VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 413: Dayao vs. Commission On Elections

G.R. No. 193643. January 29, 2013.
*
ANTONIO D. DAYAO, ROLANDO P. RAMIREZ and ADELIO R. CAPCO, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 193704. January 29, 2013.*
FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondents.
Election Law; Party-List System; For the Commission on Elections to validly exercise its statutory
power to cancel the registration of a party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due
notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds
for disqualification in Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 exists.—Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds
and procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation, viz.: Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of
Registration.—The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious sect
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* EN BANC.
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VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 413
Dayao vs. Commission on Elections
or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates
violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving
support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares
untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to
participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered. For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a
party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the
party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.
Same; Same; Each accreditation handed by the Commission on Elections to party-list organizations
can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress, thru the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), to corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code; A party-list organization,
like a corporation, owes its legal existence to the concession of its franchise from the State, thru the
Commission on Elections; Being a mere concession, it may be revoked by the granting authority upon the
existence of certain conditions.—Each accreditation handed by the COMELEC to party-list organizations
can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress, thru the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), to corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code. Franchise is a right or
privilege conferred by law. It emanates from a sovereign power and the grant is inherently a legislative
power. It may, however, be derived indirectly from the state through an agency to which the power has
been clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress prescribes the conditions on which the grant
of a franchise may be made. The power to pass upon, refuse or deny the application for registration of any
corporation or partnership is vested with the SEC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A. R.A.
No 7941, on the other hand, is the legislative act that delegates to the COMELEC the power to grant
franchises in the form of accreditation to people’s organization desirous of participating in the party-list
sys-
414
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
tem of representation. Corporations formed under the Corporation Code become juridical entities
only when they are granted registration by the SEC in the same way that people’s organizations obtain
legal existence as a party-list group only upon their accreditation with the COMELEC. A party-list
organization, like a corporation, owes its legal existence to the concession of its franchise from the State,
thru the COMELEC. Being a mere concession, it may be revoked by the granting authority upon the
existence of certain conditions. The power to revoke and grounds for revocation are aptly provided in
Section 6(1) of P.D. No. 902-A, for corporations and Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 for party-list
organizations.
Same; Same; The fact that a franchise/accreditation may be revoked means that it can never be
final and conclusive.—The fact that a franchise/accreditation may be revoked means that it can never be
final and conclusive. A fortiori, the factual findings leading to the grant of the franchise/accreditation can
never attain finality as well. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating it can never attain
perpetual and irrefutable conclusiveness as against the power that grants it. The circumstances of the
grantee are subject to constant review and the franchise/accreditation from which it derives its existence
may be suspended or revoked at the will of the granting authority. The separate instances when the
COMELEC can check the qualifications of party-list groups entail distinct statutory powers—the power
to register which includes the power to refuse registration, and the power to cancel the registration so
granted. Necessarily then, proceedings involving the exercise of one power is independent of the other
such that factual findings in the proceedings for a petition for registration are not conclusive with respect
to the factual issues that may be raised in a complaint for cancellation.
Same; Same; In Bello v. COMELEC, 637 SCRA 59 (2010) the Supreme Court confirmed that a
complaint for the cancellation of party-list registration, aside from a petition for the disqualification of
the party-list nominee, provides a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy”, against a party-list organization
alleged to have failed to comply with Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 which requires a
party-list group and its nominees to submit documentary evidence to prove that they belong to a
marginalized and underrepresented sector.—In Bello v. COMELEC, 637 SCRA 59 (2010), the Court
confirmed that a complaint for the cancellation of party-list registration,
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aside from a petition for the disqualification of the party-list nominee, provides a “plain, speedy and
adequate remedy”, against a party-list organization alleged to have failed to comply with Section 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 which requires a party-list group and its nominees to submit
documentary evidence to prove that they belong to a marginalized and underrepresented sector. In the
recent ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party-List v. COMELEC, 646 SCRA 93 (2011), the Court
reiterated that Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 validates the authority of the COMELEC, not only to register
political parties, organizations or coalitions, but also to cancel their registration based on the same legal
grounds. Such authority emanates from no less than Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Same; Same; It is the role of the Commission on Elections to ensure the realization of the intent of
the Constitution to give genuine power to those who have less in life by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, by seeing to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list system.—It is the role of the
COMELEC to ensure the realization of the intent of the Constitution to give genuine power to those who
have less in life by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, by seeing to it that only
those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the
party-list system. To effectively discharge this role, R.A. No. 7941 grants the COMELEC the power not
only to register party-list groups but also to review and cancel their registration. In ruling that the finality
of its Resolution dated January 5, 2010 stretched to the accreditation of LPGMA, the COMELEC
practically enfeebled and denied its own power to cancel what it is exclusively empowered to grant.
Same; Same; The party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and
underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law.—In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001) the Court explained that the “laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections” referred to in paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, which declares the
underlying policy for the law that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens become members
of the House of Representatives, viz.: Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which
416
disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations.
These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to “enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to
become members of the House of Representatives.” A party or an organization, therefore, that does not
comply with this policy must be disqualified. The party-list system of representation was crafted for the
marginalized and underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is
no need to categorically mention that “those who are not marginalized and underrepresented are
disqualified.” As state policy, it must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties
and other organizations under the party-list system.
VELASCO, JR., J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Party-List System; View that once COMELEC, after due proceedings, issues a
certificate of registration under prevailing COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the corresponding issuance
attains finality insofar as the right of the party-list organization to participate in the elections is
concerned; The previous grant of a certificate of registration in favor of a party-list organization should
operate to vest it with the right to participate in the elections, unless it voluntarily chooses not to file its
manifestation of intention to run in an upcoming election, or its certificate of registration is subsequently
canceled by COMELEC in a petition for cancellation under Section 6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7941 or
the Party-List System Act.—With all due respect, I submit that once COMELEC, after due proceedings,
issues a certificate of registration under prevailing COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the corresponding
issuance attains finality insofar as the right of the PLO to participate in the elections is concerned. The
decision on the registration of the organization, inclusive of its qualifications, becomes a settled
matter, sans any appeal. The old familiar rule is that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments, decisions
or orders of courts and administrative bodies must become final at sometime; that closed proceedings
should remain closed. The previous grant of a certificate of registration in favor of a PLO should operate
to vest it with the right to participate in the elections, unless it voluntarily chooses not to file its
manifestation of intention to run in an upcoming election, or its certificate of registration is subse-
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quently canceled by COMELEC in a petition for cancellation under Section 6 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7941 or the Party-List System Act.
Same; Same; View that the cancellation of registration or the challenge to accreditation should be
limited to acts committed or causes and events occurring after the grant of the certificate of registration.
The Commission on Elections cannot, whether motu proprio or through a verified complaint, consider the
cancellation of a party list’s certificate of registration based on grounds that are alleged to be existing
even prior to the registration.—It should be made clear enough that a grant of said certificate of
registration does not translate to the PLO being impervious to an action for cancellation of registration, or
to be more precise, to cancellation of accreditation. As the ponencia aptly puts it, the accreditation of a
PLO, following the issuance of a certificate of registration, can never attain perpetual and irrefutable
conclusiveness against the granting authority or accord finality to the factual findings of the COMELEC
on the qualifications of the group. I agree with the ponencia’s formulation, but with this qualification:
the cancellation of registration or the challenge to accreditation should, I submit, be limited to acts
committed or causes and events occurring after the grant of the certificate of registration. The
COMELEC cannot, whether motu proprio or through a verified complaint, consider the cancellation of a
party list’s certificate of registration based on grounds that are alleged to be existing even prior to the
registration.
Same; Same; View that while it may be that denial or refusal of registration, on one hand, and
cancellation of registration or accreditation, on the other, share the same grounds and are initiated in the
same way, i.e., motu proprio or through a verified complaint, it cannot plausibly be the intention of the
law that a party-list organization’s registration is perpetually open to challenges for cancellation.—The
rule enunciated in Sec. 6, RA 7941 is that the COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint
of an interested party, deny the registration of the PLO on any of the grounds listed in said section.
Cancellation of registration or accreditation, on the other hand, while concededly also based on the same
grounds enumerated in Sec. 6, is different from refusal to accredit the PLO in that the latter presupposes a
prior registration. Again following Sec. 6, this may be done motu proprio or through a verified complaint
filed by an interested party. While it may be that denial or refusal of registration, on
418
one hand, and cancellation of registration or accreditation, on the other, share the same grounds and
are initiated in the same way, i.e., motu proprio or through a verified complaint, it cannot plausibly be the
intention of the law that a PLO’s registration is perpetually open to challenges for cancellation. The
“cancellation” referred to in Sec. 6 is different from “refusal,” in that refusal is proper if, at the outset, the
COMELEC finds that a PLO seeking registration is not qualified or is disqualified from participating in
the elections, that is to say, from the start, there already exists a ground not to allow it from participating
in the elections. Cancellation of registration, meanwhile, refers to instances when there is already a
certificate of registration, but after the grant of such certificate, a ground for disqualification on the part of
the PLO concerned ensues, or that it subsequently fails to maintain all the qualifications of a PLO under
pertinent laws.
Same; Same; View that once the party-list organization loses its accreditation for causes recognized
by law, then it loses its eligibility for a party-list seat. Accordingly, its nominee, if there be any sitting in
the House of Representatives, loses his or her standing to represent the organization.—While the
winning PLO nominee sits in the Lower House, it is not the nominee who is actually elected into office,
but the PLO itself. The PLO is, in fine, the candidate, the one voted upon, and the “member” of the Lower
House. While there is still no clear-cut ruling on the issue of whether proceedings questioning the
qualifications of PLOs after proclamation are within the jurisdiction of HRET or COMELEC, it is my
considered view that the said cases fall properly under the jurisdiction of HRET as the “sole judge” of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the “members” of the House of
Representatives, following its constitutional mandate under Sec. 17, Article VI of the Constitution. It may
be stated in this regard that a nominee sits as a representative of a PLO. Once the PLO loses its
accreditation for causes recognized by law, then it loses its eligibility for a party-list seat. Accordingly, its
nominee, if there be any sitting in the House of Representatives, loses his or her standing to represent the
organization.
Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); Jurisdiction; View that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COME-
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VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 419
LEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the House ends, and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction
begins.—On the matter of which between the COMELEC and HRET possesses jurisdiction over
questions respecting a member of the Lower House, Guerrero v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 458 (2000),
teaches that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House ends, and the HRET’s jurisdiction begins.
ABAD, J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Party-List System; View that Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 does not, contrary to
the ponencia’s thesis, set rules of procedure from which one can draw inferences based on what such
rules fail to expressly provide; The detailed rules that govern refusal or cancellation of registration are
found in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.—Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 does not, contrary to the
ponencia’s thesis, set rules of procedure from which one can draw inferences based on what such rules
fail to expressly provide. Section 6 is pure substantive law. It does not pretend to prescribe a
comprehensive and unique procedure designed for the cancellation of registration of a party-list
organization. What it substantially does is simply vest on the COMELEC the power to refuse registration
or order its cancellation on specified grounds. The detailed rules that govern refusal or cancellation of
registration are found in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Same; Same; View that the power to refuse registration provided in Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 refers
to the action that the Commission on Elections may take in relation to an original petition for registration
as party-list organization under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941.—Obviously, the power to refuse registration
provided in Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 refers to the action that the COMELEC may take in relation to an
original petition for registration as party-list organization under Section 5 of R.A. 7941. To “refuse”
registration is to presume that a petition for registration has been made. On the other hand, it is implicit
that the power to cancel registration refers to the action that the COMELEC may take after it has already
420
granted registration. The ponencia is right that an action for cancellation of registration previously
granted is allowed under Section 6. But it cannot be implied from the right to bring an action to cancel
registration under Section 6 that a COMELEC resolution granting registration can never become final.
The COMELEC exercises adjudicative power when it grants or refuses registration or cancels one that it
has previously granted. Consequently, like the exercise of any adjudicative power that the law vests in the
COMELEC, its ruling, which either grants or refuses registration or cancels one previously granted, can
attain finality after 15 days following its promulgation.
Same; Same; View that the grounds for cancellation of registration assume that the grantee
committed fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining registration.—Can the finality of a ruling granting
registration be reconciled with the provision of R.A. 7941 which allows the filing of an action for
cancellation of registration that the COMELEC has previously granted? The answer is yes. The grounds
for cancellation of registration assume that the grantee committed fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining
registration. For instance, the COMELEC rules require a party-list applicant to state in its verified petition
“(8) That it is not a religious sect or denomination,” a ground for refusing or cancelling registration.
Religious sects or denominations are disqualified from running as party-list organizations. If it turns out
that the grantee of registration lied in its petition because it in fact merely fronts for a religious sect, any
voter can file an action for the cancellation of its registration. A decision fraudulently obtained cannot
become final.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jephte S. Daliva for petitioners in G.R. No. 193643.
Rufino M. Margate, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 193704.
Melito A. Vergara III and Amado Paolo C. Dimayuga for private respondent LPG
Marketers Association, Inc.
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VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 421
REYES, J.:
The Case
At bench are consolidated1 petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with

prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated August 5, 20102 and September
6, 2010.3
The first assailed resolution denied the complaint filed by petitioners Antonio D. Dayao,
Rolando P. Ramirez, Adelio R. Capco and Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. (FPII) for the
cancellation of the registration of private respondent LPG Marketers Association, Inc. (LPGMA)
as a sectoral organization under the Party-List System of Representation. The second assailed
resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The individual petitioners are dealers of different brands of liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG)4 while petitioner FPII is an association comprised of entities engaged in various industries
in the country.5
Private respondent LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small
industry players in the LPG and energy sector who have banded together in order to pursue their
common objective of providing quality, safe and
_______________
1 Per Resolution dated October 12, 2010; Rollo (G.R. No. 193704), p. 835.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 193643), pp. 65-70.
3 Id., at pp. 85-90.
4 Total Gas for Antonio Dayao, Petron Gasul for Adelio Capco and Shellane for Rolando Ramirez; id., at p. 260.
5 Rollo (G.R. No. 193704), p. 678.
422
reasonably priced gas and oil products.6 The group advocates access to reasonably priced LPG by
household consumers.7
On May 21, 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its cause by seeking party-list accreditation
with the COMELEC, through a petition for registration as a sectoral organization for the purpose
of participating in the May 10, 2010 elections under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 or the Party-
List System Act. LPGMA claimed that it has special interest in the LPG industry and other allied
concerns. It averred that one of its programs is the promotion of fair trade practices and
prevention of re-entry of cartels and monopolies by actively pursuing the initial gains of oil
deregulation, and vigilant advocacy for the curtailment of bureaucratic and regulatory procedures
and governmental practices detrimental to the entry, development and well-being of small LPG
entrepreneurs.8
After the requisite publication, verification and hearing, 9 and without any apparent opposition,
LPGMA’s petition was approved by the COMELEC in its Resolution dated January 5, 2010.10
Four (4) months thereafter, individual petitioners lodged before the COMELEC a complaint
for the cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a party-list organization. 11 They were later on
joined by FPII as a complainant-in-intervention.12
The complaint was docketed as SPP No. 10-010 and it proffered in essence that LPGMA does
not represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers
_______________
6 Id., at p. 192.
7 Rollo (G.R. No. 193643), p. 148.
8 Rollo (G.R. No. 193704), pp. 77-190.
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 193643), pp. 1163-1168, 1238-1244.
10 Id., at pp. 246-252.
11 Id., at pp. 260-269.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 193704), pp. 678-688. The motion for intervention was approved in COMELEC Resolution dated
August 5, 2010, Rollo (G.R. No. 193643), pp. 65-70.
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VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 423
and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers
and independent re-fillers of LPG that control 45% of the national LPG retail market and have
significant ownership interests in various LPG refilling plants. To buttress the complaint, FPII
emphasized that the business of marketing and refilling LPG requires substantial working capital
as it involves the purchase of LPG from importers or big oil players in the country, establishment
of refilling plants and safety auxiliary equipments, purchase or lease of thousands of LPG
containers, mobilization of a marketing, distribution and delivery network. FPII also alleged that
LPGMA is a mere lobby group that espouses their own interests before the Congress and the
Department of Energy.
In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does
not require that party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or
underrepresented sector of the society. It also averred that the ground cited by the petitioners is
not one of those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just trying to
resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition for registration.13
In its first assailed Resolution dated August 5, 2010,14 the COMELEC dismissed the
complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among
the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is actually a
belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been approved with
finality on January 5, 2010. The ruling was reiterated in the COMELEC Resolution dated
September 6, 201015 denying the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.16
_______________
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 193643), pp. 601-609.
14 Id., at pp. 65-70.
15 Id., at pp. 85-90.
16 For the individual petitioners, id., at pp. 105-117; For petitioner FPII, Rollo (G.R. No. 193704), pp. 711-718.
424
Pivotal to the said resolutions are the ensuing ratiocinations of the COMELEC, viz.:
LPGMA’s registration was approved x x x as early as 05 January 2010. Instead of opposing said
registration or intervening therein after having been constructively notified thereof by its publication,
[petitioners] waited almost four (4) entire months before filing the instant complaint. The purpose of
publication in these kinds of cases is similar to that of land registration cases, which is “to apprise the
whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause
may do so.” This belated filing x x x is an unfortunate attempt to circumvent the obviously final and
executory nature of the Resolution dated 05 January 2010. Granting the present complaint will only
reward [petitioners’] inaction x x x. (Citations omitted)
17
The [petitioners] must be reminded that the matter has already been ruled upon. In the Resolution
promulgated on January 5, 2010 x x x, this Commission (First Division) has resolved to grant the Petition
for Registration of LPGMA as a sectoral organization under the party-list system of representation. After
a thorough evaluation of the Petition, the Commission (First Division) has concluded that LPGMA truly
represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector. With respect to the said conclusion, absent any
circumstance subsequent to the promulgation of the mentioned Resolution which would call for the
cancellation of registration of LPGMA, the same can no longer be disturbed by this Commission. To
warrant a cancellation of LPGMA’s registration, there should be a strong showing that there has been a
change in the relevant factual matters surrounding the Petition x x x.
18
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC, the petitioners now implore the Court
to determine the correctness of the COMELEC resolutions dated August 5, 2010 and September
6, 2010.
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 68-69.
18 Id., at p. 89.
426
The Arguments of the Parties
After directing the respondents to comment on the petitions, 19 the Court received on March
17, 2011 from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a Manifestation and Motion to Remand
(In Lieu of Comment).20 According to the OSG, since the COMELEC failed to resolve the factual
issue on the qualifications of LPGMA as a registered party-list organization, the case must be
remanded to the electoral body for summary hearing and reception of evidence on the matter.
For its part, LPGMA retorted that another hearing would be a superfluity because the
COMELEC has already heard and verified LPGMA’s qualifications during the proceedings for
its petition for registration. LPGMA asserts that the petitions should instead be dismissed as they
involve factual questions that cannot be entertained in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.21
On December 26, 2012, LPGMA manifested22 to the Court that pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution dated December 13, 2012, LPGMA passed the recent automatic review conducted by
the COMELEC on the qualifications of party-list groups. LPGMA was found compliant with the
guidelines set by law and jurisprudence and its accreditation was retained for purposes of the
2013 party-list elections.
Ruling of the Court
There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation. However,
in light of COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions ought to be
dismissed.
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 1109-1110.
20 Id., at pp. 1212-1224.
21 Id., at pp. 1120-1142.
22 Id., at pp. 1364-1369.
426
An opposition to a petition for
registration is not a condition
precedent to the filing of a
complaint for cancellation.
Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-
list accreditation, viz.:
Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse
or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-
list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the
party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section
6 exists.427
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 427
Section 6 clearly does not require that an opposition to the petition for registration be
previously interposed so that a complaint for cancellation can be entertained. Since the law does
not impose such a condition, the COMELEC, notwithstanding its delegated administrative
authority to promulgate rules for the implementation of election laws, cannot read into the law
that which it does not provide. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-
related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them.23
Moreover, an opposition can be reasonably expected only during the petition for registration
proceedings which involve the COMELEC’s power to register a party-list group, as
distinguished from the entirely separate power invoked by the complaint, which is the power to
cancel.
The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately apparent from their basic definitions.
To refuse is to decline or to turn down, 24 while to cancel is to annul or remove. 25 Adopting such
meanings within the context of Section 6, refusal of registration happens during the inceptive
stage when an organization seeks admission into the roster of COMELEC-registered party-list
organizations through a petition for registration. Cancellation on the other hand, takes place after
the fact of registration when an inquiry is done by the COMELEC, motu proprio or upon a
verified complaint, on whether a registered party-list organization still holds the qualifications
imposed by law. Refusal is handed down to a petition for registration while cancellation is
decreed on the registration itself after the petition has been approved.
A resort to the rules of statutory construction yields a similar conclusion.
_______________
23 Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 396 Phil. 419, 424-425; 342 SCRA 244, 256 (2000).
24 ROGET’S II, The New Thesaurus (1988), p. 400.
25 Id., at p. 72.
428
The legal meaning of the term “and/or” between “refusal” and “cancellation” should be taken
in its ordinary significance “refusal and/or cancellation” means “refusal and cancellation” or
“refusal or cancellation”. It has been held that the intention of the legislature in using the term
“and/or” is that the word “and” and the word “or” are to be used interchangeably.26
The term “and/or” means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive
“or” or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the
purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a
construction which by the use of the disjunctive “or” alone will exclude the combination of several of the
alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive “and” will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives
standing alone. 27
Hence, effect shall be given to both “refusal and cancellation” and “refusal or cancellation”
according to how Section 6 intended them to be employed. The word “and” is a conjunction used
to denote a joinder or union; it is pertinently defined as meaning “together with”, “joined with”,
“along or together with.”28 The use of “and” in Section 6 was necessitated by the fact that refusal
and cancellation of party-list registration share similar grounds, manner of initiation and
procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing. With respect to the said matters,
“refusal” and “cancellation” must be taken together. The word “or”, on the other hand, is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one
_______________
26 See China Banking Corporation v. HDMF, 366 Phil. 913, 929; 307 SCRA 443, 457 (1999).
27 Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, p. 206 (2003), citing A.E. Davidson v. F. W. Wollworth Co., 198 SE 738, 118
ALR 1363 (1938); Annotations, 118 ALR 1367 (1939); China Banking Corporation v. HDMF, id., at p. 928; p. 457.
28 Id., citing the concurring opinion of Justice Castro, Phil. Constitution Ass’n., Inc. v. Mathay, 124 Phil. 890, 924; 18
SCRA 300, 329-330 (1966).
429
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 429
thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.29 As such, “refusal or cancellation”, consistent with
their disjunctive meanings, must be taken individually to mean that they are separate instances
when the COMELEC can exercise its power to screen the qualifications of party-list
organizations for purposes of participation in the party-list system of representation.
That this is the clear intent of the law is bolstered by the use simply of the word “or” in the
first sentence of Section 6 that “[t]he COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint
of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition.”
Consequently, the COMELEC’s conclusion that the complaint for cancellation, filed four (4)
months after the petition was approved, is actually a belated opposition, obliterates the
distinction between the power to register/refuse and the power to cancel. Since an opposition
may only be sensibly interposed against a petition for registration, the proceedings for which
involve the COMELEC’s power to register, it is wrong to impose it as a condition for the
exercise of the COMELEC’s entirely separate power to cancel. As such, the absence of an
opposition to a petition for registration cannot serve to bar any interested party from questioning,
through a complaint for cancellation, the qualifications of a party-list group.
II. The accreditation of a party-list
group can never attain perpetual and
irrefutable conclusiveness against the
granting authority.
_______________
29 Id., at p. 204; see also Heirs of George Y. Poe v. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 156302, April 7,
2009, 584 SCRA 152, 168.
430
There is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5, 2010 granting
LPGMA’s registration has since become final. Such finality, however, pertains only to the
Resolution itself and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list organization.
The said Resolution, as in any other resolution granting the registration of any other
organization desirous of party-list accreditation, did nothing more but to vest with LPGMA the
right to participate in the party-list elections, i.e., file a manifestation of its intent to participate
and have the same given due course by the COMELEC, the right to field its nominees, the right
to exercise all that is bestowed by our election laws to election candidates (hold campaigns,
question the canvass of election returns, etc.), and the right to assume office should it obtain the
required number of votes. With respect to such matters, the COMELEC resolution was already
final. LPGMA’s right to run, as it did so run, during the 2010 party-list elections is already
beyond challenge.
However, the Resolution did not create in LPGMA’s favor a perpetual and indefeasible right
to its accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to
the factual findings of the COMELEC on the qualifications of the group. Both the accreditation
and the facts substantiating the same, can be reviewed and revoked at any time by the
COMELEC, motu proprio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for
cancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
Each accreditation handed by the COMELEC to party-list organizations can be likened to the
franchise granted by Congress, thru the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to
corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code.
Franchise is a right or privilege conferred by law. It emanates from a sovereign power and the
grant is inherently a legislative power. It may, however, be derived indirectly from the state
through an agency to which the power has been
431
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 431
clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress prescribes the conditions on which the
grant of a franchise may be made.30
The power to pass upon, refuse or deny the application for registration of any corporation or
partnership is vested with the SEC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A. R.A. No
7941, on the other hand, is the legislative act that delegates to the COMELEC the power to grant
franchises in the form of accreditation to people’s organization desirous of participating in the
party-list system of representation.
Corporations formed under the Corporation Code become juridical entities only when they
are granted registration by the SEC in the same way that people’s organizations obtain legal
existence as a party-list group only upon their accreditation with the COMELEC. A party-list
organization, like a corporation, owes its legal existence to the concession of its franchise from
the State, thru the COMELEC.
Being a mere concession, it may be revoked by the granting authority upon the existence of
certain conditions. The power to revoke and grounds for revocation are aptly provided in Section
6(1) of P.D. No. 902-A,31 for corporations and Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 for party-list
organizations.
_______________
30 Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 400 Phil. 307, 330; 346 SCRA 485, 504 (2000). (Citations omitted)
31 P.D. No. 902-A, Sec. 6.
x x x x
(i) To suspend, or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations,
partnerships or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law, including the following:
[1] Fraud in procuring its certificate of registration;
[2] Serious misrepresentation as to what the corporation can do or is doing to the great prejudice of or
damage to the general public;
432
The fact that a franchise/accreditation may be revoked means that it can never be final and
conclusive. A fortiori, the factual findings leading to the grant of the franchise/accreditation can
never attain finality as well. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating it can never attain
perpetual and irrefutable conclusiveness as against the power that grants it. The circumstances of
the grantee are subject to constant review and the franchise/accreditation from which it derives
its existence may be suspended or revoked at the will of the granting authority.
The separate instances when the COMELEC can check the qualifications of party-list groups
entail distinct statutory powers―the power to register which includes the power to refuse
registration, and the power to cancel the registration so granted. Necessarily then, proceedings
involving the exercise of one power is independent of the other such that factual findings in the
proceedings for a petition for registration are not conclusive with respect to the factual issues that
may be raised in a complaint for cancellation.
Further, it must be noted that refusal and cancellation share similar grounds. The registration
of a putative party-list group can only be granted if none of the disqualifications in Section 6
exists. Conversely, a complaint for cancellation will prosper if any of the same grounds in
Section 6 is present. Inevitably then, a negative finding of disqualification in a petition for
registration is the very same fact that will be questioned in a complaint for cancellation. Hence,
to say that
_______________
[3] Refusal to comply or defiance of any lawful order of the Commission restraining commission of acts
which would amount to a grave violation of its franchise;
[4] Continuous inoperation for a period of at least five (5) years;
[5] Failure to file by-laws within the required period;
[6] Failure to file required reports in appropriate forms as determined by the Commission within the
prescribed period;
433
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 433
the findings leading to the grant of registration are final and conclusive with respect to the
qualification of the party-list group will effectively put in vain any complaint for cancellation
that may be filed. It leads to the perilous conclusion that the registration of a party-list group,
once granted, is unassailable and perpetual which, in turn, will render nugatory the equally
existing power of the COMELEC to cancel the same. R.A. No. 7941 could not have
contemplated such an absurdity.
The Court has recognized the COMELEC’s cancellation power in several occasions.
In Bello v. COMELEC,32 the Court confirmed that a complaint for the cancellation of party-list
registration, aside from a petition for the disqualification of the party-list nominee, provides a
“plain, speedy and adequate remedy”, against a party-list organization alleged to have failed to
comply with Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 880733 which requires a party-list group
and its nominees to submit documentary evidence to prove that they belong to a marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
In the recent ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party-List v. COMELEC,34 the Court
reiterated that Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 validates the authority of the COMELEC, not only to
register political parties, organizations or coalitions,
_______________
32 G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 59, 71.
33 Section 6 of the Resolution provides that the party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence
to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent. It likewise provides that the COMELEC Law Department
shall require party-list groups and nominees to make the required documentary submissions, if not already complied with
prior to the effectivity of the Resolution, not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of nominees.
34 G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011, 646 SCRA 93, 103-104.
434
but also to cancel their registration based on the same legal grounds. Such authority emanates
from no less than Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.
Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and
adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law. (Underscoring ours)
It is the role of the COMELEC to ensure the realization of the intent of the Constitution to
give genuine power to those who have less in life by enabling them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves, by seeing to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list system. 35 To effectively
discharge this role, R.A. No. 7941 grants the COMELEC the power not only to register party-list
groups but also to review and cancel their registration.
In ruling that the finality of its Resolution dated January 5, 2010 stretched to the accreditation
of LPGMA, the COMELEC practically enfeebled and denied its own power to cancel what it is
exclusively empowered to grant.
_______________
35 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil. 308, 334; 359 SCRA 698, 719
(2001).
435
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 435
Under paragraph 5 of Section 6,
a party-list organization may be
disqualified on the ground that
its officers and members do not
belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
The allegation in the complaint for cancellation, that the incorporators, officers and members
of LPGMA do not belong to the marginalized or underrepresented sector, is within the ambit of
paragraph 5 of Section 6.
In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,36 the Court explained that the “laws,
rules or regulations relating to elections” referred to in paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No.
7941,37 which declares the underlying policy for the law that marginalized and underrepresented
Filipino citizens become members of the House of Representatives, viz.:
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to
comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that
the party-list system seeks to “enable Filipino citizens
_______________
36 Id.
37 R.A. No. 7941, Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances
to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
436
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives.” A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply
with this policy must be disqualified. 38
The party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and underrepresented
and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is no need to categorically
mention that “those who are not marginalized and underrepresented are disqualified.” As state
policy, it must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.39
All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for
cancellation of LPGMA’s party-list accreditation. In the ordinary course of procedure, the herein
complaint should be remanded to the COMELEC considering that the poll body did not proceed
to make a proximate determination of the present circumstances of LPGMA’s qualifications. In
view, however of superseding incidents, the issue involved in the complaint for cancellation can
be deemed to have been already settled and a remand to the COMELEC would only be circuitous
and dilatory.
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 40 which subjected to
summary evidentiary hearings all existing and registered party-list groups, including LPGMA, to
assess their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines set
in Ang Bagong Bayani. The Resolution stated, among others, that the registration of all non-
compliant groups shall be cancelled. LPGMA
_______________
38 Supra note 35, at p. 344; 730.
39 Id.
40 In the matter of: (1) the automatic review by the Commission En Banc of Pending Petitions for Registration of
Party-List Groups; and (2) setting for hearing the accredited party-list groups or organizations which are existing and
which have filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 2013 national and local elections.
437
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 437
submitted to a factual and evidentiary hearing before the COMELEC en banc on August 28,
2012.
On December 13, 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution 41 identifying and listing the
party-list groups found to have complied with the qualifications set by law and jurisprudence.
The list of retained party-list groups included LPGMA. Pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
After exhaustive deliberation and careful review of the records, the Commission en banc finds the
following groups accredited with the party-list system compliant with the law and jurisprudence, and thus
resolves to retain their registration for purposes of allowing them to participate in the 2013 elections.
These groups and organizations, as well as their respective nominees, possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications under the law. Moreover, these groups belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors they seek to represent; they have genuinely and continuously supported their
members and constituents, as shown by their track records.
In order to streamline the list of accredited groups that will be allowed to participate in the 2013
elections, both the existing groups retained, and the new applicants whose petitions for registration have
been granted, shall be listed herein. The Commission however finds it necessary to identify the groups
retained or allowed but with dissent from some of the Commissioners, thus:
x x x x
Table 2
EXISTING PARTY-LIST RETAINED (With dissent)
PARTY-LIST ACRONYM
x x x x
35 LPG Marketers Association, Inc. LPGMA
x x x x 42

_______________
41 A certified true copy thereof was submitted to the Court by LPGMA on December 26, 2012; Rollo (G.R. No.
193643), pp. 1370-1384.
42 Id., at pp. 1381-1382.
438
Evidently, the COMELEC has already determined and declared that the present factual
circumstances of LPGMA meet the qualifications imposed by law on party-list groups. It will be
a needless roundabout to still remand the complaint to the COMELEC for it to determine anew
the present state of LPGMA’s qualifications. No useful purpose will be served thereby and it will
just be a tedious process of hearing the factual and evidentiary matters of LPGMA’s
qualifications again. The COMELEC in its Resolution dated December 13, 2012 has passed
upon the issue and all other relevant questions raised in the complaint.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J.), Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Abad, J., With Separate Opinion.
Mendoza, J., On leave.
SEPARATE OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I concur in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Reyes dismissing the instant petitions,
albeit, with regret, I cannot share certain conclusions arrived thereat.
The issue presented in this recourse is whether respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for reasons stated in its assailed
Resolutions of August 5, 2010 and September 6, 2010, the complaint for the cancellation of
respondent LPG Marketers Association’s (LPGMA’s) accreditation as a party-list organi-
439
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 439
zation (PLO). The ponencia resolves the poser in the affirmative and would have the instant
petitions remanded to COMELEC for it to undertake summary evidentiary proceedings on the
qualifications of LPGMA as a party-list group. The remand action is predicated on the postulate
that the COMELEC Resolution of January 5, 2010 granting LPGMA’ s petition for registration
as a sectoral organization for the purpose of the 2010 elections is not final and can never attain
finality vis-à-vis its possession of the qualifications or the lack of them. Owing, however, to
COMELEC Resolution No. 9513, subjecting to summary evidentiary hearings all existing
registered party-list groups, and another recent resolution, finding LPGMA as possessing all of
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the law, the ponencia finds it
unnecessary and a needless roundabout to still remand the petitions to COMELEC for the
purpose stated above.
With the view I take of the case, COMELEC could rightfully dismiss outright the petition for
cancellation commenced with it against LPGMA, regardless of whether it has undertaken,
pursuant to its Resolution No. 9513, a review of the qualifications of PLOs, including that of
LPGMA.
As it were, the petitioners have hardly shown any basis for their ascription of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC. Instead, their petitions indirectly seek to have this Court
review the determination of respondent LPGMA’s qualifications, something that the poll body
has already done before.
This, thus, brings up the question of whether or not the decision of the COMELEC, embodied
in its Resolution of January 5, 2010, granting LPGMA original petition for registration as a
party-list group may be revisited and revoked, as the ponencia urges. With all due respect, I
submit that once COMELEC, after due proceedings, issues a certificate of registration under
prevailing COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the corresponding issuance attains finality insofar as
the right of the PLO to participate in the elections is concerned. The deci-
440
sion on the registration of the organization, inclusive of its qualifications, becomes a settled
matter, sans any appeal. The old familiar rule is that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments,
decisions or orders of courts and administrative bodies must become final at sometime; that
closed proceedings should remain closed.
The previous grant of a certificate of registration in favor of a PLO should operate to vest it
with the right to participate in the elections, unless it voluntarily chooses not to file its
manifestation of intention to run in an upcoming election, or its certificate of registration is
subsequently canceled by COMELEC in a petition for cancellation under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 7941 or the Party-List System Act.
It should be made clear enough that a grant of said certificate of registration does not translate
to the PLO being impervious to an action for cancellation of registration, or to be more precise,
to cancellation of accreditation. As the ponencia aptly puts it, the accreditation of a PLO,
following the issuance of a certificate of registration, can never attain perpetual and irrefutable
conclusiveness against the granting authority or accord finality to the factual findings of the
COMELEC on the qualifications of the group. I agree with the ponencia’s formulation, but with
this qualification: the cancellation of registration or the challenge to accreditation should, I
submit, be limited to acts committed or causes and events occurring after the grant of the
certificate of registration. The COMELEC cannot, whether motu proprio or through a verified
complaint, consider the cancellation of a party list’s certificate of registration based on grounds
that are alleged to be existing even prior to the registration.
To reiterate, when COMELEC issues a certificate of registration in favor of a PLO, it, in
effect, determines that the organization has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
to participate in the elections.
In the present case, the petitioners went to great lengths to discuss their allegations that
LPGMA does not represent a
441
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 441
marginalized or underrepresented sector of society. A closer scrutiny of petitioners’ reference to
paragraphs 5 and 6 of Sec. 6, RA 7941 reveals that instead of the cancellation of the registration
of LPGMA, their contentions still relate to their basic position that LPGMA, composed as it is of
big businesses, is not qualified to be registered as a legitimate PLO, and, hence, not eligible to
participate in party-list elections. Therefore, more than alleging any ground for disqualification
or cancellation of registration, petitioners are, in fact, questioning the qualifications of LPGMA,
which had already been passed upon and considered as basis for the grant of its registration. For
this reason, the petitions must fail.
The petitions were belatedly filed;
petitioners should have filed an
opposition to LPGMA’s Petition
for Registration
COMELEC correctly ruled that the complaint for cancellation based on the above-mentioned
ground was belatedly filed, since LPGMA’s registration had already been approved as early as
January 5, 2010, but it took petitioners several months before filing the complaint for
cancellation of registration. They failed to oppose the registration or intervene in the
proceedings, despite having been constructively notified thereof by its publication. Hence, the
COMELEC Resolution on the registration of LPGMA as a PLO became final.
The rule enunciated in Sec. 6, RA 7941 is that the COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of an interested party, deny the registration of the PLO on any of the grounds
listed in said section. Cancellation of registration or accreditation, on the other hand, while
concededly also based on the same grounds enumerated in Sec. 6, is different from refusal to
accredit the PLO in that the latter presupposes a prior registration. Again following Sec. 6, this
may be done motu proprio or through a verified complaint filed by an interested party.442
While it may be that denial or refusal of registration, on one hand, and cancellation of
registration or accreditation, on the other, share the same grounds and are initiated in the same
way, i.e., motu proprio or through a verified complaint, it cannot plausibly be the intention of the
law that a PLO’s registration is perpetually open to challenges for cancellation.
The “cancellation” referred to in Sec. 6 is different from “refusal,” in that refusal is proper if,
at the outset, the COMELEC finds that a PLO seeking registration is not qualified or is
disqualified from participating in the elections, that is to say, from the start, there already exists a
ground not to allow it from participating in the elections. Cancellation of registration,
meanwhile, refers to instances when there is already a certificate of registration, but after the
grant of such certificate, a ground for disqualification on the part of the PLO concerned ensues,
or that it subsequently fails to maintain all the qualifications of a PLO under pertinent laws.
Petitions are barred by the
January 5, 2010 Resolution of
COMELEC approving the regis-
tration of respondent LPGMA
Petitioners anchor their challenge against the accreditation of LPGMA on the first guideline
set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,1 i.e., that the organization
represents the marginalized and underrepresented sector of society. They allege, in the main,
that: (1) LPGMA, is composed of refillers, marketers, and dealers of liquefied petroleum
gas;2 and (2) its nominees themselves are part of big businesses.3
COMELEC has already passed upon the question of whether or not LPGMA represents a
marginalized/under-
_______________
1 G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
2 Rollo, p. 11.
3 Id., at p. 13.
443
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 443
represented sector during the proceedings relative to its petition for registration. 4 Notably, the
issue of representation is the very same ground petitioners, in their petition for cancellation, had
raised before the COMELEC and now before the Court.
In its January 5, 2010 Resolution granting LPGMA’s petition for registration, the COMELEC
peremptorily found and so declared LPGMA as representing a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. The COMELEC En Banc wrote:
After a thorough evaluation of the Petition, the Commission (First Division) has concluded that
LPGMA truly represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector. With respect to the said conclusion,
absent any circumstance subsequent to the promulgation of the mentioned Resolution which could call for
the cancellation of registration of LPGMA, the same can no longer be disturbed by this Commission. To
warrant a cancellation of LPGMA’s registration, there should be a showing that there has been a change
in the relevant factual matters surrounding the Petition for Registration of LPGMA, which, if considered,
could change the outcome of the said case. Otherwise, the determination of whether a party-list
organization represents the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would be a never-ending
controversy.5
The above ruling should sufficiently address the arguments raised in the petitions before Us.
Indeed, the COMELEC’s determination of a PLO’s qualifications during the registration
proceedings ought to dispose of the issue of its qualification to participate in future elections.
The ruling that the organization is so qualified at the time of its registration should be considered
final and conclusive at some point in time.
The COMELEC cannot be expected to periodically review a PLO’s qualifications on the
basis of concerns that could have been brought up in prior proceedings. It cannot, at every turn,
be asked to evaluate anew a PLO’s eligibility to participate in
_______________
4 Id., at p. 61.
5 Id.
444
the elections heretofore passed upon in an appropriate registration proceeding. It behooves the
Court to prevent this repetitive and unnecessary endeavor. Hence, the dismissal of the instant
petitions is legal as it is practical.
Once proclaimed, HRET has jurisdiction
to pass upon a party-list organization’s qualifications
Should a question regarding a participating PLO’s qualifications is raised before the
COMELEC, but the PLO is subsequently declared and proclaimed to have won a seat or seats in
Congress, the COMELEC loses its jurisdiction over the case. Following such proclamation,
jurisdiction over qualification issues then devolves upon the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), and it is incumbent upon the COMELEC to refer the case to the HRET. If the
same case is pending with the Court when proclamation supervenes, the remand action, if proper,
should be to the HRET.
This is as it should be. While the winning PLO nominee sits in the Lower House, it is not the
nominee who is actually elected into office, but the PLO itself. The PLO is, in fine, the
candidate, the one voted upon, and the “member” of the Lower House. While there is still no
clear-cut ruling on the issue of whether proceedings questioning the qualifications of PLOs after
proclamation are within the jurisdiction of HRET or COMELEC, it is my considered view that
the said cases fall properly under the jurisdiction of HRET as the “sole judge” of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the “members” of the House of
Representatives, following its constitutional mandate under Sec. 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. It may be stated in this regard that a nominee sits as a representative of a PLO.
Once the PLO loses its accreditation for causes recognized by law, then it loses its eligibility for
a party-list seat. Accordingly, its nominee, if there be any sitting in the House of Representatives,
loses his or her standing to represent the organization.445
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 445
On the matter of which between the COMELEC and HRET possesses jurisdiction over
questions respecting a member of the Lower House, Guerrero v. COMELEC6 teaches that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the
House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House ends, and the HRET’s jurisdiction
begins.
In the case here, however, as already discussed above, there is no need to refer the case to
HRET, as the instant petitions have to be rejected for lack of merit.
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I vote to dismiss the petitions but for other reasons.
On May 21, 2009 respondent LPG Marketers Association, Inc. (LPGMA) filed with
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition for registration as a sectoral
organization1 so it could take part in the 2010 party-list elections. 2 LPGMA claimed that it is an
organization of both consumers and small industry players who advocate, among others, an equal
and level playing field in the liquefied petroleum gas or LPG industry with the view to making
quality, safe, and reasonably priced gas and oil products accessible to the people.
In due course, the COMELEC verified, through its Regional Election Director in the National
Capital Region, LPGMA’s existence in the constituency for which it seeks registration.
Following this, the COMELEC ordered the publication of LPGMA’s petition for registration to
give interested parties the opportunity to be heard on the registration. Fol-
_______________
6 G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000, 336 SCRA 458.
1 Docketed as SPP 09-048 (PL).
2 Rollo (G.R. 193643), pp. 126-132.
446
lowing such publication, the COMELEC conducted a hearing in which it verified the legitimacy
and existence of LPGMA, its track record and past activities, the qualifications of its members,
and its financial capability to launch and sustain a nationwide campaign in the 2010 party-list
elections. On January 5, 2010 the COMELEC’s First Division granted LPGMA’s petition for
registration.3
Over three months later or on April 12, 2010 petitioners Antonio D. Dayao, Rolando P.
Ramirez, and Adelio R. Capco filed with the COMELEC a complaint for cancellation of
LPGMA’s party-list registration.4 Petitioners alleged that the incorporators, trustees, and officers
of LPGMA were marketers and independent LPG refillers who had a 45% share in the national
LPG retail market. Hence, the COMELEC could not consider LPGMA members marginalized
and constituted an underrepresented sector of society. On May 6, 2010, four days before the
elections, petitioner Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. intervened and adopted petitioners’
complaint.5
On August 5, 2010 the COMELEC First Division dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the
grounds,6 first, that petitioners failed to cite any of the grounds for cancellation of registration
enumerated in Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) 7941; 7 and second, that petitioners filed a late
opposition to LPGMA’s registration despite notice by publication of its petition in two
newspapers of general circulation. Petitioners waited more than three months after the approval
of registration before filing their opposition.
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 246-252.
4 Id., at pp. 260-267, docketed as SPP 10-010.
5 Rollo (G.R. 193704), pp. 678-684.
6 Rollo (G.R. 193643), pp. 65-70.
7 The Party-List System Act.
447
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 447
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the First Division’s ruling but the COMELEC En
Banc denied the same on September 6, 2010,8 hence, these consolidated petitions.
The Issue Presented
The issue presented in these consolidated petitions is: whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners’ complaint for the cancellation of the party-list
registration of LPGMA for the reasons a) that the complaint failed to state a proper ground for
cancellation of registration; and b) the complaint was filed out of time.
Discussion
In his ponencia, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes would have the Court remand the case to the
COMELEC for it to conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of LPGMA as a
party-list organization had it not been for the fact that the COMELEC issued a Resolution dated
December 13, 2012 finding LPGMA compliant with the qualifications set by law and
jurisprudence. The ponencia theorizes that the factual findings in the petition for registration of
LPGMA are not final and conclusive on the factual issues raised in the complaint for the
cancellation of its registration.
The ponencia points out that it did not matter that petitioners failed to file from the beginning
an opposition to LPGMA’s application for registration as party-list organization.
The ponencia explains that (a) since Section 6 of R.A. 7941 does not require that the party who
initiates an action for cancellation of registration must have previously opposed the registration
and (b) since the same Section 6 sets no period for the filing of a complaint for cancellation of
registration, it follows that petitioners could file their complaint for
_______________
8 Rollo (G.R. 193643), pp. 85-90.
448
cancellation at any time and that the COMELEC was duty bound to hear and adjudicate the
same.
Section 6 of R.A. 7941 provides:
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.—The COMELEC may, motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties
for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
But Section 6 above does not, contrary to the ponencia’s thesis, set rules of procedure from
which one can draw inferences based on what such rules fail to expressly provide. Section 6 is
pure substantive law. It does not pretend to prescribe a comprehensive and unique procedure
designed for the cancellation of registration of a party-list organization. What it substantially
does is simply vest on the COMELEC the power to refuse registration or order its cancellation
on specified grounds. The detailed rules that govern refusal or cancellation of registration are
found in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.449
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 449
Obviously, the power to refuse registration provided in Section 6 above refers to the action
that the COMELEC may take in relation to an original petition for registration as party-list
organization under Section 5 of R.A. 7941.9 To “refuse” registration is to presume that a petition
for registration has been made. On the other hand, it is implicit that the power to cancel
registration refers to the action that the COMELEC may take after it has already granted
registration. The ponencia is right that an action for cancellation of registration previously
granted is allowed under Section 6.
But it cannot be implied from the right to bring an action to cancel registration under Section
6 that a COMELEC resolution granting registration can never become final. The COMELEC
exercises adjudicative power when it grants or refuses registration or cancels one that it has
previously granted.10 Consequently, like the exercise of any adjudicative power that the law vests
in the COMELEC, its ruling, which either grants or refuses registration or cancels one previously
granted, can attain finality after 15 days following its promulgation.11
_______________
9 Section 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition
verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or
sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC
may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
10 Part V, F (Special Proceedings), Rule 32 (Registration of Political Parties or Organizations), COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
11 Section 13(c), Rule 18, COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
450
Can the finality of a ruling granting registration be reconciled with the provision of R.A. 7941
which allows the filing of an action for cancellation of registration that the COMELEC has
previously granted?
The answer is yes. The grounds for cancellation of registration assume that the grantee
committed fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining registration. For instance, the COMELEC
rules require a party-list applicant to state in its verified petition “(8) That it is not a religious sect
or denomination,” a ground for refusing or cancelling registration. Religious sects or
denominations are disqualified from running as party-list organizations. If it turns out that the
grantee of registration lied in its petition because it in fact merely fronts for a religious sect, any
voter can file an action for the cancellation of its registration. A decision fraudulently obtained
cannot become final.
Here, LPGMA, as an applicant in the original petition for registration, carried the burden of
proving the affirmative of its claim that it was entitled to registration as a party-list organization
since it represented a marginalized and underrepresented sector. Thus, although petitioners did
not intervene to oppose LPGMA’s application for registration, the COMELEC heard the
affirmative issue, which the law itself tendered, regarding the marginalized and underrepresented
status of LPGMA’s members. The COMELEC received evidence on that issue and resolved the
same with a ruling that LPGMA met the requirement. And, when no one appealed from that
ruling, the same became final and executory.
Notably, petitioners did not claim in its complaint for cancellation that LPGMA submitted
falsified evidence that misled the COMELEC in granting its registration. Petitioners simply
wanted the COMELEC to reopen the registration proceeding, retry an issue it had already
adjudicated based on evidence, require LPGMA to once again prove its qualifications, and allow
petitioners to present evidence which, ironi-
451
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 451
cally, were already available to them at the time the original registration was being heard.
The LPGMA won in the May 10, 2010 elections, the 18th nationwide among the great
number of sectoral party-list organizations that ran. This is the clearest affirmation of its
qualification.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the consolidated petitions for failure to show that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its challenged orders.
Petitions dismissed.
Notes.—The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of
Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be “those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system,” giving the Legislature wide discretion in
formulating the allocation of party-list seats. (Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency [BANAT] vs. Commission on Elections, 592 SCRA 294 [2009])
The Court cannot recognize Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) to be a party-list
organization fully qualified to run under the party-list system in the coming 2013 party-list
elections since the question of full and total qualification is not ripe for judicial determination
and for the court’s resolution. (Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. Commission on
Elections, 646 SCRA 63 [2011])
——o0o——
VOL. 437, AUGUST 31, 2004 403

Civil Service Commission vs. De la Cruz
G.R. No. 158737. August 31, 2004. *
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ, respondent.

Civil Service Law; Civil Service Commission; Public Officers; It is elementary in the law of public
officers that the power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority.—It is
elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of
the proper authority. In Salles vs. Francisco, et al., we had occasion to rule that, in the appointment or
promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but
also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency
examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those
who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should
be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing
authority.
Same; Same; Same; Not only is the appointing authority the officer primarily responsible for the
administration of the office, he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective
appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the position.—In the appointment of division chiefs,
as in this case, the power to appoint rests on the head of the department. Sufficient if not plenary
discretion should be granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the offices
concerned. They are in a position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the office vacated. Not
only is the appointing authority the officer primarily responsible for the administration of the office, he is
also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the
functions of the position.
Same; Same; Same; Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the
head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied.—There is no
reason to disapprove the appointment of respondent as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office
considering that he is fully qualified and evidently the choice of the appointing authority. Between the
Commission and the appointing authority, we sustain the latter. “Every particular job in an office calls for
both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a
certain course, seminars attended, etc., may
_______________
EN BANC.
*
404
be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty,
ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who
can do it best should be left to the head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the
office are satisfied.”
Same; Same; Same; The reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the
date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of resolution
of the protest against it.—The reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the
date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of resolution
of the protest against it. We need not rule on petitioner’s assertion that respondent’s subsequent
compliance with the experience standards during the pendency of the case should not be counted in his
favor since respondent was anyway qualified for the position at the time of his appointment.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Marius Bartolabac for respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to
review and set aside the May 14, 2003 decision and June 17, 2003 resolution of the Court of
1 2
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54088,

entitled Saturnino de la Cruz vs. Civil Service Commission. In that decision, the appellate
court set aside CSC Resolution Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451, consequently
approving Saturnino de la Cruz’ appointment as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation
Office.
The pertinent facts, as narrated by the Office of the Solicitor General, follow.
3
_______________
Penned by Associate Justice Bennie A. Adefuin-De La Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-
1
Dadole and Mariano C. Del Castillo of the Ninth Division.

Rollo, p. 44.
2
Rollo, pp. 35-38.

3
405
VOL. 437, AUGUST 31, 2004 405
Respondent Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office, DOTC, presently
holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division.
Respondent was promotionally appointed to the said position on November 28, 1994, duly attested by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC). But prior thereto, he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation
Office (ATO).
In a letter dated February 9, 1995, Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the
ATO formally filed with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) her protest
against the promotional appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, claiming
among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said position.
On July 20, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia rendered a decision finding the protest
without merit.
Apparently dissatisfied, Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Secretary to the CSC-NCR.
Under date of October 17, 1995, Director Nelson Acebedo of CSC-NCR requested ATO Executive
Director Manuel Gilo to comment on the appeal and to submit to the CSC-NCR the documents pertinent
thereto.
Since the CSC-NCR received no action on said request for comment, the CSC-NCR again wrote
Director Gilo regarding the matter on May 5, 1997. But to no avail.
On October 14, 1997, for the last time, the CSC-NCR reiterated to Director Gilo its request for
comment.
On November 18, 1997, the CSC-NCR rendered its decision upholding the protest of Calamba and
recalling the approval of respondent’s appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. Said the
CSC-NCR:
“After an initial evaluation of the protest, we find that the only issue to be resolved is whether or not the protestee
meets the minimum experience requirements as of the date of the protestee’s appointment to the contested position.
The contested position requires four years of work experience in position/s involving management per Qualification
Standards Manual prescribed by MC No. 46, s. 1993 and/or four years of experience in planning, organizing,
directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to
licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools per ATO
Qualification Standards x x x.
x x x x x x x x x.”
406
Taking into account his previous positions, Mr. dela Cruz could not have exercised managerial or
supervisory functions for the required number of years. x x x. Moreover, vis-à-vis the experience
requirements of the approved ATO Qualification Standards, Mr. dela Cruz’ work experience prior to his
appointment to the contested position did not concur therewith.
We are of the view therefore, that experience-wise, Mr. dela Cruz did not meet the requirements of
the contested position as of the date of his appointment thereto.
Under date of December 11, 1997, ATO Director Gilo wrote the CSC-NCR asking for the
suspension of the order recalling respondent’s appointment, citing several reasons in support
thereof.
Subsequently, a Manifestation with Motion to Admit Addendum dated December 22, 1997
was filed by Director Gilo with the CSC-NCR. Director Gilo argued that Calamba had no legal
personality to file a protest because she is not a qualified next-in-rank and that the protest was
filed out of time. He likewise asserted that respondent had fully met the qualifications required of
the position.
On January 5, 1998, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo ruled that there is no cogent reason to
disturb earlier rulings on the matter. He also denied ATO Director Gilo’s request, for lack of
merit.
Strangely, in a letter dated January 13, 1998, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo granted Director
Gilo’s request and affirmed the approval of respondent’s appointment as Chief Aviation Safety
Regulation Officer. He said:
“x x x x x x x x x.
We reviewed again the documents including the Office Orders designating protestant dela Cruz to
supervisory position which were obviously issued during the latter part of 1993. A liberal consideration
thereof would come up with a little over one year of supervisory and managerial experience. Certainly, he
was short of the required number of years of work experience for the contested position as of the date of
the issue of his appointment. Nevertheless, considering that Mr. dela Cruz has already in his favor at least
four years of continuous supervisory/managerial experience from his designation as Acting Chief of the
Aviation Safety Regulation Division, supervened by his permanent appointment thereto as Chief thereof
in November 28, 1994, up to present, he has substantially satisfied the four years experience required for
appointment to the contested position.
407
VOL. 437, AUGUST 31, 2004 407
In a letter dated January 26, 1998, Calamba requested the CSC to implement the January 5, 1998
ruling of the CSC-NCR. When asked by the CSC to clarify the conflicting rulings, CSC-NCR
Director Acebedo explained that the January 5, 1998 ruling is unofficial and inexistent.
The CSC treated Calamba’s request as an appeal. On November 13, 1998, the CSC rendered
its Resolution No. 98-2970, the decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the appeal of Annabella A. Calamba is hereby granted. The appointment
of Saturnino De la Cruz as Chief Aviation Regulation Officer is disapproved. De la Cruz is hereby
reverted to his former position.
Acting on the request for reconsideration filed by respondent, the CSC rendered its Resolution
No. 99-1451 on July 6, 1999, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration of Saturnino dela Cruz is hereby denied.
Accordingly, CSC Resolution No. 98-2970 dated November 13, 1998 stands.”
On August 11, 1999, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 54088, seeking to nullify CSC Resolution Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451.
In a decision dated March 14, 2003, the Court of Appeals granted the petition by setting aside
4
CSC Resolution Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451 and approving respondent’s appointment as Chief of
the Aviation Safety Regulation Office.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied in a resolution issued on
June 17, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in approving respondent’s appointment as
Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer despite his failure to meet the minimum four-year
managerial and supervisory qualification for the position. It further contends that respondent’s
completion of the required experience during the pendency of the present case cannot be counted
in his favor because compliance with the prescribed mandatory requirements should be as of the
date of issuance of the appointment and not the
_______________
Rollo, p. 42.
4
408
date of approval by the CSC or the resolution of the protest against the appointment.
The petition lacks merit.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondent has sufficiently complied with the required
experience standards.
First, upon the issuance of respondent’s appointment on November 28, 1994, the
qualification standards of the DOTC for the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer
were as follows:
EDUCATION: Bachelor’s Degree related to Aviation
EXPERIENCE: 4 years of experience in planning,
organizing, directing, coordinating, and
supervising the enforcement of air safety
laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to
licensing, rating and checking of all airmen
and mechanics and the regulation of the
activities of flying schools. License required:
Airline Transport Rating/Flight Operations
Officer/Aircraft Maintenance Engineer
(A&P) License/Flight Engineer License
TRAINING: In-service training in management;
specialized course in aircraft maintenance/air
carrier operations/flight dispatching/aircraft
accident investigation/equipment
qualification course/flight training (local &
abroad)
ELIGIBILITY: Relevant RA 1080 Career Service Prof. 1st
Grade Relevant Eligibility for Second Level
Position 5
As noted by the CSC-NCR, the contested position required four years of work experience in
6
managerial position(s) per the Qualification Standards Manual prescribed by MC No. 46, s.
1993 and/or four years of experience in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and
supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing,
rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools
per the above-stated ATO-DOTC Qualification Standards.
Petitioner’s insistence that respondent failed to meet the four-year
managerial and supervisory experience requirement is mis-
_______________
Rollo, p. 66.
5
Rollo, p. 48.
6
409
VOL. 437, AUGUST 31, 2004 409
placed. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the use of the term “and/or” means
that the word “and” and the word “or” are to be used interchangeably. The word “or” is a
7
disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from another. Thus, the
8
use of the disjunctive term “or” in this controversy connotes that either the standard in the first
clause or that in the second clause may be applied in determining whether a prospective
applicant for the position under question may qualify.
Respondent would indeed lack the required years of work experience to qualify for the
contested position if the managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly
followed. At the time of his permanent appointment on November 28, 1994 as Chief Aviation
Safety Regulation Officer, respondent had a little over one year of managerial experience from
his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division during the latter part of 1993.
However, the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment
was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining
to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of
flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his
appointment.
Before respondent was appointed to the contested position, he had held several other
positions in the ATO, namely:
March 6, 1981 to July 15, Supply Checker
1981
July 16, 1981 to February Junior Aeronautical Engineer
5, 1983
February 6, 1983 to Air Carrier Safety Inspector
February 29, 1984
March 1, 1984 to February Check Pilot I
28, 1987
March 1, 1987 to Check Pilot II
November 27, 1994
November 28, 1994 to date Chief Aviation Safety
Regulation Officer 9
_______________
7
Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home Development Mutual Fund, 333 SCRA
777 (2000).
8
People vs. Martin, 39 SCRA 430 (1971).
9
Rollo, p. 63.
410
These positions, spanning more than 13 years, in four of the five sections of the Aviation Safety
Division of the ATO definitely met the minimum supervisory experience required of respondent
for the position.
In Rapisora vs. Civil Service Commission, this Court held that the rule that appointees must
10
possess the prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so strictly interpreted as to curtail an

agency’s discretionary power to appoint, as long as the appointee possesses other qualifications
required by law. The appellate court was therefore correct in setting aside the assailed CSC
resolutions and considering the respondent’s total work experience as sufficient to meet the
supervisory standards under the second clause, thereby finding respondent qualified for
appointment to the contested position.
Second, respondent’s promotional appointment was issued in accordance with petitioner’s
selection process. Respondent passed the rigid screening of the ATO Personnel
Selection/Promotion Board as well as the oral and written examinations of the DOTC Selection
Board.
DOTC Assistant Secretary Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. noted that:
1. 1.Capt. dela Cruz has been with the Air Transportation Office for more than 13 years
already and during such period, he faithfully and efficiently (served in) four of the five
sections of the Aviation Safety Division of which the position under consideration is the
head, thereby gaining more varied experience and working knowledge of the most
important and sensitive functions of the Division over other applicants;
2. 2.The recommendee always performs his assigned tasks promptly with dedication,
integrity, high sense of responsibility and professionalism which he had demonstrated
when he established and developed the Airport Crash Rescue Organization (ACRO)
procedure to various national airports of the country, and when he organized the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) Operations Center which is now on a 24-hour operation
and serving as the nerve center of this Office;
3. 3.He is a dedicated public servant and is always willing to respond to call of duty even
beyond office hours like when he is flying the ATO’s aircraft for navigation aide check
during holidays and weekends, aside from conducting checkride to airmen prior to
issuance of the pilot license;
_______________
228 SCRA 622 (1993).

10
411
VOL. 437, AUGUST 31, 2004 411
1. 4.Capt. dela Cruz is an outstanding team worker as well as a leader and promotes

enthusiasm among co-workers. He handles all areas of job with minimal supervision
and accomplishes objectives efficiently. He accepts stress situations and performs
extremely well. 11
Because of respondent’s excellent credentials, DOTC Assistant Secretary for Administrative and
Legal Affairs Wilfredo M. Trinidad, chair of the Personnel Selection Board, strongly
recommended his promotional appointment to the contested position.
Third, respondent’s multifarious experiences and trainings in air transportation were taken
12
into account when he was chosen for the subject position. Respondent not only showed a
continuing interest to improve his expertise in the field of air transportation, he also acquired an
Airline Transport Pilot’s License in 1998. As a privileged holder of such license, respondent
13
exercised administrative supervision and control over pilots, cabin and crew members to ensure
compliance with air safety laws, rules and regulations.
_______________
Rollo, pp. 135-136.

11
Records show that the trainings attended by respondent de la Cruz both internationally and locally included the
12
following: (a) Aircraft Accident Investigation per certificate dated October 4, 1985 from the University of Southern
California, Institute of Safety and Systems Management; (b) 9th OAA Flight Safety Seminar per certificate dated May 13-
14, 1987, Orient Airlines Association; (c) FOKKER 50 course of instruction for pilots from July 4, 1988 to July 13, 1988
per certificate dated July 12, 1988, Fokker B. V. Holland; (d) C-130A Conversion Course No. 1 per certificate dated
August 15, 1988, Aboitiz Air Transport; (e) Initial Super King Air 300 Ground and Flight Training as per certificate dated
October 5, 1988 from Elliott Flying Service, Inc., Quad-City Airport, Moline, IL.; (f) Airspace Systems Inspection Pilot
conducted by the FAA Academy per certificate dated December 7, 1989 from the U.S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration; (g) Aviation Accident Investigation per certificate dated June 15, 1990 from the Institute
of Aviation Safety, Stockholm, Sweden; (h) Aviation Safety International Conference per certificate dated March 12, 1991
from the Air Safety Foundation Philippines and Philippine Exhibition Services Organization, Inc.; (i) Kinr Air 200/B200
Pilot Initial per certificate dated September 29, 1995 from Flight Safety International; (j) A 340 Transition Course per
attestation dated June 19, 1996 from Airbus Industrie Training Centre in Blagnac; and (k) Ascent to Excellence Program
per certificate dated April 26, 1997 from the Asian Institute of Management.
13
License No. 88A27; Rollo, p. 138.
412
In addition, respondent’s dedication to the service was demonstrated by his conceptualization
and establishment of the Airport Crash Rescue Organization (ACRO) procedure in various
national airports in the country to ensure the security of both airport personnel and passengers.
Respondent also organized the Air Transportation Office Operations Center which now provides
air service assistance on a 24-hour basis.
Because of respondent’s commendable performance, he was designated Chief of the Air
Transportation Office Operations Center in 1993 per Office Order No. 178-93, in addition to his 14
duties as Check Pilot II. He was also designated Acting Chief, Aviation Safety Division, of the
ATO per Office Order No. 211-93. 15
In Teologo vs. Civil Service Commission, the Supreme Court ruled:

16
“Promotions in the Civil Service should always be made on the basis of qualifications, including

occupational competence, moral character, devotion to duty, and, not least important, loyalty to
the service. The last trait should always be given appropriate weight, to reward the civil servant who has
chosen to make his employment in the Government a lifetime career in which he can expect advancement
through the years for work well done. Political patronage should not be necessary. His record alone
should be sufficient assurance that when a higher position becomes vacant, he shall be seriously
considered for the promotion and, if warranted, preferred to less devoted aspirants.”
As stated by ATO Executive Director Manuel Gilo in his letter to CSC-NCR Director Nelson
Acebedo, “a proven excellent performance of a person is better than just experience by
occupying a position but lacks dedication to duty, strong leadership and technical know-how.” 17
It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence
discretionary on the part of the proper authority. In Salles vs. Francisco, et al., we had occasion18
to rule that, in the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers
not only their civil service eligibilities but also
_______________
Rollo, p. 139.
14
Rollo, p. 140.
15
191 SCRA 238 (1990).

16
Rollo, p. 50.
17
206 SCRA 621 (1992).

18
413
VOL. 437, AUGUST 31, 2004 413
their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency
examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which
he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified
among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the
appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their
judgment for that of the appointing authority.
In the appointment of division chiefs, as in this case, the power to appoint rests on the head of
the department. Sufficient if not plenary discretion should be granted to those entrusted with the
responsibility of administering the offices concerned. They are in a position to determine who
can best fulfill the functions of the office vacated. Not only is the appointing authority the
19
officer primarily responsible for the administration of the office, he is also in the best position to
determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the
position.20
Respondent was the uncontested choice of the appointing authority. Then DOTC Secretary
Jesus B. Garcia dismissed the protest against respondent’s appointment. ATO Executive Director
Gilo also noted respondent’s full compliance with the qualifications for the position. CSC-NCR
Director Acebedo, who previously recalled respondent’s appointment, later affirmed it after a re-
evaluation of the case and declared his previous ruling unofficial and inexistent.
Clearly then, there is no reason to disapprove the appointment of respondent as Chief of the
Aviation Safety Regulation Office considering that he is fully qualified and evidently the choice
of the appointing authority. Between the Commission and the appointing authority, we sustain
the latter. “Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications.
21
Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars
attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit,
courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of the service.
_______________
Central Bank of the Philippines and Jordan vs. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744 (1989).
19
Villegas vs. Subido, 30 SCRA 498 (1969).

20
Medenilla vs. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 278 (1991).

21
414
Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of the office
concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied.” 22
We, however, agree with petitioner that the reckoning point in determining the qualifications
of an appointee is the date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the
CSC or the date of resolution of the protest against it. We need not rule on petitioner’s assertion
that respondent’s subsequent compliance with the experience standards during the pendency of
the case should not be counted in his favor since respondent was anyway qualified for the
position at the time of his appointment.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent failed to meet the experience
requirement to qualify for the contested position, we are still inclined to uphold the appellate
court’s approval of respondent’s appointment. Petitioner itself has, on several occasions, allowed
the appointment of personnel who were initially lacking in experience but subsequently obtained
the same.
In Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 97-0191 dated January 9, 1997, it ruled thus:
“A careful evaluation of the qualifications of Josue reveals that he meets the education, training and
eligibility requirements of the position. Considering that Josue has already in his favor three (3) years and
eight (8) months experience as Senior Inspector up to the present, he has substantially satisfied the four
(4) years experience required for the appointment as Chief Inspector.”
Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, respondent is deemed to have satisfactorily complied
with the experience requirement for the contested position when he was designated Chief of the
ATO Operations Center and Acting Chief of the ATO Aviation Safety Division. Having held
said positions from 1993 to the present, respondent may be considered to have acquired the
necessary experience for the position.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
setting aside CSC Resolution No. 98-2970 and CSC Resolution No. 99-1451 is AFFIRMED. The
appointment of Saturnino de la Cruz as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer is
APPROVED.
_______________
Torio vs. Civil Service Commission, 209 SCRA 691 (1992).

22
415
VOL. 437, AUGUST 31, 2004 415
Chavez vs. Commission on Elections
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., On Official Leave.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—The power of appointment is essentially discretionary and cannot be controlled, not
even by the Court, as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing authority. (Erasmo vs.
Home Insurance & Guarantee Corporation, 388 SCRA 112 [2002])
——o0o——
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G.R. No. 193643. January 29, 2013.

At bench are consolidated1 petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with

Ruling of the Court

VOL. 437, AUGUST 31, 2004 403

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ, respondent.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54088,

Dadole and Mariano C. Del Castillo of the Ninth Division.

Rollo, pp. 35-38.

possess the prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so strictly interpreted as to curtail an

228 SCRA 622 (1993).

1. 4.Capt. dela Cruz is an outstanding team worker as well as a leader and promotes

Rollo, pp. 135-136.

In Teologo vs. Civil Service Commission, the Supreme Court ruled:

“Promotions in the Civil Service should always be made on the basis of qualifications, including

191 SCRA 238 (1990).

206 SCRA 621 (1992).

Villegas vs. Subido, 30 SCRA 498 (1969).

Medenilla vs. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 278 (1991).

Torio vs. Civil Service Commission, 209 SCRA 691 (1992).

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