5.

COMMISION PERIOD AND EXPIRATION
EFIGENIA M. TENOSO Complainant,  10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Etigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) tiled a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S.
Echanez (respondent) alleging that respondent was engaged in practice as a
notary public in Cordon, lsabela, without having been properly commissioned by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela. This is the RTC
exercising jurisdiction over the Municipality of Cordon.
This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC). To support her allegations, complainant attached the following
documents to her pleadings:
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and disqualified from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years for violating Rules 1.01 and
In a Resolution dated 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but increased the penalty of
suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year. Respondent did not file a Motion
for Reconsideration or any other subsequent pleading.
On 12 August 2009, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to the
Supreme Court for its action following Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.8
The Court modifies the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution.
Complainant presented evidence supporting her allegation that respondent had
notarized various documents in Cordon, Isabela from 2006 to 2008 and that
respondent's name does not appear on the list of notaries public commissioned
by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to
2008.

a. Two (2) documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City
Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian bearing the names of commissioned
notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago
City for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008.1 Respondent's name
does not appear on either list;
b. Copies of ten (10) documents that appear to have been notarized by
respondent in the years 2006, 2007, and 2008; and
c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-
affidavit notarized by respondent in 2008 could not be "authenticated as
to respondent's seal and signature as NO Notarial Commission was
issued upon him at the time of the document's notarization."2
In his two-page Answer, respondent denied the allegations saying, "I have never
been notarizing any document or pleadings"3 and added that he has "never
committed any malpractice, nor deceit nor have violated thelawyers (sic)
oath".4 He dismissed such allegations as being "preposterous, full of lies,
politically motivated and x x x meant to harass or intimidate him".5
Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint were
"tampered and adulterated," or that "somebody might have forged his
signature."6 He failed to attend the mandatory conference and likewise failed to
file his Position Paper.
In his Report and Recommendation dated 29 September 2008, Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag recommended that respondent be
Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's
allegations.1âwphi1 Per Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,9 the burden of
proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or
any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services,
Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez,10where a party resorts to bare
denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the
determination that he committed the violation is sustained. Respondent merely
posited that the notarized documents presented by complainant were "tampered
and adulterated" or were results of forgery, but he failed to present any
proof.11 Respondent also resorted to a sweeping and unsupported statement that
he never notarized any document. Accordingly, the reasonable conclusion is that
respondent repeatedly notarized documents without the requisite notarial
commission.
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with
public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State - the administration
of justice - as an officer of the court."12 Accordingly, '"lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing."13
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.14"Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for
notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution."15
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants,
courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents
posing as public instruments. As noted by the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the
explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently,
respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that he be
sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial

practice without a notarial commission, and accordingly, We SUSPEND him from
the practice of law for two (2) years and DISQUALIFY him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.

SO ORDERED.
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS)
FACULTY and STAFF, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO,  J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint
Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C.
Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for
child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before
the Prosecutor’s Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the
Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by
SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money
supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS
Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal
deduction of salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:
In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on
31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W.
Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane
Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994,
said second marriage was subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately
subscribed and notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to
1997, despite expiration of respondent’s notarial commission on 31 December
1987. A Certification1 dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not
applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the
period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced
by the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Ownership2 dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
2. Affidavit3 dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
3. Affidavit4 dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
4. Affidavit5 dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
5. Absolute Date of Sale6 dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in
favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties7 dated 5 March 1994, executed by
Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
7. Sworn Statement8 dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
8. Deed of Sale9 dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor
of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties10 dated 1 June 1994, executed by
Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale11 dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor
D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale12 dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in
favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties13 dated 17 April 1996, executed
by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
13. Conditional Deed of Sale14 dated 27 February 1997, executed by Aurelia
Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela
Cruz;
14. Memorandum of Agreement15 dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO
represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr.
George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child
abuse, illegal deduction of salary and others which are still pending before the St.
Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the
Prosecutor’s Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of
immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice in notarizing
documents despite the expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred16 the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a
reiteration of their allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He
also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when his
notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating
defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the
complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and
recommended that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent be administratively penalized for the following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to
have the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration
of his notarial commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another
one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years.17
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the
recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent
contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the
first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full
knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela
Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1) year, for a total
of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.18
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken,
except as to the penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and
right to practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity
to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege
or right, an attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to
protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather
than to punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty.
Cabanting,19 that the Bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as
well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an
attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being
broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a
dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether
the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his
private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be
an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.20 Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts,
may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.21
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. Possession of such moral character as
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be continuous.
Otherwise, "membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral conduct."22
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera
contracted marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less
than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without
seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their separation in-
fact, respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had
lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter, respondent
became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of
SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married
Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68.
Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second marriage was entered
into, respondent’s prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no
action having been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity or annulment of respondent’s prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous
second marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he
cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage
may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled
by the appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October
1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after respondent
contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondent’s second
marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier
emphasized, the annulment came after the respondent’s second bigamous
marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a
lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against
him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its
course, then neither will the judgment of annulment of respondent’s second
marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as
the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.23
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a
ground for disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral
conduct, vis-à-vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is "that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" and what is
"grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."24
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as
to warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in
place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.25
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider
respondent’s act as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following
recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of
Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the
law and the high moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of
almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his
wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation
to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the
mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.26
In the case of Terre v. Terre,27 respondent was disbarred because his moral
character was deeply flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he
convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void
ab initio and that she was legally single and free to marry him. When complainant
and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law
school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from
respondent’s parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten
complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.
In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,28 respondent was also disbarred for his
grossly immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three
children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he
mispresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign
land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainant’s resources by securing a
plane ticket from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter. He
did this without complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity
to assure complainant that "everything is legal."
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent
himself acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was
humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his
commitment to his wife and child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon
him to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish
the end desired.29 In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years
suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension
recommended by the IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed
by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during
the years 1988-1997 after his commission as notary public had expired,
respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite his
knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he
received no payment in notarizing said documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one
making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this
reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.30
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be
treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of
notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do so as
"reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the
crime of falsification of public documents."31
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is
done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization
or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or
one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the
lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by
making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By
acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer
likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,32 a lawyer was suspended for one year
when he notarized five documents after his commission as Notary Public had
expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed
of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we
find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances.
Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents33without the
requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondent’s misconduct such as the pending criminal
case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student
filed before the Prosecutor’s Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative
case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating
Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty
before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction
of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before
the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in
favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral
conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another
two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission
or a total of four (4) years of suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the
Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant,  5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any
vs. delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and or public servants
JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19, involved in this administrative case.
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,1respondent.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.
DECISION
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the
CALLEJO SR., J.: premises.3

May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly
notary commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? This is Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the
the novel issue presented for resolution before this Court. following:

The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001 THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in
Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional this office, the following data appear:
Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC notary public in the following years:
judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law, thus:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly commissioned as notary
public until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
basis) notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980
uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984. c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989

a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to 2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony
December 31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but E. Santos submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
the records fail to show any entry at the Clerk of Court after December
31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the
expiration of his commission in December 1989.2 b             February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June
6, 1980
...
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of
submission
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future
public service.
e. November to December 1980-no entry
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of
submission
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
 h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of
submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents
under the name Atty. Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty.
Anthony Santos was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989.4
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied
the charges against him. He also submitted a certification5 from Clerk of Court,
Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted
notarized documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and
submitted by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of
the said notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said
issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled
Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc.,
and Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the
Presiding Judge. The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.6
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the
need to resort to a full-blown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties’
assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a)
treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation,
report and recommendation.7
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant
requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially
denied the request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter was
forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July
8, 2002.8 The complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before
retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.9
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz
made the following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found
guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without
commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-
forwarding of his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his
commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be suspended from the practice
of law and barred from being commissioned as notary public, both for one year,
and his present commission, if any, be revoked.10
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in
his defense, while the complainant presented documentary evidence to support
the charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was
commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy
of the first certification. He merely alleged that "there was no proper recording of
the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted
Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." And, as already observed, he presented
no evidence, particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983
(assuming he was so commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and
notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there were only two
Record Books available in the notarial section" of the RTC of Misamis Oriental
(Cagayan de Oro City); and that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial
Commission contains items on the Name, Date Commission was issued and
Expiration of Commission of the notary public. First entry appearing was made
on December 1982."
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the "first book" would
disclose so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not present
said book. Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of
Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned
in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of appointment for all
those years. Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be
prepared and forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor
General, together with the oath of office of the notary public.11
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by
the complainant, that the respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983
without being commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his
earliest commission of record was on January 9, 1984.12
The Procedural Issues Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys provides:
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief
backgrounder. Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by
affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate
are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary
and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the
action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of
government service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such
Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with
other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as
them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed
grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be Court for disposition and adjudication.14
considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court
official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also
the Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-
be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the
B, or before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution.
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases
interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against
judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same
erring justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the
manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report
government service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The
shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall
supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative
cases already filed where the respondents have not yet been required to Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated
comment on the complaints. Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor
General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to
the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the
together with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for
respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
the final action of the Supreme Court.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by
For Acts Committed While He Was Still A Practicing Lawyer
the Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may
refer the complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the General, any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court
complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for will thereafter base its final action.15
disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer,
before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still
not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with
considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 616of the 1987
Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
respondent was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself,
as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax
Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court.17
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing
Thereafter Of An Administrative Charge Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be
Held Answerable If Found Liable Therefor
it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be
recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the
Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within
ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a
report and recommendation not later than 30 days from receipt of the
comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of
compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so,
within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of
the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be
withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in
the complaint.

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or

The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the
justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
service does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the
complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement
veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority
of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year
over members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:18
before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to
harass the respondent.
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by
during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to
the Office of the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001.21 The respondent retired
pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him
compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002.
guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been
dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official
committed by the respondent did not occur a year before the respondent’s
merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which
separation from the service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant
he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and intended merely to
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.19
harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the
ambit of the foregoing resolution.
However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative
or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment,"
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The
we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC20 which took effect on November 3, 2003. It
Judiciary
reads in part:

It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court
appointment to the judiciary.22 In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as
Administrator, an administrative complaint against any Justice of the
it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and
Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts
adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including
filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be clearly unfounded
those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown that
and baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding
the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is
should be included in the report and recommendation of the Office of the
sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on the respondent,
Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed by
considering the gravity of the offense.
the Court, the complainant may be required to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he
may further be required to show cause why he or she should not be Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be
administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of continuing in order for the respondent judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla
the court. v. Salubre,24 the respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a
practicing lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory
client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed
retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that
as a judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that the respondent’s
occurred at least a year before such filing and (c) shown prima facie that
subsequent appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from taking
responsibility for the consequences of his acts as an officer of the court.25
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of prior immoral conduct
cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if he is not
charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered
from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk
proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption.
A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to
know, that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private and official
conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. ...27
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by
substantial evidence.28 The complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to
the respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence
was, however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts
after being appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this
case because the complainant failed to present evidence that the indiscretion
continued even after the respondent was appointed to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the
right and duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public
welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this
Court.29 The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a
bounden duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded
of its members.30
Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes
Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.31Notarization by
a notary public converts a private document into a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.32
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be
treated as a mere casual formality.33 The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act
of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as
"reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of
falsification of public documents."34 For such reprehensible conduct, the Court
has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation
of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.35
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar
at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may
be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without
such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging
in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These
violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."37
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-
emphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is
at stake in every aspect of that function.38
The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence,
prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the
pleadings filed.39 Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public
for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. The
respondent merely alleged in his answer that "there was no proper recording of
the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted
Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." Furthermore, as found by the
Investigating Justice, the respondent presented no evidence of his commission
as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof of submission of
notarial reports and the notarial register.40
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and
to controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the
charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.41
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the
documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under
Section 27, Rule 13842 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or
the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no
doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority
acts and doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the
duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the public might or does
suffer undesirable consequences.43
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed
with upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. It is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
one’s mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his
admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the
practice of law.45
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own,
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.46 As we
held in the leading case of In re Almacen:47
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. ....48
In a case involving a mere court employee49 the Court disregarded the Court
Administrator’s recommendation that the charge for immorality against the
respondent be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to adduce
evidence that the respondent’s immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from
being found guilty of illicit conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of
dishonesty for falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to show that her
paramour was the father. The complaint in this case was filed on August 5, 1999,
almost twenty years after the illicit affair ended.50 The Court held that
administrative offenses do not prescribe.51
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an
administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed
as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was
committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of
the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this
Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of
justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission
of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench
and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath.
This should particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of the
matter involved - the respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial
documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending
act to the institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the
requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely
Mitigate The Respondent’s Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high
sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar.52 By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such
standards;53 he undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents
and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. The respondent also violated
Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.54 In representing that he was possessed of the
requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so authorized, the
respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will
likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case,
considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-four years
after the commission of the act complained of;56 that there was no private
offended party who came forward and claimed to have been adversely affected
by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the
respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-
earned retirement benefits.57 The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified
in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of

notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is
hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
 MILA VIRTUSIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. GRENALYN V. the car in her children s name and sold it to a third person. Mila filed a case of
VIRTUSIO, Respondent. estafa against Atty. Virtusio7Ï‚rνll apart from the present disbarment case.

DECISION Mila claimed that Atty. Virtusio evaded the return of money she misappropriated,
impeded the execution of a final judgment, and engaged in conduct that
ABAD, J.: discredits the legal profession, all in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, rendering her unfit to remain a member of the bar.8ςrνllςrνll
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who failed to use the money given by
another to fund the checks she issued as accommodation party in payment for In a July 27, 2005 Resolution,9Ï‚rνll the Court required Atty. Virtusio to comment
the property that was purchased by such person and performed a notarial act on the complaint. She asked for extension of time to comply but did not file her
without commission. comment just the same.10Ï‚rνll On Mila s motion,11Ï‚rνll the Court again required
Atty. Virtusio to file her comment and to show cause why she had not complied
with its previous orders.12Ï‚rνll Still, she did not file any comment, prompting the
The Facts and the Case
Court to impose on her on November 15, 2006 a P 500.00 fine. The court again
reiterated its order for her to file her comment.13ςrνllςrνll
On June 14, 2005, Mila Virtusio (Mila) filed with this Court a Complaint1Ï‚rνll for
disbarment against her husband's distant relative, Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio.Mila
With no response, on August 1, 2007, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to
alleged that sometime in 1999 Atty. Virtusio convinced her to buy a house and lot
resend its November 15, 2006 Resolution to Atty. Virtusio14Ï‚rνll but this was
at North Olympus Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City, from its developer,
returned unserved with the notation, "RTS-Person moved out." On December 3,
Stateland Investment Corporation (Stateland). Mila agreed for Atty. Virtusio to
2007 the Court ordered the resending of the May 3 and November 15, 2006
use her personal checks in paying the seller with Mila reimbursing her. Under this
Resolutions to Atty. Virtusio, this time at an address in Sta. Mesa that Mila
arrangement, Mila gave Atty. Virtusio the following
furnished. When this last resolution was returned unserved with the notation,
amounts: P 95,000.00, P 25,000.00, P 65,000.00, P 64,000.00 and P 64,000.00.
"RTS-Unclaimed," the Court issued a Resolution15Ï‚rνll on April 30, 2008 that
All of these were properly receipted except for the P 95,000.00 for which she got
considered Atty. Virtusio to have waived her right to file a comment considering
a receipt from her for only P 90,000.00.2Ï‚rνll On October 25 and November 24,
that she filed none despite having sought an extension from the Court. The Court
1999, Mila deposited identical amounts of P64,000.00 each in Atty. Virtusio s
also referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
checking account with Equitable Bank.3Ï‚rνll In all, Mila gave her P441,000.00.
investigation, report, and recommendation.
To her surprise, however, Mila began receiving letters from Stateland,
The IBP Investigating Commissioner directed Atty. Virtusio to file a position
demanding that she make good the dishonored checks that it got. When she
paper. She filed a motion for extension of time to file the same but did
confronted Atty. Virtusio regarding this, the latter assured her that she would take
not.16ςrνllςrνll
care of the problem. But the demand letters persisted.

Based on the pleadings on hand, the IBP Investigating Commissioner reported

For fear of losing the property, Mila directly dealt with Stateland in January 2000.
having found that Atty. Virtusio appropriated portions of the money that Mila gave
She then found out that her arrearages had come close to P 200,000.00,
her for payment to Stateland, thus evidencing her moral unfitness to practice the
inclusive of penalty and interest. In order not to lose the property, Mila and her
profession. The Commissioner recommended the imposition of the penalty of
husband decided to settle their overdue obligation with money they borrowed at
one year suspension from the practice of law17Ï‚rνll with a two-year
high interest.4Ï‚rνll In turn, Stateland turned over to her three checks of Atty.
disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public, given that she had
Virtusio, each for P 71,944.97, with the notation "DAIF."5Ï‚rνllÏ‚rνll
notarized documents despite the expiration of her notarial
commission.18Ï‚rνll The IBP Board of Governors approved the report and
Mila further alleged that Atty. Virtusio declined to return to her the money the recommendation.19ςrνllςrνll
latter misappropriated despite demand. Only when Mila threatened to file a case
against her did Atty. Virtusio agree to pay her on February 20, 2001 by executing
Atty. Virtusio filed a motion for reconsideration of the IBP Investigating
a deed of sale in her favor covering her Mazda car. Despite the sale, however,
Commissioner s action on April 30, 2009.20Ï‚rνll She explained that her failure to
Atty. Virtusio pleaded with Mila and her husband to let her keep the car
file her position paper was brought about by her belief that she needed to wait for
meanwhile since she needed it in her work. When she refused to give up the car,
the IBP s action on her motion for extension of time to file the same. Thus, she
Mila filed a replevin case against Atty. Virtusio that the court eventually decided
in Mila s favor.6Ï‚rνll But, as it turned out, Atty. Virtusio had managed to register
prayed that her attached position paper be admitted and considered in resolving
her motion for reconsideration.21ςrνllςrνll
In her version of the facts, Atty. Virtusio wants to convince the Court that she
committed no intentional wrongs and that she was but a victim of circumstances.
Although she admitted using Mila s money rather than pay Stateland with it, she
explained that, having been busy attending to her sick son in Manila, she failed to
monitor her check disbursements, entrusting it to an office staff. Only in
December 1999 was she able to audit the same and discover the
mismanagement of her funds and its co-mingling with office funds, resulting in
overlapping of accountabilities and non-funding of the checks for Stateland when
they fell due.22ςrνllςrνll
On becoming aware of the lapses, however, Atty. Virtusio
borrowed P 165,000.00 from Engr. Marciano de Guzman so she could pay Mila
but, having failed to pay him as well, he went after Mila who was co-maker of the
loan. When Atty. Virtusio tried to make further arrangements to pay what she
owed Mila, the latter refused to negotiate and did not acknowledge the past
payments she had already made. When Atty. Virtusio refused to yield to Mila s
demand for payment of the entire P 165,000.00, she filed a replevin case, a
complaint for estafa, and disbarment charge against her.23ςrνllςrνll
Atty. Virtusio averred that in October 2006 she and Mila entered into a verbal
agreement whereby she would pay her P 200,000.00, with P 87,500.00 up front,
in exchange for Mila s dismissal of all her actions. Notwithstanding that the
compromise agreement had not been formalized, Atty. Virtusio claimed that it
obliterated her liabilities, given that she substantially settled her obligations to
Mila.24ςrνllςrνll
Atty. Virtusio also pointed out, that the charges against her were not born of
some professional relation between Mila and her. She had acted as an
accommodation party, allowing Mila to make use of her personal checks to
facilitate the purchase of a property from Stateland. And, assuming that the
predicament she finds herself in has a bearing on her professional conduct, the
same does not amount to grossly immoral conduct since she owned up to her
responsibilities and exerted tireless effort to settle her accounts.25ςrνllςrνll
Further, Atty. Virtusio claimed that she should not be penalized for violation of the
notarial law since this offense did not form part of the original complaint to which
she was required to respond. At any rate, she merely committed an oversight.
She had religiously renewed her notarial commission yearly since May 1995.
When she notarized the questioned documents, she believed in good faith that
she had renewed her notarial commission for 2006 and 2007 just as before. She
asked not to be punished for her mistake since it was brought about by her
sincere commitment to extend free legal service to the
disadvantaged.26ςrνllςrνll
Lastly, Atty. Virtusio asked the Court to reconsider the harsh penalty imposed on
her in the light of the peculiar circumstances of her case and the good faith she
showed.27ςrνllςrνll
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution XIX-2011-
47728Ï‚rνll denying the motion despite an affidavit of desistance that Mila filed in
the meantime.29Ï‚rνll As provided in Section 12(b),30Ï‚rνllRule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court for final action.
Questions Presented
The questions presented in this case are:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
1. Whether or not the IBP erred in finding Atty. Virtusio guilty of grave misconduct
in her dealings with Mila and in notarizing documents without a renewed
commission; andcralawlibrary
2. Assuming Atty. Virtusio was guilty of some offenses, whether or not the IBP
imposed the appropriate penalties on her.
chanrobles virtual law library
Rulings of the Court
Lawyers are, as officers of the court and instruments for the administration of
justice, expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, and fair dealing. A lawyer s gross misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, is ground for suspension or disbarment under
the principle that, since good moral character is an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law, maintaining such trait is a condition for keeping
the privilege.31ςrνllςrνll
By her own account, Atty. Virtusio admitted misusing the money that Mila
entrusted to her for payment to Stateland. Her excuse is that she lost track of her
finances and mixed up her office funds with her personal funds. But this excuse
is too thin. She admitted misusing P 165,000.00 of Mila s money, which is not
petty cash. Indeed she tried to borrow money from a third person to cover it up
rather than just offer her shallow excuse to Mila. Atty. Virtusio s use for personal
purpose of money entrusted to her constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct
under the Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides:ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND Considering, however, that based on the evidence Atty. Virtusio had notarized
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF only two documents without a proper notarial commission, the Court finds her
THE INTEGRATED BAR. suspension from notarial practice for one year adequate.36ςrνllςrνll

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his That Mila had agreed after some financial settlement to withdraw her complaint
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a against Atty. Virtusio cannot exempt the latter from the prescribed sanction. She
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. has outraged the country s professional code and this demands a measure of
justice. As the Court said in Spouses Soriano v. Atty. Reyes,37ςrνlldisbarment is
chanrobles virtual law library a disciplinary action taken for the public good. Consequently, it is as a rule not
subject to some compromise entered into with the complainant. Besides, Mila's
evidence is already a matter of record and the Court cannot simply ignore the
Atty. Virtusio cannot absolve herself of liability by claiming that she failed to
same.38ςrνllςrνll
attend to her finances because she had to look after a sick child at that time.
Assuming she had such a child, the fact is that it was not by mere oversight that
she failed to finance the checks for Stateland. For, if this were so, she could have WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio GUILTY of gross
easily rectified her mistake by using her other funds. In truth, she spent the misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
money that Mila entrusted to her because she had no other funds. Indeed, she and IMPOSES on her the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for
had to borrow money from a third party later to remedy her financial problems. one year, effective immediately. In addition, the Court REVOKES any Notarial
Commission she may presently have and DISQUALIFIES her from applying for it
for one year also effective immediately. Further, she is WARNED of a more
What is more, supposedly to cover up for her fault, Atty. Virtusio executed a deed
severe penalty should she commit a similar infraction in the future.
of sale covering her car in Mila s favor rather than return the money she
defalcated. But, again acting with guile, she withheld possession of the car and
transferred its registration in the name of her children. Let cop1es of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. Finally, let
this judgment be made part of Atty. Virtusio's personal record 1n the latter
Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her above acts of gross misconduct that warrants her
office.ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
suspension for one year from the practice of law following Section
27,32Ï‚rνll Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
The Court cannot also countenance Atty. Virtusio s notarization of documents
after her notarial commission had expired. Although the IBP discovered this
violation of the notarial law only in the course of the proceedings and was not a
subject matter of Mila s complaint, it cannot close its eyes to the same. Besides,
Atty. Virtusio had an opportunity to defend herself against this additional
charge.33Ï‚rνll Her defense is that she thought that she had renewed her
commission.

Again, Atty. Virtusio s defense is unsubstantial. She did not renew her notarial
commission for two years, 2006 and 2007, not just one. She could not have
missed that fact considering that, as she said, she had been renewing her
commission yearly from 1995 to 2005.

A lawyer who notarizes a document without a proper commission violates his

lawyer s oath to obey the law. He makes it appear that he is commissioned when
he is not. He thus indulges in deliberate falsehood that the lawyer s oath forbids.
This violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Canon 7 as well.34Ï‚rνll A proper sanction is
authorized.35ςrνllςrνll
 VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant, v. ATTY. SERGIO E.
BERNABE, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Complaint1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004, complainant Victorina
Bautista2 prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct in the performance of his duties
as a notary public and a lawyer.
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and
notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay3 purportedly executed by Donato Salonga
and complainant's mother, Basilia de la Cruz.4 Both affiants declared that a
certain parcel of land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by
Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that
her mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998
because she has been dead since January 28, 1961.5
In his Answer,6 respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na
Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilia's death. He alleged that
before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilia's presence and in her
absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign
above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of the name of
Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no forgery since the signature
appearing on top of Basilia's name was the signature of Pronebo.
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation7 attaching thereto the affidavit
of desistance8 of complainant which reads in part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng
naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga
sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO
EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the
Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay
pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng kanyang Abogado na
si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa
Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang
kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong si Abogado SERGIO
ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa nasabing Abogado
SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner9 recommended that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal
profession for one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be
revoked; andcralawlibrary
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial
commission for a period of one (1) year.10
In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year and his notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for
reappointment as notary public for two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint
affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998. Respondent's alleged lack of
knowledge of Basilia's death does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the
personal appearance of the affiant before affixing his notarial seal and signature
on the instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The
presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the affiant.11
Respondent's act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay  in the absence of
one of the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01,12 Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.13 By affixing his signature and
notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia personally
appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the
affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed the document.
Respondent's conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the requiring her to personally appear before him in violation of the Notarial Law.
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the This allegation must likewise be investigated.
public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise
utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and to WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional
comply with the mandates of the law.14 Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe,
is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a
Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
behalf of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the
should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him. The acts report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his
of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are suspension shall take effect.
facts of which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the
document personally and not through any representative. Otherwise, their The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
representative's name should appear in the said documents as the one who DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized
executed the same. That is the only time the representative can affix his the Sinumpaang Salaysay  of Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004
signature and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of the without requiring the latter's personal appearance.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl
said document. Simply put, the party or parties who executed the instrument lαω  lιbrαrÿ
must be the ones to personally appear before the notary public to acknowledge
the document.15 Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of
Complainant's desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest SO ORDERED.
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out
by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.16

We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent
jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,17 respondent lawyer was found guilty of
notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories.
As a result, his notarial commission was revoked and he was disqualified from
reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from the
practice of law for one year.

Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 218 of complainant's
affidavit of desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized
her Sinumpaang Salaysay19 dated November 12, 2004 which was attached to the
complaint filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, without
SPOUSES CLARO and NIDA BAUTISTA, petitioners,  meters, more or less, was registered in the names of Spouses Berlina F.
vs.
BERLINDA F. SILVA, Represented by HERMES J. DORADO, in his capacity
as Attorney-In-Fact, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with
land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he
relied on the face of the seller's certificate of title.1 But for a person dealing with
land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell
is restricted, such as by Articles 1662 and 1733 of the Civil Code or Article 1244 of
the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter's capacity to sell in
order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.5 The extent of his
inquiry depends on the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity
consists of a special power of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of the
face of such public document already constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such
special power of attorney is provided or there is one but there appear flaws in its
notarial acknowledgment mere inspection of the document will not do; the
buyer must show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the
circumstances of its execution.
Appealed by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the November 21, 2001 Decision6 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 487677 which affirmed in toto the January 10, 1995 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 3091-V-89, and the February 27,
2003 CA Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 is a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-2765, Reconveyance and Damages
filed with the RTC, Branch 171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila by Berlina F. Silva
(Berlina), through Hermes Dorado (Dorado) as Attorney-in-Fact, against Spouses
Claro and Nida Bautista (Spouses Bautista). Spouses Bautista filed their
Answer8 and a Third-Party Complaint against Berlina's husband, Pedro M. Silva
(Pedro).9 In an Order dated August 6, 1991, the RTC declared third-party
defendant Pedro in default for failure to file an answer to the Third-Party
Complaint.10
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the RTC, are as follows:
1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 of the Registry of Deeds
for xxx Metro Manila District III over a parcel of land (Lot 42, Block 10, of
the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-210217, Sheet 2, being a portion of Lot
903, Malinta Estate, LRC Record No. 5941) situated in xxx Barrio of
Parada, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, containing an area of 216 square
Silva and Pedro M. Silva on August 14, 1980;
2. That on March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-
fact of his wife Berlina F. Silva, thru a Special Power of Attorney
purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by Berlina F. Silva in his
favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 in favor of
defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista; and
3. That as a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37189 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of
the Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the
names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988.11
Based on the evidence presented, the RTC also found that the signature
appearing on the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) as that of Berlina Silva is a
forgery, and that consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in
favor of Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlina.12
The RTC rendered judgment on January 10, 1995, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1988 executed by
Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Berlina F. Silva, in
favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista over the
parcel of land, described and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
B-37189 Metro Manila District III, null and void and the resulting Transfer
Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of Valenzuela Registry in the name of
Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista cancelled and that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. B-37189 reinstated.
2. Ordering defendants to reconvey the property covered by the said
Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 together with the improvements
thereon to the plaintiff.
3. Condemning the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00
in the concept of reasonable attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
Defendants' counterclaim is dismissed.
Judgment on default is hereby entered in favor of the third-party plaintiffs
Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista against third-party defendants
Pedro M. Silva, condemning the third-party defendant Pedro Silva to
 indemnify/pay third-party plaintiffs Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida
Bautista the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) the
contract price of the sale of the property, with interest at the legal rate
from the date of the execution of the said document on March 3, 1988
until the amount is fully paid and for whatever amount that the third–party
plaintiffs were adjudged and paid to the plaintiff by reason of this decision
and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Spouses Bautista filed an appeal with the CA which, in its November 21, 2001
Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC decision;14 and, in a Resolution
dated February 27, 2003, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.15
Hence, the herein petition filed by Spouses Bautista praying that the CA Decision
and Resolution be annulled and set aside on the following grounds:
I. Respondent as represented by Hermes Dorado in his capacity as
attorney-in-fact has no legal authority to file action against spouses
petitioners.
II. The petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for
value having relied upon a Special Power of Attorney which appears
legal, valid and genuine on its face.
III. Gratia argumenti that the special power of attorney is a forgery and
the deed of sale executed by the husband is null and void, the nullity
[thereof] does not include the one half share of the husband.16
The petition fails for lack of merit.
As to the first ground, petitioners argue that for lack of authority of Dorado to
represent respondent, the latter's Complaint failed to state a cause of action and
should have been dismissed.17
The argument holds no water.
True, there was no written authority for Dorado to represent respondent in the
filing of her Complaint. However, no written authorization of Dorado was needed
because the Complaint was actually filed by respondent, and not merely through
Dorado as her attorney-in-fact. As correctly observed by the CA, respondent
herself signed the verification attached to the Complaint.18 She stated therein that
she is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 and that she caused the
preparation of the Complaint.19 Respondent also personally testified on the facts
alleged in her Complaint.20 In reality, respondent acted for and by herself, and not
through any representative, when she filed the Complaint. Therefore, respondent
being the real party in interest, by virtue of the then prevailing Articles 16621 and
17322 of the Civil Code, the Complaint she filed sufficiently stated a cause of
action. The sufficiency of the Complaint was not affected by the inclusion of
Dorado as party representative for this was an obvious error which, under
Section 11 of Rule 3,23 is not a ground for dismissal, as it may be corrected by
the court, on its own initiative and at any stage of the action, by dropping such
party from the complaint.24
Anent the second ground, there is no merit to petitioners' claim that they are
purchasers in good faith.
That the SPA is a forgery is a finding of the RTC and the CA on a question of
fact.25 The same is conclusive upon the Court, 26 especially as it is based on the
expert opinion of the NBI which constitutes more than clear, positive and
convincing evidence that respondent did not sign the SPA, and on the
uncontroverted Certification of Dorado that respondent was in Germany working
as a nurse when the SPA was purportedly executed in 1987.
The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro any authority to alienate the
subject property without the consent of respondent. Absent such marital consent,
the deed of sale was a nullity.27
But then petitioners disclaim any participation in the forgery of the SPA or in the
unauthorized sale of the subject property. They are adamant that even with their
knowledge that respondent was in Germany at the time of the sale, they acted in
good faith when they bought the subject property from Pedro alone because the
latter was equipped with a SPA which contains a notarial acknowledgment that
the same is valid and authentic.28 They invoke the status of buyers in good faith
whose registered title in the property is already indefeasible and against which
the remedy of reconveyance is no longer available.29 In the alternative,
petitioners offer that should respondent be declared entitled to reconveyance, let
it affect her portion only but not that of Pedro.30
Whether or not petitioners are buyers for value in good faith is a question of fact
not cognizable by us in a petition for review.31 We resolve only questions of law;
we do not try facts nor examine testimonial or documentary evidence on record.
We leave these to the trial and appellate courts to whose findings and
conclusions we accord great weight and respect, especially when their findings
concur.32 We may have at times reversed their findings and conclusions but we
resort to this only under exceptional circumstances as when it is shown that said
courts failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.33 No such exceptional
circumstance obtains in the present case for we find the conclusions of the RTC
and CA supported by the established facts and applicable law. However, we do
not fully subscribe to some of their views on why petitioners cannot be
considered in good faith, as we will discuss below.
A holder of registered title may invoke the status of a buyer for value in good faith
as a defense against any action questioning his title.34 Such status, however, is
never presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it.35
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and
pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He
buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom
he receives the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.36
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he
relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made
further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the
title.37 Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the
following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the
land; 38 second, the latter is in possession thereof;39 and third, at the time of the
sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in
the property,40 or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his
capacity to convey title to the property.41
Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer
on notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by
scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in order
to determine the seller's title and capacity to transfer any interest in the
property.42 Under such circumstance, it is no longer sufficient for said buyer to
merely show that he relied on the face of the title; he must now also show that he
exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the title.43 Failure to
exercise such degree of precaution makes him a buyer in bad faith.44
In the present case, petitioners were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to
and possession of the land but, as indicated on the face of his title, whose
capacity to sell was restricted, in that the marital consent of respondent is
required before he could convey the property. To prove good faith then,
petitioners must show that they inquired not only into the title of Pedro but also
into his capacity to sell.
According to petitioners, to determine Pedro's capacity to sell, they conducted
the following forms of inquiry: first, they inspected the photocopy of the SPA
presented to them by Pedro;45 second, they brought said copy to Atty. Lorenzo
Lucero (the notary public who prepared the deed of sale) and asked whether it
was genuine;46 and third, they inspected the original copy of the SPA after they
advanced payment of Php55,000.00 to Pedro.47 Essentially, petitioners relied on
the SPA, specifically on its notarial acknowledgment which states that
respondent appeared before the notary public and acknowledged having
executed the SPA in favor of Pedro.
The RTC and CA, however, found such inquiry superficial. They expected of
petitioners an investigation not only into the whereabouts of respondent at the
time of the execution of the SPA48 but also into the genuineness of the signature
appearing on it.49
We find such requirements of the RTC and CA too stringent that to adopt them
would be to throw commerce into madness where buyers run around to probe
the circumstances surrounding each piece of sales document while sellers
scramble to produce evidence of its good order. Remember that it is not just any
scrap of paper that is under scrutiny but a SPA, the execution and attestation of
which a notary public has intervened.
To what extent, therefore, should an inquiry into a notarized special power of
attorney go in order for one to qualify as a buyer for value in good faith?
We agree with one author who said:
x x x To speak of "notice", as applied to the grantee, is to follow the
language of the Statue of Elizabeth. Its proviso protects the man who
purchases "upon good consideration and bona fide * * * not having
at the time * * * any manner of notice or knowledge." The term
"notice", however, is really but an approach to the test of good faith, and
all modern legislation tends toward that point.
Thus, some present day statutes (outside of the Uniform Law) may
speak of notice, actual and constructive, and define both terms, but they
should be "liberally construed, so as to protect bona fide purchaser for
value." They may require the grantee to have "knowledge" of the debtor's
intent, but save for technical purposes of pleading, the term is read in the
light of the rules we are studying. It comes always to a question of the
grantee's good faith as distinct from mere negligence. 50
There must, indeed, be more than negligence. There must be a
conscious turning away from the subject x x x. As put by the Supreme
Court, the grantee must take the consequences if he "chooses to
remain ignorant of what the necessities of the case require him to
know." The search, therefore, is described by the question, did the
grantee make a choice between not knowing and finding out the
truth; or were the circumstances such that he was not faced with
that choice? (Emphasis ours)
This means that no automatic correlation exists between the state of forgery of a
document and the bad faith of the buyer who relies on it. A test has to be done
whether the buyer had a choice between knowing the forgery and finding it out,
or he had no such choice at all.
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly
notarized, we know it to be a public document where the notarial
acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution.51 A
buyer presented with such a document would have no choice between knowing
and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with a
presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public
and acknowledged that he executed the document, understood its import and
signed it. In reality, he is deprived of such choice not because he is incapable of
knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial system, he has been
given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly
notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that
fiction of regularity which holds together commercial transactions across borders
and time.
In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has
possession and title to the property but whose capacity to sell is restricted,
qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title of the
seller as well as into the latter's capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied
on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special power
of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the
notarial acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the
document, its due execution and authenticity.52
Note that we expressly made the foregoing rule applicable only under the
operative words "duly notarized" and "all things being equal." Thus, said rule
should not apply when there is an apparent flaw afflicting the notarial
acknowledgment of the special power of attorney as would cast doubt on the due
execution and authenticity of the document; or when the buyer has actual notice
of circumstances outside the document that would render suspect its
genuineness.
In Domingo v. Reed,53 we found that the special power of attorney relied upon by
the buyers contained a defective notarial acknowledgment in that it stated there
that only the agent-wife signed the document before the notary public while the
principal-husband did not. Such flaw rendered the notarial acknowledgment of no
effect and reduced the special power of attorney into a private document. We
declared the buyer who relied on the private special power of attorney a buyer in
bad faith.
In Lao v. Villones-Lao,54 and Estacio v. Jaranilla,55 we found that the buyers knew
of circumstances extrinsic to the special power of attorney which put in question
the actual execution of said document. In Domingo Lao, the buyer knew that the
agent-wife was estranged from the principal-husband but was living within the
same city. In the Estacio case, we found admissions by the buyers that they
knew that at the time of the purported execution of the special power of attorney,
the alleged principal was not in the Philippines. In both cases we held that the
buyers were not in good faith, not because we found any outward defect in the
notarial acknowledgment of the special powers of attorney, but because the latter
had actual notice of facts that should have put them on deeper inquiry into the
capacity to sell of the seller.
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time
they were buying the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a
defective notarial acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere photocopy56 and we
are not convinced that there ever was an original copy of said SPA as it was only
this photocopy that was testified to by petitioner Nida Bautista and offered into
evidence by her counsel.57 We emphasize this fact because it was actually this
photocopy that was relied upon by petitioners before they entered into the deed
of sale with Pedro. As admitted to by petitioner Nida Bautista, upon inspection of
the photocopy of the SPA, they gave Pedro an advanced payment of
Php55,000.00; this signifies that, without further investigation on the SPA,
petitioners had agreed to buy the subject property from Pedro.
But then said photocopy of the SPA contains no notarial seal. A notarial seal is a
mark, image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary
public has officially signed it.58 There being no notarial seal, the signature of the
notary public on the notarial certificate was therefore incomplete. The notarial
certificate being deficient, it was as if the notarial acknowledgment was unsigned.
The photocopy of the SPA has no notarial acknowledgment to speak of. It was a
mere private document which petitioners cannot foist as a banner of good faith.
All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied
on the photocopy of the SPA as this turned out to be a mere private document.
They should have adduced more evidence that they looked beyond it. They did
not. Instead, they took no precautions at all. They verified with Atty. Lucero
whether the SPA was authentic but then the latter was not the notary public who
prepared the document. Worse, they purposely failed to inquire who was the
notary public who prepared the SPA. Finally, petitioners conducted the
transaction in haste. It took them all but three days or from March 2 to 4, 1988 to
enter into the deed of sale, notwithstanding the restriction on the capacity to sell
of Pedro.59 In no way then may petitioners qualify as buyers for value in good
faith.
That said, we come to the third issue on whether petitioners may retain the
portion of Pedro Silva in the subject property. Certainly not. It is well-settled that
the nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband without the
marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the
wife.60 We see no reason to deviate from this rule.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November
21, 2001 and Resolution dated February 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeal
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
6. NOTARIAL JURISDICTION
BELLA A. GUERRERO, PETITIONER, VS. RESURRECCION A. BIHIS,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Scriptures tell the story of the brothers Jacob and Esau[1], siblings who
fought bitterly over the inheritance of their father Isaac's estate. Jurisprudence is
also replete with cases involving acrimonious conflicts between brothers and
sisters over successional rights. This case is no exception.
On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella
A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan
Hospital in Tondo, Manila.
On May 24, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of the decedent in Branch 95[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-20661.
The petition alleged the following: petitioner was named as executrix in the
decedent's will and she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of her death; at the time of the execution of
the will, the testatrix was 79 years old, of sound and disposing mind, not acting
under duress, fraud or undue influence and was capacitated to dispose of her
estate by will.
Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will
was not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and
acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature
of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured
the will through undue and improper pressure and influence.
In an order dated November 9, 1994, the trial court appointed petitioner as
special administratrix of the decedent's estate. Respondent opposed petitioner's
appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition. Petitioner took her oath
as temporary special administratrix and letters of special administration were
issued to her.
On January 17, 2000, after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed a
demurrer thereto alleging that petitioner's evidence failed to establish that the
decedent's will complied with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil Code.
In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate of the will
ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will
was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's,
residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo
who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. The dispositive
portion of the resolution read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds, and so declares that it
cannot admit the last will and testament of the late Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura to probate for the reasons hereinabove discussed and also in
accordance with Article 839 [of the Civil Code] which provides that if the
formalities required by law have not been complied with, the will shall be
disallowed. In view thereof, the Court shall henceforth proceed with intestate
succession in regard to the estate of the deceased Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura in accordance with Article 960 of the [Civil Code], to wit: "Art. 960.
Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person dies without a will, or
with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity, xxx."
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the resolution of the trial court.[4]
Thus, this petition.[5]
Petitioner admits that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the
witnesses at the testatrix's residence in Quezon City before Atty. Directo and
that, at that time, Atty. Directo was a commissioned notary public for and in
Caloocan City. She, however, asserts that the fact that the notary public was
acting outside his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the validity of the notarial
will.
Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses
before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the
requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? It did not.
Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a
copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a
notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses.[6] This formal requirement is one of the indispensable
requisites for the validity of a will.[7] In other words, a notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental
witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed.[8] In the case of a
notarial will, that competent officer is the notary public.
The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental
witnesses to declare before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they
executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed.[9] Such
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for the
criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills,
or those executed without the free consent of the testator.[10] It also provides a
further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making the
testamentary dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as
devisees or legatees in the will.[11]
Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyer
duly commissioned as a notary public.
In this connection, the relevant provisions of the Notarial Law provide:
SECTION 237. Form of commission for notary public. -The appointment of a
notary public shall be in writing, signed by the judge, and substantially in the
following form:
GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCE OF ___________
This is to certify that ____________, of the municipality of ________ in said
province, was on the ___ day of __________, anno Domini nineteen hundred
and _______, appointed by me a notary public, within and for the said
province, for the term ending on the first day of January, anno Domini nineteen
hundred and _____.
_________________
Judge of the Court of
irst Instance[12] of said
Province
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary public in a
province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary
public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall
possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his
jurisdiction. (emphases supplied)
A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform
notarial acts.[13] It is issued "within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and
the notary public's authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a notary public
is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments,
within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he is
bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial
act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. As this Court
categorically pronounced in Tecson v. Tecson:[14]
An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the officer's jurisdiction
is void as if the person taking it ware wholly without official character. (emphasis
supplied)
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City,
he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the
instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could
not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura's last will and testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as
required by law.
Moreover, Article 5 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and
void unless the law itself declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and
prohibitory statutes were transgressed in the execution of the alleged
"acknowledgment." The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code
was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was
breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo
were all completely void.
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to Atty. Directo's participation in the
preparation, execution and unlawful "acknowledgment" of Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura's will. Had he exercised his notarial commission properly, the
intent of the law to effectuate the decedent's final statements[15] as expressed in
her will would not have come to naught.[16] Hence, Atty. Directo should show
cause why he should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the bar
and as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation on
the possible misconduct of Atty. Macario O. Directo.
SO ORDERED.
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Complainant,  In his Response,9 Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial
vs.
ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, CJ.:
This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana)
stemmed from a letter1 addressed to the Court filed by Executive Judge Lily
Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of
Midsayap, Cotabato requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him
for performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial
commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.
In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,
executive judges are required to closely monitor the activities of notaries public
within the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries public
shall not extend notarial functions beyond the limits of their authority. Hence, she
wrote a letter2 to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing documents within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato (which
is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his
notarial commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao) since
certain documents3 notarized by him had been reaching her office.
However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial
functions in Midsayap, Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of
ATM Card4 executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s
License5 executed by Elenita D. Ballentes.
Under Sec. 11, Rule III6 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana
could not extend his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and the Province of
Maguindanao because Midsayap, Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the
Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. The City
within the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato City.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it
was discovered that it was Atty. Quintana’s wife who performed notarial acts
whenever he was out of the office as attested to by the Joint Affidavit7executed
by Kristine C. Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes.
In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006,8 we required Atty. Quintana to
comment on the letter of Judge Laquindanum.
commission before Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato.
However, the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks.
He alleged that the reason for Judge Laquindanum’s inaction was that she
questioned his affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Cotabato
City Chapter, and required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter
and to obtain a Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this,
he opted to withdraw his petition. After he withdrew his petition, he claimed that
Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office to ask him to return his petition,
but he did not oblige because at that time he already had a Commission for
Notary Public10 issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City.
Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge Laquindanum,
because the latter immediately issued notarial commissions to other lawyers
without asking for so many requirements. However, when it came to him, Judge
Laquindanum even tracked down all his pleadings; communicated with his
clients; and disseminated information through letters, pronouncements, and
directives to court clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him and be ostracized by
fellow lawyers.
Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at Midsayap,
Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. He contended that
he did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because
he was equipped with a notarial commission. He maintained that he did not act
outside the province of Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices
his legal profession and subscribes documents, is part of the province of
Cotabato. He claimed that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice
his legal profession in the entire Philippines.
Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue
such directive, because only Executive Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his
notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in
the Province of Cotabato.
In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,11 we referred this case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In the February 28, 2007 Hearing12 before the OBC presided by Atty. Ma.
Crisitina B. Layusa (Hearing Officer), Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of
Donation,13 which was notarized by Atty. Quintana in 2004.14 Honorata Rosil
appears as one of the signatories of the document as the donor’s wife. However,
Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate of
Death15 issued by the Civil Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.
Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize
documents in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his commission as
notary public for and in the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had
already expired on December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the same.16 To
support her claim, Judge Laquindanum presented the following: (1) Affidavit of
Loss [of] Title17 executed by Betty G. Granada with subscription dated April 8,
2006 at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy18 of Mr. Elias Diosanta Arabis
with subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss [of] Driver’s
License19 executed by Anecito C. Bernabe with subscription dated February 20,
2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of Loss20 executed by Santos V.
Magbanua with subscription dated February 22, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato.
For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in the
documents marked as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum were his except for the
following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card21 executed by Kristine C. Guro; and
(2) Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s License22 executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and
(3) Affidavit of Loss23 executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He explained that those
documents were signed by his wife and were the result of an entrapment
operation of Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them
notarized by his wife, when they knew that his wife is not a lawyer. He also
denied the he authorized his wife to notarize documents. According to him, he
slapped his wife and told her to stop doing it as it would ruin his profession.
Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition,
because he did not comply with her requirements for him to transfer his
membership to the Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the
IBP President.
On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only performing
her responsibility and had nothing against Atty. Quintana. The reason why she
did not act on his petition was that he had not paid his IBP dues,24which is a
requirement before a notarial commission may be granted. She told his wife to
secure a certification of payment from the IBP, but she did not return.
This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his
Response the certification of good standing and payments of his IBP dues.
However, when the same was examined, there were no documents attached
thereto. Due to oversight, Atty. Quintana prayed that he be given time to send
them later which was granted by the Hearing Officer.
Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and promised
not to repeat the same. He also asked that he be given another chance and not
be divested of his privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of his
family.
On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the documents25 issued
by the IBP Cotabato City Chapter to prove that he had paid his IBP dues.
In a Manifestation26 dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum submitted a
Certification27 and its entries show that Atty. Quintana paid his IBP dues for the
year 2005 only on January 9, 2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381.
Likewise, the arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1998 to
2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No. 610387. Hence, when
he filed his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he had not yet completely
paid his IBP dues.
In its Report and Recommendation,28 the OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana
be disqualified from being appointed as a notary public for two (2) years; and that
if his notarial commission still exists, the same should be revoked for two (2)
years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to
be without merit, viz:
Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan,
Cotabato, which is already outside his territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary
Public.
Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:
"Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the
year in which the commissioning court is made, unless earlier revoked [or] the
notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his notarial acts within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato
City and the [P]rovince of Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his
commission as notary public in Midsayap or Kabacan and in any place of the
province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to do such act.
Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of
Maguindanao but part of the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of
respondent that he can exercise his notarial commission in Midsayap, Cotabato
because Cotabato City is part of the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of
merit.
xxxx
Further, evidence on record also shows that there are several documents which
the respondent’s wife has herself notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot
be blamed for the act of his wife as he did not authorize the latter to notarize
documents in his absence. According to him[,] he even scolded and told his wife
not to do it anymore as it would affect his profession.
In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006
the Court held, thus:
"A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register;
He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to their (sic)
secretaries"
A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all
the entries in his notarial register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it
was his wife’s act and that he did not authorize his wife to notarize documents.
He is personally accountable for the activities in his office as well as the acts of
his personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.
Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent notarized in 2004 a Deed of Donation
(Rollo, p. 79) wherein, (sic) Honorata Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants
therein, was already dead at the time of notarization as shown in a Certificate of
Death (Rollo, p.80) issued by the Civil Registrar General of Libungan, Cotabato.
Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]
"A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to
the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules."
Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even determining the presence
or qualifications of affiants therein, respondent only shows his gross negligence
and ignorance of the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
xxxx
Furthermore, respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the
right to practice his profession including notarial acts in the entire Philippines.
This statement is barren of merit.
While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the
practice of law in the Philippines.(sic) However, not every lawyer even in good
standing can perform notarial functions without having been commissioned as
notary public as specifically provided for under the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. He must have submitted himself to the commissioning court by filing his
petition for issuance of his notarial (sic) Notarial Practice. The commissioning
court may or may not grant the said petition if in his sound discretion the
petitioner does not meet the required qualifications for [a] Notary Public. Since
respondent herein did not submit himself to the procedural rules for the issuance
of the notarial commission, he has no reason at all to claim that he can perform
notarial act[s] in the entire country for lack of authority to do so.
Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent, complainant being the
commissioning court in Midsayap, Cotabato has the authority under Rule XI of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to monitor the duties and responsibilities
including liabilities, if any, of a notary public commissioned or those performing
notarial acts without authority in her territorial jurisdiction.29
xxxx
We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months and revocation and suspension of Atty.
Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years more appropriate considering
the gravity and number of his offenses.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that Atty.
Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he
notarized documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2)
he performed notarial acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife
notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one
of the signatories therein was already dead at that time.
The act of notarizing documents outside one’s area of commission is not to be
taken lightly. Aside from being a violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and
falsification.30Notarizing documents with an expired commission is a violation of
the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly
commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the
lawyer's oath proscribes.31 Notarizing documents without the presence of the
signatory to the document is a violation of Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice,32 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the lawyer’s oath which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare any
falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the documents
that he admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by
passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all
times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of
income for his family will not serve to lessen the penalty that should be imposed
on him. On the contrary, we feel that he should be reminded that a notarial
commission should not be treated as a money-making venture. It is a privilege
granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public
interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts,
and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that notarization
by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity
thereof.33

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still

existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately,
with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even
more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision
to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.1avvphi1

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a

member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.
 RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on
Notarial Practice endorsed to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
appropriate action. The first letter-complaint,[1] dated March 2, 2009, was filed by
the commissioned notaries public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty.
Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-
Lingayen) against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing
documents without a commission.
In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial
office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing
notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the
requisite notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never
commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, he applied and was commissioned to
perform notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San
Carlos City, Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial
commission, however, was never renewed upon expiration. Complainants
presented evidence supporting their allegations such as the pictures of Atty.
Siapno's law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to prove that Atty.
Siapno performed acts of notarization in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City,
to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan and Mortgage Agreement[2] showing that the
Promissory Note was notarized before Atty. Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in
2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale,[3] dated January 24, 2008, notarized in
Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons Re:
Given Name and Date of Birth,[4] dated January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan
City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt,[5]dated January 24, 2008, notarized in
Dagupan City.
Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority
to his secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas (Arenas), who
wrote legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.
On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)[6] which, in turn, indorsed the same to the
OBC.
The second letter-complaint[7] was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against
Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his
driver's license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by Atty.
Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when
presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos was not
commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.
The third letter-complaint[8] came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain
Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmariñas
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing documents for and on
behalf of several lawyers.
In its Resolution,[9] dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of
the RTC-Lingayen to conduct a formal investigation on the complaint against
Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-
Manila to conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial
Law by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and
thereafter, to submit a report and recommendation thereon.
Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno
With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge
conducted a hearing wherein the complainants affirmed the allegations in their
letter-complaint. For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and averred
that the law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and
Arenas were not his secretaries.[10]
In her Report and Recommendation,[11] the Executive Judge found that Atty.
Siapno was issued a notarial commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005
to December 3, 2006. His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006
and he was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge
found Atty. Siapno to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission
when he performed notarial functions without commission and recommended
that he be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the
recommended penalty.
A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that
Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside
the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also
proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial
commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section
11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:
Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the
year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted
the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he
was not commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.[12] It must
be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court,
Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on
Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, at all times.[13]
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for
notarizing documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired
commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[14] a lawyer was suspended by the
Court for three (3) years for notarizing an instrument without a commission.
In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,[15] the respondent was likewise suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years and was permanently barred from
being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing several documents after the
expiration of his commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v.
Quintana,[16] the Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was
disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2)
years because he notarized documents outside the area of his commission, and
with an expired commission.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn,
the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET the same as separate
administrative cases.
The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in
acting capacity, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to
submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
copy of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED
PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his
receipt of a copy of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the
Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office
of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the personal files of the respondent.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty.
Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKETthem as separate
administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is
ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report
and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.

Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work
in Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan without
the requisite commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient.
Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as notary public
permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years.

Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn

In a letter,[17] dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could not
have complied with the June 9, 2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the Court
because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at that time.
To date, no formal investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation of
Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn.
7. NOTARIAL SEAL AND REGISTER
FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA,
POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG, DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO,
ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA,
ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A.
AGATEP, complainants,  On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio
C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by
Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants, against Atty. Edwin
Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two
documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of
one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No.
243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-
Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No.
1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel
Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of
the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last
entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and
that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on
December 10, 1998.
In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua
admitted having notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they
were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal
secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty.
Pascua with the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein
were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants. They filed with
this Court a "Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondent's Comment."
They maintain that Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to inadvertence but a
clear case of falsification.1 On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.2
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
For this reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply
with the formalities and the basic requirement in the performance of their
duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or
acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries" (Sec. 246, Article
V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a
ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents
allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial
register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to
oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape
liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that
he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary
public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he
notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240.
On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on
December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively,
under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other
complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua
falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints,
a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a
member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of
inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is
hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a disinterested
witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc.
No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214)
was withdrawn in the administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against
Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the
submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another
affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998
and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence
then that both documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered
as 1213 and 1214.
A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession
(Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is
mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office,
such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any
misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court has
invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of
dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties.
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was
suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one
year for notarizing a document without affiants appearing before him, and
for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the
signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due
diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified
under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors
were dead was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more
severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of
disbarment, it being the respondent's first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was
disbarred from the practice of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a
fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered the seriousness of
the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended for
six months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months may be considered
enough penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a
ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be
imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the
notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be
REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months."3
After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings
of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty.
Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register
in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio
B. Domingo.
"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.4 The term, however, does
not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.5
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty.
Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the
vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes
misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also,
in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario
G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for
violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of
Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty
of one month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G.
Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we
believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law
upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of
notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.
 SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA
SANTUYO, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,1 spouses Benjamin
Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of
serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyer's oath and the
notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel
of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by
respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on
Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that
about six years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo
German over the ownership of the land. The case was estafa through falsification
of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by
respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The
spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said deed.2
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed
deed of sale contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document,
including an impression of respondent's notarial dry seal. Not being persons who
were learned in the technicalities surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended
that they could not have forged the signature of herein respondent. They added
that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and could not
have made any imprint of respondent's seal or signature on the subject deed of
sale or elsewhere.3
In his answer4 to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him.
He denied having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed property.
According to respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General
and Jacob Law Office where he was asked to apply for a notarial commission.
While he admitted that he notarized several documents in that office, these,
however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter
of office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it
was only when they gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed
that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would
affix the dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating to cases handled
by the law firm. Respondent added that he normally required the parties to
exhibit their community tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge
the documents before him as notary public. He would have remembered
complainants had they actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing
complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latter's husband and co-
complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he
purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an
examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was
forged; the strokes were smooth and mild.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time
the subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he
was on vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone to the law
office and enticed one of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior
lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal
scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In a report5 it submitted to the Court,
the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale
was different from his signatures in other documents he submitted during the
investigation of the present case.6 However, it ruled that respondent was also
negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial
functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial
register.7 It thus recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent's commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is
commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a commission as notary
public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof.8
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not
categorically state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale
notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that
respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The
records show that complainants themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed,
signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature
appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to who actually
affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl
lαω  lιbrαrÿ
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent's contention that he only
met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the
deed of sale. Respondent's assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in
an affidavit executed on November 17, 20019 wherein she stated that
complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on November
5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other.
The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was
arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a
deed of sale concerning another property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP
reasoned out:

xxx xxx xxx. crvll

Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive

respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his
duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the
secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary public.

For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the
document for notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the
respondent's signature which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the
secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.

As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but
foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries
in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone;
and should not have relied on somebody else.10

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of

negligence in the performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby
SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if
he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a
notary public for a period of two years from finality of this resolution, with a
warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9385
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On September 12, 2005, complainants Mariano Agadan, Eden Mollejon, Arsenio
Igme, Jose Numbar, Cecilia Langawan, Pablo Palma, Joselito Claveria, Miguel
Flores and Albert Gaydowen filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Baguio Benguet Chapter (IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter) a Complaint[1] against
respondent Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan (Atty. Kilaan) for falsification of
documents, dishonesty and deceit.  They alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated
certain entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) to operate public utility jeepney filed before the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board Cordillera Administrative Region (LTFRB-
CAR) and docketed as Case No. 2003-CAR-688 by substituting the name of the
applicant from Gary Adasing (Adasing)[2] to that of Joseph Batingwed
(Batingwed);[3] that Atty. Kilaan submitted false and/or insufficient documentary
requirements in support of  Batingwed's application for CPC; that Atty. Kilaan
prepared a Decision based on the Resolution of the LTFRB Central Office which
dismissed the Opposition filed by the complainants; and that the said Decision
granted the application of Batingwed which was adopted by the LTFRB-CAR.
On February 27, 2006, the IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter formally endorsed the
Complaint to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) for appropriate action.
[4]
 Acting on the Complaint, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Kilaan to submit his
Answer.[5]
In his Answer[6] dated April 8, 2006, Atty. Kilaan denied violating the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.  He disclaimed any
participation in the preparation of the Decision with respect to the application of
Batingwed for CPC.  He explained that it is the Regional Director of the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)-CAR who approves
the application and who drafts the Decision after the LTFRB-CAR signifies its
favorable recommendation.  He denied exercising any influence over the DOTC-
CAR or the LTFRB.  He claimed that Batingwed had decided to abandon his
application hence he no longer submitted the necessary requirements therefor.  have not alleged that the same constitutes a violation of the rules and procedures
He also disavowed any knowledge that Batingwed's application had been
forwarded to the LTFRB Central Office for approval.    Atty. Kilaan claimed that
he knew about the favorable Decision only when Batingwed showed him the
same. He narrated that considering the incomplete documents, the LTFRB
mistakenly approved Batingwed's application.  Thus, when it discovered its error,
the LTFRB immediately revoked the grant of CPC to Batingwed.
He denied intercalating the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed.  He
averred that once an application has been filed, the application and all
accompanying records remain with the LTFRB and could no longer be retrieved
by the applicant or his counsel; as such, it is highly improbable for him to
intercalate the entries therein.  Atty. Kilaan further explained that it was Adasing
who paid the filing fee in behalf of Batingwed but the cashier erroneously
indicated Adasing instead of Batingwed as payor.  Atty. Kilaan lamented that
Adasing who is not in the Philippines could not corroborate his explanation. 
Finally, Atty. Kilaan noted that complainants filed the instant suit in retaliation for
the dismissal of their Opposition to the application for CPCs which he filed on
behalf of his other clients.
The case was set for mandatory conference[7] after which the parties submitted
their respective Position Papers.[8]  In their Position Paper, complainants further
alleged that the Verification in Batingwed's application for CPC was notarized by
Atty. Kilaan as "Doc. No. 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003." 
However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaan's Notarial Registry submitted to the
Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court in Baguio City, the said notarial entry actually
refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of Batingwed's application.  
Also, complainants belied Atty. Kilaan's allegation that Adasing is presently
abroad by presenting the Affidavit of Adasing claiming that he never left the
country.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner[9] found
complainants to have miserably failed to prove that Atty. Kilaan intercalated the
entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed.  Their allegation was based on
mere suspicion devoid of any credible proof, viz:
At the onset, it is very difficult to prove that it was respondent himself who was
responsible for any intercalation, particularly the substitution of Joseph
Batingwed's application folder in lieu of Gary Odasing's.  Indeed, that is a grave
charge, and based on the evidence presented by complainants, all that they can
muster is a suspicion that cannot be confirmed.  Of course, this has to be pointed
out anyone who had access to the case folder could have possibly been
responsible for whatever intercalation that may have occurred.  That being said,
this Office is not prepared to make that leap into conjecture and conclude that it
was respondent's doing.
Besides, the Certification of the Receiving Clerk of the DOTC-CAR dated 18
October 2006 which notably was submitted by complainants stated that the
application of Gary Odasing was continued by Joseph Batingwed.  Complainants
of LTFRB.  Thus, it may be presumed to have been done in the regular course of
business.[10]
However, the Investigating Commissioner did not totally absolve Atty. Kilaan as
he found him liable for violating the Notarial Law considering that the Verification
of Batingwed's application which he notarized and denominated as "Doc. No.
253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003" was actually recorded as a
Deed of Sale in his Notarial Register. In addition, the Investigating Commissioner
noted that Atty. Kilaan lied under oath when he alleged that Adasing was abroad
as this was squarely belied by Adasing in his Affidavit.  The Investigating
Commissioner held thus:
Respondent must be punished for making it appear that he notarized a document
the Verification when in truth and in fact, the entry in his Notarial Registry shows
a different document.  Thus, it is but proper to suspend respondent's privilege of
being commissioned as a Notary Public.
Not only that.  Despite knowing that the Verification was not properly notarized,
respondent, as counsel for the applicant, proceeded to file the defectively verified
Petition with the LTFRB-Baguio City.  Clearly, there was falsehood committed by
him, as there can be no other conclusion except that respondent antedated the
Verification.
xxxx
Lastly, this cannot end without this being said.  Respondent made matters worse
by alleging in his Answer to the instant administrative complaint that Gary
Odasing was abroad which seemingly was drawn up more out of convenience
than for truth.  Now, that allegation had been completely rebuffed and found to be
untrue by the execution of an Affidavit by Gary Odasing himself.  x x x It is
therefore an affront to this Office that respondent would attempt to defend himself
by pleading allegations, which were seemingly made deliberately, and which
were later found to be untrue.  Clearly, respondent tried, albeit vainly, to deceive
even this Office.[11]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that respondent's
notarial commission, if still existing, be REVOKED immediately and that he be
further PROHIBITED from being commissioned as a notary public for TWO (2)
YEARS.
Moreover, it is likewise recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of TWO (2) MONTHS.[12]
In its September 19, 2007 Resolution No. XVIII-2007-82, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Kilaan's Notarial
Commission be revoked and that he be disqualified from being appointed as
Notary Public for two years, thereby deleting the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law.  Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the
IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XX-2012-41 dated January 15,
2012.
After a careful review of the records, we find that Atty. Kilaan committed the
following infractions:  1) violation of the Notarial Law; 2) violation of the Lawyer's
Oath; and 3) violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Motion for Reconsideration filed before the IBP Board of Governors, Atty.
Kilaan passed on the blame to his secretary for the inaccuracies in the entries in
his Notarial Register.   He asserted that being a private practitioner, he is
burdened with cases thus he delegated to his secretary the job of recording the
documents which he notarized in his Notarial Register.  He argued that the
revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification for two years is too
harsh a penalty considering that he is a first-time offender; he prayed for leniency
considering that his family depended on his income for their collective needs.
It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the
accuracy of the entries in his Notarial Register.  The Court is not persuaded by
respondent's explanation that he is burdened with cases thus he was constrained
to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in his Notarial Register to his
secretary.  In fact, this argument has already been rebuffed by this Court
in Lingan v. Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga,[13] viz:
Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:
SEC. 245.  Notarial Register. Every notary public shall keep a register to be
known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts
as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof,
to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees [therefore]. (emphasis
supplied)
xxx    xxx    xxx
SEC. 246.  Matters to be entered therein. The notary public shall enter in such
register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or
acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of
execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by him
for his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a
contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and shall
likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof and
shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in
each calendar year.  The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his
register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register
on which the same is recorded.  No blank line shall be left between entries.
xxx    xxx    xxx
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249.  Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of
duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of
first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx    xxx    xxx
(b)   The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx    xxx    xxx
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public
is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register. Respondents
cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by
passing the buck to their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day
persists despite our open condemnation. Respondents, especially Calubaquib, a
self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner," should have known better than to
give us such a simple-minded excuse.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
or routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the public,
the courts and the administrative offices in general.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and
makes it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries
public must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements
of their duties.
In Gemina v. Atty. Madamba,[14] we have also ruled that
x x x The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entries and his failure to enter the
documents that he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary
public. He cannot escape liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The
lawyer himself, not merely his secretary, should be held accountable for these
misdeeds.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common
of which are the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments.  commissioned as notary public for a period of one (1) year.  He is
In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the
significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts
a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented
as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus,
notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A
notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries
must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should
not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the
law and legal processes. The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, moreover, require a duly commissioned notary public to make the
proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any
dereliction or any act which may serve as cause for the revocation of his
commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent's failure to make the
proper entry or entries in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to
require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure
to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge by competent evidence
are grounds for the revocation of a lawyer's commission as a notary public.
Indeed, Rule VI, Sections 1 and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a
notary public to keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his
every notarial act.  His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial
commission.[15]  As mentioned, respondent failed to make the proper entries in his
Notarial Register; as such, his notarial commission may be properly revoked.
Aside from violating the Notarial Law, respondent also violated his Lawyer's Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing falsehood in the
pleadings he submitted before the IBP. His claim that Adasing was abroad hence
could not corroborate the explanation made by Batingwed was proved to be
untruthful when complainants submitted the Affidavit of Adasing insisting that he
never left the country.  Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice."  In the same vein, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 mandates that
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondent failed to observe these Rules and hence must be sanctioned.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Kilaan's suspension from the practice of
law for three (3) months and the revocation and disqualification of his notarial
commission for a period of one (1) year appropriate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, if
still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being
also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective
immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be
dealt with more severely.  He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of
this Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take
effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as
a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
 CARLITO ANG, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH
GUPANA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 139–B, Section 12(c) of the Rules of
Court assailing Resolution Nos. XVII–2005–1411 and XVIII–2008–6982 of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board
of Governors found respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana administratively
liable and imposed on him the penalty of suspension for one year from the
practice of law and the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification
from reappointment as notary public for two years.
The case stemmed from an affidavit–complaint3 filed by complainant Carlito Ang
against respondent. Ang alleged that on May 31, 1991, he and the other heirs of
the late Candelaria Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and William
Magpayo, executed an Extra–judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition4 involving
Lot No. 2066–B–2–B which had an area of 6,258 square meters and was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT ) No. (T–22409)–6433. He was
given his share of 2,003 square meters designated as Lot No. 2066–B–2–B–4,
together with all the improvements thereon.5 However, when he tried to secure a
TCT in his name, he found out that said TCT No. (T–22409)–6433 had already
been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs6 had been issued in the names of
William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque,
Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a
direct participation in the commission of forgeries and falsifications because he
was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss7 and Deed of
Absolute Sale8 that led to the transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang
pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by
Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria
Magpayo’s signature was forged as clearly shown by the Certification9 issued by
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu.
Further, the certified true copy of page 37, Book No. XII, Series of 1989 of
respondent’s Notarial Report indubitably showed that Doc. No. 181 did not refer
to the Deed of Absolute Sale, but to an affidavit.10As to the Affidavit of Loss,
which was allegedly executed by the late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994,
it could not have been executed by her as she died11 three years prior to the
execution of the said affidavit of loss.
Ang further alleged that on September 22, 1995, respondent made himself the
attorney–in–fact of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante,
Lolita Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero, and pursuant to the
Special Power of Attorney in his favor, executed a Deed of Sale12selling Lot No.
2066–B–2–B–4 to Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. on October 10, 1995. Ang
complained that the sale was made even though a civil case involving the said
parcel of land was pending before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.13
In his Comment,14 respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is
merely using the present administrative complaint as a tool to force the
defendants in a pending civil case and their counsel, herein respondent, to
accede to his wishes. Respondent averred that Ang had filed Civil Case No.
Man–2202 before Branch 55 of the Mandaue City RTC. He anchored his claim
on the Extra–judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition and sought to annul the
deed of sale and prayed for reconveyance of the subject parcel of land. During
the pre–trial conference in Civil Case No. Man–2202, Ang admitted that he is not
an heir of the late Candelaria Magpayo but insisted on his claim for a share of the
lot because he is allegedly the son of the late Isaias Ang, the common–law
husband of Candelaria Magpayo. Because of his admission, the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the four certificates of title of the land in question were
ordered cancelled and the land effectively became available for disposition. Ang
sought reconsideration of the order, but a compromise was reached that only one
TCT (TCT No. 34266) will be annotated with a notice of lis pendens. Respondent
surmised that these developments in Civil Case No. Man–2202 meant that Ang
would lose his case so Ang resorted to the filing of the present administrative
complaint. Thus, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case for being
devoid of any factual or legal basis, or in the alternative, holding resolution of the
instant case in abeyance pending resolution of Civil Case No. Man–2202
allegedly because the issues in the present administrative case are similar to the
issues or subject matters involved in said civil case.
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, to whom the case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, submitted her Report and Recommendation15 finding
respondent administratively liable. She recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that respondent
committed an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an instrument in the
disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale executed between him as
attorney–in–fact of his client and Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. despite his
knowledge that said property is the subject of a pending litigation before the RTC
of Mandaue City, Cebu. The Investigating Commissioner additionally found that
respondent “delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of their office
before being brought to him for his signature.” This, according to the
commissioner, “must have been the reason for the forged signatures of the
parties in the questioned document…as well as the erroneous entry in his
notarial register….”16 Nonetheless, the Investigating Commissioner merely
reminded respondent to be more cautious in the performance of his duties as
regards his infraction of his notarial duties. She held,
Respondent should have been more cautious in his duty as notary public which
requires that the party subscribing to the authenticity of the document should
personally appear and sign the same before respondent’s actual presence. As
such notary public respondent should not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the bar in accordance with Rule 9.0117 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary  seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
On November 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution
No. XVII–2005–141,19adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but
modifying the recommended penalty. Instead of suspension for three months, the
Board recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one
year and revocation of respondent’s notarial commission and disqualification
from reappointment as notary public for two years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,20 arguing that it was neither illegal
nor unethical for a lawyer to accept appointment as attorney–in–fact of a client to
sell a property involved in a pending litigation and to act as such. He further
contended that granting that his act was unethical, the modified penalty was
evidently too harsh and extremely excessive considering that the act complained
of was not unlawful and done without malice.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No.
XVIII–2008–69821 denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming
Resolution No. XVII–2005–141. Hence, this petition for review.
Respondent reiterates that being commissioned by his own clients to sell a
portion of a parcel of land, part of which is involved in litigation, is not per se
illegal or unethical. According to him, his clients got his help to sell part of the
land and because they were residing in different provinces, they executed a
Special Power of Attorney in his favor.22
We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent
administratively liable.
After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that respondent did not
act unethically when he sold the property in dispute as the sellers’ attorney–in–
fact because there was no more notice of lis pendens annotated on the particular
lot sold. Likewise, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to show that the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989 was
antedated.
However, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his
notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria
Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly
executed on April 29, 1994. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known
as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 1. x x x
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before
the notary public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents.23 In the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss
stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before respondent on April 29,
1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March 26,
1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law.
Indeed, respondent averred in his position paper before the IBP that he did not in
fact know Candelaria personally before, during and after the notarization24 thus
admitting that Candelaria was not present when he notarized the documents.
Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty
act or routine.25 Thus, in Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos,26 the Court emphasized the
significance of the act of notarization, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a
notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of
this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party’s free act and deed.
A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must
discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with
accuracy and fidelity.27 It devolves upon respondent to act with due care and
diligence in stamping fiat on the questioned documents. Respondent’s failure to
perform his duty as a notary public resulted in undermining the integrity of a
notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Hence, he should be
liable for his infraction, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to
subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being
dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and
utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and
failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion.28 As the Court has held in Flores v. Chua,29
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon
his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional
Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession…. (Emphasis supplied.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.” Respondent averred in his
position paper that it had been his consistent practice to course through clerical
staff documents to be notarized. Upon referral, said clerical staff investigates
whether the documents are complete as to the fundamental requirements and
inquires as to the identity of the individual signatories thereto. If everything is in
order, they ask the parties to sign the documents and forward them to him and
he again inquires about the identities of the parties before affixing his notarial
signature.30 It is also his clerical staff who records entries in his notarial report. As
aforesaid, respondent is mandated to observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties as a notary and to ascertain that
the persons who signed the documents are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein. In merely relying on his clerical staff to determine the
completeness of documents brought to him for notarization, limiting his
participation in the notarization process to simply inquiring about the identities of
the persons appearing before him, and in notarizing an affidavit executed by a
dead person, respondent is liable for misconduct. Under the facts and
circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial commission,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in order.31

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana is found administratively

liable for misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year.
Further, his notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is disqualified from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years, with a stern warning
that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of
this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN
CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,  the wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution1 or the IBP
Board of Governors which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner xxx and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering the
Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty, Atty.
Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED.
Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years.
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated June
11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the
Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive
Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty.
Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at
the time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The
notarized documents were as follows:
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and
Loida C. Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3,
2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and
Sandy Margaret L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro
married to Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and Gina Medina
notarized on April 3, 2008;
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March
17, 2008;
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and
Luisa Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and
Nelia Francisco and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and
Carmelita Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and
Simeona Limcumpao, notarized on March 27, 2008;
10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and
Libertad Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo
notarized on March 18, 2008;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S.
Consengco and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized March 18,
2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of
Pilar and Mila Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad
Cosengco and Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March 18,
2008;
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago,
notarized on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and
Development Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano,
Luzviminda Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on
March 18, 2008;
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon
married to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and Crystal Lima,
notarized on April 2, 2008; and
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T.
Casupanan and Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March 14,
2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial
Treasurer who had information that they were notarized while respondent was
outside the country attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter
contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be
notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent
sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or
the documents cameout of the office already signed. Upon verification with the
Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed
from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of
the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the
letter.3
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the
latter endorsed the same to the IBP National Office for appropriate action. The
latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles,
Jr. to formalize the complaint, the latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating,
among others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter was not intended to be a formal
complaint but rather "a report on, and endorsement of, public documents by Atty.
Bagay while he was out of the country,"4 and that any advice on how to consider
or treat the documents concerned would be welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office
of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.5
This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter
of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008, and require respondent to
comment on the said letter. In his comment,7 dated 27 March 2009, respondent
claimed that he was not aware that those were documents notarized using his
name while he was out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that
the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his knowledge and
authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the
import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses
and averred that he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his
office.
The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. When the case was called for mandatory conference on
September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a
manifestation reiterating his original position and requesting that his attendance
be excused.8 The mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. Only respondent submitted a
position paper,9 to which he added that for 21 years that he had been practicing
law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish on record dutifully minding
the rules of the law profession and notarial practice.
The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita
III)as Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated
June11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the attachments were not
authenticated photocopies and that the comment of respondent was likewise not
verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that respondent’s signature on his
comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the
attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his
office secretary.He admitted the fact that there were documents that were
notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed by his office
secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own
admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing an office
secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially
pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed
to live up to the standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty
which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority
as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate
revocation of respondent’s commission as notary public and his disqualification
to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in
its Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of the IBP.
He contended that by admitting and owning up to what had happened, but
without any wrongful intention, he should be merited with leniency. Moreover, he
claimed that he only committed simple negligence which did not warrant such
harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration of respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution
subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-
85 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby affirmed.13
On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for
appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by
the secretary of respondent while he was out of the country constituted
negligence.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18
documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he
was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that
respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s
secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary
public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act
which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which
he employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary in
charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary,
fully aware that his secretary could use these items to notarize documents and
copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this
Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable
likelihood that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such
carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is
commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his
notarial register.14 He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the
buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that
for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public
without any blemish and this was his first and only infraction. His experience,
however, should have placed him on guard and could have prevented possible
violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were
notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such
prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the
penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly
perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those directly affected by
the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and
degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.15Where the notary
public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason
of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers
not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his
negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he
allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his office open
despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge, he virtually
allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs
every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
The people who came into his office while he was away, were clueless as to the
illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that their
documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found
out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any
force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by
an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a
significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified
to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several
occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest necessarily
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.17
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries pub! ic must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of pub! ic instruments would be
undermined.18
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court
will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially
when the trust and confidence reposed by the public in our legal system hang in
the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
ADOPTED with MODIFICATION.1âwphi1Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly
negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court REVOKES his notarial
commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as notary public
for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the
repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to
enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A.
BASILIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stems from a complaint1 filed by complainant Atty.
Benigno T. Bartolome (Bartolome) on May 19, 2009 before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) against respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio (Basilio) for
violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice2 (Notarial Rules).chanrobleslaw
The Facts
In the complaint, Bartolome alleged that Basilio, a notary public in Tarlac City,
notarized a document entitled "Joint Affidavit of Non-Tenancy and Aggregate
Landholdings"3 (Joint Affidavit) purportedly subscribed and sworn to before him
by Loreto M. Tañedo (Tanedo) and Ramon T. Lim on January 15, 2006, and
supposedly recorded as Doc. No. 375, Page No. 75, Book No. X, Series of 2007
in his notarial register,4 despite the fact that Tañedo had already passed away as
early as December 1, 2003.5
In his Answer/Comment6 dated June 24, 2009, Basilio admitted having notarized
the Joint Affidavit but claimed that, prior to the notarization, he verified the
identities of the persons who appeared before him through their respective Social
Security System (SSS) identification cards and driver's licenses. He further
denied any knowledge that the one who appeared before him misrepresented
himself as Tañedo and that the latter was already dead as of December 1, 2003.7
During the clarificatory hearing, Basilio, who undisputedly notarized the Joint
Affidavit, admitted his failure to: (a) record the subject document in his notarial
book; (b) submit a copy of the same to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City
(RTC); and (c) have the notarization revoked or recalled.8
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated June 10, 2010 submitted by IBP
Investigating Commissioner Randall C. Tabayoyong (Investigating
Commissioner), Basilio was found to have manifested gross negligence and a
complete disregard of the Notarial Rules. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that contrary to Section 8, in relation to Section 6, Rule II of the
Notarial Rules, Basilio failed to indicate in the Joint Affidavit the details of the
SSS identification card and driver's license which were allegedly shown as
competent evidence of identity of the persons who appeared before him. Thus,
his claim that he verified the identities of the persons who subscribed the Joint
Affidavit could not be given credence. Basilio also failed to record in his notarial
register his notarial act on the Joint Affidavit in violation of Section 2 (a), Rule VI
of the Notarial Rules. Lastly, the Investigating Commissioner found that Basilio
failed to submit a copy of the Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC,
contrary to Section 2 (h), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules.10 Accordingly, he
recommended that Basilio's notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked; he
be disqualified from obtaining a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year
and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.11
In a Resolution12 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation.
Dissatisfied, Basilio filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution13 dated September 27, 2014.chanrobleslaw
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly found
Basilio liable for violation of the Notarial Rules.chanrobleslaw
The Court's Ruling
The act of notarization is impressed with public interest.14 As such, a notary
public must observe the highest degree of care in complying with the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties in order to preserve the confidence
of the public in the integrity of the notarial system.15
In the present case, Basilio, as duly found by the IBP, failed to faithfully comply
with his duties as a notary public.
Section 5 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules clearly states that:
SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. — A notary public shall not:
xxxx
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.
(Emphases supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A notarial certificate, as defined in Section 8, Rule II of the Notarial Rules,
requires a statement of the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular
notarization, viz.:
SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. — "Notarial Certificate" refers to the part of, or
attachment to, a notarized instrument or document that is completed by the
notary public, bears the notary's signature and seal, and states the facts
attested to by the notary public in a particular notarization as provided for
by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, a  jurat is, among others, an attestation that the person who
presented the instrument or document to be notarized is personally known to the
notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by the Notarial Rules:16
SEC. 6. Jurat. — "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;cralawlawlibrary
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules;cralawlawlibrary
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document. (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the records bear out, Basilio affixed his official signature and seal on the
notarial certificate of the Joint Affidavit without properly identifying the person/s
who signed the same. His claim that he verified the identities of the affiants
through their respective SSS identification cards and driver's licenses cannot be
given any credence considering the ostensible lack of their details on the face of
the certificate. Neither was he able to provide the fact of identification in any way.
On the other hand, it has been established that one of the named signatories to
the Joint Affidavit was already dead when he notarized the aforesaid document.
Hence, it is sufficiently clear that Basilio had indeed affixed his official signature
and seal on an incomplete, if not false, notarial certificate.
Moreover, by the same account, Basilio violated Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the
Notarial Rules which prohibits the notarization of a document if the person
involved is not personally known to the notary public or has not identified himself
through competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - x x x
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to
the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by
the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
To add, Basilio himself admitted that he failed to record his notarial act on the
Joint Affidavit in his notarial register, contrary to Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the
Notarial Rules, which states:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. — (a) For every notarial act, the
notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of notarization the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) the entry number and page number;cralawlawlibrary
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;cralawlawlibrary
(3) the type of notarial act;cralawlawlibrary
(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or
proceeding;cralawlawlibrary
(5) the name and address of each principal;cralawlawlibrary
(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the
signatory is not personally known to the notary;
(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the
person's identity;cralawlawlibrary
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;cralawlawlibrary
(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's
regular place of work or business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or
relevance.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x x (Emphases supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Since the notarial register is a record of the notary public's official acts, he is
charged with recording therein the necessary information regarding the
document or instrument notarized. If the document or instrument does not appear
in the notarial records, doubt as to its nature arises so that the alleged notarized
document cannot be considered a public document.17 Considering the evidentiary
value given to the notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record
the document in his notarial register is tantamount to falsely making it appear that
the document was notarized when, in fact, it was not,18 as in this case.
It should be clarified, however, that while Basilio had also failed to submit a copy
of the Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC, and to retain a copy thereof
for his own records, the requirement therefor, as stated under Section 2
(h),19 Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, applies only to instruments acknowledged
before the notary public. Documents like the Joint Affidavit which contain a jurat
and not an acknowledgment are not required to be forwarded to the Clerk of
Court. Hence, there should be no administrative infraction on this score.
Nevertheless, Basilio's afore-discussed violations of the Notarial Rules are grave
enough to warrant sanctions from the Court.
A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and
faithfulness.20 Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.21 In line with this mandate, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signed the same is the very person who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the
truth of what are stated therein.22 By failing in this regard, the notary public
permits a falsehood which does not only transgress the Notarial Rules but also
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."23 Verily, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face; and it is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise,
the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.

As herein discussed, Basilio's failure to properly perform his duty as a notary

public resulted not only in damage to those directly affected by the notarized
document, but also in undermining the integrity of the office of a notary public
and in degrading the function of notarization. In fine, he should be meted out with
the modified penalty of disqualification from being commissioned as notary public
for a period of two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year. Although there is no showing that Basilio prepared the document in
question, his utter disregard of the Notarial Rules as exhibited during the
proceedings before the IBP, together with his admitted failure to revoke or recall
his notarization despite his knowledge of its irregularity, warrants the same
treatment as the errant lawyer in Agbulos v. Viray:24

[T]he Court finds the need to increase that recommended by the IBP which is
one month suspension as a lawyer and six months suspension as notary public,
considering that respondent himself prepared the document, and he performed
the notarial act without the personal appearance of the affiant and without
identifying her with competent evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he
allowed the use of a CTC by someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed
himself to be an instrument of fraud. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a
lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he
is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and
suspension from the practice of law for one year.25 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Christopher A.

Basilio GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his
incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him from
being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately.
He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ORLANDO S. CASTELO, ELENA C. CAMA, OSWALDO CASTELO, JOCELYN
LLANILLO, AND BENJAMIN CASTELO, Complainants, v. ATTY. RONALD
SEGUNDINO C. CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
A notarized document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Thus, a
notary public should observe utmost care in performing his duties to preserve
public confidence in the integrity of notarized documents.1
The salient facts, as borne by the records, are:
Sometime in late 2013, Complainants Orlando S. Castelo, Elena C. Cama,
Oswaldo Castelo, Jocelyn Llanillo, and Benjamin Castelo (Castelo heirs)
received summons from the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 22, Manila (MeTC)
for an ejectment case2 filed against them by Leonida Delen and Spouses Nestor
Delen and Julibel Delen (the Delens), who alleged that they were the owners of
the house and lot located at 2511 A. Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila (subject
property). The subject property was then the residence of the Castelo heirs,3 and
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 291223 of the Registry of
Deeds for the City of Manila (RD) in the name of the Delens.4
Upon verifying the authenticity of TCT No. 291223 with the RD, the Castelo heirs
discovered that the previous title covering the subject property, TCT No. 240995,
which was in the name of the Castelo heirs' parents, Spouses Benjamin Castelo
and Perzidia5 S. Castelo (Spouses Castelo), had been cancelled6 by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24, 2010 (Deed).7 The Deed was purportedly
executed by the Spouses Castelo and the Delens, and was notarized by
Respondent Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching (Atty. Ching), despite the fact that
Perzidia S. Castelo died on May 4, 2009,8 as shown in her Death
Certificate.9 The Castelo heirs also learned that the acknowledgment page of the
Deed showed that only community tax certificates had been presented to Atty.
Ching, and not valid government issued identification cards as required by the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.10
With this discovery, the Castelo heirs filed on June 2, 2014 with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) this administrative case against Atty. Ching based on
the latter's gross negligence in notarizing the Deed.11
Atty. Ching, for his part, denied having notarized the Deed. He countered that he
did not know the Spouses Castelo and the Delens, and that the Deed presented
by the Castelo heirs had been falsified. Atty. Ching continued that his purported
signature in the Deed was forged.12 To prove the alleged forgery, Atty. Ching
presented specimens of his signatures that he used in signing pleadings and
notarizing documents.13
At the scheduled mandatory conference on September 1, 2014,14the Castelo
heirs and Atty. Ching were present.15 The Castelo heirs moved for the issuance
of an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad
Testificandum16 to Atty. Jennifer H. Dela Cruz-Buendia, the Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, or any of her duly
authorized records officers, to appear at the next scheduled mandatory
conference with Books No. 16 and 17, Series of 2010 of the Notarial Register
(Atty. Ching's notarial books), which allegedly contained the original copy of the
Deed. The IBP issued the subpoena,17 and the mandatory conference was reset
to November 13, 2014.18
In the November 13, 2014 resetting of the mandatory conference which was the
last,19 Atty. Ching's notarial books were presented.20 However, Atty. Ching failed
to attend the said conference and refute the authenticity of the Deed. Upon
verification, the IBP concluded that the copy of the Deed presented by the
Castelo heirs in their Complaint was indeed a faithful machine copy of the
original contained in Atty. Ching's notarial books.21 Thereafter, the Castelo heirs
submitted their position paper.22 Atty. Ching, however, failed to submit his.
After due proceedings, Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles (Commissioner
Robles) rendered a Report and Recommendation23 on December 3, 2014, finding
that Atty. Ching was grossly negligent in notarizing the Deed.24 The dispositive
portion reads:
UPON THE FOREGOING, considering the seriousness of the consequences of
respondent's gross negligence, it is recommended that respondent's notarial
commission be cancelled immediately, and that he be disqualified from ever
being commissioned again as notary public.25
In its Resolution26 dated February 21, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved
to adopt and approve with modification the said Report and Recommendation,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", for gross negligence in Respondent's notarial service.
Hence, Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching's notarial commission if presently
commissioned is immediately REVOKED. Further, he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as Notary Public and
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.27
After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the
Court has no compelling reason to diverge from the factual findings of
Commissioner Robles and the recommended penalty of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Gross negligence on the part of a notary public encompasses the failure to
observe any of the requirements of a notarial act under the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice which would result in putting the rights of a person to his liberty
or property in jeopardy. This includes, among others, failing to require the
presence of the signatories to a notarial instrument and ascertaining their
identities through competent evidence thereof,28 and allowing, knowingly or
unknowingly, people, other than the notary public himself, to sign notarial
documents, affix the notarial seal therein, and make entries in the notarial
register.29
In Spouses Santuyo v. Hidalgo,30 the Court ruled that Atty. Hidalgo was grossly
negligent not only in the supposed notarization of a deed of sale of a parcel of
land purchased by the Spouses Santuyo, but also in allowing his office
secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was
supposed to be done and kept by him alone. This resulted in an ownership
dispute between the Spouses Santuyo and a certain Danilo German which led to
the filing of a case of estafa through falsification of a public document against the
Spouses Santuyo, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not
categorically state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale
notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that
respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The
records show that complainants themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed,
signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature
appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to who actually
affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent's contention that he only
met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the
deed of sale. Respondent's assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in
an affidavit executed on November 17, 2001 wherein she stated that complainant
Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to
meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting
between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the
latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale
concerning another property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP
reasoned out:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive
respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his
duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the
secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the
document for notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the
respondent's signature which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the
secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but
foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries
in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone;
and should not have relied on somebody else.31
In this case, Commissioner Robles observed that while Atty. Ching denied having
notarized the Deed32by showing the discrepancy between his purported signature
therein33 and the specimen signatures34he submitted in his Answer, he miserably
failed to explain how the Deed ended up in his notarial books. Commissioner
Robles concluded that while it would not be fair to conclude that Atty. Ching
actually signed the Deed, he was nonetheless grossly negligent for failing to give
a satisfactory reason why a supposedly forged Deed was duly recorded in his
notarial books.35
The Court completely agrees with Commissioner Robles' observation. While
there may be reasons to give Atty. Ching the benefit of the doubt as to who
signed the Deed, the Court does not and cannot lose sight of the fact that Atty.
Ching still failed in ensuring that only documents which he had personally signed
and sealed with his notarial seal, after satisfying himself with the completeness of
the same and the identities of the parties who affixed their signatures therein,
would be included in his notarial register. This also means that Atty. Ching failed
to properly store and secure his notarial equipment in order to prevent other
people from notarizing documents by forging his signature and affixing his
notarial seal, and recording such documents in his notarial books, without his
knowledge and consent. This is gross negligence.
Such gross negligence on the part of Atty. Ching in letting another person
notarize the Deed had also unduly put the Castelo heirs in jeopardy of losing
their property. To make matters worse, the real property subject of the Deed was
the residence, nay, the family home of the Castelo heirs, a property that their
parents had worked hard for in order to provide them and their children a decent
shelter and the primary place where they could bond together as a family - a
property which had already acquired sentimental value on the part of the Castelo
heirs, which no amount of money could ever match. One can just imagine the
pain and anguish of losing a home to unscrupulous people who were able to
transfer title to such property and file a case in court in order to eject them - all
because of the negligence of a notary public in keeping his notarial books and
instruments from falling into the wrong hands.
This is not to say, however, that the Court has ruled on whether or not the Deed
in this case was indeed forged. Such issue is civil, and perhaps criminal, in
nature which should be passed upon in a proper case, and not in an
administrative or disciplinary proceeding such as this case.36
As for the penalty to be imposed, and taking into account the possible undue
deprivation of property on the part of the Castelo heirs as a result of Atty. Ching's
gross negligence, the Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the recommended
penalty of the IBP.
As a final note, this case should serve as a reminder for notaries public, as well
as for lawyers who are applying for a commission, that the duty to public service
and to the administration of public justice is the primary consideration in the
practice of law.37 This duty to public service is made more important when a
lawyer is commissioned as a notary public. Like the duty to defend a client's
cause within the bounds of law, a notary public has the additional duty to
preserve public trust and confidence in his office38 by observing extra care and
diligence in ensuring the integrity of every document that comes under his
notarial seal, and seeing to it that only documents that he personally inspected
and whose signatories he personally identified are recorded in his notarial books.
In addition, notaries public should properly secure the equipment they use in
performing notarial acts, in order for them not to fall into the wrong hands, and be
used in acts that would undermine the public's trust and confidence in the office
of the notary public.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching is found GUILTY of gross

negligence in the performance of his duties as notary public. His existing notarial
commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is also PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public. Moreover, he is
hereby SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR SIX (6) MONTHS.
He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.

Atty. Ching is also DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Decision to determine the reckoning point of the effectivity of his suspension.

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of Atty. Ching's records in the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and copies be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 DR. BASILIO MALVAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. CORA JANE P.
BALEROS, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment1 filed on June 30, 2014 by Dr.
Basilio Malvar (complainant) against Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros (respondent) for
acts amounting to grave misconduct consisting of falsification of public
document, violation of Administrative Matter No. 02-8-13-SC or the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules) and the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
Antecedent Facts
The complainant is the owner of a parcel of land located,in Barangay Pagudpud,
San Fernando City, La Union.2 On January 7, 2011, the complainant executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale3 in favor of Leah Mallari (Mallari) over the said lot for the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). This transaction was
acknowledged by the children of the complainant through a document
denominated as Confirmation of Sale.4
The process of conveying the title of the lot in the name of Mallari spawned the
legal tussle between the parties. According to the complainant, an agreement
was made between him and Mallari wherein he undertook to facilitate the steps
in order to have the title of the lot transferred under Mallari's name.5However,
without his knowledge and consent, Mallari who was not able to withstand the
delay in the delivery of the title of the land sold to her allegedly filed an
Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land6 as a preliminary
step for the segregation and titling of the same before the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), San Fernando City, La Union using the
complainant's name and signing the said application.7 A civil case for collection of
sum of money was instituted by Mallari before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Aringay, La Union seeking reimbursement tor the expenses she incurred by
reason of the transfer and titling of the property she purchased.8 A compromise
agreement9 was forged between the parties which failed because two out of the
four checks issued by the complainant were unfunded.10 This prompted Mallari to
file a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known
as The Bouncing Checks Law, against the complainant before the MTC of
Aringay, La Union.11
Ultimately, a criminal case for falsification of public document against Mallari was
filed before the Office of the Prosecutor and now pending before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 1.12 The
complainant alleged that it was through the conspiracy of Mallari and the
respondent that the crime charged was consummated.13
Notwithstanding the Office of the Prosecutor's determination that the evidence
presented was insufficient to establish conspiracy between Mallari and the
respondent, thereby dropping the latter's name from the indictment, the
complainant remained unfazed and thus, initiated the present petition for
disbarment seeking the imposition of disciplinary sanction against the
respondent.14 The complainant claimed that the respondent, by notarizing the
assailed Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land, made it
appear that he executed the same when the truth of the matter was he never
went to the office of the respondent for he was in Manila at the time of the
alleged notarization and was busy performing his duties as a doctor.15
On August 19, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference16 requiring
both parties to appear before it on November 18, 2014. However, the scheduled
mandatory conference was reset to December 2, 201417 here the complainant
personally appeared while the respondent was represented by her attorney-in-
fact and counsel.18
The complainant buttressed in his position paper that the respondent
consummated the crime of falsification of public document as delineated under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and thus, the presumption of regularity in
the notarization of the contested document has been overthrown and cannot
work in her favor.19 He recapped that he never appeared before the respondent
to have the subject document notarized.20 The complainant stressed that the
respondent made a mockery of the Notarial Rules by notarizing the Application
for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land in his absence.
In her Position Paper,21 the respondent refuted the allegations against her by
narrating that Benny Telles, the complainant and his sons came to her office to
have the subject document notarized and that she is certain as to the identity of
the complainant.22 Moreover, she argued that the charges filed against her were
all part of the complainant's scheme to avoid his obligations to Mallari as the
buyer of his lot.23
Ruling of the IBP
On June 15, 2015, Commissioner Maria Angela Esquivel (Commissioner
Esquivel) found that the respondent was negligent in the performance of her
duties as a notary public and violated the Notarial Rules, thereby recommending
disciplinary imposition against her. The pertinent portion of the Report and
Recommendation24 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the
Respondent's commission as a notary public be revoked; that she be disqualified
for being a notary public for two (2) years with a stem warning that a repetition of
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.25
In a Resolution26 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved Commissioner Esquivel's report and recommendation with
modification, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", for failure of Respondent to observe due diligence in
the performance of her duties and obligations as a Notary Public specifically Rule
VI, Section 2 of the Notarial Law. Thus, [the respondent's] notarial commission, if
presently commissioned, is immediately REVOKED. Furthermore, [she]
is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a Notary Public for two (2)
years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months.27 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
The Issues
Whether administrative liability should attach to the respondent by reason of the
following acts alleged to have been committed by her:
1. Falsification of the Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land;
2. Notarization of the aforesaid document in the absence of the
complainant; and
3. Double Entries in the Notarial Registry.
Ruling of the Court
After a close scrutiny of the facts of the case, the Court finds no compelling
reason to deviate from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
With regard to the imputation of falsification of public document, the Court shall
not inquire into the merits of the said criminal case pending adjudication before
the MTCC and make a ruling on the matter. Commissioner Esquivel correctly
declined to resolve the falsification case pending resolution before the regular
court to which jurisdiction properly pertains. Though disbarment proceedings
are sui generis as they belong to a class of their own and are distinct from that of
civil or criminal actions, it is judicious for an administrative body like IBP-CBD not
to pre-empt the course of action of the regular courts in order to avert
contradictory findings.28
The Court concurs with the conclusion of Commissioner Esquivel that the
respondent violated several provisions of the Notarial Rules. The complainant
insists that the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land was
notarized sans his presence. An affidavit requiring a jurat which the respondent
admittedly signed and notarized on August 18, 2010 forms part of the subject
document. The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies
that the instrument is sworn to before her, thus, making the notarial certification
essential.29 The unsubstantiated claim of the respondent that the complainant
appeared before her and signed the contested document in her presence cannot
prevail over the evidence supplied by the complainant pointing that it was highly
improbable if not impossible for him to appear before the respondent on the date
so alleged that the subject document was notarized. The complainant furnished
in his Sworn Judicial Affidavit submitted before the court patients' record cards
showing that he attended to a number of them on August 18, 2010 in De Los
Santos Medical Center, E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.30
A jurat as sketched in jurisprudence lays emphasis on the paramount
requirements of the physical presence of the affiant as well as his act of signing
the document before the notary public.31 The respondent indeed transgressed
Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Notarial Rules by affixing her official signature and
seal on the notarial certificate of the affidavit contained in the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land in the absence of the complainant
and for failing to ascertain the identity of the affiant. The thrust of the said
provision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Prohibitions.
xxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to
the instrument or document -
(1)
is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2)
is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The physical presence of the affiant ensures the proper execution of the duty of
the notary public under the law to determine whether the former's signature was
voluntarily affixed.32 Aside from forbidding notarization without the personal
presence of the affiant, the Notarial Rules demands the submission of competent
evidence of identity such as an identification card with photograph and signature
which requirement can be dispensed with provided that the notary public
personally knows the affiant. Competent evidence of identity under Section 12 of
Rule II of the Notarial Rules is defined as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of
identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:
a)
at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the individual; or
b)
the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who
personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the
individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
Granting that the complainant was present before the notary public at the time of
the notarization of the contested document on August 18, 2010, the respondent
remained unjustified in not requiring him to show a competent proof of his
identification. She could have escaped administrative liability on this score if she
was able to demonstrate that she personally knows the complainant. On the
basis of the very definition of a jurat under Section 6 of Rule II of the Notarial
Rules, case law echoes that the non-presentation of the affiant's competent proof
of identification is permitted if the notary public personally knows the former.33 A
'jurat' refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in
person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b)
is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document
in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the
notary public as to such instrument or document.34
Further, the respondent displayed lack of diligence by the non observance of the
obligations imposed upon her under Section 2 of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register.
(a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at
the time of notarization the following:
(1)
the entry number and page number;
(2)
the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3)
the type of notarial act;
(4)
the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5)
the name and address of each principal;
(6)
the competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules if the signatory is not
personally known to the notary;
(7)
the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the
person's identity;
(8)
the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9)
the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular
place of business; and
(10)
any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.
xxx
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one
in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the
page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be
left between entries.
x x x (Emphasis ours)
The same notarial details were assigned by the respondent to two distinct
documents. In an order of the MTCC where the criminal case for falsification of
document was pending, Clerk of Court Atty. Raquel Estigoy-Andres (Atty.
Estigoy-Andres) was directed to transmit the original document of the Application
for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land which was notarized by the
respondent.35 A similar order was issued by the MTCC requiring the DENR for
the production of the impugned document.36 The DENR issued a certification that
despite diligent efforts they could not locate the said document but which they
were certain was received by their office.37 Meanwhile, upon Atty. Estigoy-
Andres' certification,38 it was discovered that as per the respondent's notarial
register submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Document No. 288, Page
No. 59, Book No. LXXIII, Series of 2010 does not pertain to the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but to a notarized document
denominated as Joint Affidavit of Adjoining Owners39 executed by Ricardo
Sibayan and Cecilia Flores. Undoubtedly, the document entitled Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land nowhere appears in the
respondent's notarial register. The respondent further exposed herself to
administrative culpability when she regretfully offered plain oversight as an
excuse for the non-inclusion of the challenged document in her notarial register
and by stating that it is her office staff who usually fills it up.
To reiterate, the respondent admitted having signed and notarized the
Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but based from the
foregoing, she indubitably failed to record the assailed document in her notarial
book. It is axiomatic that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary
act. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is converted into
a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof
of authenticity and due execution.40 "If the document or instrument does not
appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is
engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is
not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this
document."41 The respondent's delegation of her notarial function of recording
entries in her notarial register to her staff is a clear contravention of the explicit
provision of the Notarial Rules dictating that such duty be fulfilled by her and not
somebody else. This likewise violates Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the CPR which
provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
In addition to the above charges, Commissioner Esquivel noted that the
respondent failed to retain an original copy in her records and to submit the
duplicate copy of the document to the Clerk of Court. However, in a previous
case, the Court ruled that the requirement stated under Section 2(h) of Rule VI of
the Notarial Rules applies only to an instrument acknowledged before the notary
public and not to the present document which contains a jurat.42 "A jurat is a
distinct creature from an acknowledgment."43It is that part of an affidavit in which
the notary certifies that before him or her, the document was subscribed and
sworn to by the executor; while an acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it
to be his act or deed.44 Hence, no liability can be ascribed to the respondent
relative to such ground.
The Court finds unacceptable the respondent's defiance of the Notarial Rules.
Under the circumstances, the respondent should be made liable not only as a
notary public who failed to discharge her duties as such but also as a lawyer who
exhibited utter disregard to the integrity and dignity owing to the legal profession.
The acts committed by the respondent go beyond being mere lapses in the
fulfilment of her duties under the Notarial Rules, they comprehend a parallel
breach of the CPR particularly Canon 9, Rule 9.01, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which
provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct" and the Lawyer's Oath which amplifies the undertaking to do
no falsehood and adhere to laws and the legal system being one of their
primordial tasks as officers of the court. Given the evidentiary value accorded to
notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in
her notarial register corresponds to falsely making it appear that the document
was notarized when, in fact, it was not.45 It cannot be overemphasized that
notaries public are urged to observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence
of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.46
if still existing and to disqualify her from appointment as a notary public for two
(2) years. She is also suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Contrary to the complainant's proposition to have the respondent disbarred, the
Court is of the belief that her acts do not merit such a grave penalty and the
sanctions so imposed suffice. The Court held in an array of cases that "removal
from the Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe -
reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the end desired."50
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros is GUILTY of violating the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer's Oath. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED,
and she is hereby DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a
period of two (2) years. She is likewise SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months effective immediately. Further, she is WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers who were remiss in their
duties as notaries public to disciplinary sanction. Failure to enter the notarial acts
in one's notarial register, notarizing a document without the personal presence of
the affiants and the failure to properly identify the person who signed the
questioned document constitute dereliction of a notary public's duties which
warrants the revocation of a lawyer's commission as a notary public.47 Upholding
the role of notaries public in deterring illegal or immoral arrangements, the Court
in the case of Dizon v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.48prohibited the respondent for a period
of two (2) years from being commissioned as a notary public for notanzmg a
compromise agreement without the presence of all the parties. In the case
of Atty. Benigno T. Bartolome v. Atty. Christopher A. Basilio,49 which factual
milieu is similar to the present case, the Court meted out against therein
respondent the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification
for two (2) years from being appointed as a notary public and suspension for six
(6) months from the practice of law due to various infringement of the Notarial
Rules such as failure to record a notarized document in his notarial register and
notarizing a document without the physical presence of the affiant.

Following jurisprudential precedents and as a reminder to notaries public that

their solemn duties which are imbued with public interest are not to be taken
lightly, the Court deems it proper to revoke the notarial register of the respondent