The application for conversion of Roxas & Co.
was the subject of the
ROXAS v. DAMBA-NFSW
GR No. 149548, 2009-12-04
Facts:
Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of
three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all
located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas.
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.
Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and
Banilad were later placed... under compulsory acquisition by ... DAR
in accordance with the CARL.
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its
President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of ...DAR
withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan
of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the... reclassification of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result,
petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for
conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543 nub on the
interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520 which was
issued on November 28, 1975 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.
The PP reads:
WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities
of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in
Batangas have potential tourism value... hereby declare the area
comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite
Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a... tourist zone under
the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA)
The PTA shall identify well-defined geographic areas within the zone
with potential tourism value,... Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its
application for conversion of its three haciendas from argricultural
to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520
which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified
them to non-agricultural uses.
Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)
to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA
No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983
hectares,... the subject of G.R. No. 167505.
above-stated Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals which the Court
remanded to the DAR for the observance of proper acquisition
proceedings. As reflected in the above-quoted statement of facts
in... said case, during the pendency before the DAR of its application
for conversion following its remand to the DAR or on May 16, 2000,
Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative
Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994[3] which states that all lands
already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the
effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance... from the
DAR.
It bears mentioning at this juncture that on April 18, 1982, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu enacted Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 4 (Nasugbu MZO No. 4) which was approved on May 4, 1983 by
the Human Settlements Regulation Commission, now the Housing
and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Issues:
1520
Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-
Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-agricultural use to exempt
Roxas & Co.'s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage
Whether Nasugbu MSO No. 4, Series of 1982 exempted certain lots
in Hacienda Palico from CARP coverage
Whether the partial and complete cancellations by the DAR of CLOA
No. 6654 subject of G.R. No. 167505 is valid
Ruling:
I. PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL
LANDS IN THE THREE MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING NASUGBU TO
NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities
as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to
tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural
purposes.
The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas
in the sector comprising the [three Municipalities that] have
potential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary
studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to
achieve its purpose.
Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
to identify what those potential tourism areas are.
In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA,[9] the Court made it
clear that the "power to determine whether Haciendas Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the
coverage of the [Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law] lies with the [Department of Agrarian
Reform], not with this Court.
The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by
Order of October 22, 2001, the application for CARP exemption of
Roxas & Co., it... finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify
all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original uses.
I... t appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the
"specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no
pending... tourism development projects in the areas. Further,
report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and
Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with
sugar cane and other crops.[11]
Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004,
[12] came up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed that
B. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces,
municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas as tourist zones that
merely:
(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas
(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within
the general area declared as tourist zone... could not be regarded as
effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land
area declared as tourist zone. This is so because "reclassification of
lands" denotes their allocation into some specific use and "providing
for the manner of... their utilization and disposition (Sec. 20, Local
Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands
shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential,
industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan."
A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value
of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone
clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land
area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said...
proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within the zone
shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural.
C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said
proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect before June
15, 1988, could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of
the lands embraced therein from CARP coverage x x x x.
The DAR's reading into these general proclamations of tourism zones
deserves utmost consideration, more especially in the present
petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate,
PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain
areas... within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not
reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.
Even so, Roxas & Co. turns to Natalia Realty v. DAR and NHA v.
Allarde to support its position. These cases are not even closely
similar to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543. The only
time that these cases may find application to said petitions is... when
the PTA actually identifies "well-defined geographic areas within the
zone with potential tourism value."
II. ROXAS & CO.'S APPLICATION IN DAR Administrative Case No. A-
9999-142-97 FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT
OF G.R. NO. 179650 CANNOT BE GRANTED IN VIEW OF
DISCREPANCIES IN THE LOCATION AND IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT
PARCELS OF
LAND.
Since PP 1520 did not automatically convert Haciendas Caylaway,
Banilad and Palico into non-agricultural estates, can Roxas & Co.
invoke in the alternative Nasugbu MZO No. 4,... which reclassified in
1982 the haciendas to... non-agricultural use to exclude six parcels of
land in Hacienda Palico from CARP coverage?
By Roxas & Co.'s contention,... n, the affected six parcels of land
which are the subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97
and nine parcels of land which... have been reclassified to non-
agricultural uses via... n, the affected six parcels of land which are
the subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 and nine
parcels of land which are the subject of DAR Administrative Case No.
A-9999-008-98 involved in G.R. No. 167505, all in
Hacienda Palico, have been reclassified t... ural uses via Nasugbu
MZO No. 4 which was approved by the forerunner of HLURB.
Roxas & Co.'s contention fails.
To be sure, the Court had on several occasions decreed that a local
government unit has the power to classify and convert land from
agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL.
The DAR Secretary[26] denied the application for exemption of
Roxas & Co., however,... [A] review of the titles, however, shows
that the origin of T-49946 is T-783 and not
T-985. On the other hand, the origin of T-60034 is listed as 59946,
and not T-49946. The discrepancies were attributed by [Roxas & Co.]
to typographical errors which were "acknowledged and initialled"
[sic] by the ROD. Per verification..., the discrepancies . .
. cannot be ascertained.
In denying Roxas & Co.'s motion for reconsideration, the DAR
Secretary held:
The landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond
to the Certification dated February 11, 1998 of the [HLURB] , the
Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator, and the Certifications...
dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National
Irrigation Authority. The certifications were issued for Lot Nos. 21,
24, 28, 31, 32 and 34. Thus, it was not even possible to issue
exemption clearance over the lots covered by TCT Nos. 60019 to
60023.
Furthermore, we also note the discrepancies between the
certifications issued by the HLURB and the Municipal Planning
Development Coordinator as to the area of the specific lots.[
In affirming the DAR Secretary's denial of Roxas & Co.'s application
for exemption, the Court of Appeals
But these certifications contain nothing to show that these lots are
the same as Lots 125-A, 125-B, 125-C, 125-D and 125-E covered by
TCT Nos. 60019, 60020, 60021, 60022 and 60023, respetively. While
[Roxas & Co.] claims that DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24 and
31 correspond to the aforementioned TCTs submitted to the DAR no
evidence was presented to substantiate such allegation... oreo
Moreover, [Roxas & Co.] failed to submit TCT 634 which it claims
covers DAR Lot Nos. 28, 32 and 24.
....a... scrutiny of the said Ordinance shows that only Barangays
Talangan and Lumbangan of the said municipality were classified as
Industrial Zones...Barangay Cogunan was not include
Its foregoing findings notwithstanding, the appellate court still
allowed Roxas & Co. to adduce additional evidence to support its
application for exemption under Nasugbu MZO No. 4.
In granting the application, the DAR Secretary[30] examined anew
the evidence submitted by Roxas & Co. which consisted mainly of
certifications from various local and national government agencies.
Even as the existence and validity of Nasugbu MZO No. 4 had
already been established, there remains in dispute the issue of
whether the parcels of land involved in DAR Administrative Case No.
A-9999-142-97 subject of G.R. No. 179650 are actually within the
said zoning... ordinance.
The Court finds that the DAR Secretary indeed committed grave
abuse of discretion when he ignored the glaring inconsistencies in
the certifications submitted early on by Roxas & Co.
Notably, then DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, on one hand,
observed that the "landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do
not correspond to the Certification dated February 11, 1998 of the
[HLURB], the Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the
Municipal Planning... and Development Coordinator, and the
Certifications dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the
National Irrigation Authority." On the other hand, then Secretary
Hernani Braganza relied on a different set of certifications which
were issued later or on September
19, 1996.
In this regard, the Court finds in order the observation of DAMBA-
NFSW that Roxas & Co. should have submitted the comprehensive
land use plan and pointed therein the exact locations of the
properties to prove that indeed they are within the area of coverage
of Nasugbu MZO
No. 4.
III. ROXAS & CO.'S APPLICATION FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 FOR THE NINE PARCELS OF
LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 167505 SHOULD BE
GRANTED.
The Court, however, takes a different stance with respect t... nine
parcels of land... in Hacienda Palico,... Location and vicinity maps of
subject landholdings;
Certification dated 10 July 1997 issued by Reynaldo Garcia,
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC) and
Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that the subject
parcels of land are within the Urban Core Zone as specified in Zone
A. VII of
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), under Resolution
No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;
Two (2) Certifications both dated 31 August 1998, issued by Alfredo
Tan II, Director, HLURB, Region IV, stating that the subject parcels of
land appear to be within the Residential cluster Area as specified in
Zone VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4,... By Order of
November 6, 2002, the DAR Secretary granted the application for
exemption b
DAMBA-NSFW moved for reconsideration but the DAR Secretary
denied the same
IV. THE CLOAs ISSUED BY THE DAR in ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. A-
9999-008-98 SUBJECT OF G.R. No. 179650 TO THE FARMER-
BENEFICIARIES INVOLVING THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN
HACIENDA PALICO MUST BE CANCELLED.
Turning now to the validity of the issuance of CLOAs... ssuance of
CLOAs in Hacienda Palico vis-à-vis the present dispositions: It bears
recalling that in DAR Administrative Case Nos. A-9999-008-98 and A-
9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 179650), the Court ruled for Roxas & Co.'s
grant of exemption... in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98
but denied the grant of exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-
9999-142-97 for reasons already discussed. It follows that the CLOAs
issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in DAR Administrative Case No. A-
9999-008-98 must be... cancelled.
But first, the Court digresses. The assertion of DAMBA-NSFW that
the petitions for partial and complete cancellations of the CLOAs
subject of DARAB Case Nos. R-401-003-2001 to R-401-005-2001 and
No. 401-239-2001 violated the earlier order in Roxas v. Court of
Appeals does... not lie. Nowhere did the Court therein pronounce
that the CLOAs issued "cannot and should not be cancelled," what
was involved therein being the legality of the acquisition
proceedings.
gs. The Court merely reiterated that it is the DAR which has primary
jurisdiction to rule on the... validity of CLOAs.
Unlike courts of justice, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body, is not
bound to strictly observe rules of procedure and evidence. To strictly
enforce rules on appeals in this case would render to naught the
Court's dispositions on the other issues in these consolidated...
petitions.

In the main, there is no logical recourse except to cancel the CLOAs

issued for the nine parcels of land identified as Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37,
19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985
covering 45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico

(or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98).

As for the rest of the CLOAs, they should be respected since Roxas &
Co., as shown in the discussion in G.R. Nos. 167540, 167543 and
167505, failed to prove that the other lots in Hacienda Palico and
the... other two haciendas, aside from the above-mentioned nine
lots, are CARP-exempt.
 compensation with an accessiblebank. Until then, title remains with
the landowner.The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of
Lubrica vs. Land Bank possession and ownership of the land to thegovernment on receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by
the DAR ofthe compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with thelandowner. No outright
change of ownership is contemplated either.

G.R. No. 170220 November 20, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee of Federico C. Suntay
over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia,
Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).In 1972, a portion of the
said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under
the landreform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27
(1972) and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet
to date, they have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it
would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228
considering the failure to determine just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227
or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation
should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial,
full and ample.

 The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer

beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP
fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was
deposited incash and bonds in favor of Lubrica. Nenita Suntay-
Tañedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a
parcel of agricultural land consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with
an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of
165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed
under the coverage of P.D. No. 27but only 128.7161 hectares
was considered by LBP and valued the same at
P1,512,575.05.Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties,
hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for
determination of just compensation.

ISSUE:

WON the determination of just compensation should be based on

the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment.

HELD:

Yes. Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment

of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before
the property can be taken away from its owners.

 The transfer ofpossession and ownership of the land to the Land bank vs. CA and Yap
government are conditioned upon the receipt by thelandowner of
the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995
Facts:

Yap and Santiago are landowners whose landholdings were acquired

by the DAR, subjecting it for transfer to qualified CARP beneficiaries.
Aggrieved by the compensation valuation of DAR and LBP,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a
preliminary mandatory injunction. The case was referred to CA for
proper determination and disposition.

Respondents argued that DAR and LBP committed grave abuse of

discretion and acted without jurisdiction when they opened trusts
accounts in lieu of the depositing in cash or bonds, before the lands
was taken and the titles are cancelled. Respondents claim that
before the taking of the property, the compensation must be
deposited in cash or bonds.

DAR, maintained that the certificate of deposit was a substantial

compliance with the rule on taking and compensation. LBP confirms
that the certificate of deposit expresses "reserved/deposited".

CA ruled in favor of Yap and Santiago. DAR filed a petition.  DAR,

maintain that the word "deposit" referred merely to the act of
depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as
form of deposit.

Issue:

Whether the opening of trust account tantamount to deposit.

Ruling:

Contention of DAR is untenable.

Section 16 of RA 6657 provides: (e)        Upon receipt by the

landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or
no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash
or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)

It is very explicit that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP
bonds, there is no ambiguity.
 Estribillo vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 159674June 30, 2006
  Doctrines
(a) Certificate of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are
as indefeasible asTCTs issued in registration proceedings;
(b) The certificate of title becomes indefeasible andincontrovertible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the
order for theissuance of the patent;
(c) The Emancipation Patents themselves, like the Certificate of
LandOwnership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian ReformLaw of 1988), are enrolled in the
Torrens system of registration.
  Facts
: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seekingthe review and reversal of the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals.The petitioners are the recipients of Emancipation
Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located atBarangay Angas, Sta.
Josefa, Agusan del Sur.The parcels of land in this case, were formerly
part of a forested area, which have been denudedas a result of the
logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI).
Petitioners,together with other persons, occupied and tilled these
areas.HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the
Philippines through Sales Patent No.2683 in 1956 by virtue of which
it was issued OCT No. P30771661.On 21 October 1972, Presidential
Decree No. 27 was issued mandating that tenanted rice andcorn
lands be brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to
farmer-beneficiaries.HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares,
requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdingsbe placed under
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation
therefor, HMIallowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate
the landholdings so that the same may becovered under said
law.HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all
relevant proceedings, including thedetermination of the Average
Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on
LandProduction, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and
Tenant Production Agreement(LTPA), covering the 527.8308
hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of thePhilippines
(LBP) in 1977.In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was
conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, thecorresponding
TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to
petitioners,among other persons.In December 1997, HMI filed with
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) ofCARAGA,
Region XIII, petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage
underPresidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former
landholdings. HMI claimed thatsaid area was not devoted to either
rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that
nocompensation was paid therefor.
  RARAD
: On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position
Paper, the RARADrendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and
EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not
devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established
tenancy relationsbetween HMI and petitioners when Presidential
Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972.
  DARAB
: Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board(DARAB), which affirmed the RARAD Decision.
CA
: The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for violation of Sec. 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Rulesof Civil Procedure.Hence, this petition
contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of
the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, reiterating that EPs are
ordinary titles, which becomeindefeasible one year after the
registration.
  Issue
: Whether or not the transfer certificates of title issued pursuant to
Emancipation Patentsacquire the same protection accorded to other
Transfer Certificates of Title.Rule:
The Supreme Court granted the petitions. The resolutions of the
Court of Appeals arereversed and set aside. The EPs and the
corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or totheir successors-in-
interest are declared valid and subsisting.
 
  Procedural  issue
 
(I included this because it’s important in the case and the Supreme
Courtreiterated the concept of Social Justice in determining the
validity of the petition):
 With the CAdismissing the petition for violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, theSupreme Court ruled that the
Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of
the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the Certification Against
Forum Shopping. In the case,Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in
signing the Verification and Certification Against ForumShopping,
falls within the phrase “plaintiff or principal party” who is required
to certify underoath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover,even if we assume for
the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of
the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be
justified for two compellingreasons: social justice considerations
and the apparent merit of the Petition.
Substantial issue
: YES. Certificate of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents
are asindefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings. After
complying with the procedure,therefore, in Section 105 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
PropertyRegistration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title aftergranting an EP to tenant-
farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), the
TCTsissued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same
protection accorded to other TCTs.

“The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible

upon the expiration of one year  from  the  date  of  the
issuance  of  the order for the issuance  of  the  patent,  x x  x.
Lands covered  bysuch title may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed toanother person
(Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court). ”

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award

(CLOAs) in Republic ActNo. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens systemof
registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes
Chapter IX on the subject ofEPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificatesof title
issued in registration proceedings.

https://www.scribd.com/document/330585224/20-Estribillo-vs-
Department-of-Agrarian-Reform-Castillo

Caballes vs. DAR

 6.            There is sharing of harvests.

G.R. No. 78214 Case Digest

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy

Facts:
The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was
acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virute of a Deed
of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is situated in
Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes,
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a protion of the land,
paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise
allowed to plant thereon, and they have agreed that the produce
thereon would be shred by them 50-50.
When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put
up a poultry on the land and they intended to build it close to
Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his dwelling
to the opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to pay renta; to
the new owners, but they refuse and later demanded for Abajon to
vacate. Abajon refused to leave.
DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner,
Andrea.
relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make
an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a
tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to
accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait
of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor
received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60, or
even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the
heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status
arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's
status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a
garden of some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant of
the said portion.

Issue:

Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that
since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for
malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for
Ruling: trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.

Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the

land which cannot be interpreted as economic-family size farm
under the definition of RA 3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1.            The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2.            The subject is agricultural land;

3.            There is consent;

4.            The purpose is agricultural production;

5.            There is personal cultivation; and


Gelos vs. Court of Appeals
Definition and nature of agricultural tenancy
     Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the physical possession by a
person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally
possessed by another for the purpose of production through the
labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm
household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable,
whether in produce or in money, or both." (RA 1199 [1954], sec. 3)
     In Gelos vs. CA,  208 SCRA 608 (1992), the Supreme Court held
that agricultural tenancy is not a purely factual relationship. The
written agreement of the parties is far more important as long it is
complied with and not contrary to law.
protestations are less than convincing. His wife's testimony that he is
illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the contrary in another
proceeding. Her claim that they were tricked into signing the
agreement does not stand up against the testimony of Atty. Santos
Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a witness (and as an
attorney and officer of the court) that he explained the meaning of
the document to Gelos, who even read it himself before signing it. . .
. Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and
suggests that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired
laborer. Not so. The work specified is not peculiar to tenancy. What
a tenant may do may also be done by a hired laborer working under
the direction of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is not the
nature of the work involved but the intention of the parties that
determines the relationship between them. As this Court has
stressed in a number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the
land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their
written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more important."

208 SCRA 608 (1992)

Facts:

Rafael Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his parents as

their laborer on a 25,000-sq. m farmland. They executed a written
contract which stipulated that as hired laborer Gelos would receive a
daily wage of P5.00.

Three (3) years later, Gelos was informed of the termination of his
services and was asked to vacate the property. Gelos refused and
continued working on the land. Alzona filed a complaint for illegal
detainer. The lower court found Gelos as tenant of the property and
entitled to remain thereon as such. The decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals.   

Issue:

What is the nature of the contract between Gelos and Alzona?

Held:

The parties entered into a contract of employment, not a tenancy

agreement. The agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in
dispute. . . . The petitioner would disavow the agreement, but his

Gabriel v. Pangilinan
FACTS:
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the
owner of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio
Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental
was entered between them.
Defendant was notified that the contract would be terminated, but
upon request was extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that
the trial court had no jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the
Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold
tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by
plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that
the land was originally verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father,
Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted, subject to the
condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond
and that which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense,
which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the
termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could
continue leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position
to attend to it personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of
determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings,
repairing dikes and such, personally with the aid of helpers since he
became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took
over who said that she helps her father in administering the leased
property, conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar
who is residing near the fishpond, defendant’s other children are all
professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in
Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural
leasehold tenancy governed by Republic
Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act
No. 3844, and the present case is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with
the aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4,
Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties
has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and
therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New
Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and
the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested
with jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this
Court.
ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and
appellant as that of a civil lease and not a leasehold tenancy under
Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First
Instance is without jurisdiction, the cue beingthat of an agrarian
relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD:
Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law
lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of
civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention
and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally
attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law
lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to
purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any
other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is
governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed
by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy
Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid
of labor available from members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed
amount in money or in produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond
and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land",
specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for
the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural
land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the
purview of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law
lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.

The court doesn’t want to decide on the second requisite since it

wasn’t raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy agreement was
severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally
because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members
of appellant's immediate farm household work the land. Only the
members of the family of the tenant and such other persons,
whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him
for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise
are included in the term "immediate farm household".

Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land. A person, in order to be
considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from
his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore,
who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants;
and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of
the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the
land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8of Republic
Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges
of one.

We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that

the relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and
appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under
Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First

Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case

No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the

appellants