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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION
For any industry to be successful it should meet not only the production requirements, but also
maintain the highest safety standards for all concerned. The industry has to identify the hazards,
assess the associated risks and bring the risks to tolerable level on a continuous basis.
Construction sector being a potentially-hazardous operation has considerable safety risk to the
workers associated with it. Unsafe conditions and practices in the site lead to a number of
accidents and causes loss and injury to human lives, damages the property, interrupt
developmental aspects etc. Risk assessment is a systematic method of identifying and
analyzing the hazards associated with an activity and establishing a level of risk for each
hazard. The hazards cannot be completely eliminated, and thus there is a need to define and
estimate an accident risk level possible to be presented either in quantitative or qualitative way.
assessment include: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability
Studies (HAZOP), Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA), Event-Tree Analysis (ETA) etc.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
Keeping the aforementioned problems in mind, the project work has been planned with the
following objectives
Review of literature on Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment.
To briefly outline the risks associated in the construction industry and also to analyze
them in order to come out with safety strategies to make the construction site safe in all
aspects.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The following is the brief review of the work carried out by different researchers in the field
of hazard identification and risk analysis (HIRA).
Qureshi (1987) had done a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) in which potential
hazards and identified by looking at the design in a dynamic manner
To identify the nature and scale of the dangerous substances;
To give an account of the arrangements for safe operation of the installation, for control
of serious deviations that could lead to a major accident and for emergency procedures
at the site;
To identify the type, relative likelihood and consequences of major accidents that might
occur; and
To demonstrate that the manufacturer (operator) has identified the major hazard
potential of his activities and has provided appropriate controls.
Khan and Abbasi (1995) proposed optimal risk analysis (ORA) which involved the
following:
1. Hazard identification and screening.
2. Hazard analysis using qualitative hazard assessment by optimal hazard and operability
study (opt HAZOP).
5. Risk estimates.
Carpignano et al. (1998) applied quantitative risk analysis (QRA) for drawing conclusions
concerning serious accidental events with the occurrence frequency and the consequences. The
QRA approach they selected was based on reservoir analysis and management systems
(RAMS) such as Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Mode Effect and Critical
Analysis (FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Cause
Consequence Analysis and were able
To identify accident initiating events and accidental sequence.
To determine the related consequences with respect to workers, population and the
environments.
Duijm (2001) identified hazards for six different techniques for disposing decommissioned
ammunition. Use has been made of functional modelling as a basis for hazard identification.
Risk levels are estimated based on general accident rates in the chemical industry. The disposal
techniques are “open burning” (OB), “open detonation” (OD), “closed detonation” (CD),
“fluidised bed combustion” (FBC), “rotary kiln (RK) incineration”, “mobile incineration” and
Comparative risk levels for alternative disposal techniques for ammunition have been derived
using hazard identification based on functional modelling of the techniques in combination
with the required manpower to perform the operations.
Khan et al. (2001) developed safety weighted hazard index (SWeHI). In quantitative terms
SWeHI represents the radius area under moderate hazard (50% probability of fatality/ damage).
In mathematical term it is represented
as SWeHI = B/ A
Where B = Quantitative measures of damage that can be caused by unit/ plant.
A= credits due to control measures and safety arrangements.
Lambert et al. (2001) used Hierarchical Holographic Modelling (HHM) for identification and
management of risk source and prioritize the identified source of risk based on their likelihood
and potential consequences and provided with options of risk management in terms of their
costs and potential impacts on the acquisition schedule.
Bell and Glade (2003) have done a risk analysis focusing on risk to life. They calculated land
slide risk and occurrence of potential damaging events as well as the distribution of the
elements at risk and proposed the following approach for risk evaluation:
Kecojevic and Radomsky (2004) studied about loader and truck safety and found out the
severity and number of accidents involving loader and trucks are higher when compared to
other operations. They established fatal categories and causes of accidents and control
strategies are discussed and evaluated to increase hazard awareness.
Dziubinski et al. (2006) studied basic reasons for pipeline failure and its probable
consequences taking individual and societal risk into consideration and proposed methodology
of risk assessment for hazards associated with hazardous substance transport in long pipelines.
Taking that methodology as example, subsequent stages of risk analysis were considered
paying special attention to the applied techniques and calculation models. A specific feature of
this methodology was a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques which offer a
possibility of a full risk assessment for long pipelines.
Laul et al. (2006) identified hazards (chemical, electrical, physical, and industrial) and
potential initiators that could lead to an accident. Hazard analysis is used to evaluate identified
hazards. Hazard analysis is done by “what if check list”, Hazard and Operability (HAZOP)
analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree
Analysis (ETA) and provided methods together with the advantages and disadvantages, for
developing a safety document for chemical, non-nuclear facilities.
Jeong et al. (2007) made a qualitative analysis by Hazard and Operability Method (HAZOP)
to identify the potential hazards and operability problems of decommissioning operations and
concluded that the decommissioning of a nuclear research reactor must be accomplished
according to its structural conditions and radiological characteristics and radiation exposure
must be controlled to within the limitation of the regulation to perform the dismantling work
under the ALARA principle safely.
Frank et al. (2008) carried out a risk assessment using common risk management tools. In
basic tools, they used diagram analysis and risk rating and filtering. In advanced tools they
used fault tree analysis (FTA), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Points (HACCP), Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) and established
a severity categorization table which divides severity of consequence into noticeable,
important, serious, very serious and catastrophic.
Nor et al. (2008) studied risk related to loaders and dozers and were assessed and ranked.
The hazards “failure to follow adequate maintenance procedure” and “failure of mechanical /
electrical/ hydraulic components” were the most severe and frequent hazards for the loaders
and they fell into the category of high risk.
Hassan et al. (2009) carried out a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) into basic steps
including system definition, Hazard Identification, Frequency Analysis, Consequence
Modelling, Risk calculations and Assessment to determine the safest route for the
transportation of hazardous material.
Kecojevic and Nor (2009) studied reports on equipment related fatal incidents and showed
that underground mining equipment including continuous miners, shuttle cars, roof bolters,
LHD‟s, longwall and hoisting contributed total of 69 fatalities. The study revealed the major
hazards resulting in fatal incidents for continuous mining equipment, shuttle cars, roof bolters,
LHD‟s and hoisting system were due to failure of victim to respect equipment working area,
failure of mechanical component, working under unsupported roof, failure of management to
provide safe working conditions, and failure of mechanical components.
Wang et al. (2009) applied HAZOP analysis to determine if the operation has potential to give
rise to hazardous situation and found the range of hazardous events. They identified the route
by which each of the hazardous events could be realised. After HAZOP analysis they
introduced MO-HAZOP program which calculates probability of an event which is the product
of probabilities of every factor.
CHAPTER 3
Construction accidents resulting in physical injuries and fatalities can be broadly categorised
into the following eight basic groups.
Falling from heights – involves workers falling from higher floors to lower
floors/ground and falling from ground level to excavation level.
Struck by falling/moving objects/vehicles – primarily involves workers being struck by
equipment, private vehicles, falling materials, vertically hoisted materials and
horizontally transported materials.
Excavation related accidents – encompasses accidents due to cave-in, contact with
underground utilities, subsiding of nearby structures, falling of materials/vehicles/
objects onto people working in the excavation as well as fumes, gases and inrushes of
water at the bottom of excavations.
Accident by operation of machinery/tools – caused by toppling of machinery,
collapsing of the parts of machinery and unsuitable or unsafe hand-held tools.
Electrocution – caused by contact with electric current from machinery, tools,
appliances or light fixtures, faulty electrical equipment and tools, and contact with
overhead/underground power lines.
Fire/explosion – accidents resulting from the explosion of pressure vessels or gasoline
The nature of health hazards that may be caused to construction workers are shown in
Table 3.1.
The working condition is an inherent hazard with the work owing to the scope and location of
the project. The inherent hazard is managed through a safety management system, which can
cause occupational accidents when flaws exist. The negligent attitude of workers to forego
safety standards also causes accidents, although it is less quantifiable. Non-human related
events are beyond control and prediction. Hence, Imriyas et al. (2006b) quoted that the
estimation of occupational injury risks in construction projects should assess two factors:
(1) Project’s inherent hazard level; and
(2) Safety management level.
As portrayed in Figure 3.1, hazards incline the project towards the accident zone while safety
pulls it towards the safety zone. When the safety force is at least equal in magnitude to the
hazard imposed, the project stays in the neutral zone. Safety below hazard level moves the
project towards the accident zone. Hence, the prediction of occupational accidents in a project
entails the assessment and comparison of the project hazard and safety management.
7. Crane use;
8. Construction machinery and tools usage;
9. Works on contaminated sites;
10. Welding and cutting works; and
11. Works in confined spaces.
A particular project may have many of these activities and the degree of hazard inherent in
each activity is attributed to its risk parameters.
Demolition is one of the high-risk activities of the construction industry with a fatal and
major injury incidence rate of about 17 times of that for the whole of the construction
industry. Approximately 10% of all fatal accidents each year in the construction field occur
in the demolition sector.
Demolition workers face a variety of hazards viz:
· Falling from heights;
· Being hit or trapped by falling objects;
· Excessive noise from hand-held tools, demolition balls, pneumatic drills, explosives and
falling parts;
· Vibration from hand-held pneumatic tools;
· Respiratory hazards from dust which may contain toxic constituents such as asbestos and
silica;
· Flying particles causing eye and skin injuries; and
· Fires and explosives, especially when demolishing tanks that contained oils or flammable
chemicals.
The risk in demolition works is influenced by four variables, viz:
· Volume/size of demolition;
· Type of structure;
· Method of demolition; and
· Level of site supervision.
Davies and Tomasin (1996) categorised excavations into three types: trenches; basements and
wide excavations; and pits/shafts (for pad and pile foundations). They expose workers to
similar hazards and accidents. Workers in the underground construction industry, especially
water, sewer and utility line companies, have traditionally had a higher accident and injury rate
than other workers in the heavy construction industry. According to the OSHA (2002), the
fatality rate for excavation works is 112% higher than the rate for general construction.
Accidents in excavation works occur in one of the following ways (HSE, 2005):
1. Collapse of sides/cave-in: Cave-in is perhaps the most feared and chief cause of accidents
in excavation works. It buries workers and/or cause crushing injuries to survivors.
2. Contact with underground utilities: Works in excavations often encounter obstructions
from intersecting utilities lines that may cause injuries and/or fatalities to workers by:
(1) Electrocution and/or explosion when electrical cables and/or gasoline pipes are
damaged;
(2) Collapse of excavation due to flooding led by damage to water lines and/or sewer lines;
(3) Drowning in floods from damaged water/sewer lines.
3. Dangerous atmospheres: Dangerous atmospheres in excavations may result from oxygen
deficiency as well as the presence of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrous fumes and
methane gas, which suffocate workers, kill or cause respiratory problems.
4. Workers being struck by falling materials/objects from top.
5. Workers falling into excavations.
The excavation-related accidents comprises of five hazard rating variables for excavation
works, viz:
· Excavation configuration (depth, width and length);
· Geological condition (soil type and water table);
· Presence of underground utilities (electrical, water and sewer lines);
· Nearby vehicular traffic (vibration and surcharge load); and
· Nearby structures.
Scaffolding is the most common way of providing platforms to works at heights. The
following hazards are associated with scaffold use (Davies and Tomasin, 1996):
(1) Ladders slip when users are climbing or working from them;
(2) Users slip or miss their footing while climbing;
(3) Users overbalance when carrying materials or tools; and
(4) When defective ladders are used, they fracture under the weight of the user.
Davies and Tomasin (1996) identified two causes for falseworks collapses:
Inadequate design – deficiency in falsework design is caused by:
(1) failure to correctly estimate the type and extent of loading;
(2) inadequate foundation;
(3) incorrect choice or use of materials; and/or
(4) lack of provision for lateral stability.
Poor assembly – caused by the failure to inspect the materials (such as struts, planks, etc.),
the soil condition at the foundation and the false work erection.
The occupation of roofers has been rated as one of the most dangerous occupations, with a
fatality rate of 29 per 100 000 workers. Roofers are at about six-time higher risk for fatal
occupational injuries than the average worker, with falls being fatal events in 75% of cases.
Falls from roofs constitute the leading cause for work-related fall fatalities and they represent
more than one-fifth of all occupational fatal falls. Analyses of occupational fatality data
between 1994 and 1996 indicate an increasing trend in the number of fatal falls from roofs
during construction. Additionally, falls from roofs are a serious cause of non-fatal injuries in
the construction industry. In 1996, an estimated 2550 serious injuries in the USA were due to
construction-related falls from roofs. The injuries caused by falls from roofs are typically
extremely severe, requiring long periods of treatment and recovery and resulting in substantial
medical costs. King and Hudson (1985) observed a higher proportion of roofing accidents
during maintenance period/activities as well. These include roof edge falls, falls through fragile
roofing materials and falls from the internal structure of roofs.
The most serious accidents that occur during the erection and assembly of structural steel or
pre-cast frameworks are (Davies and Tomasin, 1996):
Erectors falling from heights when at their places of work, going to or returning from
them;
The collapse of the whole or part of the framework causing workers to fall or striking
those at lower levels; and
Workers at lower levels being struck by tools or materials falling or being thrown down.
Cranes are remarkable and invaluable tools for hoisting and carrying, but they are heavily
represented in the industrial injury and fatality statistics. Most of them occur in the construction
industry. In the US, approximately 30-50 crane fatalities occur in the construction industry per
year, with there being a total of approximately 70 crane fatalities across all industries per year
(OSHA, 1996). MacCollum (1993) estimated that crane hazards are the source of 25-33% of
casualties in construction and maintenance activities. With regards to fatalities only, Ontario
recorded an average of 10% of construction fatalities related to cranes (CSAO, 1994) and the
New South Wales construction industry indicated that approximately 12% of fatalities were
crane-related (AFCC, 1987). Davies and Tomasin (1996) identified five crane-related hazards:
(1) overturning of a crane or the structural failure of its parts; (2) dropping of the suspended
load; (3) electrocution; (4) trapping of people; and (5) accidents during erection and
dismantling as well as loading and unloading.
The causes of different crane failures are shown in Figure 3.2. Davies and Tomasin (1996)
quoted that the overturning of a crane or parts of it occur due to overloading, differential
settlement of the crane support or foundation, operating slope (for mobile cranes) and/or
operating method. Ederer (2006) reported that basic causes of dropping the load are
overloading and improper maintenance of the crane and its parts. Neitzel et al. (2001) criticised
that electrocution and trapping are caused due to lack of communications between the operator,
slingers and flagman/supervisor whereas erection and dismantling injuries are caused by
unsafe work practice of erectors and lack of supervision.
Of all the construction industry fatalities, 18% occur with construction machinery (Helander,
1991). The types of machinery involved in accidents include excavators and shovels,
earthmoving equipment (i.e. crawler tractors and bulldozers, scrapers and graders), dumpers
and dump trucks, forklift trucks, road rollers and lorries. Accidents in construction machinery
usage occur in one of the following modes (Helander, 1991; Davies and Tomasin, 1996):
· Workers being run-over or struck by machinery moving forward or reversing;
· Collision between machinery or with fixed objects such as falseworks or scaffoldings;
· Overturning of machinery while in operation; and
· Workers falling from machinery.
These accidents are caused by the following major factors:
· Vibration from powered hand-held tools, causing a group of diseases. One of them is blood
circulation disturbance known as “vibration white finger”.
Helander, 1991; Davies and Tomasin, 1996 noted that workers of mechanical contractors have
contacted with considerable tools-related hazards, notably those who are involved in:
(1) heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems;
(2) site utilities such as water supply, storm water drainage system, sanitary disposal system
and gas supply systems;
(3) plumbing works - water distribution, water treatment and sanitary facilities;
(4) fire protection; and
(5) specialty systems.
Most of the hazards are the result of faulty tools and/or unsafe handling of tools. Moreover, the
type of tools and duration of use also dictate the hazard.
(5) Demolition.
Davies and Tomasin (1996) quoted that sites where contamination might be expected include:
(1) Asbestos producers;
(2) Chemical plants and depots;
(3) Dockland areas;
(4) Explosive factories and depots;
(5) Landfill sites of domestic and industrial wastes;
(6) Metal smelting and refining plants;
(7) Metal treatment and finishing works;
(8) Mines and quarries;
(9) Oil production and storage depots;
(10) Paints and graphite factories and depots;
(11) Railway yards;
(12) Scrap yards;
(13) Sewage works;
(14) Steel works; and
(15) Tanning and associated trades.
Short or long term health effects to people exposed to contaminants depend on the following
variables
· The type of contaminants on site;
· The quantity of contaminants present; and
· The duration that the workers are exposed on site.
The term “confined space” refers to a space, which by design has limited openings for entry
and exit, unfavorable natural ventilation that could contain or produce dangerous air
contaminants, and is not intended for continuous employee occupancy. Confined spaces
include tanks, process vessels, pits, silos, vats, degreasers, boilers, utility vaults, pipelines,
manholes, box girders and columns. Workers are required to enter confined spaces for tasks
such as repair, inspection and maintenance, and are often exposed to multiple hazards. Of the
803 deaths, 499 (62%) were caused by atmospheric hazards and 223 (28%) were caused by
mechanical suffocation. Eighty-one victims (10%) died from other causes of injury. Fatal
injuries that occur in confined spaces are most likely to be from atmospheric hazards. The types
of atmospheric hazards in confined spaces can be quite varied – some examples are shown in
Table 3.4. Rescue attempts in confined spaces can expose the unprepared rescuer to the risk of
asphyxiation in an atmosphere that is unable to support respiration.
The main characteristics that recognise the level of hazards in a confined space
are as follows (EH&S, 2006):
Space configuration (i.e. size of the space and size of the ingress/egress);
Purpose of the confined space (i.e. if it is currently being used);
Activity to be involved inside the space (i.e. welding, application of solvents/adhesives,
etc.); and
Level of natural ventilation inside the space.
CHAPTER 4
RISK ASSESSMENT
4. RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment is the process used to determine likelihood that people may be exposed to an
injury, illness or disease in the workplace arising from any situation identified during the
hazard identification process prior to consideration or implementation of control measures.
Risk occurs when a person is exposed to a hazardous situation. Risk is the likelihood that
exposure to a hazard will lead to an injury or a health issue. It is a measure of the probability
and potential severity of harm or loss.
Risk assessment forms crucial early phase in the disaster management planning cycle and is
essential in determining what disaster mitigation measures should be taken to reduce future
losses. Any attempt to reduce the impact of disaster requires an analysis that indicates what
threats exist, their expected severity, who or what they may affect, and why. Knowledge of
what makes a person or a community more vulnerable than another added to the resources and
capacities available determines the steps we can take to reduce their risk.
Risk assessment is carried out in series of related activities which builds up a picture of the
hazards and vulnerabilities which explain disaster events.
Following are some of the important terminologies involved in hazard identification and risk
analysis:
Harm: Physical injury or damage to the health of peoples either directly or indirectly as a result
of damage to property or to the environment.
Hazard: Hazard is a situation that poses a level of threat to life, health, property or
environment. Most hazards are dormant with only a theoretical risk of harm however once a
hazard becomes active it can create emergency situation.
Risk: Risk concerns the deviation of one or more results of one or more future events from
their expected value.
Tolerable risk: Risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of
society
Protective measure: The combination of risk reduction strategies taken to achieve at least
the tolerable risk. Protective measures include risk reduction by inherent safety, protective
devices, and personal protective equipment, information for use and installation and training.
Serious Bodily Injury means any injury which involves the permanent loss of any part
or section of the body or the permanent loss of sight or hearing or any permanent physical
incapability or the facture of any bone or one or more joint or bone of any phalanges of
hand or foot.
Reportable Injury means any injury other than any serious bodily injury, which involves
the enforced absence of injured person from work for a period of 72 hours or more.
Minor Injury means any injury which results in enforced absence from work of the person
exceeding 24hrs and less than 72 hours.
Risk Analysis: A systematic use of available information to determine how often specified
events may occur and the magnitude of their likely consequences.
Risk Assessment: The process used to determine risk management priorities by evaluating and
comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other criteria.
Risk Treatment: Selection and implementation of appropriate options for dealing with risk.
They are all inter-related and form an integral part of a management system. A brief description
of each of the three types of Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis is given below:
Identify Operational health and safety hazards with the purpose of immediately treating
significant risks
Gather information to feed back to issue-based Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
Gather information to feed back to baseline Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis.
Continuous
Risk
Assessment
4 5
2
4
Management
3
5 5
Issue–Based
Baseline Risk
Risk
Assessment 2 1 Assessment
3
The different steps of risk assessment procedure are as given below (Figure 4.3):
Step 1: Step 2:
Identify the Assess the
Hazard Risks
Step 3:
Step 5:
Evaluate the
Monitor
existing
and Review
controls
Step 4:
Implement
additional
risk controls
The risk assessment criteria used for all levels of site evaluation take into account two basic
factors:
The existing site conditions
The level of the travelling public's exposure to those conditions.
The Initial Site Evaluation and Detailed Site Evaluation both apply weighted criteria to the existing
information and information obtained from one site visit. The Initial Site Evaluation subdivides
the initial inventory listing of sites into 5 risk assessment site groups. The Detailed Site Evaluation
risk assessment is then performed on each of the three highest risk site groups in order of the group
priority level of risk. The result of the Detailed Site Evaluation process is a prioritized listing of
the sites within each of the three highest risk site groups.
Because of the uncertainties linked with probabilistic risk analysis used for quantification of the
risk levels the general guiding principle is that the risk be reduced to a level considered As Low
as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The risk acceptability criteria are illustrated in Figure 4.4. It
can be seen that there are three tiers:
a. A tolerable region where risk has been shown to be negligible and comparable with everyday
risks such as travel to work.
b. A middle level where it is shown the risk has been reduced to As Low As Reasonably
Practicable level and that further risk reduction is either impracticable or the cost is grossly
disproportionate to the improvement gained. This is referred as the ALARP region.
An intolerable region where risk cannot be justified on any grounds. The ALARP region is kept
sufficiently extensive to allow for flexibility in decision making and allow for the positive
management initiatives which may not be quantifiable in terms of risk reduction.
Accident Statistics:
Accident statistics are the most commonly used measures of safety performance. Occupational
injury rates in terms of frequency and severity over a specific period of man-hours worked provide
a relative measure of the effectiveness of the safety program in place. Nevertheless, injury statistics
only provide a retrospective analysis of injury experience and it is an indicator of how effectively
a safety program was managed.
Workplace Inspection:
Workplace inspection is a more effective mean of evaluating the safety program than relying only
on statistics. Through inspections, the assessor can determine the degree of influence being
exercised over site conditions, the control of hazards, the enforcement of safety standards, the use
of required personal protective equipment and the degree to which safe work practices are being
applied. This approach is also referred to as safety auditing.
The following are the key elements to be dealt while understanding the key elements of an effective
safety management system at a construction site,
1. Providing and maintaining a workplace that is safe, without risk to health, and adequate as
regards to facilities and arrangements for the workers’ welfare at work.
2. Ensuring that adequate safety measures are taken in respect of any machinery, equipment, plant,
article or process used by the workers.
3. Ensuring that the workers are not exposed to hazards arising out of the arrangement, disposal,
manipulation, organization, processing, storage, transport, working or use of things in their
workplace or near their workplace under the control of the contractor.
4. Developing and implementing procedures for dealing with emergencies that may arise while the
workers are at work.
5. Ensuring that every work person has adequate instruction, information, training and supervision
as is necessary for that person to perform the work.
6. Giving the workers all necessary information about the way the activities and operations on site
are conducted as might affect their safety or health while they are on site.
The following are the safety attributes under each safety aspect which has to be evaluated in any
construction site depending upon the magnitude of the risks involved to life and surrounding
property.
1. Project safety organization
Competency and duties of:
Inspection of:
1. Cranes by crane operators on a daily basis
2. Electrical distribution board by a competent person on a daily basis
Maintenance of:
1. Tower crane(s)
2. Mobile crane(s)
3. Gondola(s)
4. Piling machine(s)
5. Passenger hoist(s)
6. Mobile working platform(s)
7. Construction vehicles like truck, forklift, bulldozer, etc.
Sub-contractors:
1. Safe work procedures
2. Safe use of plant, machinery and tools
3. Safety inspection systems
4. Trained operatives and supervisors
5. Adherence to safety requirements during construction
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5. CONCLUSION
The first step for emergency preparedness and maintaining a safe workplace is defining and
analyzing hazards. Although all hazards should be addressed, resource limitations usually do not
allow this to happen at one time. Hazard identification and risk assessment can be used to establish
priorities so that the most dangerous situations are addressed first and those least likely to occur
and least likely to cause major problems can be considered later. The assessment of project hazards
and the contractor’s safety management system are two crucial aspects for risk rating. However,
they are complex in nature due to the size, complexity and multi-party involvement in the
construction process. Eleven factors and their respective hazard attributes for building hazards
assessment were identified in this report. This report also encompasses the main eight factors and
Selection of proper method for assessing the hazards might result in a safety work site for any
construction project. For a successful hazard identification and risk assessment program, it is very
much ideal to consider all the minor aspects which may result in a major accident.
Based on the findings in a particular work place in a construction site, it is necessary to adopt any
of the methods of risk assessment discussed in the earlier chapters in order to derive the respective
The risk scores thus obtained by following any of the methods are very much helpful in
understanding the degree of risk involved in any action or activity in construction activity. The
risk scores also helps the contractors or construction firms in taking prior safety measures to avoid
accidents in the work place. Thus the risk scores are very much evident in decision making like
CHAPTER 6
REFERENCES
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