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Core nations dominate the economic structure of their historical time and strive to
maintain or expand this authority. One fundamental element of a core nation is the
ability to produce and distribute products. Another characteristic is a strong state
machinery linked to a unified national culture. The state supports economic influence
wielded by private businesspeople, merchants, and financial institutions, which play a
vital role in core nations. Culture often serves as an ideological justification for
dominance. The state also provides military force to protect and expand economic
interests. Contemporary core nations dominate high technology, financial institutions,
and high-profit industries. Within the context of the world-system, core nations
compete among themselves for economic advantage.
Peripheral areas or nations (often colonies from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries
and defined as underdeveloped or semideveloped for a brief time in the twentieth
century) serve the interests of the core nations. Peripheral areas provide agricultural
products, luxury goods, raw materials, and cheap sources of labor. At times peripheral
areas gained prominence, serving as key geographically located posts to protect trade
routes between the core and the periphery. Peripheral areas are dependent upon core
nations and have often been a source of conflict between core nations. Core methods of
domination range from various forms of colonialism to anticolonial imperialism and
economic dependency.
Last in the tripartite world-system are semiperipheral nations and areas. These serve as
intermediate trading areas between the core nations and the peripheral areas. They also
have small manufacturing sectors, geared to either local or international trade, and
some capital accumulation.
One reason is the changing nature of the products of significance in the world
economy. An example is the indigo industry, which was, for a brief period, an
important product in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century world economy. More
broadly, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, agricultural production dominated
the economic world-system. By the late eighteenth century manufactured goods were
the product of choice, and since the last decades of the twentieth century high
technology production characterizes the core nations.
Within this paradigm, world-system analysis stresses dynamic interaction and change.
Core nations can become semiperipheral or even peripheral nations. One classic
example is Spain, which devolved from a core nation in the sixteenth century to a
semiperipheral nation in the eighteenth century.
Conversely, a semiperipheral area can rise, over time, to core status. In the case of
Atlantic North America, the colonies developed from external (the pre-Columbian
period) to peripheral (the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries). After independence
the United States evolved from a semiperipheral nation (the eighteenth to
midnineteenth centuries) to a core nation (the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth
centuries) and recently to hegemonic power (the late twentieth century).
One historical dynamic is the competition of core nations for advantage in the world-
system economically, politically, culturally, and often militarily. Wallerstein identifies
several struggles between core nations that result in warfare reverberating around the
globe. Importantly, peripheral areas and semiperipheral areas are not passive
participants in the system. In many cases they strive to rise in status and often rebel, at
times successfully, against the power and control of the core nations and the hegemon.
This creates policy disputes over strategy and tactics within the core nations. In the late
eighteenth century, for example, Spanish diplomacy toward the rebelling British
colonies was caught between the desire to weaken the power of England and the fear
that the colonial rebellion would set a precedent for Spain's own colonies.
HEGEMONY
One other important concept plays a crucial role in the world-system: hegemony.
During various historical times, one core nation accumulated sufficient power to
dominate the other core nations. According to Wallerstein, hegemony "refers to those
situations in which one static combines economic, political, and financial superiority
over other strong states, and therefore has both military and cultural as well as
economic and political power" (Wallerstein 2004, p. 94). Because of its superior means
of production and distribution, strong financial institutions that lend credit to both
domestic industry and externally to peripheral and semiperipheral areas, and the
financial prowess to support military action, the hegemon dominates the world-system.
Wallerstein identifies three periods of hegemonic domination in the modern world: the
United Provinces (Netherlands) in the mid-seventeenth century, Great Britain in the
mid-nineteenth century, and the United States in the mid-twentieth century. In each of
these cases, the hegemon, from a position of dominant economic power, advocated
freer trade. The economic, military, and, at times, ideological burdens of maintaining a
position of superiority, however, threaten the hegemonic power, which must pour
resources into retaining its dominant position in the world-system.
Wallerstein's argument that the Dutch were the first hegemonic power, due to their
application of science to agricultural production and their dominance over sea
distribution, has generated lively scholarly debate. The idea of hegemony, moreover,
has influenced the study of twentieth-century U.S. diplomatic historiography,
particularly in interpreting the relationship between the United States and Latin
America. Historians Thomas J. McCormick and Thomas Schoonover, for example,
have applied world-system theory to examining the means of U.S. hegemonic control
and the rivalry between the United States and other core powers.
INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS
World-system analysis arose during the 1970s, primarily through the writings of
Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein identifies four intellectual antecedents that emerged
between 1945 and 1970 as promulgating the emergence of world-system theory: (1)
the study of Latin American history, contemporary politics, and foreign relations, from
which arose the conceptualizations of core/periphery and dependency theory; (2) the
Marxian idea of an "Asiatic mode of production"; (3) the historical debate about the
transition from feudalism to capitalism; and (4) the scholarship of Fernand Braudel and
the Annales school of historiography.
Latin American scholars strove to understand the economic and social structures of
their region and its relationship to the United States. As succinctly stated by the
nineteenth-century Mexican statesman Porfirio Diaz (1830–1915): "Poor Mexico. So
far from God and so close to the United States." Emphasizing informal
imperialism, dependency theory focuses on the subjugation by core nations of
peripheral and semiperipheral economies through new forms of domination, such as
financial coercion (dollar diplomacy) and, at times, military action. Since the 1940s
international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, have been
created by core powers to continue this dependency. Any economic development was
primarily in the service of the core nations.
Second, the "Asiatic mode of production" stresses the role of large, bureaucratic, and
autocratic empires in the world-system. For example, during the Cold War, China
regulated its economy to combat the capitalist world-system.
A third contribution to world-system theory was the debate on the timing and nature of
the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Did internal factors within individual
nations, such as consolidation of political power under a strong central government, or
external factors, such as the expansion of trade, take precedence in the emergence of
capitalism?
The subtitle of Wallerstein's first volume on the development of the modern world-
system is significant: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-
Economy in the Sixteenth Century (1974). Not only does he date the advent of the
modern world-system in the sixteenth century, but he emphasizes the idea that
capitalism can be applied to agricultural economies. During this time, mercantilism,
that is, the economic nationalism revolving around trade, became the preferred
European state policy.
Colonies also served as way stations for commerce on the trade routes that linked the
world-system and as bases to protect the trade routes or disrupt the commerce of rival
core powers. At times, a colony can also be one part of a broader trade system, such as
the various seventeenth- and eighteenth-century triangular trade routes. One example is
the India-China-Britain triangular trade of the eighteenth century. Britain purchased tea
from China, which was paid for with Indian raw cotton, and later with opium imported
into China. In turn, Britain curtailed Indian domestic production of finished cotton
goods and encouraged the Indian merchants to import British cotton manufactures.
Incorporation into the world-system induced changes in the economic, and even
cultural, patterns of the peripheral and colonial areas. The nineteenth century saw the
famous competition of European core powers for colonies in Africa and the Middle
East.
Colonialism took several forms between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries,
ranging from settler colonies to political control by a small group of core citizens over
a large native population. While economic factors were central, the creation of colonies
was buttressed and sanctified by the religious and ideological worldview of the core
nations. This worldview included racism, which justified dominance and often made
peripheral populations feel culturally inferior. Both Catholic and Protestant colonizers
sought to expand their religious spheres of domination.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, policymakers in the major European core
nations—England, France, Spain, and the Netherlands—realized that conflicts in the
peripheral colonial areas were as important toward maintaining the balance of
power within the world-system as wars on the continent. In the late 1750s, for
example, the Duc de Choiseul (1719–1785), French minister of foreign affairs, wrote
to Charles III, king of Spain (1759–1788) and of Naples and Sicily (1735–1759): "The
King [of France] believes that it is possessions in America that will in the future form
the balance of power in Europe, and that, if the English invade that part of the world,
as it appears they have the intention of doing, it will result therefrom that England will
usurp the commerce of the nations, and that she alone will remain rich in Europe."
Until the early nineteenth century, France and Spain fought to deny England
hegemony.
In a careful study of India, Wallerstein traces the colonization of the Mughal Empire,
which ruled much of the Indian Subcontinent during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. The decision to incorporate India as part of the British Empire illustrates the
dynamics of the globalization of the world-system and the conflicts between the core
powers. Contributing to Britain's decision to colonize was competition with France,
which also sought Indian riches.
Demonstrating the linkage between private business and government in the world-
system, three actors participated in the colonization of India: the British East India
Company, the British government, and individual traders. In the mid-eighteenth
century, a debate arose in England over the economic costs of colonialism (i.e.,
whether the costs of colonial rule outweighed the trade advantages). This debate, in
one form or another, occurred in all core colonial powers until the demise of formal
colonialism.
Within world-system analysis, colonies are not passive participants. In virtually every
colony, antisystemic forces disputed colonial status. Responses ranged from petition to
revolution and warfare. Beginning with the British North American colonies and the
Spanish and French colonial empires in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, anticolonialism gained momentum. The successful anticolonial rebellion
against the French in Haiti in 1804, moreover, reinforced a racial fear of slave
rebellions into the consciousness of European powers and the United States.
By the late nineteenth century, anticolonial rebellions were occurring worldwide, and
in the twentieth century, core nations realized that the costs of colonialism outweighed
the advantages. By the twenty-first century, formal colonialism was essentially a relic
of the past. While many colonies rebelled against colonial status, most did not reject
the basic structure of the capitalist world-system. Ultimately, core nations found new
methods of controlling the economies of the newly independent nations in the
periphery and semiperiphery. These methods included economic coercion and military
intervention.
GLOBALIZATION
In the 1990s the idea of globalization entered into public discourse. World-system and
globalization theory stress a global economic interaction,
but globalism and globalizationare not synonymous terms. Globalization is one form
of core domination in the world-system. Both globalism and globalization emphasize a
global perspective in understanding the world economy and take into account private
business as an important element in the dynamics of the global economy. However,
Wallerstein asserts that in globalization theory, "the pressures on all governments to
open their frontiers to the free movement of goods and capital is unusually strong"
(Wallerstein 2004, p. 93).
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Wallerstein observes that the modern world-
system is in crisis, which he defines as difficulties that cannot be resolved. Several
factors contribute to this crisis. First, the revolutions of 1968, demonstrations by
students throughout the Western world who organized to condemn both United States
hegemony and the collusion of the Soviet Union, challenged the fairness of the world-
system, and these challenges have continued in antiglobalization activism.
Second, less and less of the earth's population live in rural areas, which were, for
centuries, a prime source of cheap industrial labor; hence, the costs of production have
risen. Even the current trend of "runaway factories" (corporations moving their
production facilities to peripheral areas with cheap labor) is not secure, because
corporations and governments must pay the high costs of moving and often the
expense of maintaining political stability in these areas. Wallerstein suggests that a
choice exists between constructing a new world-system based on the same hierarchical
privileges of the old system, or constructing a new more democratic and equalitarian
system.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
McCormick, Thomas J. "World Systems." In Explaining the History of American
Foreign Relations, 2nd ed., edited by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, 149-
161. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System, Vol. 3: The Second Era of Great
Expansion of the Capitalist World Economy, 1730–1840s. San Diego, CA: Academic
Press, 1989.