Israel v Eichmann

Principle: The universal principle (Jurisdiction). It recognizes that a sovereign can adopt criminal laws that apply to the person who has committed
any crime of universal nature (Jus Cogence, War Crime, Mass Killing etc.) Anywhere in the world when the conduct is recognized by nations as
being of universal concern.

Fact: Adolf Eichmann, was an Austrian by birth who worked as the Head of Section for Jewish Affairs charged of the Final Solution to the Jewish
Question. In this capacity, he killed more than 4200000 Jewish people and the transfer of money from evacuated Jews to the State and was
responsible for the administration of the Torture camps.

Later, he was captured by Israeli Security Forces in Argentina, where he reached after traveling many European country then having a fake identity
of Red Cross as being Ricardo Klement. After that ISF handed over to the District Court of Jerusalem to stand trial for war crimes, crimes against
humanity and crimes against the Jewish people.
Issue: whether Israel had the authority to put him in the trial or not?

Decision: He was convicted of all 15 counts and sentenced to death.

Reasoning: His crimes were crimes against humanity, he violated the principal of jus cogence so every country has the right to try that type of
crime.

People v Tulin

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with barrels of
kerosene, regular gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates including the accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and completely took over the vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes
were unloaded transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the
Philippines.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the accused were charged with qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy
in Philippine Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal. Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial
court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of
Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.
ISSUE:
WON the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the Philippine waters and territory?
RULING:
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was
widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage
of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence,
passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction
between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did
was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law
of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree
No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was
committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee"
by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where
its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by
the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.
The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with
more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is
likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43
Phil. 19 [1922]).
Govt of Hongkong v Olalia

FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of “accepting an advantage as
agent,” in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying
the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high “flight risk.” Judge
Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing and the case was raffled off to another judge. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the
above Order, but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Is the contention of the Petitioner, that the potential extraditee has a right to bail under the Constitution or statutory law, the right being
limited solely to criminal proceedings, tenable?

HELD: NO, the contention is untenable.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly,
the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the
subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations
of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been
persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual
person is now a valid subject of international law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights.
Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration
are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land.
In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should
see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Nicolas v Romulo

1. Prequel: Decision of the CA in Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al.
 Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape
committed against a Filipina, Nicolas (petitioner)
 The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the
crime of Rape upon a complaint by Suzette S. Nicolas,
 Complaint (rephrased): On Nov 1 2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City the abovenamed accuseds, being then members of the
United States Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano (the driver) conspired and raped Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a
Starex Van
2. VFA stuff: Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) the US, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the
proceedings.
 During the Trial (which was transferred from the RTC Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security reasons) the US Government faithfully complied
with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required.
3. RTC found defendant Smith guilty, but acquitted the others sentenced to reclusion perpetua
 Part of dispositive: Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, VFA accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall,
thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J.
SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.
4. Romulo- Kenney Agreement:
 On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents,
purportedly acting under orders of the DILG, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the US government, provided for under
new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states:
o The RP and US Governments agree that, in accordance with the VFA Corporal Daniel J. Smith, US Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military
custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
 The Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 states:
o The RP DFA and the US Embassy agree that, in accordance with the VFA upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine
Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of approximately
10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct
supervision of the Philippine DILG will have access to the place of detention to ensure the US compliance with the terms of the VFA.
5. CA: dismissed this petition because it was moot (doesn’t say why)
Issue 1: Constitutionality of the VFA not unconstitutional
Issue 2: Whether or not the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA are unconstitutional No
Issue 3: Whether or not Smith can be detained in the Embassy No
Ratio 1: VFA is constitutional
1. Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because the VFA is void and unconstitutional.
 This issue has been resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA in Bayan v. Zamora, brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present
cases.
2. The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25
 Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting State.
 Rationale of Sec 25: The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a
recurrence of the situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were binding upon us
but not upon the foreign State.
3. Resolution on the issue depends on: whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed
“under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
A. Bayan v. Zamora: the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the US as attested and certified
by the duly authorized representative of the US government.
o The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding
international agreement or treaty recognized by the US
o The US has an internationally known practice of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the
so-called Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.
B. The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement
was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the RP Senate and the US Senate.
o RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty’s purpose is for developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall. The VFA, is simply an implementing
agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states that it is “Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual
Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951”
o As an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and
consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification.
Ratio 2:
1. The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the following rules apply:
A. Article V Criminal Jurisdiction: The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately
reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings.
Also, the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after
timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
2. Petitioner’s argument: this violates the the exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines. They argue
also argue that this violates the equal protection clause
 The EPC is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to
enter our territory and all other accused.
 The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent
agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, but the principle
remains. The power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is not curtailed or violated, but is normally
encountered around the world.
 Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in
relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign
State allowed to enter another State’s territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
Ratio 3: Allowing Smith to be detained in the US Embassy violates the VFA,(important)
1. There is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction,
the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA:
 Article V Criminal Jurisdiction Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in
facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have
the right to visits and material assistance.
 The above clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the
detention shall be “by Philippine authorities.”
 Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United
States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.”
 Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the US towards an agreement on detention facilities
under Philippine authorities
2. Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas which held that treaties entered into by
the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to
make them enforceable. (I don’t know why the fuck they discussed it at the end but I’m just going with it. Its not that important tho. Concentrate
on Ratio 3, #1)
A. First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable,
precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA has been
implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.
B. The VFA is covered by implementing legislation, the Case-Zablocki Act, inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that
executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to these present
cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the Case-Zablocki Act.
 In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena decision of the ICJ subject matter of the
Medellin decision, as these are not self-executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack legislative implementing
authority.
C. Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US
Congressional Record, 82nd Congress,
 Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi, an executive agreement is a “treaty” within the meaning of that word in
international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the US.
 There are three types of treaties in the American system:
 Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties – These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution
 Executive–Congressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and Congress and need not be submitted to the Senate.;
 Sole Executive Agreements. – These are agreements entered into by the President. They are to be submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days of
ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act after which they are recogni ed by the ongress and may be implemented.
 As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done
through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.
Sanders v. Veridiano

FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph
Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and who were employed as game room attendants in the special services
department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time
to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of the reinstatement of
private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libelous imputations which
caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners.

ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents sued them for
damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge
of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The
private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the United States of which they are all citizens
and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.

US v Guinto

Facts: The private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force station in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by
them for contracts for barbering services in the said base. On February 24, 1986, The U.S. Air Force through its Western Pacific Contracting Office in
Okinawa Area Exchange solicited bids through the contracting officer, James F. Shaw. The Private respondents submitted their bids because they
are concessionaire inside the Clark air base for several years, but the bidding was won by the defendant Ramon Dizon with objection of the private
respondents because the defendant submitted bidding not mention in the solicitation. Petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse
explained that bidding is not awarded to Dizon but an extension of his present contract until August 31, 1986. June 30, 1986 the private
respondents file a complaint to RTC to compel PHAX and the petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon and to conduct re-bidding of the
barbershop concession and to allow respondent to continue operating pending on ligation by writ of preliminary injunction. The respondent court
issued an ex parte order directing individual petitioner to maintain status quo. July 22, 1986 petitioner file motion to dismiss and opposition to the
preliminary injunction, on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-
suability. The individual defendants, as officials/employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit. October 10, 1988 RTC denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract is commercial in nature between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants.December
11, 1986, the defendants file a petition for certiorari and prohibition and preliminary injunction to the Supreme Court on the decision of the RTC
denying the motion to dismiss the case.

Issue: Whether or not the officials/employees of the U.S. Air Force were immune from suit?

Held: The court ruled that that the petitioner cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents. The contracts in
question being decidedly Commercial, and the conclusion reached in United Sates of America v Ruiz case cannot be applied. The petition is
dismissed and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order
dated December 11, 1986 is lifted.
Chuidian v Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
In September 1980, Chuidian allegedly a dummy of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, was able to obtain, allegedly under false pretenses, a loan
guarantee from Philguarantee Corp., the BOI and the Central Bank, in favor of the Asian Reliability Co. Inc. (ARCI). ARCI, 98% of which was allegedly
owned by Chuidian, was granted a loan guarantee of US $25M for the establishment of 5 inter-related projects in the country.
However, Chuidian used the same in investing in corporations operating in the US. ARCI then defaulted in the payments of the loan, compelling
Philguarantee to undertake payments for the same. Philguarantee sued Chuidian before a Californian court, charging him of violating the terms of
the loan, defaulting in payments and misusing the proceeds for his personal benefit. Chuidian claimed that he himself was a victim of the
systematic plunder perpetrated by the Marcoses.
On November 1985, Philguarantee entered into a compromise agreement with Chuidian whereby Chuidian shall assign and surrender title to all his
companies in favor of the Phil. Gov’t. In return, Philguarantee shall absolve Chuidian from all civil and criminal liability concerning the payments
Philguarantee had made on Chuidian’s defaulted loans. It was further stipulated that the Phil. government shall pay Chuidian the amount of US
$5.3M. Chuidian received the 1st two installments of the payment. The remaining balance of US $4.6M was to be paid through an irrevocable
Letter of Credit (L/C) from which Chuidian would draw US $100k monthly.

With the advent of the Aquino administration, the newly-established PCGG exerted earnest efforts to search and recover properties and assets
suspected as having been illegally acquired by the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Chuidian was among those whose assets were sequestered
by the PCGG. The PNB was directed to place the letters of credit under its custody, in behalf of the PCGG.

In the meantime, Philguarantee filed a motion before the Superior Court of California, seeking to vacate the stipulated judgment containing the
settlement between Philguarantee and Chuidian on the grounds that: (a) Philguarantee was compelled by the Marcos administration to agree to
the terms of the settlement; (b) Chuidian blackmailed Marcos into pursuing the settlement agreement by threatening to expose the fact that the
Marcoses made investments in Chuidian’s American enterprises; and (c) the Aquino administration had ordered Philguarantee not to make further
payments on the L/C to Chuidian. However, the Californian court concluded that Philguarantee was not able to sufficiently show that the
settlement should be set aside. On appeal, the CA of the State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court denying Philguarantee’s
motion.
Chuidian filed before the California Central District Court, an action against PNB seeking to compel the latter to pay the proceeds of the L/C.
Philguarantee intervened in said action, raising the same issues and arguments it had earlier raised in the action before the Santa Clara Superior
Court, alleging that PNB was excused from making payments on the L/C since the settlement was void due to illegality, duress and fraud.
The Federal Court rendered judgment ruling: (1) in favor of PNB excusing the said bank from making payment on the L/C; and (2) in Chuidian’s
favor by denying intervenor Philguarantee’s action to set aside the settlement agreement.

Meanwhile a Deed of Transfer was executed between then Sec. of Finance and then PNB President Edgardo Espiritu, to facilitate the rehabilitation
of PNB. Thus, the gov’t assumed all liabilities of PNB including the L/C listed in favor of Chuidian in the amount of US $4.4M

On July 1987, the gov’t filed before the Sandiganbayan a civil case against the Marcos spouses, several gov’t officials, and a number of individuals
known to be cronies of the Marcoses, including Chuidian, seeking the reconveyance, accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth allegedly
procured illegally by the defendants.
While the case was pending, the Republic filed a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment over the L/C in the name of Chuidian, citing as grounds
therefor the following:
(1) Chuidian embezzled or fraudulently misapplied the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary capacity, justifying issuance of the writ under Section 1(b),
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The writ is justified under Section 1(d) of the same rule as Chuidian is guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
which the action was brought, or that he concealed or disposed of the property that is the subject of the action;
(3) Chuidian has removed or disposed of his property with the intent of defrauding the plaintiff as justified under Section 1(c) of Rule 57; and
(4) Chuidian is residing out of the country or one on whom summons may be served by publication, which justifies the writ of attachment prayed
for under Section 1(e) of the same rule.
The Republic also averred that should the action brought by Chuidian before the U.S. District Court of California to compel payment of the L/C
prosper, inspite of the sequestration of the said L/C, Chuidian can ask the said foreign court to compel the PNB Los Angeles branch to pay the
proceeds of the L/C. Eventually, Philguarantee will be made to shoulder the expense resulting in further damage to the government. Thus, there
was an urgent need for the writ of attachment to place the L/C under the custody of the Sandiganbayan so the same may be preserved as security
for the satisfaction of judgment in the case before said court.

Chuidian opposed the motion for issuance of the writ of attachment, contending that:
(1) The plaintiff’s affidavit appended to the motion was in form and substance fatally defective;
(2) Section 1(b) of Rule 57 does not apply since there was no fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and Chuidian;
(3) While Chuidian does not admit fraud on his part, if ever there was breach of contract, such fraud must be present at the time the contract is
entered into;
(4) Chuidian has not removed or disposed of his property in the absence of any intent to defraud plaintiff;
(5) Chuidian’s absence from the country does not necessarily make him a non-resident; and
(6) Service of summons by publication cannot be used to justify the issuance of the writ since Chuidian had already submitted to the jurisdiction of
the Court by way of a motion to lift the freeze order filed through his counsel.
On July 1993, the Sandiganbayan ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against the L/C as security for the satisfaction of judgment. The
Sandiganbayan ruled:
1) Although there was no separate was attached to the motion, the motion itself contained all the requisites of an affidavit, and the verification
thereof is deemed a substantial compliance of Rule 57, Section 3.
2) Fiduciary relationship exists between Chuidian and ARCI but not with the Republic. Hence, the Republic cannot invoke Sec. 1(b) of Rule 57.
3) There was a prima facie case of fraud committed by Chuidian, justifying the issuance of the writ of attachment.
4) The Sandiganbayan also adopted the Republic’s position that since it was compelled to pay, through Philguarantee, the bank loans taken out by
Chuidian, the proceeds of which were fraudulently diverted, it is entitled to the issuance of the writ of attachment to protect its rights as creditor.
5) Chuidian’s absence from the country was considered by the Sandiganbayan to be the most compelling ground for the issuance of the writ.

Almost four (4) years after the issuance of the order of attachment, Chuidian filed a motion to lift the attachment based on the following grounds:
1) He had returned to the Philippines, and considering that his absence was the most compelling ground for the issuance of the writ, the latter
should be lifted.
2) There was no evidence at all of initial fraud or subsequent concealment except for the affidavit submitted by the PCGG Chairman whose
statement is hearsay since he was not a witness to the litigated incidents, was never presented as a witness by the Republic and thus was not
subject to cross-examination.
3) He denies that he ever disposed of his assets to defraud the Republic, and there is nothing in the records that support the Sandiganbayan’s
erroneous conclusion on the matter.
4) He was never a defendant in any other pending criminal action.
5) He was not guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. L/C was not a product of fraudulent transactions but the result of
court-approved settlement.
6) Should the attachment be allowed to continue, he will be deprived of his property without due process. The L/C was payment to Chuidian in
exchange for the assets he turned over to the Republic. Said assets had already been sold by the Republic and cannot be returned to Chuidian
should the government succeed in depriving him of the proceeds of the L/C.
7) Finally, throughout the 4 years that the preliminary attachment had been in effect, the gov’t had not set the case for hearing. The case itself
should be dismissed for laches owing to the Republic’s failure to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time. Accordingly, the
preliminary attachment, being only a temporary or ancillary remedy, must be lifted and the PNB ordered to immediately pay the proceeds of the
L/C to Chuidian.
The Republic opposed e motion and contended that allowing the foreign judgment as a basis for the lifting of the attachment would essentially
amount to an abdication of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide the ill gotten wealth cases lodged before it in deference to the
judgment of foreign courts.
The Sandganbayan denied petitioner’s motion and also the latter’s subsequent MR.

ISSUE:
WON the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted as a result of petitioner’s return to the country and his averments that there was no fraud
in incurring the obligation

HELD: No
*Preliminary attachment issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of action. When the preliminary attachment is
issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the
attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff’s application and affidavits on which
the writ was based – and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued – the reason being that the hearing
on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action
would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.

The merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment;
otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion.

There are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a counterbound immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of
improper and irregular issuance. These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the
Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified therein. Petitioner’s motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any
infirmity or defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a counterbond.
Republic of Indonesia v Vinzon

Facts:

This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and
voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor
Kasim waived their immunity from suit.

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James
Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to
take effect in a period of four years.

When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement.
The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the petitioners which
opposed by invoking immunity from suit.

Issues:

Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.
Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private capacities.

Discussions:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The
practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim
par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A contrary attitude would
“unduly vex the peace of nations”.

The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity.
This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii
(public acts of the government of a state), but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the commercial activities of a state.)

Rulings:

The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The mere entering into a contract
by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is
only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of
a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of
Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of
the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State
for the purposes of the mission;
an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on
behalf of the sending State;
an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision clearly applies only to a situation where the
diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.
DOH v Phil Pharmawealth

Defense of state immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and
injurious to the rights of others neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal
capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Secretary of Health Alberto G.
Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only
qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth)
submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G
Benzathine. Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of
response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth‘s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid
for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the non- accreditation of respondent‘s Penicillin G
Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS). Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction,
mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial
praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH
et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same
to plaintiff company‖ and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al.
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however,
denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOH‘s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City denying petitioners‘ motion to dismiss the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will prosper.

HELD:

The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and
whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its complaint,
DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been
tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be
impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite
its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus.
Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the
defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to
the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity,
although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in
their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of ―illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff
Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth
of their powers given by law is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by
law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.
Professional Video v TESDA

FACTS:

In 1999, TESDA, an instrumentality of the government established under R.A. No. 7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached to the DOLE to
develop and establish a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country.

To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees who have passed the
certification process.

Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) signed and executed the “Contract Agreement Project PVC ID Card issuance” for the provision of goods and services
in the printing and encoding of the PVC cards. PROVI was to provide TESDA with the system and equipment compliant with the specifications
defined in the proposal. In return, TESDA would pay PROVI a specified sum of money after TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted goods and
services. PPOVI alleged that TESDA has still an outstanding balance and still remains unpaid.

TESDA claims that it entered the Contract Agreement and Addendum in the performance of its governmental function to develop and establish a
national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification; in the performance of this governmental function, TESDA is immune from suit.

ISSUE:

Can TESDA be sued without its consent?

RULING:

TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in
Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution. It is as well a universally
recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state.

The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy. That public service would be hindered, and the public
endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and
dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government.

The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an
unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agencys performance of
governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In
the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government agency covered by its own charter.

As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing and
establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for
the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed
by suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.
ATCI v Echin

FACTS:

Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for
the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a MOA.

Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one year.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the
probationary period.

Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by Amalia Ikdal, and the
Ministry, as the foreign principal.

The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary
for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.

The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such,
the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one-year
period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws.

The CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent.

RULING:

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere
expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principals liability
must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. Verily, to
allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.

As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in
respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti
Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not
substantiated.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of
processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the
party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with the Rules of Court.

These documents submitted by petitioners do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under
Kuwaiti civil service laws.

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042:

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several.
This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance
bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may
be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support
to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held
where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned
respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this
court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service.”

HELD

The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem
when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there
exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the
meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of
respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and
even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear
in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law
are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of
the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen
is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”.
The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered
as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of
law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public
employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends
beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers
who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to
his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran

The case was brought before the Court by Application by the United States following the occupation of its Embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants
on 4 November 1979, and the capture and holding as hostages of its diplomatic and consular staff. On a request by the United States for the
indication of provisional measures, the Court held that there was no more fundamental prerequisite for relations between States than the
inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, and it indicated provisional measures for ensuring the immediate restoration to the United States
of the Embassy premises and the release of the hostages. In its decision on the merits of the case, at a time when the situation complained of still
persisted, the Court, in its Judgment of 24 May 1980, found that Iran had violated and was still violating obligations owed by it to the United States
under conventions in force between the two countries and rules of general international law, that the violation of these obligations engaged its
responsibility, and that the Iranian Government was bound to secure the immediate release of the hostages, to restore the Embassy premises, and
to make reparation for the injury caused to the United States Government. The Court reaffirmed the cardinal importance of the principles of
international law governing diplomatic and consular relations. It pointed out that while, during the events of 4 November 1979, the conduct of
militants could not be directly attributed to the Iranian State — for lack of sufficient information — that State had however done nothing to
prevent the attack, stop it before it reached its completion or oblige the militants to withdraw from the premises and release the hostages. The
Court noted that, after 4 November 1979, certain organs of the Iranian State had endorsed the acts complained of and decided to perpetuate
them, so that those acts were transformed into acts of the Iranian State. The Court gave judgment, notwithstanding the absence of the Iranian
Government and after rejecting the reasons put forward by Iran in two communications addressed to the Court in support of its assertion that the
Court could not and should not entertain the case. The Court was not called upon to deliver a further judgment on the reparation for the injury
caused to the United States Government since, by Order of 12 May 1981, the case was removed from the List following discontinuance.

Liang v People

FACTS:
· 2 criminal informations for for grave oral defamation were filed against Jeffrey Liang, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB
· MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes
· RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines annulled and set aside the order of MTC
· SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute and is limited on the
official capacity and immunity CANNOT cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty
· A motion of reconsideration is filed

ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys immunity

HELD: NO

· slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity

· issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine

PUNO, J., concurring:

· the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is
· Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all
acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic
immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only those necessary for the
exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes.
o officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a
waiver of immunity
o If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify by the DFA
Minucher v CA

Facts:

On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on account of what he claimed to have been
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case.

Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. In an order of 25 June
1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the SC asking that the Civil Case complaint be ordered dismissed. The case
was referred to the Court of Appeals which sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him.
Minucher filed a petition for review with the SC appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals which the SC reversed the decision of the appellate
court and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. RTC continued with its hearings on the case Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in
actual and compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00;
attorney’s fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.The trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he
was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of
committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo
that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the
“Receiving State” pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. Hence, this case.

Issue:

Whether Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes, Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the
executive branch of the government. The Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst
apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove
the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than
compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the
territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. But while the diplomatic
immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be
ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present
controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified
with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of
the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a
foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect,
suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim –
par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. “It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same
tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.
Deutsche v CA

FACTS: The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical Co-
operation (Agreement) in Bonn, West Germany. The Agreement affirmed the countries’ common interest in promoting the technical and economic
development of their States, and recognized the benefits to be derived by both States from closer technical co-operation," and allowed for the
conclusion of "arrangements concerning individual projects of technical co-operation." While the Agreement provided for a limited term of
effective of five (5) years, it nonetheless was stated that "the Agreement shall be tacitly extended for successive periods of one year unless either
of the two Contracting Parties denounces it in writing three months prior to its expiry," and that even upon the Agreement’s expiry, its provisions
would "continue to apply to any projects agreed until their completion." On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign
Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the German government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement, which affirmed
the common commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called Social Health Insurance Networking and Empowerment (SHINE)
which was designed to "enable Philippine families especially poor ones and to maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality."
The Republic of Germany assigned the GTZ as the implementing corporation for the program while the Philippines designated the Department of
Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH). Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to
work for SHINE. But in September of 1999, Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Private
respondents' had a misunderstanding with the Project Manager of SHINE. It was claimed that SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its
original purpose to facilitate the development of social health insurance by shoring up the national health insurance program and strengthening
local initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to support local partners and new initiatives on the premise that community and local government unit
schemes were not sustainable a philosophy that supposedly betrayed Nicolay’s lack of understanding of the purpose of the project. This lead to an
exchange of letters which was interpreted to be the resignation of the private respondents. Private respondents then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal to the labor arbiter. GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the
case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany. This was opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification that it was immune from suit
from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that it was GTZ and not the German government which had implemented the SHINE Project and
entered into the contracts of employment. The Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among others, that
GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its
diplomatic status. GTZ did not file a motion for reconsideration to the Labor Arbiters Decision or elevate said decision for appeal to the NLRC.
Instead, GTZ opted to assail the decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
promulgated a Resolution dismissing GTZs petition, finding that judicial recourse at this stage of the case is uncalled for, the appropriate remedy of
the petitioners being an appeal to the NLRC. Thus, the present petition for review under Rule 45, assailing the decision and resolutions of the Court
of Appeals and of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE: 1. WON GTZ can invoke State immunity from suit.

HELD: NO, GTZ cannot invoke State immunity from suit even if their activities performed pertaining to SHINE project are government in nature. The
principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states
that the State may not be sued without its consent. In this case, GTZ’s counsel described GTZ as the implementing agency of the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany, however it does not automatically mean that it has the ability to invoke State immunity from suit. They had failed to
adduce evidence, a certification from Department of Foreign Affairs which could have been their factual basis for its claim of immunity. At the same
time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that Philippine
corporations can be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government. The apparent equivalent under
Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine government, or a government-owned or
controlled corporation (GOCC) without original charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that every corporation
incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity to sue and be sued in its corporate name. The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ
consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important barometer for testing
whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time, our Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is
conditional on its withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an instrumentality
or agency invoking immunity remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision, is often conferred by the very same statute or
general law creating the instrumentality or agency
DFA v NLRC

FACTS

On January 27, 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case for his alleged illegal dismissal by Asian Development Bank and the latter's
violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Two summonses were served, one to the ADB and the other through the DFA. Forthwith, the ADB and
the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Office, were covered by an immunity from legal processes
except for borrowing, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") and
the Agreement Between the Bank and the Government of the Philippines regarding the Banker's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement).
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not
appeal the decision. Instead, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void jugdgment".

ISSUES

1. Whether the ADB is correct in invoking its immunity from suit

2. Whether the ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

3. Whether the DFA has the legal standing

RULING

1. Yes. The stipulations of both the Charter and the Headquarter's Agreement establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and
guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The
Bank's officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The granting of these immunities
and privileges are treaty covenants ans commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government. Being an international organization that
has been extended diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.

2. No. The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which
a waiver of immunity would not attack.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when
challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be
allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help to keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the
international community.
Lasco vs UNRFNRE

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for
NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint
project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal
dismissal and damages.Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed diplomatic
immunity.

Issue:WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the
SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which thespecialized agencyisa party.´ Private respondent is not engaged
in a commercial venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine Government and theUnited
Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland

WHO v Aquino

Facts:

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects,
contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the
crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge
Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal
baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended.
The Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the
Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law
officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search
warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer
acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of
the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the
search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health Organization vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-
35131, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)
ICMC v Calleja

FACTS:

ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work.
It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to
those of the International Committee for Migrtion (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for
Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by the ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it enjoys
diplomatic immunity.

On Februaury 5, 1987 Med – Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med – Arbiter’s Decisionand ordered the immediate conduct of a
certification election.

This present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.

HELD:

The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for Certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order
earlier issued is made PERMANENT.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence,
in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the
political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

BASIS:

Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status “similar to that
of a specialized agency.”
Article III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from
every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no
waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
Lacierda v Platon

Petitioners Rodrigo Lacierda, Erlinda Cruz-Lacierda, Jessica and Renan Saliente, Ruby Salde and Armniel Sim (Lacierda, et al.) were all
employees/officers of Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), an international agency which is immune from suits, it being
clothed with diplomatic immunity. Meanwhile, respondents Rolando Platon, Agnes Lacuesta, Dan Baliao, Amelita Subosa, Merlita Junion, Teresita
Hilado, Demetrio Estenor, Salvador Rex Tillo, Teresita Natividad, Teresa Mallare, Jocelyn Coniza and Nelda Ebron (Platon, et al.) are officers and
with the management of SEAFDEC, Aqua Culture Development (AQC), an international organization composed of governments of Southeast Asia
created by virtue of a treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory.

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and SEAFDEC entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where the former has found the
Department of Agriculture (DA) through SEAFDEC to be qualified in providing the necessary services and in implementing JICA‘s Third Country
Training Programme on Responsible Aquaculture Development (training program). Regarding the liquidation, such shall be made by submitting a
statement of expenditures containing the itemized breakdown of all expenses incurred, attaching therewith all copies of supporting documents and
evidences and receipts certifying the said expenditures (original copies will be kept by SEAFDEC). In case there will be an excess in the amount
consigned, the excess amount will be returned to JICA.

Lacierda, et al. were selected by SEAFDEC to take part in the training program. After such was concluded, Lacierda, et al. submitted to SEAFDEC
documents in support of their liquidation of cash advances and claim for reimbursement of expenses but an audit of the same showed that “hotel
receipts submitted were much higher that the actual amount that they paid on accommodation.” Thus, Lacierda, et al. were terminated for cause
―on the ground of misrepresentation or false statements with intent to gain or take advantage and fraudulent machination for financial gain.

More than a year later, Lacierda, et al. filed a complaint against Platon, et al. alleging that they are suing them in their individual and personal
capacities for their commission of malicious, oppressive and inequitable actionable acts. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and the person of Platon, et al., it holding that assailed acts could only be performed
by them in their official functions as administrators of SEAFDEC. Also, Lacierda, et al. prayed to be restored and returned to their respective
work/positions in SEAFDEC; to be given the salaries, benefits and other privileges; to be awarded actual damages by reason of the deprivation of
the salaries and benefits they should have received; and to be paid moral damages. Such allegations and reliefs clearly indicate that their cause/s of
action arose out of employer-employee relationship which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and not the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Lacierda, et al.‘s complaint

HELD:

A court cannot be divested of jurisdiction by the ingenuous omission by a plaintiff of any reference to a matter which clearly shows that said court
has jurisdiction, nor can a court be conferred with jurisdiction where it has none by a contrived wording by a plaintiff‘s allegations in the complaint
in order to impress that it is within said court‘s jurisdiction.

Lacierda, et al.‘s primary prayer — for the Platon, et al. to be ordered “to restore and return Lacierda, et al. to their respective work/positions in
SEAFDEC and to all the salaries, benefits and other privileges appurtenent thereto without loss of seniority, diminution of ranks or pay to continue
during the pendency of this case,” betrays their cause of action, however. If Platon, et al. were sued in their personal capacity as emphatically
stressed by Lacierda, et al., for tort and damages, they would under no circumstance, power or authority be able to carry out such primary prayer.