1. Employees Union of Bayer v.

Bayer PH

EUBP (Union 1) headed by Facundo negotiated with Bayer for the signing of a CBA
which resulted in a deadlock when Union 1 rejected Bayer’s wage-increase proposal.
This resulted to a strike so SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Pending the
resolution, Remigio’s group, without authority from the union, accepted Bayer’s
wage-increase proposal. SOLE then issued an arbitral award ordering Union 1 and
Bayer to execute a 1997-2001 CBA which was subsequently registered with DOLE.
Barely six months after the signing of the CBA, Remigio’s group then solicited
signatures from union members to rename the union as Reformed EUBP (Union 2),
among others. Union 1 and Union 2 sought recognition from Bayer and demanded
remittance of the union dues. Bayer initially decided to not deal with either union and
placed the union dues in a trust account. Union 1 then filed the first unfair labor
practice (ULP) complaint against Bayer for non-remittance of dues. While the first
ULP case was pending, Bayer decided to remit the union dues to Union 2. Union 1
filed a second ULP complaint against Bayer for gross violation of the CBA and
violation of the duty to collectively bargain. On the same date, Union 2 and Bayer
agreed to sign a new CBA. Thus, Union 1 filed a motion for TRO/injunction before
the NLRC. The LA dismissed both complaints for ULP for lack of jurisdiction and the
motion for issuance of TRO was also denied. CA affirmed LA’s and NLRC’s rulings.
Union 1 argues that Bayer’s acts of negotiating with Union 2 constitutes ULP. Bayer
counters that there can be no ULP because the requisites for ULP (i.e. that the
violation of the CBA should be gross and that it should involve a violation in the
economic provisions of the CBA) were not satisfied.

ISSUE:whether Bayer’s act of negotiating and dealing with Union 2 despite the
validly existing CBA of Bayer with Union 1 constitutes ULP.

RULING:YES. Anemployershouldnotbeallowedtorescindunilaterally its CBA with the

duly certified bargaining agent it had previously contracted with and decide to bargain
anew with a different group if there is no legitimate reason for doing so and without
first following the proper procedure. Article 253 of the Labor Code provides, in part,
that where there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively
shall also mean that neither party shall terminate or modify such agreement during its
lifetime. CBA serves as the covenant between the parties and has the force and effect
of law between them during the period of its duration. Compliance with the terms and
conditions of the CBA is mandated by express policy of the law primarily to afford
protection to labor and to promote industrial peace. (see doctrine). When an employer
proceeds to negotiate with a splinter union despite the existence of its valid CBA with
the duly certified and exclusive bargaining agent, the former indubitably abandons its
recognition of the latter and terminates the entire CBA.

DOCTRINE: When a valid and binding CBA had been entered into by the workers
and the employer, the latter is behooved to observe the terms and conditions thereof
bearing on union dues and representation. If the employer grossly violates its CBA
with the duly recognized union, the former may be held administratively and
criminally liable for unfair labor practice.

The requisites of ULP as pronounced in Silva (i.e. that the violation of the CBA
should be gross and that it should involve a violation in the economic provisions of the
CBA) should not be construed to apply to violations of the CBA which can be
considered as gross violations per se, such as utter disregard of the very existence of
the CBA itself.
2. Prince Transport v. Garcia

PTI hired Garcia et al. as as drivers, conductors, mechanics or inspectors (except

Diosdado Garcia who was hited as Operations Manager). When their commissions
were reduced by PTI, Garcia et al. attended several meetings to discuss the protection
of their interests. They asked for cash advances, some were denied and some were
approved. Suspecting the formation of a union, PTI transferred PTI transferred all
union members and sympathizers to its sub-company Lubas. Lubas eventually stopped
its operations due to PTI’s refusal to maintain and repair the units being used. Garcia,
et al. filed various complaints against PTI charging the company with illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice and illegal deductions. They likewise prayed for

th
premium pay for holiday and rest day, holiday pay, service leave pay, 13 month pay,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. LA ruled that their was no ULP
committed by PTI but Lubas illegally dismissed 40 employees. NLRC substantially
affirmed the LA. CA reversed and ruled that PTI was guilty of ULP, the transfer being
indicative of PTI’s intent to frustrate the efforts of the employees to organize
themselves.
The issues are WoN CA erred when it gave due course to the petition for certiorari? –
NO, first, well-settled is the rule that CA may review factual findings of the NLRC via
certiorari when such were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record. Second, Garcia, et al. substantially complied with the procedural requirements.

WoN PTI committed unfair labor practices? – YES, under Article 248 (a) and (e) of
the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of LP if it interferes with, restrains or
coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it
discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions
of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. The transfer to Lubas left Garcia, et al. high and dry insofar as the
operations of Lubas was concerned. The Court finds no error in the findings and
conclusion of the CA that PTI withheld the necessary financial and logistic support
such as spare parts, and repair and maintenance of the transferred buses until only two
units remained in running condition. This left Garcia, et al. virtually jobless.

DOCTRINE: An employer is guilty of LP if it interferes with, restrains or coerces its

employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in
regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

The power of the CA to review NLRC’s decision is well settled in jurisprudence.

Moreover, BP 129, as amended by RA 7902, specifically gives the CA the power to
pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.
3. Manila Mining Employees v. Manila Mining

MMC is engaged in gold and copper ore mining. It is required by law to maintain a
tailing pond to store waste material from its mining operations. A permit is required to
operate a tailing pond, and one of the requisites for renewal is the consent of the
community as shown through a environmental compliance certificate (EEC).
Meanwhile, the MMC employees had an organizational meeting then formed a
legitimate labor union, leading to a request with MMC to bargain collectively through
the submission of CBA proposals. After this occurred, The DENR-Environmental
Management Bureau (DENR- EMB) did not issue another permit upon the expiry of
the old one as MMC was unable to obtain the consent of the community, thus leading
to the closure of the tailing pond. MMC was compelled to shut down its mining
operations and temporarily laid-off more than 400 workers. MMC also called for a
suspension of the CBA negotiations with the union until resumption of mining
operations. 11 rank-and-file union members filed a complaint for ULP. The LA and
the NLRC ruled that there was a valid lay-off that did not constitute ULP. The union
claims that unilateraly suspending the CBA negotiations was an ULP; the Union also
claims bad faith in laying-off employees as a result of MMC’s own failure to get a
permit. The issue is WoN the acts of MMC amounted to ULP – NO. Suspension of
negotiations is not equal to refusal to bargain. The union could not prove bad faith in
the failure of MMC to obtain the consent of the community to get a permit. The SC
affirmed the rulings of the LA and the NLRC. It it cannot be said that MMC
deliberately avoided the negotiation. It merely sought a suspension and in fact, even
expressed its willingness to negotiate once the mining operations resume. There was
valid reliance on the suspension of mining operations for the suspension, in turn, of
the CBA negotiation. The Union failed to prove bad faith in MMCs actuations.

DOCTRINE: The suspension of the CBA negotiations, for a valid cause, cannot be
equated to refusal to bargain amounting to an Unfair Labor Practice.

4. Central Azucarera de Bais Employees Union v. Central Azucarera de Bais

CABEU-NFL (UNION 1) was the certified bargaining agent of the COMPANY's rank
& file employees. It sent a proposed CBA, seeking increases in wages and several
benefits. The COMPANY responded with a counter-proposal, where they agreed to
most benefits, but refused to grant additional and separate Christmas bonuses. UNION
1 gave an amended proposal where it reduced its previous demands on wages &
bonuses, but the COMPANY maintained its position, and the parties had a deadlock.
The UNION 1 filed a notice of strike with the NCMB, which began conciliation
proceedings.

When the UNION 1 requested for copies of the COMPANY's financial statements a
year after and the resumption of conciliation meetings, the COMPANY informed the
NCMB that 90% of the rank & file employees withdrew their support from
UNION 1 and re-organized into a new union, Central Azucarera de Bais Employees
Labor Association (UNION 2). The COMPANY likewise said that a new CBA had
been concluded and was ratified by rank & file workers constituting 91% of the
collective bargaining unit. NCMB failed to react to this letter by the COMPANY, but
neither did it convene with UNION 1 and COMPANY. Thus, UNION 1 filed a
complaint of ULP, for refusal to bargain.

The SC ruled that COMPANY is not liable for ULP. (see doctrine) The COMPANY
believed that UNION 1 was no longer the representative of the workers. It just wanted
to foster industrial peace by bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its
rank and file workers and by negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA with
UNION 2. Such actions of the COMPANY are nowhere tantamount to anti-unionism,
the evil sought to be punished in cases of unfair labor practices.

DOCTRINE: For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that
CAB was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that
social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety that resulted in suspending
negotiations.
5. BPI Employees Union-Davao City-FUBU v. BPI

BOMC was created pursuant to CB Circular 1388. A service agreement between

BOMC and BPI was implemented, wherein BOMC undertook to provide services
such as check clearing, delivery of bank statements, fund transfers. No BPI employee
was displaced and those transferred to BOMC were given other assignments. The
Manila Chapter of the BPI Employees Union filed a complaint for ULP. The LA
decided the case in favor of the union, but was reversed by the NLRC. A merger
between FEBTC and BPI took effect, with BPI as the surviving corporation. Because
of the merger, BPI and FEBTC’s cashiering functions were transferred to BOMC. BPI
Davao Employees Union objected to the transfer, contending that the functions
rightfully belonged to the BPI employees and that the union members were deprived
of membership of the former FEBTC personnel who, by virtue of the merger, would
have formed part of the bargaining unit pursuant to the union shop provision. The
union filed a formal protest and requested BPI to submit the BOMC issue to the
grievance procedure under the CBA, but BPI did not consider it as grievable, instead,
a conference was held. BPI invoked management prerogative stating that the creation
of the BOMC was to preserve more jobs. The union argued that BPI undermined the
existence of the union since it reduced the bargaining unit. The union then filed a
notice of strike, while BPI filed a petition for the SOLE to assume jurisdiction over
the case, and the latter ordered the parties to cease and desist from committing any act
that may aggravate the situation. On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the NLRC’s
decision and held that it was well within BPI’s prerogatives to determine what
conditional tasks should be performed, who should best perform it and what should be
done to meet the exigencies of business. It pointed out that the union did not, by the
mere fact of the merger, become the bargaining agent of the merged employees as the
union’s right to represent said employees did not arise until it was chosen by them.
The issue is WoN BPI’s act of outsourcing functions formerly performed by union
members violates the CBA.

The SC held in the negative. Art. 261 of the Labor Code provides that violations of a
collective bargaining agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the
CBA. In this case, the alleged violation of the union shop agreement in the CBA, even
assuming it was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of an economic provision in
the agreement. The provisions relied upon by the union were those articles referring to
the recognition of the union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
rank-and-file employees. It failed to take into consideration its recognition of the
bank’s exclusive rights and prerogatives, likewise provided in the CBA, which
included the hiring of employees, promotion, transferees, and dismissals for just
cause.

DOCTRINE: Violations of a collective bargaining agreement, except those which are

gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be
resolved as grievances under the CBA.
6. Pepsi Cola Products v. Molon et al.

Pepsi adopted a company-wide retrenchment program denominated as Corporate

Rightsizing Program. To commence with its program, it sent a notice of retrenchment
to the DOLE as well as individual notices to the affected employees informing them
of their termination from work. Subsequently, on July 13, 1999, Pepsi notified the
DOLE of the initial batch of 47 workers to be retrenched. Among these employees
were 6 elected officers and 29 active members of the LEPCEU- ALU, including
herein respondents. LEPCEU-ALU filed a Notice of Strike before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) due to Pepsi’s alleged acts of union
busting/ULP. It claimed that Pepsi’s adoption of the retrenchment program was
designed solely to bust their union so that come freedom period, Pepsi’s company
union, the Leyte Pepsi-Cola Employees Union-Union de Obreros de Filipinas #49
(LEPCEU-UOEF#49) would garner majority vote. Pepsi filed before the NLRC a
petition to declare the strike illegal with a prayer for the loss of employment status of
union leaders and some union members. A return-to-work order was issued.
Incidentally, respondent Saunder Santiago Remandaban III (Remandaban), failed to
report for work within 24 hours from receipt of the said order because he had to
consult a physician regarding a pain on his right foot. Eventually, Pepsi and LEPCEU-
ALU agreed to settle their labor dispute arising from the company’s retrenchment
program and thus, executed the Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing agreement,
respondents still filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. The
NLRC ruled in favor of Pepsi however this was reversed in the CA.

ISSUE/s: Whether respondents’ retrenchment was valid? YES. Pepsi had validly
implemented its retrenchment program. Records disclose that both the CA and the
NLRC had already determined that Pepsi complied with the requirements of
substantial loss and due notice to both the DOLE and the workers to be retrenched.
PEPSI-COLA’s financial statements are substantial evidence which carry great
credibility and reliability viewed in light of the financial crisis that hit the country
which saw multinational corporations closing shops. Records also show that the
respondents had already been paid the requisite separation pay as evidenced by the
September 1999 quitclaims signed by them.

To properly effect a retrenchment, the employer must: (a) serve a written notice both
to the employees and to the DOLE at least one (1) month prior to the intended date of
retrenchment; and (b) pay the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month pay or at least one-half (1⁄2) month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. FURTHER, the employer must prove the requirements for a valid
retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence. These requirements are:

(1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses
which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual
and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in
good faith by the employer;
(2) That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of
retrenchment;(3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1⁄2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher;

(4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for
the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to
security of tenure; and(5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the
employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial
hardship for certain workers.

Whether Pepsi committed ULP in the form of union busting? NO. Pepsi is not guilty
of Union Busting as it retrenched its employees and good faith. Furthermore, the fact
that Pepsi’s rightsizing program was implemented on a company-wide basis dilutes
respondents’ claim that Pepsi’s retrenchment scheme was calculated to stymie its
union activities, much less diminish its constituency.

DOCTRINE: Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, retrenchment is one of the
authorized causes to validly terminate an employment. Retrenchment is defined as the
termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee
and without prejudice to the latter, resorted by management during periods of business
recession, industrial depression or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls over shortage
of materials.

7. Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, PH – Cebu Plant

Coca-Cola is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution
of softdrink products. It has several bottling plants all over the country, one of which
is located in Cebu City. Under the employ of each bottling plant are bottling operators.
In Cebu City, there are 20 bottling operators who work for its Bottling Line 1 while
there are 12-14 bottling operators who man its Bottling Line 2. All of them are male
and they are members Union. The bottling operators work in two shifts. The 1st shift
is from 8 to 5 p.m. and the second shift is from 5 p.m. up to the time production
operations is finished. Thus, the second shift varies and may end beyond eight hours.
However, the bottling operators are compensated with overtime pay if the shift
extends beyond eight (8) hours. For Bottling Line 1, 10 bottling operators work for
each shift while 6 to 7 bottling operators work for each shift for Bottling Line 2. Each
shift has rotations of work time and break time. Prior to September 2008, the rotation
is this: after two and a half (2 1⁄2) hours of work, the bottling operators are given a 30-
minute break and this goes on until the shift ends. In September 2008 and up to the
present, the rotation has changed and bottling operators are now given a 30-minute
break after 1 1⁄2 hours of work. In 1974, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 2
were provided with chairs upon their request. In 1988, the bottling operators of then
Bottling Line 1 followed suit and asked to be provided also with chairs. Their request
was likewise granted. Sometime in September 2008, the chairs provided for the
operators were removed pursuant to a national directive of Coke. This directive is
in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of Coke for bottling
operators, wherein every bottling operator is given the responsibility to keep the
machinery and equipment assigned to him clean and safe. The program reinforces the
task of bottling operators to constantly move about in the performance of their duties
and responsibilities. With this task of moving constantly to check on the machinery
and equipment assigned to him, a bottling operator does not need a chair anymore,
hence, Coke’s directive to remove them. Furthermore, Coke rationalized that the
removal of the chairs is implemented so that the bottling operators will avoid sleeping,
thus, prevent injuries to their persons. As bottling operators are working with
machines which consist of moving parts, it is imperative that they should not fall
asleep as to do so would expose them to hazards and injuries. In addition, sleeping
will hamper the efficient flow of operations as the bottling operators would be unable
to perform their duties competently. Union initiated the grievance machinery of the
CBA. Even after exhausting the remedies contained in the grievance machinery, the
parties were still at a deadlock with petitioner still insisting on the removal of the
chairs and respondent still against such measure. Both parties availed of the
conciliation/mediation proceedings before the NCMB. Arbitration Committee ruled
for Union, CA reversed. Union was saying not valid exercise of management
prerogative, violation of labor law, violation of CBA, violation of Art. 100

Whether or not CA committed GAD in removing chairs – NO, management is free to

regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place, and manner of
work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer
of employees, work supervision, lay- off of workers, and discipline, dismissal and
recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute
as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. The
rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. There is no law that
requires employers to provide chairs for bottling operators. The CA correctly ruled
that the Labor Code, specifically Article 132 thereof, only requires employers to
provide seats for women. No similar requirement is mandated for men or male
workers. It must be stressed that all concerned bottling operators in this case are men.
The Court completely agrees with the CA ruling that the removal of the chairs did not
violate the general principles of justice and fair play because the bottling operators’
working time was considerably reduced from 2 1⁄2 to just 1 1⁄2 hours and the break
period, when they could sit down, was increased to 30 minutes between rotations. The
bottling operators’ new work schedule is certainly advantageous to them because it
greatly increases their rest period and significantly decreases their working time. A
break time of thirty (30) minutes after working for only one and a half (1 1⁄2) hours is
a just and fair work schedule. The operators’ chairs cannot be considered as one of the
employee benefits covered in Article 100 of the Labor Code. In the Court’s view, the
term "benefits" mentioned in the non-diminution rule refers to monetary benefits or
privileges given to the employee with monetary equivalents. Such benefits or
privileges form part of the employees’ wage, salary or compensation making them
enforceable obligations. This Court has already decided several cases regarding the
non-diminution rule where the benefits or privileges involved in those cases mainly
concern monetary considerations or privileges with monetary equivalents. Some of
these cases are: where the case involves the payment of 14th, 15th and 16th month
bonuses; regarding the 13th month pay, legal/special holiday pay, night premium pay
and vacation and sick leaves; regarding salary wage increases; involving service
awards with cash incentives, premium pay, Christmas party with incidental benefits
and promotional increase.

DOCTRINE: Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and

judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working
methods, time, place, and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of
workers, and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management
prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with
due regard to the rights of labor.

The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. There is no law that
requires employers to provide chairs for bottling operators. The CA correctly ruled
that the Labor Code, specifically Article 132 thereof, only requires employers to
provide seats for women. No similar requirement is mandated for men or male
workers. It must be stressed that all concerned bottling operators in this case are men.

8. GOYA v. GOYA Employees Union

*Note: The SC resolved the issues regarding 1) the voluntary arbitrator’s jurisdiction
in ruling a matter not submitted for resolution and 2) the management’s prerogative in
light of the CBA. It did not discuss unfair labor practice (ULP) extensively. It was
only the CA citing the Voluntary Arbitrator which provides for the rule on ULP.

SUMMARY: On January 2004, petitioner Goya hired contractual employees from

Peso Resources Development Corporation to perform temporary and occasional
services in its factory in Marikina.
For failing to settle ammicably with the Voluntary Arbitrator, they submitted for
resolution the issue on whether Goya is guilty of unfair labor acts by engaging the
services of PESO under the CBA, laws, and jurisprudence. [Important]

Union argued that the hiring of contractual employees is in gross violation of the
CBA tantamount to unfair labor practice since the work of the contractual
workers were previously assigned to regular workers and union members. This
according to the union violates Section 4, Article I of the CBA where it would not be
possible to anymore hire probationary and casual employees.

The company argued that: 1) Contracting arrangements are allowed by law and within
management prerogative, 2) Contracting did not prejudice the union since no single
employee was terminated nor were the work hours nor bargaining unit were affected,
and 3) Section 4 Article I of the CBA provided for the definition of the categories
of employees and does not put a limitation on the company's right to engage the
services of job contractors.

Voluntary Arbitrator: No ULP but the company violated the CBA for not keeping in
with its letter and spirit. Instead of engaging PESO for temporary or occasional
services, it should have directly hired causal employees instead in accordance with the
spirit of the CBA.

CA: Dismissed Goya's petition. CA citing the Voluntary Arbitrators Resolution ruled
that “While the engagement of PESO is in violation of Section 4, Article I of the
CBA, it does not constitute unfair labor practice as it (sic) not characterized under the
law as a gross violation of the CBA. Violations of a CBA, except those which are
gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice. Gross
violations of a CBA means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the
economic provisions of such agreement. x x x”
Petitioner Goya manifested that its corporate life was shortened to June 30, 2006 and
the 3 year liquidation period allowed by law expired on June 30, 2009

The issues are:

1) Whether the VA is empowered to rule on a matter not covered by the issue

submitted for arbitration. – Generally no. But if the submitted issues are germane to
or interrelated or intertwined with the issue submitted for resolution, the VA can
resolve.

2) Whether Goya committed Unfair Labor Practice. – No. ULP is only committed if
there’s a gross violation of the agreement.

3) Whether contracting out of services from PESO was a valid exercise of

management prerogative. – NO. Having the right of management prerogative is
different from its valid exercise. The right to exercise management prerogative is
limited by the CBA.

SC decided to rule on the petition even if Goya’s corporate life ceased on January
2009. In this case, a complete and final adjudication of the dispute between the parties
necessarily called for the resolution of the related and incidental issue of whether the
Company still violated the CBA but without being guilty of ULP as, needless to state,
ULP is committed only if there is gross violation of the agreement. Lastly, the act
of contracting out despite the existence of the CBA was considered by the Court as an
invalid exercise of management prerogative.

DOCTRINE(Our Topic): Violations of a CBA, except those which are gross in

character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice. Gross violations of
a CBA mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement. x x x”
9. T&H Shopfitters Corp. & Gin Queen Corp. v. T&H Shopfitters Corp. & Gin Queen
Corp. Workers Union
The union officers/members and other employees held their first formal meeting to
discuss the formation of a union. The following day, 17 employees were barred from
entering the employer’s factory in Castillejos, Zambales and ordered to transfer to
T&H Shopfitters’ warehouse at Subic Bay Freeport Zone purportedly because of
expansion. Afterwards, said 17 employees were repeatedly ordered to go on forced
leave due to the unavailability of work. On December 18, 2003, the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. III issued a certificate of
registration in favor of THS-GQ Union.

Union officers/members contended that the affected employees were not given regular
work assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired to perform their
functions. This development prompted them to seek the assistance of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board. Subsequently, an agreement between the employer
and Union was reached. Employers agreed to give priority to regular employees in the
distribution of work assignments. Union officers/members averred, however, that
employers never complied with its commitment but instead hired contractual workers.
On March 24, 2004, Union filed a petition for certification election. On July 12, 2004,
an order was issued to hold the certification election in both T&H Shopfitters and Gin
Queen. Eventually, the certification election was scheduled on October 11, 2004.

Meanwhile, the director of Gin Queen informed its employees of the expiration of the
lease contract between Gin Queen and its lessor in Castillejos, Zambales and
announced the relocation of its office and workers to Cabangan, Zambales. Some of
the union officers/members, who visited the site in Cabangan, discovered that it was a
"talahiban" or grassland. Later, the said union officers and members were made to
work as grass cutters in Cabangan. Due to these circumstances, the employees
assigned in Cabangan did not report for work. As a consequence, the THS- GQ Union
president was made to explain why he should not be terminated for insubordination.
The other employees who likewise failed to report in Cabangan were meted out with
suspension.

On October 10, 2004, employers sponsored a field trip to Iba, Zambales, for its
employees. The officers and members of the THS-GQ Union were purportedly
excluded from the field trip. On the evening of the field trip, a certain Angel
Madriaga, a sales officer of petitioners, campaigned against the union in the
forthcoming certification election.

The following day or on October 11, 2004, the employees were escorted from the field
trip to the polling center in Zambales to cast their votes. On October 13, 2004, the
remaining employees situated at the SBFZ plant cast their votes as well. Due to the
heavy pressure exerted by employers, the votes for "no union" prevailed. On October
14, 2004, Union filed its protest with respect to the certification election proceedings

The issue in this case is WON the petitioner corporations are guilty of Unfair Labor
Practice. YES.-- Indubitably, the various acts of petitioner companies, taken
together, reasonably support an inference that indeed, such were orchestrated to
restrict respondent employees’ free exercise of their right to self-organization.
The Court is of the considered view that petitioners’ undisputed actions prior
and immediately before the scheduled certification election, while seemingly
innocuous, unduly meddled in the affaits of its employees in selecting their
exclusive bargaining representative.

The questioned acts of petitioner corporations, namely: (1) sponsoring a field trip
to Zambales for its employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the
scheduled certification election; (2) the active campaign by sales officer of the
petitioner corporations against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the
field trip; (3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center; (4) the
continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents’ functions; (5) assigning
union members to the Cabangan site to work on a rotational basis for union members,
all reek of interference on the part of the petitioner companies.

DOCTRINE: In essence, ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the
workers’ right to organize. As specified in Article 248 and 249 of the Labor Code, the
prohibited acts must necessarily relate to the workers’ right to self-organization.

10. Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union

Mendoza was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union (Union 1). In April
2007, the union, through Cometa (Union secretary) sent a letter to Mendoza informing
him that the union could no deduct the increased P200 union fee because he failed to
give a check off authorization, and to pay his union dues. In May 2007, Quebral (First
VP and Treausurer) informed Borela (President) through a letter that Mendoza and
several others failed to pay the union dues in violation of Sec. 1(g) Art. IX of the
union’s constitution and by-laws. Thus, the President referred the charge to the union
grievance committee for investigation. After a hearing, the committee recommended
that Mendoza be suspended for 30 days which the executive board unanimously
approved. Thereafter, a letter was sent to Mendoza informing him of his suspension.
Mendoza filed a letter stating his intention to appeal to the general membership
assembly, but the executive board did not act on it. In August 2007, Mendoza was
againt suspended for failure to pay union dues, which he again appealed, but was
unheaded. During his suspension, the elections for union officers took place. He filed
a petition to run was Vice President, but was disqualified for not being a member of
good standing because of his suspension. In October 2007, he was again notified of
his failure to pay union dues, but this time his penalty was expulsion. (Note that in all
3 suspensions and the expulsion, it was always after the EB unanimously approved the
recommendation of the grievance committee). Again he filed an appeal to the
executive board, but it was unheaded.

Mendoza thereafter joined union 2. Other union 1 members wanted to join union 2,
but they were threatened that if they did so, they would not get benefits from the new
CBA. In union 1’s proposed CBA, a provision stated that in the event of retrencement,
non-union 1 members shall be removed first, and that only union 1 members would
receive a bonus. Mendoza filed a complaint with the LA for unfair labor practice (his
illegal termination from union 1 for non-payment of dues) and for unlawful
interference, coercion, and violation of the rights of the employees to self-organization
because of the CBA which contained provisions discriminatory against non- union 2
members. The officers of union 1 countered that such is an intra- union dispute that is
not within the jurisidiction of the LA.

LA: referred the case back to the Union for the General Assembly to act or deliberate
upon Mendoza’s appeal. (because of non-exhaustion of admin remedies)

NLRC: declared the LA decision null and void for lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed.

The issues in this case are W/N the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case at
bar? YES. While it is true that some of Mendoza’s causes of action constitute intra-
union cases cognizable by the BLR for being an intra- union dispite, Mendoza’s
charge of unfair labor practices falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the labor arbiters.

W/N the executive board committed ULP? YES. Union 1’s constitution and by-
laws clearly state that in cases of suspension and termination, the member has 3 and 7
days respectively to file an appeal to the executive board which will be heard by the
general membership assembly. Here, Mendoza was illegally suspended for the second
time, and thereafter unlawfully expelled from union 1 due to the executive board’s
failure to act on his written appeals. Because of their inaction, Mendoza was
unceremoniously suspended, disqualified and deprived of his right to run for the
position of union 1’s Vice President in the election of officers, expelled from union 1,
and forced to join another union, union 2. For these, the executive board is guilty of
unfair labor practices under Article 249(a) and (b) -- that is, violation of Mendoza’s
right to self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of his union
membership.

DOCTRINE: Article 247 of the Labor Code states that the civil aspects of all cases
involving unfair labor practices, which may include claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney’ss fees and other affirmative relief,
shall be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters.

11. CEPALCO v. TUCP

The 2 cases involve TUCP (UNION) filing against CEPALCO and CESCO with the
same charges involving two different contracting arrangements respectively. TUCP is
the sole CB agent of the rank-and-file employees of CEPALCO. CEPALCO entered
into a Contract for Meter reading(case1) and Contract for Warehousing Works(case2).
As a result the employees and union members of CEPALCO were relieved, assigned
in floating positions, and replaced with CESCO workers. This prompt the union
members to file a complaint in the NLRC for ULP against the companies. UNION
claimed that CEPALCO's act of contracting out services, which used to be part of the
functions of the regular union members, is violative of Article 259 (c). Union alleged
that it would ultimately result in the dissipation of Union’s membership in CEPALCO.
Moreover, the UNION argued that the workers placed by CESCO must be deemed
regular rank-and-file employees of CEPALCO. LA and NLRC dismissed the
complaints. CA however found that CESCO is a labor-only contractor while there is
NO ULP on the part of CEPALCO.

Issue: Whether or not the issue on CESCO being a labor only contractor is moot
by absolving CEPALCO of the ULP charges? NO. The issue was not dead, it is the
preliminary argument of the UNION to prove there is ULP and there is nothing infirm
in passing upon the matter of labor-only contracting. Whether or not UNION is a
real party-in-interest? NO. UNION failed to demonstrate how it stands to be
benefited or injured by a judgment and CESCO employees are the ones entitled to
seek reliefs (Relevant) Whether or not CEPALCO contracting out services
amounted to ULP? NO – The UNION failed to provide substantial evidence that
would constitute ULP; they failed to show how contracting out violated their right to
self-organization. They focused on averments against CEPALCO and CESCO’s
arrangement; and failed to provide the link to ULP.

DOCTRINE: Labor-only contracting is considered as a form of ULP when the

same is devised by the employer to "interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of their rights to self-organization.” All ULP involves infringement
of the right to self-organize. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are
NOT ULP. Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if
it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees
to self-organize.