Causal Determinism and Human Freedom Are Incompatible: A New Argument for

Incompatibilism
Author(s): Ted A. Warfield
Source: Noûs, Vol. 34, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom (2000),
pp. 167-180
Published by: Blackwell Publishing
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676127 .
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Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom, 2000

CAUSAL DETERMINISM AND HUMAN FREEDOM ARE

INCOMPATIBLE: A NEW ARGUMENT FOR INCOMPATIBILISM

Ted A. Warfield
The University of Notre Dame

"If I had to do it all over again, I'd do it all over again." Yogi Berra, 1998.t

I. Introduction

I will use the name "incompatibilism"for the thesis that freedom and causal
determinism are incompatible and will call those who accept this thesis "in-
compatibilists".Most incompatibilistsaccept some version or other of the well
known Consequence argument.lIn Section II, I will identify and explore what
I think is a serious difficulty for the best and most influential presentationsof
the Consequence argument.I do not, however, come to champion the cause of
compatibilism. On the contrary, after my critical discussion of the Conse-
quence argument, I will go on, in Section III, to offer a new argument for
incompatibilism.
Consequence style arguments are typically formalistic elaborations upon
the following simple line of thought:

If determinismis true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of natureand
events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born,
and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore the consequences
of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (van Inwagen 1983,
p.l6)

Consequence argumentsare united by their defining feature, the use of some

sort of transferof "powerlessness"(or "powernecessity" or "unfreedom")prin-
ciple. The transfer principle employed in such an argument, to use Timothy
O'Connor's (1993) well chosen analogy, (allegedly) "slingshots"our powerless-
ness with respect to the past and laws of natureto yield powerlessness over the
future via the strictly necessary link between the past, (deterministic)laws, and
future.2
168 / Ted A. Warfield

Using "no choice" as the relevant notion of "powerlessness"or "unfree-

dom", one powerful and influential version of the Consequenceargumentlooks,
at least in rough form, like this:

A CONSEQUENCEARGUMENT
P1. No one has any choice about the past and laws of nature.
P2. Given determinism, the conjunction of the past and laws of nature
strictly implies every truth about the future.
P3. No one has any choice about those propositions strictly implied by
true propositions that no one has a choice about.
C1. So, given determinism no one has any choice about any future truth
(including future truths concerning the allegedly free actions and de-
cisions of human agents).

I am an incompatibilist and I endorse and am willing to defend a suitably de-

veloped version of the Consequence argumentdisplayed above.3And many of
my fellow incompatibilists have, over the past few decades, defended various
versions of the Consequence argumentwith a high level of philosophical so-
phistication. Strangely enough, however, and though the compatibilist replies
to these argumentshave been, on the whole, quite weak, these defenses of the
Consequence argumenthave not led to the universal acceptance of incompati-
bilism among contemporaryphilosophers.Indeed,the compatibilistposition con-
cerning freedom and causal determinismremains without a doubt the dominant
position on the topic.4
In Section III I will offer a new argumentfor incompatibilismdistinct from,
and in my view at least as plausible as, the strongest versions of the Conse-
quence argument. My argument will perhaps resemble some versions of the
ConsequenceArgumentin some respects. But my argumentdoes not employ a
"transferof necessity" principle and so is not simply one more version of the
Consequence argument.5
Before offering my argumentin Section III, I will, in Section II, do two
things. One thing I will do is attempt to dispel worries about the "proof like"
appearanceof my argumentfor incompatibilism.The other thing I will do, tak-
ing up the bulk of Section II, is point out and discuss a problematicfeature of
standardConsequence arguments.

II. "ProofS' and a Formal Problem for Consequence Arguments

I will argue for incompatibilismby showing that necessarily, for all prop-
ositions X, if determinismis true and X, then no one is free to make it the case
that X. Some parts of my argumentwill have a "formalistic"or "proof like"
appearance.This appearance,however, should not lead anyone to think that I
am trying in any literal sense to provide a proof of incompatibilism (or any-
thing else).6 Rather,what I offer in Section III is merely an argument(a rather
 A New Argumentfor Incompatibilism / 169

strong and convincing one in my view, but still, just an argument).The formal-
istic characterof the presentationshould not distractfrom this fact.
So far as I aware,all versions of the Consequenceargumentemploy a "con-
ditional proof" strategy; many also employ the terminology. Indeed, in most
incompatibilist argumentsthe overall form of the argument is that of condi-
tional proof. The argumenttypically looks like this: assume determinism and
show that, given the assumption, no one has freedom. Most incompatibilists,
however, either do not adequately understandor simply fail to adhere to a re-
striction relevant premises in such an argument must meet if the incompati-
bilist conclusion is to follow from such an argument.Most incompatibilists,to
be precise, seem unaware that in order to get the incompatibilist conclusion
that determinism and freedom are strictly incompatible (that no deterministic
world is a world with freedom), their conditional proofs must not introduce or
in any way appeal to premises that are merely contingently true in between the
assumptionof determinismand the step at which the "no freedom" conclusion
is reached.
This is a simple point applying to any alleged conditional proof of a strict
conditional. In general, to show by conditional proof that P strictly implies Q,
one assumes the truthof P and derives the truth of Q, appealing only to P and
necessary truths along the way to Q. In offering such an argument,one is re-
stricted, on pain of modal fallacy, from appealing to merely contingent truths
in between the assumptionof P (which may be contingent) and the arrivalat Q.
My evidence that typical proponentsof the ConsequenceArgumentare un-
aware of this restrictionis that they defend only the truth,not the (broad logi-
cal) necessity, of the relevant steps of their arguments.To use the Consequence
Argument displayed above as a model, incompatibilists typically defend the
truth,but not the necessity, of (P1) of the argument.Introducinga merely con-
tingently true premise into such an argument,however, weakens the justifiable
conclusion of the argumentconsiderably.Argumentsweakenedin this way show
at most that the following conditional is true:

WEAK If determinismis true then there is no freedom.

But this conclusion is strictly weaker than (it is implied by but does not imply)
the properincompatibilist conclusion:

INC Necessarily, if determinismis true then there is no freedom.

Notice that (WEAK), if it is a material conditional, is true in every inde-

terministic world and is true in every world without freedom. While showing
that the actual world is indeterministicwould establish this readingof (WEAK),
doing so would not establish the properincompatibilistconclusion, (INC). One
could defend a stronger contingent reading of (WEAK) as, for example, a
counterfactualconditional, by arguing that the contingent premise appealed to
170 / TedA. Warfield

in one's conditional proof is of suitable modal strength. Like (WEAK), how-

ever, such a conclusion would be strictly weaker than the proper incompati-
bilist conclusion. Finally, one could, in appealing to a contingent premise in
one's conditional proof, defend a strict conditional asserting that the conjunc-
tion of determinism with some contingent truth, C, strictly implies the "no
freedom" conclusion: necessarily, all deterministic worlds with C contain no
freedom. But once again, this conclusion is strictly weaker than the proper
incompatibilist conclusion. It is, I conclude, a mistake to appeal to a merely
contingently true premise in the body of a "conditionalproof" style argument
for incompatibilism.7
This mistake, however, is apparentlymade by even the most prominent
recent defenders of incompatibilism.Both Peter van Inwagen (1983) and Rob-
ert Kane (1996) defend the truth,but not the necessity, of relevant premises of
their favorite versions of the Consequence argument. Both van Inwagen and
Kane defend the truth,but not the necessity, of premises stating that, for exam-
ple, "no one has a choice about the laws of nature."Indeed, van Inwagen has
made it clear on more than one occasion that he is not even trying to defend the
necessity of such premises.8The Consequence argumentsof van Inwagen and
Kane therefore appearto be in danger.
Because this charge of modal fallacy is a serious one and is being made
againstthe flagship argumentof contemporaryincompatibilists,it is worth paus-
ing to display and explicitly examine the most influential version of the Con-
sequence argumentto see that my complaint is justified. The version I have in
mind is, of course, the third version of the argument offered by my distin-
guished colleague Peter van Inwagen.
In an amusing passage beginning ChapterThree of An Essay on Free Will,
van Inwagen dismisses much of the literature on the incompatibility of free
will and determinism.Here's the passage:

Discussions of this question are usually not on a very high level. In the
great majorityof cases, they are the work of compatibilists and consist to a
large degree in the ascription of some childish fallacy or other to incom-
patibilists.... It is not my purposein this book to defend any previous writer
against a charge of fallacious argument. My own arguments will be ex-
plicit, and any fallacies they commit should be correspondinglyvisible. (It
is doubtful whether anyone has ever been seduced by the fallacies with
which the incompatibilists are customarily charged; if anyone indeed has
achieved such a level of philosophical incompetence, I, at least, fall short
of it). (1983, p.55)

Though I would never accuse van Inwagen of incompetence, I am making the

charge of fallacy. Let's see if I can make the charge stick.
In An Essay on Free Will, van Inwagen offers the following argumentfor
incompatibilism. Here are van Inwagen's abbreviations:Let "Np" abbreviate
 A New Argumentfor Incompatibilism / 171

"p is true and no one has or ever had a choice about whether p", "[1"abbrevi-
ate broadlogical necessity, "D" materialconditional, "PO"abbreviatethe com-
plete state of the world at some time in the distant pass, "L" abbreviate the
conjunction of the laws of nature, and "P" abbreviateany truth. Here are van
Inwagen's rules of inference: ALPHA: From [1P, derive NP; BETA: From NP
and N(P3Q), derive NQ. With this set up in place van Inwagen argues as
follows:

Another ConsequenceArgument(van Inwagen)

1. [1 ((PO & L) D P) Consequence of Determinism
2. [1 (PO D (L D P)) 1
3. N (PO D (L D P)) 2, Alpha
4. N PO Premise "fixity of the past"
5. N (L D P) 3,4, Beta
6. N L Premise "fixity of the laws"
7. N P 5,6, Beta

Having thus reached the conclusion that no one has or ever had any choice
about any truth from his assumption of determinism, van Inwagen concludes
that freedom and determinismare incompatible.
Whatevervirtues this argumentmay have (and it has many), and whatever
additional vices it may have (and it has some), this argumentmost certainly
exhibits the modal fallacy I have been discussing.9 For the proper incompati-
bilist conclusion, (INC), to follow from the soundness of this argument, van
Inwagenwould need premisesformallystrongerthanpremises(4) and (6) above.
Among other things, van Inwagen needs to defend not merely the truth, but
also the necessity, of his claim that no one has a choice about the laws of na-
ture. Van Inwagen, that is, needs to defend the truth of [1 NL, not just NL.l°
Perhapsvan Inwagen would be willing to defend this strongerpremise (and the
similarly strengthenedversion of premise 4). As the argumentis presented in
An Essay on Free Will, however, the argument,even if sound, does not estab-
lish the proper incompatibilist thesis. Instead it establishes only (WEAK) or
some similarly weakened thesis. The time is ripe for a new and improved in-
compatibilist argument.I will provide such an argumentin Section III.
As I stressed above, what I will offer in Section III is not a proof of incom-
patibilism. Rather,I will simply be offering a "semi-formal"argumentfor in-
compatibilism. I will, naturally enough, be quite interested to find out what
step in the argumentcompatibilists wish to reject or call into question for I do
not think that there is a "defective" step in the argument.But I have no doubt
that at least the craftiestphilosophersin the compatibilist camp will find some-
thing in the argumentsthat they feel should be rejected. They had better, for if
nothing else my argumentis valid and, if sound, implies the falsity of compat-
ibilism. It follows that one wishing to confront the argument and hold onto
one's compatibilism must reject some step in the argument.This does not im-
172 / TedA. Warfield

ply (at least not by itself) that my argument "begs the question" against the
compatibilist.ll If it did, then, so far as I can tell, any formally valid argument
would "beg the question" against those who do not accept its conclusion and
all formally invalid argumentswould, of course, be unsound:philosophical ar-
gumentationwould thereby be reduced to absurdity.

III. An Argument for Incompatibilism

I now arguefor incompatibilism.So that the argumentcan move right along

once it begins, I introducethe following fairly standardabbreviationsup front:

Let "D" abbreviateDeterminism.

Let "H" abbreviatethe conjunction of the complete state of the world in
the distant past with the laws of nature.l2
Let "Fsa"abbreviate"S is free to make it that case that a".
Use standardsymbols for broad logical necessity ("[1"),broad logical pos-
sibility ("O"), and negation (" ") and use "D" for material conditional.

Compatibilistshave traditionallymaintainedthat one being free to, for ex-

ample, stand at noon, does not require that one so standing be consistent with
the actual past and laws of nature. On the contrary,compatibilists have typi-
cally maintainedthat one's being free, in circumstancesH, to make it the case
that P consists in it being true that one would make it the case that P were
circumstances different in some specified respect. I was free to stand at noon
just means, according to typical compatibilists, (something like): had I tried to
stand at just before noon (or had I wanted to stand at noon) then I would have
stood at noon. Such compatibilists therefore deny this key proposition:

1. [1 Vxts (Fsx D O (H & x)).

A compatibilist needn't accept the common conditional analysis approach

to freedom to be committed to denying (1).13All truthsin a deterministicworld
are strict consequences of the past and laws of natureof the world in question.
So any compatibilistcommittedto there being a deterministicworld in which P
is the case and in which one is free to make it the case that P is committed to
denying (1). Furthermore,a simple argumentleads from the acceptance of (1)
to incompatibilism. Let's see how this argumentworks. After this argumentI
will provide a more complicated argumentfor (1).14Putting this simple argu-
ment from (1) to incompatibilism together with the later argumentfor (1) will
give me an overall argumentfor incompatibilism.
I aim to show that the following proposition, expressing the incompati-
bilist thesis, is true:

CONCLUSION:
g Vxts ((D & x) D Fs x).
 A New Argumentfor Incompatibilism / 173

Determinismis the thesis that the conjunction of the past and laws implies all
truths;that is

2. [1 Vx (D D (x D [1 (H D x))).

(2) is clearly equivalent to

3. [1 Vx ((D & x) D O (H & x)).

(1) is trivially equivalent to (1')

1'. C] Vxts (Fs x D O (H & x))

and from (3) and (1') it follows that

4. O 3x3s (D & x and Fs x).

(4), plainly enough, is strictly equivalent to the incompatibilist conclusion I'm

after, namely

CONCLUSION:C1Vxts ((D & x) D Fs x).l5

This simple argumentshows that incompatibilismfollows quickly if (1) is

true. I will now argue for (1). I argue for (1) by showing that a certain obvi-
ously valid inference is in fact valid only if (1) is true.
Consider the following proposition (schema):

5. P is true and there's nothing anyone is free to do in the circumstances

that even might result in P.

It seems as obvious as just about anything that (5) strictly implies

6. P is true and there's nothing anyone is free to do in the circumstances

that would definitely result in p.16

For example, if Kelly is not going to win tonight's lottery and there's nothing
anyone is free to do in the circumstancesthat even might result in Kelly's win-
ning the lottery then it follows that Kelly's not going to win the lottery and
there's nothing anyone is free to do in the circumstancesthat would definitely
result in Kelly's winning the lottery. If there's nothing I'm free to do in the
circumstancesthat even might get me out of going to the President's talk, then
certainly there's nothing I'm free to do in the circumstancesthat would ensure
that I get out of going to the President's talk. That (5) entails (6) seems obvi-
ously correct. (And before anyone complains or worries about possible equiv-
174 / TedA. Warfield

ocationcausedby the"contextdependence" of thephrase"inthecircumstances"

note that(a) we can enforcea univocalreadingof "in the circumstances" by
stipulationand(b) the argumentwouldproceedexactlyas it does substituting
the clearlyunivocalphrase"giventhe actualpastandlaws"for "inthe circum-
stances"throughout the argument).
Compatibilists, I maintain,mustrejectthe inferencefrom(5) to (6). Com-
patibilistsmustdo thatbecause,as I will now argue,thisinferenceis validonly
if (1) is true.(5), I maintain,shouldbe understoodas

7. P & VsVx (Fsx D [1 ((x & H) D P))

and(6) shouldbe understoodas

8. P & 3s3x (Fsx & [1 ((x & H) D P))

or,equivalently,as

8'. P & VsVx (Fsx & [1 ((x & H) D p)).17

I claim that (7) strictlyimplies (8') only if (1) is true.l8I show this as
follows:assume(1) is false andshowthatgiventhe assumptionit follows that
thereis a possibleworldin which(7) is truebut (8') is false. The existenceof
sucha worldwouldconclusivelyestablishthat(7) does not strictlyimply(8').
Onceagainrecall(1):

1. [1 VsVx (Fsx D O (H & x)).

Assume(1) is false andwe get

9. O 3s3x (Fsx D O (H & x))

equivalently,

9'. O 3s3x (Fsx & O (H & x)).

Instantiateandwe get

10. O (Fba & O (H & a).

Given(10), however,we can see thatthe truthof (7) does not guaranteethe
truthof (8'). Let's see why this is so.
(10) tells us thatthereis a world,call it w, whereagentb is freeto makeit
the case thata despitethe fact thata is incompatiblewiththe pastandlaws of
w. Becausea is incompatiblewiththe pastandlaws of w, it follows that a is
 A New Argumentfor Incompatibilism / 175

a truth of w. Indeed, it follows that a is a strict consequence of the past and

laws of w.
Recall (7):

7. P & VsVx (Fsx D [1 ((x & H) D P)).

Since P is just some true proposition, we can, in discussing (7), let P be a.

Given this, the following proposition is an instance of (7):

11. a & VsVx (Fsx D [1 ((x & H) D a)).

We know from (10) that a is a truthof w, so the first conjunct of (11) is true.
We also know from (10) that a is a strict consequence of H. It follows trivi-
ally that, for all propositionsx, a is a strict consequence of the conjunctionof
x with H. So it follows that the consequent of the second conjunct of (11) is
true and so the second conjunctof (11) is true. So in w, (11), an instance of (7),
is true.
Now recall

8'. P & VsVx (Fsx & [1 ((x & H) D P)).

Having just shown that an instance of (7) is true in w, I now seek to complete
this part of my argumentby showing that the correspondinginstance of (8') is
false in w. Again, P is just any truthof the world in question. In discussing (7)
we let P be a, so let's do that again. It follows that the first conjunct of (8') is
true in w. What about the second? Instantiating(8'), and letting P once again
be a, we can get

12. a & (Fba & [1 ((a & H) D a)).

As already noted, a is a truth of w, so (12) is true just in case the following

proposition is true:

13. (Fba&[l ((a&H) D a)).

But (13) is true only if at least one of the following two propositions is true:

14. Fba
15. [1 ((a & H) D a).

But we know from (10) that in w agent b is free to make it the case that a. So
(14) is false in w. And we also know from (10) that H strictly implies a and
so that the conjunction of H and a is a contradictionand therefore strictly im-
plies anything at all including, of course, a. (Alternatively, since a of course
176 / Ted A. Warfield

strictly implies a, the conjunction of a with anything, including H, strictly im-

plies a). So (15) is false in w. But since (14) and (15) are both false in w, it
follows that (13) is also false in w which implies that the relevant instance of
(8') is false in w.
So, given the assumption that (1) is false, we have shown that there is a
world, w, in which an instance of (7) is true, but the correspondinginstance of
(8') is false. This establishes that (7) implies (8') only if (1) is true.
As I showed earlier, however, the truth of (1) leads quickly to incompati-
bilism. For given the following proposition equivalent to (1),

1'. [1 Vxts (Fs x D O (H & x))

and the following trivial consequence of determinism,

3. [1 Vx ((D & x) D O (H & x))

it follows that

4. O 3x3s (D & x & Fs x).

And (4) is, as we also saw earlier,strictlyequivalentto the incompatibilistthesis:

CONCLUSION:[1 Vxts ((D & x) D Fs x).

So compatibilists must deny the validity of the inference from (7) to (8').
As discussed above, the inference from (7) to (8') is just the formalization of
the inference from (5) to (6). That is, this inference is just the inference from

5. P is true and there's nothing anyone is free to do in the circumstances

that even might result in P

to

6. P is true and there's nothing anyone is free to do in the circumstances

that would definitely result in P.

Compatibilistsare thereforecommittedto the existence of a world in which

P is true and there is nothing I'm free to do (in the circumstancesI'm in) that
even might make it the case that P, but in which there is something I'm free
to do (in the circumstancesI'm in) that would definitely make it the case that
P. So, it appearsthat compatibilists must be open to the possibility, for exam-
ple, that though there's nothing I'm free to do that even might get me out of
attendingthe President'stalk, there may well be somethingI'm free to do which
would definitely get me out of attendingthe President'stalk. To this I say "be-
 A New Argumentfor Incompatibilism / 177

lieve it if you can and if you are a compatibilist you have to believe it". I for
one choose incompatibilism.l9

Notes

8As quoted in Sports Illustrated, 9/14/98.

1. A few proponentsof the Consequence argumentare Carl Ginet (1991, Chapter5),
Robert Kane (1996, Chapter4), and Peter van Inwagen (1983, Chapter3).
2. Determinism is the thesis that the complete state of the world in the distant past
nomologically necessitates the future.This implies, obviously enough, that the con-
junction of the complete state of the world in the distant past with the laws of na-
ture strictly (metaphysically)necessitates the future.
3. Though some additionalwork is needed (to, among other things, address the con-
cerns of note 10), see Finch and Warfield (1998) and Warfield (1999) for partial de-
fenses of versions of the Consequenceargument.Finch and I respondto the common
charge that causal indeterminismis incompatible with freedom and so provide as-
sistanceto those incompatibilistswho also wish to endorselibertarianism(which adds
the thesis that freedom exists to incompatibilism). See Crisp and Warfield (forth-
coming) for replies to the best recent challenges to the main inference principle em-
ployed in most versionsof the Consequenceargument(van Inwagen'sPrincipleBeta).
4. Peter van Inwagen has recently remarkedthat "compatibilismis nowadays widely
regardedas implausible"(1997, p.373). (As recently as 1983, in An Essay on Free
Will, van Inwagen called compatibilism the "received opinion (1983, p.v) and said
that "incompatibilismcan hardly be said to be a popular thesis among present-day
philosophers"(1983, p.15)). Van Inwagen is mistaken about the currentstanding of
compatibilism.This mistake is perhapsexplained by the fact that most philosophers
working professionally on issues concerning freedom and determinism are incom-
patibilists.Among philosophersgenerally, compatibilismis the majorityposition, at
least according to my recent informal surveys on the matter.
5. My argumenttherefore at least seems to support John Martin Fischer in his ongo-
ing dispute with van Inwagen over van Inwagen's claim that plausible incompati-
bilist argumentsmust employ (or "presuppose")some version or other of the transfer
principle (van Inwagen's Principle Beta). See van Inwagen 1989 and 1994, Fischer
and Ravizza 1992 and 1996, Fischer 1994 and 1996 and Warfield 1997. Elsewhere
(Warfield 1997) I have severely criticized Fischer's response to van Inwagen on
this point and I stand by that criticism. But while Fischer's defense of his thesis
was flawed, his thesis may well be true. It is not clear, however, that my argument
shows that Fischer's thesis is true. Depending on how van Inwagen and Fischer are
understanding"presuppose"(and they do not tell us) my argumentsmay well pre-
suppose the validity of some Beta like transferprinciple. For what it's worth, I think
that in the face of my argumentthe burden is on van Inwagen, should he wish to
maintainhis position in this debate, to show that my argumentdoes presuppose the
validity of a transferprinciple.
6. At least if by "proof" one means (in part) a sound argument that no reasonable
person could understandbut not fully embrace.
7. The argumentI provide in Section III will not contain this weakness nor will any
partof the argument.My argumentwill be, without question, an argumentfor (INC).
178 / Ted A. Warfield

My argumentis not of the right form (conditional proof) to even possibly exem-
plify this error.
8. See van Inwagen 1977, p.107 and 1983 Chapter3. I am not, to be clear, claiming
that no argumentcontaining a contingent premise could possibly lend support to
the incompatibilistposition. Rather,I am claiming that the particulartype of incom-
patibilistargumentfavored by van Inwagen and Kane (a conditionalproof of a broad
modal claim) is invalid (and therefore does not support incompatibilism) if a con-
tingent premise is introducedinto the argument.
Jim Stone helpfully discusses what I think is an instance of this general point in
Stone 1998. Though I disagree sharply with Stone's overall position (Stone defends
compatibilism) I am in broad agreement with his main critical point against the
Consequence argument.
9. For a critical discussion of some of the other difficulties facing this particularver-
sion of the Consequence argumentsee Crisp and Warfield (forthcoming).
10. One wishing to defend the strengthenedpremise, CINL,might, but needn't, defend
the thesis that the laws of one world are the laws of every world. "L", as part of
such an argument could and probably should be indexed to individual worlds. I
hope to elaborate upon this point and explore the possibility of defending such a
strengthenedConsequence argumenton anotheroccasion.
11. Whatever,exactly, that means and I'm sure it means something! See Roy Sorens-
en's interestingpaper"UnbeggableQuestions"(1996) for a powerful argumentcon-
cluding that there is a fallacy of begging the question.
12. By "the complete state of the world"I mean, of course, only the complete hardpast
of the world (excluding, for example, true future tensed propositions).There is, un-
fortunately,no settled philosophical account of just what features of a time are the
"hard"featuresof a time. Alvin Plantingahas correctlypointed out that typical Con-
sequence argumentsdepend (and my argumentmay well depend) on the assump-
tion that the laws of natureof a world are hard facts about times in the distant past.
Like most incompatibilists, I accept that the laws are fixed in this way.
13. Compatibilistsshouldn't,in my view, accept a conditionalanalysis of freedom. Such
analyses are, so far as I can tell, hopeless for what are by now commonly accepted
reasons. For one discussion of these difficulties (and other difficulties for compati-
bilists) see van Inwagen, 1983, ChapterFour.
14. One might be tempted to assert that no argumentfor (1) is needed. After all, (1)
says only that a necessary condition for one's being free to make it the case that X
is that X be broadlylogically consistent with the past and laws of nature.This seems
to state a quite weak necessary condition for freedom. If this is your reaction, I
sympathize.If no argumentfor (1) is needed, then incompatibilismfollows, as shown
in the text. Because incompatibilism follows quickly from (1) it is worth trying to
see if (1) can be defended in some way beyond the appeal to "obviousness". As
argued in the text, I think (1) can be defended in a more productive way: the truth
of (1) is requiredfor the validity of certain clearly valid patternsof inference.
15. In an importantand neglected paper Thomas Flint (1987, p.438) provided an argu-
ment for the conclusion that all compatibilists must deny something very similar to
what I have called (1) (Flint's proposition replaces "x" in the consequent of my (1)
with "S makes it the case that x"). Though there are importantsimilarities between
my argumentand Flint's there are also differences. To note two differences: (i) as
Flint formulates his argumentit appears at most to establish (WEAK) not (INC);
(ii) Flint seems to assume that compatibilists are committed to the existence of free-
 A New Argumentfor Incompatibilism / 179

dom. With suitableclarificationsand simple corrections,however, I think that Flint's

argumentis sound. Flint does not, however, go on to defend the truthof his propo-
sition in an attemptto argue for incompatibilism. Instead he merely points out that
it would be dialectically inappropriateto simply assume the relevant proposition in
criticizing compatibilism (no doubt he would say the same thing about my (1).
Though I'm not sure he's right about this, it is importantto note that I do not merely
assume the truthof (1). I offer an argumentfor it.
16. In terminology introducedin Finch and Warfield (1998), the claim that (5) implies
(6) is equivalent to the claim that the "might"reading of "no choice" implies the
"would"reading of "no choice". In the conventions introducedin that paper,this is
the claim that "Mp"implies "Np". Others who have discussed these different un-
delstandings of the "no choice" locution have agreed that the "might"reading ob-
viously implies the "would"reading; see for example, McKay and Johnson 1996.
17. One might want to understand(5) and (6) using subjunctivesratherthan strict con-
ditionals. I think that this would be a mistake. One preferringsuch a reading how-
ever could construct an argumentparallel to the one in the text reaching the same
conclusion. I leave the task of constructing the argumentto those attractedto the
subjunctiveinterpretationof (5) and (6).
18. Because so much turnson the symbolization of (5) and (6) as, respectively, (7) and
(8), it is worth saying a bit more about this. In both (5) and (6) I'm understanding
the phrase "in the circumstances"as stipulatively equivalent to "given the past and
laws of nature".Given this, the translationsseem stlaightforward.(5), translatedas
(7), says that P is true and every agent/proposition pair is such that if the agent is
free to bling about the propositionthen P is going to (still) be true even if the prop-
osition is "added"to the past and laws. This is the clearest understandingof a prop-
osition, the " P" of (5), being such that (given the circumstances)no one is free to
make it the case. Similarly, (6), translated as (8), simply says that P is true and
there's no agent who is free to make some proposition true (to do something) that
would, when "combinedwith" the circumstances,imply P. I take it that's exactly
what it means to say that no one could, given the circumstances ensure that P.
19. My understandingof free will was shaped by an early reading of Peter van In-
wagen's influentialAn Essay on Free Will and in discussions with ChristopherHill.
I thank Paddy Blanchette, Marian David, Robert Kane, Michael Kremer, Tim
O'Connor, Alvin Plantinga, Mike Rea and Dean Zimmerman for helpful discus-
sion of this paper.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University
of Notre Dame where Tom Flint provided insightful commentary.Finally I owe a
special thanks to Tom Crisp for his help and comments at several stages in the
development of this paper.

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