Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges| G.R. No. 156109 | November 18, 2004 | J.

Panganiban

Petitioner: Khristine Regino assisted and represented by Armando Regino

Respondent: Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, Rachelle Gamurot, Elissa Baladlad
Topic: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Summary: Khristine Regino was prevented from taking two of her final exams when she refused to buy
two party tickets for PCST’s fundraising. The filed in the RTC for damages. The Court ruled that the
doctrine of administrative remedies is inapplicable at the case at bar. First, petitioner was correct in
claiming that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no application where a
student is not asking for the reversal of the policies of an educational institution nor demanding that
she be allowed to take the final examinations that she was prevented from taking but is praying for
damages. Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on
the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of Administrative agencies are
not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. And
third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal
and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner’s action for damages inevitably calls for
the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of
the courts

FACTS:

 Khristine was a first year computer science student at Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology (PCST)
 February 2002: PCST held a fundraising campaign dubbed as the Rave Party and Dance
Revolution, the proceeds of which where to go to the construction of the school’s tennis and
volleyball courts:
o Each student was required to pay two tickets, P100 each. Students who purchased
tickets with additional points in their test scores, and those who refused were denied
the opportunity to take their final examinations
 Khristine refused to pay for the tickets because she and her family were financially challenged
and her religion prohibited her from attending dance parties and celebrations
 Respondents Gamurot and Baladad, her teachers in logic and statistics, respectively, disallowed
her from taking her exams.
 Khristine filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for Damages against PCST, Gamurot, and
Baladad
 Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss: petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Jurisidiction should have been with CHED because the question raised involved a determination
of the wisdom of the policy of PCST
 RTC: dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It was CHED, and not the courts, that
had jurisdiction over the controversy
 Khristine filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45
WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable—NO

1. Petitioner was correct in claiming that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
has no application where a student is not asking for the reversal of the policies of an
educational institution nor demanding that she be allowed to take the final examinations that
she was prevented from taking but is praying for damages.
a. Factoran, Jr. v. CA: “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic.
Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless
the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.”
b. In the case at bar, Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither
is she demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled
in another educational institution.
2. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of
the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of Administrative agencies are not
courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals
a. In the case at bar, CHED does not have the power to award CHED does not have the
power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before
the Commission.
3. Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is
purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner’s action for damages
inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls
within the jurisdiction of the courts

WON the complaint stated sufficient cause/s of action—YES, there were two causes of action, first,
breach of contract, second, liability for tort

1. The first cause of action was for breach of contract

a. It was already ruled in Alcuaz v. PSBA and Non v. Danes II, that a contractual relationship
subsists between the school and the student. This relationship gives rise to bilateral or
reciprocal rights and obligations
b. Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set
academic standards, completion of academic requirements and observance of school
rules and regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing their “completion”
of the course enrolled in.
c. In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue raising measure belatedly, in the
middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students’
taking the final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a
course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at
the start of the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice
of the enrollees.
2. Second cause of action is based on liability for tort
 a. An academic institution may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with
its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort
b. The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and
“demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of
the Civil Code
c. In the case at bar, she was made to sit out her logic class while her classmates took the
exam, and in her statistics class, Baladad announced to the whole class that she wasn’t
allowing petitioner and another student to take their exams, and then ejected them
from the classroom.

WON academic freedom justifies PCST’s acts—NO

1. In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to “academic freedom.” We are not
impressed. According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what
may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study
2. The Court has emphasized that once a school has, in the name of academic freedom, set its
standards, these should be meticulously observed and should not be used to discriminate
against certain students After accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot renege on its
contractual obligation on grounds other than those made known to, and accepted by, students
at the start of the school year.

Disposition: The petition is granted.