute falls within the
in the customer care jurisdiction of the regular
department but she courts.
refused due to a lower
salary rank and rate.
DEspite the abolition of her
office, she continued
reporting for work, so
SMART terminated her.
Astorga then filed a
complaint for illegal
dismissal. In the
meantime, SMART sent a
letter to Astorga
demanding that she pay
the current market value of
the Honda which was
given to her under the
company’s car plan
program. She did not do
this, and SMART filed a
replevin.
Rule 63 — Declaratory Relief

Monetary Board Respondent established a
v. Philippine pension loan product for bona
Veterans Bank fide veterans or their surviving
spouses, as well as salary
loan product for teachers and
low salaried employees to
provide financial assitance to
veterans and teachers.
Respondent devised a quasi-judicial powers or
program by charging a
premium in the form of a
Whether or not the No. the decision of the
petition for BSP Monetary Board
declaratory relief is cannot be a proper
proper subject matter for a
petition for declaratory
relief since it was issued
by the BSP Monetary
Board inthe exercise of its
functions.
Declaratory relief is defined
as an action by any person
interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written
instrument, executive order
or resolution, to determine
any question of construction
or validity arising from the
instrument, executive order
or regulation, or statute; and
for a declaration of his rights
 higher fee known as credit and duties thereunder. The
Redemption Fund from said only issue that may be
borrowers. An exampination raised in such a petition is
was conducted by the the question of construction
Supervision and Examination or validity of provisions in an
Department of the Banko instrument or statute.9 Ergo,
Sentral ng Pilipinas, which the Court, in CJH
found, among other things, Development Corporation v.
that respondent’s collection of Bureau of Internal
premiums from the proceeds Revenue,10 held that in the
of the various salary and same manner that court
pension loans violated decisions cannot be the
Section 54 of RA 8791, proper subjects of a petition
whichs tates that banks shall for declaratory relief,
not directly engage in the decisions of quasijudicial
insurance business as agencies cannot be subjects
insurer. Respondent wrote a of a petition for declaratory
letter justifying the existence relief for the simple reason
of the CRF. Petitioners issued that if a party is not
a resolution directing agreeable to a decision
respondent’s trust and either on questions of law or
investment department to of fact, it may avail of the
return to the borrowers all the various remedies provided
balances of the CRF. by the Rules of Court.
Rule 65 — Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Dacudao v. Sec. Petitioners were among the Did petitioners No. .Firstly, petitioners In Bañez, Jr. v.
of Justice investors whom Angeles and property bring their have unduly disregarded Concepcion, we explained
his associates in the Legacy petition for the hierarchy of courts by why, to wit:The Court must
Group allegedly defrauded certiorari, coming directly to the enjoin the observance of the
through the Legacy Group’s prohibition, and Court with their petition for policy on the hierarchy of
buy back agreement that mandamus directly certiorari, prohibition and courts, and now affirms that
earned them check payments to the court? mandamus without the policy is not to be
that were dishonored. After tendering therein any ignored without serious
their written demands went special, important or consequences. The
unheeded, they initiated a compelling reason to strictness of the policy is
 number of charges for
syndicated estafa against
Angeles.
Bank of Traders Royal Bank (TRB)
Commerce v. proposed to sell to petitioner
Radio Philippines Bank of Commerce
Network, (Bancommerce) for P10.4
billion its banking business
consisting of specified assets
and liabilities. Bancommerce
agreed subject to prior
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas'
(BSP's) approval of their
Purchase and Assumption (P
& A) Agreement.
justify the direct filing of
the petition.We
emphasize that the
concurrence of jurisdiction
among the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial
Courts to issue the writs
of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and
injunction did not give
petitioners the
unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. An
undue disregard of this
policy against direct resort
to the Court will cause the
dismissal of the recourse.
Whether or not the Yes. . Bancommerce
direct filing of the invoked certain
petition for ceritorari recognized exceptions to
by Bancommerce the rule.12 It had to forego
was valid? the filing of the required
motion for reconsideration
of the assailed RTC Order
because a) there was an
urgent necessity for the
CA to resolve the
questions it raised and
any further delay would
prejudice its interests; b)
under the circumstances,
a motion for
reconsideration would
designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with
causes that are also well
within the competence of the
lower courts, and thus leave
time to the Court to deal with
the more fundamental and
more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to
it. The Court may act on
petitions for the
extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or
when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an
exception to the policy.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court provides that
a petition for certiorari may
only be filed when there is
no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the
course of law. Since a
motion for reconsideration is
generally regarded as a
plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy, the failure to first
take recourse to is usually
regarded as fatal omission
 have been useless; c)
Bancommerce had been
deprived of its right to due
process when the RTC
issued the challenged
order ex parte, depriving it
of an opportunity to
object; and d) the issues
raised were purely of
law.In this case, the
records amply show that
Bancommerce’s action fell
within the recognized
exceptions to the need to
file a motion for
reconsideration before
filing a petition for
certiorari.
Yusay v. CA Petitioners owned a parcel of Does prohibition lie No. Here, however, the The rule and relevant
land in Mandaluyong. Half against remedy of prohibition was jurisprudence indicate that
was used as residence, the expropriation not called for, considering prohibition was not available
rest rented out to nine other that only a resolution to the petitioners as a
families.The land was their expressing the desire of remedy against the adoption
only source of income. The the Sangguniang of Resolution No. 552, for
mayor tried to expropriate the Panglungsod to the Sangguniang
land to develop it for cost expropriate the Panglungsod, by such
housing for priveleged but petitioners’ property was adoption, was not exercising
deserving city inhabitants. issued. As of then, it was judicial, quasi-judicial or
premature for the ministerial functions, but
petitioners to mount any only expressing its collective
judicial challenge, for sentiment or opinion. Verily,
thepower of eminent there can be no prohibition
domain could be against a procedure
exercised by the City only whereby the immediate
through the filing of a possession of the land under
verified complaint in the expropriation proceedings

Star Special Petitioners were the owners
Watchman and of two parcels of land in
Detective Agency Puerto Princesa. Before
v. Puerto Puerto Princesa became a
Princesa City city, the national governmnet
established a military camp,
known as Western Command.
Petitioners property was used
as a road right-of-way leading
to the camp, called Wescom
road. Petitioners filed an
proper court. Before the
City as the expropriating
authority filed such
verified complaint, no
expropriation proceeding
could be said to exist.
Until then, the petitioners
as the owners could not
also be deprived of their
property under the power
of eminent domain.
Whether or not the No. Considering that the
remedy of COA still retained its
mandamus is primary jurisdiction to
proper to compel adjudicate money claim,
respondents to petitioners should have
comply with the filed a petition for
decision certiorari with this Court
pursuant to Section 50 of
P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the
COA's refusal to act did
not leave the petitioners
may be taken, provided
always that due provision is
made to secure the prompt
adjudication and payment of
just compensation to the
owner. This bar against
prohibition comes from the
nature of the power of
eminent domain as
necessitating the taking of
private land intended for
public use, and the interest
of the affected landowner is
thus made subordinate to
the power of the State. Once
the State decides to
exercise its power of
eminent domain, the power
of judicial review becomes
limited in scope, and the
courts will be left to
determine the appropriate
amount of just compensation
to be paid to the affected
landowners.
It has been held, however,
that a resort to the remedy
of mandamus is improper if
the standard modes of
procedure and forms of
remedy are still available
and capable of affording
relief.
action for payment of just without any remedy at all.
compensation against Puerto
Princessa. The RTC ruled in
favor of petitioners. The write
of execution was issued
directing respondents to
satisfy the money judgement.
1. Samson v. Gabor
G.R. No. 182970

Facts of the Case:

Spouses Gabor own a parcel of land in Rizal. They sold the land to petitioner, who
executed a deed of sale to Ramos. Respondent filed an action for legal redemption
with the RTC. Petitioner and Ramos then executed an agreement revoking the
transfer. Respondent Spouses Gabor are registered owners of a parcel of land in
Rizal Province.

Procedural history
The RTC dismissed the suit but the CA reversed and upheld the Respondents’ right
of legal redemption.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action.

Holding:

No. Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides that a cause of action is the
act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In this case, aside
from the fact the respondent spouses had mortgaged the property to respondent
bank, there is no other allegation of act or omission on part of respondent bank in
violation of the right of petitioner.
2. Uniwide Holdings Inc. v. Alexander Cruz
G.R. No. 171456

Facts of the Case:

Uniwide entered into a franchise agreeemnt with Cruz. It was agreed that it would
be five years and it would be that way to establish and operate a Uniwide Family
Store. AArticle 10.2 of the Agreement called for the franchisee to pay a monthly
serice fee. Inc ase of delay, it was provided that there would be charged an interest.
Article 27.5 provided that the franchisee consented to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of Quezon.

Procedural History:

When Cruz’s accounts remained unsettled, UHI filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money before the Paranaque City RTC. Cruz filed a motion to dismiss on
ground of improper venue, which was granted by the RTC. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not a case based on several causes of action is dismissible on ground of

improper venue?

Holding:

When construing with Section 5, Rule 2 (which states the general rule where
personal actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or defendant
resides, at the election of the plaintiff, the exception being that parties may, before
filing of action, validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue) where there is a
joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise out
of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in
the one at bar, may be brought before other venues provided that such other causes
of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein. In this
case, the deeds, unlike the Agreement, bear no exclusive venue stipulation with
respect to the causes of action thereunder. Hence, the general rule on venue applies
- that the complaint may be filed in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
The restriction should be strictly construed as relating solely to the agreement for
which the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of such
limitation on a contracting party will create unwarranted restrictions which the parties
might find unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.
3. Lourdes Suits v. Binaro
G.R. No. 204729

Facts of the Case:

Two executive contracts were executed with respondent Binaro for room
accomodations for two groups of students, as petitioner owns a hotel. Although
respondent paid the total contract price, it is claimed that there was an unpaid
balance for damages to furniture.

Procedural History:

Petitioner filed a Statement of Claim for collection of sum of money with damages
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. The MeTC dismissed the complaint
with prejudice for lack of cause of action. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the RTC, arguing that a dismissal based on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action cannot be deemed a dismissal with prejudice under the
Rules, and that lack of cause of action is not a valid ground for dismissal. RTC ruled
against petitioner. Petitioner filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this petition.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing with
prejudice based on lack of cause of action.

Holding:
The courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of cause of action. In
the case of Macaslang v. Zamora, the Court provided that failure to state cause of
action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On the one
hand, failure to state cause of action refers to insufficiency of the pleading, and is a
ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of
cause of action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of
action alleged in the pleading.
4. Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102976

Facts of the Case:

Iron and Steel Authority was created with the power to initiate expropriation of land
required for basic iron and steel facilities. The National Steel Corporation had an
expansion program, and thus the president issued a proclamation withdrawing from
sale or settlement a large track of public land in Iligan. Since certain parts of such
public land were occupied by non-operational fertilizer plants owned by respondent,
an LOI was issued directing the National Steel Corporation to negotiate with
respondent for compensation of occupancy rights.

Procedural History:

ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in the RTC of Iligan
City. While the trial was ongoing, the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired.
MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that no valid judgment could be
rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person, which the trial court
granted. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that despite expiration of term,
its juridical existence continued until winding up of affairs could be completed, and
alternatively, that the Republic of the Philippines, being the real party-in-interest,
should be allowed to be substituted for petitioner. The trial court denied the MR. The
CA denied on appeal. Hence, this petition for review.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in
view of the expiration of ISA’s term.

Holding:

In this case, petitioner is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the

Republic. Thus, its powers, duties, functions, assets, and liabilities are properly
regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic. It is elementary that
when the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties
and functions, as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to and
are re-assumed by the Republic, in the absence of special provisions of law. When
the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must
be looked for in the charter and supplementarily in the provisions of the Corporation
Code. Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize the role of
representative parties, that a party authorized by statute may sue or be sued without
joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended. In this case,
ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or
representative of the Republic pursuant to its authority under PD 272. From these
premises, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not justify dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings.
5. Spouses Oco v. Limbaring
G.R. No. 161298

Facts of the Case:

Sabas Limbaring subdivided his lot and then executed deeds of sale in favor of
Jenniferand Sarah Jane Limbaring. The daughter of Sabas, Percita Oco, filed a
perjry case against her uncle who was the father of Jenifer and Sarah. In the pretrial,
it was agreed that the parties would reconvey two parcels of land to petitioner, and
that respondent would pay expenses incurred to transfer the title. But Percita left
without paying.

Procedural History:

Respondent filed against petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the

ground that respondent was not the real party in interest. In his opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss, respondent contended that he was a trustor. RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss. After filing their Comments to Respondent’s Formal Offer of
Exhibits, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC granted the demurrer and
dismissed the Complaint on the ground that respondent was not the real party in
interest. On appeal, the CA reversed

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not Respondent was a real party in interest in the suit to rescind the
Deeds of Reconvenyance.

Holding:

Under Article 1448 of the Civil Code on implied trusts, if the person to whom the title
is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the
sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in
favor of the child. In this case, respondent’s alleged acts - paying the price of subject
properties, naming his children as owners - raise the presumption that a gift was
effected in their favor. Respondent failed to rebut this presumption. Absent any clear
proof that a trust was created, he cannot be deemed a real party in interest.
6. Golangco v. Fung
G.R. No. 157952

Facts of the Case:

Respondent issued an office memorandum maliciously imputing against petitioner

that he had committed bribery. This was sent to petitioner’s superiors in POEA and
this casued prejudice to petitioner.
Procedural History:

A case was then filed where petitioner alleged that the imputations against him were
wrong and libelous. The prosecution therein requested that a subpoena ad
testificandum be issued and served on Atty Ramos, Resident Ombudsman of POEA,
to compel him to testify in the criminal case. Nevertheless, the prosecution failed to
present Ramos as a witness because no subpoena had been issued. Consequently,
the RTC issued an order terminating the prosecution’s presentation of evidence.
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, claiming that the RTC judge
committed grave abuse of discretion for not issuing the subpoena to require Ramos
to appear and testify. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari of the
petitioner.

Holding:

The OSG is to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in
his official capacity is a party, according to the Administrative code. In this case, the
People of the Philippines were indispensable parties, and petitioner not joining the
People as a party in his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals was fatal and
enough cause for summary rejection of his petition. Although the petition for
certiorari bore the conformity of the public prosecutor, such conformity alone did not
suffice. The authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to appear for and
represent the People was confined only to the proceedings in the trial court
7. Equitable PCI Bank v. Heirs of Tiu
G.R. No. 178529

Facts of the Case:

Atonio Tiu wanted to secure loans obtained by Ching from Petitioner Equitable Bank,
so a real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner was issued. Tui also executed an an
Amendement to the Real Estate Mortgage which increased the amount secured by
the mortgage. This was signed by his wife which said, “with my marital consent”. Tiu
died, and the loan remained unsettled.
Procedural History:

Petitioner filed a petitioner for sale for the foreclosure. Respondents Heirs of Tiu filed
a Complaint before the RTC of Tacloban against petitioner and the Clerk of Court for
annulment of the AREM, alleging that the AREM is without force and effect, having
been executed without the valid consent of the wife of mortgage who at the time of
execution was already suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s Disease and hence
incapable of giving consent. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground the
respondents were not the real parties-in-interest. RTC denied the Motion. Petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the present petition.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not the complaint filed by Respondents, without impleading Matilde who
must also be Antonio’s heir and who was principally obliged under the AREM, is
dismissible for lack of cause of action.

Holding:
Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that as a general rule, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Section 3 of
the same Rule provides that the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case
and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. In this case, since the
mortgaged property is presumed conjugal, Matilde is obliged principally under the
AREM. Therefore, she is the real party in interest and hence, the action must be
prosecuted in her name as she stands to be benefited or injured in the action.

8. Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth Inc

Facts of the Case:
An administrative order was issued by the DOH. This gave out guidelines and
procedures for the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical
products for sale or distribution to the public. This was then amended by other
administrative orders. These orders provided that the accreditation may be recalled,
suspended, or revoked after due deliberation, hearing, and notice by the DOH
Accreditation Committee. The DOH then issued a Memorandum hearing and notice
by the DOH accreditation Committee. Next, a list and category of sanctions to be
imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceuticals. The DOH then
issues a memorandum which invited representatives of 24 accredited drug
companies to a meeting where they were directed to submit within 10 days their
respective explanations on the adverse findings covering their products. Instead of
submitting a written explanation, PPI sent a late letter stating that it referred the
matter to their lawyers. Usec Galon then informed PPI that it’s accreditation had
been suspended.

Procedural History:

A complaint seeking to declare null and void the relevant DOH administrative
issuance's was filed before the RTC of Pasig City against DOH, former Sec
Romualdez and Usec Galon, alleging undue delegation violation of due process.
Petitioners moved for dismissal, claiming that the case was one against the State.
The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of principle of state immunity from
suit. PPI appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the trial court decision.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not the case should be dismissed for being a suit against the State.

Holding:
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly
or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. An unincorporated government
agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit
because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. In this case, the DOH,
being an unincorporated agency of the government, can validly invoke the defense
of immunity from suit because it has not consented to be sued. The doctrine of state
immunity extends also to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in the
discharge and performance of their duties.

9. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos

G.R. No. 159402
Facts of the Case:

It was discovered by Spouses Ramos that a portion of their land was being used as
part of the runway of Loakan airport, operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office
(ATO). The respondents, Spouses Ramos, then agreed to sell the land to ATO, but
ATO did not pay.

Procedural History:

The respondents filed an action for collection against ATO. In their answer, ATO and
co-defendants invoked the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, where President
Marcos reserved parcels of land including respondents’ for use of the Loakan Airport.
They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without State’s
consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance
of governmental functions. The RTC rendered its decision. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent.

Holding:

There is a need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency

performing governmental functions and one performing proprietary functions. Section
3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides the immunity of the State
from suit. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii,
as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area,
where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation
being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owners. Immunity has not been upheld in favor
of the proprietary functions whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function
of government, but was essentially a business. In previous jurisprudence, the Court
declared that the CAA, predecessor of ATO, is an agency not immune from suit, it
being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. Therefore, the CA thereby
correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the
Government not performing purely governmental or sovereign function, but was
instead involved in the management of Loakan Airport, an activity that was not
exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Furthermore, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property.

10. Lotte Phil Co Inc v. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 166302
Facts of the Case:

Petitioner hired respondents to work in a confectionery facility. Petitioner then

entered into a contract with Maintenance and Janitorial Services to provide
manpower for needed maintenance, utility, janitorial, and other services. Respondent
then was fired.

Procedural History:

Respondent lodged a labor complaint against both petitioner Lotte and 7J for illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment declaring 7J as employer of
respondents and also found 7J guilty of illegal dismissal. Respondents appealed to
the NLRC praying that Lotte be declared as their direct employer because 7J is
merely a labor-only contractor. NLRC affirmed the LA decision. Respondents filed
with the Court of Appeal, which reversed the decision and declared Lotte as the real
employer of respondents and that 7J was merely a labor-only contractor and agent
of Lotte. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the Court of
Appeals should have dismissed the petition for failure to implead 7J who is an
indispensable party, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not 7J is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded in

respondents’ petition in the Court of Appeals.

Holding:

What is an indespensible party? It is important to answer this first before we delve

into the discussion. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action. The joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void. In this case, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in
interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. No final ruling on this
matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion is necessary for the
effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties with
due process.

11. Chua v. Torres

G.R. No. 151900
Facts of the Case:

An RBC check in favor of Caltex Service Center was issued by Chua in payment of
purchase of oil. But the check was dishonored by drawee bank. Beltran did not
bother to check who had issued the check and instead instituted an action against
petitioner Christine Chua for BP 22. The policce officers went to her residence, in the
auto repair shop of her brother, and even her uni.

Procedural History:

Christine filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Caloocan city, impleading
also her brother Jonathan as a necessary co-plaintiff. Named as defendants therein
were respondents Torres and Beltran. Upon motion of respondents, the RTC
ordered the dismissal of complainant on the ground that Chua had not executed a
certification against forum shopping. After the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration, the matter was elevated directly to the Court by way of petition for
review under Rule 45.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not a co-plaintiff impleaded only as necessary party, who has no claim
for relief, should also make a certification against forum shopping.

Holding:

Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court makes no distinctions that would expressly
exempt a necessary party from executing the certification against forum shopping.
Nevertheless, a misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as
a plaintiff in the first place, and it would make little sense to require the misjoined
party in complying with all the requirement expected of plaintiff. At the same time,
Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor non-
joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of action. Clearly, misjoinder of parties is not
fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-
joinder or misjoinder of parties.

12. Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque City v. Ebio

G.R. No. 178411
Facts of the Case:

Respondents claim to be the absolute owners of land in Paranaque. The land was
due to an accretion of Cut-cut creek. It was asserted by respondents that the original
occupant was their great grandfather Jose Vitalez. Jose gave the land to his son,
and his son continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed such lot.
Respondent married the son’s daughter, and the couple made their house on the lot.
Then the son executed a transfer of rights in favor of Ebio. So respondents were
surprised when several public officers proceeded to cut 8 coconut trees planted on
such lot.

Procedural History:

Respondents went to the RTC of Paranaque City and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners. The RTC issued an Order denying the petition for lack
of merit. Respondents then elevated the matter to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC
Decision.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not the State is an indispensable party to respondents’ action for

prohibitory injunction.

Holding:

The State is neither a necessary nor indispensable party to an action where no

positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed. The
law that governs over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866 and Article 457 of the New Civil Code which provide that alluvial deposits
along banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added.
Moreover, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of
Paranaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project.

13. Bulawan v. Aquende

G.R. No. 182819
Facts of the Case:

Bulawan alleges that she is the owner of a certain lot, and that she had bought the
property from the Yaptengco brothers, who in turn claim that they had inherited the
property from Yap Chin Chun. Yap claimed ownership also over the same property.
Yap says that in another civil case, the trial court had already declared the
subdivision survey of the Yaptengco brothers simulated. This means that Yap Chin
Chun is still the rightful owner. The trial court ruled for Bulawan, This was then
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the decision became final and executory, the
trial court issued a writ of execution. This writ was then questioned, as Aquende
claims that he was unaware of any litigation on his property

Procedural History:

Aquende filed a Notice of Appearance, praying for partial annulment of the decision,
which the trial court denied. Thereafter, Aquende filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, adding that he is an indispensable party and the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not impleaded as a party in the
case. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Aquende. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not respondent is an indispensable party.

Holding:

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that an indispensable party is a party
in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. The absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority. In this case, during the proceedings before the trial court, the
answers of Yap and Register of Deeds should have prompted the court to inquire
further whether there were other indispensable parties. It would be the height of
inequity to allow respondent’s title to be nullified without being given the opportunity
to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of property.

14. National Power Corporation v. Provincial Government of Bataan

G.R. No. 180654
Facts of the Case:

National Power Corporation received a notice of franchise tax delinquency from the
provincial government of Bataan. Respondents then sent again notices of tax due.
The NPC then replied that it had ceased to be liable for payment of such tax ever
since the enactment of EPIRA. Ignoring NPC’s view, a warrant of levy was issued
on 14 real properties causing their sale at public auction.

Procedural History:

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mariveles, alleging that the
foreclosure had no legal basis. The RTC dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed
to the CA but respondent moved to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over
subject matter, arguing that appeal should be lodged with the Court of Tax Appeals.
CA granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the petition.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not NPC still owned or operated the business subject to local franchise
tax.

Holding:

It was held that saying that NPC was liable for local franchise tax is a nullity. EPIRA
created the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and transferred to it
NPC’s electrical transmission function. The NPC therefore ceased to operate that
business in Bataan by operation of law. Since local franchise tax is imposed on the
privilege of operating a franchise, it is clear that such tax is not a liability of the NPC.
Further, the EPIRA created the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM Corp) and transferred to it all of NPC’s “generation assets”. It
also transferred all existing liabilities of the NPC to PSALM Corp, presumably
including the unpaid liability for local franchise tax. Since the subject properties
belong to PSALM Corp and TRANSCO, they are certainly indispensable parties to
the case that must be necessarily included before it may properly go forward.

15. Chiang Kai Shek School v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 58028
Facts of the Case:

Private respondent Oh was dismissed from his teaching position in Chian Kai Shek
school, after having taught for a period of 33 years, for no reason.

Procedural History:

Respondent then demanded separation pay, benefits, and moral and exemplary
damages against petitioner. The CFI dismissed the compaint. The Court of Appeals
set aside the decsion. Petitioner then filed a review on certiorari.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not a school that has not been incorporated may be sued.

Holding:

Under Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, it states quite plainly that only natural
or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action. Act No. 2706, as amended,
imposes the obligation upon schools recognized by the government to incorporate
under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. In this case,
although the school has not been incorporated, petitioner cannot now invoke its own
non-compliance with the law to immunize it from private respondent’s complaint.

16. Gochan v. Young

G.R. No. 131889
Facts of the Case:
The daughter of Gochan, Alice, and the mother of respondents, had inherited 50
shares of stock in the corporation Gochan Realty from her father. When Alice died,
she left 50 shares to her husband, John Young Sr. The RTC of Cebu adjudicated
6/14 of these shares to her children. John Sr requested Gochan to partition the
shares of his late wife. This would be done by canceling the stock certificates in his
name. Then, new certificates would be issued in the name of respondents. Gochan
Realty refused, citing the right of first refusal given to the remaining stockholders.

Procedural History:

Respondents filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of stock to the
rightful owners. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging lack of
jurisdiction over subject matter, that respondents were not the real parties in interest,
and that the cause of action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. SEC granted
the motion to dismiss. Respondent then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals. The CA ruled that Respondents Spouses Uy had the capacity to sue and
that the Intestate Estate of John Young Sr. was an indispensable party.

Statement of Issue(s):

1. Whether or not Spouses Uy have the personality to file suit before the SEC.
2. Whether or not Spouses Uy could bring a derivative suit in the name of
Gochan Realty.
3. Whether or not the intestate estate of Young Sr. is an indispensable party in
the case.

Holding:

1. Uy’s averment in the complaint - that the purchase of her stocks by the
corporation was null and void - is deemed admitted. Cecilia then remains a
stockholder of the corporation in view of the nullity of the Contract of Sale.
Although she was no longer registered as a stockholder in the records as of
filing of case, the admitted allegations in the complaint made her still a bona
fide stockholder of Gochan Realty as between the parties.
2. In previous jurisprudence, the Court has recognized the right of a single
stockholder to file derivative suits to bring about a redress of the wrong done
directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders. In this case, the
complaint alleges all the components of a derivative suit. The personal injury
suffered cannot disqualify them from filing a derivative suit.
3. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court only permit an executor or
administrator to represent or bring suits on behalf of the deceased, but this
does not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. Since the shares
are still in Young Sr.’s name, no final determination can be had without his
estate being impleaded in the suit. His estate is thus an indispensable party
with respect to the cause of action dealing with the registration of shares in
the names of the heirs of Alice. Regardless, the case can no longer be
remanded to SEC. RA 8799 transferred SEC’s jurisdiction over cases
involving intra-corporate dispute to courts of general jurisdiction or the
regional trial courts.
17. Judge Sumaljag v. Spouses Literato
G.R. No. 149787

Facts of the Case:

A complaint for the nullity of deed of sale of real property was executed between
Josefa and spouses Diosdidit and Literato. It was alleged that this deed of sale was
spurious. Josefa was the sister of Menendez, and they were two of six heirs who
inherited the property in equal parts. Respondents filed an amended answer with
counterclaim, impleading Petitioner Sumaljag with Josefa on the allegation that
petitioner, at the instance of Josefa, occupied the lots without respondents’ authority.

Procedural History:

Menendez then filed with the RTC. After Josefa’s death, Atty. Puray - petitioner’s and
Josefa’s common counsel - filed a motion for substitution, praying that the deceased
be substituted by petitioner. The RTC denied and instead ordered the appearance of
her full-blood sister Michaeles. Petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari to
question the interlocutory order, which was dismissed for lack of merit.

Statement of Issue(s):

Whether or not the deceased may be substituted by petitioner.

Holding:

In this case, although counsel for Josefa did in fact notify the court of the fact of her
death, he was not able to properly give the court the name and address of the legal
representatives. The person, petitioner herein, that counsel gave as substitute was
not one of those mentioned under Section 16 of Rule 3. What does section 16, Rule
3, state? It states that it is the duty of counsel to inform the court within 30 days after
the death of his client of the fact of death, and to give the name and address of the
deceased’s legal representative or representatives. The “legal representatives” that
the provision speaks of refer to those authorized by law - administrator, executor or
guardian - who, under the rule on settlement of estate, is constituted to take over the
estate of the deceased. Section 16 of the same Rule also provides that the heirs of
the deceased may be allowed to be substituted, without requiring appointment of an
executor or administrator. Thus, counsel could have validly manifested to the court
the transfer of Josefa’s interests in the subject matter of litigation pursuant to Section
19, Rule 3. But this can happen only while the client-transferor was alive and while
the manifesting counsel was still the effective and authorized counsel for the client-
transferor, not after the death of the client when the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated. Therefore, in applying the Rule, her heirs are her surviving sisters and
the children of her deceased sister, who should be her legal representatives.

18. O. Ventanilla Enterprises vs. Tan,

GR No. 180325, 20 February 2013

Facts of the case:

Alfredo S Tan and private responded Adelina Tan were leased to properties by petitioner.
The properties in question were in Cabanatuan City. The Tans, however, did not follow the
terms of the lease. Petitioner then filed a complaint against the Tans for termination of
contract. A case was then filed in the RTC

Procedural history:

Petitioner filed a complaint against the Tans with the RTC. Private respondent appealed.
Petitioner then filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by the trial
court. The trial court issued Orders lifting and cancelling the Notice of Levy on private
respondent’s properties and also several bank accounts. Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, was the filed to the Court of Appeals which ruled that
there was no extraordinary judgement in the case that would merit a recall of the entry of
judgement to reopen the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the the Court of Appeals was correct.

Holding:

The CA was correct in ruling that there is no extraordinary circumstance in this case that
would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. The reason given by
petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the CA Decision was promulgated, hence,
it was not properly notified of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious consideration.
In Mojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc.,[17] the Court explained
that it is the party's duty to inform the court of its counsel's demise, and failure to apprise the
court of such fact shall be considered negligence on the part of said party.

19. Sarsaba vs. Fe vda. De Te,

GR No. 175910. 30 July 2009

Facts of the case: Respondent represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda,

filed with the RTC, a Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayerfor the
delivery of the truck pendente lite against petitioner, Sereno,Lavarez and the NLRC of
Davao City. Respondent alleged, among others, that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te,
the registered owner of the truck, as evidenced by the Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration. Petitioner alleges that that there was no showing that the heirs have filed an
intestate estate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Te, or that respondent was duly
authorized by her co-heirs to file the case; and that the truck was already sold to Gasing on
March 11, 1986 by one Jesus Matias, who bought the same from the Spouses Te. Corollarily,
Gasing was already the lawful owner of the truck when it was levied on execution and, later
on, sold at public auction. On October 17, 2005, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss the Case on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal
defendants; and (2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for lack of legal personality to
sue. It appeared that the respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died on April 12, 2005. Respondent,
through her lawyer, argues that respondent's death did not render functus officio her right to
sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, hadlong testified on the complaint on
March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf and,accordingly, submitted documentary exhibits in
support of the complaint.

Issue: What is the legal effect of death of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case

Procedural History: Petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
assailing the Order dated March 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Digos City,
Davao Del Sur, in Civil Case No. 3488

Holding: When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules
of Court require a substitution of the deceased. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform
the court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter's legal
representative. The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16, 46 Rule 3 of
the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The rule on substitution by heirs is not a
matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on substitution was crafted
to protect every party's right to due process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased
party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate. It is only when there is a denial of due process,
as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court
nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein. In the case before Us, it
appears that respondent's counsel did not make any manifestation before the RTC as to her
death. In fact, he had actively participated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown any
proof that he had been retained by respondent's legal representative or any one who
succeeded her.

20. Dagdag vs Tongnawa

GR. No. 161166-67, 3 February 2005.

Facts of the case:

Respondents were sent a memorandum by Dagdag, the mayor of the municipality of
Tanudan, asking them why they should not be administratively santioned for acts
unbecoming of public servants and failure to perform their duties. They were given 72 hours.
Michael Tongnawa and Antonio Gammod, respondents, are the municipal engineer and
municipal planning and development coordinator.The Municipal Grievance Committee found
respondents liable for insubordination, non-performance of duties and absences without
official leaves. Respondents were then suspended for two months.

Procedural History:Respondents appealed to CSC. CSC affirmed the order of the petitioner.
Respondents filed an MR but was denied. Respondents filed a Petition for Review in the CA
which was granted, reversing the CSC ruling. Petitioner filed an MR but was denied.

Issue:
Who may appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals?

Holding:
The CSC and the mayor of Tanudan are real parties in interest in this case and, therefore,
can contest the decision of the CA.
The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as
contemplated by the Rules, means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected
by the judgment, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest
as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.

21. Torres vs. Rodellas,

GR No. 177836, 4 September 2009

Facts of the case:

Respondent left her family and went to Saudi Arabia. Edwino moved to Respondent’s house
in Occidental Mondoro. Edwino occupied the portion vacated by respondent’s sister. He
claims that respondent sold him the house, and he has an affidavit of relinquishment/sale of
right. Edwino also filed an MSA with the DENR in his own name for the property.
Respondent’s MSA application was turned down for Edwino. Respondent’s son returned. He
learned of Edwino’s claim and filed with the community environment and natural resources
office (CENRO) against Edwino’s MSA on the ground that the affidavit of relinquishment was
forged as respondent was abroad

Procedural History: The CA issued a resolution dismissing the petition assailing the
decision of the Office of the President. A petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 was
then filed.

Issue:
Whether or not the counsel of Edwino has the personality to file Motion for Reconsideration

Holding:
Yes. Because pf A.O No. 18, s.1987, Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable. Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court, is applicable here. Substitution of a
deceased party by heirs is allowed in actions that survive the death of a party thereto,
particularly, causes of action that affect primarily and princippally property and properety
rights, injuries to the person being merely incidental. In this case, the action outlives the
death of Edwino as this case involves the parties’s respective rights to acquire property
which is the MSA grant. While it is not mentioned when Edwino’s exact date of death is in
Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Office of the President, considering counsel told
Office of the President of Edwino’s death in a delayed manner, sec. 16, Rule 3 merely
provides for disciplinary action against counsel in case of such failure to comply with its duty.
In said section, one can find no mention that counsel would be without legal personality to
appear for the benefit of the client or its heirs.

22. Re: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from legal and filing fees of
the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., AM No. 09-6-9-SC 19 August 2009

Facts of the case:

Good Shepherd Foundation is an organization which works for and with indigent persons, to
quote “the poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to children
who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay
for common prescriptions, to broken families who returned to a normal life. The administrator
of this asked the Supreme Court if he could be exempt from the payment of legal fees.

Procedural History:
The administrator of Good Shepherd foundation wrote a letter to the Supreme Court

Issue: Can the Courts grant to Good Shepherd who works for indigent and underprivileged
people, from payment of legal fees?

Holding:
Article III, Sec 11 of the 1987 Constitution is clear in it’s intent , where the bases or the
exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause. The clear intent of the
language of the provisions of the Rules of Court show that only a natural party litigant is
indigent. The Good Shepherd Foundation, not being a natural litigant, cannot be exempt.

23. Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals,

GR No. 154096, 22 August 2008

Facts of the case:

The Benedicto group refused to reconvey 65% stockholdings of FEMII and UEC as part of
their oblidation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit of petitioner.
Thus, petitioner instituted two complaints which were later consolidated. Respondent and his
daughter tried to have the cases dismissed, which the RTC did. Petitioner then filed an
amended complaint. Julita Benedicto took over after her husband died.

Procedural history
The RTC entertained the Amended Complaint. Julita and Francisca moved to dismiss the
amended complaint, but RTC denied. Benedicto’s wife Julita and Francisca filed their
Answer to the amended complaint then they went to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The
verification portion of the joint petition and the certification on non-forum shopping bore only
Francisca’s signature. An Affidavit was executed by Julita in favor of Francisca. The CA
rendered a Decision, setting aside the assailed RTC orders and dismissing the amended
complaints. Irene filed an MR, but the same was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review.

Issue: Is an affidavit enough for forum shopping?

Holding: Regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping, the general rule is that all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case should sign it. However, time and again it is stressed that
the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote the orderly administration of
justice, do not interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances. As has been ruled by the Court, the signature of any of the principal
petitioners or principal parties, as Francisca is in this case, would constitute a substantial
compliance with the rule on verification and certification of non-forum shopping. It cannot be
overemphasized that Francisca herself was a principal party.

24. Sps. Ang vs. Sps. Ang,

GR No. 186993, 22 August 2012

Facts of the case:

A $300,000 loan was obtained by respondents from petitioners, as well as a promissory note
executed for the latter, where respondents promised to pay petitioners with interest of 10%
per year upon demand. But respondents failed to pay. The loan already amounted to
720,000 plus interest, petitioners, residents of LA, executed an SPA to Atty Aceron to file an
action in court against respondents.

Procedural history:

Case was filed in the RTC QC. Dismissal was moved by the respondent on the grounds of
improper venue since the complaint can only be filed in the court of the place where either
they or the petitioners reside, and respondent resides in Bacolod while petitioner resides in
LA.

Issue: Was the dismissas of the complaint on the ground that venue was proper?

Holding:

The rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and
their witnesses. If one were to invoke Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, one would
insist that Atty. Aceron, being their attorney-in-fact, is deemed a real party in interest in the
case below and can prosecute the same before the RTC. Such being the case, the
petitioners assert, the said complaint for collection of sum of money may be filed in the court
of the place where Atty. Aceron resides, which is the RTC of Quezon City.

25. Universal Robina Corp. vs Lim, GR No. 154338, 5 October 2007

Facts of the case:

There was a contract of sale between Universal Robina Corporation and Albert Lim.
Petitioner sold to Lim grocery products amounting to 808k. After tendering partial payments,
Lim did not settle his obligation despite demands.

Procedural history:
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint.RTC dismissed the complaint motu
proprio on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue because Universal
Robina’s principal office is in Pasig City and Albert Lim is from Laoag City. Petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration. RTC granted the motion and admitted petitioner’s
amended complaint. On December 6, 1999, summons was served upon respondent. For his
failure to file an answer seasonably and upon motion of petitioner, the trial court issued an
Order declaring him in default and allowing petitioner to present its evidence ex parte.

Issue: WON the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioner’s complaint on the ground of
improper venue?

Holding:
A court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not
one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu pro prio on the basis of the
pleadings. Sec. 2. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide that in venue of personal actions. All
other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. Sec.
4 Rule 4 of the same Rules provide that this Rule shall not apply. Where the parties have
validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. In
personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or her
residence or the place where the defendant resides. The parties may agree to a specific
venue which could be in a place where neither of them resides. In addition, it is stated under
Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of court that improper venue not impleaded in the motion to
dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived.The court may only dismiss an action motu
proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and
prescription.

26. ANICETO G. SALUDO JR. V. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTL INC, GR. No. 159507, 19
April 2006

Facts of the case:

AMEX is a corporation doing business in The Philippines which engages in providing credit
and other credit facilities. It is situated in Makati. Plaintiff is a member of the House of
Representatives who lived in Leyte. Petitioners credit card from that company was
dishonored as well as his daughter. He was then charged with late payment, and his cards
were cancelled. Petitioner claimed moral damages as a result of AMEX’s act which was
committed in gross and evident bad faith. In their answer, respondents specifically denied
the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of
cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the complaint
should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the
parties was a resident of Leyte

Procedural history

CA held that not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte, hence venue was
improperly laid.

Issue: WON venue was improperly laid

Holding: The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and
orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every
action and proceeding., so while petitioner’s complaint for damages against respondents
before the court is a personal action governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts,
the choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to
plaintiff's whim because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.

27. SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS, GR. No. 133743, 6 February 2007

Facts of the case:

San Luis contracted three marriages. The first marriage, there were six children, the second,
one son, the third he had no son. Respondent wanted a dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC. The heirs
from the first wife filed a motion to dismiss, but the trial court denied. Stating at the time of
San Luis’ death, since he was the governor of Laguna, it should have been filed there.

Procedural History:

Consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision of the CA which
reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 Resolutions of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708, and its May 15,
1998 Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Was venue was properly laid?

Holding: The petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed
in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death.
There is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. This is in accord with Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of
a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.

28. United overseas bank vs Rosemoor Mining, GR No. 159669, 12 March 2007

Facts of the case:

A mortgage agreement was entered between petitioner and respondent, wherein respondent
mortgaged 6 parcels of land in Nueva Ecija. Extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties was
made, and petitioner was the highest bidder.

Procedural history:

Rosemoor’s filed separate complaints against the Bank, one before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila and the other before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. Manila case -
Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual filed a Complaint, originally captioned as one for Damages,
Accounting and Release of Balance of Loan and Machinery and for Injunction" before the
Manila RTC. The Bank moved for the dismissal of the original and amended complaints on
the ground that the venue had been improperly laid. The motion was denied. The Bank filed
another motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the ground of forum-shopping.
They say that as between the action before the Manila RTC and the petition before the
Malolos RTC, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same set of facts, but to no avail. The Malolos RTC denied the motion
to dismiss. . Despite receipt of the Order, the Bank opted not to file its answer. It filed
instead a motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, respondents moved to declare the Bank in
default. Thereafter, Malolos RTC issued an order denying the Bank’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and at the same time declaring the Bank in default for failure
to file its answer. The decision in the Malolos case was also appealed to the Court of
Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not Rosemoor committed forum-shopping in filing the two cases against
the bank

Holding: Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that actions
affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and
tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.The venue of the action for the nullification of the
foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos RTC. In the present case, there is only one
proceeding sought to be nullified and that is the extra-judicial mortgage foreclosure sale. And
there is only one initial transaction which served as the basis of the foreclosure sale and that
is the mortgage contract.

29. LUCAS VS. FABROS, AM No. MTJ-99-1266, 31 January 2000

Facts of the case:

Elenita did not appear the Preliminary Conference, and so Judge Fabros dismissed the case.
However, Elenita filed a motion for reconsideration and such was granted. Lucas, who was
the respondent in that case, filed another case against the judge for gross ignorance, stating
Section 19 of the Rules of Summary Procedure, as a motion for reconsideration is prohibited.
Respondent explained, however, that it was granted in the interest of justice.

Procedural history:
The complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. A

Issue: WON the motion for reconsideration filed by Elenita is a prohibited pleading as
contemplated under the Revised Rules on Summary Proceeding?

Holding: The order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to
appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial
of the case. As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the Rule
on Summary Procedure. This rule, however, applies where the judgment sought to be
reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving
Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure: "The motion prohibited by this
Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial
on the merits of the case."

30. BONGATO VS MALVAR, GR No. 141614, 14 August 2002

Facts of the case:

Petitioner was accused of unlawfully entering a parcel of land belonging to the spouses.
Petitioner then filed a motion for extension of time, which was denied by the MTCC, as it was
proscribed under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Petitioner filed an answer (with a new
counsel) which the MTCC disregarded, as it was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary
period. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss with another counsel which the MTCC denied.
Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the land in question,
and to pay rentals, attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit.

Procedural history
RTC judge affirmed MMTC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. CA held that the lot
referred to in the present controversy was different from that involved in the anti-squatting
case. It further ruled that the MTCC had jurisdiction, and that it did not err in rejecting
petitioners Motion to Dismiss.

Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Motion to Dismiss
was a prohibited pleading

Holding: Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated the
Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited
pleading. Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the
rule on prohibited pleadings.

31. PASCUAL VS JOVELLANOS, AM No. MTJ-02-1429, 4 October 2002

Facts of the case:

Lorenzo Manaois was accused of forcible entry, but the complaint was dismissed as it was
without prejudice for being insufficient in some material allegations. Petitioner then corrected
this, but instead of answer. Manaois filed a motion to strike out as he claims the complaint is
false. No answer was submitted, and the motion to strike out was granted. Complainant
accused judge of neglect of duty.

Procedural history:

In his Comment, respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint. He accused Atty.
Peregrino, complainant’s counsel in the forcible entry case, of having a penchant for filing
administrative cases against him instead of appealing decisions before the proper court.
After investigation of this case, the OCA found that respondent failed to apply the Rule on
Summary Procedure, which he ought to have been very conversant with, because it was a
common procedure in municipal courts.

Issue: WON Respondent failed to apply the Rules on Summary Procedure?

Holding: Verily, judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of the
Complaint and the evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to file his
answer after the lapse of ten (10) days from the service of the summons. Section 6 of the
Rule allows the trial court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon failure of the
defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period. Moreover, under Section 10 of
the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render his decision within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing them.
This notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment dated
December 15, 1999, filed in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure.

32. Victoria vs Brewmaster international, GR. No 182779, 23 August 2010

Facts of the case:

Filed for a complaint for sum of money against petitioner, Respondent is a marketing
company who sells beer. Accordingly, petitioner got a credit of 182. 502 pesos. As proof,
there are sales invoices. It says that despite demands, they did not pay. Petitioner responds,
denying any knowledge of the obligation.

Procedural history
Petitioner did not appear in the scheduled prelim conf. MeTC dismissed the complaint,
ratiocinating that respondent, as plaintiff, failed to meet the burden of proof required to
establish its claim by preponderance of evidence. Respondent elevated the case to the RTC
through a notice of appeal. RTC affirmed the decision of the lower court. Respondent then
went to the CA through a petition for review. There, it succeeded in obtaining a judgment in
its favor.

Issue: WON the CA erred in its decision

Holding: The basic requirement under the rules of procedure is that a complaint must make
a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his
claim. Ultimate facts: substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the plaintiff's
primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.
They refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the
cause of action rests. Thus, the CA erred.

33. MONGAO VS PRYCE, GR No. 156474, 16 August 2005

Facts of the case:

Respondent agreed to sell to the latter for the price of 5 million a parcel of land in Cotabato.
Respondent paid the 550,000 earnest money, but after considerable delay, offered to pay
the balance, but such was rejected. Respondent did not pay the check to petitioner Mongao
despite written and oral demands.

Procedural history:

Respondent refuted petitioners' allegations in the answer, said earnest money was allegedly
part of the amount directly paid by respondent corporation to the DBP in order to redeem
certain properties of the Animas family. Petitioners moved for judgment on the pleadings on
the ground that the answer admitted the material allegations of the complaint and, therefore,
failed to tender an issue.. RTC granted the motion while CA reversed and remanded the
case for trial on the merits.

Issue: WON judgment on the pleadings was proper?

Holding:
Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the ROC provides that where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. Respondent’s answer admitted that
there was a perfected contract of sale between it and petitioner and that respondent refused
to tender payment of the purchase price solely to petitioner. Now, if an answer does in fact
specifically deny the material averments of the complaint in the manner indicated by said
Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or asserts affirmative defenses in accordance with Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 6, a judgment on the pleadings would naturally not be proper.

34. BUNGCAYAO v. FORT ILOCANDIA PROPERTY HOLDINGS, GR. No. 170483, 19

April 2010

Facts of the case:

 Petitioner is one of two entrepeneurs who added improvements on the foreshore area of a
beach where a hotel was constructed. The other entrepeneurs began setting up their own
stalls in the area, and formed a Beach Resport Owner’s Association. Six parcels of land in
the beach were transferred to the Philippine Tourism Authority. Petitioner and other D’Sietro
members then applied for a foreshore lease with the CENRO and was granted a provisional
permit. DENR then denied the lease applications.

Procedural history:
The D'Sierto members appealed the denial of their applications. The then DENR Secretary
denied the appeal. Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before
the RTC of Laoag, City against respondent. Petitioner alleged that his son had no authority
to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him. The trial court
confirmed the agreement of the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim and the return of P400,000 to respondent. Petitioner's counsel, however,
manifested that petitioner was still maintaining its claim for damages against respondent.
Petitioner and respondent agreed to consider the case submitted for resolution on summary
judgment. Thus, the trial court considered the case submitted for resolution. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, alleging that he manifested in open court that he was
withdrawing his earlier manifestation submitting the case for resolution. Respondent filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment

ISSUE: WON respondent’s counterclaim was compulsory

Holding: The only claim that remained was the claim for damages against respondent. A
compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may
have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the
same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.

35. Philtranco Service Enterprises v. CA, GR No. 161909, 25 April 2012.

Facts of the Case:

On Felix Paras way home to Manila from Bicol, he boarded a vehicle owned and operated by
Inland Trailways inc. The bus was bumped by another vehicle owned and opearated by
Philtranco. The said accident brought damage to the vehicles, and caused physiacal injuries to
the passengers. Paras was taken to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with several injuries
such as hematoma. PAras went to two operations affecting the fractured portions of his body.

Procedural History:
Inland denied responsibility, by alleging that its driver Coner had observed an utmost and
extraordinary care and diligence to ensure the safety of its passengers. Inland invoked the
Police Investigation Report that the Philtranco bus driver of Apolinar Miralles was which
violently bumped the rear portion of the Inland bus, and therefore, the direct and proximate
cause of Paras' injuries. Upon leave of court, Inland filed a third-party complaint against
Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles. RTC rendered decision that the third-party defendant
Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff jointly and severally. All the
parties appealed to the CA on different grounds.

Statement of the Issue:

Whether or not Paras can recover damages moral damages in this suit based on quasi-delict
Ruling:
Under the Section 12 Rule 6 of Rules of Court— A third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called
the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect
of his opponent's claim. In Balbastro v. Court of Appeals, Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Revised
Rules of Court authorizes a defendant to bring into a lawsuit any person "not a party to the
action . . . for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of his
opponent's claim." The impleader of new parties under this rule is proper only when a right to
relief exists under the applicable substantive law. The requisites for a third-party action
are, firstly, that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the action; secondly, that
the claim against the third-party defendant must belong to the original defendant; thirdly, the
claim of the original defendant against the third-party defendant must be based upon the
plaintiff's claim against the original defendant; and, fourthly, the defendant is attempting to
transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff. It
is worth adding that allowing the recovery of damages by Paras based on quasi-delict, despite
his complaint being upon contractual breach, served the judicial policy of avoiding multiplicity
of suits and circuity of actions by disposing of the entire subject matter in a single litigation.

36. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency Inc, GR No. 152579, 7 August 2009

Facts of the case:

Respondent was hired under a one year employment contract with Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency Inc. She went to Taiwan to work in Wacol as quality control. There, she
was asked to work as a cutter. A certain Mr Huwang then informed her without prior notice that
she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and
passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” She earned only a total of 9k
NT because Wacoal deducted to cover her plane ticket expense back to Manila.
Procedural history :

Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA
dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National
Labor Relations Commission

ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

HELD:

The award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should be increased to the
amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract. In Serrano
v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the
clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. Sameer
contends that both the June 6, 2001 Petition and the July 5, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration
filed by ASBT before the Court of Appeals were signed by Mildred Santos, as corporate
president, who is not a member of the Bar. As such, Sameer argues that both the Petition and
the Motion for Reconsideration should be considered unsigned pleadings which produce no
legal effect, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 7 of rules of court. Obviously, the
rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either the party to the case or the counsel
representing that party

37. Anderson v. Ho, GR No. 172590, 7 January 2013.

Facts:

An ejectment case was filed with the MeTC. This case was then dismissed. Later, it was
appealed to the RTC which also dismissed the same. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. This was then denied by the RTC. Wanting to file with the CA a petitioner for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, Atty Oliva, petitioner’s counsel. Filed a motion for
extension of time of 15 days. This was granted by the CA. Later, said counsel sought another
extension of 15 days as the petition had been finalized and sent to Anderson in hawaii for her
to read as well as sign.

Procedural History:

When it was the last day of the extended period, the petition was not yet been sent back. An
additional extension was sought. CA granted the said motion for extension. Atty. Oliva was
finally able to file the Petition for Review but the certification against forum shopping attached
thereto was signed by him on Anderson’s behalf without any accompanying authority to do so.
Hence, the CA dismissed the case as the certification of forum shopping was signed not by the
petitioner herself but by her counsel without authority to do so. A motion for reconsideration
was filed which was also denied by the CA. Thus, petitioner now invokes before the SC the
liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure

Issue:
Whether or not the rules on certification against forum shopping may be relaxed in this case.

Ruling:

The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it imposes has been
constantly underscored by this Court. One of these procedural requirements is the certificate of
non-forum shopping which, time and again, has been declared as basic necessary and
mandatory for procedural orderliness. In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank the
Court reiterated the guidelines respecting non-compliance with or submission of a defective
certificate of non-forum shopping, the relevant portions of which are as follows: As to
certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, is generally
not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax
the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance or presence of ‘special circumstances or
compelling reasons’.

38. Fuentebella v. Castro, GR No. 150865, 30 June 2006.

Facts:
Respondent engaged the funeral services of Rolling Hills Memorial Park for the interment of
the remains of her dead husband, Freddie Castro. As the burial was taking place and the
casket of her deceased husband was to be lowered, it was discovered that the dimensions of
the vault did not fit with the measurements of the casket. Because of this, the casket was lifted
and placed under the heat of the sun for one hour in front of all the mourners. To her
humiliation, the employees of petitioner measured the casket by using a spade.

Procedural History:

Darlica filed a complaint for damages before the MTCC. Darlica withdrew the complaint
because amount of damages claimed exceeds PhP 200,000. Darlica filed a similar complaint
with the RTC of Negros Occidental. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari. The petition, however, was dismissed by the CA. A perusal of the records discloses
that the verification and the certification against forum shopping was signed by a certain
Lourdes Pomperada without any showing or indication that she is duly authorized by the
petitioners to sign for and in their behalf

ISSUE:

Was the certification false because there was already a prior case before the MTCC

Ruling:

An omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute
res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and
nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the
said certificate are not present. Hence, in any event, the trial court correctly held that the
submission of a false certification shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal sanctions.

39. Cagayan Valley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GR No. 151413, 13 February

2008.
Facts:
Petitioner says that it granted 20% sales discounts to qualified senior citizens on purchases of
medicine. This was in accordance with RA 7432. This was treated as deductions from the
gross sales in order to arrive at the net sales instead of treating them as tax credit as provided.
They then filed a claim with the BIR for tax refund/ tax credit. BIR did not act on the tax credit
so Cagayan filed a petition for review before the CTA.

Procedural History:

The CTA denied the tax credit to Cagayan notwithstanding Cagayan’s entitlement to a tax
credit. Aggrieved, Cagayan elevated the matter before the CA One of the issues raised before
the CA is the irregularity of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping as it was
signed by the president without any proof of authorization by the Board of Directors of
Cagayan.

ISSUES:

Whether Cagayan’s president can sign the subject verification and certification sans the
approval of its Board of Directors.

RULING:

The president can sign the verification and certification. The Court has recognized the authority
of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. the
following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification
without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the
President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel
Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. The rationale applied in the
foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the
corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being “in a position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition
40. Chua v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, GR No. 182311, 19 August 2009

Facts:
Chua was president of the company Chua and Filiden. The company got a 4 million peso loan
from metrobank, secured by a real estate mortgage. However, the value of the collateral was
more than the loan, so Chua was given an open credit line for future loans. They were unalbe
to pay their obligations, so metrobank entered into a debt settlement agreement with them,
whereby the loan was restructured. Finally, it was demanded that the company pay their
liabilities. When petitioners were unable to pay, Metrobank tried to extra-juducually forcelose
the REM constituted on subject properties.

Procedural History:

RTC issued an Order directing that the said sale be reset. The auction sale, however,
proceeded, and a Certificate of Sale was accordingly issued to respondent Metrobank as the
highest bidder of the foreclosed properties.-Chua amended the Injunction Complaint alleged
that the Certificate of Sale was a falsified document since there was no actual sale that took
place on 8 November 2001. Chua also prayed in their Amended Complaint for the award of
damages-RTC-Branch 257 denied Chua’s application for injunction on the ground that the sale
of the foreclosed properties rendered the same moot and academic.

Issue:
Whether or not successively filing Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402
amounts to forum shopping.

Ruling:
Petitioners were unable to state in the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping the existence of Civil
Case No. CV-01-0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258. If the forum shopping is not
considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed without prejudice, on
the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata. However, if the forum shopping is willful and
deliberate, both (or all, if... there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with
prejudice..[43] In this case, petitioners did not deliberately file Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 for
the purpose of seeking a favorable decision in another forum. Otherwise, they would not have...
moved for the consolidation of both cases. Thus, only Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 is dismissed
and the hearing of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 before RTC-Branch 258 will be continued.

41. Metrobank v. Santos, GR No. 157867, 15 December 2009.

Facts:
A loan was obtained by respondent from Metrobank of the amoung of two million pesos. To
secure payment, a real estate mortgage over a condominium unit in Makati and all it’s
improvements were issued. When the loan was not paid despite demand, Metrobank instituted
an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the real estate morgage, where Metrobank
was the highest bidder. So Metrobank registered the certificate of sale. The redemption period
lapsed without De Koning redeeming the property. Metrobank demanded that possession over
the condominium unit be turned in.
Procedural History:
The lower court issued an order setting the ex parte hearing of Metrobank's petition.
Respondent’s counsel appeared and manifested that he filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that Metrobank's petition violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which
requires the attachment of a certification against forum shopping to a complaint or other
initiatory pleading. When Metrobank failed to disclose the existence of two pending cases in
the certification attached to its petition, it failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of
the Rules so that its petition should be dismissed. The RTC agreed with respondent and
dismissed Metrobank's petition for having a false certification of non-forum shopping. The
lower court denied Metrobank's motion for reconsideration. Metrobank thus elevated the matter
to the CA on a petition for certiorari on January 5, 2001.The CA affirmed the dismissal of
Metrobank's petition. It explained that Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules is not limited to actions,
but covers any "initiatory pleading" that asserts a claim for relief. The CA denied Metrobank's
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS

Ruling:
Metrobank claims that an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is not an
initiatory pleading asserting a claim. Rather, it is a mere incident in the transfer of title over the
real property which was acquired by Metrobank through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, in
accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. Thus, the petition is not covered by
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules and a certification against forum shopping is not required. A writ
of possession may issue either (1) within the one year redemption period, upon the filing of a
bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. In order to obtain
a writ of possession, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale must file a petition, in the form of
an ex parte motion, in the registration or cadastral proceedings of the registered property. The
reason why this pleading, although denominated as a petition, is actually considered a motion
is best explained in Sps. Arquiza v. CA, where it is stated that the certification against forum
shopping is required only in a complaint or other initiatory pleading. The ex parte petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading.

42. Vda. de Daffon v. CA, GR No. 129017, 20 August 2002.

FACTS:
Petitioner and her husband had one child, Joselito, who married respondent and they had six
children. Joselito dies after his father. Respondent, with her six children, instituted an action for
partition against petitioner over the properties left by petitioner’s husband which formed part of
his conjugal partnership.
Procedural History:
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, but the trial court denied the same. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the latter dismissed the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
Ruling:
In this case, the Court of Appeals was correct. The Supreme Court ruled that in the
determination of whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, only the statements in the
complaint may be properly considered. The complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts
on which the plaintiffs rely for their claim. The allegations in the complaint in the case at bar
are sufficient to establish respondent's right to the estate of Amado. By stating their
relationship to the deceased, they established their line of succession as the basis for their
claim. Their rights to succeed as heirs were transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. The Court likewise ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, which was the subject of the petition for certiorari.

43. Titan Construction v. David, GR No. 169548, 15 March 2010.

Facts:

Spouses David acquired a lot in White Plains, Quezon City, registered under the name of
“MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to Manuel A. David". Spouses then
separated and no longer communicated. Manuel then discovered that Martha had previously
sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation for 1m through a deed of sale in the name
of Titan. Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance against Titan
before the RTC.Manuel alleges that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without
his knowledge and consent.
Procedural History:
The RTC issued a Decision which (i) invalidated both the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129;
(ii) ordered Titan to reconvey the property to Martha and Manuel; (iii) directed the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new title in the names of Manuel and Martha; and (iv) ordered
Titan to pay P200,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance as attorney's fees, and P50,000.00
as costs of suit. the CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court but deleted the award of
attorney's fees and the amount of P50,000.00 as costs
Issue:
Whether or not there is a Failure to Deny the Genuineness and Due Execution of the SPA
Ruling:
While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery procedure and must be reasonably
construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The
interpretation should be one which assists the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and
most important, a just determination of the disputed issues. It is true that the reply filed by
Manuel alleging that the special power of attorney is a forgery was not made under oath.
However, the complaint, which was verified by Manuel under oath, alleged that the sale of the
subject property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his knowledge,
consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is nothing on the face of the deed of
sale that would show that he gave his consent thereto. In Toribio v. Bidin, it was held that
where the verified complaint alleged that the plaintiff never sold, transferred or disposed their
share in the inheritance left by their mother to others, the defendants were placed on adequate
notice that they would be called upon during trial to prove the genuineness or due execution of
the disputed deed of sale.

44. Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works, GR No. 143338, 29 July 2005.

Facts:
A complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondents was filed by petitioner, who
impleades the spouse of Morales in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner
says that it extended a loan to respondents in the amount of 1 million pesos. Under the
promissory note, respondents bound themselves to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan
through twenty five monthly installments of 40,000 a month. Respondents defaulted on their
monthly installments despite demand.

Procedural History:
Petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default which was opposed by
the defendants upon the ground that they were never served with copies of the summons and
of petitioner's complaint. Petitioner filed a motion praying that the presiding judge, Judge
Ricardo D. Diaz, of the court a quo inhibit himself from this case. This motion to inhibit was
denied by the trial court.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals make a mistake
Ruling:
Rule 8 Section 8 of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action or defense is founded upon a
written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party
does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an
inspection of the original instrument is refused. In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan
Bank v. Mariano Velarde, this Court held that Respondent also denied any liability on the
promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan
documents do not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these
allegations in his "denial under oath," stating that the "promissory note sued upon, assuming
that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him
and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses.
There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the ANSWER of both defendants,
they denied generally and specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
promissory note and by way of special and affirmative defenses herein states that he
(MORALES) never signed the promissory note attached to the complain in his personal and/or
individual capacity. Moreover, what appears in the record was an admission of paragraphs 1 &
2 but they deny generally and specifically the rest of the allegations. It would be considered
that there is a sufficient compliance of the requirement of the law for specific denial.

45. Luistro v. CA, GR No. 158819, 16 April 2009.

FACTS:

First Gas Power Corporation entered into a Substation interconnection agreement with
Meralco and NPC, where First Gas would finance, construct, and commission a 230 kilovolt
electric power transmission line. Under the SIA, First Gas had to acquire easement of right of
way over certain lands. Frist Gas entered into a Contract of Easement of Right of Way with
Luistro, an owner of a parcel of land in Batangas where First Gas was granted perpetual
easement. However, Luisitro’s counsel wrote a letter to Frist Gas asking for a temporary
stoppage of all kinds of work within the vicinity of petitioner’s residential hoouse pending
settlement of petitioner’s grievance that the house and other improvements lay underneath the
transmission wire/line being constructed and would endanger the life and health of the persons
in the vicinity.

Procedural History:

RTC: Luistro filed a complaint for Rescission/Amendment And Or Modification of Contract Of

Easement According to Luistro: he entered into the Contract under misrepresentation. First
Gas filed a MOTION TO DISMISS for failure to state cause of action. RTC denied MTC. RTC
also denied MR.CA: First Gas filed petition for certiorari before the CA. CA ordered dismissal
for failure to state cause of action. CA denied the MR filed by Luistro.

Statement of the Issue:

Whether the complaint alleges fraud with particularity as required under Section 5, Rule 8 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Ruling:
Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that “In all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.
Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally.”
Again, the complaint falls short of the requirement that fraud must be stated with particularity.
The complaint merely states “That sometime in the year of 1997, the consolidator-facilitator of
the Defendants FGPC and Balfour by means of fraud and machinations of words were able to
convince[] the plaintiff to enter into ‘CONTRACT OF EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY’ wherein
the latter granted in favor of the defendant FGPC the right to erect [its] Tower No. 98 on the
land of the plaintiff situated at Barangay Maigsing Dahilig, Lemery 4209 Batangas including the
right to Install Transmission Lines over a portion of the same property for a consideration
therein stated, a xerox copy of said contract is hereto attached as [] ANNEXES “A” up to “A-4”
of the complaint” AND; “That the said contract, (Annexes “A” up to “A-4”) was entered into by
the plaintiff under the “MISREPRESENTATION, PROMISES, FALSE AND FRAUDULENT
ASSURANCES AND TRICKS” of the defendants”

46.Indiana Aerospace v. Commission on Higher Education, GR No. 139371, 4 April 2001.

Facts of the case

Petitioner, a school, posted an advertisement in the Manila Bulletin. Engineering (TPRAME)
inquired whether petitioner had acquired university status. Dr Vera referred the letter to CHED,
and CHED to it’s regional director in Cebu, requesting the office to conduct an investigation. As
a consequence of said Report, respondent's Legal Affairs Service was requested to take legal
action against petitioner. Respondent directed petitioner to desist from using the term
University, including the use of the same in any of its alleged branches.
Procedural History:
Respondent filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss. The CA ruled that petitioner
had no cause of action against respondent. Petitioner failed to show any evidence that it had
been granted university status by respondent as required under existing law and CHED rules
and regulations. A certificate of incorporation under an unauthorized name does not confer
upon petitioner the right to use the word "university" in its name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of default is valid
RULING:
In the case of Lina v. Court of Appeals discussed the remedies available to a defendant
declared in default, as follows: (1) a motion to set aside the order of default under Section 3(b),
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, if the default was discovered before judgment could be rendered;
(2) a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37, if the default was discovered after
judgment but while appeal is still available; (3) a petition for relief under Rule 38, if judgment
has become final and executory; and (4) an appeal from the judgment under Section 1, Rule
41, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted to.

47. Monzon v. Spouses Relova, GR No. 171827, 17 April 2008.

Facts of the Case:

Spouses Relova and Perez allege that Monzon issued a promisory note in their favor worth
P600k and secured by a lot in Tagaytay city. A deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land
was later executed in favor of the Perez spouses. The same thing happened with spouses
Relova where a promisory note in the amount of 200,000 was issued and secured by a lot. A
deed of conditional sale over the parcel of land was later issued in favor of spouses Relova.
Monzon was indevted to the Coastal Lending Corporation, who extrajudically foreclosed the
proeprty of Monzon. The winning bidder in this extrajudicial forecloseure was Addio properties.
Of the amount paid by Addio, there was a residue of roughlyP1.6M (indebtedness of Monzon
was only around P3.4M while Addio paid P5M for the property that‘s why there‘s an excess).
This residue is in the custody of Atty. Luna as Branch Clerk of Court. Monzon argues that she
has already fulfilled her obligation to the spouses via dacion en pago evidenced by the Deed of
Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Procedural History: RTC: Due to Monzon and counsel’s absence on said hearing date despite
due notice, granted an oral Motion by the respondents by issuing an Order allowing the ex
parte presentation of evidence by respondents. Atty. Luna should deliver the residue to
spouses Relova and Perez. At this point in time, Addio properties intervened. The CA affirmed
RTC, denied Monzon’s appeal, the violation of due process since she was not allowed to
present in court again after not appearing in first hearing.

Issue :
Whether or not Monzon is declared in default

Ruling:
Section 3, Rule 9
“(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but not to take part in the trial.”
Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and not failure to appear
at the hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default, except the failure to appear at a pre-
trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant are followed, that
is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment based thereon
may be rendered against the defendant.

The RTC applied the effects of a default order upon petitioner under Section 3, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court which states the “If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed
therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party,
and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall
proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of
evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.”

48. Sps. Lambino v. Presiding Judge, GR No. 169551, 24 January 2007.

Facts of the case:

Petitioner, a lawyer, and his wife secured a housing loan from private respondent BPI. The interest rate
was 19% pe annum payable in 180 monthly installments. A mortgage loan agreement was executed by
petitioners over their property as security. However, petitioners failed to pay the monthly amortizations
from January 15, 1995 to May 15, 1995. Private respondent filed a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the MLA with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Valenzuela City and sought to have the
property sold to satisfy the balance of petitioners' loan account. The public auction was set at 10:00 a.m.
on July 11, 1995. Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the MLA and the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale with a prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Procedural History:
The court suspended pretrial to enable the parties to settle the matter amicably. the trial court issued an
Order denying the motion of petitioners in its finding that the alleged escalating and arbitrary rate of
interest and other charges imposed by private respondent had accrued long before the complaint was
filed.
Issue:
Whether the court of appeals made a mistake
Ruling:
Section 6 of Rule 10 which states that “Upon motion of a party, the court may, upon reasonable notice
and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions,
occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.
If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party should plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying
the time therefor.” The rule is a useful device which enables the court to award complete relief in one
action and to avoid the cost of delay and waste of separate action. Thus, a supplemental pleading is
meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the
latter. A supplemental complaint must be consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in
the original complaint. A new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such complaint. The
supplemental complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related
to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action. However, although
the facts occur before the commencement of the suit if a party does not learn of their existence until
after he has filed his pleading, he may file a supplemental pleading. As a general rule, leave will be
granted to file a supplemental complaint which alleges any material fact which happened or came within
plaintiff's knowledge since the original complaint was filed, such being the office of a supplemental
complaint. The purpose of the rule is that the entire controversy might be settled in one action; to avoid
unnecessary litigation; prevent delay, unnecessary repetition of effort; unwarranted expense of litigants;
to broaden the scope of the issues in an action owing to the light thrown on it by facts, events and
occurrences which have accrued after the filing of the original pleading; to bring into record the facts
enlarging or charging the kind of relief to which plaintiff is entitled.

49. Philippine Ports Authority v. Gothong, GR No. 158401, 28 January 2008.

Facts of the Case:

After the expiration of the lease contract of Veterans Shipping Corporation over the Marine Slip
Way in the North Harbor then petitioner WG&A requested respondent PPA for it to be allowed
to lease and operate the said facility. Thereafter, then President Estrada issued a
memorandum addressed to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) and the General Manager of PPA.
Procedural history:
Petitioner WG&A commenced an Injunction suit before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner claims that the PPA unjustly, illegally and prematurely terminated the lease contract.
It likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to arrest the evacuation.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the same was again
denied in an order. WG&A then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the nullification
of the aforementioned RTC orders. CA granted respondent's petition, thereby setting aside the
RTC orders and directing the RTC to admit respondent's second amended complaint pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the admission of the second amended complaint.
Ruling:
The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, which states that the Section 3, Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that
the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the
new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the
new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or
defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration
in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of
the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."

50. Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. S.R Farms, Inc., GR No. 161849, 9 July 2010

Facts of the Case:

A shipment was made of Indian Soya Bean meal to Manila. The vessel was owned by Consti-
Feed with respondent as it’s ship agent. The shipment arrived in Manila, and was discharged.
All throughout the entire period of unloading, good and dair weather condition prevailed.
However, there was a shortage of the shipment.
Procedural History:
Petitioner then filed a Complaint for damages. The complaint was dismissed at the instance of
respondent on the ground that it has no cause of action against the former. Upon motion of
RCS, the case against it was likewise dismissed for lack of cause of action. RTC rendered its
Decision dismissing respondent's complaint, as well as the opposing parties' counterclaims
and crossclaims. Respondent filed an appeal with the CA. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of amended complaint against petitioner should retroact to the date of fling
of original complaint
Ruling:
The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the
filing of the original; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the
amendment. It is true that, as an exception, this Court has held that an amendment which
merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the
date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which
expired after the service of the original complaint. The exception, however, would not apply to
the party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint. The rule on the non-
applicability of the curative and retroactive effect of an amended complaint, insofar as newly
impleaded defendants are concerned, has been established as early as in the case of Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. In the said case, the defendant Barber Lines
Far East Service was impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint which was filed
after the one-year period of prescription. The order of the lower court dismissing the amended
complaint against the said defendant on ground of prescription was affirmed by this Court.

51. Spouses Dionisio v. Linsangan, GR No. 178159, 2 March 2011.

Facts of the case:
Gorgonio Cruz owned agricultural lands in San Rafael, Bulacan. The tenant, Romualdo,
cultivated the lands. When Romualdo died, his widow was given permission by Cruz to
stay on the property provided that she would vacate it upon demand. Petitioners bought
property from Cruz. They trued to get Romualdo’s widow out.
Procedural history:
The MTC rendered judgment, ordering Wilfredo to vacate the land and remove his house
from it. RTC affirmed the MTC decision, holding that the case was one for forcible entry.
CA rendered judgment, reversing the decisions of the courts below, and ordering the
dismissal of the Dionisios' action. The CA held that, by amending their complaint, the
Dionisios effectively changed their cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of
possession which fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Dionisios' amendment of their complaint effectively changed their cause
of action from one of ejectment to one of recovery of possession

Ruling:

An amended complaint that changes the plaintiff's cause of action is technically a new
complaint. Consequently, the action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such
amended pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original version. Thus, the statute of
limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the filing of the amended pleading. The Court
acknowledges, however, that an amendment which does not alter the cause of action but
merely supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning
date of filing based on the original complaint. The cause of action, unchanged, is not barred
by the statute of limitations that expired after the filing of the original complaint. To determine
if an amendment introduces a different cause of action, the test is whether such amendment
now requires the defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is completely different
from that stated in the original complaint. Here, both the original and the amended complaint
required Wilfredo to defend his possession based on the allegation that he had stayed on
the land after Emiliana left out of the owner's mere tolerance and that the latter had
demanded that he leave.

52. Sps. Barraza v. Campos, Jr.

G.R. No. L-50437; 28 February 1983.

Facts of the Case:

Respondent owned a lechon business, however petitioner used the trade name in
the CFO.

Procedural History:

A complaint for damages was filed. Petitioners in the CFI filed an “urgent ex parte
motion” for extension of time of 15 days within which to file an answer, which the CFI
granted on Nov. 2.

Statement of Issues:
Was the Order of respondent judge declaring petitioners in default for failure to file
their answer within the reglementary period provided by law correct?

Holding:

Respondent judge granted petitioners a 15-day extension to file their answer, or up

to Nov. 18. Instead of filing their answer, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
complaint on Nov. 17, or one (1) day before the expiration of the period as extended
by the court. This is clearly allowed under Sec. 1, Rule 16.
53. David v. Gutierrez-Fruelda
G.R. No. 170427; 30 January 2009.

Facts of the Case:

A complaint for accounting, reconveyance, and damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment against petitioner. It was claimed that petitioner fraudulently exceeded
his special power of attorney to put land in his name and did not remit and account
any money from the transaction involving their lands.

Procedural History:

Service of summons was not served as petitioner was abroad. Petitioner also failed
to answer the service by publication, so private respondents moved that petitioner be
declared in default. On July 14, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for extension of 15
days to file answer, but the RTC declared petitioner in default in an Order dated July
15. The RTC noted that the period to file petitioner's Answer lapsed on May 19, 2005,
60 days after the last publication on March 19, 2005, and that petitioner failed to
answer despite the "many opportunities" given to him. The RTC also denied
petitioner's motion for extension to file Answer.

Statement of Issues:

Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to lift
order of default?

Holding:

Petitioners voluntary appearance was equivalent to service of summons. It has cured

any alleged defect in the service of summons. Petitioner's motions were not motions
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. On the
contrary, the motions invoked the RTC's jurisdiction while seeking the following
affirmative reliefs: to grant extension, deny the motion to declare petitioner in default
and lift the order of default. Thus, petitioner waived any defect in the service of
summons by publication or even want of process because for the RTC to validly act
on his motions, it necessarily acquired jurisdiction over his person. Unfortunately, his
claim that he has meritorious defenses is unsubstantiated. He did not even state
what evidence he intends to present if his motion is granted.
54. Republic v. Caguioa
G.R. No. 174385; 20 February 2013.

Facts of the Case:

A petitioner for TRO and mandatory injunction was filed against the Finance
Secretary, seeking to nullify section 6 of RA 9334.

Procedural History:

Respondent judge issued the preliminary injunction. The Republic filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the SC. Private respondents filed before respondent
judge motions for leave to intervene and to admit complaints-in-intervention. Without
acting on the Republic's motion to suspend the proceedings, the respondent judge
granted on August 11, 2005 the private respondents' motions and complaints-in-
intervention. The respondent judge found the private respondents to be similarly
situated as the lower court petitioners; they stood, too, to be adversely affected by
the implementation of RA 9334. The Republic moved to reconsider the respondent
judge's August 11, 2005 order, arguing that it had been denied due process because
it never received copies of the private respondents' motions and complaints-in-
intervention.

Statement of Issues:

Whether the present petition was procedurally defective?

Holding:

The present petition was filed within the reglementary period. Contrary to the private
respondents' position, the 60-day period within which to file the petition
for certiorari is counted from the Republic's receipt of the July 5, 2006 order denying
the latter's motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
clear on this point — "In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of said motion."
55. University of the Philippines v. Dizon
G.R. No. 171182; 23 August 2012.

Facts of the Case:

A construction agreement was entered into with petitioner and Stern Builders Corp
for a building in UPLB. UP did not pay all three buildings and the last one was
disallowed by COA. Stern Builders sued UP to collect the unpaid billing and to
recover damages.

Procedural History:

The RTC ruled in favor of Stern Builders Corp. UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3,
2002. Stern Builders opposed the notice of appeal on the ground of its filing being
belated, and moved for the execution of the decision. UP countered that the notice of
appeal was filed within the reglementary period because UP's Office of Legal Affairs
(OLS) in Diliman, Quezon City received the order of denial only on May 31, 2002. On
February 24, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that UP's
notice of appeal had been filed late.

Statement of Issues:

Whether the SC should give due course to UP’s petition for review in the name of
equity in order to reverse or modify the adverse judgment against it despite its finality?

Holding:

The service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the
UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the
counsel of record of UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client that
the service should be made. That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City,
which was served with the denial only on May 31, 2002. As such, the running of the
remaining period of six days resumed only on June 1, 2002, rendering the filing of
UP's notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 timely and well within the remaining days of
UP's period to appeal. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other.
56. Cathay Metal Corp. v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.
G.R. No. 172204; 10 July 2014.

Facts of the Case:

A joint venture was entered into with respondent and farmer beneficiaries in CAvite.
While respondent was negotiating, petitioner entered into an irrevocable exclusive
right to buy contracts with the same farmers, where the farmer beneficiaries
committed themselves to sell to petitioner their agricultural properties upon
conversion. Respondent caused the annotation of its adverse claim on the
beneficiaries certificates of title. Contracts of sale of the properties were executed.
TCTs were also issued. A consolidated petition for cancellation of the adverse claims
were filed. The postman issued a certification which said that the reason for the
return was that the cooperative was inexistent. Therefore, petition was tried to be
filed personally by petitioner. This failed for the same reason. The RTC declared that
the service, by registered mail, was effected. Petitioner claimed that summons was
served upon respondent at its official registered address. Petitioner argued that
summons could only be validly served to respondent's official address as indicated in
its registration with the Cooperative Development Authority. This is because
respondent as a registered cooperative is governed by the Cooperative Code, a
substantive law that requires summons to be served to respondent's official address.
Substantive law takes precedence over procedural rules.

Procedural History:

Since no one received the summons, petitioner insisted that the RTC issue an order
to effect substituted service. Respondent still did not file its answer.

Statement of Issues:

Whether respondent was validly served with summons or notice of the hearing?

Holding:

The Rules of Court provides that notices should be sent to the enumerated officers.
The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons
under the Rules of Court. Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides an
exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical
entities. These persons are the juridical entity's president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. The enumeration in
Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service of summons upon persons other than
those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is
not sufficient service of summons. This provision of the rule does not limit service to
the officers' places of residence or offices. If summons may not be served upon
these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may be served
upon any of the officers wherever they may be found. Hence, petitioner cannot use
respondent's failure to amend its Articles of Incorporation to reflect its new address
as an excuse from sending or attempting to send to respondent copies of the petition
and the summons.
58.Rapid Realty and Development Corp. v. Villa
G.R. No. 184197; 11 February 2010.

Facts of the Case:

A declaration of nullity of subdivision plans was filed by petitioner. Summons were

attempted, but the first one, which was a personal service, failed. Zapanta, the court
process server, then resorted to substituted service, serving to the househelp who
did know acknowledge receipt.

Procedural History:

Respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, denying the existence of two
women helpers who allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the
summons. The trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave respondents five
days to file their Answer. They failed to do so, thus petitioner filed a Motion to
declare them in default, which the trial court again granted. Respondents filed an
Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second order declaring them in default
and to vacate proceedings, which the court denied. The CA annulled the trial court's
Orders declaring respondents in default for the second time.

Statement of Issues:

Whether respondents, in filing the first Motion to Lift the Order of Default, voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court?

Holding:

It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary
appearance (Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court). The filing of motions to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to
challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is
thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule
on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made; and (3) Failure to do
so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted
to the court for resolution.
59. Green Star Express, Inc. v. Nissin-Universal Robina Corp.
G.R. No. 181517; 6 July 2015.

Facts of the Case:

Universal Robina Corp owned a van, which got into a vehicular accident which
resulted to the death of the van’s driver. A case was filed for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, and petitioner sent a demand letter to respondent. The criminal
case was dismissed.

Procedural History:

Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the summons. NURC
filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service. The
RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss.The CA reversed the
RTC.

Statement of Issues:

Whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC, vesting the trial court
with jurisdiction.

Holding:

It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic

private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be
said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. NURC maintains
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was received by its
cost accountant, Tinio. It argues that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, which provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity, in
cases where the defendant is a domestic corporation like NURC, summons may be
served only through its officers. Here, Tinio, a member of NURC's accounting staff,
received the summons on January 22, 2004.
60. Delos Reyes v. Ramnani
G.R. No. 169135; 18 June 2010.

Facts of the Case:

A favorable decision was rendered for respondent in a civil case. A write of execution
was then issued by the RTC. The branch sheriff then conducted a public bidding.
Respondent was the highest bidder and a write of possession was issued. The
respondent filed an order to the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale in her
favor. This was opposed by petitioner.

Procedural History:

The RTC granted the motion. This was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner contends that
the motion dated February 16, 2004 filed by respondent to compel the sheriff to
execute the final certificate of sale is fatally defective because it does not contain a
notice of hearing.

Statement of Issues:

Is a hearing needed for the motion?

Holding:

As a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions
which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party. As already discussed, respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final
certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the
same. Hence, the subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. At any
rate, the trial court gave petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in
fact he filed a Comment/Opposition on March 1, 2004 before the trial court.
Petitioner cannot, therefore, validly claim that he was denied his day in court.
61. Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corp.
G.R. No. 171872; 28 June 2010.

Facts of the Case:

A complaint for forcible entry was filed by petitioner against the respondent.

Procedural History:

Such was filed in the MTC. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered
respondent to vacate the disputed land in the name of petitioner and to return the
possession of the land to petitioner. RTC reversed the MTC decision and dismissed
petitioner's complaint. Petitioner received the RTC Decision and thereafter filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was set for hearing. It was only 6 days after the
scheduled hearing on Feb. 26, 2004, that respondent's counsel received a copy of
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The rescheduled hearing on April 2, 2004
was again reset on May 7, 2004, and was further reset to Aug. 6, 2004. After the
hearing, respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss dated Aug. 9, 2004, claiming that
non-compliance with the three-day notice rule did not toll the running of the period of
appeal, which rendered the decision final.

Statement of Issues:

Whether the RTC was correct in dismissing petitioner's Omnibus Motion for allegedly
failing to comply with the three-day notice requirement?

Holding:

“The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be served by Tuesday
at the latest, in order that the requirement of the three days may be complied with. If
notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not
claimed from the post office, the date of the first notice of the postmaster should be
at least five (5) days before Tuesday.” Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that "[e]very
written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice." Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three days after
receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the petitioner's
Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with the
notice requirement, respondent should have received the notice of the hearing at
least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November 2004.
62. PNB v. Deang Marketing Corp.
G.R. No. 177931; 8 December 2008.

Facts of the Case:

A dacion en pago arrangement in an agreement forged by petitioners transformed

respondent’ outstanding loan obligations into a seven year term loan. Respondents
filed before the RTC a Complaint. Summons was served on petitioner. Respondents
filed a Motion to Declare [Petitioner] in Default, which they set for hearing. On even
date, the trial court received petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time [30 days up to
June 11, 2006] to File Answer. Eight days prior to the slated hearing of respondents'
Motion to Declare [Petitioner] in Default, the trial court issued an Order denying said
motion and granting petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. To the
trial court's Order respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In the meantime,
petitioner filed its Answer to the Complaint on May 25, 2006.

Procedural History:

The RTC denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of its May 16, 2006 Order
denying their Motion to Declare petitioner in default and granting the latter's Motion
for Extension. The CA annulled the RTC’s orders.

Statement of Issues:

Whether the CA was correct in declaring petitioner in default?

Holding:

The intention to delay was rather obvious. Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time
to File Answer was laden with glaring lapses. It filed the Motion for Extension,
however, via a private courier (without any explanation for availing for such mode) on
May 14, 2006, which was received by the RTC on May 15, 2006 or ten days late. A
motion for extension of time to file a pleading must be filed before the expiration of
the period sought to be extended. The court's discretion to grant a motion for
extension is conditioned upon such motion's timeliness, the passing of which renders
the court powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed
after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to
extend. Petitioner was not candid enough to aver in the Motion for Extension that the
period had lapsed, as it still toyed with the idea that it could get away with it. The
allegations therein were crafted as if the said motion was timely filed. In requesting
for a 30-day extension or until June 11, 2006 to file answer, petitioner apparently
reckoned the date from which the extension would start on May 12, 2006, which
was not the last day of the 15-day period sought to be extended, it being May 5,
2006. By computation, petitioner actually sought more than 30 days, contrary to the
period of extension it purportedly requested. The counting of the period was
erroneous, even if one uses the material dates alleged by petitioner. No satisfactory
reason was adduced to justify the tardiness of the Answer and no compelling reason
was given to justify its admission.
63. Sps. Anunciacion v. Bocanegra
G.R. No. 152496; 30 July 2009.

Facts of the Case:

According to petitioners, respondents were served with summons and legal

processes through Atty Piazarri, whose office address is at 2830 Juan Luna St,
Tondo Manila. Atty Piazarro wrote a demand letter on behalf of respondents to
vacate the land, stating that respondents owned it.

Proceduralhistory

Petitioners filed before the RTC, Manila, a complaint for Quieting of Title.
Respondents, through their counsel, Atty. Caparas, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. Later, respondents filed a
Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Manifestation, citing as grounds:
1) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; 2) That
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; and 3) That the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. The RTC sustained the
respondents, and the CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal.

Statement of Issues:

Whether the CA erred acted with grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:

The dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the respondents after they had voluntarily appeared before the trial court clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. Quite apart from their voluntary appearance,
respondents' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Second Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss were clearly in violation of Rule 15, Section 8 in relation to Rule 9, Section 1
of the Rules. Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance
of, even if not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of
limitations.
64. Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.
G.R. No. 131471; 22 January 2003.

Facts of the Case:

A sublease and dealer agreement was entered between Panganiban and Shell,
where Shell leased to Panganiban a gasoline station for a period which would
terminate at the same time as Shell’s lease. As Shell was not the owner of the lot,
and was leasing it under a lease agreement, it notified Panganiban that the
agreement was expiring and that Panganiban should wind up her business affairs,
but as she had believed it would expire later, she still occupied the lots and paid
rentals, although Shell did not accept.

Procedural History:

Panganiban filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC. Shell filed an unlawful
detainer case against Panganiban eight months after it submitted its Answer. Shell
filed a Manifestation. Shell claimed that the issue of the renewal of the lease should
be raised in the unlawful detainer case pending before the MTC. The MTC ruled in
favor of Shell. The RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory relief. The CA upheld
the order of the RTC dismissing the petition for declaratory relief on the ground
of litis pendentia.

Statement of Issues:

Whether the CA erred in affirming RTC-Makati's dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1010
on motion of shell on the ground of litis pendentia which was filed long after Shell
had filed its answer?

Holding:

The requirement that a motion to dismiss should be filed within the time for filing the
answer is not absolute. Even after an answer has been filed, a defendant can still file
a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis
pendentia (3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that
would constitute a ground for dismissal. Litis pendentia is also one of the grounds
that authorize a court to dismiss a case motu proprio. In this case, the bona
fide existence of litis pendentia is beyond dispute.
65. Universal Robina Corp. v. Lim
G.R. No. 154338; 5 October 2007

Facts of the Case:

URC and Lim entered into a contract of sale where URC sold to Lim grocery
products totaling P808,059.88. After tendering partial payments, respondent refused
to settle his obligation despite petitioner's repeated demands.

Procedural History:

URC filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint against Lim for a sum of money.
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and improper venue. URC filed a motion for reconsideration together
with an amended complaint alleging that the parties agreed that the proper venue for
any dispute relative to the transaction is Quezon City, which was granted by the RTC.
Summons was served upon Lim, but he failed to file an answer seasonably, and he
was declared in default upon motion of URC. However, the RTC again dismissed the
complaint on the ground of improper venue, stating: “There is not even a remote
connection by the parties to Quezon City, where this RTC sits, the plaintiff
corporation has principal office at Pasig City and the defendant is, as provided in the
complaint, from Laoag City.” The CA dismissed the appeal due to URC’s failure to
attach thereto an explanation why copies of the petition were not served by personal
service but by registered mail, in violation of Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Statement of Issues:

Whether the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioner's complaint on the ground
of improper venue?

Holding:

No. Implicit from Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is that improper venue not
impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a court
may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not
one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the
basis of the pleadings. In Dacoycoy v. IAC, this Court held that a trial court may
not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue. The court
may only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription. In the instant case,
respondent, despite proper service of summons, failed to file an answer and was
thus declared in default by the trial court. Verily, having been declared in default, he
lost his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and present his defense,
including his right to question the propriety of the venue of the action.
66. Galindo v. Heirs of Roxas
G.R. No. 147969; 17 January 2005.

Facts of the Case:

Galindo possessed a lot of land and paid taxes thereon. When he died, his heirs
sold their rights and interests over the land to Roxas. Urbano, one of the heirs of
Galindo, was a minor then, so he did not sign the document (Documento de
Compromiso) but he executed an affidavit signifying his conformity to the sale
executed by his siblings; (4) Urbano later ratified the sale by executing an affidavit
signifying he was agreeable thereto. The CFI ordered the Galindo heirs to execute a
deed of absolute sale in favor of the heirs of Roxas. When Urbano died intestate, his
heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate where they adjudicated unto
themselves as owners the undivided rights and interests of Urbano over the lot.

Procedural History:

The heirs of Roxas, through Reginald, filed a complaint against one of the heirs of
Urbano in the RTC. The RTC denied the motion, ruling that based on the plaintiffs'
allegation in the complaint that they were the legitimate children of the deceased
Roxas, such plaintiffs are the real parties-in-interest. The CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari.

Statement of Issues:

Whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion?

Holding:

An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Section 1, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court provides that only persons or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Section 4, Rule 8 of the said
Rules further provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or
the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be
averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the
plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person
in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and
no suit can lawfully be prosecuted in the name of that person. The party bringing suit
has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative character that he
claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but
who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint.
67. Chu v. Sps. Cunanan
G.R. No. 156185; 12 September 2011.

Facts of the Case:

5 registered lands were sold to Cunanan for P5m by Sps Chu. It was stipulated that
the ownership of the lots were still with the Chus. Such would be transferred to
Cunan only upon complete payment of the total consideration in the terms of the
deed of sale, A special power of attorny was issued authorizing Cunanan to borrow
P5, 161, 090 from any banking institution. The proceeds of the net balance would
then be delivered. But Cunanan transderred the title of the five lands to her name
without the knowledge of the spouses Chu, and then later to spouses Carlos.

Procedural History:

Sps. Chu commenced Civil Case No. G-1936 in the RTC to recover the unpaid
balance from Sps. Cunanan. The case was dismissed, and the parties entered into a
compromise agreement which was approved by the RTC. Sps. Chu later brought
another suit (Case No. 12251) against Sps. Carlos and Benelda Estate, seeking the
cancellation of their TCTs, and later impleaded Sps. Cunanan as additional
defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on res judicata. The
RTC denied the motions to dismiss as it found no identity of parties and subject
matter between the two cases. The CA reversed the RTC.

Statement of Issues:

Was the case barred by res judicata although the compromise agreement did not
expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and although the compromise
agreement made no reference to the lots now registered in Benelda Estate's name?

Holding:

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal

concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The intent
of the parties to settle all their claims against each other is expressed. Apparently,
the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or
rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. The petitioners were not at
liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon
which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there
would be no end to litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of
suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the
courts. Their contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of Civil Case.
68. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corp. v. Aban
G.R. No. 175666; 29 July 2013.

Facts of the Case:

A life insurance policy was taken out by Sotero. In it, her niece respondent was
beneficiary. Petitioner issued the insurance policy. Sotero died. However, upon
investigation, petitioner found that Sotero did not personally apply for insurance, and
it was respondent who filed the insurance application.

Procedural History:

Petitioner filed a civil case for annulment of the policy before the RTC. Respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that petitioner's cause of action was barred by
prescription pursuant to Section 48 of the Insurance Code. The RTC granted the
motion to dismiss, which was affirmed by the CA.

Statement of Issues:

Whether the courts below were correct in applying Sec. 48 of the Insurance Code?

Holding:

Section 48 serves a noble purpose, as it regulates the actions of both the insurer and
the insured. Under the provision, an insurer is given two years — from the effectivity
of a life insurance contract and while the insured is alive — to discover or prove that
the policy is void ab initio or is rescindible by reason of the fraudulent concealment or
misrepresentation of the insured or his agent. After the two-year period lapses, or
when the insured dies within the period, the insurer must make good on the policy,
even though the policy was obtained by fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation.
This is not to say that insurance fraud must be rewarded, but that insurers who
recklessly and indiscriminately solicit and obtain business must be penalized, for
such recklessness and lack of discrimination ultimately work to the detriment of bona
fide takers of insurance and the public in general. The self-regulating feature of
Section 48 lies in the fact that both the insurer and the insured are given the
assurance that any dishonest scheme to obtain life insurance would be exposed,
and attempts at unduly denying a claim would be struck down. Life insurance
policies that pass the statutory two-year period are essentially treated as legitimate
and beyond question, and the individuals who wield them are made secure by the
thought that they will be paid promptly upon claim. Section 48 contributes to the
stability of the insurance industry, and prevents a situation where the insurer
knowingly continues to accept annual premium payments on life insurance, only to
later on deny a claim on the policy on specious claims of fraudulent concealment and
misrepresentation, such as what obtains in the instant case.
69. ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL , petitioners, vs. NEW VISTA
PROPERTIES, INC., MARIA ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA,
and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. 176014. September 17, 2009

Facts of the Case

A land in Calamba, LAguna, was owned by both Maria and Clemente Alipit. They then
executed a special power of attorney making Milagros A De Guzman their attorney-in-fact to
sell their property. De Guzman then executed a deed of absolute sale to New Vista
Properties. When New Vista leanred that the parcel of land was claimed by petitioners
Vitangcol by a deed of sale between Maria and Vitangcol.
Procedural History

New Vista filed a notice of adverse claim over the lot and a suit for quieting of title before the
RTC of Calamba Court.. RTC ruled in the favor of Vitangcol. According to the RTC, what the
agent (De Guzman) sold to New Vista was a different lot which she was not authorized to
sell. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the Amended Complaint of Vitangcol states a cause of action?

Holding

The trial court acted within its discretion in considering said SPA relative to the motion to
dismiss the amended complaint, as Vitangcol duly submitted that piece of document in court
in the course of the June 7, 2004 hearing on the motion to dismis The trial court, however,
erred in ruling that, taking said SPA into account, the amended complaint stated no cause of
action. Indeed, upon a consideration of the amended complaint, its annexes, with the June
18, 1989 SPA thus submitted, the Court is inclined, in the main, to agree with the appellate
court that the amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. In a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint constituting a
cause of action lies on whether or not the court, admitting the facts alleged, could render a
valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. And to sustain a motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must be shown that the claim for relief in the complaint
does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous,
indefinite, or uncertain.
70. BENJAMIN CUA (CUA HIAN TEK), petitioner, vs. WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING,
INC. and ADVANCE SHIPPING CORPORATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 171337. July 11, 2012.]

Facts of the Case

Cua sought payment of 2 million pesos as reparation for damage to his shipment of soybean
against respondent.

Procedural history:

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, assailing the RTC's jurisdiction over
Cua's claim; it argued that Cua's claim should have first been brought to arbitration. Cua
opposed Advance Shipping's argument; he contended that he, as a consignee, was not
bound by the Charter Party Agreement, which was a contract between the ship owner
(Advance Shipping) and the charterers.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not Cua's claim for payment of damages against the respondents has prescribed?

Holding

Cua’s claim for payment of damages has not prescribed due to the admitted fact that there
was indeed an extension of their agreement. Cua timely filed his claim before the trial court
and the CA failed to appreciate the admissions made by the respondents in their pleadings
that negate a finding of prescription of Cua's claim. It was ruled that the action has not
prescribed because jurisprudence recognized the validity of agreements extending such
period pursuant to COGSA. The allegation of an agreement extending the period to file an
action in Cua's complaint is a material averment that, under Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court, must be specifically denied by the respondents; otherwise, the allegation is
deemed admitted. A review of the pleadings submitted by the respondents discloses that
they failed to specifically deny Cua's allegation of an agreement extending the period to file
an action to November 12, 1990. Wallem's motion to dismiss simply referred to the fact that
Cua's complaint was filed more than one year from the arrival of the vessel, but it did not
contain a denial of the extension. Since the COGSA is the applicable law, the respondents'
discussion to support their claim of prescription under Article 366 of the Code of Commerce
would, therefore, not constitute a refutation of Cua's allegation of extension.
71. SWEDISH MATCH, AB, JUAN ENRIQUEZ, et al. petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ALS MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and ANTONIO K.
LITONJUA, respondents.

G.R. No. 128120. October 20, 2004

Facts of the Case

Petitioner had three subsidiary corporations in The Philippines. Phimco and Phils are some
of them. Petitioner decided to sell them, and several corporations tried to get Phimco, one of
them being respondent. A case was filed against petitioners to sell the Phimco, but petitioner
alleged that there is no cause of action as there was no perfected contract between them.

Procedural History

RTC dismissed respondents' complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision. It ruled that the series of written communications between petitioners and
respondents collectively constitute a sufficient memorandum of their agreement.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court's decision?

Holding

The Court of Appeals erred procedurally in motu propio dismissing the complaint in its
entirety for “lack of a valid cause of action: without the benefit of a full blown trial and on the
mere motion to dismiss. Respondents' attempt to prove the alleged verbal acceptance of
their US$36 million bid becomes futile in the face of the overwhelming evidence on record
that there was in the first place no meeting of the minds with respect to the price.
72. CALIFORNIA AND HAWAIIAN SUGAR COMPANY; PACIFIC GULF MARINE, INC.
and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY , petitioners, vs. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY
CORPORATION, respondent.

G.R. No. 139273. November 28, 2000.

Facts of the Case

A cargo of soyben meal arrived in manila via the vessel MV Sugarl Islander. Such was
consigned to several consignees, one of them being the Metro Manila Feed Millers
Association. The cargo from the vessel to barges were discharged on Nov 30. Respondent
says that when the cago was weighed, a shortage was discovered. Petitioners refused to
settle.

Procedural History

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against herein petitioners. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent's claim is premature, the
same being arbitrable. The RTC deferred the hearing on the motion to dismiss and directed
the petitioners to file an answer. The trial court denied petitioners' Motion for a Preliminary
Hearing. Affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that a preliminary hearing on
affirmative defenses could not be allowed because a motion to dismiss had previously been
filed. Further, it ruled that the arbitration clause did not bind the respondent.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners'
Motion for a Preliminary Hearing?

Holding

Where a preliminary hearing appears to suffice, there is no reason to go on to trial.In the

present case, the trial court did not categorically resolve petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, but
merely deferred resolution thereof. Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules, specifically
provides that a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no
motion to dismiss has been filed. Section 6, however, must be viewed in the light of Section
3 of the same Rule, which requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits them
from deferring its resolution on the ground of indubitability. The ground invoked may still be
pleaded as an affirmative defense even if the defendant's Motion to Dismiss has been filed
but not definitely resolved, or if it has been deferred as it could be under the pre-1997 Rules.
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied a preliminary hearing on a
simple issue of fact that could have possibly settled the entire case. One reason why
dockets of trial courts are clogged is the unreasonable refusal to use a process or procedure,
like a motion to dismiss, which is designed to abbreviate the resolution of a case.
73. SPS. ENRIQUETA RASDAS, and TOMAS RASDAS, SPS. ESPERANZA A. VILLA,
and ERNESTO VILLA, and LOLITA GALLEN, petitioners, vs. JAIME ESTENOR,
respondent.

G.R. No. 157605. December 13, 2005.

Facts of the Case

A parcel of land in Isabela is the subject of this case. Respondent filed a complaint for
recovery of owndership of the land, asserting that he was the owner. The RTC ruled in favor
of petitioners. Respondent then appealed the RTC decision before the Court of Appeals,
which reversed the judgement of the RTC. Petitioners were ordered to vacate the land.

Procedural History

Petitioners filed a Complaint against respondent for just compensation and preliminary
injunction with temporary restraining order. Petitioners asserted therein that they were the
lawful owners of the subject property, although they ultimately conceded the efficacy of the
appellate court's final and executory decision. Still, they alleged that they were entitled to just
compensation relating to the value of the houses they had built on the property, owing to
their purported status as builders in good faith. Respondent as defendant countered with a
Motion to Dismiss, arguing that petitioners' complaint was barred by res judicata, owing to
the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the complaint is barred by res judicata?

Holding

It was held that it is the second kind of res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment," that barred
the instant complaint. Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same. The Supreme Court observed that the causes
of action in the two cases involved were so glaringly similar that it had to affirm the dismissal
of the second case by virtue of the "bar of former judgment rule."
74. SUSIE CHAN-TAN, petitioner, vs. JESSE C. TAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 167139. February 25, 2010

Facts of the Case

Petitioner and respondent were married in Manila Cathedral. They were blessed with two
sons. Justin was born in Canada and Russel was born in The Philippines. Petitioner then
filed a case for annulment under Article 36. The trial court issued a partial judgement
approving the compromise and declared the marriage void. On 4 November 2004, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration. She claimed she was no longer
interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the circumstances in her life had led her to the
conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best interest of the children. She prayed
that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo
ante the filing of the suit.

Procedural History

The trial court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner. It held that the decision is final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day
reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. I

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the annulment decided by the trial court attained finality?

Holding

It as decided that it was executory when the husband failed to appeal during the
reglementary period. The husband claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and
void for violation of his right to due process. He argued he was denied due process when,
after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived
his right to present evidence and rendered judgment based solely on the evidence presented
by private respondent. We upheld the judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it was based
solely on evidence presented by therein private respondent. The alleged negligence of
counsel resulting in petitioner's loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial
court's judgments. Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While
she may have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her
counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court. When petitioner filed the motion to
dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution
of the trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day
reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. Nothing is
more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable.
75. ALDERSGATE COLLEGE, INC et al. petitioners, vs. JUNIFEN F. GAUUAN et al.
respondents

G.R. No. 192951. November 14, 2012.

Facts of the Case

A case was filed against respondents before the SEC. When the SEX was reorganized
pursuant to RA 8799, the case was transferred to the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya for further
proceedings. The case was sought to be dismissed on the complaint or the issuance of a
summary judgement. The RTC denied the motion on the ground that "there are several
issues raised which would still need the presentation of evidence to determine the rights of
the parties."

Procedural History

Respondents-intervenors also sought the dismissal of the complaint in their Answer-in-

Intervention with Motion to Dismiss. The RTC, did not allow. The respondents-intervenors
again filed in February 2010 a Motion to Withdraw and/or to Dismiss Case. The RTC granted
the motion despite the opposition of the petitioners, and dismissed the case on the basis of
the Resolution passed by the members of the Board of Trustees of petitioner Aldersgate
College dated December 14, 2009 recommending the dismissal of the case.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case?

Holding

As this case involves an intra-corporate dispute, the motion to dismiss is undeniably a

prohibited pleading. Moreover, the Court finds no justification for the dismissal of the case
based on the mere issuance of a board resolution by the incumbent members of the Board
of Trustees of petitioner corporation recommending its dismissal, especially considering the
various issues raised by the parties before the court a quo. Hence, the RTC should not have
entertained, let alone have granted the subject motion to dismiss.
76. VILMA QUINTOS AND CATALINO IBARRA, petitioners, vs. PELAGIA NICOLAS et
al., respondents

G.R. No. 210252. June 16, 2014.

Facts of the Case

Petitioners and respondents are siblings. Their parents were owners of the subject property,
whcih was located in Quezon city. When the parents died, they left to their ten children the
ownership over the subject property. Respondent siblings brought an action against petition

Procedural History

Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein
they alleged that during their parents' lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal
properties in favor of their ten (10) children. They likewise averred that they have been in
adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4)
decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They also deny any participation in
the execution of the aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and
the Agreement of Subdivision. Respondents countered that petitioners' cause of action was
already barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the
7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the respondents' counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or res
judicata?

Holding

Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right
of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet. The Supreme Court held that Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to
Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be
without prejudice. This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred
by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties
and the same subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners have been
determined with finality by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that
partition is improper for co-ownership does not or no longer exists.
77. BENEDICTA M. SAMSON and MARCIAL M. SAMSON, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE
GERALDINE C. FIEL-MACARAIG, FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO et al.,
respondents.

G.R. No. 166356. February 2, 2010.

Facts of the Case

Benedicta and Marcial Samson obtained a loan of 10k pesos from Far East Bank and Trust
Co. The loan was secured by a real estate morgage over four parcels of land in Marikina.
When petitioners did not comply with the terms of the loan, FEBTC filed for extra judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage at the RTC. These were sold to FEBTC.

Procedural History

Petitioners filed a case for annulment of the sale. Six months later the RTC issued an Order
dismissing the complaint. The CA dismissed. The appellate court ruled that a writ of
certiorari lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The RTC Order subject of the petition was a final judgment which
disposed of the case on the merits; hence, it was a subject for an ordinary appeal, not a
petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals added that even assuming that the petitioners
availed of the proper remedy, they failed to show that public respondent gravely abused her
discretion by acting in a despotic or arbitrary manner, or that she was motivated by passion
or personal hostility when she issued the assailed Orders.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the case was dismissed with prejudice?

Holding

The RTC dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable
length of time, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. The RTC Order dated
20 June 2003 was a final judgment which disposed of the case on the merits. This was even
clarified in the subsequent RTC Order of 22 December 2003 which denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration wherein the lower court stated that: "Therefore, the dismissal was
'with prejudice' or a dismissal that had the effect of adjudication upon the merits in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court." The remedy to obtain reversal or
modification of the judgment on the merits is appeal.The availability of the right to appeal
precludes recourse to the special civil action for certiorari. The RTC Order subject of the
petition was a final judgment which disposed of the case on the merits; hence, it was a
subject for an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari.
78. ELOISA MERCHANDISING, INC. and TREBEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners,
vs. BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK and ENGRACIO M. ESCASINAS, JR., ,
respondents

G.R. No. 192716. June 13, 2012

Facts of the Case

A real estate mortgage over properties located in Makati were executed by petitioner on
behalf of respondent. A continuing suretyship was executed in favor of BDO to secure the
credit accomondation. BDO inisiated foreclosure proceedings. Petitioners filed a complaint
for annulment of real estate mortgage. BDO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of cause of action, which can be determined from the facts alleged in the complaint.

Procedural History

Petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte in view of the absence of BDO during
the pre-trial. The trial court reinstated the case and set the case again for pre-trial
conference pursuant to BDO’s reconsideration. For failure of the petitioners to appear
despite due notice at the scheduled pre-trial conference, case was ordered dismissed. The
trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioners to prosecute their case. CA affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the case.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the dismissal is proper?

Holding

Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure stated that the failure on the part of
the plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court or the Rules,
or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, may result in the dismissal of
the complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant. However, despite the trial
court's leniency and admonition, petitioners continued to exhibit laxity and inattention in
attending to their case.
79. HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR., petitioners, vs. JUANA GONZALES, her son
MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS,
respondents.

G.R. No. 185922. January 15, 2014

Facts of the Case

Dr. Favis was married to Captolina Aguilar. They had seven children. When Captilona died,
Dr Favis took a common law wife. They had one child. Finally, he married his common law
wife, and he acknowledged their son as legitimate. When Dr Favis died, he executed a deed
of fonation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with the
common law wife.

Procedural History

Dr. Favis' children with his first wife, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the
Deed of Donation. The RTC nullified the Deed old Donation. The trial court found that Dr.
Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his
mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. The Court of Appeals motu proprio
ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the
Family Code.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for
failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made?

Holding

The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The facts of the
case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the respondents were
concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was shown not alone by the
absence of a motion to dismiss but on the respondents' insistence on the validity of the
donation in their favor of the subject properties Respondents not only confined their
arguments within the pre-trial order; after losing their case, their appeal was based on the
proposition that it was error for the trial court to have relied on the ground of vitiated consent
on the part of Dr. Favis. The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case that clearly
demonstrated the refusal by the respondents to compromise. Instead it ordered the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground that it did not allege what in fact was shown
during the trial. The error of the Court of Appeals is patent.
80. RAMON CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., petitioners, vs. JOSEPH
CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 175507. October 8, 2014

Facts of the Case

Antonio Ching owned P Wing Enterprises. Ching alleged that he was the only child of
Ramon with his common law wife. The wife disputed this. She states that even if Ramon’s
certificate alleges that he was Antonio’s illegitimage child, he was just adopted. Joseph and
Jaime, on the other hand, claim to be his illegitimage children with the maid. LAter, Ching
was murdered. Ramon induced the maid and her children to sign an agreement that waived
the estate.

Procedural History

A complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ching were filed by petitioners.
Petitioners filed a complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement
of Estate and the Certificates” against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. The dismissal
of the second case was made without prejudice. Respondents argue that the dismissal
should have been with prejudice under the "two-dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first case.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the "two-dismissal rule” is applicable in this case?

Holding

Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the
plaintiff. Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant. The
dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant under Rule 16, Section
1 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they
were merely re-filing the same claim that had been previously dismissed on the basis of lack
of jurisdiction. When they moved to dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can be
considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiff's instance. The trial court dismissed the first
case by granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants.
81. PARA AQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. CATALINA L. SANTOS,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, LUZ B. PROTACIO, and DAVID R. RAYMUNDO,
respondents.

G.R. No. 194638. July 2, 2014.

Facts of the Case

Catalina Santos entered into a contract of lease with Chua. This lease was over land in
Paranaque. Chua was given the first option to buy. Chua then caused the construction of a 6
door commercial complex on the leased premise. However, by reason of business reverses,
he was constrained to assign his rights to Bing. Bing assumed all oblications under the lease
contract with Santos. Lee executed a deed of assignment over the leased premises.
Petitioner then filed a complaint before the RTC against Santos. Respondents moved to
dismiss.

Procedural History

On July 2, 1998, Petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial, claiming that it was preparing a
petition for certiorari and prohibition which (a) was to be filed with the CA before the
scheduled pre-trial, and (b) was intended to challenge the validity of the RTC's Orders by
raising alleged prejudicial questions that must be resolved first before the pre-trial and trial
on the merits of the case could proceed. Incidentally, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
that was actually filed at 2:17 in the afternoon of July 7, 1998, contrary to petitioner's
assertion in its Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial that it was to be filed before the July 7, 1998 pre-
trial.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the RTC's denial of petitioner's Motion to Cancel
Pre-Trial?

Holding

The trial court has the discretion on whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone and/or
reschedule the pre-trial conference in accordance with the circumstances obtaining in the
case. This must be so as it is the trial court which is able to witness firsthand the events as
they unfold during the trial of a case. Postponements, while permissible, must not be
countenanced except for clearly meritorious grounds and in light of the attendant
circumstances. In this case, the RTC was able to explain to the satisfaction of the Court that
the postponement of the pre-trial.
82. ROBERTO G. ALARCON, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
BIENVENIDO JUANI, respondents.

G.R. No. 126802. January 28, 2000

Facts of the Case

Roberto Alarcon filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale agaisnt respondents.
Alacron says that before he went to Brunei to work, he left with his father a special power of
attorney to administer, mortgage, or sell his properties in Bulacan. Using the SPA, a cportion
of the land was sold to respondents.

Procedural History

The parties made admissions of facts during the pre-trial conference. The partial decision
declared that the deed of sale in favor of the defendants was void ab initio. For failure of the
defendants to interpose an appeal from the partial decision, the same became final and
executory. After several years, respondent Bienvenido Juani filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for the annulment of the trial court's partial decision. After hearing the case, the
Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the partial decision. Its decision was
anchored on its finding that the partial decision was vitiated by extrinsic fraud.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not there was intrinsic or collateral fraud attendant, which would justify the
setting aside of the partial decision?

Holding

From the foregoing, the admissions were clearly made during the pre-trial conference and,
therefore, conclusive upon the parties making it. The purpose of entering into a stipulation of
facts or admissions of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as
well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which
can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. The parties themselves are required to attend or
their representative with written authority from them in order to arrive at a possible amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations
or admissions of facts and documents. All of the matters taken up during the pre-trial,
including the stipulation of facts and the admissions made by the parties are required to be
recorded in a pre-trial order. Juani cannot now claim that he was denied his day in court
when judgment was rendered on the basis of their (Juani, Baluyot and Sulit) counsels'
admissions.
83. SILVESTRE TIU, petitioner, vs. DANIEL MIDDLETON and REMEDIOS P.
MIDDLETON, respondents.

G.R. No. 134998. July 19, 1999

Facts of the Case

A complaint for recovery of possession of real property was filed against petitioner. Before
the commencement of the trial, the court a quo sent a notice of Pre-trial Conference stating
in part: "The parties are warned that witnesses whose names and addresses are not
submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial . . . ." In his Pre-trial Brief,
petitioner averred that he would be presenting six witnesses, but he did not name them.

Procedural History

After the pre-trial conference, the court issued a Pre-trial Order. In such order, it was said
that the petitioner would present six witnesses and specifying the hearing dates for the said
purpose. Trial ensued, and herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the case below, presented
their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, petitioner called Antonia Tiu as his first
witness. Respondents objected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify
because petitioner had failed to name her in his Pre-trial Brief citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules of Court, . Sustaining respondents, the lower court then issued the assailed
orders.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not a judge can exclude a witness whose name and synopsis of testimony were
not included in the pre-trial brief?

Holding

It was emphasized that pre-trial and its governing rules are not technicalities which the
parties may ignore. As earlier stated, pre-trial is essential in the simplification and the speedy
disposition of disputes. In light of the objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial court
therein, it is evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and other pieces of
evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief, provided the parties are given prior notice to this
effect. Indeed, the court and the parties must pay attention not only to the pre-trial briefs, but
also to the pre-trial order. Respondents' failure to challenge the pre-trial brief submitted by
petitioner before the trial nor invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to
submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies is fatal to their case.
The provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses "shall control
the subsequent course of action." The court proceeded with the trial without modifying the
Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they
invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his
witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to
the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioner's unnamed witnesses. Modifying a
pre-trial order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses
will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the
Rules.
84. JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY, respondents.

G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003

Facts of the Case

Gina was married. But then she petitioner and separated from her husband. They cohabited
as husband and wife. They had no children. When their relationship went bitter, she went to
work as an entertainer in Japan. The couple then separated. Respondent filed a complaint
for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with
the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00
a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of
their unfinished house. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her. petitioner claimed that the expenses for
the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their
fishing vessel.

Procedural History

The trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, and private respondent was allowed to
present evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but the same
was also denied. A decision was rendered in favor of private respondent. CA affirmed.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidence ex
parte?

Holding

Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to
file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre- trial, i.e., the
plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis
thereof.
85. GEORGE S. TOLENTINO et al, petitioners vs. PACIFICO S. LAUREL et al,
respondents

G.R. No. 181368. February 22, 2012

Facts of the Case

Respondents allege that they are registered owners of a parcel of land in Quezon. However,
petitioners have been in actual possession of the Western portion of the said property which
they had tried to develop into fishponds.

Procedural History

Respondents filed a suit against petitioners to recover the property. Petitioners, as

defendants in the trial court, averred in their Answer that the subject property is owned by
the Republic and they are occupying the same by virtue of a Fishpond Lease Agreement
entered with the Department of Agriculture. Petitioners were declared in default, for failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and
reset the pre- trial conference. Despite several resetting of the pre-trial conference of which
petitioners were notified, petitioners failed to appear. Hence, the trial court issued an Order
allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte, instead of declaring petitioners in
default. After the ex parte hearing for the reception of evidence, the RTC ruled in favor of
respondents. CA affirmed.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not Petitioners were denied their day in court?

Holding

There was no lack of due process claimed by petitioners. On the contrary, petitioners were
given more than ample opportunity to be heard through counsel. From the foregoing, the
failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is
the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then
the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment
on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without
objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the
plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.
86. Corpuz v. Corpuz

G.R. Nos. 175677 & 177133, July 31, 2009

Facts of the Case

Azucena Corpus had both a mastercard and VISA of Citibank, which she paid in full on
December 7, 1998. While she was in Italy, she dined at a restaurant. When she tried to
settle her bill, she presented her VISA which the restaurant did not honor, but then she
presented her MasterCard which was honored. On the same day she incurred a bill with a
store but both her VISA and Mastercard were not honored. Azucena’s husband inquired why
his wife’s credit cards were not honored, and Citibank explained that her check-payments
had not yet been cleared at the time. When she returned, she wrote letters to
Citibank.Citibank did not respond to the letter, however, drawing Azucena to write Citibank
for the cancellation of the cards. Only after Azucena's counsel informed Citibank of imminent
legal remedies on her part did Citibank indulge Azucena with a written explanation why her
credit cards were not honored in Italy.

Procedural History
Azucena later filed a complaint for damages. After an exchange of pleadings by the parties,
and the issues having been joined, the trial court set the case for pre-trial conference,
during which the spouses and their counsel failed to appear, despite notice. =

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the excuse of the petitioners is a valid cause under Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court.

Holding

NO. The Court held that while Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court allows as an
exception a valid cause for the non-appearance of a party at the pre-trial, the instances cited
by the spouses and their counsel hardly constitute compelling exigencies or situations which
warrant occasional flexibility of litigation rules. In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines where the
counsel for the therein petitioner failed to calendar a scheduled pre-trial in his diary, the
Court held that: The alleged failure of petitioner's counsel to record the scheduled pre-trial in
his 1997 diary to justify his absence at the pre-trial cannot amount to excusable
negligence. To constitute excusable negligence, the absence must be due to petitioner's
counsel's failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of his
carelessness, inattention or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence
of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident. Petitioner's counsel's failure to
record the date of pre-trial in his 1997 diary reflects his carelessness, his failure to heed his
responsibility of not neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, xxx. Petitioner's counsel must
know that pre-trial is mandatory. Being mandatory, the trial court has discretion to declare a
party non-suited. Absent a showing of grave abuse in the trial court's exercise thereof, as in
the case at bar, appellate courts will not interfere.
87. Chan Kent v. Micarez

G.R. No. 185758, March 9, 2011

Facts of the Case

Petitioner’s parents were looking for a residential lot for petitioner and her spouse. As she
was married to an American citizen, she arranged to pay for the purchase price of the
residential lot and register in the names of Spouses Micarez, under an implied trust. A deed
of absolute sale was executed between Spouses Micarez and the owner. Petitioner sent the
money which was used for the payment of the lot. Later, she learned that the Spouses
Micarez sold the lot to Dionesio.

Procedural History

Petitioner filed a Complaint for recovery of real property before the RTC. After filing their
respective pre-trial briefs, and the issues in the case had been joined, the RTC explored the
possibility of an amicable settlement among the parties by ordering the referral of the case to
the Philippine Mediation Center.

Statement of the Issue

Whether the RTC erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 13-2007 due to the failure of petitioner's
duly authorized representative, Manalang, and her counsel to attend the mediation
proceedings under the provisions of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA and 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure.

Holding

Yes. Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate
sanction including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such other
sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in
case any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during
mediation proceedings. The Court found the sanction too severe to be imposed on the
petitioner where the records of the case is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant
disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. There is no clear demonstration that the
absence of petitioner's representative during mediation proceedings on March 1, 2008 was
intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the case. Neither is it indicative of lack of
interest on the part of petitioner to enter into a possible amicable settlement of the case.|||
88. Aguilar v. LIghtbringers Credit Cooperative

GR No. 209605, 12 January 2015.

Facts of the Case

Three complaints for sum of money were separately filed by respondent Lightbringers Credit
Cooperative against petitioners. Petitioners were members of the cooperative who borrowed
funds. Petitioners say there was a discrepancy between the principal amount of the loans
which show that they never borrowed. They also claim that no interest could be had because
there was no written agreement as to it’s imposition.

Procedural History

On the scheduled pre-trial conference, only respondent and its counsel appeared.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the petitioners can have their evidence admitted despite being declared in
default, due to their absence during the pre-trial.

Holding

NO. The case of Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Joseph
Enario discussed the difference between non-appearance of a defendant in a pre-trial
conference and the declaration of a defendant in default in the present Rules of Civil
Procedure. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the
defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex
parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the
privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being
that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the
opportunity to rebut or present his own evidence. In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to
attend the pre-trial conference set on August 25, 2009. They did not even give any excuse
for their non-appearance, manifestly ignoring the importance of the pre-trial stage. Thus, the
MCTC properly issued the Order, allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.
89. Sps. Salvador v. Sps. Rabaja

GR No. 199990, 4 February 2015

Facts of the Case

There was a dispute wherein petitioner spouses as the sellers, the sellers’ agent, and the
buyers, respondents, were fighting over a parcel of land. What happened was that
respondent heard that petitioners were looking for buyers, so respondent made the initial
payment to the agent in front of the seller. The seller had a special power of attorney. The
next day, there was a contract to sell. Respondents made several payments. However,
petitioners said they did not receive any payment, and respondents received a notice to
vacate.

Procedural History

An action for ejectment, the complaint was filed before the MeTC. Ruled in favor of
petitioners. Brought to RTC. The pre-trial conference began but attempts to amicably settle
the case were unsuccessful. It was formally reset to February 4, 2005, but Spouses
Salvador and their counsel failed to attend. Consequently, the RTC issued the pre-trial
order declaring Spouses Salvador in default and allowing Spouses Rabaja to present their
evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales to present evidence in her favor.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court gravely abused
its discretion in declaring petitioners in default and in depriving them of the opportunity to
cross-examine respondents Sps. Rabaja.

Holding

NO. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases.
Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under
the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. "The importance of pre-trial in
civil actions cannot be overemphasized." There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and
their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper
notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel
as he forgot to update his calendar. This excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference
to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As
a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer present any evidence in
their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the RTC to present
evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as defendants. Considering that Gonzales as
co-defendant was able to attend the pre-trial conference, she was allowed to present her
evidence. The RTC could only render judgment based on the evidence presented during the
trial.
90. Pagtalunan v. Tamayo

GR No. 54281, 19 March 1990

Facts of the Case

A case was filed with the Court of the First Instance of Bulacan by the respondent, who is
the Republic of The Philippines, for expropriation of a parcel of land. The CFI gave a writ of
posession placing the Republic in possession of the land,
Procedural History

On June 8, 1978, petitioners herein filed a supplemental motion for leave to intervene, with
complaint in intervention attached thereto, alleging that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has
been the bona fide agricultural tenant of a portion of the land.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not petitioners have the right to intervene in the expropriation proceedings
instituted by the State against private respondents as registered owner of the subject
property

Holding

NO. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.
Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene
is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.
In the present case, the State in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain has
decided to expropriate the subject property for public use as a permanent site for the
Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public Works and Highways. On the other hand,
petitioners have not been issued an emancipation patent. |Petitioners cannot now
successfully argue that Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a portion of the proceeds from
the expropriation proceedings corresponding to the value of the landholding.
91. Pulgar v. RT of Mauban, Quezon

GR No. 157583, 10 September 2014

Facts of the Case

34 tax declarations on the building and machinery in Mauban Plant were issued and
assessedfor a certain amount. Later, the QPL tried to pay first quarter installment but such
was rejected. Thus, QPL filed a complaint for consignation and damages before the RTC
against the province of Quezon.

Procedural History

Pulgar filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-in-Intervention, Pulgar's motion was
initially granted and his Answer-in-Intervention was admitted. Declaring that QPL's
complaint essentially challenged the amount of the taxes assessed, the RTC ruled that it is
the Local Board of Assessment Appeals that had jurisdiction over the complaint.
Consequently, it also dismissed Pulgar's motion for intervention since with the dismissal of
the main case, the same had no leg to stand on.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing Pulgar's motion for intervention as a
consequence of the dismissal of the main case.

Holding

NO. Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main

action. Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction. The cessation of the principal litigation on jurisdictional grounds at
that means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to intervene.
92. Ang Kek Chen v. Bello

GR Nos. L-76344-46, 30 June 1988

Facts of the Case

Petitioner Ang was charged before the then Manila City, with the crimes of "Maltreatment,"
"Threats," and "Slight Physical Injuries," committed on December 1977.

Procedural History

After the prosecution had presented its evidence, Ang filed a Demurrer to Evidence which
was denied by the respondent court. Ang elevated the incident to the RTC. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed Regional Trial Court. Meanwhile, the then presiding judge of
MTC, where the cases were pending, was promoted to the RTC of Manila. As a
consequence, respondent judge, as officer-in-charge of the MTC, directed the return of the
case records to the Clerk of Court for "re-raffle." Petitioner, however, alleged that he
received the corresponding order after the cases had already been actually "re-raffled" and
assigned to respondent judge. Ang filed a motion to re-raffle the cases, which was denied.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present
petition, alleging that Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
|||

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion in violation of Circular No. 7 of
this Court, regarding the manner of raffle of cases, not denied or explained by public
respondent, is a trivial one.||.

Holding

It is not. A violation or disregard of the Court's circular on how the raffle of cases should
be conducted is not to be countenanced. A party has the right to be heard by an impartial
and unbiased tribunal. LThe raffle of cases is of vital importance to the administration of
justice because it is intended to insure impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases
public suspicion regarding assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated.
When the respondent judge conducted the raffle of the three criminal cases in question,
apparently in violation of the Court's Circular No. 7, he did not only arouse the suspicion
that he had some ulterior motive for doing so, but he violated the cardinal rule that all
judicial processes must be done above board.
|||
93. Universal Rubber Products, Inc. v. CA

GR No. L-30266, 29 June 1984

Facts of the Case

Petitioner was sued by two respondent corporations who claim unfair competition.

Procedural History

Private respondents made a request to the respondent Judge to issue a

subpoena duces tecum against the treasurer of herein petitioner. Acting favorably on
that request, said respondent Judge issued a subpoena duces tecum,Petitioner filed
a motion in the court below praying that the subpoena duces tecum dated be
quashed on the grounds that: (1) the said subpoena is both unreasonable and
oppressive as the books and documents called for are numerous and voluminous; (2)
there is no good cause shown for the issuance thereof; and (3) the books and
documents are not relevant to the case pending below. Acting on the said motion and
on the opposition thereto, respondent Judge denied the motion to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. ||

Statement of the Issue

Whether the issuance of the "subpoena duces tecum" is proper in a suit for unfair
competition.

Holding

YES. Based on jurisprudence, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a

"subpoena duces tecum", it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or
document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before
the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been
so designated or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena duces tecum" once issued
by the court may be quashed upon motion if the issuance thereof is unreasonable and
oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the
persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of
production thereof. The argument that the petitioner should first be found guilty of unfair
competition before an accounting for purposes of ascertaining the amount of damages
recoverable can proceed, stands without merit. The complaint for unfair competition is
basically a suit for "injunction and damages. Hence, the collection of the complainant for the
accounting of petitioner's gross sales as damages per R.A. 166, appears most relevant. For
Us, to determine the amount of damages allowable after the final determination of the unfair
labor case would not only render nugatory the rights of complainant under Sec. 23 of R.A.
166, but would be a repetitious process causing only unnecessary delay.
94. People v. Montejo

GR No. L-24154, 31 October 1967

Facts of the Case

A petition was alleged by the City Fiscal of Zamboanga against Felix Wee Sit for double
homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. It was claimed that
Ernesto Salvador, a resident of Rizal, was a material and important witness.

Procedural History
It was alleged that at the time accused was called for trial in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City, pursuant to a formal request of the City Fiscal, respondent Judge issued
a subpoena to patrolman Uaje. But when the case was called for continuation, he did not
appear "and forthwith the undersigned City Fiscal formally moved for an order of arrest" or
in the alternative "to cite him for contempt for willful failure to appear at the trial of the case
as a material witness.” Such a motion was presented and denied on the same day by the
respondent Judge in the Order sought to be annulled in this petition. In their answer of the
Respondents, they denied that of the allegation that Uaje was "a material, much less an
important, witness,".

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not a Court of First Instance possesses authority on a criminal case "to compel
by subpoena the attendance of the witness who, as in this case, resides hundreds of miles
away from the place of trial."|||

Holding

Yes. It was argued that under the Rules of Court, a witness is not bound to attend a
hearing if held outside the province he resides unless the distance be less than 50
kilometers from his residence to the place of trial. Such contention did not command the
assent of this Court. Thus: "It is loathe to clip what undoubtedly is the inherent power of the
Court to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein. Section 9 of
Rule 23 is thus interpreted to apply solely to civil cases. A recognition of such power in a
court of first instance conducting the trial of an accused may be gleaned from principle that
justifies it when satisfied 'by proof or oath, that there is reason to believe that a material
witness for the prosecution will not appear and testify when required,' to order that he 'give
bail in sum as may deem proper for such appearance. Upon refusal to give bail, the court
must commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged.
|||
95. Genorga v. Quintain

Adm. Matter No. 981-CFI (78 SCRA 94), 29 July 1977

Facts of the Case

Dr Gil Genorga, the former municipal health officer of Masbate had a warrant of arrest
against him as he did not appear as medico-legal witness in a pending murder case.
Accused says that he sent a letter to respondent judge asking if he would be reimbursed but
got nor reply. Thus, he suffered humiliation from being arrested.

Procedural History

He filed an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a
judge.against Judge Quintain..

Statement of the Issue

Whether a court of first instance hearing a criminal case may compel by subpoena the
attendance of a witness in his sala. ||.

Holding

It was argued that under the Rules of Court, a witness is not bound to attend a hearing if
held outside the province he resides unless the distance be less than 50 kilometers from his
residence to the place of trial. Such contention did not command the assent of this Court. It
would follow then that respondent Judge should decide said motion without taking into
consideration Section 9 of Rule 23. What was done by Judge Quitain was, therefore, within
his discretion.|||
96. Luz v. National Amnesty Commission

GR No. 159708, 24 September 2004

Facts of the Case

The petitioner was charged with violation of illegal possession of firearms in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
|

Procedural History

On March 22, 2000, the petitioner filed an application for amnesty with the Local
Amnesty Board for Metro Manila. In due course, the board denied the said application.
Under Administrative Order No. 2, the petitioner had until December 7, 2002, a Saturday,
within which to file a petition for review of the said resolution with the Court of Appeals. On
December 9, 2002, the petitioner filed a motion in the appellate court for an extension of
fifteen (15) days from December 9, 2002, or until December 24, 2002 within which to file his
petition. The petitioner alleged therein that he had just engaged the services of counsel who
needed additional time to study the case and draft the petition.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the petitioner timely filed his second motion for extension of time to file his
petition for review|.|

Holding

YES.
The Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare
that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of “the last day of the period” so that when a
party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the last
day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the
required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
The extension granted by the Court of Appeals should be tacked to the original
period and commences immediately after the expiration of such period. Under the
Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, the CA has no discretion to reckon the
commencement of the extension it granted from a date later than the expiration of such
period, regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.
97. Neypes v. CA

GR No. 141524, 14 September 2005

Facts of the Case

An action for annulment of judgement and titles of land were filed before the RTC of Oriental
Mindoro against the Bureau of Forest Development. In the course of the proceedings, the
parties filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by
petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest
Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the
Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
|||

Procedural History

The trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved
that the petitioners' motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against
the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them
was improper.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the aggrieved party is given a fresh reglementary period of 15 days to file an
appeal counted from the receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial.

Holding

Yes.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court.

The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full
or partial) or any final order or resolution. The Court thus hold that petitioners seasonably
filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998, the
date of the receipt of Motion for Reconsideration.
99. Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos

GR No. 152643, 28 August 2008

Facts of the Case

Respondents were charged with Estafa through Falsification of public document. The
Criminal case arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly
committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the
mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.
Hence, the criminal case. Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings
in Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question. The RTC granted the aforesaid
motion. Concepcion's motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2000.
|||

Procedural History
Concepcion instituted a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of RTC orders. The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter's
deposition. RTC granted the motion. The respondents' motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural
technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation, since
Concepcion was already of advanced age. After several motions for change of venue of
the deposition-taking, Concepcion's deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her
residence.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies to the Deposition of
Petitioner.

Holding

NO. In criminal cases, the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It
also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they
deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said
witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses' demeanor. As
exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In the case at bench, in
issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was
too sick to travel and appear before the trial court.
100. AM No. 15-06-10-SC, RE: Adopting the Guidelines for Continuous Trial of
Criminal Cases in Pilot Courts, 30 June 2015.

101. Lee v. Romillo, Jr.,

GR No. L-60937, 28 May 1988.

Facts of the Case

Private respondent filed a complaint for accounting with damages. There was a contract for
arrastre services in Manila between respondent and William Lines. In the year 1973, plaintiff
Mendioro conducted arrastre operations as per arrastre contract with William Lines, Inc, that
all the income from the arrastre operations during the said period were received and held in
trust for Mendioro by defendants Lee, Tan and Chiongbian who were also tasked with the
disbursement of the said income for operational expenses. Defendants Lee, Tan and
Chiongbian were duty-bound to turn over to plaintiff Mendioro the income they held in trust
for him; and they failed to do so despite Mendioro's repeated demands.|||

Procedural History

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion was denied. The trial court
granted the motion to include .At the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, the parties filed a
partial stipulation of facts.During the hearing on where the counsel for the petitioners failed
to show up, Mendioro was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. An amended order of the
trial court granted the petitioners an opportunity to adduce their evidence. Lengthy trials
were conducted and The Trial Court decided against the Petitioners.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the delegation of the reception of the evidence ex-parte to the lower court's
legal researcher is illegal.|||

Holding

In the case of The National Housing Authority v.Court of Appeals, the Court categorically
stated that: "The contention that the Trial Court cannot delegate the reception of evidence
to its Clerk of Court, citing the case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete is not well taken. Suffice it to
say, for purposes of this suit, that the said case referred to reception of evidence by a
Clerk of Court after declaration of defendant's default. No default is involved herein. As
held in the case of Laluan v. Manalo, no provision of law or principle of public policy
prohibits a Court from authorizing its Clerk of Court to receive the evidence of a party
litigant.||
102. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Sandoval

GR No. 169677, 18 February 2013

Facts of the Case

A complaint was filed against the Marcoses for ill-gotten wealth. Later, the Republic moved
for the amendment of the complaint to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. This
was granted.
|||

Procedural History

When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the original
defendants in Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank.
Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion until it was first given the
opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary evidence the Republic had
already presented against the original defendants. In its reply to Asian Bank's comment, the
Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper.
Statement of the Issue

Whether or not holding of a separate trial would deny Metro bank due process, because
Asian Bank was entitled to contest the evidence of the Republic against the original
defendants prior to Asian Bank's inclusion as an additional defendant.|||

Holding

The Trial Court held the Separate Trials to be improper. The Court held that
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to
Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and
separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered
away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time,
unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally
lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts." Exceptions to
the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting
separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the
issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or
when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues
will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

|||
 103. Casent Realty Development Corp. v. Philbanking Corp., GR No. 150731,
14 September 2007.

Facts of the Case:

Two promissory notes were issued by petitioner to Rare reality, which were assigned to
respondent by a Deed of Assignment. Petitioner did not pay, despite demand.

Procedural History:

A complaint before the Makati City RTC was filed by respondent. The parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial conference. The respondent
presented its evidence and exhibits. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Judgment on
Demurrer to the Evidence, claiming that the plaintiff’s failure to file a Reply to the
Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an
admission of the genuiness and execution of said documents. Trial court ruled in
favor of the petitioner. Appellate court ruled that the trial court erred when it
considered the Answer.

Statement of Issue:

Did CA err in excluding the petitioner’s affirmative defenses in its answer in resolving
a demurrer to evidence.

Held:

Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: “the defendant may move
for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which
pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to
sue. The “facts” referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by
the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. Petitioner, by way
of defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the
promissory notes.
 104. Uy v. Chua, GR No. 183965, 18 September 2009.

Facts of the Case:

Respondent had an illegal relationship with Irene and sired two children. The birth
certificates of the children were filed out with the names or Irene’s father and her
mother’s maiden name. Respondent financially supported petitioner

Procedural History:

Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
filiation. Hearings then ensued, petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove
her claim of illegitimate filiation wherein the respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence
on the ground that the Decision in Spec. Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, a prior
proceeding where petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a
decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent which a Compromise Agreement
was filed by the parties, had already been barred by res judicata. The trial court
allowed respondent’s Demurrer and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Statement of Issue:

Was the trial court correct in granting the demurrer to evidence?

Held:

Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 provides that:
“After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move
for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.” Demurrer is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either
grant or deny. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 should not apply herein and
respondent should still be allowed to present evidence before the RTC for Special
Proceedings No. 12562-CEB. Thus, it was incumbent upon RTC to make the determination.
It did not take into consideration any of the evidence presented by petitioner.
 105. Wood Technology Corp. v. Equitable Bank, GR No. 153867, 17
February 2005.

Facts of the Case:

WTC got a loan from respondent, signed by Cordova and Young, which bound
themselves as surities. When demand was made by respondent, petitioners did not
pay. They claim that only one demand letter was made. Plus, the loan had not
matured yet, as the maturity date was blank.

Procedural History:

A complaint for sum of money was then filed. Petitioners prayed for the reformation
of the promissory note and surety agreement while the respondent moved for a
judgment on the pleadings wherein the RTC rendered judgment against the
petitioners. Petitioner appealed but the CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not the appellate court made a mistake when it allowed RTCs judgement
on the pleadings

Held:

“In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all
because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other
hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist.”
The judgment rendered by the trial court is valid as a summary judgment. A
judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party’s pleadings. We agree
with both the trial and the appellate courts that this matter proferred as a defense
could be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the stipulations in the promissory note
which was already before the trial court.
 106. Municipality of Tiwi v. Betito, GR No. 171873, 9 July 2010.

Facts of the Case:

The NPC was found liable for unpaid real estate taxes. This included geothermal
plants in the Municipality of Tiwi with substations in Albay (which were sold in an
auction sale). In the sale, the Municipality obtained ownership over the properties.
An agreement was entered into between BPC and Albay where NPC agreed to settle
it’s tax liabilities.The mayor requested to remit the rightful tax share of Tiwi and its
barangays. The governor stated that the request cannot be granted. So NPC
requested clarification from the OP.

Procedural History:

Respondent filed a motion for partial judgement on the pleadings. Trial court
rendered such, as petitioners answer to the complaint did not tender an issue. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Statement of Issue:

If the application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment
is baseless, improper and unwarranted

Held:

a review of the records reveal that respondent and petitioners set-up multiple levels of claims
and defenses, respectively with some failing to tender an issue while others requiring the
presentation of evidence for resolution. A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the
truth of all material and relevant allegations of the opposing party. The judgment must rest
on those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted in the
pleadings. It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegation of the adverse party’s pleading. If it appears that not all the material
allegations of the complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them were either
denied or disputed, then the defendant has set up certain special defenses. Those, if proven,
would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff's main cause of action, judgment on the pleadings
cannot be rendered.
 107. Tan v. Dela Vega, GR No. 168809, 10 March 2006.

Facts of the Case:

A complaint for quieting of title and the declaration of nullity of free patent was filed
by respondents against the heirs of Mencias and the Secretary of DENR. Petitioner
was later impleaded as purchasers of the disputed lot in Rizal.

Procedural History:

For faliure to file their answer petitioners were declared in default. Respondents filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings which was granted by the trial court. Hence, the titles
derived or issued on the basis of said Free Patent are void because the Public Land Act
applies only to public lands and not private lands. On the theory that the spring cannot rise
higher that its sources, the trial court concluded that petitioners cannot be purchases in good
faith considering that their title was derived from Macario who acquired the property by virtue
of a void title. It further ruled that petitioners' defense of good faith must fail because they
were forewarned of the notice indicating that the questioned lot is inside. Petitioners
appealed to the CA which affirmed the assailed order of the trial court. They filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied in a resolution. Hence, this petition.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not a judgment on the pleadings is proper in the instant case.

Held:

In the case at bar, we find that the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the
pleadings because the pleadings filed by the parties generated ostensible issues that
necessitate the presentation of evidence in order to determine the validity of the titles
from which the respondent’s title was derived. In a proper case for judgment on the
pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending
party’s answer to raise an issue.
 108. Adolfo v. Adolfo, GR No. 201427, 18 March 2015.

Facts of the Case:

A petitioner for judicial separation of property was filed in the RTC by Adolfo against
his wife. Allegedly, the parties were married and they had one child. The acquired a
lot in Mandaue during marriage. The parties then separated because of
irreconcilable differences. Petitioner then suggested separation of conjugal property,
but respondent refused. Respondent contended that she is the sole owner of the subject
property which she inherited from her mother; that petitioner is a lazy bum, gambler,
drunkard, wife abuser, and neglectful father; that respondent found all means to support the
family. She caused to be built on a portion of her mother's land a house even while petitioner
was bumming around; that one day, petitioner destroyed the roof of the house that was then
being built; that petitioner subsequently abandoned her and their child in 1968, and
transferred to Davao City where he took a mistress and begot four children by her.

Procedural History:

The trial court rendered in its decision that the subject property constituted conjugal property.
An appeal was filed with the CA. meanwhile, during the pre-trial conference, petitioner filed a
Request for Admission of 1) the genuineness of the duly marked certified true copies of the
Complaint, Answer; 2) respondent's declaration in said Answer that the subject property
constituted conjugal property of the marriage; and 3) the trial court's pronouncement in said
case that the subject property forms part of the conjugal estate. A Motion for Judgment
Based on the Pleadings was filed, stating that since respondent failed to answer his request
for admission, the matters contained in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule
26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules); that as a consequence of
the application of the rule, respondent is in effect considered to have admitted that the
subject property is a conjugal asset of their subsisting marriage . Branch 55 issued an Order
granting petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings. It held that plaintiff is entitled to
the relief demanded. The CA rendered its decision, which reversed the Decision of the trial
court and declared that, among others, that the subject property was respondent’s
paraphernal property.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in deciding the case on a question of substance not in
accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable jurisprudence.

Held:

Instead of resolving petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court should
have denied it or held it in abeyance. Judgment on the pleadings is proper "where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading." Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted "if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." If the answer does in fact specifically deny the
material averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses, a judgment on the
pleadings would naturally be improper. In a case for judgment on the pleadings, the Answer
is such that no issue is raised at all. The essential question in such a case is whether there
are issues generated by the pleadings. The trial court however disregarded the fact that its
decision was then the subject of a pending appeal. One of the issues raised in the appeal is
precisely whether the subject property is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the respondent.
 109. Calubaquib v. Republic, GR No. 170658, 22 June 2011.

Facts of the Case:

A landholding in Cagayan was declared by President Manuel L Quezon as a military

reservation site, under Proclamation No. 80. It is subject to private rights, if any there be.
Supposedly, petitioners unlawfully entered the military reservation and demands were made
for them to leave. Petitioners claim that the land is theirs.

Procedural History:

Respondent filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan a complaint for recovery of
possession against petitioners. Without any trial, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing petitioners' claim of possession of the subject property in the concept of owner.
The trial court held that while Proclamation No. 80 recognized and respected the existence
of private rights on the military reservation, petitioners' position could "not be sustained, as
there was no right of [petitioners] to speak of that was recognized by the government." The
CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not a propriety of rendering a summary judgment is proper in this case.

Held:

The guidelines for summary judgement was ignored by the trial court. Summary judgment is
proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer
filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. For this case, the trial court proceeded to
render summary judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion therefor it was improper
for the trial court to have persisted in rendering summary judgment.
 110. YKR Corp. v. Philippine Agri-Business Center Corp., GR No. 191838, 20
October 2014.

Facts of the Case:

Yulo died. After his death, his late wife Teresa J Yulo and their six children became
substitutes. His wife then died. The petitioners have three other siblings who claim
that they "have gone their own separate way[s] when Luis A. Yulo died. [p]etitioners have
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief if their siblings are aware of the
proceedings in (Sandiganbayan), including respondent's move for a summary judgment and
the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan."

Procedural History:

Respondent PABC, a domestic corporation, is a plaintiff-in-intervention which sought, among

others, that the Sandiganbayan call it as the true and lawful owner of a real property known
as the "Yulo King Ranch" located in Busuanga, Palawan, and order petitioner Republic of
the Philippines (Republic) to lift the sequestration and return possession of the subject
property to said respondent. The Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolutions in its favor.
Petitioners YKR Corporation and then seven out of the ten Yulo heirs responded to the
Request for Admissions by making no categorical admission or denial of the matters set
forth in the Request for Admissions allegedly because all the records of YKR
Corporation have been taken by the PCGG when they were sequestered. Court held that
the matters requested for admission “ought to be within the “personal knowledge” of YKR
Corporation and seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in law when it granted the respondent’s
motion for summary judgment even if the same is not supported by deposition,
affidavit or admission on the records.

Held:

A prudent examination of the evidence on record yields to no other conclusion that there
exists a genuine issue of fact as raised in both petitions. In ruling on the issue of whether a
genuine issue of fact exists, there was no mention of any circumstance or situation upon
which the court a quo derived its conclusion that the matters requested for admission "ought
to be within the personal knowledge" of YKR Corporation and seven out of the ten Yulo
Heirs. We cannot thus properly ascertain whether the facts which the latter could not make
any truthful admission or denial are so plainly and necessarily within their knowledge.
 111. Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corp., GR No. 197582, 29 June 2015.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner issued Philippine Business Bank Checks as payment for her loan.
However, the checks were dishonored having been drawn against a closed account.

Procedural History:

MeTC found petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of the six rubber checks.
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This was
denied being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the
denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules. The RTC dismissed petition of certiorari and its motion for reconsideration,
ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the Notice of
Appeal filedl by petitioner. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision, which is already final and
executory, may still be modified.

Held:

Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final and executory after
petitioner failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and
immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses
its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Nonetheless, the Court has the power and
prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when
justice requires it. Substantial justice dictates that the penalty meted on the petitioner be
accordingly corrected within the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22.
 112. Delfino v. Anasao, GR No. 197486, 10 September 2014.

Facts of the Case:

Delfino owned several parcels of agricultural land in Laguna. He sold some coconut
land, leaving him with rice land. The tenanted portion was tilled by respondents, and
placed under Operation land transfer.

Procedural History:

Delfino filed an Application for Retention. What was issued was an order denying the
retention of the 9.8597 has but granting the 4.8120 has which was not covered by OLT.
Delfino appealed to the DAR Secretary Respondents appealed to the OP but later withdrew
the appeal and instead filed a petition for review in the CA. CA reversed the OP's ruling and
reinstated the Orders of Secretary Pangandaman. DAR Secretary is not precluded from
making the necessary amendments/clarifications thereof so that the fallo would at least
conform with the body of said order and so that the same could readily be executed with
dispatch.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not the Order of Secretary Pangandaman violated the rule on

immutability of final judgments.

Held:

The doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments is grounded on fundamental

considerations of public policy and sound practice to the effect that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. There
are exceptions to the general rule, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable. The clarification made by Secretary Pangandaman falls under the
fourth exception.
 113. Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista, GR No. 168406, 14 January 2015.

Facts of the Case:

The employees of Club Filipino Inc were represented by a union, CLUFEA. There
were bargaining agreements between the two, and CLUFEA made several demands
for a new agreement, which was denied. CLUFEA filed before the NCMB a request for
preventive mediation. The meeting ended with the parties' respective panels declaring a
deadlock in negotiation. CLUFEA filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike on the ground of
bargaining deadlock. CLUFEA conducted a strike vote under the Department of Labor and
Employment's supervision with the majority of CLUFEA's total union membership voting to
strike. CLUFEA staged a strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock.

Procedural History:

Club Filipino, Inc. filed before the NLRC a Petition to Declare CLUFEA's Strike illegal. Labor
Arbiter declared CLUFEA's strike "procedurally infirm for CLUFEA's failure to comply with
the procedural requirements for staging a strike. The Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal
and considered "all the officers of the union . . . terminated from service." CLUFEA appealed
the Labor Arbiter's Decision before the NLRC and ruled that CLUFEA's Appeal was filed by
persons "[having] no legal standing to question the [Labor Arbiter's] decision."

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not Club Filipino, Inc.’s filing of the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prevented the Resolution from becoming final and executory.

Held:

As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for Reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution is prohibited as provided by Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioner’s Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration is in the nature of a second Motion for
Reconsideration. For this court to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, the second
Motions must present "extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first
obtained." Once leave to file is granted, the second Motion for Reconsideration is no longer
prohibited This case falls under the exception, . In the present case, this court granted leave
to petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in the
Resolution. The Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, therefore, is no longer prohibited.
 114. NTC v. Aplhaomega Integrated Corp., GR No. 184295, 30 July 2014.

Facts of the Case:

Public biddings were conducted by TRANSCO. AIC was licensed transmission line
contractor, and was part of the biddings. They were awarded 6 government
construction projects. However, they encountered difficulties and incurred losses
because TRANSCO breached contract, so they gave up the projects to TRANSCO.
AIC, a duly licensed transmission line contractor, participated in the public biddings
conducted by TRANSCO and was awarded six (6) government construction projects and
encountered difficulties and incurred losses allegedly due to TRANSCO's breach of their
contracts, prompting it to surrender the projects to TRANSCO under protest. Charged
against TRANSCO: breached the contracts by its failure to: (a) furnish the required Detailed
Engineering; (b) arrange a well-established right-of-way to the project areas; (c) secure the
necessary permits and clearances from the concerned local government units (LGUs); (d)
ensure a continuous supply of construction materials; and (e) carry out AIC's requests for
power shut down.

Procedural History:

AIC submitted a request for arbitration before the CIAC. Amended Complaint against
TRANSCO CIAC Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Final Award was filed. CA affirmed the
Arbitral Tribunal's factual findings that TRANSCO failed to exercise due diligence in
resolving the problems regarding the right-of-way and the lack of materials before
undertaking the bidding process and entering into the contracts with AIC.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal's findings that AIC was
entitled to its claims for damages as a result of project delays.

Held:

The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal on the
matter of AIC's entitlement to damages which the CA affirmed as being well supported by
evidence and properly referred to in the record. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
provides that a petition for review on certiorari under the said rule, as in this case, "shall
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.” It is well-settled that findings of
fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality,
especially when affirmed by the CA. The CIAC possesses that required expertise in the field
of construction arbitration and the factual findings of its construction arbitrators are final and
conclusive, not reviewable by this Court on appeal. Indeed, the rule is well entrenched:
Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was
specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.
 115. DBP v. Guarina Agricultural and Realty Development Corp., GR No.
160758, 15 January 2014.

Facts of the Case:

DBP gave a loan to GC to finance the development of its resort complex in Iloilo, so
GC executed a promissory note and real estate mortgage over several real
properties as security, plus a chattel mortgage. The loan was released in several
installments. GC used to proceeds to defray costs of improvements, and demanded
balance on the loan but DBP refused. DBP paid some supplies of GC without it’s
approval. It was found by DBP that GC had not completed the construction works, so
DBP demanded that GC expedite the completion of the project. Not happy with the
non-action, DBP initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. A notice of
foreclosure sale was sent to GC, which was published leading the clients and
patrons of GC to think that the resort had closed.

Procedural History:

GC brought the case in the RTC to demand specific performance and to stop the
foreclosure of the mortgages. DBP moved for the dismissal of the complaint. GC
amended the complaint to seek the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings. DBP
filed its answer and trial followed upon the termination of the pre-trial without any
agreement being reached by the parties. In the meantime, DBP applied for the
issuance of a writ of possession by the RTC. Aggrieved, GC assailed the granting of
the application before the CA on certiorair. After the CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari, DBP sought the implementation of the order for the issuance of the writ of
possession. RTC issued the writ of possession and rendered its judgment.The CA
sustained the RTC’s judgment. DBP timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
CA denied its motion. Hence, this appeal by DBP.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not the Decision of the CA and its resolution denying petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration were issued in accordance with law.

Held:

DBP's actuations were legally unfounded. It is true that loans are often secured by a
mortgage constituted on real or personal property to protect the creditor's interest in case of
the default of the debtor. In other words, GC would not incur in delay before DBP fully
performed its reciprocal obligation. Considering that it had yet to release the entire proceeds
of the loan, DBP could not yet make an effective demand for payment upon GC to perform
its obligation under the loan. Hence, GC would not be in default without the demand. Under
the circumstances, DBP's foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the mortgaged
properties at its instance were premature, and, therefore, void and ineffectual.
 116. Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation, GR No. 198423, 23 October
2012.

Facts of the Case:

Gonzales employment was terminated by his employer, respondent. However, the
LA held that it was an illegal dismissal. So Gonzales filed a motion for execution of
reinstatement. Solid reinstated Gonzales in the payroll. But the NLRC modified the
decision be reduing the amount of damages.

Procedural history

Solid Cement filed a petition for review which was denied by the Court of Appeals. Thus, the
judgement became final and entry of judgement was recorded .

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration is allowed.

Held:

As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the

Rules of Court, and this reason alone is sufficient basis for us to dismiss the present
second motion for reconsideration. The ruling in the original case, as affirmed by the
Court, has been expressly declared final. The immutability principle, rather than
being absolute, is subject to well-settled exceptions, among which is its
inapplicability when a decision claimed to be final is not only erroneous, but null and
void. The matter before us — in the Rule 45 petition questioning the CA's Rule 65
determination — is the scope of the benefits awarded by the LA, as modified on
appeal and ultimately affirmed by this Court, which ruling has become final and
which now must be implemented as a matter of law. Given these considerations, to
reopen this case on second motion for reconsideration would not actually embroil the
Court with changes in the decision on the merits of the case, but would confine itself
solely to the issue of the CA's actions in the course of determining lack or excess of
jurisdiction or the presence of grave abuse of discretion in reviewing the NLRC's
ruling on the execution aspect of the case. Additionally, while continued
consideration of a case on second motion for reconsideration very strongly remains
an exception, our action in doing so in this case is not without sound legal
justification. An order of execution that varies the tenor of a final and executory
judgment is null and void. This was what the CA effectively did — it varied the final
and executory judgment of the LA, as modified on appeal and ultimately affirmed by
the Court.
 117. Tadeja v. People, GR No. 145336, 20 February 2013.

Facts of the Case:

Ruben Bernardo had died, and the witness. Elena and Jacinta, were watching a
public dance during a fiesta. There they saw Ruben being hacked to death by
petitioners. Petitioners claim that Ruben and his son went to the barangay in a
drunken state and was waving a knife and cursing at the crowd.

Procedural History:

An Information for homicide for the death of Ruben was filed against petitioners. The RTC
acquitted Russel and Robenson except for Plaridel who absconded, all the other accused
appealed to the CA. The CA issued a Decision in affirming the findings and Decision of the
RTC. This Court issued a decision affirming the Resolution of the CA and denied the
reconsideration. Petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Motion with leave of Court to
Vacate Judgment Due to Supervening Event alleging that the police force finally arrested
Plaridel. The Court treated the motion as a second motion for reconsideration and denied it
with finality on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading. Ferdinand prayed for the
reopening of the case on the basis of the confession of Plaridel.

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not to grant the petitioner’s motion to reopen the case for reception of
further evidence in the trial court.

Held:

Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if
admitted. The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the
term "newly discovered." The confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He
participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. It
was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he
absconded.
 118. SJS Officers v. Lim, GR No. 187836, 10 March 2015.

Facts of the Case:

A comprehensive plan and relocation plan was submitted to the RTC of Manila by
Chevron, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum, and Petron.The presiding judge would monitor
the strict enforcement of the decision.

Procedural History:

Now before us are the following submissions of the intervenor oil companies, to wit:
(1) Motion for Reconsideration[4] of the Decision dated 25 November 2014 filed by
intervenor Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell); (2) Motion for
Clarification[5] filed by intervenor Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron); and (3)
Manifestation of Understanding of the Dispositive Portion of the Decision of 15
December 2014[6] (the correct date of promulgation is 25 November 2014) filed by
intervenor Petron Corporation (Petron).

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not there is interference or encroachment with the policy making powers
of the political departments of the government.

Held:

The allegation of encroachment on the policy making power of the political departments of
the government is bereft of merit. The prayer that the submission of an updated
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, including the period for relocation, be deferred
until after the Motion is resolved with finality is denied. The compliance period prescribed in
the Decision shall remain. These cases being a mere sequel to the earlier petition, we so
hold that the relocation and transfer contemplated therein include the removal of the facilities,
especially so when the city plans on building commercial establishments to replace the
Pandacan terminals and provide a source of employment for displaced employees.
Accordingly, the comprehensive plan to be submitted within forty-five (45) days from receipt
of the Decision shall also include the removal of the facilities. On the matter of the
enforcement of the assailed Decision in these cases, Petron further posits that its first theory,
that is, that the removal of the facilities is excluded from the comprehensive plan to be
submitted to the Regional Trial Court, would be in accord with its "Manifestation". The denial
of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon have been found, upon
due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a
modification of the judgment or final order. It means not only that the grounds relied upon are
lacking in merit but also that any other, not so raised, is deemed waived and may no longer
be set up in a subsequent motion or application to overturn the judgment; and this is true,
whatever may be the title given to such motion or application, whether it be "second motion
for reconsideration" or "motion for clarification" or "plea for due process" or "prayer for a
second look," or "motion to defer, or set aside, entry of judgment," or . . ., etc . This
Resolution is final. Under pain of contempt, no further pleadings, motions or papers in the
guise of the above-enumerated submissions shall, thus, be entertained in these cases.
119. ABUBAKAR A. ADFAL and FATIMA A. ADFAL vs. ROMEO CARLOS
G.R. No. 173379
Facts of the Case
A complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners Gulbajar and Joh Does was filed by
Carlos. It was alleged that they were occupying a parcel of land in respondents name, and
that respondents had allowed them to stay there by mere tolerance. It was claimed that
petitioner sold the property to respondents but allowed petitioners to stay in the property. So
respondent demanded that petitioners turn over the property to him, as he needed such for
his personal use. There were several attempts to serve summons and complaint on
petitioners, but they still failed to answer.

Procedural History

The MTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners then filed the petition for relief before the
RTC, which the court dismissed. It ruled that the same should have been filed before the
MTC in accordance with Sec 1 of Rule 38 which provides that a petition for relief should be
filed "in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be
set aside."

Statement of the Issue

Whether the RTC erred in dismissing their petition for relief from judgment.

Holding

A petition for relief from judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, as in the
present case, is a prohibited pleading. The legal justification is that Section 13(4) of Rule 70
of the Rules of Court provides petitions for relief from judgment are prohibited. The same is
also provided in the Rules of Summary Procedure. The reason for this is to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that when a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside. A petition for relief from judgment, if allowed by the Rules and not a prohibited
pleading, should be filed with and resolved by the court in the same case from which the
petition arose.
120. CITY OF DAGUPAN vs. ESTER F. MARAMBA

G. R. No. 174411

Facts of the Case

The City of Dagpuan caused the demolition of a commercial fish center, without giveing
notice to Maramba. There was also included a threat of taking over the property. This made
Maramba file a complaint for injunction with damages and a restraining order. According to
Maramba, the demolition was unlawful and that the "complete demolition and destruction of
the previously existing commercial fish center of plaintiff is valued at Five Million
(₱10,000,000.00) pesos." The word, "ten," was handwritten on top of the word, "five."
Maramba asked for a judgment "ordering defendant corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of
Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos for the actual and present value of the commercial fish
center completely demolished by public defendant." The word, "million," was handwritten on
top of the word, "thousand," and an additional zero was handwritten at the end of the
numerical figure. The handwritten intercalation was notexplained in any part of the records
and in the proceedings.

Procedural History

The RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff. A petition for relief with prayer for preliminary injunction
was filed. The court denied the petition for relief. However, acting through another judge, it
granted such and modified its earlier decision, reducing the amount to P75k, the amount
representing that which the plaintiff proved. Maramba filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
which the court granted, ruling that the city’s motion for reconsideration lacked notice and
hearing and did not toll the period to appeal. Petitioner city argues that its petition for relief
was filed on time.

Statement of the Issue

Whether the lack of notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration is excusable negligence
that allows the filing of a petition for relief of judgment.

Holding

This Court has indeed held time and time again that, under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered
defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of
hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal
or the filing of the requisite pleading. As an integral component of procedural due process,
the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant.
Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the
adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion
before a resolution by the court. The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as
well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds
upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that
the requirements of procedural due process were substantially complied with, and that the
compliance justified a departure from a literal application of the rule on notice of hearing.
This court held that "when the adverse party has actually had the opportunity to be heard,
and has indeed been heard through pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose
behind the rule is deemed duly served.”
121. ATTY. RICO PAOLO R. QUICHO, representing BANK OF COMMERCE vs.
BIENVENIDO S. REYES, JR., Sheriff IV, Branch 98, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
A. M. No. P-14-3246

Facts of the Case

Petitioner alleged that the procedure observed by Reyes in implementing the alias writ
violated the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court. He cited the manual: "if the judgment
obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of
payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the
judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value
and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose
which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment." He
states that as the holder of the assets and properties of Traders Royal Bank (TRB), BOC
was given the option to choose which property to be surrendered to satisfy the judgment. It
was only when BOC was unable to exercise the option that Reyes could levy on other
properties. BOC was forced to surrender under protest a real estate property to satisfy the
judgment and preserve its other properties from being wrongfully levied by Reyes. It was
argued that Reyes did not give BOC a chance to exercise that option. What happened was
that Reyes blow-torched the locked grill door of BOC’s cash vault and forcibly took the
money deposits of its clients as well as its computers. Reyes sowed terror by bringing with
him agents of the NBI who were in full-battle gear and carrying high-powered firearms. Atty.
Quicho concluded that these illegal acts of Reyes warranted his relief as sheriff of the RTC.
Reyes denied the charges against him. According to him, he did not violate any law when he
refused to accept BOC’s offer of a property located in Paranaque City to satisfy the judgment
debt. Atty. Quicho refuted Reyes’ argument that BOC was not entitled to exercise the option
to choose the properties to be levied; he explained that under Section 9, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, it was clear that if the judgment obligor could not pay the judgment debt in
cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment oblige, he
still had the option to choose which of his properties he could offer to satisfy the obligation.

Procedural History

The OCA found sufficient grounds to hold Reyes administratively liable for his
overzealousness in implementing the alias writ of execution. The OCA opined that when
BOC offered its real estate properties in Paranaque to answer for the judgment debt, a legal
issue arose as to whether the offer was acceptable under the law. Thus, according to OCA,
Reyes should have brought the matter to the attention of the Court, instead of resolving it
himself. The OCA recommended that the case be redocketed as a regular administrative
matter against Reyes, and that he be found guilty of Grave Abuse of Authority and fined.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not Reyes gravely abused his authority relative to the implementation of the writ
of execution

Holding

Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure as to how execution of
judgments for money is enforced. The duties of a sheriff are: (1) to first make a demand from
the obligor for the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and of
all lawful fees; (2) to receive payment in the form of cash, certified bank check payable to the
obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter; (3) to levy upon the properties
of the obligor, not exempt from execution, if the latter cannot pay all or part of the obligation;
(4) give the obligor the opportunity to exercise the option to choose which property may be
levied upon; (5) in case the option is not exercised, to first levy on the personal properties of
the obligor, including the garnishment of debts due the obligor and other credits, i.e., bank
deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other personal properties not
capable of manual delivery or in the possession or control of third parties; and (6) to levy on
real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
From the aforecited provisions, it is clear that the sheriff shall demand from the judgment
obligor the immediate payment in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods
immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which of his property can be
levied upon.
122. HEIRS OF CRISTETA DE LA ROSA vs. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS et al.
H. R. No. 147939

Facts of the Case

There was a previous case, wherein petitioners were said to illegally enter a parcel of land in
Rizal, and they were held to vacate the premises and pay damages.

Procedural History

A notice of appeal to the RTC of Morong, Rizal was filed. Private respondents filed a Motion
for Dismissal. Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Dismissal of Appeal. The RTC
issued an order dismissing the case for failure of the petitioners to file the required
memorandum. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, questioning the
jurisdiction of the respondent judge to hear and try the case. The CA denied the petition and
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The court decreed that failure to comply with
Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court is not jurisdictional.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petitioners' Petition and Motion for
Reconsideration based on its erroneous interpretation of Section[s] 6 and 7 of Rule 40 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Holding

Section 9, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, states, in part, that a party's appeal by
notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due
time. The RTC acting as an appellate court acquired jurisdiction over the case of the
petitioners upon their filing of the notice of appeal on October 5, 1998. The filing of the notice
of appeal in due time and the payment of the appropriate fees by the petitioners perfected
their appeal in the RTC. As a necessary consequence thereof, the MTC was divested of
jurisdiction over their case. From the filing of the written notice of appeal, petitioners' appeal
was perfected without need of any further act, and, consequently, the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the subject of the case. The alleged
failure of the clerks of court to furnish petitioners copies of the letter of transmittal and Notice
of Appealed Case that resulted in their inability to file their memorandum on time can no
longer be reviewed by this Court.
123. VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION vs. NIEVES AMIGO
G. R. No. 169793

Facts of the Case

Two lots in Isabela covered by TCTs were registered under the name of Encarnacion. The
lots formed part of a single track of land owned by Valiente. But Valiente sold the same to
Mallapitan, who sold it to Magpantay. Magpantay died, and his widow executed an affidavit
of waiver. In this waiver, she waived her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law,
Encarnacion. Respondent allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion
without the permission of Magpantay. Despite demands, respondent did not vacate.

Procedural History

Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining
order with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Isabela. The MTC ruled that respondent
vacate the premises and pay damages. On appeal, the RTC ruled that the case be
dismissed on the ground that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA, which
remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

Statement of the Issue

Was accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer proper

Holding

In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property
are a.) Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, which is a summary action for recovery of physical possession
where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in
the proper inferior court b.) Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the
real right of possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court, and
c.) Accion reinvindicatoria, which is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be
brought in the proper Regional Trial Court. After a careful evaluation of the evidence on
record of this case, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
holding that the proper action in this case is accion publiciana; and in ordering the remand of
the case to the RTC for further proceedings. The length of time that the petitioner was
dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion
interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year
period, the suit must be commenced in the Regional Trial Court via an accion
publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess.
124. RODOLFO “RUDY” CANLAS et al vs. ILUMINADA TUBIL
H. R. No. 184285

Facts of the Case

Tubil together with her husband, claim that they are the owners of a lot. As proof, she says
that before the lot was titled, it was declared for tax purposes in her name. Respondents
erected a residential house on the land on which they are presently occupying.

Procedural History

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Tubil against petitioners before the MTC.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the MTC is without jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The MTC denied the respondents’ motion because the grounds relied upon
were evidentiary in nature which needed to be litigated. RTC affirmed. CA reversed.

Statement of the Issue

Which court (MTC or RTC) has jurisdiction over the matter?

Holding

The allegations in the complaint are what determines the nature of the action as well as the
court which has jurisdiction over the case. In the instant case, respondent’s allegations in the
complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction on the
MTC over the subject matter. She sent on January 12, 2004 a letter demanding that
petitioners vacate the property but they failed and refused to do so. The complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed on June 9, 2004, or within one year from the time the last
demand to vacate was made.
125. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NELIA S. SILVERIO-
DEE
G. R. No. 178933

Facts of the Case

An intestate proceeding was filed by Ricardo Silberio for the settlement of his deceased
wife’s estate. While the case was pending, petitioner filed a petition to remove the
adminstrator, Ricardo C Silvero sr. Ricardo Silberio Sr. filed an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of his deceased wife’s estate. During the pendancy of the case, petitioner Ricardo
Silberio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the
subject estate.

Procedural History

The RTC issued an Order granting the petitin. The RTC then issued an Omnibus Order
affirming its order and denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. The
Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property within 15 days
from receipt. Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC. Meanwhile, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal/ Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution against the appeal of Nelia
Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the
reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The RTC issued
an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary
period. CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided
by the Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in the Neypes
case

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the Omnibus orders are interlocutory orders which are not subject to appeal
under Sec. 1 of Rule 41

Holding

Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration. In all the above instances where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65. The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory
order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing
party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be
contested in a single appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final
judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.
The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an
interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter
resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial
court to do other than to execute the order.
126. SPOUSES ELBE LEBIN and ERLINDA LEBIN vs. VILMA S. MIRASOL
H. R. No. 164255

Facts of the Case

The administrator of the Estate of L.J. Hodges was relayed an offer by petitioners to
purchase an asset of the estate. A deposit of 20% of the offer was made. The administrator
stated that Erlinda Lebin was the actual occupant of Lot. 18. Atty. Tabares was
commissioned by the RTC to do an ocular inspection of Lot 18 to see if it was true. In the
report, it was confirmed, and the RTC granted the administrator’s motion for the approval of
the offer. Mirasol offered to purchase the lot, but then found out that her house was actually
standing on Lot 18. Mirasol then filed a petition for relief from the order. While the resolution
was pending, the petitioners made the last payment for installment, but the motion for
execution of the deed of sale was not acted upon by the RTC.

Procedural History
RTC ruled that there shall be equal partition of the subject lot. An appeal was filed. Mirasol
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss the appeal.
Hence, the petitioners appealed via petition for review on certiorari before this court.
Statement of the Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal for their failure to timely
file a record on appeal
Holding

The elimination of the record on appeal in most cases, retaining the record on appeal only
for appeals in special proceedings and in other cases in which the Rules of Court allows
multiple appeals was among the innovations introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 12. No
record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall
be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an
index of the contents thereof. The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals
within 15 days from notice of the judgment, and as already stated, shall point out the error of
fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to
be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken by merely filing a notice of appeal within 15 days
from notice of the judgment, except in special proceedings or cases where multiple appeals
are allowed in which event the period of appeal is 30 days and a record on appeal is
necessary. There is therefore no longer any common method of appeal in civil cases to the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
127. ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES vs. LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, and
ANTONIO J. HENSON
G.R. No. 159130

Facts of the Case

Ruby J Henson filed a petitioner to allow the will of her late mother with the RTC of Manila.
One of the deceased’s daughters, Lilia Henson-Cruz, opposed the petition of Ruby.
According to her, Ruby had understated the value of their late mother’s estate and acted
with unconscionable bad faith. Lilia asked that her mother’s holographic will be disallowed
and that she be appointed as the intestate administratrix. Lilia subsequently moved for the
appointment of an interim special administrator of the estate of her late mother. The trial
court then made petitioner Briones the special administrator of the estate. Atty Briones
submitted the special administrator’s final report, and prayed that he be paid a commission
of around 10m. The respondents opposed the approval of the final report. Respondents filed
an audit request with the trial court, which the court granted

Procedural History

The RTC ruled that it reiterates its designation of the accounting firm and suspends the
approval of the report of the special administrator. Respondents filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, which the trial court
denied. They then filed a Petition for Mandamus. The CA granted the respondent’s petition
for Mandamus, holding that the trial court had neither the power nor the authority to deny the
appeal on the ground of forum shopping. It pointed out that under Section 13, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the authority of the trial court to dismiss an
appeal, either motu proprio or on motion, may be exercised only if the appeal was taken out
of time or if the appellate court docket and other fees were not paid within the reglementary
period.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the respondent’s petition for mandamus

Holding

From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator's commission is no less a

claim against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the
Rules recognizes this when it provides for "Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an
Estate." Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the
Special Administrator's commission - effectively, a claim by the special administrator
against the estate - is the lower court's last word on the matter and one that is
appealable.
128. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. PRYCE GASES, INC. et al
G. R. No. 188365

Facts of the Case

Pryce Gases is a debtor of the IFC and the FMO. The IFC and the FMO filed a petitioner for
rehabilitation with the RTC of Makati as Pryce was unable to service it’s debts.

Procedural History

The RTC approved the rehabilitation plan. BFB filed a notice of appeal. PGI filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal. RTC dismissed BFB’s appeal, ruling that the law clearly states that in
special proceedings, record on appeal is required to perfect the appeal. BFB filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA, which the court dismissed. It ruled that corporate rehabilitations
are special proceedings and as such, appeals from the final order or decision therein should
be by record on appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Statement of the Issue

The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
sustaining the RTC decision in dismissing BFB’s appeal.

Holding

A petition for corporate rehabilitation is considered a special proceeding. Thus, the period of
appeal provided in paragraph 19(b) of the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 for special proceedings shall apply, that is, the period of appeal
shall be 30 days since a record of appeal is required. In this case, BFB filed a notice of
appeal on 3 November 2003, before the effectivity of the AM. Hence, at the time of filing of
BFB’s appeal, the applicable mode of appeal is Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that a party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as
to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon approval of the record on appeal filed
in due time. In this case, BFB did not perfect the appeal when it failed to file the record on
appeal. The filing of the notice of appeal was not sufficient because at the time of its filing,
the Rules required the filing of the record on appeal and not merely a notice of appeal.
Appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. The party who seeks to
exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which
the right to appeal is lost.
129. BARANGAY SANGALANG vs. BARANGAY MAGUIHAN
H. R. No. 159792

Facts of the Case

A case was lodged before the Sangguinang Bayan. In this case, petitioner claims that the
lots are within their territorial jurisdiction, wheras respondent claims that it is within their
territorial boundary. The case was then referred to a hearing committee. The committee said
that the properties belonged to petitioner.

Procedural History

Respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). RTC rendered a
Decision ruling in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed an MR, which was denied. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, which the CA dismissed, ruling that petitioner had availed
itself of the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal instead of filing a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the Court should entertain petitioner’s appeal.

Holding

As correctly observed by the CA, under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the
jurisdictional responsibility for settlement of boundary disputes between and among local
government units is to be lodged before the proper Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan concerned. In the case at bar, it is clear that when the case was
appealed to the RTC, the latter took cognizance of the case in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction. Hence, any further appeal from the RTC Decision
must conform to the provisions of the Rules of Court dealing with said matter. On this score,
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be
by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42. Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that
petitioner has availed itself of the wrong remedy. Since the RTC tried the case in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, instead of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
130. ATTY. JESUS F. FERNANDEZ vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CONCEPCION
OLIVARES
G. R. No. 131094

Facts of the Case

Private respondent Concepcion Olivares filed a complaint against petitioner for unlawful
entry.

Procedural History

The MeTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action. Olivares appealed
to the RTC of Manila and the latter reversed the MeTC’s decision. 14 days after receipt of
the decision, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Fernandez filed a
motion for extension of time with the CA. Fernandez asked for a motion for new trial. This
was denied by the RTC. The court ruled that when Fernandez went to the Court of Appeals
and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, and the Court of Appeals
accordingly acted on the same by granting the extension sought, jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over the parties and the subject matter had already attached. This prompted
Fernandez to file a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Fernandez filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not mere filing of a motion for extension of time to file the petition for review
automatically divested the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case

Holding

The Court of Appeals has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez
merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition but not the petition itself. In general,
in order for a Court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. Jurisdiction over the person is
acquired by service of summons or by voluntary appearance. At first glance and mindful of
the rule that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as the motion for extension
of time to file petition for review filed by Fernandez in this case, is considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court it may seem at once apparent that the Court of
Appeals had in fact acquired jurisdiction over his person. As we are dealing here with the
jurisdiction of an appellate court, additional rules are required for jurisdiction to attach therein,
to wit: (1) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the
time for doing so; (2) he must have filed his petition for review likewise within the time for
doing so; (3) he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and (4) the other parties must
have perfected their appeals in due time. The Rule requires that in an appeal by way of
Petition For Review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely
filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. In the discussion of the
Committee on the revision of the Rules of Court, it was emphasized that to perfect the
appeal, the party has to file the petition for review and to pay the docket fees within the
prescribed period.
131. ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS
H. R. No. 130866

Facts of the Case

Alleged is that private respondent worked as an operations manager of petitioner. However,

there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner. His name was
also not included in the monthly payroll. He was then dismissed from his employment for
misappropriating 38k. Petitioner claims that respondent was not his employee.

Procedural History

The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee

relationship existed between the parties. Thus his office had no jurisdiction over the
case. Private respondent appealed to the NLRC, and the court set aside the decision,
remanding the case back to LA. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the NLRC for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not appeals from the NLRC can be filed directly with the SC

Holding

The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action
of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer
to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth
be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
132. PHILLIPS SEAFOOD (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION vs. THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS
G. R. No. 175787

Facts of the Case

Philips Seafood Philippines Corporation was granted a tax income holiday for six years for
locating in a less developed area. Petitioner used to supply semi-processed raw materials to
Philips Seafood, Inc, an affiliate corporation, before the latter closed due to financial
difficulties. As they were unable to recover from it’s financial reverses. PSPI stopped
operations. Petitioner acquired title to the plant and informed respondent of transfer.
Respondent infromed petitioner that it’s ITH would extend.

Procedural History

Petitioner received by fax BOI’s letter denying its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
elevated the matter to the Office of the President, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals,
questioning the dismissal of its appeal before the Office of the President. The appellate court
denied petitioner’s omnibus motion on the ground that the same was filed with intent to delay
the case. Simultaneously, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review for having
been filed out of time as petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of the President instead of
filing a Rule 43 petition to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period.

Statement of the Issue

Whether or not the review by the Office of the President of the decisions of respondent BOI
is allowed

Holding

E.O. No. 226 contains no provision specifically governing the remedy of a party whose
application for an ITH has been denied by the BOI. The right to appeal is not a constitutional,
natural or inherent right – it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore,
available only if granted or provided by statute. The BOI was created by virtue of E.O. No.
226 at the time when then President Corazon Aquino was exercising legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution. E.O. No. 226 apparently allows two avenues of appeal from
an action or decision of the BOI, depending on the nature of the controversy. One mode is to
elevate an appeal to the Office of the President when the action or decision pertains to either
of these two instances: first, in the decisions of the BOI over controversies concerning the
implementation of the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise between registered
enterprises or investors and government agencies under Article 7; and second, in an action
of the BOI over applications for registration under the investment priorities plan under Article
36.
133. PADILLA MERCADO et al vs. SPOUSES AGUEDO ESPINA and LOURDES ESPINA
H. R. No. 173987

Facts of the Case

Alleged in the complaint of petitioners is that they are the heirs of the late spouses Santiago
and Sofronia Mercado. Both were owners of the subject parcel of land. After the death of
Santiago and Sofronia, petitioners inherited the lot. Respondents then claimed that the lot
was theirs, as gthey had bought it from Josefa, who in turn bought it from Genivera, who
bought it from Mercado. Petitioners say that Josefa, through fraudulent machinations,
obtained title over the subject property in her name. A declaration of nullity of the deed of
sale was prayed for.

Procedural History

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case. The RTC denied respondents' Motion to Dismiss. Respondents then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC. Respondents then filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA, which the court also denied. Meanwhile, petitioners, by
leave of court, filed an Amended Complaint to include the assessed value of the subject
property. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, which was denied.
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA praying that both orders be
set aside and the petition dismissed, which the CA finally granted. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the CA denied it

Statement of the Issue

Was giving due course to respondents’ second motion to dismiss proper

Holding

Under Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an

original one. As a consequence, the original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer
considered part of the record. In the present case, the Amended Complaint is, thus, treated
as an entirely new complaint. As such, respondents had every right to move for the dismissal
of the said Amended Complaint.
134. MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION vs. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION
G. R. No. 158332

Facts of the Case

Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation was sued by Remington Industrial Sales
Corporation for payment of around 900 thousand pesos worth of construction materials and
other merchandise. The complaint was amended 4 times, and impleaded other parties
because they were assigness/transferees of the real and personal properties, chattels,
machineries, equipment, and other assets of Marinduque Mining.

Procedural History

The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendants Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation et al. to pay the sum demanded. Petitioner and its co-defendants PNB,
DBP, Nonoc Mining, ICC and APT filed with the CA an appeal, which the court dismissed.
On its own, petitioner also attempted to institute an appeal with the Court. However, for lack
of an affidavit of service the Court denied its motion. Thus, private respondent filed with the
RTC a Motion for Execution solely against petitioner. Over petitioner's objection, the RTC
granted the Motion for Execution, dismissing the original complaint filed in the RTC. This
became final.

Statement of the Issue

Whether the Court's Decisions in DBP v. CA and PNB v. CA inured to the benefit of
petitioner which was not a party to either case

Holding

The general rule is that one party's appeal from a judgment will not inure to the benefit of a
co-party who failed to appeal; and as against the latter, the judgment will continue to run its
course until it becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however, one exception
stands out: where both parties have a commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed
to be the vicarious appeal of the other. The adjudication rendered in DBP v. CA and PNB v.
CA is plain: private respondent has no cause of action against DBP, PNB and their
transferees, including petitioner, for they are corporate entities separate and distinct from
Marinduque Mining, and cannot be held liable for the latter's obligations to private
respondent.
135. Corazon Cruz v. MIAA, GR No. 184732, 9 September 2013.
G. R. No. 184732

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner Corazon Cruz entered into a contract with MIAA for lease of a 1400 square meter
property which petitioner would use as a commercial arcade for lease to other businesses.
However, according to her, respondent did not inform her that part of the leased premises
was subject to public use (easement), and as a result she suffered losses such as being
unable to obtain a building permit and certificate of electrical inspection from the Manila
Electric Company, tenants not paying rent, etc. Since her tenants could not pay, she was
unable to pay her own rent Dec 2004 onwards. And as some of Cruz’s stalls were located in
the easement area, MMDA demolished them, causing her damages. She tool this into
consideration when computing her rent, however MIAA terminated the lease contract.

Procedural History
Cruz then filed a case before the RTC of Pasic city for breach of contract, consignation, and
damages. MIAA then filed a motion to dismiss, and the RTC dismissed the complaint due to
forum shopping, as the Pasig and Manila cases are founded on the same actionable
document. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, thus Cruz filed a
notice of appeal. The CA held that the dismissal by the RTC was proper, but that Cruz did
not commit forum shopping but that venue was improper as she admitted that her residence
was actually in Manila and not San Juan.

Statement of the Issue:

Was the dismissal of the case proper?

Holding

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the
dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of improper venue because the same was not an
error raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. Jurisprudence dictates that the
appellee’s role in the appeal process is confined only to the task of refuting the assigned
errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not the party who instituted the
appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed therefor, he merely
assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to the affirmance of the
judgment appealed from. Keeping in mind that the right to appeal is essentially statutory in
character, it is highly erroneous for the appellee to either assign any error or seek any
affirmative relief or modification of the lower court’s judgment without interposing its own
appeal. As held in the case of Medida v. CA:An appellee who has not himself appealed
cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in
the decision of the court below. He cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not
appealed from by him. He cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment
modified. All that said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue
on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor, even
on grounds not included in the decision of the court a quo nor raised in the appellant's
assignment of errors or arguments.
 136. DAR v. Berenguer

GR No. 154094, 9 March 2010.

Facts of the case:

Respondents were registered owners of several residential and industrial lands in Barangay
Bibincahan, Sorsogon. The respondents received from the Department of Agrarian Reform
that their land fell under the CARP. This was protested, and respondents filed in the office of
the DAR an application for exclusion of landholdings from the CARP coverage. Without
acting on the application, their titles and certificates were canceled.

Procedural history:

Later, Regional Director Dalugdug denied the respondents application for exclusion, and
thus they appealed to DAR secretary. Pending the resolution of respondents appeal, Baribag
filed in the DAR office a petition seeking to implement the order of the regional director, and
he was placed in possession of respondent’s land. Respondents appealed before the DAR
adjudication board, which was noted but a write of possession was given to Baribag. CA
reversed DAR’s order

Statement of Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing respondent’s petition for certiorari

Held

The CA did not err in treating the petition for certiorari as a petition for review. There are
precedents in that regard. In Department of Education v. Cuanan,11 this Court ruled that the
petition for certiorari filed by therein respondent Cuanan with the CA within the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review could be treated as a petition for review,
for that would be in accord with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of substantial justice. The Court had occasion to expound on the exceptions to the
rule that a recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 rendered the petition dismissible
for being the wrong remedy, thus: The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution
issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are
exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy
dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are
null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority. As will be shown forthwith, exception (c) applies to the present
case.Furthermore, while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of
a petition for certiorari, immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is
warranted where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceeding
was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object.
 137. Panganiban v. Tara Trading Ship Management Inc.

GR No. 187302, 18 October 2010.

Facts of the case

Petitioner was hired by Tara Trading Shipmanagement on behalf of respondent Shiling SDB
BHD to work as an oiler. Aroung 2006, petitioner started exhibiting signs of mental instability
and was diagnosed with brief psychotic disorder. DEspite demands for compensation,
respondents failed and refued to comply with their contractual obligations.

Procedural history

Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents praying for the payment of 60,000 as total
and permanent disability benefits. The Labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners. The case
was appealed to the NLRC, who affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The appeal of
respondents was dismissed for lack of merit. Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a write of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
with the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC.

Statement of issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can file both a petition for review under Rule 45 and a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65

Held:

Preliminarily, considering the grounds raised by petitioner, it appears that he denominated

this petition as one under Rule 45, but he filed it as both a petition for review under Rule
45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The applicable rule is
Rule 45, which clearly provides that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any
case, regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this
Court through a petition for review. This remedy is a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case. Recourse under Rule 65 cannot be allowed either as an add-on or as
a substitute for appeal.The procedural infirmity notwithstanding, the Court shall treat this
petition as one filed under Rule 45 only and shall consider the alleged grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA as an allegation of reversible error
 138. Llamas v. CA

GR No. 149588, 29 September 2009

Facts of the case

On November 1978, petitioners conspired and, despite knowing that their parcel of land in
Paranaque was mortgaged to Rural Bank of Imus, seel such to Conrado P Avilla.
Petitioners were doung duilty and sentenced to two months imprisonment.

Procedural history

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners then
filed a petition for review, which was denied for failure to state material dates. Since it
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, the judgement became final and executory.
Petitioner Francisico moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time
the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offence charged. There being no
actions taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted on September 13
the instant proceedings for the annumlment of the trial and the appellate courts’ decision.

Statement of issue:

Whether or not Rule 47 may be applied to criminal cases

Held

In People v. Bitanga,13 the Court explained that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot
be availed of in criminal cases, thus —

Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of
judgment to the following:

Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.a1f

The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered
in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit
such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases.
Section 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:

Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The provisions of
Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the
Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar
as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal
cases.
 139. Sps. Arcenas v. Queen City Development Bank

GR No. 166819, 16 June 2010.

Facts of the case

Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City an action for declaratory relief
against respondent, praying for the declaration of their rights as lessors under the
contract of lease.

Procedural history

Respondent filed an answer contending that the action for declaraotry releif was not
proper since the contract of lease had already been violated. RTC dismissed the action
for declaratory relief. Petitioners then filed with the RTC another case, this time for breach
of the same contract of lease, which the RTC set for pre trial. Petitioners filed a pre trial
brief, pre trial was reset as respondent’s counsel wanted to know the exact amount for
settlement. On the date of pre-trial, only respondent was present. On the date scheduled
for the hearing, petitioner and counsel failed to appear thus respondent bank presented
evidence for it’s counterclaim. Petitioner filed a manifestiation with motion, alleging that
the faulure to file a motion to reconsider the order and failure to attend hearing was due to
their mistaken belief that respondent bank was earnestly seeking a settllement.
Respondent filed an opposition to such manifestation and motion. RTC denied the
manifestation and motion to reconsider. Petitioners then filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of order, which was dismissed as there was no appropriate remedies without
sufficient justification before reporting to the petition for annulment of order. CA also
denied motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners. On July 14, Oscar Arcenas, one of
the petitioners died, leaving Dolores the only petitioner, who filed this petition for review.

Statement of issue:

Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgement?

Held

Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for
annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for
new trial, appeal or a petition for relief.17 If petitioner fails to avail of these remedies without
sufficient justification, she cannot resort to the action for annulment of judgment under Rule
47, for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence Petitioner tries to justify
her failure to avail of the appropriate remedies on a promise of settlement. However, such
promise was not an excuse for petitioner's counsel not to lift the order of non-suit and to file
a petition for relief.Petitioner's claim that she was present when respondent bank's counsel
moved for the issuance of the order of non-suit against her was not proven by any
evidence.There was indeed a failure to show, to our satisfaction, that petitioner could not
have availed of the ordinary and appropriate remedies under the Rules. Thus, she cannot
resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her
inaction or negligence.
 140. Genato Investments Inc. v. Barrientos

GR No. 207443, 23 July 2014

Facts of the case:

A lot situated in Caloocan city was registered under the name of the petitioner. Due to an
alleged deficiency in real property taxes, the office of the city treasurer of Caloocan city
sold the land at public auction, and respondent was the highest bidder and the office of
the city treasurer issued a certificate of sale of delinquent property. Petitioner was not
aware of any of the proceedings before the office of the city treasurer. REspondent
prayed for the consolidation of ownership of the proper, despite the fact that the
delinquency sale only involved one lot of the property.

Procedural history

RTC issued an order granting respondent’s petition. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 but withdrew, CA granted prayer to withdraw. Petitioner then
filed with the CA a petitioner for annulment of judgement. CA dismissed claiming that the
petition for annulment of judgement is not the proper remedy

Statement of issue:

Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing on the grounds that the petition for
annulment of judgement is not the proper remedy

Held

We disagree with the reasoning of the CA and respondents that petitioner in this particular
case should have filed either an action for reconveyance or annulment of the auction sale,
because to do so would have required the court hearing the action to modify or interfere with
the judgment or order of another co-equal court, especially in this case where the said
judgment ororder had attained finality. Wellentrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that
a court has no power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the
administration of justice.We have repeatedly ruled that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party,without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. The same
petition is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own
neglect in promptly availing of the same.31 There is here no attempted substitution;
annulment of judgment is the only remedy available to petitioner.
 141. Natalia Realty v. CA

GR No. 126462, 5 February 2003

Facts of the case

Petitioner alleged that respondents were occupying and illegally squatting on certain
portions of the subject property. Private respondents claim that they are the wners of their
respoective houses and lots that have been in their possession before the outbreak of
World War II

Procedural history

Natalia Realty filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for recovery of possession of
the two parcels of land. The case was dismissed for petitioner’s failure to prosecute.
However, the trial court issued another order by a different judge granting the motions of
private respondents to order petitioner to surrender possession of portions of the subject
property. The orders then attained finality and petitioner moved to set aside the orders
claiming excusable oversight on the part of its counsel. This was denied by the trial court.
An entry of judgement was issued claiming that the resolution became final and executory.
A writ of execution was filed by Navarro who claimed to be the original counsel of
respondents, but was denied, as it was ruled that it was not a class suit. Navarro
appealed to the Court of Appeals. REpsondents then filed for execution, but petitioner
opposed the motion as the trial court had denied because of a supervening event. Judge
Queribin wrote a letter instead of acting on the motion, and inquired what final orders and
decisions he should enforce. The resoultion of the motion for execution was then allowed.
Petitioner thhen filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to set aside as the personal letter
of the judge is not authorized by the Rules of Court.

Statement of issue

Whether or not the writ of execution to should have been allowed

Held

The general rule is when a court's judgment or order becomes final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment or
order.29 In this case, because of the innumerable delays, the enforcement of the final orders
and decision has been long overdue. The delays are partly attributable to the fact that the
case went through a number of presiding judges. The filing of unauthorized motions and
appeal by Navarro complicated what was otherwise just a simple case of enforcement of
final judgment. But it was petitioner’s intolerable strategy of filing motions, some belatedly
filed, to thwart execution that caused this case to drag for more than a decade.Judge
Querubin could have ended the delays had he readily complied with the February 6, 1995
Resolution of the Court of Appeals ordering him to execute the final orders and decision in
Civil Case No. 359-A. Instead, Judge Querubin wrote a letter to the Court of Appeals asking
it to specify the final orders and decision that should be enforced. In response to the query,
the Court of Appeals issued another resolution identifying these final orders and
decision.While we agree with petitioner that Judge Querubin’s query is not provided for in
the Rules of Court, it is nevertheless not prohibited.
 142. Philippine Hawk Corp. v. Lee
GR No. 166869, 16 February 2010

Facts of the case

A vehicular accident occurred in Quezon which killed respondent’s husband and caused
respondent physical injuries. The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeek, and
a buy. The buy was owned by petitioner and was bieng driven by Margarito Avila

Procedural history

Respondent then filed before the RTC of Quezon City a complaint against petitoner
Philippine Hawk corporation. The trial court issed a pre-trial order, and the parties agreed
to stipulate on certain facts and issues. Avila was found guilty of simple negligence. On
appeal, the Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Statement of issue:

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in awarding other kinds of damages in favor of
respondent, when this was not appealed from the trial courts decision

Held:

Rule 51 SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the
proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely
related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the
court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the
former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now includes some substantial changes in the rules on
assignment of errors. The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a
party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject
matter. To this exception has now been added errors affecting the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceedings therein.Also, even if the error complained of by a party is
not expressly stated in his assignment of errors but the same is closely related to or
dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in his brief, such error may now be
considered by the court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin. The procedure in the
Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise
indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that the latter is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an
unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the
determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent, will be
considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.It may also
be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is authorized to consider a
plain error, although it was not specifically assigned by the appellant, otherwise it would be
sacrificing substance for technicalities
 143. Gonzales III v. Office of the President

GR No. 196231-32, 28 January 2014

Statement of the facts:

Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the PNP IAS against Manila Police District
Senior Inspector Mendoza and four others for robbery, grave threat, robbery extortion, and
physical injury. Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an administrative
charge for grave isconduct with the National Police Commission against Mendoza based on
the allegations of Kalaw.After preparing a draft decision on MEdoza’s case, the deputy
obudsman, who found Mendoza guilty, forwarded the records to the office of the
ombudsman. This was approved. Pending action by ombudsman, Mendoza hijacked a
toursit bus and held 21 foreign tourists and four Filipino tour assistants hostages. Mendoza
died. Ombudsman was found guilty of gross misconduct in handling the case against
Mendoza. Gonzales, the deputy pmbudsman, was charged for gross neglect of duty.

Procedural history

Gonzales posits that OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy

Ombudsman.

Statement of issue

Whether on not the Office of the president’s ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent
for taking nine days instead of five days to review the motion for reconsideration was
baseless

Held

Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the
case forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP72 relied on
Section 8, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on
Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration within five days. Even if we consider this provision to
be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since he is a Deputy
Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer
tasked with the initial resolution of the motion. In Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 7 on
the resolution of the case and submission of the proposed decision, the period for resolving
the case does not cover the period within which it should be reviewed
 144. Vivares v. Reyes

GR No. 155408, 13 February 2008

Facts of the case

Severino Reyes was the father of respondent Jose Reyes and Torcuato Reyes. Upon his
death, the two came upon their inheriance and had an oral partition of properties. When
Torcuato dies, his will was up for probate. Petitioner, the executor of the will when Ignaling
(also petitioner ) was declared a lawful heir to Torcuato. Believing that Torcuato did not
receive his full share in the estate of Severino, petitioners instituted an action for partition
and recovery of real estate.

Procedural history

A commission was formed and the disputed properties were annotated with notices of lis
pendens. Petitioners filed a motion to place properties in litigation under recievership before
the trial court, alleging that to their prejudice respondent had, without prior court approval
and without petitioner’s knowledge, sold to third parties and transferred in his own name
several common properties.

Statement of issue

Whether or not receivership was justified

Held

We sustain the CA ruling that the trial court acted arbitrarily in granting the petition for
appointment of a receiver as "there was no sufficient cause or reason to justify placing the
disputed properties under receivership." Petitioners cannot now impugn the oral partition
entered into by Torcuato and respondent and hence cannot also assail the transfers made
by respondent of the lots which were subject of said agreement, considering that Torcuato
also sold properties based on said verbal arrangement. Indeed, the parties agreed that the
civil action does not encompass the properties covered by the oral partition. In this factual
setting, petitioners cannot convince the Court that the alleged fraudulent transfers of the lots
made by respondent, which purportedly form part of his share in Severino’s estate based on
the partition, can provide a strong basis to grant the receivership. petitioner is willing to post
a counterbond in the amount to be fixed by the court based on Sec. 3, Rule 59 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.Anchored on this rule, the trial court should have dispensed with the
services of the receiver, more so considering that the alleged fraud put forward to justify the
receivership was not at all established.Petitioners advance the issue that the receivership
should not be recalled simply because the adverse party offers to post a counterbond. At the
outset, we find that this issue is barred by estoppel.10 While the CA made a statement that
the trial court should have discharged the appointed receiver on the basis of the proposed
counterbond, such opinion does not jibe with the import of Sec. 3, Rule 59. The rule states
that the "application may be denied or the receiver discharged." In statutory construction, the
word "may" has always been construed as permissive. If the intent is to make it mandatory
or ministerial for the trial court to order the recall of the receiver upon the offer to post a
counterbond, then the court should have used the word "shall." Thus, the trial court has to
consider the posting of the counterbond in addition to other reasons presented by the offeror
why the receivership has to be set aside.
145. Smart Communications v. Astorga

GR No. 148132, 28 January 2008

Facts of the case

Astorga was employed by Smart Communications as a Distric Sales manager of the

Corporate SAles Marketing Group. SMART launghed an organizational realignment to
achieve more efficent operations. Part of the reorganization was the outsourcing of the
marketing and sales force. To soften the blow, SNMI agreed to absorb the personnel who
would be recommended by SMART, but Astorga landed last in the performance
evaluation. SMART offered her a supervisory position in the customer care department
but she refused due to a lower salary rank and rate. DEspite the abolition of her office,
she continued reporting for work, so SMART terminated her. Astorga then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. In the meantime, SMART sent a letter to Astorga
demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda which was given to her
under the company’s car plan program. She did not do this, and SMART filed a replevin.

Procedural history

The labor arbiter ruled in her favor regarding employment. Astorga filed a motion to
dismiss the replevin case. The RTC fenied Astorga’s motion regarding the replevin case.
She brought it to the CA, who reversed the RTC ruling, claiming that it was intertwined
with Astorga’s complaint for illegal dismissal. However, the NLRC ordered that Astorga
return the vehicle. She filed then a motuon for reconsideration but it was denied.

Statement of issue

Whether or not the replevin was proper

Held

Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit
and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s
demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of
the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor
rather than employee-employer relations.33 As such, the dispute falls within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
 146. Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank

GR No. 189571, 21 January 2015

Statement of fact

Respondent established a pension loan product for bona fide veterans or their surviving
spouses, as well as salary loan product for teachers and low salaried employees to provide
financial assitance to veterans and teachers. Respondent devised a program by charging a
premium in the form of a higher fee known as credit Redemption Fund from said borrowers.
An exampination was conducted by the Supervision and Examination Department of the
Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which found, among other things, that respondent’s collection of
premiums from the proceeds of the various salary and pension loans violated Section 54 of
RA 8791, whichs tates that banks shall not directly engage in the insurance business as
insurer. Respondent wrote a letter justifying the existence of the CRF. Petitioners issued a
resolution directing respondent’s trust and investment department to return to the borrowers
all the balances of the CRF.

Procedural history

The RTC dismissed respondent’s petition for declaratory relief. Almost a year later,
respondent filed a Motion to Admit it’s Motion for Reconsideration. RTC allowed the motion
and required petitioners to file their answer. RTC then granted respondents petition for
declaratory relief.

Statement of issue

Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper

Held

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute;
and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised
in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or
statute.9 Ergo, the Court, in CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal
Revenue,10 held that in the same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects
of a petition for declaratory relief, decisions of quasijudicial agencies cannot be subjects of a
petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a
decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided
by the Rules of Court. In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board
cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by
the BSP Monetary Board inthe exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions.
 147. Dacudao v. Sec. of Justice,

GR No. 188056, 8 January 2013

Statement of facts

Petitioners were among the investors whom Angeles and his associates in the Legacy
Group allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group’s buy back agreement that earned
them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands went unheeded,
they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Angeles.

Procedural history

The Secretary of Justice directed all Regional State prosecutors to forward all cases
already filed against Delos Angeles to the secretariat of the DOJ. An order was then
issued directing the cases to be fowarded wither to the Secretariat of the department of
justice or the secretariat of the special panel for distribution. Petitioners went to the
Supreme Court on petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ascribing to the
respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion.

Statement of issue

Did petitioners property bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
directly to the court?

Held:

The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and merit, is
dismissed.Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming
directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without
tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition.We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard of this policy against
direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v.
Concepcion, we explained why, to wit:The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on
the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to
deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave
time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and
important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.
 148. Bank of Commerce v. Radio Philippines Network

GR No. 195615, 21 April 2014.

Statement of facts

Traders Royal Bank propsoed to sell to petitioner Bank of Commerce it’s banking
business consisting of specified assets and liabilities. Bancommerce agreed subject to
Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ approval of their purchase, and it was approved, subject to
Banccocommerce annd TRB setting up an escrow fund. To comply, TRB placed 50 m in
escrow with Metrobank. BSP approved. Shortly after, TRB was ordered to pay
respondents damages for a previous case. REspondents filed a motion for execution, but
ather than pursue a levy, they filed a supplemental motion for execution where they
described TRB now as the Bank of Commerce.

Procedural history

Bancommerce filed it’s special appearance with opposition to the same questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC. This prompted Bancommerce to file a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Bancommerce sought
reconsideration of the RTC order, but RTC denied. Bancommerce elevated the RTC
order to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Statement of issue

Whether or not the direct filing of the petition for ceritorari by Bancommerce was valid

Held

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari may only be
filed when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. Since a
motion for reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy,
the failure to first take recourse to is usually regarded as fatal omission.But Bancommerce
invoked certain recognized exceptions to the rule.12 It had to forego the filing of the required
motion for reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order because a) there was an urgent
necessity for the CA to resolve the questions it raised and any further delay would prejudice
its interests; b) under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would have been
useless; c) Bancommerce had been deprived of its right to due process when the RTC
issued the challenged order ex parte, depriving it of an opportunity to object; and d) the
issues raised were purely of law.In this case, the records amply show that Bancommerce’s
action fell within the recognized exceptions to the need to file a motion for reconsideration
before filing a petition for certiorari.
 149. Yusay v. CA

GR No. 156684, 6 April 2011

Statement of facts

Petitioners owned a parcel of land in Mandaluyong. Half was used as residence, the rest
rented out to nine other families.The land was their only source of income. The mayor tried
to expropriate the land to develop it for cost housing for priveleged but deserving city
inhabitants.

Procedural history

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of
the city. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and the RTC set aside its decision/ The
city appealed to the CA. The CA ruled in favor of respondents

Statement of issue

Does prohibition lie against expropriation

Held

The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not available to the
petitioners as a remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but only expressing its collective sentiment or opinion. Verily, there can be no
prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under
expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to
secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. This bar
against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating
the taking of private land intended for public use, and the interest of the affected landowner
is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its
power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the
courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the
affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the
taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just
compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available.Here, however, the remedy
of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’ property was issued. As of
then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for thepower of
eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint
in the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint,
no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners
could not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.
 150. Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency v. Puerto Princesa City

GR No. 181792, 21 April 2014

Statement of facts

Petitioners were the owners of two parcels of land in Puerto Princesa. Before Puerto
Princesa became a city, the national governmnet established a military camp, known as
Western Command. Petitioners property was used as a road right-of-way leading to the
camp, called Wescom road. Petitioners filed an action for payment of just compensation
against Puerto Princessa. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. The write of execution was
issued directing respondents to satisfy the money judgement.

Procedural history

Petitioners diled a motion to declare respondents in indirect contempt of court for their failure
to comply with the decision despite the issuance of a write of execution against them.
Petitioners wrote a letter to the Commission on Audit requesting that it order respondents to
pay petitioners the amount adjudged. The Commision on Audit informed petitioners that they
could not act upon the request to order respondents to pay the amount adjudged as they
had no jurisdcition over the matter as the case was already in the execution stage.
Petitioners filed a mandamus.

Statement of issue

Whether or not the remedy of mandamus is proper to compel respondents to comply with
the decision

Held

It has been held, however, that a resort to the remedy of mandamus is improper if the
standard modes of procedure and forms of remedy are still available and capable of
affording relief. Considering that the COA still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate
money claim, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari with this Court pursuant to
Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave the petitioners
without any remedy at all. Thus, denied.