EN BANC

G.R. No. 188056               January 8, 2013

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom
Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies
(Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement"
that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for
the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for
syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Davao City on February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket No.
XI-02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and Docket No. XI-02-
INV.-09-C-00753.1

On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order
No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors,
and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to
the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.

DO No. 182 reads:2

All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy Group of Companies,
may be filed with the docket section of the National Prosecution Service, Department of
Justice, Padre Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel
for assignment and distribution to panel members, per Department Order No. 84 dated
February 13, 2009.

However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et al. of Legacy group of
Companies in your respective offices with the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de
Oro City which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should be forwarded to
the Secretariat of the Special Panel at Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura,
Manila, for proper disposition.

For information and guidance.

Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ. 3

Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice
grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated
their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to
the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice
and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated

March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for
syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated
their right to equal protection under the Constitution.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice,
maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and
prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.

Issues

The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:

1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Court?

2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing

DO No. 182?

3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate
petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights?

Ruling

The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and
merit, is dismissed.

Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to
the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering
therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.4 An undue disregard of this policy against
direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v.
Concepcion,5 we explained why, to wit:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now
affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness
of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also
well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal
with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to
it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist
to justify an exception to the policy. This was why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v.
Suelto:

x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to

satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary
writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or
other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is
and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe. (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict adherence to the
policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing tendency on the part of litigants
and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and
sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by
the highest tribunal of the land," the Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against
taking a direct resort to the highest tribunal, viz:

x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any
part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking
any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra— resulting from the deletion of
the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended
precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the
extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding
jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.1âwphi1

xxxx

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and
evidence of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will
require a more strict observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum
from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is
a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the
petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever
be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly
defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court,

the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.6

Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was
permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.

The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.7 "The sole office of the writ of certiorari," according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company:8

x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of
discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must
be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must
concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.9 The burden of proof lies on petitioners to
demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they
merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would
appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned
issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in
the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group.
The function involved was purely executive or administrative.

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it
a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews
the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed,
in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,10 the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:

x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or

innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is
the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. 11

There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor’s
power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this
characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial
body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court
of law.

But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly
endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of
law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and
adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the
same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever
a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in
order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or
whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.

Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However, we do not
see how that can be. They have not shown in their petition in what manner and at what
point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we already indicated why the issuances were not
infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition
transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a) Similarly, the petition could not be one for
mandamus, which is a remedy available only when "any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court."12 The main objective
of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the
respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the
exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us,
was what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor. Consequently,
their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed
issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they
were unquestionably entitled.

Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its
validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima,14 the Court has extended the
presumption of validity to legislative issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued
by administrative agencies, saying:

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret

the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as
binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of
Justice had promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate of the DOJ to
"administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes
thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and
Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive
Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became

incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by
showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice
to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must
further show that the performance of the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative Code
of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid down by the assailed
issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in any
degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them by the
Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like
them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the
wrong through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution
attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation
and prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or
oppressively against petitioners.

Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in DO No. 182
of the cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City,
claiming that the exemption traversed the constitutional guaranty in their favor of the
equal protection of law.17

The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, to
wit:

It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for syndicated estafa were filed
with your office against officers of the Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the
distance of the place of complainants therein to Manila, your Office is hereby exempted
from the directive previously issued by the undersigned requiring prosecution offices to
forward the records of all cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the Task Force.

Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary investigation of all
cases involving the Legacy Group of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to
file the corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to prosecute the same in
court.
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification.18 Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long
as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.19

That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009,
the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro,
where many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the
preliminary investigations would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into
account that the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan
de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of
complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified
in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182.
The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid.
Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the
ground that the non-application of the exemption to them would cause them some
inconvenience.

Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy disposition
of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there would be considerable
delay in the resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a flagrant transgression of
petitioners’ constitutional rights to speedy disposition of their cases."20

We cannot favor their contention.

In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that although the Constitution
guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a
flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken into account. There occurs a violation
of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are sought and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.22 It is cogent to mention
that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of the
concept.23

The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to
obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them.
Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during
the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of
the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources
and of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.

On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more cases
reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and other parties.
Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and subsequent cases
should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The Constitution prohibits only the
delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights
nugatory.24 In fine, we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right of
petitioners to the speedy disposition of their cases.

Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases
against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated. They maintain that
DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with
retroactive effect.

Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and
one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a
remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create
new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or
the confirmation of already existing rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the procedure of
the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.

Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted
obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.

Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to
assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the
prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of
Justice exercises control and supervision over all the regional, provincial, and city
prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions;
and administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating rules and
regulations to carry out their objectives, policies and functions.

Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds of his
authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any person or entity who may
feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right to call for the
invalidation or nullification of the rules and regulations issued by, as well as other actions
taken by the Secretary of Justice.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus for lack of merit.

Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195032               February 20, 2013

ISABELO A. BRAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBA Y AN (1st Division), Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Isabelo Braza (Braza) seeking to

reverse and set aside the October 12, 2009 Resolution 1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275, entitled People v. Robert G. Lala, et al., as well as its
October 22, 2010 Resolution,2 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for the 12th Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Summit scheduled in December 2006. In preparation for
this international diplomatic event with the province of Cebu as the designated venue, the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) identified projects relative to the
improvement and rehabilitation of roads and installation of traffic safety devices and
lighting facilities. The then Acting Secretary of the DPWH, Hermogenes E. Ebdane,
approved the resort to alternative modes of procurement for the implementation of these
projects due to the proximity of the ASEAN Summit.

One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to be undertaken was the installation of

street lighting systems along the perimeters of the Cebu International Convention Center
in Mandaue City and the ceremonial routes of the Summit to upgrade the appearance of
the convention areas and to improve night-time visibility for security purposes. Four (4)
out of eleven (11) street lighting projects were awarded to FABMIK Construction and
Equipment Supply Company, Inc. (FABMIK) and these were covered by Contract I.D.
Nos. 06H0021, 06H00049, 06H00050, and 06H00052. Contract I.D. No. 06H00050, the
subject transaction of this case, involved the supply and installation of street lighting
facilities along the stretch of Mandaue-Mactan Bridge 1 to Punta Engaño Section in
Lapu-Lapu City, with an estimated project cost of ₱83,950,000.00.

With the exception of the street lighting project covered by Contract I.D. No. 06H0021,
the three other projects were bidded out only on November 28, 2006 or less than two (2)
weeks before the scheduled start of the Summit. Thereafter, the DPWH and FABMIK
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby FABMIK obliged itself to
implement the projects at its own expense and the DPWH to guarantee the payment of
the work accomplished. FABMIK was able to complete the projects within the deadline
of ten (10) days utilizing its own resources and credit facilities. The schedule of the
international event, however, was moved by the national organizers to January 9-15,
2007 due to typhoon Seniang which struck Cebu for several days.

After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and
Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Ombudsman –Visayas, alleging that the
ASEAN Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. A panel composing of three
investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation to determine the veracity of the
accusation. Braza, being the president of FABMIK, was impleaded as one of the
respondents. On March 16, 2007, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) and the DPWH to cease and desist from releasing or disbursing
funds for the projects in question.3

On March 23, 2007, the fact-finding body issued its Evaluation Report4 recommending
the filing of charges for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, against the DPWH officials
and employees in Region VII and the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu, and private
contractors FABMIK and GAMPIK Construction and Development, Inc. (GAMPIK).
This report was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMBVisayas) for the
conduct of a preliminary investigation and was docketed therein as OMB-V-C-07-124-C,
entitled PACPO-OMB-Visayas v. Lala, et. al.

After the preliminary investigation, the OMB-Visayas issued its Resolution,5 dated

January 24, 2008, finding probable cause to indict the concerned respondents for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. It was found that the lampposts and other
lighting facilities installed were indeed highly overpriced after a comparison of the costs
of the materials indicated in the Program of Works and Estimates (POWE) with those in
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) documents; and that the contracts entered into between the
government officials and the private contractors were manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.

Subsequently, the OMB-Visayas filed several informations before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019 against the officials of DPWH Region VII, the
officials of the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu and private contractors, FABMIK
President Braza and GAMPIK Board Chairman Gerardo S. Surla (Surla). The
Information docketed as SB-08- CRM-02756 (first information) which involved the street
lighting project covered by Contract I.D. No. 06H00050 with FABMIK, was raffled to
the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. It was alleged therein that Braza acted in
conspiracy with the public officials and employees in the commission of the crime
charged.

On June 6, 2008, Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to travel

abroad. He entered a plea of "not guilty."

On August 14, 2008, the motions for reinvestigation filed by Arturo

Radaza (Radaza), the Mayor of Lapu-lapu City, and the DPWH officials were denied by
the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit. Consequently, they moved for the reconsideration of
said resolution.7 On August 27, 2008, Braza filed a motion for reinvestigation8 anchored
on the following grounds: (1) the import documents relied upon by the OMB-Visayas
were spurious and falsified; (2) constituted new evidence, if considered, would overturn
the finding of probable cause; and (3) the finding of overpricing was bereft of factual and
legal basis as the same was not substantiated by any independent canvass of prevailing
market prices of the subject lampposts. He prayed for the suspension of the proceedings
of the case pending such reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan treated Braza's motion as
his motion for reconsideration of its August 14, 2008 Resolution.

On November 13, 2008, Braza filed a manifestation9 to make of record that he was
maintaining his previous plea of "not guilty" without any condition.

During the proceedings held on November 3, 2008, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its
August 14, 2008 resolution and directed a reinvestigation of the case.10 According to the
anti-graft court, the allegations to the effect that no independent canvass was conducted
and that the charge of overpricing was based on falsified documents were serious reasons
enough to merit a reinvestigation of the case. The Sandiganbayan said that it could be
reasonably inferred from the July 30, 2008 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-V-C-07-
0124-C that the latter would not object to the conduct of a reinvestigation of all the cases
against the accused.

Braza filed his Manifestation,11 dated February 2, 2009, informing the Sandiganbayan of

his intention to abandon his previous motion for reinvestigation. He opined that the
prosecution would merely use the reinvestigation proceedings as a means to engage in a
second unbridled fishing expedition to cure the lack of probable cause.

On March 23, 2009, Braza filed a motion12 in support of the abandonment of

reinvestigation with a plea to vacate Information, insisting that the further reinvestigation
of the case would only afford the prosecution a second round of preliminary investigation
which would be vexatious, oppressive and violative of his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of his case, warranting its dismissal with prejudice.

After concluding its reinvestigation of the case, the OMB-Visayas issued its
Resolution,13 dated May 4, 2009, (Supplemental Resolution) which upheld the finding of
probable cause but modified the charge from violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 301914 to
violation of Sec. 3(e)15 of the same law. Accordingly, the prosecution filed its
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information16 on May 8, 2009.

On July 1, 2009, Braza filed his Comment (to the motion to admit amended information)
with Plea for Discharge and/or Dismissal of the Case.17 He claimed that the first
information had been rendered ineffective or had been deemed vacated by the issuance of
the Supplemental Resolution and, hence, his discharge from the first information was in
order. By way of an alternative prayer, Braza sought the dismissal of the case with
prejudice claiming that his right to a speedy disposition of the case had been violated and
that the Supplemental Resolution failed to cure the fatal infirmities of the January 24,
2008 Resolution since proof to support the allegation of overpricing remained wanting.
Braza averred that he could not be arraigned under the second information without
violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

On October 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution admitting the
Amended Information,18 dated May 4, 2009, (second Information) and denying Braza's
plea for dismissal of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not be
placed in double jeopardy should he be arraigned anew under the second information
because his previous arraignment was conditional. It continued that even if he was
regularly arraigned, double jeopardy would still not set in because the second information
charged an offense different from, and which did not include or was necessarily included
in, the original offense charged. Lastly, it found that the delay in the reinvestigation
proceedings could not be characterized as vexatious, capricious or oppressive and that it
could not be attributed to the prosecution. The dispositive portion of the said resolution
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Admit Attached Amended

Information filed by the prosecution is hereby GRANTED. The Amended Information
charging all the accused therein with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, being the
proper offense, is hereby ADMITTED.

Consequently, accused Braza's Alternative Relief for Dismissal of the Case is

hereby DENIED.

Let the arraignment of all the accused in the Amended Information be set on November
18, 2009, at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.19

On November 6, 2009, Braza moved for reconsideration with alternative motion to quash
the information20 reiterating his arguments that his right against double jeopardy and his
right to a speedy disposition of the case were violated warranting the dismissal of the
criminal case with prejudice. In the alternative, Braza moved for the quashal of the
second information vigorously asserting that the same was fatally defective for failure to
allege any actual, specified and quantifiable injury sustained by the government as
required by law for indictment under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and that the charge of
overpricing was unfounded.

On October 22, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution stating,
among others, the denial of Braza's Motion to Quash the information. The anti-graft court
ruled that the Amended Information was sufficient in substance as to inform the accused
of the nature and causes of accusations against them. Further, it held that the specifics
sought to be alleged in the Amended Information were evidentiary in nature which could
be properly presented during the trial on the merits. The Sandiganbayan also stated that it
was possible to establish the fact of overpricing if it would be proven that the contract
price was excessive compared to the price for which FABMIK purchased the street
lighting facilities from its supplier. Braza was effectively discharged from the first
Information upon the filing of the second Information but said discharge was without
prejudice to, and would not preclude, his prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. It added that his right to speedy disposition of the case was not violated
inasmuch as the length of time spent for the proceedings was in compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process. The Sandiganbayan, however, deemed it proper
that a new preliminary investigation be conducted under the new charge. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan disposed:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the separate omnibus motions of
accused-movant Radaza and accused-movants Bernido, Manggis and Ojeda, insofar as
the sought preliminary investigation is concerned is GRANTED.

Accordingly, this case is hereby remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman/Special

Prosecutor for preliminary investigation of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The said
office/s are hereby ordered to complete the said preliminary investigation and to submit
to the Court the result of the said investigation within sixty (60) days from notice.

However, the Motion for Bill of Particulars of accusedmovants Lala, Dindin Alvizo,
Fernandez, Bagolor, Galang and Diano, the Motion for Quashal of Information of
accused-movants Bernido, Manggis and Ojeda, and accused-movant Braza's Motion to
Quash, are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.21
 ISSUES

Undaunted, Braza filed this petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on
the Sandiganbayan for issuing the Resolutions, dated October 12, 2009 and October 22,
2010, respectively. Braza raised the following issues:

A) The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the

withdrawal of the Information in violation of the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy, the petitioner having entered a valid plea and
vigorously objected to any further conduct of reinvestigation and amendment
of Information.

B) The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the

withdrawal and amendment of the Information without prejudice, the
proceedings being fraught with flip-flopping, prolonged and vexatious
determination of probable cause, thereby violating petitioner's constitutional
right to speedy disposition of his case, warranting his discharge with
prejudice regardless of the nature of his previous arraignment.

C) The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the

motion to quash Amended Information, there being no allegation of actual,
specified, or quantifiable injury sustained by the government as required by
law (in cases involving Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019) with the Reinvestigation Report
itself admitting on record that the government has not paid a single centavo
for the fully-implemented project.

D) The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the

new indictment under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 without threshing out the fatal
infirmities that hounded the previous finding of overpricing – the erroneous
reliance on spurious import documents and lack of price canvass to establish
prevailing market price – thereby rendering the new Resolution fatally
defective.22

Essentially, Braza posits that double jeopardy has already set in on the basis of his "not
guilty" plea in the first Information and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted under the
second Information. He claims that his arraignment was unconditional because the
conditions in the plea were ineffective for not being unmistakable and categorical. He
theorizes that the waiver of his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy was not
absolute as the same was qualified by the phrase "as a result of the pending incidents." He
argues that even granting that his arraignment was indeed conditional, the same had
become simple and regular when he validated and confirmed his plea of "not guilty" by
means of a written manifestation which removed any further condition attached to his
previous plea.
Braza submits that the prolonged, vexatious and flip-flopping determination of probable
cause violated his right to a speedy disposition of the case which would justify the
dismissal of the case with prejudice. Further, he assails the sufficiency of the allegation of
facts in the second Information for failure to assert any actual and quantifiable injury
suffered by the government in relation to the subject transaction. He points out that the
admission in the Reinvestigation Report to the effect that the government had not paid a
single centavo to FABMIK for the fully implemented project, had rendered as invalid,
baseless and frivolous any indictment or prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019. Braza insists that the Supplemental Resolution of the OMB-Visayas was fatally
defective considering that the Ombudsman did not conduct an independent price canvass
of the prevailing market price of the subject lampposts and merely relied on the spurious
and false BOC documents to support its conclusion of overpricing.

By way of comment,23 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) retorts that the

withdrawal of the first information and the subsequent filing of the second information
did not place Braza in double jeopardy or violate his right to speedy disposition of the
case. The OSP reasons that Braza waived his right to invoke double jeopardy when he
agreed to be conditionally arraigned. It further argues that even granting that the
arraignment was unconditional, still double jeopardy would not lie because the charge of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the second information is a different offense
with different elements from that of the charge of violation of Sec. 3(g) in the first
Information. The OSP posits that his right to a speedy disposition of the case was not
violated as the delay in the proceedings cannot be considered as oppressive, vexatious or
capricious. According to the OSP, such delay was precipitated by the many pleadings
filed by the accused, including Braza, and was in fact incurred to give all the accused the
opportunities to dispute the accusation against them in the interest of fairness and due
process.

The OSP also submits that proof of the actual injury suffered by the government and that
of overpricing, are superfluous and immaterial for the determination of probable cause
because the alleged mode for committing the offense charged in the second Information
was by giving any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The
second Information sufficiently alleges all the elements of the offense for which the
accused were indicted.

The Court’s Ruling

Simply put, the pivotal issue in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying Braza's plea for the dismissal of Case No. SB-08-CRM-
0275 and his subsequent motion to quash the second Information, particularly on the
grounds of double jeopardy, violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case, and
failure of the Information to state every single fact to constitute all the elements of the
offense charged.
The petition is devoid of merit.

It is Braza’s stance that his constitutional right under the double jeopardy clause bars
further proceedings in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. He asserts that his arraignment under
the first information was simple and unconditional and, thus, an arraignment under the
second information would put him in double jeopardy.

The Court is not persuaded. His argument cannot stand scrutiny.

The June 6, 2008 Order24 of the Sandiganbayan reads:

This morning, accused Isabelo A. Braza was summoned to arraignment as a

precondition in authorizing his travel. The arraignment of the accused
was conditional in the sense that if the present Information will be amended as a
result of the pending incidents herein, he cannot invoke his right against double
jeopardy and he shall submit himself to arraignment anew under such Amended
Information. On the other hand, his conditional arraignment shall not prejudice his right
to question such Amended Information, if one shall be filed. These conditions were
thoroughly explained to the accused and his counsel. After consultation with his counsel,
the accused willingly submitted himself to such conditional arraignment.

Thereafter, the accused, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned by reading the
Information to him in English, a language understood by him. Thereafter, he pleaded Not
Guilty to the charge against him. [Emphases supplied]

While it is true that the practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or

"conditional" arraignment of the accused is not specifically sanctioned by the Revised
Internal Rules of the Procedure of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of
Procedure, this Court had tangentially recognized such practice in People v.
Espinosa,25 provided that the alleged conditions attached to the arraignment should be
"unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The Court further required that the
conditions must be expressly stated in the order disposing of arraignment, otherwise, it
should be deemed simple and unconditional.26

A careful perusal of the record in the case at bench would reveal that the arraignment of
Braza under the first information was conditional in nature as it was a mere
accommodation in his favor to enable him to travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan
losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia in case he would abscond. The
Sandiganbayan's June 6, 2008 Order clearly and unequivocally states that the conditions
for Braza's arraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the Information would
be amended, he shall waive his constitutional right to be protected against double
jeopardy and shall allow himself to be arraigned on the amended information without
losing his right to question the same. It appeared that these conditions were duly
explained to Braza and his lawyer by the anti-graft court. He was afforded time to confer
and consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he voluntarily submitted himself to such conditional
arraignment and entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense of violation of Sec. 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019.

Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke double jeopardy had been convincingly
laid out. Such waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent. It may not be amiss to state
that on the day of said arraignment, one of the incidents pending for the consideration of
the Sandiganbayan was an omnibus motion for determination of probable cause and for
quashal of information or for reinvestigation filed by accused Radaza. Accordingly, there
was a real possibility that the first information would be amended if said motion was
granted. Although the omnibus motion was initially denied, it was subsequently granted
upon motion for reconsideration, and a reinvestigation was ordered to be conducted in the
criminal case.

Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional arraignment and its legal
consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to
conveniently avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second
information. Besides, in consonance with the ruling in Cabo v. Sandiganbayan,27 this
Court cannot now allow Braza to renege and turn his back on the above conditions on the
mere pretext that he affirmed his conditional arraignment through a pleading
denominated as Manifestation filed before the Sandiganbayan on November 13, 2008.
After all, there is no showing that the anti-graft court had acted on, much less noted, his
written manifestation.

Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that there was a valid and unconditional plea, Braza
cannot plausibly rely on the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment under the
second information because the offense charged therein is different and not included in
the offense charged under the first information. The right against double jeopardy is
enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution, which reads:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.

This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule

11728 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double
jeopardy, the accused has the burden of demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the
first.29 As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment, (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.30 The test for the third element is
whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a
frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first information.

Braza, however, contends that double jeopardy would still attach even if the first
information charged an offense different from that charged in the second information
since both charges arose from the same transaction or set of facts. Relying on the
antiquated ruling of People v. Del Carmen,31 Braza claims that an accused should be
shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act.

It appears that Braza has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether aware, of the ruling
in Suero v. People32 where it was held that the same criminal act may give rise to two or
more separate and distinct offenses; and that no double jeopardy attaches as long as there
is variance between the elements of the two offenses charged. The doctrine of double
jeopardy is a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused from the risk
of being prosecuted twice for the same offense, and not a different one.

There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another and
different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts.33 Prosecution for the
same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that the two charges stemmed from the same
transaction. A comparison of the elements of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and
those of violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law, however, will disclose that there is neither
identity nor exclusive inclusion between the two offenses. For conviction of violation of
Sec. 3(g), the prosecution must establish the following elements:

1. The offender is a public officer;

2. He entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; and

3. The contract or transaction is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the

government.34

On the other hand, an accused may be held criminally liable of violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, provided that the following elements are present:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or

official functions;

2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
 3. His action caused undue injury to any party, including the government or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his functions.35

Although violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same
law share a common element, the accused being a public officer, the latter is not inclusive
of the former. The essential elements of each are not included among or do not form part
of those enumerated in the other. For double jeopardy to exist, the elements of one
offense should ideally encompass or include those of the other. What the rule on double
jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two offenses.36

Next, Braza contends that the long delay that characterized the proceedings for the
determination of probable cause has resulted in the transgression of his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of the case. According to him, the proceedings have
unquestionably been marred with vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay meriting the
dismissal of Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. Braza claims that it took the OMB more than
two (2) years to charge him and his co-accused with violation of Section 3(e) in the
second information.

The petitioner's contention is untenable.

Section 16, Article III of the Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "[A]ll
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." The right to a speedy disposition of a case is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.37 The constitutional guarantee to a speedy
disposition of cases is a relative or flexible concept.38 It is consistent with delays and
depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.39

In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan,40 the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine

whether the right to a speedy disposition has been violated, as follows:

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning

of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination
of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced
are as follows: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Using the foregoing yardstick, the Court finds that Braza’s right to speedy disposition of
the case has not been infringed.

Record shows that the complaint against Braza and twenty-three (23) other respondents
was filed in January 2007 before the PACPO-Visayas. After the extensive inquiries and
data-gathering, the PACPO-Visayas came out with an evaluation report on March 23,
2007 concluding that the installed lampposts and lighting facilities were highly
overpriced.41 PACPO-Visayas recommended that the respondents be charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Thereafter, the investigatory process was set
in motion before the OMB-Visayas where the respondents filed their respective counter-
affidavits and submitted voluminous documentary evidence to refute the allegations
against them. Owing to the fact that the controversy involved several transactions and
varying modes of participation by the 24 respondents and that their respective
responsibilities had to be established, the OMB-Visayas resolved the complaint only on
January 24, 2008 with the recommendation that the respondents be indicted for violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The Court notes that Braza never decried the time spent for
the preliminary investigation. There was no showing either that there were unreasonable
delays in the proceedings or that the case was kept in idle slumber.

After the filing of the information, the succeeding events appeared to be part of a valid
and regular course of the judicial proceedings not attended by capricious, oppressive and
vexatious delays. On November 3, 2008, Sandiganbayan ordered the reinvestigation of
the case upon motion of accused Radaza, petitioner Braza and other accused DPWH
officials. In the course of the reinvestigation, the OMB-Visayas furnished the respondents
with the additional documents/papers it secured, especially the Commission on Audit
Report, for their verification, comment and submission of countervailing
evidence.42 Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas issued its Supplemental Resolution, dated May
4, 2009, finding probable cause against the accused for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019.

Indeed, the delay can hardly be considered as "vexatious, capricious and oppressive." The
complexity of the factual and legal issues, the number of persons charged, the various
pleadings filed, and the volume of documents submitted, prevent this Court from yielding
to the petitioner’s claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
Rather, it appears that Braza and the other accused were merely afforded sufficient
opportunities to ventilate their respective defenses in the interest of justice, due process
and fair investigation. The re-investigation may have inadvertently contributed to the
further delay of the proceedings but this process cannot be dispensed with because it was
done for the protection of the rights of the accused. Albeit the conduct of investigation
may hold back the progress of the case, the same was essential so that the rights of the
accused will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency. 43 The bare
allegation that it took the OMB more than two (2) years to terminate the investigation and
file the necessary information would not suffice.44 As earlier stated, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time spent for the investigation is not a sufficient basis to conclude that
there was arbitrary and inordinate delay.

The delay in the determination of probable cause in this case should not be cause for an
unfettered abdication by the anti-graft court of its duty to try and determine the
controversy in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. The protection under the right to a speedy
disposition of cases should not operate to deprive the government of its inherent
prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases.

Finally, Braza challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the second information
because there is no indication of any actual and quantifiable injury suffered by the
government. He then argues that the facts under the second information are inadequate to
support a valid indictment for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The petitioner's simple syllogism must fail.

Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 states:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers – In addition to acts or omission of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

In a catena of cases, this Court has held that there are two (2) ways by which a public
official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions,
namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.45 The accused
may be charged under either mode or under both.1âwphi1 The disjunctive term "or"
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. 46 In
other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.

It must be emphasized that Braza was indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 under the second mode. "To be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that
the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his
official, administrative and judicial functions."47 The element of damage is not required
for violation of Section 3(e) under the second mode.48
In the case at bench, the second information alleged, in substance, that accused public
officers and employees, discharging official or administrative function, together with
Braza, confederated and conspired to give F ABMIK unwarranted benefit or preference
by awarding to it Contract I.D. No. 06H00050 through manifest partiality or evident bad
faith, without the conduct of a public bidding and compliance with the requirement for
qualification contrary to the provisions of R.A. No. 9184 or the Government Procurement
Reform Act. Settled is the rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with
public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 3 019.49 Considering that all the elements of the offense of
violation of Sec. 3(e) were alleged in the second information, the Court finds the same to
be sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction.

At any rate, the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature
and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits.50 It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the issue right at the outset without the
benefit of a full-blown trial. This issue requires a fuller ventilation and examination.

All told, this Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, much less did it gravely err, in
denying Braza's motion to quash the information/dismiss Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275.
This ruling, however, is without prejudice to the actual merits of this criminal case as
may be shown during the trial before the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan is

hereby DIRECTED to dispose of Case No. SB-08-CRM- 0275 with reasonable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC               July 9, 2013

RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL TO DECIDE

CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING
MOTIONS IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27, SAN
FERNANDO, LA UNION.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case originates from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) on March 3 and 4, 2008 in the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, La Union, Branch 27, in view of the disability retirement of Presiding Judge
Antonio A. Carbonell on December 31, 2007.

According to the Audit Team’s Report, Branch 27 had a total caseload of 231 cases,
consisting of 147 criminal cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge Carbonell failed to decide
41 criminal cases (one inherited) and 22 civil cases (four inherited), namely: Criminal
Case Nos. 1183, 4559, 5117, 3532, 3672, 5165, 5007, 5946, 6934, 5763, 7014, 5991,
4724, 6311, 6076, 4789, 6297, 5424, 4928, 6403, 6816, 5635, 5666, 5134, 5865, 6284,
6454, 5394, 6770, 5375, 5356, 7557, 5940, 6311, 6333, 7729, 7111, 6325, 6068, 6517,
and 7766; and Civil Case Nos. 3009, 4564, 4563, 4714, 3647, 4362, 6041, 4798, 4561,
6989, 2882, 6185, 7153, 7163, LRC 2332, SCA 7198, 7310, 3487, 7327, 7331, 7298, and
7323.1

Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed to resolve pending motions or incidents
in four criminal cases and 12 civil cases, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 7559, 6409, 7787,
and 7788; and Civil Case Nos. 4793, LRC 1308, 7064, 4973, SP 2901, SP 2952, AC
1797, 7100, 7152, 7060, SP 2986, and SP 2987.2

In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA recommended to the Court that a fine
of ₱50,000.00 be imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for failing to
promptly decide the cases and to resolve pending motions and incidents. 3

On June 17, 2008, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to furnish Judge Carbonell with a
copy of the Audit Team’s Report, and ordered him to submit his comment on the report
within ten days from notice.4

Not having received the comment from Judge Carbonell despite the lapse of the time
given, the Court resolved on September 21, 2010 to require him to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt.5

Judge Carbonell replied,6 stating that he had incorporated his comment/compliance to the

June 17, 2008 resolution in the letter dated July 17, 2008 (Re: Very Urgent Request for
Release of Disability Retirement Benefits and Money Value of Accrued Leave Credits)
he had sent to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno.7 He remarked that the Court had actually
granted his request for the payment of his disability retirement benefits subject to the
retention of ₱200,000.00 pending resolution of the pending administrative cases against
him.8

In his July 17, 2008 letter to Chief Justice Puno, Judge Carbonell surmised that the Audit
Team might have overlooked the fact that he had inherited some of the undecided cases
from the predecessor judge; that said cases had no transcripts of stenographic notes,
because of which he was impelled to require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda; that the cases would only be considered submitted for decision after the
parties would have filed their respective memoranda; and that he had undergone a
quadruple heart bypass operation in 2005 that had adversely affected his pace in deciding
the cases.

On November 23, 2010, the Court referred Judge Carbonell’s letter to the OCA for
evaluation, report, and recommendation.9

In its Memorandum dated February 2, 2011,10 the OCA reiterated its recommendation to

impose a fine of ₱50,000.00 on Judge Carbonell, noting that he had failed to render any
valid reason for his delay in deciding the cases submitted for decision and in resolving
the pending motions or incidents in other cases. The OCA noted that only five cases
submitted for decision had been inherited; and that the case records did not bear any
requests for extension of time or any directive for the transcription of stenographic notes.
It stressed that heavy caseload would not justify the failure to promptly decide and
resolve cases because he could have simply asked the Court for an extension of time.

The recommendation of the OCA is well-taken, subject to the modification of the penalty
to be imposed.

As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times act with efficiency
and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain
professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding
principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence
that the public have reposed in him and the institution he represents.11

The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of

cases.12 Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith
and confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay.13 Thus, judges have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to
the rule on the speedy disposition of cases and observe the periods prescribed by the
Constitution for deciding cases, which is three months from the filing of the last pleading,
brief or memorandum for lower courts.14 To further impress upon judges such mandate,
the Court has issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15,
1999) that would insure the speedy disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges
to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution.

Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of
circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence,
the Court has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All
that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases,
and the Court has almost invariably granted such request.
Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases and to resolve 16 pending motions or
incidents within the 90-day reglementary period. He intimated that his poor health
affected his pace in deciding the cases. Had such been the case, then he should have
explained his predicament to the Court and asked for an extension of time to decide the
cases. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.

Judge Carbonell claims that some of the inherited cases had no transcripts of
stenographic notes, thereby preventing him from resolving the cases on time. He posits
that a case would not be considered submitted for decision if the parties did not yet file
their respective memoranda.1âwphi1

The Audit Team’s Report shows that, in an apparent attempt to suspend the running of
the 90-day period to decide the cases, Judge Carbonell liberally gave the parties in most
of the overdue cases several extensions of time to file their respective memoranda. Some
extensions were even for indefinite periods, with the parties being simply given "ample
time to file their memo," as the relevant court orders stated.

In view of the foregoing, Judge Carbonell’s excuses are futile in the light of the following
provisions of Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, viz:

(3)

A case is considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of the
parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90) days period for deciding the case
shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in
case the Court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for
decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the expiration of the period to do so,
whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to
interrupt or suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard
by another judge not the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full period
of ninety (90) days from the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the
same.

(4)

The court may grant extension of time to file memoranda, but the ninety (90) day period
for deciding shall not be interrupted thereby.

Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell’s failure to decide several cases within the
reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions,15 like fines. The fines
imposed have varied in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided
within the reglementary period and other factors, including the presence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by the parties from the delay, the
health condition and age of the judge, etc.16 Thus, in one case, the Court mitigated the
liability of a Judge who had been suffering from illnesses and who had later retired due to
disability, and imposed upon him a fine of ₱20,000.00 for failure to decide 31 cases.17

Considering that Judge Carbonell similarly retired due to disability, the Court believes
that his poor health condition greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his
duties as a trial judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason the
Court reduces the recommended penalty of fine from ₱50,000.00 to ₱20,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Retired Judge Antonio A. Carbonell is ORDERED to pay a fine of

₱20,000.00 to be deducted from the ₱200,000.00 that was withheld from his retirement
benefits, and the balance to be immediately released to him.

SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 191411               July 15, 2013

RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 191871

EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G.

AMUGOD, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari1 are the October 6, 20092 and

February 10, 20103 Resolutions of public respondent First Division of Sandiganbayan
(SB), denying the Motion to Quash4 dated July 8, 2009 filed by petitioner Rafael L.
Coscolluela (Coscolluela). The said motion was adopted by petitioners Edwin N.
Nacionales (Nacionales), Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas (Malvas), and Jose Ma. G. Amugod
(Amugod), praying for the dismissal of Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation
of their right to speedy disposition of cases.

The Facts

Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) for three
(3) full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his
Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as
Provincial Health Officer.5

On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of the
Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint6 dated November 7, 2001 from People’s
Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical
and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 which
allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.

Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report7 dated
April 16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against
petitioners.8 Consequently, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits.9

On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares (Cañares)
prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable cause against
petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known
as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and recommended the filing of the
corresponding information. On even date, the Information10 was prepared and signed by
Cañares and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro (Miro) for
recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003.
However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro),
came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the
SB.

Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the
SB.11

On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash,12 arguing, among others, that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges
against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was
instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela’s motion.

In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash13 dated August 7,

2009, explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it
still had to go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also
pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in
the proceedings during the interim.14

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In a Resolution15 dated October 6, 2009, the SB denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash for

lack of merit. It held that the preliminary investigation against petitioners was actually
resolved by Cañares on March 27, 2003, one (1) year and four (4) months from the date
the complaint was filed, or in November 9, 2001. Complying with internal procedure,
Cañares then prepared the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information for the
recommendation of the Miro and eventually, the final approval of the Casimiro. As these
issuances had to undergo careful review and revision through the various levels of the
said office, the period of delay – i.e., from March 27, 2003 to May 21, 2009, or roughly
over six (6) years – cannot be deemed as inordinate16 and as such, petitioners’
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.17

Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration 18 dated

November 9, 2009 and November 6, 2009, similarly arguing that the SB erred in making
a distinction between two time periods, namely: (a) from the filing of the complaint up to
the time Cañares prepared the resolution finding probable cause against petitioners; and
(b) from the submission of the said resolution to the Acting Ombudsman for review and
approval up to the filing of the Information with the SB. In this regard, petitioners
averred that the aforementioned periods should not be compartmentalized and thus,
treated as a single period. Accordingly, the delay of eight (8) years of the instant case
should be deemed prejudicial to their right to speedy disposition of cases.19

The SB, however, denied the foregoing motions in its Resolution20 dated February 10,
2010 for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petitions.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether the SB gravely abused its
discretion in finding that petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are meritorious.

A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which provides:
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings,
either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. 21

It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be
understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved would not be sufficient.22 Jurisprudence dictates that the right is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.23

Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1)
the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.24

Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’ right to a
speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated.

First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted

amount of time to complete.

In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SB’s position that the conduct of
preliminary investigation was terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time when
Cañares prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information. This is
belied by Section 4,

Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the
"Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman," which provides:

SEC. 4. Procedure – The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner
prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
provisions:

xxxx
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no complete resolution of a case
under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer’s
recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint.
Therefore, in the case at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the
petitioners were not terminated upon Cañares’ preparation of the March 27, 2003
Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time Casimiro finally approved the
same for filing with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May
21, 2009, or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.

Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case largely
remains unjustified.

To this end, the Court equally denies the SB’s ratiocination that the delay in proceedings
could be excused by the fact that the case had to undergo careful review and revision
through the different levels in the Office of the Ombudsman before it is finally approved,
in addition to the steady stream of cases which it had to resolve.

Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution,
mandated to be the "protector of the people" and as such, required to "act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, in order to
promote efficient service."25 This great responsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by
ineptitude. Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to
carefully go through the particulars of case but also to resolve the same within the proper
length of time. Its dutiful performance should not only be gauged by the quality of the
assessment but also by the reasonable promptness of its dispensation. Thus, barring any
extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in
the case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal work activity –
any of which have not been adequately proven by the prosecution in the case at bar –
there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not
have earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners.

Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert
their right to speedy disposition of cases.

Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because
they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. They were only
informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the
lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with
the SB on June 19, 2009.26 In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the
proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason
as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Instructive on this point is
the Court’s observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,27 to wit:

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-
going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to
comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a
preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of
being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against
them had already been dismissed.

On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special
or even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its
investigation. Its excuse for the delay — the many layers of review that the case had to
undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail — has lost its novelty and is no
longer appealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does not
involve complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that the
subject computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even
before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the
petitioners’ duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the
Office of the Ombudsman’s responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of
reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged
before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo:28

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the
duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.

Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy
delay in the proceedings against them.

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged
towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to
prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or,
if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may
interpose.30 This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the
passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. In the
context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan31 (Corpuz)
illumined:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the
possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because
the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the
events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is
curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things:
(a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the
ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably
attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked
by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or
prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper
for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the
defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the broader purview of the
entire proceedings of which trial proper is but a stage, the above-discussed effects in
Corpuz should equally apply to the case at bar. As held in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.:32

Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:

"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."

Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of
justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case";
includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords
broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It
is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only
the period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies to
civil, criminal and administrative cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)

Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman’s
resolution of the case as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has
caused, it is undeniable that petitioners’ constitutional right to due process and speedy
disposition of cases had been violated. As the institutional vanguard against corruption
and bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of accountability
in order to ensure that cases before it are resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally
expose those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case.

Corollarily, for the SB’s patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence
surrounding the matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied
the quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set aside and the
criminal case against petitioners be dismissed.

While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the acquittal of
the petitioners, it does not necessarily follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from
any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case which the
Province may opt to pursue.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case
does not bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on
the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.33 As explained in the case of
Abejuela v. People,34 citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:35

The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to
the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law
against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered."
 xxxx

In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., we declared:

"While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to

civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
whether or not the same be punishable by law."(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Based on the violation of petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases as herein

discussed, the present case stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution or
the defense has been given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the Court is unable
to make a definite pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed committed the acts or
omissions from which any civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed under
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.36 Consequently, absent this pronouncement,
the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on the delict
if only to recover the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to
petitioners’ alleged malfeasance.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS
Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of the Constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases of petitioners Rafael L. Coscolluela, Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr.
Ernesto P. Malvas, and Jose Ma. G. Amugod, without prejudice to any civil action which
the Province of Negros Occidental may file against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188165               December 11, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION & THIRD DIVISION, HERNANDO
BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO and ERNEST
ESCALER, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 189063

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION, HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ,
ROSARIO SALVADOR PEREZ, ERNEST DE LEON ESCALER and RAMON
CASTILLO ARCEO, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The guarantee of the speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the
Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies. Thus, the fact-finding investigation should not be deemed separate
from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman if the
aggregate time spent for both constitutes inordinate and oppressive delay in the
disposition of any case.

The Case

The Court resolves the petitions for certiorari the State instituted to assail and nullify, in
G.R. No. 188165, the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0265
entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest
Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended; and, in G.R. No. 189063, the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of SB-08-CRM- 0266
entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest
Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, of
the Revised Penal Code.

Common Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On November 12, 2002, Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama of Bulacan (Cong.

Villarama) delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives denouncing acts
of bribery allegedly committed by a high ranking government official whom he then
called the "2 Million Dollar Man."1 In reaction, the Office of the President directed the
Presidential Anti- Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the exposé of
Cong. Villarama. PAGC sent written communications to Cong. Villarama, Cong. Mark
Jimenez, Senator Panfilo Lacson and respondent Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez
inviting them to provide information and documents on the alleged bribery subject of the
exposé.2 On November 18, 2002, Cong. Villarama responded by letter to PAGC’s
invitation by confirming that Secretary Perez was the government official who "ha[d]
knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his expose."3 In his own letter of
November 18, 2002, however, Secretary Perez denied being the Million-Dollar Man
referred to in Cong. Villarama’s privilege speech.4 On November 25, 2002, Cong.
Jimenez delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives confirming Cong.
Villarama’s exposé, and accusing Secretary Perez of extorting US$2 Million from him in
February 2001.5

On November 25, 2002, then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo requested PAGC to submit
documents relevant to the exposé.6 On November 26, 2002, Ombudsman Marcelo
formally requested Cong. Jimenez to submit a sworn statement on his exposé. 7 Cong.
Jimenez complied on December 23, 2002 by submitting his complaint-affidavit to the
Office of the Ombudsman. The complaint-affidavit was initially docketed as CPL-C-02-
1992. On the same day, the Special Action Team of the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Research Office (FIRO) of the Office of the Ombudsman referred Cong. Jimenez’s
complaint-affidavit to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau and to the
Administrative Adjudication Board, both of the Office of the Ombudsman, for
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication, respectively.8

The complaint-affidavit of Jimenez was re-docketed as OMB-C-C-02- 0857L, for the

criminal case in which the respondents were Secretary Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and
Ramon C. Arceo, Jr.; and as OMB-C-A-02-0631L, for the administrative case involving
only Secretary Perez as respondent.9

On January 2, 2003, a Special Panel composed of Atty. Evelyn Baliton, Atty. Mary Susan
Guillermo and Atty. Jose de Jesus was created to evaluate and conduct an investigation of
CPL-C-02-1992.

On even date, Secretary Perez, through counsel, requested Ombudsman Marcelo that the
Office of the Ombudsman itself directly verify from the Coutt’s Bank whether he
(Secretary Perez) had ever held any account in that bank to which the sum of US$2
Million had been remitted by Cong. Jimenez.10

On January 15, 2003, Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the Special
Panel to refer the complaint of Cong. Jimenez to FIRO for a full-blown fact-finding
investigation.11

On June 4, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received the letter dated May 30, 2003
from the counsel of Cong. Jimenez, submitting the supplemental complaint-affidavit
dated April 4, 2003 of Cong. Jimenez.

In his letter dated July 3, 2003, Secretary Perez, through counsel, sought the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of probable cause.12

On July 17, 2003, Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol informed Secretary Perez
about the letter from Coutts Bank stating that "Hernando B. Perez" had no account with
it, and assured that the letter would be considered in the final resolution of the case. 13
On August 22, 2005, Ombudsman Marcelo created a new Special Panel to evaluate CPL-
C-02-1992, and, if warranted, to conduct administrative and preliminary investigations,
thereby superseding the creation of the Special Panel formed on January 2, 2003.14

On November 14, 2005, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) completed its fact-finding
investigation and filed complaints against the following individuals, namely:

A. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernesto L.

Escaler, Ramon C. Arceo and John Does for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019;

B. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez for violation of the following:

Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, Article 183 (Perjury) of the
Revised Penal Code, and Article 171, par. 4 (Falsification) of the RPC; and

C. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L.

Escaler, Ramon C. Arceo and John Does for violation of the provisions of R.A.
1379.15

On November 23, 2005, the Special Panel directed Secretary Perez (who had meanwhile
resigned from office), his wife Rosario S. Perez (Mrs. Perez), Escaler and Arceo to
submit their counter-affidavits in OMB-C-C-02-0857-L, OMB-C-C-05-0633-K, OMB-C-
C-05-0634-K and OMB-C-C-05-0635-K (criminal cases). In another order of the same
date, the Special Panel directed former Secretary Perez to file his counter-affidavit in
OMBC-A-02-0631-L (administrative case).16

On November 29, 2005, the respondents filed an urgent motion for extension of time to
file their counter-affidavits.

On December 2, 2005, the counsel for Escaler entered his appearance and sought the
extension of the time to file Escaler’s counter-affidavit.17

On December 5, 2005, the Special Panel ordered the respondents to file their counter-
affidavits within ten days from December 4, 2005, or until December 14, 2005. 18

On December 7, 2005, Asst. Ombudsman Apostol issued PAMO Office Order No. 22,
Series of 2005, creating a new team of investigators to assist in the preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication of OMB-C-C-02-0857L, OMB-C-A-02-
0631L (administrative case), OMB-CC-05-0633K to OMB-C-C-0635K (forfeiture
proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379). The office order cancelled and superseded
PAMO Office Order No. 01-2003, Series of 2003.19
On December 12, 2005, former Secretary Perez, Mrs. Perez and Arceo filed an urgent
motion to be furnished copies of the complaints.20 On December 13, 2005, they submitted
a consolidated joint counter-affidavit dated December 12, 2005.21

On December 15, 2005, the respondents filed a manifestation to which they attached the
affidavit of Atty. Chona Dimayuga.22

On December 20, 2005, Escaler, instead of filing his counter-affidavit, moved to

disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation,
and to require the Special Panel to turn over the investigation to the Department of
Justice (DOJ).23

On December 22, 2005, the respondents submitted the affidavit of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuño.24

On December 29, 2005, the Special Panel denied the motion to disqualify the Office of
the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation, and ordered Escaler to
submit his counter-affidavit within five days from notice.25

On January 4, 2006, Cong. Jimenez filed an urgent motion for extension of the period to
file his opposition to the motion earlier filed by Escaler, and to be granted a new period to
reply to the consolidated joint counter-affidavit of the Perezes and Arceo.26

Between January 9, 2006 and February 10, 2006, Cong. Jimenez filed urgent motions for
time to file his opposition, the last of them seeking an extension until February 10,
2006.27

On February 21, 2006, the Perezes and Arceo reiterated their urgent motion to be
furnished copies of the complaints.28

On February 22, 2006, Cong. Jimenez opposed Escaler’s motion to disqualify the Office
of the Ombudsman.29 On the same date, Escaler asked for at least 20 days from February
17, 2006 (or until March 9, 2006) within which to reply to Cong. Jimenez’s opposition to
his motion.30 On March 9, 2006, Escaler replied to Cong. Jimenez’s opposition.31 On
March 28, 2006, Cong. Jimenez sought leave to file a rejoinder to Escaler’s reply. 32

On May 15, 2006, Escaler moved for the reconsideration of the order of December 29,
2005.33

On May 25, 2006, the Special Panel denied Escaler’s motion for reconsideration; directed
the FIO "to let respondent Escaler examine, compare, copy and obtain any and all
documentary evidence described, attached to and forming part of the complaints" of the
cases; and granted Escaler an extension of five days within which to submit his counter-
affidavit.34

After Escaler failed to submit his counter-affidavit despite the lapse of the five day period
given to him, the preliminary investigation was terminated.35

On August 23, 2006, Escaler commenced in this Court a special civil action
for certiorari with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) docketed as G.R.
No. 173967-71.36 On September 4, 2006, the Court required the Office of the
Ombudsman to comment on the petition of Escaler.37

On November 6, 2006, the Special Panel issued a joint resolution, finding probable cause
and recommending that criminal informations be filed against the respondents, as
follows:

1) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and

Ramon S. Arceo, Jr. for Extortion (Robbery) under par. 5 of Article 294 in relation
to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code;

2) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and

Ramon S. Arceo, Jr. for violation of Section 3 (b) of Rep. Act. 3019.

3) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez for Falsification of Public Documents

under Article 171 par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

4) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez for violation of Sec. 7, R.A. 3019 in

relation to Section 8 of R.A. 6713.38

On January 5, 2007, Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (Ombudsman Gutierrez),

who had meanwhile replaced the resigned Ombudsman Marcelo, approved the joint
resolution of the Special Panel.39

On January 11, 2007, the Perezes and Arceo sought the reconsideration of the joint
resolution,40 and supplemented their motion for that purpose with additional arguments
on January 15, 2007.41

On January 17, 2007, Arceo filed an ex parte motion for leave to admit attached
supplemental motion for reconsideration.42

On January 24, 2007, the Perezes and Arceo filed an urgent motion to suspend
proceedings. On February 6, 2007, Escaler also filed a motion to suspend proceedings ex
abundanti ad cautelam.43
On March 15, 2007, Cong. Jimenez asked for time to comment on the respondents’
motion for reconsideration. He filed another motion for extension of the time to comment
on April 27, 2007.44

On September 18, 2007, the Perezes prayed that the proceedings be held in abeyance to
await the ruling on their application for intervention in Escaler’s action in the Court. On
October 1, 2007, they filed a motion to dismiss.45

On October 2, 2007, Cong. Jimenez submitted his affidavit of desistance. 46 Thus, on

October 4, 2007, the Perezes filed an ex parte motion for resolution on the basis of the
desistance by Cong. Jimenez.47

On January 25, 2008, the Special Panel issued an omnibus resolution denying the original
and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the Perezes and Arceo; their motion to
suspend the proceedings; Escaler’s motion to suspend proceedings ex abundanti ad
cautelam; and the Perezes’ motion to dismiss.48

On April 18, 2008, the Perezes brought a petition for certiorari with an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction in this Court (G.R. No. 182360-63).49 In due time, the
Court required the respondents in G.R. No. 182360-63 to file their comments on the
petition.50

On April 18, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan four
informations against respondents, namely:

1. for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended;

2. for Robbery (Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code;

3. for Falsification of Public/Official Document under Art. 171 of the Revised

Penal Code; and

4. for violation of Section 7, Rep. Act 3019, as amended, in relation to Section 8,

Rep. Act 6713.51

Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265

[Violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019]

The information alleging the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 entitled People v. Hernando
Benito Perez, et. al., and was raffled to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan,52 averred:
That during the month of February, 2001 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the
City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Hernando B. Perez, a high ranking public officer, being then the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, while in the performance of his official function, committing the
offense in relation to his office and taking advantage thereof, conspiring, confabulating
and confederating with accused Ernest L. Escaler, Rosario S. Perez and Ramon C. Arceo,
all private individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally request and
demand the amount of US TWO MILLION DOLLARS ($2,000,000.00) for himself
and/or other persons from Mark Jimenez a.k.a. Mario B. Crespo, and thereafter
succeeded in receiving from the latter the sum of US$1,999,965.00 in consideration of
accused Hernando S. Perez’s desisting from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute
affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case against former
President Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark
Jimenez for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the government, over
which transaction accused Hernando S. Perez had to intervene in his official capacity
under the law, to the damage and prejudice of Mark Jimenez.

CONTRARY TO LAW.53

On May 8, 2008, the Perezes moved to quash the information.54 Escaler presented a

similar motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam on May 12, 2008,55 while Arceo
adopted the motions of the Perezes and Escaler on May 13, 2008.56 On June 4, 2008, the
Office of the Ombudsman countered with a consolidated opposition.57

On July 17, 2008, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan promulgated its resolution
denying the motions to quash,58 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Quash of accused Hernando B.

Perez and Rosario S. Perez and the urgent Ex- Abudanti Ad Cautelam Motion to Quash
of accused Ernest Escaler are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Accordingly, let the arraignment of the accused herein proceed on July 18, 2008 at 8:30
in the morning as previously set by the Court.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents separately sought the reconsideration of the resolution of denial of their

motions to quash.

On November 13, 2008, the Sandiganbayan First Division granted the motions for
reconsideration,59 rendering the following ratiocination, to wit:

xxxx
After a second hard look on the respective contentions of the parties, the Court is inclined
to grant the Motions for Reconsideration of the accused and perforce grant their motion
to quash the Information filed against them in this case.

It is axiomatic that as a general rule prerequisite, a motion to quash on the ground that the
Information does not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should
be resolved on the basis of the factual allegations therein whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted; and on additional facts admitted or not denied by the
prosecution. If the facts in the Information do not constitute an offense, the complaint or
information should be quashed by the court.

xxxx

It is clear that the ambit of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to
contracts or transaction involving monetary consideration where the public officer has
authority to intervene under the law. Thus, the requesting or demanding of any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit covered by said Section 3(b) must be in connection
with a "contract or transaction" involving "monetary consideration" with the government
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. In this
regard, the Supreme Court in Soriano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan construed the term
"contract" or "transaction" covered by Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as follows –

"It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the
terms which precedes it. A transaction like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in
the investigation conducted by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, applying the above construction of the Supreme Court in the case at bench, the
Court believes and so holds that the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B.
Perez "from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target
personalities involved in the plunder case against former President Joseph ‘Erap’
Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark Jimenez for admission
into the WPP of the government", cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered as"contract" or "transaction" as defined within the ambit of the fourth
element of the offense under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 because no "monetary
consideration" as in credit transaction is involved.

The Court finds untenable the prosecution’s contention that the execution by Mark
Jimenez of the affidavits in connection with his pending application for admission in the
WPP (and not the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez from pressuring Mark
Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case
against President Estrada) is the very contract or transaction required by the offense
charged in this case; and that all the elements of a contract contemplated therein are
present as there is allegedly consent between the government and Mark Jimenez, object
or subject matter which is the execution of affidavits in connection with his application
for admission in the WPP, and a cause or consideration which consists of security and
monetary benefits to be given by the government to Mark Jimenez in exchange for his
participation as a witness under the WPP.

For even assuming for the sake of argument that the pending application of Mark Jimenez
for admission in the WPP can be considered as a contract or transaction, it bears stressing
that the principal consideration for the said application of Mark Jimenez is the latter’s
obligation to testify as a witness under the WPP on one hand and his entitlement to the
protection granted to a witness in the WPP on the other hand and as such, does not entail
any money consideration. Certainly, this is not the (monetary) consideration which is
essential or involved in credit transactions. Any pecuniary or monetary expense that may
be incurred by the Government as a result of the implementation of the program in favour
of Mark Jimenez is purely incidental. Such alleged monetary benefit is definitely not the
reason that impelled Mark Jimenez to allegedly avail of the WPP of the government.

More precisely, however, what appears as the main consideration of the alleged demand
or receipt of accused Hernando B. Perez of the sum of US$2,000,000.00 from Mark
Jimenez is the former’s alleged desistance from pressuring the latter to execute affidavits
implicating targeted personalities in the plunder case against former President Estrada. In
the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, such
alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez (and even the application of Mark
Jimenez for admission into the WPP as argued by the prosecution) can hardly be
considered as a "contract" or "transaction" that is contemplated in Section 3(b) of RA
3019, as amended.

Moreover, the Court takes note of the admission made by the prosecution in its
Memorandum that the transaction involving Mark Jimenez’s execution of affidavits for
his admission to the WPP is not yet a perfected contract between the Government and
Mark Jimenez since it is still in its "negotiation phase" because of the refusal of Mark
Jimenez to execute the affidavits against certain individuals. This admission is another
indication that there is indeed no contract or transaction to speak of that is covered under
the fourth element of the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.

Finally, it may be argued that while the material allegations in the subject information
may not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended, the
same material/factual allegations nevertheless constitute Direct Bribery or another felony
which is necessarily included in the offense charged herein so that the subject
information in this case should not be quashed. It is believed, however, that the filing of
the Information charging the accused with Robbery in SB-08-CRM-00266 pending
before the Second Division of this Court on the basis of the same acts complained of in
this case, constitutes a bar against the information for said lesser felony as it would result
into two differently charged felonies from a single act and thus, would unnecessarily or
unjustifiably expose the accused to the danger of suffering two penalties for a single
offense if the subject information is not quashed. If a single act results into two or more
offenses, they should not be charged and/or punished separately unless the other offense
with different elements is penalized under a special law. To do so would violate, if not
the principle of double jeopardy, the rule against splitting a single act into various
charges. It is settled that a defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions
upon the same act by splitting the same into various charges, all emanating from the same
law violated, when the prosecution could easily and well embody them in a single
information because such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience
to the administration of justice in general and to the accused in particular, for it would
require the presentation of substantially the same evidence before different courts.

All told, with the absence of the fourth element, the Court finds that the factual/material
allegations in the subject Information do not constitute the offense of violation of Section
3(b) of RA 3019, as amended, and therefore, It is constrained to quash the said
Information. In this regard, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss/resolve the other
issues raised in the subject motions for reconsideration of the herein accused and/or
disturb the other findings contained in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered.

WHEREFORE, the instant Motions for Reconsideration of the herein accused are

resolved accordingly and the subject Information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A.
3019, as amended, is hereby QUASHED.

SO ORDERED.

The State moved for the reconsideration of the resolution quashing the information in
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265.

During the pendency of the State’s motion for reconsideration, Criminal Case No. SB-08-
CRM-0265 was re-raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.

On April 21, 2009, the Third Division denied the Ombudsman’s motion for
reconsideration,60 holding thusly:

xxxx

The core issue raised in the submission of the parties relates to the meaning of the word
"transaction" as it is used in Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 to constitute an element of the offense.
More particularly, has the meaning of the term "transaction" as enunciated in the Soriano
case been modified by subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court?
The meaning of "transaction" in Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 was enunciated in the Soriano
case when the Supreme Court stated:

As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the
petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b)
of R.A. No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.

The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) …

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,

percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

The petitioner states:

Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner’s guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct
Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.

The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of
Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is
necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the
accused is a public officer; in consideration of ₱4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited,
₱2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to
dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or
may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending
before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is
with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)

Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:

A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term ‘transaction’ as used
thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but
includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature,
pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in
the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other
interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of
transaction between the government and other party wherein the public officer would
intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the
term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in
the investigation conducted by the petitioner. (Emphasis Supplied)

The argument of the Prosecution that the interpretation of the term "transaction" defined
in the Soriano case has been modified by the Mejia, Pelegrino and Chang cases does not
persuade.

A review of the Mejia, Peligrino and Chang cases reveals that the main issue adjudicated
in those cases involved an interpretation of the element of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, namely:
the right to intervene of the public officer in the contract or transaction and not the
element of what is a contract or transaction with the government.

Thus, in the Mejia case, the Supreme Court ruled:

Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene in the setting
of the hearing of cases and she does not formulate resolutions thereof. The branch clerk
of court is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge whose duty is to assist in the
management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not involving the
exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge. It is this special relation of the petitioner
with the judge who presumably has reposed confidence in her which appears to have
been taken advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the complainants to give her
money in consideration of a promise to get a favorable resolution of their cases.

In the Peligrino case, the Supreme Court ruled:

Petitioner is a BIR Examiner assigned to the Special

Project Committee tasked "xxx to undertake verification of tax liabilities of various

professionals particularly doctors within the jurisdiction of Revenue Region 4-A, Manila
xxx" Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private
complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his official capacity is
undisputed. Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are present. (Emphasis
Supplied)

In the Chang case, the Supreme Court ruled:

San Mateo’s justification behind such refusal- that he had no authority to accept an
amount less than the assessment amount- is too shallow to merit belief, he being the
Chief Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division of the Treasurer’s
Office, who had, on those various meetings, gone out of his way to negotiate the
settlement of the assessed deficiency tax.

In the recent case of Merencillo vs. People, the Supreme Court identified the issues raised
in the Petition as follows: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to believe petitioner’s evidence
over that of the prosecution and (2) the Sandiganbayan’s failure to recognize that
Petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.

In addressing the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled:

Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily
inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the essential
elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the
other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit
is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or
offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions
involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to
intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general
scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act
which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an
act which is his official duty to do. Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed
from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses.
No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of the
offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds from a
second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one. (Emphasis Supplied)

Prosecution’s argument that the statement of the Supreme Court above-quoted is

an obiter dictum is specious.

An obiter dictum is a "judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but
one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential
(although it may be considered persuasive)." In the Merencillo case, one issue raised by
Petitioner was precisely the issue of double jeopardy which the Supreme Court resolved
by distinguishing the elements of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct Bribery.
As one of the elements of the offense of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, the Court
adopted the meaning given to the term "transaction" in the Soriano case. The above-
quoted resolution was not a mere obiter dictum but the ratio decidendi which is defined
as:
"1. the principle or rule of law on which a court’s decision is founded; 2. The rule of law
on which a later court thinks that a previous court founded its decision xx"

The Prosecution argued that it is a maxim in statutory construction that a law must be
read in its entirety and no single provision should be interpreted in isolation with respect
to the other provisions of the law. The Prosecution further argued that a close
examination of RA 3019 in its entirety would show that the term "transaction" appears
several times and was never confined to transactions involving monetary consideration.
Suffice it to say that a maxim in statutory construction cannot be superior to an express
interpretation of the law made by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the provisions in RA
3019 cited by Prosecution constitute different offenses with their own different elements,
with their own different modalities of commission.

The reference to the Congressional record by the Prosecution does not disprove the fact
that for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, the transaction must involve monetary
consideration. As pointed out earlier, no less than the Supreme Court has interpreted the
meaning of the term "transaction" as an element of violation of the said section.
Likewise, as admitted by the Prosecution, the reference to the deliberations of Congress
which it cited involved deliberations on Sec. 5 of RA 3019 and not on Sec. 3 (b) of RA
3019. The two sections, i.e. Sec. 5 and Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 are different offenses with
their own different elements.

Having resolved the core issue in the Motion For Reconsideration of the Prosecution,
there is no further need to discuss the other arguments of the Prosecution in its Motion.

WHEREFORE, Prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the First

Division dated November 13, 2008 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

On June 22, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) assailed in this Court via
petition for certiorari the resolution of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 17, 2008
quashing the information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and the resolution
promulgated on April 21, 2009 denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.

On November 18, 2009, the Court denied the Perezes’ urgent motion for leave to file a
motion to dismiss for being a prohibited pleading, and instead required the respondents to
comment on the petition, among other things.61

Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0266

[Robbery under Art. 293, in relation to
Art. 294, Revised Penal Code]
The information charging robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, Revised
Penal Code was raffled to the Second Division (Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266).62

On May 6, 2008, Escaler filed a motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam, alleging that
the facts charged did not constitute an offense.63 On May 2, 2008, the Perezes filed their
own motion to quash the information.64 On May 6, 2008, Arceo filed an ex parte motion
to adopt the Perezes motion as well as Escaler’s motion to quash.65

On June 26, 2008, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the respective
motions to quash of respondents.66

On June 30, 2008, Escaler moved to reconsider the denial.67 On July 10, 2008, Arceo also
moved to reconsider the denial.68 The Perezes filed their own motion for reconsideration
on July 11, 2008.69

On November 20, 2008, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan granted the motions
for reconsideration, quashed the information charging respondents with robbery, and
dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266,70 holding as follows:

xxxx

The Court after a careful perusal of the issue and the record on hand, is persuaded. Extant
in the record and which the prosecution admits or at least does not deny are the
following:

1. The alleged Robbery (extortion) was committed on February 13, 2001 (Joint
Resolution signed by members of the Special Panel composed of Orlando Ines,
Adoracion Agbada, Mary Susan Geronimo, Jose de Jesus Jr., signed by Asst.
Ombudsman Pelagio Apostol, and approved by Ombudsman Mr. (sic) Merceditas
N. Gutierrez.) (pp. 4-69, Vol. 1, Records; pp. 70-88, Complaint-Affidavit of Mark
Jimenez, Vol. 1, Records)

2. On February 23, 2001 the amount of US $1,999,965.00 was transferred to

Coutts Bank Hongkong in favour of the beneficiary of Account No. HO 13706,
from Trade and Commerce Bank, Cayman Island through the Chase Manhattan
Bank in New York. Subsequently from March 6, 2001 to May 23, 2001 funds
were transferred from Coutts Bank to other accounts, among them a $250,000.00
bank draft/cheque issued to Ramon C. Arceo (pp. 10-11 Records).

3. On December 23, 2002 Congressman Mark Jimenez filed his complaint with the
Ombudsman charging Hernando Perez, Ernest Escaler, Ramon Arceo and several
John Does (Mrs. Rosario Perez was not among those charged) with criminal
offenses of Plunder, Extortion, Graft and Corruption, Obstruction of Justice,
 Violation of the Penal Provision of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
R.A. 6713, and Administrative Offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Oppression, Committing acts Punishable under the Anti-Graft Law, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the service, and Violation of Section 5 (2) of
R.A. 6713. It was subscribed and sworn to on (the ) 23rd day of December 2002
(Complaint-Affidavit of Mario Mark (MJ) Jimenez B. Crespo – pp. 70-88
Records).

4. On December 23, 2002, the FIRO (Fact Finding and Intelligence Research
Office) recommended that the case be referred to the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau and the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (p. 6 of the
Records)

5. The information was filed with this Court only on April 18, 2008.

Having established, or at least as claimed by Complainant Mark Jimenez, that the

Robbery (extortion) took place on February 13, 2001, the Ombudsman should have
demanded a reasonable explanation from the complainant who was then a Congressman,
wealthy and influential and in whose house the alleged intimidation took place, why he
was filing the complaint only on December 23, 2002 a matter of more than eighteen (18)
months. This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible motive in filing
the complaint.

At any rate, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the office of the Ombudsman as
nominal complainant filed a complaint with the Ombudsman on November 14, 2005
charging Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Salvador Perez, Ernest L. Escaler, Ramon
Antonio C. Arceo Jr. and John Does with Violation of Sec. 3(b) R.A. 3019, Sec. 8 in
relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. 6713, Perjury (Art. 183 RPC) and Art. 171 par. 4 Falsification,
RPC and violation of R.A. 1379. (Pp. 132 to 170 of Records) Robbery is NOT one of the
charges.

With the Ombudsman’s finding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated on
February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to
Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favour of the accused, there is
no reason why within a reasonable period from these dates, the complaint should not be
resolved. The act of intimidation was there, the asportation was complete as of February
23, 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge
of Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon
which to anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint or to dismiss it
are on hand. The case is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear
transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the
constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded the Ombudsman to act
within a reasonable time.
The long wait of the accused is without valid cause or justifiable motive and has
unnecessarily trampled upon their constitutional prerogatives to a speedy disposition of
the case. This is an impermissible course of action that our fundamental law loathes.

As Justice Laurel said, the government should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice. It is the moral and legal obligation of the
Court to see that criminal proceedings come to an end (People vs. Calamba 63 Phil 496).

The Constitution of the Philippines provides:

Art. 3 Sec. 16: All persons shall have a right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial(,) quasijudicial or administrative bodies.

Thus under our present fundamental law, all persons are entitled to a speedy resolution of
their cases be it civil, administrative or criminal cases. It is, in criminal cases however
where the need to a speedy disposition of their cases is more pronounced. It is so, because
in criminal cases, it is not only the honor and reputation but even the liberty of the
accused (even life itself before the enactment of R.A. 9346) is at stake.

The charge is a simple case for Robbery. Certainly it does not involve complicated and
factual issues that would necessitate painstaking and gruelling scrutiny and perusal on the
part of the Ombudsman. It may have its novel, and to it, valid reason for departing from
the established procedure and rules, but virtually in doing so, it has failed to discharge its
duty as mandated by the Constitution to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officers and employees.

The totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances bears unmistakably the
earmarks of inordinate delay, making the applicability of the doctrine enunciated in
Anchangco Jr. and Duterte cases cited in the parties’ pleadings irrefragable.

Accordingly, there being a clear violation of the constitutional right of the accused, the
prosecution is ousted of any authority to file the information and we hereby order the
quashing of the information and the consequent dismissal of this case.

While the ground upon which the Court banked and relied this dismissal order was not
invoked in the motions for reconsideration of accused Escaler and Arceo, since they are
similarly situated with their coaccused spouses Perez, this resolution applies to them with
equal force and effect.

On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, We hereby consider the Motion for
Reconsideration of our resolution denying the motion for consolidation moot and
academic; even as, We rule that the said motion lacks persuasiveness considering that,
per Manifestation of accused Escaler he is not in any way a party to all the cases pending,
the accused in each of the cases were charged with different offenses, and the different
cases are already at different stages of the proceedings, and considering the argument of
the prosecution that the different offenses in the four (4) cases consist of different
elements necessitating presentation of different proofs and evidence for each case.

Accused’(s) bonds are ordered cancelled and the Hold-Departure Order issued against
them in this case is lifted and set aside.

So ordered.

The State moved to reconsider the resolution of November 20, 2008,71 but the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration on June 19,
2009,72 stating thusly:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the People of the Philippines dated
December 8, 2008 seeking to reconsider the Resolution of this Court promulgated on
November 20, 2008 dismissing the case, as well as accused-spouses Perez Opposition
dated December 22, 2008, accused Arceo’s Comment/Opposition of even date, and the
Opposition dated January 5, 2009 of accused Ernest L. Escaler.

On record too, are the Plaintiff’s Consolidated Reply dated January 19, 2009 to the three
(3) Opposition/Comment of the accused, the three (3) Rejoinders of the accused of
different dates, the plaintiff’s sub-rejoinder dated February 9, 2009, accused Perezes(‘)
Manifestation and Plaintiff’s Comment dated February 16, 2009 to Perezes(‘)
Manifestation.

All these shall be considered and taken up by the Court in seriatim.

The first issue brought up by the accused is a supposed procedural lapse of the plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration in that the same was filed in violation of Sec. 4 Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court which provides in substance that in every written motion required to be
heard, the notice of hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing.

Of course, it is not disputed that the accused-spouses received through registered mail
their copy of plaintiff’s motion only on December 16, 2008 while it set the date of
hearing on December 12, 2007 thus the motion was set for hearing before the other party
received it. Accused Ramon Arceo received his copy of the motion only on December 17,
2008 while accused Ernest Escaler received his copy after December 18, 2008 giving the
same situation as accused Perezes. It must be taken note of that the Court set the hearing
of the plaintiff’s motion on December 18, 2008, as on December 12, 2008 the date
specified on plaintiff’s motion, no accused has received his copy of the said motion.
Considering thus, the situation, there seems plausibility for the accused claim of
transgression of the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court.

Nonetheless, considering the transfer of the date of hearing, and that all the parties were
given ample time to file and submit their respective pleadings which at the time the issue
was to be resolved had grown voluminous, the Court is not inclined to give due
consideration for this procedural impropriety.

The Court takes note however that the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was filed
only on December 8, 2008 beyond the fifteenth day period within which it should be
filed, since it received a copy of the Resolution of this Court on November 21, 2008.
Thus, the fifteenth day fell on December 6, 2008 after which the said Resolution has
become final and executory. The Resolution in question therefore which finally disposes
of the case is not only final but executory as well which is virtually beyond the reach of
the motion for reconsideration belatedly filed.

We will now tackle the merits of the grounds invoked by the People.

The first ground cited in the People’s motion was that the filing of complaint against
former secretary Hernando B. Perez was not attended by ill motive since it reasoned out
that it was the intimation of the Court when it stated in its Resolution the Ombudsman
xxx "should have demanded a reasonable explanation from the complainant who was
then a congressman, wealthy and influential and in whose house the alleged intimidation
took place, why he was filing the complaint only on December 23, 2002 a matter of more
than eighteen (18) months. This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible
motive in filing the complaint. xxx "We take note of the response of the prosecution
"Jimenez thought that after the pay-off, Secretary Perez would stop threatening him and
would leave him in peace for good. This was the reason why Jimenez did not
immediately file a complaint against Secretary Perez and his co-accused."

The first and foremost impression We can gather is that the alleged about two million
dollars which supposedly was the result of accused Perez’ alleged extortion was delivered
already to the accused. All along therefore, if the claim of the prosecution is to be
believed, Robbery has long been committed that was on or about February 2001 as
alleged in the information. With or without ill-motive, the Ombudsman should have acted
within a reasonable time. Certainly eighteen (18) long months from the filing of the
complaint can not be considered within a reasonable time.

The movant then argued that the filing of the information only on April 18, 2008 were
due to legal impediments which were beyond the control of the office of the
Ombudsman.
The Court can not understand those alleged "legal impediments" in the prosecution for
Robbery. Here is the prosecution claiming strongly that the filing of the complaint was
not attended by ill-motive and that after the pay-off even if a crime has been committed
against complaint Congressman Mark Jimenez, the latter delayed his filing of the
complaint because he thought the accused would leave him in peace. This is the only
impediment we can think of, and this definitely is not a legal impediment; certainly too
this is not beyond the control of the Office of the Ombudsman.

But the Court shall keep track of the movant’s argument about this supposed legal
impediment. Admitting that the asportation was complete on February 23, 2001, the
prosecution reasoned out that the case can not be filed in Court at that time due to
insufficiency of evidence. As averred in the Opposition of accused Ernest Escaler, "xxx
the plaintiff’s duty is to determine whether there exists probable cause to hold the
accused for trial for simple robbery", and those documents which the prosecution so
capitalized it exerted so much offer to obtain, are mere evidentiary matters. This is even
admitted in the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.

Consider these facts all explicitly admitted by the prosecution:

On February 13, 2001 accused former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez accompanied by
accused Ernest Escaler supposedly threatened complainant Congressman Mark Jimenez
to send him to jail where he will die of boil (Putang ina mo, sinasalsal mo lang ako.
Hindot ka. Ipakukulong kita sa Quezon City Jail. Doon mamamatay ka sa pigsa). On
February 23, 2001 the amount of US $1,999,965 owned by Congressman Mark Jimenez
was transferred to Coutts Bank, Hongkong in favour of Account Number 13706 in the
name of Ernest Escaler (confirmed by Trade and Commerce Bank Payment Detail Report
dated February 23, 2001)

Congressman Mark Jimenez did not file my complaint against the accused in any Court
or prosecutor office. This, despite his claim in his counter-affidavit that:

"12. Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada stepped down as President after the Armed Forces of the
Philippines withdrew its support to him, and the Arroyo Administration was installed on
January 19, 2001. The new Secretary of Justice, Hernando B. Perez, was appointed by
Pres. Arroyo. Soon after his appointment. Sec. Perez sent feelers that I am his first target
for inclusion in the criminal cases that he will file against Pres. Estrada. He also
threatened and intimidated me and my family with bodily harm and incarceration in a city
jail with hardened criminals and drug addicts unless I execute damaging affidavits against
Pres. Estrada and his cronies and associates. Because of the intense pressure upon me and
my family, I was forced to come across with US $2.0 Million. (Page 73 of the Records)

It was only on December 23, 2002 as stated in our Resolution that Congressman Mark
Jimenez filed his complaint with the Ombudsman, even if the said offense was alleged to
have been committed on Feb. 13, 2001 and it was only on April 18, 2008 that the
Ombudsman presented the information with this Court.

The complainant had hesitated into filing his complaint for about eighteen (18) months
while the Ombudsman with double hesitation dillydallied for about six (6) years. All in
all, the delay from the supposed commission of such a simple offense of Robbery took
more than seven years – that is from February 13, 2001 to April 18, 2008. It is clear the
socalled legal impediments are but empty assertion to belatedly justify an impermissible
action.

Taking exception to our ruling that the totality of facts and surrounding circumstances
bear unmistakably the earmarks of inordinate delay, the movant made a comparison of
those cases dismissed by the Supreme Court for violation of the Constitutional right of
the accused to speedy disposition of cases, and this case, and wrongfully conclude there
was no delay in their handling of the case at bar.

We have already resolved and passed upon rather adequately this issue in our Resolution
with the observation that not anyone of the cases cited involved the charge of Robbery.
The movant’s discussion asserted no new and substantial reason and argument to
persuade us to reverse or modify our considered opinion. We however pose this question
to the prosecution. If Asst. Ombudsman Pelagio Apostol recommended the filing of the
information against the accused on November 7, 2006 why did it take the Ombudsman
only on January 5, 2007 to approve the recommendation. And if, on January 11, 2007 the
accused submitted their Motion for Reconsideration, why did it take the Ombudsman up
to April 15, 2008 – a matter of about fifteen (15) months to resolve the same when there
was NO OPPOSITION nor comment from the other party?

The argument that "the authority of the Ombudsman is not divested by the claimed delay
in filing the information as this authority is vested by law" is a reckless reasoning that
only shows that while admitting there was undue delay in the disposition of the case, it
could still proceed with its information to charge the accused.

The prosecution need not be reminded of the uniform ruling of the Honorable Supreme
Court dismissing the cases of Tatad, Angchangco, Duterte and other cases for
transgressing the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. To
argue "that the authority of the Ombudsman is not divested by the claimed delay in filing
the information xxx" is to limit the power of the Court to act on blatant transgression of
the constitution.

As to fact-finding investigation, the Court finds it so baseless for the movant to capitalize
on what it supposedly did in the process of the fact-finding stance; and then reasoning out
as if clutching on straws that the sequences of events should excuse it from lately filing
the information. But it took the movant six (6) years to conduct the said fact-finding
investigation, and then unabashedly it argues that is not part of the preliminary
investigation.

Determining probable cause should usually take no more than ninety (90) days precisely
because it only involves finding out whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the persons charged could be held for trial or not. It does not require sifting through and
meticulously examining every piece of evidence to ascertain that they are enough to
convict the persons involved beyond reasonable doubt. That is already the function of the
Courts.

As argued by accused Ramon Arceo, the claim of the movant that the preliminary
investigation of the instant case commenced only on November 14, 2005 when the Field
Investigation Office (FIO) filed its complaint, and not on December 23, 2002 when Mark
Jimenez filed his complaint-affidavit, is rather specious and does not hold water as
Robbery was not among the offenses included in the charge of the FIO. As such, it is not
correct to say that the counting of the period for delay should commence only in
November 2005.

The conclusion thus, that the long waiting of six (6) years for the Office of the
Ombudsman to resolve the simple case of Robbery is clearly an inordinate delay,
blatantly intolerable, and grossly prejudicial to the constitutional right of speedy
disposition of cases, easily commands assent. This Court, it must be made clear, is not
making nor indulging in mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved.

In its sixth ground the movant argued that the First, Third and Fourth Divisions all junked
the claimed inordinate delay of the accused and asked that the Second Division should
"xxx co-exist not work on cross-purposes with the other Court’s Division xxx". The
argument begs the question! Suppose if and when the incident reaches the Supreme
Court, the highest Court of the land ruled that it is the Second Division which is correct,
and the other Divisions in error, what would happen now to the argument of the movant
that "xxx there is rhyme or reason for the Sandiganbayan, Second Division to co-exist
xxx with the other Court’s Division xxx".

Moreover, the information in the first division charges the accused of Violation of Sec. 3
(b) of R.A. 3019, in the third division the accusation was for Falsification of Public
Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, while the accused have been
indicted for violating Sec. 7 R.A. 3019 in relation to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6713 before the
Fourth Division. The Court can not say whether there is need for paper trail or monitoring
of documents in those cases, as the Divisions concerned can competently resolve and
pass upon it but certainly in this instant case of Robbery, to indulge in a prolonged fact-
finding process is not a boon but a bane on the part of the prosecution
In a distasteful exhibition of unsavoury language, bordering on derision and contempt,
the prosecution argued that "xxx the assailed resolution is a wanton display of arrogance,
contemptuous and outright illegal for it mooted the same issue of inordinate delay
pending with the Honorable Supreme Court xxx". This only goes to show that the
prosecution is totally ignorant of the hierarchy of Courts in our judicial system.

xxx It must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of
expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even
by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that
prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be
vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the
State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal
trials the best evidence that can be obtained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration dated

December 8, 2008 is denied for lack of merit.

So ordered.

On August 24, 2009, the State assailed the resolutions of the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan in this Court (G.R. No. 189063).73

Consolidation of the petitions

On October 26, 2009, the Court directed that G.R. No. 189063 be consolidated with G.R.
No. 182360-63 (entitled Hernando B. Perez and Rosario S. Perez v. The Ombudsman,
Field Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman and Mario B. Crespo a.k.a. Mark Jimenez)
and G.R. No. 173967-71 (Ernest B. Escaler v. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al.).74

On April 7, 2010, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 188165 with G.R. Nos. 173967-71,
G.R. Nos. 182360-63 and G.R. No. 189063 (People of the Philippines v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, et al.).75

G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 were special civil actions for certiorari to
prevent the filing of the criminal informations against the respondents.

Deconsolidation and dismissal of

G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63

on the ground of their intervening mootness

On February 11, 2013, the Court deconsolidated G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No.
182360-63 from G.R. No. 188165 and G.R. No. 189063 on the ground that the
intervening filing of the informations in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 had rendered the petitions in G.R. No. 173967-71
and G.R. No. 182360-63 moot.76

Issues

In G.R. No. 188165, the State raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM-265, BY
CONFINING THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD "TRANSACTION" IN
SECTION 3(B) OF R.A. 3019 AS TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
MONETARY CONSIDERATION.

II.

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
RELYING SOLELY ON THE CASE OF SORIANO, JR. VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND DISREGARDED JURISPRUDENCE THAT
SHOWS SECTION 3 (B) OF RA 3019 EXTENDS TO ANY DEALING WITH
THE GOVERNMENT.

III.

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WTH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT RESOLVED THE MOTIONS TO QUASH (ON THE
GROUND THAT THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION DO NOT
CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE) BY GOING BEYOND THE ALLEGATIONS IN
THE INFORMATION AND CONSIDERING SUPPOSED FACTS WITHOUT
ANY BASIS.77

In G.R. No. 189063, the State submits the following issues:

A. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN
CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM-0266 BY HOLDING THAT "THERE BEING A
CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
 ACCUSED, THE PROSECUTION IS OUSTED OF ANY AUTHORITY TO
FILE THE INFORMATION."

B. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE TOTALITY OF THE FACTS
AND THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES BEARS UNMISTAKABLY
THE EARMARKS OF INORDINATE DELAY, MAKING THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN ANGCHONGCO
JR. AND DUTERTE CASES CITED IN THE PARTIES’ PLEADINGS
IRREFRAGABLE.78

The foregoing issues are restated thuswise:

I.

Whether or not it was the Office of the Solicitor General, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, that had the authority to file the petitions to assail the
Sandiganbayan resolutions.

II.

Whether the State, as the petitioner in G.R. No. 188165 and G.R. No. 189063, resorted to
the wrong remedy in assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dismissing the
criminal charges against the respondents through petitions for certiorari instead of
petitions for review on certiorari.

Specific Issue in G.R. No. 188165

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or in excess of jurisdiction in quashing the information by applying the definition
of transaction in Soriano, Jr. v Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 188.

Specific Issue in G.R. No. 189063

Whether or not the Sandiganabayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the criminal case due to the inordinate
delay of the Office of the Ombudsman in bringing the criminal action against respondents
as to violate their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases.

Ruling

The petitions for certiorari are devoid of merit.

 I.

The Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to

file an appeal or certiorari from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court.

Respondents contend that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to file the
petitions for certiorari because only the Solicitor General could file the petitions in this
Court pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative
Code as amended by E.O. No. 292 ,which pertinently states:

Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceedings, investigation or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a
party.

xxxx

The contention of the respondents is grossly erroneous.

That only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal or certiorari in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings is the general
rule,79 but the rule admits the exception concerning "all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines,
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986."
More specifically, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 authorizes the exception, viz:

xxxx

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
 xxxx

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules
that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in
cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold
emphasis provided)

xxxx

Consequently, the filing of the petitions in these cases by the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the OSP, was authorized by law.

II.

Petitioner did not establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan

The petitions for certiorari brought by the State must nonetheless be dismissed for failure
to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan in issuing the
assailed resolutions.

A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action based on the specific

grounds provided in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and can prosper only the
jurisdictional error, or the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the inferior court or judge is alleged and proved to exist.

In De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,80 the Court has expounded on
the nature and reach of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, to wit:

We remind that the writ of certiorari – being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in
character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction,
or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that
courts have no power or authority in law to perform) – is not a general utility tool in the
legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ certiorari was
issued out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench, commanding agents or officers of the
inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party
more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine
from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court’s judgment was rendered
without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would
result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If
the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in
matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was
said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential
requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.1âwphi1

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as
it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to
issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations
in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an
inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides
the requirements for that purpose, viz:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.

Considering that the requisites must concurrently be attendant, the herein petitioners’
stance that a writ of certiorari should have been issued even if the CA found no showing
of grave abuse of discretion is absurd. The commission of grave abuse of discretion was a
fundamental requisite for the writ of certiorari to issue against the RTC. Without their
strong showing either of the RTC’s lack or excess of jurisdiction, or of grave abuse of
discretion by the RTC amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the writ
of certiorari would not issue for being bereft of legal and factual bases. We need to
emphasize, too, that with certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, they must strictly
observe the rules laid down by law for granting the relief sought.

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In
this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty,
or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such
as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in
a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. (citations
omitted)

Did the petitioner show grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the issuance of the
writ of certiorari prayed for?

A.

G.R. No. 188165

The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the

restrictive meaning of the term transaction as
used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019
adopted in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

In its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265, the

Sandiganbayan relied on the ruling in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,81 in which the
principal issue was whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint
conducted by petitioner Soriano, Jr., then a Fiscal, was a "contract or transaction" as to
bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which
punished any public officer for "[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law." The Soriano,
Jr. Court ruled in the negative, and pronounced:

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.

Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the
term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
(Emphasis supplied)

The State now argues, however, that the Sandiganbayan thereby committed grave abuse
of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of
the term transaction in Soriano, Jr. considering that the term transaction should be
construed more liberally, and positing that Soriano, Jr. was already abandoned by the
Court, citing for that purpose the rulings in Mejia v. Pamaran,82 Peligrino v.
People,83 and Chang v. People.84

We disagree with the petitioner, and find for the respondents.

First of all, the interpretation in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used in Section
3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 has not been overturned by the Court.

In Mejia v. Pamaran, decided en banc on April 15, 1988, Mejia had demanded and
received money from some persons involved in certain cases in a trial court where Mejia
was then serving as the branch clerk of court in consideration of a promise that she would
help in getting a favorable judgment for them. The issue was whether or not Mejia could
be convicted under the information that alleged that she had demanded a certain amount,
although the Sandiganbayan found that the amount was different from that charged in the
information. The Court dismissed her petition, and ruled that "[i]n a prosecution under
the foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the value of the gift, money or present, etc.
is immaterial xxx [w]hat is penalized is the receipt of any gift, present, share, percentage,
or benefit by a public officer in connection with a contract or transaction with the
Government, wherein the public officer has to intervene in his official capacity." The
Court nowhere ruled on the proper interpretation of the term transaction.

In Peligrino v. People, decided on August 13, 2001, Peligrino, an examiner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, was convicted of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
for demanding the amount of ₱200,000.00 from the complainant in connection with the
latter’s tax liabilities. Peligrino’s defense was that he did not "demand" the money, but
the money was just given to him. He argued that he had only informed the complainant of
his tax deficiencies, and that the complainant had then requested the reduction of the
amount claimed as his tax deficiencies. The Court found no merit in Peligrino’s
argument. The ruling had nothing to do with the interpretation of the term transaction.

Chang v. People, decided on July 21, 2006, was a case in which two persons – Chang and
San Mateo – were convicted of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 after
being found to have received ₱125,000.00 in consideration of their issuance of a
Certificate of Examination to the effect that the complainant had "no tax liability" in
favour of the municipality, notwithstanding that it had not settled with them on their
assessed deficiency tax of ₱494,000.00. Chang and San Mateo contended that the charge
had resulted from an involuntary contact whereby complainant Magat had simply tossed
to them the brown envelope; that there had been no conspiracy between them; and that
what had transpired had been an instigation, not an entrapment. In affirming their
conviction, the Court did not touch on the proper interpretation of the term transaction as
used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019.

The three rulings the State has cited here did not overturn the interpretation made
in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
because the proper interpretation of the term was clearly not decisive in those cases. On
the contrary, in the later ruling in Merencillo v. People,85 promulgated in 2007, the Court
reiterated the restrictive interpretation given in Soriano, Jr. to the term transaction as
used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with a differentiation
between bribery under the Revised Penal Code and the violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 by holding that the latter is "limited only to contracts or
transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority
to intervene under the law."

And, secondly, it does not help the State any that the term transaction as used in Section
3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and
liberally, considering that laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and laws imposing
penalties and forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party
seeking to enforce them, and liberally against the party sought to be charged. 86

Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the
information for failing to properly state the fourth element of the violation of Section 3(b)
of Republic Act No. 3019.

B.

G.R. No. 189063

The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave

abuse of discretion in finding that there had
been an inordinate delay in the resolution
against respondents of the charge in
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266

Upon its finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred inordinate delay in
resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought against the respondents, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 mainly to uphold their
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case.
But now comes the State contending that the delay in the resolution of the case against
the respondents was neither inordinate nor solely attributable to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Citing Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,87 in which the Court held that
speedy disposition of cases was also consistent with reasonable delays, the State
supported its contention by listing the various incidents that had caused the delay in the
investigation, and then laying part of the blame on the respondents themselves.

The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III of the Constitution,
which declares:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings.88 While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient,89 the right to the
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.90

According to Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,91 inordinate delay in resolving a criminal

complaint, being violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to
the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the criminal case. 92

Was the delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive?

We answer in the affirmative.

The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman investigated had
supposedly occurred in the period from February 13, 2001 to February 23, 2001. Yet, the
criminal complaint came to be initiated only on November 25, 2002 when Ombudsman
Marcelo requested PAGC to provide his office with the documents relevant to the exposé
of Cong. Villarama. Subsequently, on December 23, 2002, Cong. Jimenez submitted his
complaint-affidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. It was only on November 6, 2006,
however, when the Special Panel created to investigate Cong. Jimenez’s criminal
complaint issued the Joint Resolution recommending that the criminal informations be
filed against the respondents. Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint Resolution only
on January 5, 2007.93 The Special Panel issued the second Joint Resolution denying the
respondents’ motion for reconsideration on January 25, 2008, and Ombudsman Gutierrez
approved this resolution only on April 15, 2008. Ultimately, the informations charging
the respondents with four different crimes based on the complaint of Cong. Jimenez were
all filed on April 15, 2008, thereby leading to the commencement of Criminal Case No.
SB-08- CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266. In sum, the fact-finding
investigation and preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly
five years and five months.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually
long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to
criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate
and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright
violation of the respondents’ right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of
their cases. If, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,94 the Court ruled that a delay of almost three
years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of his
case, taking into account the following, namely: (a) the complaint had been resurrected
only after the accused had a falling out with former President Marcos, indicating that
political motivations had played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process; (b) the Tanodbayan had blatantly departed from the established procedure
prescribed by law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (c) the simple factual
and legal issues involved did not justify the delay, there is a greater reason for us to hold
so in the respondents’ case.

To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or that
the delay was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State miserably failed.

For one, the State explains that the criminal cases could not be immediately filed in court
primarily because of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause, like
not having a document showing that the funds (worth US$1,999,965.00 as averred in the
complaint of Cong. Jimenez) had reached Secretary Perez;95 and that it could not obtain
the document, and to enable it to obtain the document and other evidence it needed to
await the ratification of the Agreement Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region (RP-HKSAR
Agreement),96 and the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RP-Swiss MLAT). 97

To us, however, the State’s dependence on the ratification of the two treaties was not a
sufficient justification for the delay. The fact-finding investigation had extended from
January 15, 2003, when Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the
Special Panel and referred the complaint of Cong. Jimenez for fact-finding investigation,
until November 14, 2005, when the FIO completed its fact-finding investigation. That
period accounted for a total of two years and 10 months. In addition, the FIO submitted
its report only on November 14, 2005, which was after the Department of Justice had
received on September 8, 2005 the letter from Wayne Walsh, the Deputy Government
Counsel of the Hongkong Special Administrative Region in response to the request for
assistance dated June 23, 2005,98 and the reply of the Office of Justice of Switzerland
dated February 10, 2005 and a subsequent letter dated February 21, 2005 from Liza
Favre, the Ambassador of Switzerland, to Atty. Melchor Arthur Carandang, Acting
Assistant Ombudsman, FIO, together with documents pertaining to the bank accounts
relevant to the investigation.99 For the Office of the Ombudsman to mark time until the
HKSAR Agreement and the Swiss-RP MLAT were ratified by the Senate before it would
proceed with the preliminary investigation was oppressive, capricious and vexatious,
because the respondents were thereby subjected to a long and unfair delay.

We should frown on the reason for the inordinate delay because the State would thereby
deliberately gain an advantage over the respondents during the preliminary investigation.
At no time should the progress and success of the preliminary investigation of a criminal
case be made dependent upon the ratification of a treaty by the Senate that would provide
to the prosecutorial arm of the State, already powerful and overwhelming in terms of its
resources, an undue advantage unavailable at the time of the investigation. To allow the
delay under those terms would definitely violate fair play and nullify due process of law
– fair play, because the field of contest between the accuser and the accused should at all
times be level; and due process of law, because no less that our Constitution guarantees
the speedy disposition of the case.

The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part
of the preliminary investigation because the former was only preparatory in relation to
the latter;100 and that the period spent in the former should not be factored in the
computation of the period devoted to the preliminary investigation.

The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.

The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution
applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasijudicial or administrative bodies.
The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the
State is accepted. Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter
for purposes of determining if the respondents’ right to the speedy disposition of their
cases had been violated.

There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State for the long delay of
more than five years in bringing the charges against the respondents before the proper
court. On the charge of robbery under Article 293 in relation to Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, the preliminary investigation would not require more than five
years to ascertain the relevant factual and legal matters. The basic elements of the
offense, that is, the intimidation or pressure allegedly exerted on Cong. Jimenez, the
manner by which the money extorted had been delivered, and the respondents had been
identified as the perpetrators, had been adequately bared before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The obtention of the bank documents was not indispensable to establish
probable cause to charge them with the offense. We thus agree with the following
observation of the Sandiganbayan, viz:

With the Ombudsman’s finding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated on
February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to
Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favor of the accused, there is
no reason why within a reasonable period from these dates, the complaint should not be
resolved. The act of intimidation was there, the asportation was complete as of February
23, 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge
of Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon
which to anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint or dismiss it are
on hand. The case is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear
transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the
constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded the Ombudsman to act
within reasonable time. 101

In fine, the Office of the Ombudsman transgressed the respondents' right to due process
as well as their right to the speedy disposition of their case.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari for their lack of

merit.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806               April 7, 2014

(Formerly A.M. No. 11-4-36-MTCC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE BORROMEO R. BUSTAMANTE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES, ALAMINOS CITY, PANGASINAN, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present administrative matter arose from the judicial audit of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, then presided by Judge Borromeo
R. Bustamante (Bustamante). Judge Bustamante retired on November 6, 2010.

Considering the impending retirement of Judge Bustamante, a judicial audit of the MTCC
was conducted on September 21, 2010 by a team from the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). In a Memorandum1 dated October 6, 2010, Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) Raul Bautista Villanueva (Villanueva) informed Judge Bustamante
of the initial audit findings that, as of audit date, there were 35 cases for decision (21 of
which were already beyond the reglementary period) and 23 cases with pending incidents
for resolution (19 of which were already beyond the reglementary period) in Judge
Bustamante’s court. At the end of his Memorandum, DCA Villanueva gave Judge
Bustamante the following directives:

1. EXPLAIN in writing within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof your failure
to: [a] decide within the reglementary period Civil Case Nos. 1847, 1870, 1937,
1978, 2056 and 2205, LRC Nos. 28, 65 and 70, and Criminal Case Nos. 5428,
6468, 6469, 6558, 7222, 7721, 8163, 8390, 8395, 8654, 9022 and 9288; and, [b]
resolve the incidents in Civil Case Nos. 1668 and 2132, Criminal Case Nos. 8004,
8005, 8006, 8580, 9015, 9016, 9190, 9191, 9196, 9232 and 9235;

2. DECIDE with dispatch the cases enumerated in item (I) above, and to SUBMIT
copies of the decisions to this Office within three (3) days after your compulsory
retirement; and

3. RESOLVE with dispatch the incidents for resolution in the cases enumerated in
item (II) above, and to SUBMIT copies of the resolution to this Office within the
same period indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph.2

Judge Bustamante submitted a letter3 dated November 8, 2010,4 addressed to DCA

Villanueva, in which he explained:

I have the honor to inform you that I have decided all the cases, Civil, LRC and Criminal
Cases submitted before my last day in office on November 5, 2010 except Civil Cases
Nos. 1937 (Bustillo vs. Sps. Rabago) and 2056 (Cale vs. Pader, et al.) because of lack of
TSN taken when I was not yet the Presiding Judge. I found out that there is [a] need to
retake the testimonies of the witness concerned so as to attain substantial justice.

As to why I failed to decide the said cases within the reglementary period, it was because
of the volume of work in this court. As it was noticed by the Auditors when they came
over to audit, I have already started deciding with drafts attached to the records but I was
overtaken by more pressing matters that I have to take immediate attention, like urgent
motions, motions to dismiss, motions to quash, approval of bails. All of these are in
addition to my trial duties.

I have to work as early as 7:30 o’clock in the morning, and sometimes at 7:00 o’clock,
with the desire to finish everything on time. I burned my candle at night just [to] comply
with my duties within the time frame but because of human frailties, I failed to do so on
time because as I said[,] of the volume of work in this court. But nonetheless I have
decided all the cases submitted for decision before I retired except, as above stated, Civil
Cases Nos. 1737 and 2056 because of the reasons already stated.

Judge Bustamante further accounted for the cases with incidents for resolution, as
follows:

In Civil Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Civil Cases Nos. 1668 and
2132. However, the motion to dismiss by defendant Celeste in Civil Case No. 2222,
considering the opposition of the plaintiff because of their counterclaim, I believed the
motion needs further hearing, hence, the motion was not resolved. Similarly, the motion
to dismiss in Civil Case No. 2254 needs further hearing, and if no order setting the
motion for hearing, it may be an oversight because of the submission of several cases for
decision almost at the same time.

In Criminal Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Crim. Cases Nos. 9015 &
9016 (People vs. Paltep vda. De Perio) and Crim. Cases Nos. 9148 & 9149 (People vs.
Anselmo, Jr.) while Crim. Case No. 9196 was set for further hearing.

On the motion to suspend proceedings in Crim. Cases Nos. 9190 & 9191, it may have
been an oversight because these cases are the off-shoots of Civil Case No. 2222 and pre-
trial conference for the marking of documentary evidence has been subsequently set but
the counsel for the accused failed to appear.

The motion to dismiss in Crim. Cases Nos. 8615, 8616 & 8617, was not resolved because
of the prayer of the parties in open court for them to await the resolution of the civil cases
they filed before the Regional Trial Court, as they are working for the settlement of these
civil cases, which may have [an] effect in these cases.

The other incidents were set for hearing so that the court could judiciously resolve the
matter.5

In support of his compliance, Judge Bustamante submitted to the OCA copies of the
decisions and resolutions he referred to in his letter.

The OCA submitted to the Court its Memorandum6 dated March 24, 2011, reporting viz:
 (1) Judge Bustamante had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his court.
Of the 33 cases decided by Judge Bustamante, 13 were still within the
reglementary period while 20 were already beyond the reglementary period. Of the
20 cases Judge Bustamante had decided beyond the reglementary period, 10 were
decided more than a year after their respective due dates (ranging from 1 year and
8 days to 4 years and 7 months beyond the due dates) and 10 were decided within
a year after their respective due dates (ranging from 5 days to 6 months beyond the
due dates).

(2) Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending
incidents in his court, all of which were resolved beyond their respective
reglementary periods (ranging from 5 days to 3 years, 8 months, and 16 days after
the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with pending incidents in his court, Judge
Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require further hearing; (b) there is a
need to await the resolution of other cases pending before other courts; and (c)
oversight. The OCA noted, though, that Judge Bustamante failed to submit any
order setting the pending incidents for hearing or holding in abeyance the
resolution of the same until the related cases before other courts have already been
decided.

Unconvinced by Judge Bustamante’s explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases

and resolving pending incidents, the OCA recommended that:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that retired Judge Borromeo R.

Bustamante, formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan,
be FINED in the amount of ₱20,000.00 for gross inefficiency.

In a Resolution7 dated February 8, 2012, the case was re-docketed as a regular

administrative matter.

Judge Bustamante wrote the Court a letter dated July 3, 2013, stating that although he
already retired from the service on November 6, 2010, he has yet to receive his retirement
benefits (except for his accumulated leave credits), because of the pendency of the instant
administrative matter against him. Consequently, Judge Bustamante prayed that the
administrative matter be resolved soonest so he could already receive his retirement
benefits or that his retirement benefits be released but a certain amount commensurate to
the fine that the Court might impose be withheld.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a
member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of
the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true
to its commitment to provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a
speedy disposition of their cases.8

The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that
a judge must decide cases within 90 days from submission. As the Court summed up in
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar 9:

Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judges must decide all cases within
three months from the date of submission. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted
at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (Branch 1), Surigao City, the Court held that:

A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is
submitted for decision. Judges are to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide
cases within the period specified in the Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of
the last pleading, brief or memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground
for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient justification for
his non-compliance therewith.

Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer
justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the court's
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that:

A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an
extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the
required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3, Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend
promptly to the business of the court and decide cases within the periods prescribed by
law and the Rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, lower court judges are also mandated to
decide cases within 90 days from submission.

Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the
integrity, competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of
justice more efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this
duty so as not to negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems
of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-day
reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period
constitutes a ground for administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for
the delay. (Citation omitted.)
This Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the
constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no
matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not
only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and
confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute.10

A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she
should instead persevere in its implementation.11 Heavy caseload and demanding
workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of
cases.12 The Court usually allows reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of
the heavy caseload of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the 90-day
reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for
an extension and such request is generally granted.13 But Judge Bustamante did not ask
for an extension in any of these cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required
period, without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is liable
for undue delay that merits administrative sanction.1âwphi1

Equally unacceptable for the Court is Judge Bustamante’s explanation that he failed to
decide Civil Case Nos. 1937 and 2056 because of the lack of Transcript of Stenographic
Notes (TSN). These two cases were allegedly heard when he was not yet the presiding
judge of the MTCC. Relevant herein is the ruling of the Court in Re: Problem of Delays
in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan14:

The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself. In Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3,
1989, the Supreme Court provided that "A case is considered submitted for decision upon
the admission of the evidence of the parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90)
days period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for
decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall
be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the
expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of stenographic
notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period for deciding the case
unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which
case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days from the completion of the
transcripts within which to decide the same." x x x (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted.)

The OCA reported that contrary to his claim, Judge Bustamante substantially heard Civil
Case Nos. 1937 and 2056, until the two cases were submitted for decision on November
20, 2009 and February 27, 2010, respectively. Even if it were true that the two cases were
heard by the previous presiding judge of the MTCC, there is no showing that from the
time the cases had been submitted for decision until Judge Bustamante’s retirement on
November 6, 2010, Judge Bustamante made an effort to have the TSN completed.
Although technically, the 90-day period would have started to run only upon the
completion of the TSN, the Court finds Judge Bustamante’s lack of effort to have the
TSN completed as the root cause for the delay in deciding the two cases.

The Court is likewise unconvinced that the pending incidents in several cases were left
unresolved because of the need for further hearings in the same. The incidents were
already submitted for resolution and, as the OCA observed, Judge Bustamante only saw
the need for further hearings in said cases after the conduct of the judicial audit. In
addition, Judge Bustamante did not submit any order setting the cases for hearing.

Least acceptable of Judge Bustamante’s explanations for his delay in deciding cases
and/or resolving pending incidents was oversight. A judge is responsible, not only for the
dispensation of justice but also for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt
delivery of court services. Since he is the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions, he should know the cases submitted to him for
decision or resolution, especially those pending for more than 90 days.15

There is no dispute that Judge Bustamante failed to decide cases and resolve pending
incidents within the reglementary period, and without authorized extension from the
Court and valid reason for such failure, Judge Bustamante is administratively liable for
undue delay in rendering a decision or order.

Under the amendments to Rule 14016 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a
decision or order is a less serious charge, for which the respondent judge shall be
penalized with either (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00, but not
more than ₱20,000.00.

Considering the significant number of cases and pending incidents left

undecided/unresolved or decided/resolved beyond the reglementary period by Judge
Bustamante; as well as the fact that Judge Bustamante had already retired and can no
longer be dismissed or suspended, it is appropriate to impose upon him a penalty of a fine
amounting to ₱20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds retired Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, former Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, GUILTY of
undue delay in rendering decisions and orders, and imposes upon him a FINE of
₱20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189171               June 3, 2014

EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA, Petitioner,
vs.
DAN JOEL LIM and RICHARD TAN, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for the reversal of the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 26 September 2008, and its subsequent Resolution3 dated 26 August
2009. Both dismissed the Petition for Review4 filed by Edilberto L. Barcelona (petitioner)
for lack of merit.

The CA affirmed the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolutions dated 18 December
20065 and 28 August 2007,6which in turn affirmed the Order dated 27September 2000
issued by the Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Roy V.
Señeres (Chairperson Señeres or simply Chairperson). The Order barred petitioner, who
was then the officer-in-charge of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC, from
entering its premises a month before the Efficiency and Integrity Board (Board) could
investigate the administrative case for dishonesty and grave misconduct filed against him.

The records disclose that on 14 August 2000, respondent businessman Dan Joel Lim
(Lim), the owner of Top Gun Billiards, filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (sworn statement)
with the Criminal Intelligence Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Lim claimed as follows: (1) his employees, Arnel E.Ditan and Pilipino Ubante, were
influenced by petitioner to file a labor complaint against Lim;7 and (2) petitioner, then an
NLRC officer, demanded 20,000 for the settlement of the labor case filed against Lim.
On the strength of this sworn statement, the NBI organized an entrapment operation
against petitioner.

On 16 August 2000, Lim informed the NBI that petitioner would drop by Top Gun
Billiards around seven o’clock in the evening, expecting to receive the 20,000 petitioner
was demanding from him; otherwise, petitioner would order that Top Gun Billiards be
closed. After Lim handed him the marked bills, petitioner began counting them. The
latter was arrested by the NBI right when he was about to put the money in his bag.

After being duly informed of his constitutional rights, petitioner was brought to the NBI
office where he was booked, photographed, and fingerprinted. Thereafter, he underwent
ultraviolet light examination. The Certification dated 16 August 2000of the NBI-Forensic
Chemistry Division stated that his hands "showed the presence [of] Yellow Fluorescent
Specks and Smudges,"8 and that "[s]imilar examinations made on the money bills showed
the presence of yellow fluorescent specks and smudges x x x."9
In a letter to the City Prosecutor of Manila, NBI Director Federico M. Opinion, Jr.
recommended the prosecution of petitioner for robbery under Article 293 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The NBI filed the Complaint. Finding probable cause, the City
Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on 18 August 2000 an
Information against petitioner for the crime of robbery.

It was further discovered that while the inquest papers were being prepared by the NBI,
Richard Tan (Tan), owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, had filed a similar extortion
Complaint against petitioner. The latter supposedly asked him to pay ₱15,000 in
exchange for the settlement of a fabricated case.10

Reports of the circumstances leading to the arrest and filing of the Complaints against
petitioner were submitted by Tan and Lim to Chairperson Señeres. On17 August 2000,
copies of the documentary evidence11 against petitioner were likewise endorsed to the
Chairperson.12

Finding a prima facie case against petitioner, Chairperson Señeres issued Administrative
Order No. 9-02 Series of 2000 on 1 September 2000, formally charging him with
dishonesty and grave misconduct. The Order created a panel (the Board) to look into the
present case; require petitioner to file an answer to the charges; conduct an investigation;
and thereafter submit its report/recommendation.13 The Order also placed petitioner under
a 90-day preventive suspension upon receipt thereof.

The Board issued a Summons dated 19 September 2000 directing petitioner to answer the
charges against him. Both the Order and the Summons were served on him, but he
refused to receive them.14 He never filed an Answer.

Lim, Tan, and the NBI agents involved in the entrapment operations appeared at the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Board on 28 September 2000 in order to
confirm their accusations against petitioner.

On 23 October 2000, the Board conducted a hearing attended by petitioner with three of
his lawyers. He manifested therein that he was not subjecting himself to its
jurisdiction.15 Thus, he left without receiving copies of the Order and other documents
pertinent to the case.16

The Board resolved the administrative case ex parte. It found that petitioner had been
caught red-handed in the entrapment operation. His guilt having been substantially
established,17 the Board in its 31 October 2000 Report/Recommendation18 found him
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Upon approval of this recommendation by
NLRC Chairperson Señeres on 14 November 2000, petitioner was dismissed from
service.
A copy of the Board’s Decision was received by petitioner on 22 November 2000. On 1
December 2000, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time Within Which to File the
Proper Responsive Pleading, but it was denied.19

Petitioner appealed to the CSC. In his Appeal Memorandum,20 he presented his side of
the story. He claimed to have visited Lim’s establishment to play billiards every now and
then. Before going home, he would supposedly drop by the place, which was a mere 5- to
10-minute tricycle ride away from where he lived.21 When Lim’s employees discovered
that petitioner worked for the NLRC, they told him of their employer’s labor law
violations.22 Thus, petitioner assisted them in filing a case against Lim and later
scheduled the case for a conference on 10 August 2000.

Two days before the scheduled conference, petitioner was informed by one of the
employees that Lim wanted to speak with him. Lim supposedly offered petitioner money
to drop the labor case filed against the former. According to petitioner, this offer was
"flatly rejected."23

The next day, when petitioner went to Lim’s establishment to play billiards, a billiard
hustler by the name of Abel Batirzal (hustler) informed him that Lim required everyone
playing in the establishment to lay a wager on the games they played.24 Since he
"abhorred" gambling, petitioner decided to discourage the hustler by raising the amount
the latter proposed.25

Petitioner lost to the hustler. As the former was about to leave the establishment, he
discovered that his cellular phone and pack of Philip Morris cigarettes were no longer
where he left them. The security guard on duty informed him that a certain Ian Gumban
had stolen the items.26

Petitioner went straight to the Western Police District Station and filed a Complaint for
theft, billiard hustling, syndicated gambling, swindling, and violation of city ordinances
against Lim and three of the latter’s employees or friends.27

A day after the foregoing incident, or on 10August 2000, neither Lim nor his employees
appeared at the scheduled conference. On the evening of the same day, petitioner went to
Lim’s establishment to check on the employees. There they told him to consider their
Complaint withdrawn, since Lim had already decided to settle the case with them.
Accordingly, the case was dropped from the NLRC’s calendar. 28

Petitioner claims that on 16 August 2000, the day of the alleged entrapment, he received
a call from Lim. The person who had stolen petitioner’s cellphone was supposedly
willing to return it at seven that evening at Lim’s billiards hall.29
When petitioner arrived, he saw Lim and one of the latter’s employees. Lim approached
petitioner and informed him that the thief could no longer return the phone. The thief had
allegedly decided to just pay the value of the phone and entrust the money to Lim. The
latter tried to give the money to petitioner and urged him to count it, as the former was
not sure how much the thief had given. Petitioner supposedly refused to receive and
count the cash and, instead, insisted that Lim arrange a meeting with the thief. 30

Because petitioner would not take the money, Lim inserted the wad of cash into the open
pocket of the former’s shoulder bag.31Just when petitioner was about to pull out the
money and throw it back to Lim, the NBI agents appeared and arrested petitioner who
recalls the incident as follows:

x x x [W]hile trying to retrieve the unduly incriminating wad of money to throw it back
to Mr. Lim, aboutfive or seven burly men accosted petitioner without properly identifying
themselves and with strong-arm tactics, hand-cuffed him over his vehement protestations.
One of the burly men even pointed his gun at petitioner’s face as he and his companions
wrestled petitioner to a car. x x x.32

With respect to Tan, petitioner claims that the latter never demanded or received any sum
of money from him. Allegedly, Tan was only displeased with petitioner’s active
assistance to one of Tan’s aggrieved employees.33

Petitioner further claims that even before Chairperson Señeres formally charged him with
dishonesty and grave misconduct, the former had already filed an urgent request for an
emergency leave of absence because of the alarming threats being made against him and
the members of his family.34

Petitioner asked the CSC to nullify the 27 September 2000 Order of Chairperson Señeres.
The Order barred petitioner from entering the NLRC premises a month before the hearing
conducted by the Board. He then questioned its impartiality. As proof of his allegation,
he made much of the fact that the Board denied his Motion for Extension of Time Within
Which to File a Proper Responsive Pleading.35

Six years after petitioner had filed his Appeal Memorandum, the CSC dismissed it. The
dispositive portion of its Resolution36 dated 18 December 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Edilberto S. (sic) Barcelona is hereby DISMISSED.

Accordingly, the Decision dated November 14, 2000 of Roy R. Seneres, [Chairperson,]
(NLRC) finding him guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and imposing upon him
the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-entering government service, forfeiture of retirement benefits and bar from taking
any civil service examinations is hereby AFFIRMED.37
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 15 January 2007.38 He questioned the
validity of his dismissal by asserting that before its implementation, the NLRC had the
legal duty of obtaining its confirmation by the Department of Labor and Employment
(Labor) Secretary.39

On 28 August 2007, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CSC
through a Resolution.40

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review, but it was dismissed by the CA in the assailed
Decision dated 26 September 2008.41

A Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of Honorable Justice
Vicente S.E. Veloso (Justice Veloso)42 was then filed by petitioner. The latter cited the
following reasons for the prayer for inhibition:

1) Honorable Justice Veloso was a Commissioner of public respondent NLRC at

the time of the subject incident; and

2) The undersigned counsel, eldest son of petitioner, just recently resigned from
the law firm where the daughter of Justice Veloso is working. 43

Justice Veloso, in a Resolution44 dated 27 February 2009, stated that while the grounds
invoked by petitioner did not constitute valid bases for an inhibition, the former would
voluntarily inhibit "to assuage petitioner in whatever fears he may have" over the CA’s
handling of the Motion for Reconsideration.

Thereafter, the CA issued the assailed Resolution45 dated 26 August 2009 denying

petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. In spite of his voluntary inhibition, Justice
Veloso still signed the herein questioned Resolution to signify his concurrence.

Hence, this Petition praying for the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the
appellate court and the dismissal of the administrative Complaint filed against
petitioner.46

This Court required respondents Lim and Tan to file their respective Comments, but
neither of them complied. Since copies of the Resolution ordering them to Comment
were personally served upon them, the Court resolved to consider them to have waived
their right to comment on the Petition.47

Petitioner comes before this Court raising the following arguments:

1. The CA decided a question of substance "not in accord with the applicable law
and jurisprudence" when it:
 a. Denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration with the participation of
Justice Veloso, who had earlier voluntarily inhibited himself from the case.

b. Ruled that petitioner was not denied due process of law in spite of
overwhelming proof that the NLRC chairperson failed to act with
impartiality in deciding petitioner’s case.

c. Ruled that petitioner’s appeal to the CSC had not been filed on time,
even though the commission itself did not question the timeliness of
that.1âwphi1

d. Ruled that the findings of the CSC were supported by evidence.

2. The CA, like the CSC, failed to address all the issues presented by petitioner
when it chose to keep silent on the following issues:

a. The denial of the right of petitioner to the speedy disposition of his case;
and

b. The failure of the disciplining authority to obtain the confirmation by the

Department head of the former’s decision to dismiss petitioner from
service.48

We reduce the issues to the following:

Whether petitioner was denied due process of law;

II

Whether the factual findings of the CSC are supported by evidence;

III

Whether the CA had the authority to review matters not assigned by the parties as issues;

IV

Whether the right of petitioner to the speedy disposition of his case has been violated by
the CSC; and

V
Whether the NLRC violated the Civil Service Rules provision, which allows the
execution of a penalty of removal decreed by a bureau or office head, pending appeal
thereof to the CSC, only when the penalty has been confirmed by the Secretary of the
department concerned.

Petitioner was not denied due

process of law.

Petitioner claims he was denied due process of law due to the partiality of Chairperson
Señeres, the Board, the CSC, and the CA.

Considering the many complaints of petitioner, we deem it best to present an exhaustive

outline of his entire evidence therefor. Below are several circumstances he cites to prove
that he was not afforded the right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal.

According to petitioner, Chairperson Señeres served not only as the former’s accuser, but
also as judge and executioner.49 The Chairperson’s partiality was supposedly
demonstrated by the following acts:

1. On 10 November 2000, petitioner and his two sons allegedly approached and
asked Chairperson Señeres why he was persecuting petitioner. The Chairperson
supposedly replied: "Wala akong pakialam. Pasensya kayo. Tapos na ang tatay
ninyo!"50

2. Chairperson Señeres issued defamatory press releases to the media announcing

the preventive suspension of petitioner and depicting the latter as a corrupt
government official. The Chairperson allegedly took advantage of the situation of
petitioner in support of the former’s then prospective political career, to wit:

x x x [A]t the expense of petitioner, [he] took advantage of the opportunity to

project himself as a graft buster to further his sagging political career and burning
senatorial ambitions by immediately issuing press releases and causing the
malicious publication of the petitioner’s preventive suspension without affording
the latter due process of law.51

3. Lim never filed a written complaint against petitioner as required by Section 8

of the Civil Service Rules and, consequently, the latter was not given the chance to
file a counter-affidavit or comment on the written Complaint as mandated by
Section 11 of the Civil Service Rules.

4. No preliminary investigation was conducted as required by Section 12 of the

Civil Service Rules.
 5. Chairperson Señeres failed to serve the formal charge to petitioner in
accordance with Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (Civil Service Rules).52

6. The Order dated 1 September 2000, which immediately placed petitioner under
a 90-day preventive suspension, supposedly violated the requirement in Section 19
of the Civil Service Rules that an order of preventive suspension be issued only
upon service of the formal charge.

7. The Board created by Señeres to investigate the case denied the Motion for
Extension of Time filed by petitioner, in order to ensure that the latter would no
longer be able to return to work.

As for the Board, its "lack of and glaring absence of impartiality and objectivity" was
supposedly shown by the following:53

1. A substantial portion of the Report/Recommendation of the Board shows that it

delved into petitioner’s expression of protest against the Chairperson’s unfair
treatment, and thereby reinforced petitioner’s apprehension that the case would not
be resolved on its merits.

2. The denial of petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time Within Which to File
the Proper Responsive Pleading dated 1 December 2000 was allegedly unjust and
groundless.

With respect to the CSC, petitioner claims that it "curiously amended" Section 43(2) of
the Civil Service Rules only three weeks after he had filed his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution denying his appeal.54

Lastly, petitioner bewails the supposed haphazard manner in which the CA disposed of
his claim that he had been denied due process of law. He claimed that it simply dismissed
the issue through a one-sentence ruling, which reads:

On the alleged failure of the NLRC to observe impartiality, suffice it to say that petitioner
failed to present proof to substantiate his self-serving allegations.55

In the eyes of petitioner, it would appear that every agency of the government that had a
hand in this case was, at his expense, either motivated by personal bias or driven by the
desire to advance its members’ political or professional careers in the government.

Petitioner’s claims are without merit.

Contrary to the assertions of petitioner, Chairperson Señeres did not act as the former’s
accuser, judge and executioner.56 To be clear, the accusers of petitioner were Lim and
Tan, while his judge was an independent Board formed to investigate his case. This Court
is aware that the Board only had the power to recommend, and that that latter’s
recommendation was still subject to the approval of the Chairperson. Still, petitioner
cannot claim that he was denied due process on this basis alone, because the remedy to
appeal to the proper administrative body—the CSC in this case—was still made available
to him.

Petitioner claims that Sections 8,11, 12, 16, and 19 of the Civil Service Rules were
violated by Chairperson Señeres. Petitioner misses the point that strict compliance with
the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law. Administrative rules
of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object as well as to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses.57

This Court finds that both Chairperson Señeres and the Board essentially complied with
the procedure laid down in the Civil Service Rules. Where due process is present, the
administrative decision is generally sustained.58

The claim of petitioner that he was denied due process is negated by the circumstances of
the case at bar.

The Report/Recommendation of the Board shows that both complainant and respondent
were given the opportunity to be heard by the Board and to adduce their respective sets of
evidence, which were duly considered and taken into account in its Decision.

Petitioner insists that Lim never filed a written complaint against him as required by
Section 8 of the Civil Service Rules. Petitioner further complains that he was not given
the chance to file a counter affidavit, a right provided by Section 11 of the Civil Service
Rules. The records disclose, however, that reports leading to his arrest and the filing of
the Complaint against him were submitted by Tan and Lim to the Chairperson of the
NLRC. On the basis of the sworn statements supporting the criminal Complaint against
petitioner, Chairperson Señeres found a prima facie case against him and issued the Order
formally charging him with dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Furthermore, the Board gave petitioner the chance to answer the charges against him
when it issued its 19 September 2000 Summons for that very purpose. He does not deny
that he was served a copy of the Summons, but that he refused to receive it. It was his
choice not to file an answer. After he decided to waive this right, we cannot now allow
him to claim that he has been deprived of the right to air his side through an answer or a
counter-affidavit.

Petitioner further claims that Chairperson Señeres violated Section 12 of the Civil Service
Rules when the latter dispensed with the requirement of conducting a preliminary
investigation. It is important to note that this preliminary investigation required by
Section 12 of the Civil Service Rules is not the same as that required in criminal cases.
Section 12 defines a preliminary investigation of administrative cases in the Civil Service
as an "ex parte examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant and
the person complained of, as well as documents readily available from other government
offices." Petitioner presents no evidence to prove that either Chairperson Señeres or the
Board failed to examine these records. In fact, the records show that, on 28 September
2000, Lim and Tan appeared in the preliminary investigation conducted by the Board to
confirm their sworn statements and the criminal cases they had filed against petitioner.
That he submitted no documents for consideration in the preliminary investigation was
his choice.

According to petitioner, no formal charge was ever filed against him as mandated by
Section 16 of the Civil Service Rules. He now claims that Chairperson Señeres had no
right to place him under preventive suspension, because Section 19 of the Civil Service
Rules requires that a formal charge be served on petitioner before an order of preventive
suspension may be issued. The provision reads:

SECTION 19. Preventive Suspension. — Upon petition of the complainant or motu

proprio, the proper disciplining authority may issue an order of preventive suspension
upon service of the Formal Charge, or immediately thereafter to any subordinate officer
or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge involves:

a. dishonesty;

b. oppression;

c. grave misconduct;

d. neglect in the performance of duty; or

e. If there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which
would warrant his removal from the service.

An order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily remove the respondent

from the scene of his misfeasance or malfeasance and to preclude the possibility of
exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against him or tampering of
documentary evidence on file with his Office.

In lieu of preventive suspension, for the same purpose, the proper disciplining authority
or head of office, may reassign respondent to other units of the agency during the formal
hearings.
In this case, the Order was the formal charge. It was served on petitioner, but he refused
to receive it. He claims that on 27 September 2000, or a month before the hearing
conducted by the Board, Chairperson Señeres barred him from entering the NLRC
premises. Petitioner was thereby denied access to evidence and witnesses that could
support his case.59 But, as revealed by Section 19, Chairperson Señeres had the right to
issue an Order of preventive suspension pending investigation by the Board, because
petitioner was being charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Moreover, the Order of Chairperson Señeres preventing petitioner from entering the
latter’s office was also valid under Section 19. This Order was meant to preclude
petitioner from possibly exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against
him or to prevent him from tampering with documentary evidence on file with his office.
This preventive measure is sanctioned by law.

As established by the facts, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard and to
adduce his evidence. This opportunity was enough for one to comply with the
requirements of due process in an administrative case. The formalities usually attendant
in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, as long as the
parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their respective sets of evidence. 60

As regards the charge of lack of impartiality, we agree with the CA’s pronouncement that
petitioner failed to substantiate his self-serving allegations. Mere suspicion of partiality
does not suffice.61

Chairperson Señeres released statements to the media regarding the case of petitioner and
allegedly told him and his children that the Chairperson did not care about their woes.
Assuming this allegation to be true, it did not necessarily mean that Chairperson Señeres
was incapable of deciding the case without bias. These acts did not satisfactorily prove
the claim that in order to promote and further his political ambitions, he took advantage
of petitioner’s situation. As the NLRC Chairperson, he had the duty to answer the
questions of the media on the status of the cases against graft and corrupt practices
involving government officials under his commission. Furthermore, his statements to
petitioner and the latter’s family are not sufficient for this Court to believe that every one
of his acts, in relation to the case of petitioner, was meant to ensure the latter’s downfall
at whatever cost.

Similarly, the denial of petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time, does not prove that the
tribunal failed to be impartial.

Petitioner is banking on one incident in which his Motion was denied. The denial in
itself, without any extrinsic evidence to establish bias, does not prove that he was denied
his right to be judged by an impartial and independent tribunal. While petitioner had the
right to file a Motion for Extension of Time, he did not have the right to expect that the
Motion would be granted. Absent any proof that the denial of this motion was made in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court will not
interfere with the pronouncement of the quasi-judicial body.

Lastly, the CSC has the power and the authority to amend the Civil Service Rules
whenever it deems the amendment necessary. The insinuation of petitioner that this
change was made for the sole purpose of hurting his appeal is a mere product of his
imagination. The CSC is under no obligation to review all the cases before it and, on the
basis thereof, decide whether or not to amend its internal rules.

We note, though, that the authority of the CSC to amend the rules does not give it the
authority to apply the new provision retroactively. The consequence of an illegal
retroactive application of a provision is discussed below.

The finding of the CSC that

petitioner is guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct is supported by the
evidence.

With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the factual findings of the
CSC, the CA ruled as follows:

Finally, it is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies such as the Civil
Service Commission are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court and
the Supreme Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise
on the specific matters under their consideration.62

Petitioner now claims that the CA did not even bother to discuss his allegation that the
findings of the CSC were not supported by evidence.63 Unimpressed by the CA
Resolution, he is now asking this Court to review the factual findings of the CSC.

Believing that the CSC found him guilty based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by
Lim before the NBI, petitioner insists that this piece of evidence is insufficient to support
the CSC’s conclusions.64 He claims that there is no specific allegation in the sworn
statement of Lim whether petitioner demanded money from the former; "who set the
alleged August 16, 2000 meeting at Mr. Lim’s billiard center; how it was agreed; and
what was the purpose of that meeting."65

Petitioner casts doubt on the veracity of the statements of Lim, who supposedly filed a
report against him with the NBI a few days after filing a theft Complaint against
him.66 According to petitioner, Lim should not be believed, because all of the latter’s
allegations are fueled only by vengefulness.
After claiming that Lim’s statement should not be trusted because of "ill-
motive,"67 petitioner now questions the motives of the CSC and the NBI.

Anent the reliance of the CSC on the Sinumpaang Salaysay, petitioner decries:

To an unprejudiced, reasonable mind, the statement of Mr. Lim is not sufficient evidence
to pin down petitioner for such a serious offense as Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
The NLRC read more into the document and put words into the mouth of Mr. Lim.

Unfortunately, the CSC blindly affirmed the NLRC’s findings just to dispose of the case
after unreasonably sitting on it for more than six (6) long years.68

With respect to the NBI agents, petitioner harps on their eagerness to believe Lim’s
Complaint without even bothering to investigate. Petitioner explains his point:

[T]he NBI agents who conducted the alleged entrapment operation were motivated by the
desire to record an "accomplishment" and to obtain "commendatory results" due to the
highly competitive police function and law enforcement activities."69

We affirm the CA’s findings.

First, except for his accusations, petitioner presents no proof that the CSC "blindly"
affirmed the NLRC’s ruling just to get rid of the case. A reading of the Resolutions of the
CSC reveals otherwise. They thoroughly discussed the factual circumstances surrounding
this case, the evidence, and why and how the conclusion was reached. In order to
overcome the validity of these Resolutions, petitioner must present evidence to prove that
the evidence relied on by the CSC was unsubstantial.

In attempting to prove that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove his guilt,
petitioner asks this Court to focus on the inadequacy of Lim’s Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Contrary to these assertions, however, the following pieces of evidence—in addition to
Lim’s sworn statement—were considered by the CSC in resolving petitioner’s appeal:

1. The sworn statement of Tan, who appeared in the preliminary investigation

conducted by the Board to confirm that he had filed a similar extortion Complaint
against petitioner;70

2. The Report and the evidence presented by NBI Special Investigator Marvin E.
de Jemil, who appeared before the Board to confirm the contents of his Report,
findings, and evidence against petitioner in support of the administrative charges
filed against the latter; and
 3. The statement of the arresting officers who apprehended petitioner in the
entrapment operation, and who also appeared in the continuing investigation to
affirm the contents of their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.71

Factual findings of administrative bodies like the CSC are binding on this Court, unless
these findings are not supported by substantial evidence.72 In this case, we rule that the
findings of fact and conclusions of the CSC have passed the test of substantiality. It is
sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by the evidence on record; or,
stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by
evidence.73 The absence of substantial evidence is not shown by stressing that there is
contrary evidence on record, whether direct or circumstantial.74

All the pieces of evidence presented before the CSC point to the guilt of petitioner.
Several persons, both private individuals and law enforcers, came forward to testify and
present evidence to prove the allegations against him. In fact, each testimony
corroborated the testimonies of the others, effectively allowing the CSC to form a
complete picture of the incidents that led to the ultimate act of extortion.

As defined in the landmark case Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,75 all that is
needed to support an administrative finding of fact is substantial evidence, which is
defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." The evidence presented in the present case is more than enough to
support the conclusion reached.

Where the findings of fact of a quasi-judicial body are supported by substantial evidence,
these findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate court.76 Thus, the CA did not
err in ruling that the CSC had committed no error in finding that petitioner was guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct.

In the case at bar, petitioner accuses the NBI agents of being driven by "ill-motive." In
the absence of credible evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties prevails over his unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions, to wit:

Between the naked assertions of accused-appellant and the story recounted by the
NARCOM agents, jurisprudence dictates that the latter is to be given more weight. Aside
from having in his favor the presumption of regular performance of duty, we find as the
court a quo did that the testimony of Lt. Cantos is more credible, being fully and
convincingly corroborated, as opposed to that of accused-appellant. Besides, no improper
motive to falsely accuse appellant could be imputed to him. In the absence of proof of
such motive to falsely impute a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty as well as the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim
of having been "framed up."77
This rule holds true for the present case. Not only do the NBI agents have in their favor
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties; their statements are
credible and corroborated as well. After being caught red-handed, petitioner needs
extrinsic evidence to back up his allegations to prove that the NBI agents had an ulterior
motive to falsely impute the crime to him.

The appellate court has the authority

to review matters that the parties
have not specifically raised or
assigned as error.

Petitioner questions the propriety of the following pronouncement of the CA:

We likewise note that petitioner’s appeal to the CSC was made beyond the reglementary
period. Admittedly, petitioner received the Decision of the NLRC on 22 November 2000.
Petitioner’s motion for extension of time within which to file the proper responsive
pleading filed on 1 December 2000 did not stop the running of the period for its finality,
and the Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum were filed only on 27 December
2000 or one (1) month and five (5) days from receipt of the Decision. Petitioner
erroneously counted the period within which to appeal from the date he received the
Order denying his motion for extension to file his responsive pleading.78

While petitioner does not deny that his appeal to the CSC was filed beyond the
reglementary period, he argues that the timeliness of his appeal has never been an issue.
He thus claims that only the issues raised by the parties may be resolved by the Court.

Petitioner is mistaken. An appeal throws the entire case open for review, viz:

[A]n appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that
this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error
by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the
case.79

Petitioner adds that the CA erred in applying technical rules strictly. According to him, if
its strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is
within this Court’s power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their
operation.80

We agree with petitioner’s claim that rules of procedure are established to secure
substantial justice, and that technical requirements may be dispensed with in meritorious
cases. However, we do not see how the CA, in deciding the case at bar, could have
overlooked this policy. Although it took notice of the failure of petitioner to file his
appeal with the CSC on time, and perhaps used this failure as a supporting argument, it
did not dismiss the Petition on that sole ground. In fact, a perusal of the CA Decision now
in question will reveal that the appellate court took cognizance of the case and adequately
discussed the pertinent issues raised by petitioner.

No violation of the right of petitioner

to the speedy disposition of his case.

Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum with the CSC on 27
December 2000,81 but it only issued its Resolution on 18 December 2006.

According to petitioner, he sees no justifiable reason for the six-year delay in the
resolution of his appeal before the CSC.82 He is now asking this Court to "rectify" the
wrong committed against him and his family by absolving him of the administrative
charges.83

Section 16, Rule III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, reads:

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept
of speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to resolve the
appeal of petitioner does not, by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right to
the speedy disposition of his case. After all, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case must also be
considered.84

Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr.,85 laid down the guidelines for determining the applicability of
Section 16, Rule III, to wit:

In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated,
certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of
delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice
caused by the delay. x x x.

The CSC maintains that "[p]etitioner failed to assert such right before the proceedings in
the CSC and, even assuming that there was delay in resolution of his appeal before the
CSC, no prejudice was caused to him."86

Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that the fact that he made several telephone calls to
inquire about the status of his appeal87 and sent to the Commissioner of the CSC a letter
dated 2 March 2001, informing the latter that the case had been "forwarded to CSC-Main
without action of CSC-NCR,"88 sufficiently proves that he did not fail to assert his right.
On this particular point, we have to agree with the CSC that "the alleged telephone calls
made by petitioner are self-serving and lack corroborative evidence."89 Since there is no
way of ascertaining whether or not he actually made these phone calls, this allegation
cannot be given any probative value.

As to the letter petitioner allegedly sent to CSC Commissioner Jose Erestain, Jr., it is
apparent from the face of the letter that there is no indication at all that the intended
recipient actually received it.

The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or statute,
may be waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law. One’s right to the
speedy disposition of his case must therefore be asserted.90 Due to the failure of petitioner
to assert this right, he is considered to have waived it.

The NLRC did not violate the rule

against the execution of a penalty of
removal pending appeal to the CSC.

According to petitioner, when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the CSC on
15 January 2007, Section 43 of Rule III of the Civil Service Rules provided that a penalty
of removal from government service could not be executed pending appeal, unless the
Department Secretary concerned confirmed the imposition of the penalty,91 viz:

SECTION 43. Filing of Appeals. — Decisions of heads of departments, agencies,

provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding
thirty (30)days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be
appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.

In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,
the same may be initially appealed to the department head and finally to the Commission
Proper. Pending appeal, the same shall be executory except where the penalty is removal,
in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
concerned.

A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate
authority, copy furnished the disciplining office. The latter shall submit the records of the
case, which shall be systematically and chronologically arranged, paged and securely
bound to prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen (15) days, to the appellate
authority. (Emphasis supplied)
However, on 7 February 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07-0244,92 which amended
the aforementioned provision of the Civil Service Rules. The pertinent portion of the
CSC Resolution reads:

Section 43. Filing of Appeals. — Decisions of heads of department, agencies, provinces,

cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty
(30)days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed
to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,
the same may be initially appealed to the department head and finally to the Commission
Proper. Pending appeal, the same shall be executory except where the penalty is removal,
in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
concerned.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the decision of the head of an attached agency
imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office is appealable directly to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof. Pending appeal, the penalty imposed shall be executory,
including the penalty of removal from the service without need for the confirmation by
the department secretary to which the agency is attached.

A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate
authority, copy furnished the disciplining office. The later shall submit the records of the
case, which shall be systematically and chronologically arranged, paged and securely
bound to prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen (15) days, to the appellate
authority. (Emphasis in the original)

It appears that Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules is self-contradicting. While the
second paragraph provides that a penalty of removal "shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned," the third paragraph states: "Pending appeal,
the penalty imposed shall be executory, including the penalty of removal from the service
without need for the confirmation by the department secretary to which the agency is
attached." The CSC should look into the implication and/or consequence of its
amendment of the rules and should clarify how the newly enacted paragraph can operate,
without conflict, with the reenacted provisions of the old Section 43.

In any case, even if we were to assume that the new rules now declare that a penalty of
removal shall be executory pending appeal, without need for confirmation by the
secretary of the Department to which the agency is attached, this rule cannot and should
not be applied to petitioner’s case.
Resolution No. 07-0244 became effective 15 days after 21 March 2007, the day it was
published, or a few months before the CSC denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. This Court cannot declare that the amendment of the Civil Service
Rules while the case of petitioner was pending proves the lack of impartiality on the
CSC’s part as petitioner claims. However, it can and does now declare that the CSC had
no right to retroactively apply the amended provision to petitioner’s case.

Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. 93 When petitioner
was dismissed, the old Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules was still in effect. The
aforecited provision clearly states that the penalty of removal is not executory, pending
appeal, unless the penalty is confirmed by Secretary of the Department where the
dismissed employee works.

Petitioner now claims that because the penalty of dismissal imposed by Commissioner
Señeres was never confirmed by the Secretary of Labor, it could not have been executed
while his appeal to the CSC was ongoing; thus, he should have been allowed to continue
to work and receive his salary.94

We agree.

After a thorough review of the records of this case, however, the Court is convinced that
petitioner was never actually barred from returning to work after the 90-day period
lapsed. The records disclose that he made no attempt to return to work after the expiration
of the suspension period. Thus, he was never prevented from returning to work—he just
chose not to go back.

There is no question that 90-day preventive suspension was issued in accordance with
law. The moment this period expired, petitioner was automatically reinstated in the
service. This rule is clear in Section 20 of the Civil Service Rules, which reads thus:

SECTION 20. Duration of Preventive Suspension. — When the administrative case

against an officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of his preventive
suspension, unless otherwise provided by special law, he shall be automatically reinstated
in the service; provided that, when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the
fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay should not be included
in the counting of the 90 calendar days period of preventive suspension. Provided further
that should the respondent be on Maternity/Paternity leave, said preventive suspension
shall be deferred or interrupted until such time that said leave has been fully enjoyed.

Petitioner refused to receive the Order dated 1 September 2001 implementing his 90-day
preventive suspension. He was allowed to go to work until 27 September 2000—the day
he was supposedly barred from entering the office. Thus, his actual suspension from
work began on the latter date and expired 90 days thereafter, specifically on 25 December
2000.

By virtue of Section 20 of the Civil Service Rules, petitioner was automatically reinstated
on 26December 2000—the day after the preventive suspension period expired. Since he
never attempted to resume the performance of his duties after the expiration of the
preventive suspension, he cannot now claim that the penalty of removal was executed,
pending his appeal to the CSC, without the confirmation of the Secretary of Labor. Had it
been shown that he was prevented from returning to his post after the expiration of the
legally sanctioned preventive suspension, he would have been entitled to the payment of
his back salaries from the moment the suspension expired up to the time his dismissal
would have been implemented.

That he has never rendered any service to government that would authorize him to collect
backwages is beyond cavil. He was never prevented from returning to work after his
suspension, thus he is not entitled to any back salary.

With respect the 90-day suspension period, the Civil Service Rules do not state whether
an employee placed under preventive suspension is entitled to back salaries for the period
of suspension. However, in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,95 we ruled that an employee has
no right to compensation for preventive suspension pending investigation, even if the
employee is exonerated from the charges. Although a statutory provision was used to
justify the ruling therein, we also explained the principle behind the law, to wit:

The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is cogently stated in

Floyd R. Mechem’s A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers as follows:

Section 864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office. — An officer
who has been lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the
period during which he was so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined
that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason given is "that
salary and perquisites are the reward of express or implied services, and therefore cannot
belong to one who could not lawfully perform such services."

Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In
addition, his suspension must be unjustified. x x x.

The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty,

oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service
Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered "unjustified," even if later the charges are
dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. It is one of
those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this
reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the conclusion of the
investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the
investigation is not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be automatically
reinstated.96 (Emphasis in the original)

The same logic applies to the present case.

As regards the participation of Justice Veloso in the CA’s deliberation on the Motion for
Reconsideration after he had deliberately declared that he would voluntarily inhibit
himself from hearing the case, this Court is of the opinion that the propriety of his act is
best threshed out in an administrative case held for that purpose—one in which he can
file his comment and explain his side.

Lastly, considering the gravity of the offense committed by petitioner, the Office of the
Ombudsman should be directed to immediately investigate the matter and, if it thereafter
finds it necessary, to file the appropriate criminal charges against him.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 26
September 2008 and its Resolution dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100595, as
well as the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated 18 December 2006 and
28August 2007 are AFFIRMED.

The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby DIRECTED to immediately investigate the

criminal allegations described in this Decision, and if it finds appropriate, to file the
necessary criminal charges against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, March 08, 2016

SPOUSES CESAR AND THELMA SUSTENTO, Complainants, v. JUDGE FRISCO

T. LILAGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A judge is mandated to resolve with dispatch the cases and matters in his court, mindful
that any delay in their disposition erodes the faith of the people in the judicial system.

Antecedents

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the antecedents as follows:
x x x In the Administrative Complaint dated 05 July 2010 filed by Spouses Cesar and
Thelma Sustento, it was averred that the said complainants concurrently appear as the
"Defendants" in an Unlawful Detainer case ("Wilfreda Pontillan vs. Spouses Cesar
Sustento and Thelma Sustento," Civil Case No. 2008-05-CV-08, filed before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Tacloban City, Leyte) as well as the
"Plaintiffs" in a Specific Performance and Damages case ("Spouses Cesar Sustento and
Thelma Sustento vs. Wilfreda Pontillan, et al.," Civil Case no. 2005-03-37, before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, Leyte). In the Unlawful Detainer case,
complainants Spouses Sustento raised as one of their three affirmative defenses [in their
Answer] the alleged violation of non-forum-shopping rule by the plaintiff for their failure
to disclose the pending case for Specific Performance in the RTC, Branch 6, Tacloban
City, Leyte, involving the same property subject matter of the ejectment case. On 09
September 2008, Judge Sylvia Z. Pocpoc-Lamoste issued an Order decreeing inter
alia that "it is not plaintiffs duty to disclose the pendency of the case for Specific
Performance since it was not she who filed the case and [that] the issues and cause of
action of the cases are different x x x." On 29 September 2008, herein complainants
Spouses Sustento filed an Omnibus Motion for a reconsideration of the 09 September
2008 Order. However, in an Order dated 24 November 2008, Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste
denied the Omnibus Motion.

On 26 January 2009, complainants Spouses Sustento filed a Petition for Review on

Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Tacloban City, Leyte, praying for
the annulment of the aforecited Orders issued by Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste. In an Order
dated 03 March 2009, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan directed private respondents to
file their comment to the petition. On 31 March 2009, private respondents filed their
Comment/Answer. Complainants Spouses Sustento followed suit, filing a rejoinder to
Private Respondent's Comments/Answer.

Almost six (6) months had already elapsed [and only after complainants filed a motion
for Early Resolution, dated 08 September 2009] before respondent Judge Lilagan issued
an Order dated 15 September 2009 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Complainants
Spouses Sustento filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 01 December 2009, private
respondents' Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration was filed. On 08
December 2009, complainants Spouses Sustento filed their Reply.

On 10 December 2009, respondent Judge Lilagan issued an Order deeming the Motion
for Reconsideration submitted for resolution. However, up to the date of the instant
administrative matter was filed, respondent Judge Lilagan has still yet to resolve the
Motion for Reconsideration.1

On the basis of the foregoing, the complainants have charged the respondent with undue
delay in the resolution of the petition for certiorari they had filed to assail the adverse
order issued by Judge Sylvia Z. Pocpoc-Lamoste of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 1, in Tacloban City in Civil Case No. 2008-05-CV-08 entitled Wilfreda
Pontillan v. Spouses Cesar Sustento and Thelma Sustento, and undue delay in the
resolution of their motion for reconsideration beyond the prescribed 90-day period in
violation of the Administrative Circular No. 38-98 and Section 15, Article VIII of the
Constitution. They have further charged him with having issued the order of September
15, 2009 dismissing their petition for certiorari without passing upon the issues raised in
the petition by making findings of fact bereft of factual basis, and relying on information
that were immaterial and irrelevant to the petition.2

Later on, the complainants withdrew their charge against the respondent through their
motion dated October 7, 2010,3 stating that complainant Thelma Sustento had decided "to
give herself a softer atmosphere to focus more on the appeal of the main case from which
this complaint emanates."4

In his comment with motion,5 the respondent sought the termination of the case based on
the withdrawal of the complaint against him.

The OCA denied the motions of the parties, however, pointing out instead that the
complainants could not just withdraw the administrative complaint out of a sudden
change of mind;6 and that the unilateral act of the complainants did not control the Court's
exercise of its disciplinary power.7 It recommended to the Court the following actions on
the complaint, to wit:

1. That the instant administrative case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative

matter;

2.That respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34,
Tacloban City, be DIRECTED to submit a more responsive COMMENT to the
Complaint dated 05 July 2010 of Spouses Cesar A. Sustento and Thelma C. Sustento
within a non-extendible period often (10) days from notice; and

3. That failure to submit the required Comment within the given period shall be
considered a WAIVER of his right to file his comment and/or related pleadings relative
to the complaint.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the resolution promulgated on March 21, 2011,9 the Court re-docketed the case as a
regular administrative matter, and directed the respondent to submit a more responsive
comment vis-a-vis the complaint.

In his comment dated May 28, 2011,10 the respondent denied liability, and contended that
the petition for certiorari subject of the complaint was a prohibited pleading for being
brought against the interlocutory order issued by MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste in
the accion interdictal; that, as such, he was not obliged to rule on the petition
for certiorari;11 that his failure to seasonably resolve the motion for reconsideration
within the prescribed 90-day period did not amount to gross incompetence on his part
because several reasons justified the delay, namely: (a) his increasing workload; 12 (b) his
suspension from work for three months by virtue of another administrative case filed
against him;13 (c) the failure of his Clerk III (Ms. Jerlyn Lapesura) to remind him of the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration;14 and (d) the issuance of the order submitting
the motion for reconsideration for resolution on December 10, 2009 coincided with "the
period of euphoria for the Christmas holidays."15 He pleaded for leniency considering that
his lapse concerned the motion for reconsideration against the dismissal of the prohibited
petition for certiorari.16 He denied being biased in favor of a colleague, MTCC Judge
Pocpoc-Lamoste, the respondent in the petition for certiorari, and insisted that such
claim was not supported by evidence.17

On January 26, 2012, the OCA recommended that the respondent be held guilty of undue
delay in resolving the motion for reconsideration; and that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from office for six months without pay and without other benefits, with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. 18

Issue

Was the respondent guilty of the less serious offense of undue delay in rendering an order
by not resolving the complainants' motion for reconsideration within the prescribed
period?

Ruling of the Court

We adopt the findings of the OCA.

The complainants' allegation against the respondent judge of being biased in favor of
MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste, the respondent in the petition for certiorari, was
untenable because it was based on suspicion. We emphasize that every allegation of bias
against a judge should be established with proof of clear and actual bias. Otherwise, the
allegation should be rejected as speculative.

Anent the delay in the resolution of the complainants' motion for reconsideration, we find
that the respondent judge was guilty thereof. We remind that decision-making is
primordial among the many duties of judges. The speedy disposition of cases thus
becomes the primary aim of the Judiciary, for only thereby may the ends of justice not be
compromised and the Judiciary may be true to its commitment of ensuring to all persons
the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial.19 To pursue this aim, the Court, through
the Rules of Court and other issuances, has fixed reglementary periods for acting on cases
and matters. Tn respect of decisions, judges are given 90 days from the time the cases are
submitted for determination within which to render their judgments. Also, Rule 3.05 of
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to promptly dispose of
the court's business and to decide cases within the required periods. Failure to render a
decision within the 90-day period from the submission of a case for decision is
detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation
of the speedy administration of justice.20 Accordingly, any judge who delays the
disposition of any case or matter beyond the prescribed period without the Court's
express clearance is liable for gross inefficiency and must be administratively sanctioned.

On January 26, 2009, the complainants brought in the RTC in Tacloban City their
petition for certiorari to annul the order issued by MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste in Civil
Case No. 2008-05-CV-08, and the case was assigned to the respondent judge. It was only
on March 3, 2009 when he directed the private respondent to file the comment on the
petition. The comment was filed on March 31, 2009, and the complainants submitted
their rejoinder to the comment. Subsequently, after they requested the resolution of the
petition for certiorari by motion dated September 8, 2009, he issued his order of
September 15, 2009 dismissing the petition for certiorari. In due time, they filed their
motion for reconsideration. The parties exchanged their written submissions on the issue
until the respondent judge issued the order of December 10, 2009 deeming the motion for
reconsideration submitted for resolution. But he did not resolve the motion for
reconsideration even by the time they filed their administrative complaint against him on
July 26, 2010 in the Office of the Court Administrator.21

What is obvious is that the respondent judge took too much time in disposing of the
petition for certiorari and the ensuing motion for reconsideration. The delays were
plainly violative of the injunction to him to act expeditiously on the matters 90 days from
their submission.

The respondent judge sought to justify his delay by citing the voluminous caseload he
had as the presiding judge. The justification does not persuade. Although we are not
insensitive to the heavy caseloads of the trial judges, we have allowed reasonable
extensions of the periods for the trial judges to resolve their cases. If the heavy caseload
of any judge should preclude his disposition of cases within the reglementary period, he
should notify the Court, through the Court Administrator, of the reasons or causes for the
delay, and request in writing a reasonable extension of the time to dispose of the affected
cases. No judge should arrogate unto himself the prerogative to extend the period for
deciding cases beyond the mandatory 90-day period.

The respondent judge insists that that he did not need to act on the resulting motion for
reconsideration because the petition for certiorari, being a prohibited pleading, was a
contravention of the rules of procedure.22 Such insistence did not justify his inability to
act promptly. The fact that the petition for certiorari was a prohibited pleading furnished
him a better reason to act promptly on the petition for certiorari and the motion for
reconsideration.

We are also not swayed by his other excuses of not having then a legal researcher
assigned to him; and of his branch clerk of court being recently appointed. The court's
business did not stop because of such events; hence, he could not use such excuses to
delay his actions on the pending matters before his court. Verily, the responsibility for the
prompt and expeditious action on the case, which belonged first and foremost to him as
the presiding judge, could not be shifted to others like the legal researcher or the recently
appointed branch clerk of court.

The respondent judge gave other justifications, like the time when the motion for
reconsideration was submitted for resolution on December 10, 2009 being already in "the
period of euphoria for the Christmas holidays;"23 and that he was serving his three-month
suspension from office relative to another administrative case of undue delay in rendering
an order when the case was filed, but resolved the complainants' motion for
reconsideration as soon as he reported back to work. We reject these justifications as
unworthy explanations of the failure to resolve the motion for reconsideration in an
expeditious and seasonal manner simply because they did not place the timely resolution
beyond the control of the respondent judge.

The respondent cannot be spared from the consequences of his undue delays in the case
of the complainants. He did not show that he ever requested the Court for the additional
time within which to dispose of the matters therein. It then becomes inescapable for him
to face the consequences of his inexplicable inaction. He was guilty of gross inefficiency
and neglect of duty. Failure to render a decision within the 90-day period from the
submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial
office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice.24

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or
order falls within the category of a less serious charge, and is penalized as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - x x x

B.  If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall
be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or

2.  A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

xxxx
This case is not the first time that the respondent is found guilty of an administrative
offense. Aside from the charge dealt with in Daaco v. Judge Lilagan,25 where he was
suspended for three months without pay for undue delay in rendering an order, he had
been penalized five times, as follows:

1. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1490, for falsification of certificate of service, in which he was fined
PI,000.00 on July 28, 1999;26

2. A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of judicial
authority and willful disobedience to settled jurisprudence, in which he was fined
P10,000.00;27cralawred

3. A.M. No. RTJ-00-1564, for falsification of certificate of service, maltreatment and

violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in which he was reprimanded;28

4. OCA IPI No. 01-1280-RTJ, for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority
and serious misconduct, in which he was reprimanded;29 and

5. A.M. No. RTJ-06-1985, for violation of the Constitution and Code of Judicial

Conduct, in which he was reprimanded.30

Although the OCA has recommended the penalty of suspension from office for six
months without salary and other benefits, the Court opts to impose on the respondent the
penalty of fine of P45,000.00, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future will be
more severely sanctioned.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent Judge Frisco T.

Lilagan, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Tacloban
City GUILTY of gross inefficiency for his undue delay in resolving the pending motion
for reconsideration; and, ACCORDINGLY, FINES him in the amount of P45,000.00,
with a warning that a similar infraction in the future will be more severely sanctioned.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017 ]
JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
(SECOND DIVISION) AND ERINEO S. MALIKSI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the February 2, 2015[1] and
March 20, 2015[2] Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case
No. SB-14-CRM-0432, which dismissed the case filed by Juanito Victor C. Remulla
(Remulla) against respondent Erineo S. Maliksi (Maliksi) for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

On August 12, 2005, Remulla filed a criminal complaint against Maliksi before the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
He alleged that Maliksi, as governor of Cavite, caused the purchase of certain medical
supplies from Allied Medical Laboratories Corporation in November 2002 without
conducting any public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefit or preference to it. On
December 15, 2005, Maliksi filed his counter-affidavit.[3]

The Ombudsman Ruling

After almost nine (9) years, in a resolution, dated August 27, 2014, the Ombudsman
found probable cause against Maliksi for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. [4]

Maliksi filed his motion for reconsideration, arguing that there was no probable cause and
that there was a violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. [5] In its order,
dated October 22, 2014, the Ombudsman denied the said motion for reconsideration.[6]

In November 2014, the Ombudsman filed an information for violation of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 against Maliksi before the Sandiganbayan. Maliksi then filed his Motion
to Dismiss,[7] dated November 20, 2014, alleging that the finding of probable cause
against him was null and void, and that his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
his case was violated. According to him, the 9-year delay in the proceedings caused him
undue prejudice.

The Sandiganbayan Ruling

In its February 2, 2015 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan found that Maliksi's right to a
speedy disposition of his case was violated. Thus, it dismissed the case against him. It
stated that the explanation provided by the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), was insufficient to justify its 9-year delay in the resolution of Maliksi's
case. The Sandiganbayan noted that the interval was caused by the delay in the routing or
transmission of the records of the case, which was unacceptable. Citing Coscolluela v.
Sandiganbayan,[8] (Coscolluela), it wrote that it was inconsequential to determine
whether an accused had followed up on his case because it was not his duty to do so. The
Sandiganbayan opined that it was the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the
resolution of the case within a reasonable time.

On February 12, 2015, the OSP filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[9] arguing that
the delay in the preliminary investigation was neither whimsical nor capricious,
considering that Maliksi did not complain on the delay.

In its assailed resolution, dated March 20, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for
partial reconsideration. It reiterated that the fact-finding of the case, which lasted for three
(3) years, and the preliminary investigation, which lasted for six (6) years, were due to
mechanical routing and avoidable delay. The Sandiganbayan found that such delays were
unnecessary and unacceptable. It also echoed Coscolluela that it was not the duty of the
respondent in a preliminary investigation to follow up on the prosecution of his case.

Hence, this petition.

Issue

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT. [10]
Remulla argues that the Sandiganbayan should not have dismissed the case as there was a
finding of probable cause; that there was no violation of Maliksi's right to a speedy
disposition of his case because he did not promptly assert his right; that mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient to invoke inordinate delay;
that in Tilendo v. Ombudsman[11] (Tilendo), there must be an active assertion of the right
to a speedy disposition of cases before the Ombudsman; and that Coscolluela is
inapplicable because the petitioner therein was completely unaware of his pending case.

In his Comment,[12] Maliksi countered that the petition was defective because it was filed
by Remulla, a private party. He underscored that only the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), or, in certain instances, the OSP, may bring or defend actions for or on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines. Maliksi also pointed out that the delay of nine (9) years
in the preliminary investigation of his case was clearly an inordinate delay. He cited the
cases of Tatad v. Tanodbayan[13] and People v. Sandiganbayan,[14] where even delays of
even shorter period of years were considered violations of the right to speedy disposition
of cases. Finally, Maliksi argued that the petition was a violation of his constitutional
right against double jeopardy because a dismissal of criminal case due to the right to
speedy disposition of a case is tantamount to an acquittal.

In his Reply,[15] Remulla averred that he had the legal standing to file this subject petition
as a taxpayer or a citizen because public funds were illegally disbursed. He contended
that the length of delay was not the only factor that must be considered in determining
inordinate delay. Remulla invoked the cases of Guerrero v. CA[16] (Guerrero), Bernat v.
Sandiganbayan[17] (Bernat) and Tello v. People[18] (Tello), where the failure of the accused
to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case was deemed a waiver for such right.
He pointed out that Maliksi knew that there was a pending case against him but he never
asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case during the preliminary investigation.
Finally, Remulla claimed that there was no violation of the right against double jeopardy
as the dismissal of Maliksi's case was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

In its Comment,[19] the Ombudsman, through the OSP, argued that Court must provide a
definitive ruling on the concept of inordinate delay because the current model was still in
a state of perpetual flux. It opined that Coscolluela was inapplicable in the present case as
Maliksi was aware of the pending case against him before the Ombudsman. The OSP
also emphasized that the Sandiganbayan merely dismissed the case against Maliksi by
considering the sole factor of length of delay. It cited the case of Barker v. Wingo,
[20]
 where the defendant's assertion of, or failure to assert, his right to a speedy trial was
one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry whether there was deprivation of such
right. The OSP echoed the argument of Remulla that an accused who does not take any
step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the case was deemed to have slept on his
right and have given acquiesces to the supervening delays.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The petition was filed by a private party

Procedural law mandates that all criminal actions, commenced by a complaint or an

information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control, of a public prosecutor.
In appeals of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals (CA) and before this Court, the
OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title
III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.[21] In certain instances, the OSP
represented the People, when it involved criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.[22]

The present case challenges the dismissal of a criminal case due to the violation of the
right to speedy disposition of cases. The petition filed before this Court was initiated by
Remulla in his capacity as a private complainant without the intervention of either the
OSG or the OSP. Although he claims that he has legal standing as a taxpayer, the present
case is criminal in nature and the People is the real party in interest. [23] Remulla captioned
his petition as "People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Erineo
S. Maliksi"[24] but it is clear that he does not represent the People.

Only on rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal
action on his own behalf such as when there is a denial of due process, [25] or where the
dismissal of the case is capricious shall certiorari lie.[26] As will be discussed later,
Remulla failed to qualify in any of these exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, he has
no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against Maliksi on the
ground of violation of the right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative concept

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial,[27] is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of
a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed.[28]

More than a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker v. Wingo[29] was
promulgated, this Court, in Martin v. Ver,[30] began adopting the "balancing test" to
determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of cases
has been violated. As this test necessarily compels the courts to approach such cases on
an ad hoc basis, the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are
weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the
delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to
defendant resulting from the delay. None of these elements, however, is either a
necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered together with
other relevant circumstances. These factors have no talismanic qualities as courts must
still engage in.a difficult and sensitive balancing process.[31]

In this case, Remulla argues that the cases of Tilendo, Guerrero, Bernat, and Tello dictate
that it is mandatory for a respondent or accused to actively assert his right to a speedy
disposition of his case before it may be dismissed on the said ground. He insists that
Maliksi failed to follow up on his case during the preliminary investigation, hence, he
cannot invoke his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Further, he avers that the
doctrine in Coscolluela, where the Court held that there was no need for the respondent to
follow up his case, is not controlling and it is only applicable when the respondent is
completely unaware of the preliminary investigation against him.

To resolve these issues, the first set of cases cited by Remulla must be examined to
determine whether it is mandatory for a respondent or accused to assert his right to a
speedy disposition of his case. Also, the case of Coscolluela and its related cases must be
evaluated whether the respondent or accused has the obligation to follow up his case.

Tilendo, Guerrero, Bernat, and Tello cases

In Tilendo, the petitioner therein invoked his right to a speedy disposition of his case
because the preliminary investigation by the NBI lasted for three (3) years before it filed
a complaint before the Ombudsman. In denying his petition, the Court held that there was
no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage only began
after the NBI filed its complaint against Tilendo. Even assuming there was delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation, Tilendo did not do anything to accelerate the
disposition of his case.

In Guerrero, the last pleading before the Court of First Instance was filed on December
21, 1979. The case was later re-assigned to two other judges, and on March 14, 1990, the
last judge found out that the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) was incomplete and
ordered the parties to have the same completed. The petitioner therein filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The Court ruled
that there was no such violation because it was only after the new judge reset the retaking
of the testimonies that the petitioner asserted his right. It was also held that a judge could
hardly be faulted for the delay because he could not have rendered the decision without
the TSN. The Court observed that the conduct of the case could have a different
dimension had the petitioner made some overt act to assert his right.

Later, in Bernat, the criminal case against the petitioner therein was submitted for
resolution before the Sandiganbayan on August 23, 1994. It was reassigned to Justice Ma.
Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada upon her assumption of office on November 3, 1998; and
sometime in 2002, she found out that some of the TSN were missing. Thus, the parties
were ordered to attend a conference to discuss the matter. Instead of attending the
conference, the petitioner therein filed a motion asserting his right to a speedy trial. In
dismissing his argument, the Court cited the case of Guerrero where the TSN were also
lost and the judge had to retake the testimonies. It noted that the petitioner failed to assert
his rights. The Court also reiterated the ruling in Guerrero that the case could have taken
a different dimension had the petitioner actively asserted his right to a speedy trial.

Similarly, Tello echoed the doctrine in Bernat because the petitioner therein did not take
any step to accelerate the disposition of his case. He only invoked his right to speedy trial
after the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision convicting him for malversation of
public funds.

Coscolluela and its related cases

In Coscolluela, the petitioners therein were investigated for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. In a resolution, dated March 27, 2003, the assigned graft investigator
found probable cause against the petitioners. The Ombudsman, however, only approved
the said resolution on May 21, 2009 and filed the information on June 19, 2009. The
petitioners sought to dismiss the case as the delay of six (6) years violated their right to a
speedy disposition of their case. In upholding the position of the petitioners, the Court
ruled that there was unjustified delay in the preliminary investigation of the case. The
Ombudsman could not give a sufficient justification why it took six (6) years before it
approved the resolution of the graft investigator. The Court also held that it was not the
petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. The petitioners therein
were not informed of the ongoing preliminary investigation against them.

Coscolluela relied on the case of Duterte v. Sandiganbayan[32] (Duterte) to justify that

there was no requirement to follow up a case. In the said case, the petitioners were
required to file a comment, instead of a counter-affidavit. The preliminary investigation
was delayed for four (4) years. They could not have urged the speedy resolution of their
case because they were completely unaware that the investigation was still ongoing. The
Court also noted therein that the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or
even novel reason which could justify the 4-year delay in terminating its investigation
and the incident did not involve complicated factual and legal issues.

Earlier, in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan[33] (Cervantes), a complaint for violation of

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was filed before the Tanodbayan. On October 16, 1986,
the petitioner therein filed an affidavit to answer the allegations against him. On May 18,
1992, or after almost six (6) years, an information was filed by the OSP with the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioner asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case. The
Court upheld his right because the OSP's explanation that no political motivation
appeared to have tainted the prosecution of the case was insufficient reason to excuse the
inordinate delay. It was also ruled therein that "[i]t is the duty of the prosecutor to
speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether
the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence
provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him."[34]

More recently, in People v. Sandiganbayan[35] (People), a complaint was filed against the

private respondents therein on December 28, 1994 before the Ombudsman. The last
counter-affidavit was filed by the private respondents on March 11, 1996. On July 10,
1996, the special prosecution officer issued a memorandum recommending the filing of
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman.
Instead of filing the information, however, the case was subjected to several "thorough
review and reevaluation." It was only on October 6, 2009 that the criminal informations
were filed before the Sandiganbayan. Eventually, the private respondents implored their
right to speedy disposition of their case.

It was held therein that there was inordinate delay of twelve (12) years from the time that
the last counter-affidavit was filed until the informations were lodged before the court.
The explanation of the OSP that the case was subjected to a painstaking review and that
the Ombudsman had to transfer to its new building Were not given credence by the
Court. It emphasized that the Ombudsman simply failed to timely exercise its discretion
as to whether or not to file criminal cases against the private respondents. The Court did
not sustain the OSP's argument that the respondents must be blamed for not taking any
step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter. Citing Cervantes, the Court
reiterated that it was the duty of the prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case
regardless of the fact that the accused did not object to the delay.

Finally, in Inocentes v. People[36] (Inocentes), a complaint for violation of Section 3 (e)

was filed before the Ombudsman against the petitioner therein. Following the denial of
his motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2005, the prosecution filed the
informations with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Tarlac City. On March 14, 2006,
however, the Ombudsman ordered the withdrawal of the informations. From this point, it
took almost six (6) years, or only on May 2, 2012, before the informations were filed
with the Sandiganbayan. The Court opined that there was inordinate delay in the
disposition of the petitioner's case because it took six (6) years before his case and the
records thereof was transferred from the RTC to the Sandiganbayan. The argument of the
OSP that the petitioner had no right to complain about the delay because he failed to
seasonably invoke his right was not upheld by the Court. It reiterated the doctrine
of Coscolluela that it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their
case.

Harmonizing the two sets of cases

The first set of cases shows that the criminal cases were not dismissed because of the
non-assertion of the accused of their right to a speedy disposition of cases or speedy trial.
Other factors in the balancing test were also considered by the Court, particularly, the
reason for the delay in the proceedings and the prejudice caused by the delay.

In Guerrero and Bernat, it was held that the delay was acceptable because there was a
necessity to retake the testimonies of the witnesses due to the lost TSN. The courts could
not have adjudicated the case without the TSN. On the other hand, in Tilendo, the Court
accepted the explanation of the OSP that there was no inordinate delay because the NBFs
inquiry was not part of the preliminary investigation. Hence, as the length of delay in
these cases were properly justified by the prosecution and the accused therein failed to
take steps to accelerate their cases, the Court found that the there was no prejudice
caused, which would warrant the assertion of their right to a speedy disposition of cases.

In the second set of cases, the lengthy delay in the proceeding against the accused therein
was not satisfactorily explained. In Cervantes, the prosecution provided a lackluster
excuse that there was no inordinate delay because the case was not politically motivated,
in People, the filing of the case in court was drastically delayed because it was subjected
to unnecessary reviews, and the Ombudsman basically failed to decide whether to file the
case or not. In Inocentes, there was an unwarranted delay in the filing of the case due to
the lethargic transfer of the records from the RTC to the Sandiganbayan. Finally,
in Coscolluela, the Ombudsman could not give an explanation why the preliminary
investigation was delayed for six years.

Essentially, the Court found in those cases that the State miserably failed to give an
acceptable reason for the extensive delay. Due to the manifest prejudice caused to the
accused therein, the Court no longer gave weighty consideration to their lack of objection
during the period of delay. It was emphasized in those cases that it was the duty of the
prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case regardless if the accused failed to
object to the delay.

Based on the foregoing, there is no conflict between the first and the second set of cases.
In the first set, the Court did not solely rely on the failure of the accused to assert his
right; rather, the proper explanation on the delay and the lack of prejudice to the accused
were also considered therein. In the same manner, the Court in the second set of cases
took into account several factors in sustaining the right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of cases, such as the length of delay, the failure of the prosecution to justify
the period of delay, and the prejudice caused to the accused. The utter failure of the
prosecution to explain the delay of the proceedings outweighed the lack of follow ups
from the accused.

Accordingly, both sets of cases only show that "[a] balancing test of applying societal
interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis."[37] To reiterate, none of the factors in the balancing test is
either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered
together with other relevant circumstances. Corpus v. Sandiganbayan[38] thoroughly
explained how the factors of the balancing test should be weighed, particularly the
prejudiced caused by the delay, to wit:
xxx Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit
the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable
to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned
prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things:
(a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the
ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably
attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for
such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications
invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is
improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over
the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State.
Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates
the factors for granting a continuance.[39] [Emphases supplied]
Remulla argues that the assertion or non-assertion of the right to a speedy disposition of
cases determines whether the court must dismiss the case for inordinate delay or continue
the proceedings. Such argument, however, fails to persuade. It must be emphasized that
the balancing test is a relative and flexible concept. The factors therein must be weighed
according to the different facts and circumstances of each case. The courts' are given
wide judicial discretion in analyzing the context of the case, bearing in mind the
prejudice caused by the delay both to the accused and the State.

In addition, there is no constitutional or legal provision which states that it is mandatory

for the accused to follow up his case before his right to its speedy disposition can be
recognized. To rule otherwise would promote judicial, legislation where the Court would
provide a compulsory requisite .not specified by the constitutional provision. It simply
cannot be done, thus, the ad hoc characteristic of the balancing test must be upheld.

Likewise, contrary to the argument of the OSP, the U.S. case of Barker v. Wingo,[40] from
which the balancing test originated, recognizes that a respondent in a criminal case has no
compulsory obligation to follow up on his case. It was held therein that "[a] defendant has
ho duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that
the trial is consistent with due process."[41]

Finally, Remulla argues that the doctrine in Coscolluela - that the accused has no duty to
follow up on the prosecution of their case - only applies to cases where the accused is
unaware of the preliminary investigation. A review of related and subsequent cases,
however, validates the said doctrine that it is applicable even if the accused was fully
informed and had participated in the investigation. In Cervantes, the petitioner filed his
affidavit before the Tanodbayan to answer the allegations against him. In People, the
respondents therein were able to file their counter-affidavit with the Ombudsman.
In Inocentes, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman. In
all these cases, the accused were completely informed of the preliminary investigation
against them and they were able to participate in the proceedings before the delays were
incurred. In spite of this, the Court applied the doctrine in Coscolluela because it was the
Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the proceedings within the bounds of reasonable
timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it.

In fine, it has been settled that the factors in the balancing test must be given different
consideration and weight based on the factual circumstances of each case. Applying such
principle in this case, the Court can now determine whether or not the Ombudsman
committed inordinate delay and violated Maliksi's right to a speedy disposition of his
case.

The Ombudsman failed to justify the delay in the proceedings

As indicated in the resolution, dated February 2, 2015, of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP
gave the following explanation regarding the delay in the proceedings against Maliksi as
follows:
In justifying the length of time that it took the OMB to resolve the case, the prosecution
meticulously explains that three different cases were filed against the accused, two of
which were from the complaint of Juan (sic) Victor C. Remulla for Violation of the Anti-
Graft Law and for Grave Misconduct, which was received by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon on August 7, 2005 (Remulla complaints). The third case was
through the Feedback Report of PCSO Fund Allocation Department Manager Teresita
Brazil regarding the "Approved Financial Assistance of P10M to province of Cavite c/o
Gov. Ayong Maliksi," which was transmitted to the Ombudsman Central Office in 2005
(PCSO complaint). This was allegedly assigned for fact-finding investigation in July 3,
2006 under CPL-C-05-0188. Upon completion of the investigation, the complete record
of the third case was said to have been forwarded to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon on September 26, 2008 for consolidation with the two cases
initiated by complainant Remulla.

Since the complete records of the Remulla cases, including the proposed Resolution and
Decision, had already been submitted to the Ombudsman Proper for approval on January
9, 2007, through the Central Record Division, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon sent a
Memorandum dated October 24, 2008 to the Ombudsman requesting that the third PCSO
case be incorporated with the two Remulla cases already resolved. This Memorandum
Request was allegedly received by the Ombudsman Proper on June 4, 2009 and
approved by then Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez. On April 6, 2010, the Chief
Administrative Officer of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon forwarded the
complete record of the third PCSO case to the Chief of the Central Records Division for
incorporation with the two Remulla cases.

Continuing to the recital of events, the prosecution states that the cases against the
accused were resolved by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon as early as
2007 and were forwarded in the same year to the Ombudsman Proper for final approval.
Unfortunately, final action on the Resolution was allegedly overtaken by disruptive
incidents and political events like the 2010 hostage-taking at the Quirino Grandstand and
the impeachment of Ombudsman Gutierrez that led to her resignation in April 2011.
[42]
 [Emphases supplied]
The length of delay in the proceedings of Maliksi's case must first be determined.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,[43] it was held that inordinate delay should be computed
from the time of the fact-finding investigation until the completion of the preliminary
investigation by the Ombudsman. The Court expounded that "[t]he guarantee of speedy
disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be
defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted.
Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes
of determining if the respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their cases had been
violated."[44]

Applying the foregoing rule, the delay in Maliksi's case started from the fact-finding
investigation of the Ombudsman when he filed his counter-affidavit in Remulla cases on
December 15, 2005 until the completion of the PCSO case on October 24, 2008, or a
span of three (3) years. At that point, the preliminary investigation began, until it was
terminated on August 27, 2014 and the information was filed before the court.in
November 2014, or a period of six (6) years. Thus, the Sandiganbayan observed that the
delay incurred in the proceedings lasted for a total period of nine (9) years. Even if the
Court excludes the fact-finding stage of three (3) years, there was still six (6) years of
inordinate delay.

As to the reason for the delay, the Court is of the view that the explanation provided by
the OSP fails to justify the delay of six (6) years in the resolution of the case against
Maliksi because, first, there was a delay in the approval of the Remulla complaints by the
Ombudsman. These complaints were filed in 2005 and Maliksi filed his counter-affidavit
in the same year, on December 15, 2005. According to the OSP, the proposed resolution
and decision for the Remulla cases were submitted to the Ombudsman as early as January
9, 2007 for approval. The resolution and decision, however, remained unacted by the
Ombudsman so much so that it was only after one (1) year and nine (9) months that the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon was able to send a memorandum, dated October 24, 2008,
for their consolidation with the PCSO case. No explanation for the Ombudsman's
inaction on the Remulla cases was advanced by the OSP.

Second, while the memorandum for consolidation of the Remulla and PCSO cases was
dated October 24, 2008, it was only received by the Ombudsman on June 4, 2009.
Evidently, the mere routing or transfer of the memorandum from the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon to the Ombudsman took almost eight (8) months. Then Ombudsman Gutierrez
approved the memorandum for consolidation on an unspecified date,

Third, notwithstanding the approval of' the consolidation by the Ombudsman, it was only
on April 6, 2010 when the Chief Administrative Officer of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon forwarded the complete record of the third PCSO case to the Chief of the Central
Records Division. As the approval of the memorandum on consolidation was undated, the
Sandiganbayan assumed that the cause of delay was either the Ombudsman's belated
approval or the Chief Administrative Officer of the Deputy Ombudsman's delay in the
transmittal of the case records. In either case, a delay of ten (10) months for the
implementation of a memorandum for consolidation is unacceptable.

Noticeably, the transfer of these memoranda and records are ministerial in nature and
does not require the exercise of discretion. Thus, the Court is baffled on how these
routine acts could take so long to be accomplished, As properly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, routine matters could have been exercised at a faster pace in order to
avoid unnecessary delay that expectedly bears heavily on litigants.[45]

Fourth, from the time that the consolidation of the Remulla and PCSO cases were
approved on April 6, 2010, it took four (4) years, or until July 8, 2014, before the joint
resolution finding probable cause against Maliksi was issued by the Ombudsman. There
is a void of account as to what exactly happened to the case during this 4-year period.
Even more baffling was that although the cases were consolidated, the information filed
in November 2014 only involved the Remulla case.

Lastly, the OSP sought the understanding of the Sandiganbayan and explained that the
resolution of the consolidated cases was overtaken by disruptive events such as the 2010
hostage-taking at the Quirino Grandstand and the impeachment complaint against the
Ombudsman Gutierrez. These excuses, however, could hardly be considered as enough
reason to warrant the delay in the proceedings. Obviously, these events have no direct
relation to the Remulla and PCSO cases to affect their speedy resolution. The functions
of the Ombudsman under the Constitution are not suspended by the occurrence of
unrelated events to its mandate, whether political or not. Moreover, to sustain the
argument of the OSP would set a perilous precedent as the delayed cases pending before
the Ombudsman from 2010 to 2014 can simply be overlooked by citing these occasions.

Based on the foregoing, the explanation provided by the OSP falls short of the reasonable
justification to authorize delay in the proceedings. It was downright unnecessary to
prolong the proceedings for a period of nine (9) years. To summarize, the initial delay
began when the Ombudsman did not act with dispatch on the approval or disapproval of
the proposed resolution and decision in the Remulla. Due to its delay, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon was able to send a memorandum for consolidation with the PCSO
case. The mere routing or transfer of the memorandum to the Ombudsman incurred eight
(8) months of delay. Then, when the memorandum was approved, it took ten (10) months
before the records could be transferred from the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to the
Ombudsman. Finally, for a period of four (4) years, the consolidated cases sat at the
Ombudsman. As the OSP did not submit an explanation as to the status of the case in that
4-year period, the Court can only conduct guesswork on the cause of its delay.

Had the Ombudsman immediately approved or disapproved the proposed resolution and
decision submitted to its office on January 9, 2007, then the case would have been
promptly acted upon. If filed before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution and the defense
could have timely presented their case. Instead, the Ombudsman chose inaction which led
to a chain of delays lasting until July 8, 2014. After the lapse of nine (9) years of being
kept in the dark, Maliksi could not have had the opportunity to timely present, his case in
court due to the extensive delay in the preliminary investigation. Certainly, this protracted
period of uncertainty over his criminal case caused him prejudice, living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion and even, hostility.

Further, in light of the circumstances of this case, the Court does not give great weight to
Maliksi's lack of objection over the delay because the OSP miserably failed to defend the
Ombudsman's inaction. The prosecution could not give an acceptable reason to justify the
9-year interval before the case was filed in court. The proceedings were marred by the
delay in the mechanical transfer of documents and records. No steps were taken by the
Ombudsman to ensure that the preliminary investigation would be resolved in a timely
manner. Clearly, the failure of the prosecution to justify the 9-year interval before the
case was filed in court far outweighs Maliksi's own inaction over the delay. As articulated
in Coscolluela, Duterte, Cervantes, People, and Inocentes, the Court reiterates that it is
the duty of the prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case regardless of whether or
not the accused objects to the delay.

Likewise, Remulla's argument that the Sandiganbayan only took into account the length
of delay in the proceedings deserves scant consideration. Aside from the length of delay,
the anti-graft court thoroughly discussed the Ombudsman's failure to give a suitable
reason for the delay and the prejudice it had caused to Maliksi. The latter's lack of follow
up with his case was not given much weight because of the prosecution's manifest failure
to justify the protracted lull in the proceedings. The Sandiganbayan, after properly taking
into consideration all the relevant factors in the balancing test and gave different weight
on each factor based on the particular circumstances of this case, came to a conclusion
that the Ombudsman committed inordinate delay. The case underwent the intricate and
difficult balancing test before Maliksi's right to a speedy disposition of his case was
sustained. Thus, the Court rules that the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the criminal case against Maliksi.

To conclude, the Court finds it proper to reiterate the underlying principle of the
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases in the landmark case of Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan:[46]
xxx Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee
of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Right (both in
the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
constitutional rights. xxx

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation
does not warrant dismissal of the information. True — but the absence of a preliminary
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue
delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected for now, until man
has not yet invented a device for setting back time.[47]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 2, 2015 and March 20, 2015
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan Second Division in SB-14-CRM-0432
are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018 ]
CESAR MATAS CAGANG, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH
DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. Nos. 210141-42]

CESAR MATAS CAGANG, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH

DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate
delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the
dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through
mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view
of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to
the complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her
constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered by the
courts as a waiver of right.
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 are Petitions for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction[1] assailing
the Resolutions dated September 12, 2012[2] and January 15, 2013[3] of the
Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cesar Matas Cagang's (Cagang) Motion
to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest in Criminal Case
Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457.

G.R. Nos. 210141-42, on the other hand, refer to a Petition for Certiorari with an urgent
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction[4] assailing the June 18, 2013 Order[5] and September 10, 2013 Resolution[6] of
the Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cagang's Motion to Quash Order of
Arrest in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457.

Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan's denial to quash the Informations and Order
of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman's alleged inordinate delay
in the termination of the preliminary investigation.

On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint
alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice
Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by diverting
public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as
"dummies." The complaint was docketed as CPL-M-03-0163 and referred to the
Commission on Audit for audit investigation. A news report of Sun Star Davao dated
August 7, 2003 entitled "P61M from Sarangani coffers unaccounted" was also docketed
as CPL-M-03-0729 for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.[7]

On December 31, 2002, the Commission on Audit submitted its audit report finding that
the officials and employees of the Provincial Government of Sarangani appear to have
embezzled millions in public funds by sourcing out the funds from grants, aid, and the
Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin Chiongbian using dummy
cooperatives and people's organizations.[8] In particular, the Commission on Audit found
that:

(1) There were releases of financial assistance intended for nongovernmental

organizations/people's organizations and local government units that were
fraudulently and illegally made through inexistent local development projects,
resulting in a loss of P16,106,613.00;

(2) Financial assistance was granted to cooperatives whose officials and members were
government personnel or relatives of officials of Sarangani, which resulted in the
wastage and misuse of government funds amounting to P2,456,481.00;
(3) There were fraudulent encashment and payment of checks, and frequent travels of
the employees of the Vice Governor's Office, which resulted in the incurrence by the
province of unnecessary fuel and oil expense amounting to P83,212.34; and

(4) Inexistent Sagiptaniman projects were set up for farmers affected by calamities,
which resulted in wastage and misuse of government funds amounting to
P4,000,000.00.[9]

On September 30, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order terminating
Case Nos. CPL-M-03-0163 and CPL-M-03-0729. It concurred with the findings of the
Commission on Audit and recommended that a criminal case for Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 be filed against the public officers named by the Commission on
Audit in its Summary of Persons that Could be Held Liable on the Irregularities. The list
involved 180 accused.[10] The case was docketed as OMB-M-C-0487-J.

After considering the number of accused involved, its limited resources, and the volumes
of case records, the Office of the Ombudsman first had to identify those accused who
appeared to be the most responsible, with the intention to later on file separate cases for
the others.[11]

In a Joint Order dated October 29, 2003, the accused were directed to file their counter-
affidavits and submit controverting evidence. The complainants were also given time to
file their replies to the counter-affidavits. There was delay in the release of the order since
the reproduction of the voluminous case record to be furnished to the parties "was
subjected to bidding and request of funds from the Central Office."[12] Only five (5) sets
of reproductions were released on November 20, 2003 while the rest were released only
on January 15, 2004.[13]

All impleaded elective officials and some of the impleaded appointive officials filed a
Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, Injunction with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order with Branch 28, Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani.
The Regional Trial Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the Office of
the Ombudsman from enforcing its October 29, 2003 Joint Order.[14]

In an Order dated December 19, 2003, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the Petition on
the ground that the officials had filed another similar Petition with this Court, which this
Court had dismissed.[15] Thus, some of the accused filed their counter-affidavits.[16]

After what the Office of the Ombudsman referred to as "a considerable period of time," it
issued another Order directing the accused who had not yet filed their counter-affidavits
to file them within seven (7) days or they will be deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence on their behalf.[17]

In a 293-page Resolution[18] dated August 11, 2004 in OMB-M-C-0487-J, the

Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Governor Miguel D. Escobar, Vice
Governor Felipe Constantino, Board Members, and several employees of the Office of
the Vice Governor of Sarangani and the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with
Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019.[19] Then Tanodbayan Simeon V. Marcelo (Tanodbayan Marcelo)
approved the Resolution, noting that it was modified by his Supplemental Order dated
October 18, 2004.[20]

In the Supplemental Order dated October 18, 2004, Tanodbayan Marcelo ordered the
conduct of further fact-finding investigations on some of the other accused in the case.
Thus, a preliminary investigation docketed as OMB-M-C-0480-K was conducted on
accused Hadji Moner Mangalen (Mangalen) and Umbra Macagcalat (Macagcalat). [21]

In the meantime, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information dated July 12, 2005,
charging Miguel Draculan Escobar (Escobar), Margie Purisima Rudes (Rudes), Perla
Cabilin Maglinte (Maglinte), Maria Deposo Camanay (Camanay), and Cagang of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents.[22] The Information
read:
That on July 17, 2002 or prior subsequent thereto in Sarangani, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miguel Draculan Escobar, being the
Governor of the Province of Sarangani, Margie Purisima Rudes, Board Member, Perla
Cabilin Maglinte, Provincial Administrator, Maria Deposo Camanay, Provincial
Accountant, and Cesar Matas Cagang, Provincial Treasurer, and all high ranking and
accountable public officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani by reason of their
duties, conspiring and confederating with one another, while committing the offense in
relation to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and misappropriate the amount of
THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00), Philippine
Currency, in public funds under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by
falsifying or causing to be falsified Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-7-10376 and its
supporting documents, making it appear that financial assistance has been sought by
Amon Lacungam, the alleged President of Kalalong Fishermen's Group of Brgy.
Kalaong, Maitum, Sarangani, when in truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well that
no financial assistance had been requested by Amon Lacungan and his association, nor
did said Amon Lacungan and his association receive the aforementioned amount, thereby
facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of THREE
HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00) through the
encashment by the accused of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Check No.
11521401 dated July 17, 2002, which amount they subsequently misappropriated to their
personal use and benefit, and despite demand, said accused failed to return the said
amount to the damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest in the
aforesaid sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[23]
The Sandiganbayan docketed the case as Crim. Case No. 28331. Escobar, Maglinte, and
Cagang were arraigned on December 6, 2005 where they pleaded not guilty. Rudes and
Camanay remained at large.[24]

On June 17, 2010, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision[25] in Crim. Case No. 28331
acquitting Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang for insufficiency of evidence. Maglinte,
however, was ordered to return P100,000.00 with legal interest to the Province of
Sarangani. The cases against Rudes and Camanay were archived until the Sandiganbayan
could acquire jurisdiction over their persons.[26]

In a Memorandum[27] dated August 8, 2011 addressed to Ombudsman Conchita Carpio

Morales (Ombudsman Carpio Morales), Assistant Special Prosecutor III Pilarita T.
Lapitan reported that on April 12, 2005, a Resolution[28] was issued in OMB-M-C-0480-K
finding probable cause to charge Mangalen and Macagcalat with Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
[29]
 Thus, it prayed for the approval of the attached Informations:
It should be noted that in a Memorandum dated 10 December 2004 and relative to OMB-
M-C-03-0487-J from which OMB-M-C-04-0480-K originated, Assistant Special
Prosecutor Maria Janina Hidalgo recommended to Ombudsman Marcelo that the status of
state witness be conferred upon Gadian. This recommendation was approved by
Ombudsman Marcelo on 20 December 2004. Hence, as may be noted[,] Gadian was no
longer included as respondent and accused in the Resolution dated 12 April 2005 and the
attached Information.

Related cases that originated from OMB-M-C-03-0487-J for which no further

preliminary investigation is necessary were filed before the courts. One of these cases is
now docketed as Criminal Case No. 28293 and pending before the Sandiganbayan, First
Division. It is noteworthy that in its Order dated 14 November 2006 the Sandiganbayan,
First Division granted the Motion to Dismiss of the counsel of Felipe Constantino after
having submitted a duly certified true copy of his clients Death Certificate issued by the
National Statistics Office. Considering the fact therefore, there is a necessity to drop
Constantino as accused in this case and accordingly, revised the attached Information.

An Information for Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents is also

submitted for your Honor's approval considering that no such Information is attached to
the records of this case.

VIEWED IN THE FOREGOING LIGHT, it is respectfully recommended that, in view of

his death, Felipe Constantino no longer be considered as accused in this case and that the
attached Informations be approved.[30]
Ombudsman Carpio Morales approved the recommendation on October 20, 2011.
[31]
 Thus, on November 17, 2011, Informations[32] for Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents were filed against Cagang, Camanay, Amelia Carmela Constantino Zoleta
(Zoleta), Macagcalat, and Mangalen. The Informations read:
[For Violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019]

That on 20 September 2002, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Sarangani,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Provincial
Treasurer CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Provincial Accountant MARIA DEPOSO
CAMANAY, and Executive Assistant to Vice Governor Felipe Katu Constantino,
AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, and then Vice-Governor and now
deceased Felipe Katu Constantino, all of the Provincial Government of Sarangani,
committing the offense in relation to the perfom1ance of their duties and functions,
taking advantage of their respective official positions, through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, conspiring and confederating with Barangay
Captain UMBRA ADAM MACAGCALAT and HADJI MONER MANGALEN, the
alleged President and Treasurer, respectively of Kamanga Muslim-Christian Fishermen's
Cooperative ("Cooperative"), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause the disbursement of the amount of Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P350,000.00) under SARO No. D-98000987 through Development Bank of the
Philippines Check No. 282398 dated 20 September 2002 and with HADJI MONER
MANGELEN as payee thereof, by falsifying Disbursement Voucher No. 401-200209-
148 dated 20 September 2002 and its supporting documents to make it appear that
financial assistance was requested and given to the Cooperative, when in truth and in fact,
neither was there a request for financial assistance received by the said Cooperative after
the check was encashed, as herein accused, conspiring and confederating with each other,
did then and there malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their own personal
use and benefit the said amount of P350,000.00 thereby causing undue injury to the
government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

[For Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents]

That on 20 September 2002, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Sarangani,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Provincial
Treasurer CESAR MATAS CAGANG, and now deceased Felipe Katu Constantino,
being then the Provincial Treasurer and Vice-Governor respectively, of the Province of
Sarangani who, by reason of their public positions, are accountable for and has control of
public funds entrusted and received by them during their incumbency as Provincial
Treasurer and Vice-Governor respectively, of said province, with accused Provincial
Accountant MARIA DEPOSO CAMANAY, and Executive Assistant to Vice Governor
Felipe Katu Constantino, AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, and then
Vice-Governor and now deceased Felipe Katu Constantino, all of the Provincial
Government of Sarangani, committing the offense in relation to the performance of their
duties and functions, taking advantage of their respective official positions, conspiring
and confederating with Barangay Captain UMBRA ADAM MACAGCALAT and
HADJI MONER MANGALEN, the alleged President and Treasurer, respectively of
Kamanga Muslim-Christian Fishermen's Cooperative ("Cooperative"), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified Disbursement
Voucher No. 401-200209-148 dated 20 September 2002 and its supporting documents,
by making it appear that financial assistance in the amount of Three Hundred and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00) had been requested by the Cooperative, with CESAR
MATAS CAGANG, despite knowledge that the amount of P350,000.00 is to be sourced
out from SARO No. D-98000987, still certifying that cash is available for financial
assistance when Countrywide Development Funds could not be disbursed for financial
aids and assistance pursuant to DBM Circular No. 444, and MARIA DEPOSO
CAMANAY certifying as to the completeness and propriety of the supporting documents
despite non-compliance with Commission on Audit Circular No. 96-003 prescribing the
requirements for disbursements of financial assistance and aids, thus facilitating the
issuance of Development Bank of the Philippines Check No. 282398 dated 20 September
2002 in the amount of P350,000.00 and in the name of HADJI MONER MANGELEN,
the alleged Treasurer of the Cooperative, when in truth and in fact, neither was there a
request for financial assistance received by the said Cooperative after the check was
encashed, as herein accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and
there malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and
benefit the said amount of P350,000.00 thereby causing undue injury to the government
in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[33]
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-0456 and SB-11-0457.

Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest while Macagcalat and Mangalen separately filed their own Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest. Cagang argued that
there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations.
Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan[34] and Roque v. Ombudsman,[35] he argued that the delay
violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. [36] The
Office of the Ombudsman, on the other hand, filed a Comment/Opposition arguing that
the accused have not yet submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and that
there was no showing that delay in the filing was intentional, capricious, whimsical, or
motivated by personal reasons.[37]
On September 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution [38] denying the Motions
to Quash/Dismiss. It found that Cagang, Macagcalat, and Mangalen voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the motions.[39] It also found that there was
no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information, considering that 40 different
individuals were involved with direct participation in more or less 81 different
transactions.[40] It likewise found Tatad and Roque inapplicable since the filing of the
Informations was not politically motivated.[41] It pointed out that the accused did not
invoke their right to speedy disposition of cases before the Office of the Ombudsman but
only did so after the filing of the Informations.[42]

Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration[43] but it was denied in a Resolution[44] dated

January 15, 2013. Hence, Cagang filed a Petition for Certiorari[45] with this Court,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458.[46]

In an Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest[47] dated June 13, 2013 filed before the
Sandiganbayan, Cagang alleged that an Order of Arrest was issued against him. [48] He
moved for the quashal of the Order on the ground that he had a pending Petition for
Certiorari before this Court.[49]

In an Order[50] dated June 28, 2013, the Sandiganbayan denied the Urgent Motion to
Quash Order of Arrest on the ground that it failed to comply with the three (3)-day notice
rule and that no temporary restraining order was issued by this Court.

Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration[51] but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a

Resolution[52] dated September 10, 2013. Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with an
urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction,[53] essentially seeking to restrain the implementation of the Order of Arrest
against him. This Petition was docketed as G.R. Nos. 210141-42.

On February 5, 2014, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order[54] in G.R. Nos.
210141-42 enjoining the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the proceedings of the
case and from implementing the warrant of arrest against Cagang. This Court likewise
consolidated G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 with G.R. Nos. 210141-42.[55] The Office of
the Special Prosecutor submitted its separate Comments[56] to the Petitions on behalf of
the People of the Philippines and the Office of the Ombudsman.[57]

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him violated
his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Citing Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan,[58] he argues that the Office of the Ombudsman lost its jurisdiction to file
the cases in view of its inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
almost seven (7) years after the filing of the complaint.[59]
Petitioner further avers that the dismissal of cases due to inordinate delay is not because
the revival of the cases was politically motivated, as in Tatad, but because it violates
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution[60] and Rule 112, Section 3(f)[61] of the Rules of
Court.[62] He points out that the Sandiganbayan overlooked two (2) instances of delay by
the Office of the Ombudsman: the first was from the filing of the complaint on February
10, 2003 to the filing of the Informations on November 17, 2011, and the second was
from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation in 2005 to the filing of the
Informations on November 17, 2011.[63]

Petitioner asserts that the alleged anomalous transactions in this case were already
thoroughly investigated by the Commission on Audit in its Audit Report; thus, the Office
of the Ombudsman should not have taken more than seven (7) years to study the evidence
needed to establish probable cause.[64] He contends that "[w]hen the Constitution enjoins
the Office of the Ombudsman to 'act promptly' on any complaint against any public
officer or employee, it has the concomitant duty to speedily resolve the same."[65]

Petitioner likewise emphasizes that the Sandiganbayan should have granted his Motion to
Quash Order of Arrest since there was a pending Petition before this Court questioning
the issuance of the Informations against him. He argues that the case would become moot
if the Order of Arrest is not quashed.[66]

The Office of the Special Prosecutor, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner, along with
his co-accused Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Magalen have remained at large and
cannot be located by the police, and that they have not yet surrendered or been arrested.
[67]
 It argues that the parameters necessary to determine whether there was inordinate
delay have been repeatedly explained by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed Resolutions.
It likewise points out that petitioner should have invoked his right to speedy disposition
of cases when the case was still pending before the Office of the Ombudsman, not when
the Information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan. It argues further
that Tatad was inapplicable since there were peculiar circumstances which prompted this
Court to dismiss the information due to inordinate delay.[68]

The Office of the Special Prosecutor argues that the Sandiganbayan already made a
judicial determination of the existence of probable cause pursuant to its duty under Rule
112, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.[69] It points out that a petition for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to question the denial of a motion to quash and that the appropriate
remedy should be to proceed to trial.[70]

Procedurally, the issues before this Court are whether or not the pendency of a petition
for certiorari with this Court suspends the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, and
whether or not the denial of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari. This Court is also tasked to resolve the sole substantive issue of whether or not
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Cesar
Matas Cagang's Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest and Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on the ground of inordinate delay.

To give full resolution to this case, this Court must first briefly pass upon the procedural
issues raised by the parties.

Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the pendency of a petition for certiorari before this
Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent the issuance of
a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Under Rule 65, Section
7[71] of the Rules of Court:
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition is
filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the
filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public
respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative
charge.
Since this Court did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in G.R. Nos. 206438 and
206458 was filed, the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding with trial. It was
only upon the filing of the Petition in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 that this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not appealable as it is merely

interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The denial of
the motion to quash can still be raised in the appeal of a judgment of conviction. The
adequate, plain, and speedy remedy is to proceed to trial and to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Thus, in Galzote v. Briones:[72]
...In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused
results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court's decision of
conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not
only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the
latter's ruling.

In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the
denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable;
an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be
used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy.
The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial
as discussed above.[73]
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash simply signals the commencement of the
process leading to trial. The denial of a motion to quash, therefore, is not necessarily
prejudicial to the accused. During trial, and after arraignment, prosecution proceeds with
the presentation of its evidence for the examination of the accused and the reception by
the court. Thus, in a way, the accused is then immediately given the opportunity to meet
the charges on the merits. Therefore, if the case is intrinsically without any grounds, the
acquittal of the accused and all his suffering due to the charges can be most speedily
acquired.

The rules and jurisprudence, thus, balance procedural niceties and the immediate
procurement of substantive justice. In our general interpretation, therefore, the accused is
normally invited to meet the prosecution's evidence squarely during trial rather than
skirmish on procedural points.

A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if the party can
establish that the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion:
[A] direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the
general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In
past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice;" the
promotion of public welfare and public policy; cases that "have attracted nationwide
attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;" or
judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to
justify a petition for certiorari.

In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish
that the lower court issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts
and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.[74]
Petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied his Motion to Quash/Dismiss, insisting that the denial transgressed upon his
constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is consistent with this theory.

II
The Constitution guarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases. Under Article III,
Section 16:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The right to speedy disposition of cases should not be confused with the right to a speedy
trial, a right guaranteed under Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution:
Section 14.

....

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a criminal prosecution. The
right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked even against quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or administrative cases before them. As Abadia v.
Court of Appeals[75] noted:
The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand
substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which
tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends
the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies." This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the
military and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader
protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.[76]
Both rights, nonetheless, have the same rationale: to prevent delay in the administration
of justice. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan:[77]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against
him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in
the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case
is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
tem1 and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,

expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a
system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude
the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the
accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence,
courts are to give meaning to that intent.[78]
While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the right to speedy
disposition of cases may be invoked before quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in
proceedings that are adversarial and may result in possible criminal liability. The right to
speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and
preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since neither of these
proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution. The Constitution itself
mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to "act promptly" on complaints filed before it:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees
of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.[79]
As if to underscore the importance of its mandate, this constitutional command is
repeated in Republic Act No. 6770,[80] which provides:
Section 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or
employees of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative,
civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote
efficient service by the Government to the people.
Neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 6770 provide for a specific period within
which to measure promptness. Neither do they provide for criteria within which to
determine what could already be considered as delay in the disposition of complaints.
Thus, judicial interpretation became necessary to determine what could be considered
"prompt" and what length of time could amount to unreasonable or "inordinate delay."

The concept of inordinate delay was introduced in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,[81] where this

Court was constrained to apply the "radical relief" of dismissing the criminal complaint
against an accused due to the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.

In Tatad, a report was submitted to the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command
sometime in October 1974, charging Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad) with graft and corruption
during his stint as Minister of Public Information. In October 1979, Tatad submitted his
resignation. It was only on December 29, 1979 that a criminal complaint was filed against
him. Then President Ferdinand Marcos accepted his resignation on January 26, 1980. On
April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan[82] referred the complaint to the Criminal Investigation
Service, Presidential Security Command for fact-finding. On June 16, 1980, the
Investigation Report was submitted finding Tatad liable for violation of Republic Act No.
3019.

Tatad moved for the dismissal of the case but this was denied on July 26, 1982. His
motion for reconsideration was denied on October 5, 1982. Affidavits and counter-
affidavits were submitted on October 25, 1982. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan issued a
resolution approving the filing of informations against Tatad. Tatad filed a motion to
quash on July 22, 1985. The motion to quash was denied by the Sandiganbayan on
August 9, 1985. The Sandiganbayan, however, ordered the filing of an amended
information to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense. In compliance,
the Tanodbayan submitted its amended information on August 10, 1985. Tatad filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan on September 17,
1985. Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with this Com1,
questioning the filing of the cases with the Sandiganbayan.

On April 10, 1986, this Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the
change in administration brought about by the EDSA Revolution and the overthrow of
the Marcos regime. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested that as the
charges were not political in nature, the State would still pursue the charges against
Tatad.

In resolving the issue of whether Tatad's constitutional rights to due process and to
speedy disposition of cases were violated, this Court took note that the finding of
inordinate delay applies in a case-to-case basis:
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief"
and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial
where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally
guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.[83]
This Court found that there were peculiar circumstances which attended the preliminary
investigation of the complaint, the most blatant of which was that the 1974 report against
Tatad was only acted upon by the Tanodbayan when Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos in 1979:
A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in
this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report.

We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing
attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecution was politically
motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and
should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted,
wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the
basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without
fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless
or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's
perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.[84]
Thus, the delay of three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation was
found to have been inordinate delay, which was violative of petitioner's constitutional
rights:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct
of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We
are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and
grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government
official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment,
which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal
and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify
a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a
relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the
case.[85]
Political motivation, however, is merely one of the circumstances to be factored in when
determining whether the delay is inordinate. The absence of political motivation will not
prevent this Court from granting the same "radical relief." Thus, in Angchangco v.
Ombudsman,[86] this Court dismissed the criminal complaints even if the petition filed
before this Court was a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Ombudsman
to resolve the complaints against him after more than six (6) years of inaction:
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges
against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as
the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it.
For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement
in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the
government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If
we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not
to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance
of the writ prayed for.[87]
As in Angchangco, this Court has applied the Tatad doctrine in Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan,[88] Roque v. Ombudsman,[89] Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan,[90] Lopez, Jr. v.
Ombudsman,[91] Licaros v. Sandiganbayan,[92] People v. SPO4 Anonas,[93] Enriquez v.
Ombudsman,[94] People v. Sandiganbayan, First Division,[95] Inocentes v. People,
[96]
 Almeda v. Ombudsman,[97] People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,[98] Torres v.
Sandiganbayan,[99] and Remulla v. Sandiganbayan.[100]

This Court, however, emphasized that "[a] mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient"[101] to rule that there was inordinate delay. Thus, it qualified the
application of the Tatad doctrine in cases where certain circumstances do not merit the
application of the "radical relief" sought.

Despite the promulgation of Tatad, however, this Court struggled to apply a standard test
within which to determine the presence of inordinate delay. Martin v. Ver,[102] decided in
1983, attempted to introduce in this jurisdiction the "balancing test" in the American case
of Barker v. Wingo, thus:
[T]he right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept than other
constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be quantified into a
specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the
judicial process when the right must be asserted or considered waived...

[A] claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to a
balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, in determining whether defendant's right to a speedy
trial has been denied...[103]
The Barker balancing test provides that courts must consider the following factors when
determining the existence of inordinate delay: first, the length of delay; second, the
reason for delay; third, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his or her right;
and fourth, the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay.

For a period of time, this balancing test appeared to be the best way to determine the
existence of inordinate delay. Thus, this Court applied both the Tatad doctrine and
the Barker balancing test in the 1991 case of Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan:[104]
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right
to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the
delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.[105]
The combination of both Tatad and the balancing test was so effective that it was again
applied in Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,[106] where this Court took note that:
[D]elays per se are understandably attendant to all prosecutions and are constitutionally
permissible, with the monition that the attendant delay must not be oppressive. Withal, it
must not be lost sight of that the concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term
and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. [107]
Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is deemed to
have commenced. In Dansal v. Fernandez,[108] this Court recognized that the right to
speedy disposition of cases does not only include the period from which a case is
submitted for resolution. Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before
trial. Thus, the right may be invoked as early as the preliminary investigation or inquest.

In criminal prosecutions, the investigating prosecutor is given a specific period within

which to resolve the preliminary investigation under Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court.[109] Courts are likewise mandated to resolve cases within a specific time frame.
Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate
courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed
by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification
shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said
period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall
decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further
delay.
Under Republic Act No. 8493, or The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the entire trial period
must not exceed 180 days, except as otherwise provided for by this Court. [110] The law
likewise provides for a time limit of 30 days from the filing of the information to conduct
the arraignment, and 30 days after arraignment for trial to commence.[111] In order to
implement the law, this Court issued Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98[112] reiterating the
periods for the conduct of trial. It also provided for an extended time limit from
arraignment to the conduct of trial:
Section 7. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
Sections 2 and 6 for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the
time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision
shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time
limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the
time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
The Circular likewise provides for certain types of delay which may be excluded in the
running of the periods:
Section 9. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing
the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the
accused;

(2) delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the
accused;

(3) delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;

(4) delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings: Provided, that the delay does not exceed
thirty (30) days;

(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition or proceedings relating to change of venue of
cases or transfer from other courts;

(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and

(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during
which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential
witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when
his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence.
An essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are
known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent
or physically unable to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge
is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the
charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the
subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused
over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not
run and no motion for separate trial has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio
or on motion of either the accused or his counsel or the prosecution, if the court granted
such continuance on the basis of his findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice
served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a
speedy trial.
These provisions have since been incorporated in Rule 119, Sections 1, [113] 2,[114] 3,[115] and
6,[116] of the Rules of Court.

Several laws have also been enacted providing the time periods for disposition of cases.

In Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act No. 8551, resolution of
complaints against members of the Philippine National Police must be done within ninety
(90) days from the arraignment of the accused:
Section 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. - Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP
for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or
more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not
exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: provided, however, that if it can be shown
by evidence that the accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may
order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is
punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: provided, further, that
the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in
the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent:
provided, finally, that such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the
exigency of the service upon recommendation of the chief, PNP. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused."
Republic Act No. 9165,[117] Section 90 provides that trial for drug related offenses should
be finished not later than 60 days from the filing of the information:
Section 90. Jurisdiction. -

....

Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60)
days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be
rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case for
resolution.
Republic Act No. 9372,[118] Section 48 mandates continuous trial on a daily basis for
cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism:
Section 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism,
the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other
short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial.
Republic Act No. 9516[119] amends Presidential Decree No. 1866[120] to provide for
continuous trial for cases involving illegal or unlawful possession, manufacture, dealing,
acquisition, and disposition of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives:
Section 4-B. Continuous Trial. - In cases involving violations of this Decree, the judge
shall set the case for continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other
short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial. Such case shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Implementing rules and regulations have also provided for the speedy disposition of
cases. The Implementing Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of
Child Abuse Cases[121] provide that trial shall commence within three (3) days from
arraignment:
Section 21. Speedy Trial of Child Abuse Cases. - The trial of child abuse cases shall take
precedence over all other cases before the courts, except election and habeas corpus
cases. The trial in said cases shall commence within three (3) days from the date the
accused is arraigned and no postponement of the initial hearing shall be granted except on
account of the illness of the accused or other grounds beyond his control.
The Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9208,[122] as
amended by Republic Act No. 10364,[123] mandates the speedy disposition of trafficking
cases:
Section 76. Speedy Disposition of [Trafficking in Persons] Cases. - Where practicable
and unless special circumstance require; otherwise, cases involving violation of R.A. No.
9208 shall be heard contiguously: with hearing dates spaced not more than two weeks
apart. Unnecessary delay should be avoided, strictly taking into consideration the Speedy
Trial Act and SC Circular No. 38-98 dated 11 August 1998.
Laws and their implementing rules and regulations, however, do not generally bind courts
unless this Court adopts them in procedural rules.[124] In any case, this Court has already
made several issuances setting periods for the conduct of trial.

Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure m Environmental Cases[125] provide that trial
must not exceed three (3) months from the issuance of the pre-trial order:
Section 1. Continuous trial. - The court shall endeavor to conduct continuous trial which
shall not exceed three (3) months from the date of the issuance of the pre-trial order.
Rule 14, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property Rights
Cases[126] limits the period of presenting evidence to 60 days per party:
Section 2. Conduct of trial. - The court shall conduct hearings expeditiously so as to
ensure speedy trial. Each party shall have a maximum period of sixty (60) days to present
his evidence-in-chief on the trial dates agreed upon during the pre-trial.
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 25-2007[127] provides that trial in cases
involving the killings of political activists and members of the media must be conducted
within 60 days from its commencement:
The cases referred to herein shall undergo mandatory continuous trial and shall be
tenninated within sixty (60) days from commencement of trial. Judgment thereon shall be
rendered within thirty (30) days from submission for decision unless a shorter period is
provided by law or otherwise directed by this Court.
The Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right of the Accused to
Bail and to Speedy Trial[128] provide for strict time limits that must be observed:
Section 8. Observance of time limits. - It shall be the duty of the trial court, the public or
private prosecutor, and the defense counsel to ensure, subject to the excluded delays
specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, compliance
with the following time limits in the prosecution of the case against a detained accused:

(a) The case of the accused shall be raffled and referred to the trial court to which it is
assigned within three days from the filing of the information;

(b) The court shall arraign the accused within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle;

(c) The court shall hold the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days after arraignment
or within ten (10) days if the accused is under preventive detention; provided, however,
that where the direct testimonies of the witnesses are to be presented through judicial
affidavits, the court shall give the prosecution not more than twenty (20) days from
arraignment within which to prepare and submit their judicial affidavits in time for the
pre-trial conference;

(d) After the pre-trial conference, the court shall set the trial of the case in the pre-trial
order not later than thirty (30) days from the temlination of the pre-trial conference; and
(e) The court shall terminate the regular trial within one htmdred eighty (180) days, or the
trial by judicial affidavits within sixty (60) days, reckoned from the date trial begins,
minus the excluded delays or postponements specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.
A dilemma arises as to whether the period includes proceedings in quasi-judicial agencies
before a formal complaint is actually filed. The Office of the Ombudsman, for example,
has no set periods within which to conduct its fact-finding investigations. They are only
mandated to act promptly. Thus, in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,[129] this
Court stated that a fact-finding investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
should not be deemed separate from preliminary investigation for the purposes of
determining whether there was a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases:
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part
of the preliminary investigation because the former was only preparatory in relation to
the latter; and that the period spent in the former should not be factored in the
computation of the period devoted to the preliminary investigation.

The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.

The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution
applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasijudicial or administrative bodies. The
guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the
State is accepted. Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter
for purposes of determining if the respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their
cases had been violated.[130] (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division[131] must be re-examined.

When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman conducts a motu
proprio fact-finding investigation, the proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the
accused is invited to attend these investigations, this period cannot be counted since these
are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the Office of the
Ombudsman will not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge the accused.

This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the Ombudsman as
unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its investigation takes too long, it can result in
the extinction of criminal liability through the prescription of the offense.

Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against
the accused, the period of investigation will not be counted in the determination of
whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated. Thus, this Court now holds
that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to
have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of
the preliminary investigation. In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,[132] the ruling
that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate
delay is abandoned.

With respect to fact-finding at the level of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman must
provide for reasonable periods based upon its experience with specific types of cases,
compounded with the number of accused and the complexity of the evidence required. He
or she must likewise make clear when cases are deemed submitted for decision. The
Ombudsman has the power to provide for these rules and it is recommended that he or
she amend these rules at the soonest possible time.

These time limits must be strictly complied with. If it has been alleged that there was
delay within the stated time periods, the burden of proof is on the defense to show that
there has been a violation of their right to speedy trial or their right to speedy disposition
of cases. The defense must be able to prove first, that the case took much longer than was
reasonably necessary to resolve, and second, that efforts were exerted to protect their
constitutional rights.[133]

What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by

"mere mathematical reckoning."[134] It requires consideration of a number of factors,
including the time required to investigate the complaint, to file the information, to
conduct an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the submission
of the case for decision.[135] Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable
postponements or force majeure, must also be taken into account.

The complexity of the issues presented by the case must be considered in determining
whether the period necessary for its resolution is reasonable. In Mendoza-Ong v.
Sandiganbayan[136] this Court found that "the long delay in resolving the preliminary
investigation could not be justified on the basis of the records."[137] In Binay v.
Sandiganbayan,[138] this Court considered "the complexity of the cases (not run-of-the-
mill variety) and the conduct of the parties' lawyers"[139] to determine whether the delay is
justifiable. When the case is simple and the evidence is straightforward, it is possible that
delay may occur even within the given periods. Defense, however, still has the burden to
prove that the case could have been resolved even before the lapse of the period before
the delay could be considered inordinate.

The defense must also prove that it exerted meaningful efforts to protect accused's
constitutional rights. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,[140] the failure of the accused to timely
invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases may work to his or her disadvantage, since
this could indicate his or her acquiescence to the delay:
Petitioner was definitely not unaware of the projected criminal prosecution posed against
him by the indication of this Com1 as a complementary sanction in its resolution of his
administrative case. He appears, however, to have been insensitive to the implications
and contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition
of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems
to have been without his objection hence impliedly with his acquiescence. [141]
In Dela Peña v. Sanqiganbayan,[142] this Court equated this acquiescence as one that
could amount to laches, which results in the waiver of their rights:
[I]t is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was set for
arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation. As stated by them in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss, "[o]ther
than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing." Also, in their petition, they averred:
"Aside from the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits, petitioners in the
present case did not file nor send any letter-queries addressed to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao which conducted the preliminary investigation." They slept
on their right - a situation amounting to laches. The matter could have taken a different
dimension if during all those four years, they showed signs of asserting their right to a
speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some over acts, like filing a motion for
early resolution, to show that they were not waiving that right. Their silence may,
therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner
therein was "insensitive to the implications and contingencies" of the projected criminal
prosecution posed against him "by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the
disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening
delay seems to have been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with his
acquiescence."[143]
This concept of acquiescence, however, is premised on the presumption that the accused
was fully aware that the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated despite a
considerable length of time. Thus, in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,[144] this Court stated
that Alvizo would not apply if the accused were unaware that the investigation was still
ongoing:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-
going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to
comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a
preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of
being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against
them had already been dismissed.[145]
Similarly, in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:[146]
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because
they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. They were only
informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the
lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with
the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the
proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason
as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether...
....

Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the
petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the
Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of
reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged
before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo:
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the
duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.[147]
Justice Caguioa submits that this Court should depart from Dela Peña. He explains that
the third factor of the Barker balancing test, i.e., waiver by the accused, was applied
within the context of the Sixth Amendment[148] of the American Constitution in that it
presupposes that the accused has already been subjected to criminal prosecution. He
submits that as the right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked even before
criminal prosecution has commenced, waiver by the accused should be inapplicable.

The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked by a respondent to any type
of proceeding once delay has already become prejudicial to the respondent. The
invocation of the constitutional right does not require a threat to the right to liberty. Loss
of employment or compensation may already be considered as sufficient to invoke the
right. Thus, waiver of the right does not necessarily require that the respondent has
already been subjected to the rigors of criminal prosecution. The failure of the respondent
to invoke the right even when or she has already suffered or will suffer the consequences
of delay constitutes a valid waiver of that right.

While the Barker balancing test has American roots, a catena of cases has already been
decided by this Court, starting from Tatad, which have taken into account the Philippine
experience.

The reality is that institutional delay[149] a reality that the court must address. The
prosecution is staffed by overworked and underpaid gove1nment lawyers with mounting
caseloads. The courts' dockets are congested. This Court has already launched programs
to remedy this situation, such as the Judicial Affidavit Rule,[150] Guidelines for
Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right of the Accused to Bail and to Speedy
Trial,[151] and the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial.[152] These programs, however,
are mere stepping stones. The complete eradication of institutional delay requires these
sustained actions.

Institutional delay, in the proper context, should not be taken against the State. Most
cases handled by the Office of the Ombudsman involve individuals who have the
resources and who engage private counsel with the means and resources to fully dedicate
themselves to their client's case. More often than not, the accused only invoke the right to
speedy disposition of cases when the Ombudsman has already rendered an unfavorable
decision. The prosecution should not be prejudiced by private counsels' failure to protect
the interests of their clients or the accused's lack of interest in the prosecution of their
case.

For the court to appreciate a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases, delay
must not be attributable to the defense.[153] Certain unreasonable actions by the accused
will be taken against them. This includes delaying tactics like failing to appear despite
summons, filing needless motions against interlocutory actions, or requesting
unnecessary postponements that will prevent courts or tribunals to properly adjudicate the
case. When proven, this may constitute a waiver of the right to speedy trial or the right to
speedy disposition of cases.

If it has been alleged that there was delay beyond the given time periods, the burden of
proof shifts. The prosecution will now have the burden to prove that there was no
violation of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy disposition of cases. Gonzales
v. Sandiganbayan[154] states that "vexatious, capncwus, and oppressive delays,"
"unjustified postponements of the trial," or "when without cause or justifiable motive a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his [or her] case
tried"[155] are instances that may be considered as violations of the right to speedy
disposition of cases. The prosecution must be able to prove that it followed established
procedure in prosecuting the case.[156] It must also prove that any delay incurred was
justified, such as the complexity of the cases involved or the vast amount of evidence that
must be presented.

The prosecution must likewise prove that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a
result of the delay. Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan[157] defined prejudice to the accused as:
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy
trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to
minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is
also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the
distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged
by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,
hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is
subjected to public obloquy.[158]
In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:[159]
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged
towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to
prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or,
if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may
interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage
of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.[160]
The consequences of delay, however, do not only affect the accused. The prosecution of
the case will also be made difficult the longer the period of time passes. In Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan:[161]
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the govemment that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
govemment to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exe1iion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity offairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things:
(a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the
ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably
attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.[162]
The consequences of the prosecution's failure to discharge this burden are severe. Rule
119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court requires that the case against the accused be
dismissed if there has been a violation of the right to speedy trial:
Section 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. - If the
accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116
and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the information may be dismissed on
motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused
shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of
going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this
Rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the
right to dismiss under this section.
Tatad, as qualified by Angchangco, likewise mandates the dismissal of the case if there is
a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. The immediate dismissal of cases is
also warranted if it is proven that there was malicious prosecution, if the cases were
politically motivated, or other similar instances. Once these circumstances have been
proven, there is no need for the defense to discharge its burden to prove that the delay
was inordinate.

To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary

investigation violates the accused's right to due process and the speedy disposition of
cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. The burden of
proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or
procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the
burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the
delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical
reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much
time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity
of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily
explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a
result. The timely invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must also be examined
on a case-to-case basis.

III

This Court proceeds to detennine whether respondent committed inordinate delay in the
resolution and termination of the preliminary investigation against petitioner.

There is no showing that this case was attended by malice. There is no evidence that it
was politically motivated. Neither party alleges this fact. Thus, this Court must analyze
the existence and cause of delay.

The criminal complaint against petitioner was filed on February 10, 2003. On August
11, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause
against petitioner. This Resolution, however, was modified by the Resolution
dated October 18, 2004, which ordered the conduct of further fact-finding investigation
against some of the other respondents in the case. This further fact-finding was resolved
by the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12, 2005. On August 8, 2011, or six (6) years
after the recommendation to file informations against petitioner was approved by
Tanodbayan Marcelo, Assistant Special Prosecutor II Pilarita T. Lapitan submitted the
informations for Ombudsman Carpio Morales' review. Informations against petitioner
were filed on November 17, 2011.

Six (6) years is beyond the reasonable period of fact-finding of ninety (90) days. The
burden of proving the justification of the delay, therefore, is on the prosecution, or in this
case, respondent.

Respondent alleged that the delay in the filing of the informations was justified since it
was still determining whether accused Mary Ann Gadian (Gadian) could be utilized as a
state witness and it still had to verify accused Felipe Constantino's death. The
recommendation, however, to utilize Gadian as a state witness was approved by
Tanodbayan Marcelo on December 20, 2004.[163] Felipe Constantino's death was verified
by the Sandiganbayan in its November 14, 2006 Order.[164] There is, thus, delay from
November 14, 2006 to August 8, 2011.
This Court finds, however, that despite the pendency of the case since 2003, petitioner
only invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases when the informations were filed on
November 17, 2011. Unlike in Duterte and Coscolluela, petitioner was aware that the
preliminary investigation was not yet terminated.

Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights
during this period, choosing instead to wait until the infmmation was filed against him
with the Sandiganbayan.

Furthennore, the case before the Sandiganbayan involves the alleged malversation of
millions in public money. The Sandiganbayan has yet to determine the guilt or innocence
of petitioner. In the Decision dated June 17, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan acquitting
petitioner in Crim. Case No. 28331:
We wish to iterate our observation gathered from the evidence on record that the subject
transaction is highly suspect. There is a seeming acceptance of the use of questionable
supporting documents to secure the release of public funds in the province, and the
apparent undue haste in the processing and eventual withdrawal of such funds. However,
obvious as the irregularities may be, which can only lead to distrust in the ability of
public officials to safeguard public funds, we are limited to a review only of the evidence
presented vis-a-vis the charges brought forth before this Court. Thus, We cannot make
any pronouncement in regard to such seeming irregularities.[165]
The records of the case show that the transactions investigated are complex and
numerous. As respondent points out, there were over a hundred individuals investigated,
and eventually, 40 of them were determined to have been involved in 81 different
anomalous transactions.[166] Even granting that the Commission on Audit's Audit Report
exhaustively investigated each transaction, "the prosecution is not bound by the findings
of the Commission on Audit; it must rely on its own independent judgment in the
determination of probable cause."[167] Delays in the investigation and review would have
been inevitable in the hands of a competent and independent Ombudsman.

The dismissal of the complaints, while favorable to petitioner, would undoubtedly be

prejudicial to the State. "[T]he State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to
prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the
Office of the Ombudsman."[168] The State is as much entitled to due process as the
accused. In People v. Leviste:[169]
[I]t must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court,
and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in
question, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the
justice system as a whole and caused uncalled - for delays in the final resolution of this
and other cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the respondent court, instead of
easing the burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically enough,
unnecessarily delayed the case - in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought
to avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice.
[170]

This Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of
cases considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex case. Definitely,
granting the present Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due process rights of the State.

IV

This Court now clarifies the mode of analysis in situations where the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial is invoked.

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial.
While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be
invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of
cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial.
What is impmiant is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the
right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a
conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the
Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard
to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken
against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing
of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has
been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is
invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions
and circulars,[171] and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the
Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked.
If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution
has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated
by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence,
and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it
followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the
prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of
evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider
the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the
simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was
solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there
is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged
from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious
prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be
dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition
of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the
delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be
properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely
raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of
the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right
to speedy disposition of cases.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order dated

February 5, 2014 is LIFTED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to resolve Case No.
SB-11-CRM-0456 and Case No. SB-11-CRM-0457 with due and deliberate dispatch.

The period for the determination of whether inordinate delay was committed shall
commence from the filing of a formal complaint and the conduct of the preliminary
investigation. The periods for the resolution of the preliminary investigation shall be that
provided in the Rules of Court, Supreme Court Circulars, and the periods to be
established by the Office of the Ombudsman. Failure of the defendant to file the
appropriate motion after the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods shall be
considered a waiver of his or her right to speedy disposition of cases.

The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division[172] that factfinding investigations

are included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is ABANDONED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
 [ G.R. No. 238696, October 17, 2018 ]
ILDEFONSO T. PATDU, JR. AND REBECCA S. CACATIAN VS. FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 17
October 2018 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 238696 (Ildefonso T. Patdu, Jr. and Rebecca S. Cacatian vs. Field

Investigation Office - Office of the Ombudsman).— This Petition for Review
on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by lldefonso T. Patdu, Jr. (Patdu)
and Rebecca S. Cacatian (Cacatian) (petitioners) seeks the reversal and setting aside of
the Decision[2] dated May 31, 2017 and Resolution[3] dated April 12, 2018 issued by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 145782. The petitioners were both appointed as
Director III of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and were
former members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the said agency.[4]

On April 4, 2011, a Complaint[5] was filed by the Field Investigation Office-Office of thp

Ombudsman (FIO-OMB) charging the petitioners, along with the other members of the
DOTC-BAC and its Chairman with Misconduct. The same complaint charged two other
DOTC officials with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. A Supplemental Complaint[6] was
subsequently filed on June 19, 2013 by the FIO-OMB against the foregoing officials
(including the petitioners), along with several others. This time, they were charged with
causing undue injury to the Government and giving unwarranted benefits, advantage,
and preference to West Island Beverages Distributor (WIBD) through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence under Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as well as
Grave Misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service under
Sections 46(A-3) and 46(B-8) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, respectively. The charges, with respect to the petitioners herein, relate to their
issuance of BAC Resolutions Nos. 2004-84[7] and 2004-85[8] which lead to the
procurement via direct contracting and award of the contract for the supply of 1,582
units of Nokia 1100 cellphones intended for the 2nd Congressional District of Iloilo to
the WIBD in the amount of Php 6,248,900.00.

The petitioners' participation in the said scheme may be summarized as follows:

In a letter dated October 21, 2004, former Congresswoman Judy Jalbuena Syjuco
(Congresswoman Syjuco) of the 2nd District of Iloilo requested former DOTC Secretary
Leandro R. Mendoza (DOTC Secretary) for the allotment of the maximum amount of Php
3,249,720.00 for the acquisition of cellphones for 301 barangay captains and/or
barangay officials of the 2nd District of Iloilo.[9] Two Special Allotment Release Orders
(SARO) were issued to the DOTC for the purchase of communications equipment for
Region VI: one on December 14, 2004 for Php 3,249,658.00 and the other on December
15, 2004 for Php 3,000,000.00.[10]

In another letter dated December 15, 2004, Congresswoman Syjuco informed the DOTC
Secretary of the SAROs and requested for the adoption of an alternative mode of
procurement of the communications equipment due to the alleged necessity to acquire
the same and to facilitate the acquisition. Attached to the letter was a quotation for
1,582 Nokia 1100 cellphones at Php 3,950.00 per unit prepared by one Jonathan Ng (Ng)
of the WIBD in Iloilo City. The quotation referred to an undated Certification issued by
one Evan Fullon (Fullon) of Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART), Iloilo, certifying WIBD
as the authorized distributor for SMART in the island of Panay. [11]

On December 17, 2004, the Technical Working Group (TWG) of the DOTC-BAC issued a
Memorandum,[12] recommending the adoption of an alternative mode of procurement
via direct contracting, provided that the provisions of Section 50(c) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations Part A (IRR-A.) of R.A. No. 9184 or the Government Procurement
Reform Act, would be complied with.[13]

Pursuant to the TWG memorandum and considering that the SAROs were to expire on
December 31, 2004, the petitioners and other members of the DOTC-BAC issued
Resolution No. 2004-84 on December 21, 2004. Therein, they recommended to the
DOTC Secretary the adoption of the alternative method of procurement via direct
contracting. This was approved by the DOTC Secretary. [14]

The following day or on December 22, 2004, the TWG issued another Memorandum,
[15] 
recommending the award of the contract to WIBD. The TWG considered the
following: (1) the quotation of WIBD; (2) the Certification of Fullon of SMART; (3) the
Certification of Venacio G. Santidad (Santidad), Director of the Procurement Supply and
Property Management Service (PSPMS), that WIBD had no sub-dealers in the Island of
Panay selling at lower prices and no suitable substitute could be obtained from the
suppliers in the locality.

On December 28, 2004, the petitioners and other members of the DOTC-BAC issued
Resolution No. 2004-85, awarding the subject contract to WIBD.[16] However, before the
award of the contract or on December 23, 2004, a Purchase Order[17] for the acquisition
of the cellphones was already prepared by the BAC Chairman which was approved by
the DOTC Secretary.[18]

The cellphone units were allegedly delivered to the DOTC and inspected by two DOTC
officials on February 22, 2005. On the same date, Santidad certified that he transferred
the said units to Mayor Isabelo Maquino of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. A disbursement voucher
was thereafter prepared and a corresponding Land Bank check was issued payable to
WIBD, which in turn issued an official receipt to the DOTC. [19]

On August 17, 2006, a Complaint-Affidavit before the OMB was filed by Manuel
Mejorada (Mejorada), the Provincial Administrator of Iloilo, questioning the subject
procurement. It was later revealed that there was no actual delivery of the subject
cellphones to the intended beneficiaries, that WIBD was a distributor of "Smartload"
(electronic) only, and that there were no Nokia 1100 cellphones purchased by WIBD
from SMART from December 2004 to February 2005.[20]

The petitioners vehemently denied the allegations against them and posited that, as
members of the BAC, they were merely guided by the memoranda of the TWG when
they issued BAC Resolutions Nos. 2004-84 and 2004-85. The petitioners also countered
that the resolutions were passed in good faith, done in the regular course of business,
and premised documents presented to them.[21]

On August 4, 2014, the OMB rendered its Decision[22] where the petitioners and their co-
respondents were found guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty and meted
the penalty of dismissal from the service with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and a bar from
taking the civil service examinations. In turn, the petitioners and Geronimo Quintos
(Quintos) filed Motions for Reconsideration,[23] which was denied by the OMB in its Joint
Order[24] dated March 17, 2015.

The petitioners and Quintos appealed before the CA via Petition for Review, arguing
their innocence and the violation of their rights to due process and to the speedy
disposition of their case.[25]

In the assailed Decision[26] promulgated on May 31, 2017, the CA affirmed the

petitioners' liability for Grave1 Misconduct as the latter completely disregarded R.A. No.
9184 and its IRR when they failed to exercise their functions diligently during the
issuance of the subject BAC resolutions. It likewise noted that the procedures laid down
in the Government Procurement Policy Board's (GPPB) Manuals were not complied
with, particularly the conduct of an initial industry survey and pre-procurement
conference. Meanwhile, considering that the petitioners were not charged with Serious
Dishonesty in the complaints before the OMB, they were exonerated from the said
offense. Revisiting the imposable penalty, the CA mitigated the same taking into account
the petitioners' respective lengths of service and that this is their first offense. The CA
further noted that considering Cacatian and Quintos never asserted the right for the
speedy disposition of their case before the OMB and Patdu only alleged the same in his
supplemental motion for reconsideration, their failure to promptly assert such right was
deemed a waiver of the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed August 4, 2014 Decision and March 17, 2015 Joint Order
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that [the petitioners] and [Quintos] are found
guilty of Grave Misconduct but are exonerated of the charge of Serious Dishonesty.
The said petitioners are sentenced to suffer the penalty of suspension for one (1) year
without pay.

SO ORDERED.[27]
Motions for Partial Reconsideration were respectively filed by the
petitioners[28] and the FIO-OMB,[29] but both were denied by the CA in the assailed
Resolution[30]  dated April 12, 2018.
 Hence, the instant petition where the petitioners' issues may be summarized as
follows:
A.   WHETHER OR NOT THE CA VIOLATED THE PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT HELD THEM ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR
GRAVE MISCONDUCT DUE TO THEIR NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE STANDARDS IN THE
GPPB MANUALS.

B.       WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS

ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

C.  WHETHER OR NOT JURISPRUDENCE GUARANTEE THE PETITIONERS'

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THEIR CASE.[31]
First, the petitioners point out that the GPPB Manuals were only adopted in June
2006 and became effective in January 2007. Meanwhile, the subject BAC resolutions
were issued in separate occasions in December 2004. The petitioners submit that the
GPPB Manual cannot be a basis to determine their liability for Grave Misconduct as to
do so would violate their right to due process and the constitutional doctrine against ex
post facto laws. The Court is not persuaded.
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As
long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
the demands of due process are sufficiently met.[32]
Here, apart from the charge of Serious Dishonesty, records show that the
petitioners were duly apprised of the charges against them through the complaints filed
before the OMB. They were likewise afforded the opportunity to be heard as they were
able to actively participate in the proceedings before the OMB through their Joint
Counter Affidavit[33] and Motion for Reconsideration.[34] Hence, there can be no violation
of the petitioners' right to due process with respect to the charge of Grave Misconduct.

The Court likewise disagrees with the assertion that the application of the standards set
by the GPPB Manuals in determining their culpability for Grave Misconduct would
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits
the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.[35]
The GPPB Manuals clearly do not fall within the aforementioned definition. The
GPPB Manuals were adopted by the GPPB as a reference guide in the conduct of
procurement operations pursuant to R.A. No. 9184. They do not mete out penalty for
violation but merely provide a frame of reference. Not being penal in nature, they
cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. Therefore, the application of the GPPB
Manuals was not a violation on the constitutional proscription.

However, considering that the GPPB Manuals were adopted by the GPPB on June 14,
2006[36] and that the subject BAC resolutions were issued by the petitioners in December
2004, the guidelines set forth in the former cannot reasonably be referred to for the
issuance of the latter. Accordingly, the IRR-A of R.A. No. 9184 which was approved on
September 23, 2003 and took effect on October 8, 2003 applies in this case.[37]

Second, maintaining that they cannot be held liable for any misconduct, the petitioners
posit that, as members of the BAC, they reasonably relied in good faith on the
recommendations of the TWG and the certification of Santidad. They likewise reiterate
that they evaluated the information and documents made available to them when they
issued the subject BAC resolutions but were nonetheless mislead by the deceitful
certification of WIBD regarding its qualifications as a supplier.

The Court disagrees. Applying R.A. No. 9184 and the IRR-A, the liability of the petitioners
for Grave Misconduct remains. Section 10, Article IV of R.A. No. 9184 mandates that all
procurement shall be done through competitive bidding.[38] Alternative methods of
procurement, however, are allowed but only in highly exceptional cases set forth in
Article XVI of the same law. These alternative modes of procurement include Direct
Contracting as defined under Section 50 of Article XVI, the pertinent provisions of which
provide:
Section 48. Alternative Methods. - Subject to the prior approval of the Head of
the Procuring Entity or his duly authorized representative, and whenever justified by the
conditions provided in this Act, the Procuring Entity may, in order to promote economy
and efficiency, resort to any of the following alternative methods of Procurement:

x x x x
b. Direct Contracting, otherwise known as Single Source Procurement - a method of
Procurement that does not require elaborate Bidding Documents because the supplier
is simply asked to submit a price quotation or a pro-forma voice together with the
conditions of sale, which offer may be accepted immediately or after some
negotiations[.]

Section 50. Direct Contracting. - Direct Contracting may be resorted to only in any of the
following conditions:

x x x x

c. Those sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer, which does not have sub-dealers
selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained at more
advantageous terms to the government.
The IRR-A of R.A. No. 9184 mirrors the foregoing definition and conditions to wit:
Section 50. Direct Contracting

Direct Contracting or single source procurement is a method of procurement of goods

that does not require elaborate bidding documents. The supplier is simply asked to
submit a price quotation or a pro-forma invoice together with the conditions of sale.
The offer may be accepted immediately or after some negotiations. Direct contracting
may be resorted to by concerned procuring entities under any of the following
conditions:

x x x x

c) Those sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer which does not have sub-dealers
selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained at more
advantageous terms to the Government.
Considering the foregoing, it is evident that the conditions of Section 50(c) of R.A.
No. 9184 under which Direct Contracting may be resorted to were not met. The above-
cited provision states that direct contracting may be resorted to by procuring entities in
the procurement of goods sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer which does not
have sub-dealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be
obtained at more advantageous terms to the Government.

As admitted by the petitioners regarding the issuance of the BAC resolutions, they
merely relied in the recommendations of the TWG, the certification of Fullon that WIBD
is the authorized distributor of SMART in the island of Panay, and the certification of
Santidad that WIBD had no sub-dealers in the Island of Panay selling at lower prices and
no suitable substitute could be obtained from the suppliers in the locality. They
additionally contend in this petition that in December 2004, the term "exclusive dealer"
had no categorical definition. Hence, the petitioners reasonably relied in good faith on
the memoranda of the TWG and the certification by Santidad.

The Court cannot subscribe to the petitioners' contentions. As aptly observed by the CA,
the petitioners, as members of the DOTC-B AC, do not exercise purely ministerial duties.
According to Section 12, Article V of R.A. No. 9184, among their functions include
determining the eligibility of prospective bidders, conducting evaluation of bids,
recommending award of contracts, as well as recommending the use of alternative
methods of procurement in proper cases. Additionally, the BAC shall be responsible for
ensuring that the procuring entity abides by the standards set forth in R.A. No. 9184 and
its IRR.[39] While a TWG may be created to assist in the procurement process, it is the
BAC which ultimately makes the corresponding recommendations to the head of the
procuring entity. As such, the BAC is not limited to the recommendations of the TWG
and may reject the latter's endorsements if they violate the express provisions of law
and its implementing rules.

That the phrase "exclusive dealer" had no categorical definition to guide the petitioners
is of no moment. A cursory reading of Section 50(c) of R.A. No. 9184 reveals that direct
contracting under the said sub-section may be resorted to only when there is an
exclusiveness of dealer or manufacturer, such dealer or manufacturer sells at lower
prices, and that no suitable substitute can be obtained by the procuring entity at more
advantageous terms. Considering that the subject procurement is the purchase of
cellphones and that the said communication equipment is widely and commonly
available, it is readily apparent that there is no exclusiveness of dealer in this case.

The Court reiterates the observation of the CA, with which we agree, that the
petitioners should have known and should have informed the TWG that not only were
there several alternative products aside from Nokia 1100 units, and suppliers aside from
SMART, there might have been several other dealers apart from WIBD.
Grave misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer coupled with the elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or
to disregard established rules.[40]
Here, the petitioners utterly failed to exercise their functions diligently when they
recommended the procurement via direct contracting and awarded the subject contract
to WIBD considering the standards required by law and its implementing rules have not
been met. Such actions, which are in blatant and complete disregard of R.A. No. 9184
and the IRR-A undoubtedly amounts to grave misconduct.

Third, the petitioners argue that assuming they failed to promptly invoke their right to
the speedy disposition of their case, the rulings in the cases of Almeda v. Office of the
Ombudsman (Mindanao), et al.,[41] and Juanito Victor C. Remulla v. Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) and Erineo S. Maliksi  [42] still guarantee such constitutional right. The
Court is not convinced.

In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,[43] the Court highlighted the flexible concept of the right to

the speedy disposition of one's case, to wit:
It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the
speedy disposition of cases, it is a flexible concept. Due regard must be given to the
facts and circumstances surrounding each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried. Just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition of
cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.[44]
In Almeda, the Court held that there was a violation of the right to the speedy
disposition of therein petitioner's case considering, among others, that the preliminary
investigation proceedings took more than 11 years to resolve, the delay was solely
caused by the OMB and the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), and therein
petitioner repeatedly pleaded for the swift resolution of her case. In Remulla, the delay
of 9 years, from the preliminary investigation to the finding of probable cause against
the accused therein, was attributed to several factors including the OMB not acting with
dispatch on the proposed resolution and decision in the case filed by the petitioner. The
Court then held that the failure of the prosecution to justify the 9-year interval before
the case was filed in court outweighed the accused's own inaction over the delay.

The Court notes that there is no showing that the circumstances similar to the foregoing
cases are present in the instant case.

In the recent case of Cesar Matas Cagang v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court had the
opportunity to clarify the mode of analysis and set guidelines in situations where the
right to the speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial is invoked.

Among such guidelines, the Court established that:

[T]he right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be
timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the
lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have
waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.[46]
Accordingly, the party invoking the right to the speedy disposition of his or her
case must do so promptly upon the lapse of the procedural period within which the
OMB should conduct its proceedings. While the OMB is yet to prescribe rules as to such
periods on this score, it is likewise undisputed that the petitioners invoked their right to
the speedy disposition of their case belatedly in Patdu's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration before the OMB and in their appeal before the CA. Hence, there was no
timely invocation of the right to speedy disposition and the petitioners are deemed to
have waived their right thereto.

Assuming arguendo, that they did not waive their right to the speedy disposition of their
case, there is likewise no violation of their constitutional right.

In this regard, the Court applies the guidelines set forth in Cagang. As to when a case is
deemed initiated and whether the period for fact-finding investigations should be
included therein, the Court held thus:
 [A] case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a
conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the
Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due
regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be
taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to
the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.[47] (Emphasis Ours)
Here, it is undisputed that the FIO-OMB pleaded for, among other things, the
petitioners to be placed in preventive suspension pending a formal investigation in its
April 2011 Complaint and prayed that administrative adjudication be conducted to
determine the latter's liability in its June 2013 Supplemental Complaint. While the
Complaints were offshoots of the Complaint filed by Mejorada on August 17, 2006,
records are bereft of any showing that the petitioners were the subject of any forma-
investigation relating to the subject procurement prior to the April 2011 Complaint. In
fact, it was only upon the filing of the April 2011 Complaint that the FIO-OMB sought for
a formal investigation of the petitioners' administrative liabilities. The petitioners even
disclosed in the instant petition that they were surprised to learn of the charges against
them through the April 2011 Complaint.[48]

Applying the foregoing guidelines, the administrative case against the petitioners was
deemed initiated upon the filing of the April 2011 Complaint. Prior to such time, the
petitioners were neither formally investigated nor administratively charged.
Furthermore, no proof was presented to show the petitioners were made to endure any
vexatious process before the OMB, neither from the time Mejorada's Complaint was
filed in 2006 to the April 2011 Complaint by the FIO-OMB nor from the time the April
2011 Complaint was filed until the June 2013 Supplemental Complaint, seeking
administrative adjudication of the petitioners' case.

As to the determination of the length of delay, the Court held in this wise:
[Determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider
the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the
simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was
solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there
is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged
from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious
prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically
be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
Another Exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused
acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.[49]

To reiterate, there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.

Records reveal that the FIO-OMB prayed for the formal investigation of the petitioners
on April 4, 2011 and sought the administrative adjudication of their liability on June 19,
2013. On August 4, 2014, the OMB rendered its Decision finding the petitioners
administratively liable for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty. The OMB's joint
order denying the petitioners' motions for reconsideration were issued on March 17,
2015. More or less a period of four (4) years have lapsed from the April 2011 Complaint
until the OMB rendered its joint order.

To Our mind, the time it took the Ombudsman to complete its proceedings can hardly
be considered an unreasonable and arbitrary delay as to deprive the petitioners of their
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case. This takes into account that
the petitioners are just two of several public officials charged in the complaints and their
administrative case is just one of several aspects involved therein. Moreover, there was
nothing in the records to show that the said period was characterized by delay which
was vexatious, capricious, or oppressive. There was, thus, no inordinate delay
amounting to a violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights. Their assertion in
relation to this must necessarily fail.

All told, finding that the CA did not commit any reversible error in rendering the assailed
decision, the Court therefore sustains the guilt of the petitioners of Grave Misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 31, 2017 and the Resolution dated April 12, 2018
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 145782 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 233946-53, March 13, 2019 ]
LT. GEN. JORGE SEGOVIA [RET.], MAJ. GEN. AURELIO BALADAD
[RET.], MAJ. GEN. JOSELITO REYES, ET AL. VS. THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated March 13,
2019, which reads as follows:

"G.R. Nos. 233946-53 (Lt. Gen. Jorge Segovia [Ret.], Maj. Gen. Aurelio Baladad
[Ret.], Maj. Gen. Joselito Reyes, et al. vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, the People of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Ombudsman). - This treats of the Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus[1] filed by Lt. Gen. Jorge Segovia (Ret.)
(Segovia), Major General Aurelio Baladad (Ret.) (Baladad), Maj. Gen. Joselito Reyes
(Reyes), Brig. Gen. Cristobal Zaragoza (Zaragoza), PS/Supt. Marion Balonglong,
PS/Supt. Allan Nobleza, and Maj.. Jovily Cabading (Cabading) (collectively, the
petitioners), seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated June 7, 2017[2] and
July 25, 2017,[3] both issued by the Sandiganbayan, denying the Motion to Quash and the
Motion for Reconsideration, respectively, filed by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
against them.

The right of an accused to the speedy disposition of cases is a sacrosanct right that must
not only be respected by courts and tribunals, but must also be invoked only in clear
instances of vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The determination of a
violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases shall not be subject to a mechanical
mathematical reckoning of time, but must be scrutinized and analyzed according to the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[4]

The Antecedents

The petitioners were then active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).[5]

The PNP of Rizal Province (Rizal PNP) received intelligence reports stating that a certain
Mario Condes was brandishing firearms and terrorizing the people at Sitio Mahangin,
Barangay Maybangcal, Morong, Rizal. Further reports revealed that the members of the
New People's Army were gathering at the said site. Consequently, the PNP applied for a
Search Warrant to search a farmhouse located along E. Dela Paz Street, Sitio Mahangin,
Barangay Maybangcal.[6]

At around 6:00 a.m. of February 6, 2010, a team composed of officers of the Rizal PNP,
accompanied by members of the 16th Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army,
implemented the Search Warrant. This resulted to the arrest of 43 people (Morong 43) for
illegal possession of firearms and of various improvised explosive devices and
components (IEDS). The IEDS were discovered inside one of the buildings at the search
site, where a large group of people was gathered in what appeared to be a bomb making
lesson.[7]

On February 7, 2010, State Prosecutor II Romeo B. Senson (SP Senson) conducted

inquest proceedings against the Morong 43.[8]

Thereafter, on February 8, 2010, SP Senson issued the inquest resolution recommending

the filing of criminal informations against the Morong 43 for violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,[9] P.D. No. 1877,[10] and the Election Code. SP Senson likewise
recommended that the Morong 43 be temporarily detained at Camp Capinpin, pending
the issuance of a final Department of Justice (DOJ) resolution approving his
recommendation.[11]

Meanwhile, on May 3, 2012, eight of the Morong 43 members, namely, Dr. Merry Mia
Clamor, Dr. Alexis Montes, Gary Liberal, Ma. Teresa Quinawayan, Reynaldo
Macabenta, Mercy Castro, Jane Beltran Balleta, and Samson Castillo, filed a Joint
Complaint Affidavit against the petitioners, accusing them of violating Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009, Sections 2 and 4 of R.A. No. 7438,
[12] 
and Robbery under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[13]

On October 26, 2015, the OMB issued a Resolution[14] (First OMB Resolution) finding
probable cause to indict the petitioners for violation of Section 2 (a) and (b), and Section
4 of R.A. No. 7438.

Former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales (Carpio-Morales) approved the First

OMB Resolution on December 21, 2015. The petitioners received the notice of the First
OMB Resolution on January 26, 2016, and filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration
against the same.[15]
On March 23, 2016, the OMB issued a Resolution[16] denying the petitioners' Motion for
Partial Reconsideration.

Consequently, the OMB filed criminal informations against the petitioners before the
Sandiganbayan on October 25, 2016.

On March 20, 2017, the petitioners, finding the Informations to be duplicitous in

character, filed a Motion to Quash the said Informations. They claimed in their Motion to
Quash that the recital of facts in the Informations alleged the violation of both Sections
4(a) and 4(b) of R.A. No. 7438, which were two separate and distinct criminal offenses.
[17]

Then, on April 20, 2017, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash, praying
for the dismissal of the Informations on the ground of the OMB's inordinate delay in the
resolution of the preliminary investigation of their case. According to them, the
unreasonable delay by the OMB constituted a violation of their right to the speedy
disposition of their case.[18]

On May 3, 2017, the OMB filed its opposition to the Supplemental Motion to Quash. In
its Opposition, the OMB countered that there was no inordinate delay in the resolution of
the petitioners' case.[19]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On June 7, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution[20] denying the

petitioners' Motion to Quash. The Sandiganbayan held that there was no inordinate delay
in the resolution of the petitioners' case. The Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that the concept
of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, and a mere mathematical reckoning of time is
not sufficient. Rather, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The Sandiganbayan found that the petitioners' case moved with
reasonable continuity during the preliminary investigation, and became idle only for two
years and five months, following the filing of the last affidavit up to the resolution of the
complaint. It noted that the delay was reasonable considering that the investigating
prosecutor had to study 10 separate counter-affidavits, a reply and rejoinder affidavits;
the offenses charged were complex; and the Resolution had to go through the review and
approval of the Bureau Director, Assistant Ombudsman and the Ombudsman herself.

The dispositive portion of the assailed resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused's Motion to Quash is DENIED for
lack of merit.

Let the arraignment of the accused on June 29, 2017 at 8:30 a.m. proceed, as scheduled.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[22] dated July 25, 2017.

Undeterred, the petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution rests on whether or not the petitioners'
right to the speedy disposition of their case was violated.

The petitioners maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that there was no violation of their
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases.[23] The petitioners point out that the
right to the speedy disposition of cases must be examined according to the balancing of
interest test, with due regard given to the length of the delay, reason for the delay,
assertion by the accused and the prejudice caused to the accused. According to the
petitioners, the OMB failed to present any valid justification for the delay.[24]

Moreover, the petitioners contend that the length with which their cases lagged was
similar to the periods of delay in the cases of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,[25] Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan,[26] and People v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[27] where the Court dismissed the
Informations on account of the violation of therein accused's right to the speedy
disposition of their cases.[28]

Furthermore, the petitioners lament that they suffered prejudice due to the delay in the
resolution of their case.[29]

Finally, the petitioners maintain that they never waived their right to the speedy
disposition of cases, contrary to the Sandiganbayan's finding.[30]

On the other hand, the People, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
counters that the petitioners miserably failed to show that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions. The petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of cases was not
violated because the delay that may have taken place in the resolution of their case was
justified under the circumstances. Besides, the petitioners failed to assert their right at the
earliest opportunity. Moreover, the petitioners did not suffer any prejudice.[31]

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition is bereft of merit.

The Determination of Delay in the

Proceedings is not Subject to a Mere
Mathematical Reckoning

No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees to all persons accused of crimes the right
to a speedy disposition of their case. Article III, Section 16 in no uncertain terms
mandates that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."[32]

Significantly, in determining whether there was a violation of the accused's constitutional

right to the speedy disposition of cases, the Court stressed in the recent en banc case of
Cesar Matas Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City; Office of the
Ombudsman; and People of the Philippines[33] that "[a] mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved is not sufficient" to rule that there was inordinate delay.[34] Furthermore,
the Court laid down the following guidelines in determining whether the delay in the
disposition of the case constitutes a violation of the accused's right to the speedy
disposition of cases, to wit:

i. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to a speedy
trial;

ii. A case shall be deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. The doctrine in Sandiganbayan[35] which
states that the fact-finding investigation should not be deemed separate from the
preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining whether there was a
violation of the right to a speedy disposition of cases has been abandoned.

Accordingly, the period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing
of the formal complaint shall no longer be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.

Likewise, the OMB shall set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with
due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond the
periods set by the OMB shall be taken against the prosecution;

iii. Courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the case
was resolved within the time periods contained in the law, Supreme Court
resolutions, and circulars, then the burden falls on the defense to prove that the
accused's right to a speedy disposition of cases was indeed violated. Specifically,
the defense must show that the case is motivated by malice, or is politically
 motivated and attended by utter lack of evidence; and that it did not contribute to
the delay.

Otherwise, if the case drags beyond the reasonable periods, and the accused
invokes his right to a speedy disposition of cases, then the prosecution must justify
the delay. The prosecution must prove that it followed the prescribed
procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution
of the case; the issues in the case were complex, and that the volume of the
evidence made the delay inevitable; and that the accused did not suffer any
prejudice as a result of the delay;

iv. "Determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must

consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be
weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised." This rule holds
true unless it is shown that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by
malice, or if the accused himself/herself waived his/her right to a speedy
disposition of cases or the right to a speedy trial. In all cases of dismissals due to
inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed
by the relevant court; and

v. The right to a speedy disposition of cases or the right to a speedy trial must be
timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion
upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Failure to do so, constitutes a
waiver of such right.[36]

Applying the foregoing tenets to the case at bar, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan
that there was no inordinate delay in the investigation of the case against the petitioners.

The Investigation Conducted by the

OMB Proceeded at a Continuous and
Steady Pace

The records reveal that the offenses were alleged to have been committed by the
petitioners sometime in February 2010. The Joint Complaint Affidavit was filed two
years thereafter, or on May 3, 2012. Following Cagang,[37] it is the filing of this Joint
Complaint Affidavit that started the prosecution machinery against the petitioners. Thus,
the two-year gap from the purported commission of the offense up to the filing of the
complaint against the petitioners shall not be considered in determining the period in
which the investigation proceeded. Thus, the reckoning point for determining whether the
OMB was guilty of inordinate delay in investigating the petitioners' case shall be May 3,
2012.

It must be noted that after the filing of the Joint Complaint Affidavit, the DOJ endorsed
the said affidavit to the OMB on August 31, 2012. This means that the Joint Complaint
Affidavit landed on the hands of the OMB on August 31, 2012. Over the course of one
year, the parties submitted their respective pleadings. Such that, the last pleading
necessary to resolve the complaint, or the Joint Rejoinder Affidavit, was received by the
OMB on June 3, 2013. After this, the OMB reviewed the case, and the investigating
prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict the petitioners on October
26, 2015. The same was, thereafter, forwarded to the Ombudsman, who approved the
same Resolution on December 21, 2015.

A perusal of this timeline would show that the case proceeded at a continuous pace.
Added to this, the petitioners do not refute that they themselves filed several
motions[38] during the pendency of the investigation, which likewise contributed to the
delay in the resolution of their case.[39]

This notwithstanding, the petitioners staunchly maintain that a "lull" in the proceedings
took place from the filing of the last pleading, or the Joint Rejoinder Affidavit, on June 3,
2013, until the OMB rendered a Resolution on October 26, 2015. According to the
petitioners, this "lull" of around two years and five months was unjustified, and, thus,
constituted a violation of their right to the speedy disposition of their case.

The Court is not persuaded.

Suffice to say, the delay in the disposition of the case shall not be subject to a mere
mathematical reckoning. Rather, the Court will consider the peculiar facts and
circumstances surrounding the case. Contrary to the petitioners' claim that there was a lull
in the investigation of their case, the records show that numerous proceedings actually
took place during the said two-year period. During this time, the OMB had to exert
efforts to obtain the middle name of accused Manuel Tabion (Tabion). In fact,
various Subpoena Duces Tecum were issued to the PNP requesting for the Personal Data
Sheet of the said accused. The OMB had to await the response of the PNP, as the former
office needed to determine Tabion's middle name.[40]

Likewise, during the questioned period, the OMB's investigating prosecutor had to study
the case and evaluate the charges. It is worth mentioning that aside from having
numerous complainants, the case also involved 10 respondents, including former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Each of the respondents submitted various
pleadings, ranging from their Counter-Affidavit with attached documents, a Joint Reply
Affidavit and a Joint Rejoinder Affidavit. The investigating prosecutor had to consider all
the pleadings and documents in the resolution of the case. Moreover, according to the
OMB, the same pleadings and documents were studied by the Bureau Director, Assistant
Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman in their review and approval of the Resolution.

Furthermore, the OMB explained that the case was complex, such that the preliminary
investigation involved three offenses, namely, violation of R.A. No. 9745, R.A. No.
7438, and Article 294 of the RPC.

Added to all these, the resolution of the OMB's investigating prosecutor underwent a
series of reviews and considerations by the OMB. The same resolution was forwarded to
the Bureau Director, Assistant Ombudsman, and, thereafter, to Ombudsman Carpio-
Morales.

Undoubtedly, the aforementioned timeline and justifications would show that there was
no inordinate delay in the investigation of the case. It is also clear from the records that
the OMB followed the established procedure in prosecuting the petitioners' case. This
proves that there were no vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays in the investigation
of the case.

The Petitioners Failed to Show Any

Prejudice Suffered from the Alleged
Delay in the Prosecution of their Case

In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his/her case
was violated, it is likewise essential for the accused to show that he/she suffered
prejudice due to the delay.

The petitioners claim that due to the length of time that the preliminary investigation
lagged, they suffered prejudice consisting of difficulties in traveling which, in turn,
prevented them from competently fulfilling their duties.

The Court notes the observation of the Sandiganbayan that contrary to their averment, the
petitioners did not actually suffer any setbacks in their career brought about by the
investigations against them. On the contrary, the petitioners (save for those who have
already retired) were even promoted during the pendency of the investigation, despite the
complaint lodged against them. The records show that Segovia was promoted as
Lieutenant General; Baladad to Major General; Reyes to Brigadier General; Zaragoza to
Colonel; and Cabading to Major. Plainly, their accusation that they were denied the
promotion they deserved is clearly false.[41] Despite the purported difficulties and
inconveniences they allegedly experienced in fulfilling their duties, they were all still
promoted to higher ranks.

Needless to say, such minor inconvenience experienced by the petitioners is a burden that
is attached to every criminal prosecution. Other than the above-mentioned
inconveniences, and the anxiety they may have experienced, the petitioners have not
shown that they suffered any more prejudice than is attributable to the nature of
preliminary investigation.[42] Simply stated, the petitioners suffered no serious prejudice
beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay attributed to the normal
processes of justice.

It also bears noting that the records are bereft of any showing that there was a deliberate
attempt on the part of the OMB to delay the case, or gain some tactical advantage over
the accused, or to harass or prejudice them. In fact, neither did the petitioners allege any
bad faith or ill-motive on the part of the OMB to deliberately delay the case. Neither did
they allege that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, nor that they
were victims of political persecution.

Finally, the allegation of a delay in the disposition of the case seems to be a mere
afterthought. The records show that the petitioners initially filed a Motion to Quash,
solely on the ground that the Information was flawed, as it charged two offenses. A
month thereafter,[43] the petitioners changed their tune and belatedly claimed that their
right to a speedy disposition of cases was violated. It must be remembered that the
invocation of one's right to a speedy disposition of cases must be timely raised. The
accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of such right.[44]

The Cases of Tatad, Duterte and

Sandiganbayan do not apply squarely
to the instant case

The petitioners cannot harp on the cases of Tatad,[45] Duterte[46] and Sandiganbayan,

[47]
 and conveniently assert that the Court should order the dismissal of the cases filed
against them, simply because the periods of delay in the aforementioned cases are similar
to the instant case.

It cannot be gainsaid that the Court stressed that in determining the fact of inordinate
delay, particular regard must be given to the peculiar facts and circumstances surrounding
each case.[48] This said, the perceived similarities between the aforementioned cases and
the case at bar are shallow and superficial, to say the least. A closer scrutiny of the facts
in each case would reveal a stark disparity with the instant case.

In the case of Tatad, the Court found that aside from the length of the delay, the
proceedings against therein accused - Tatad were attended by political motivations, and
that there was a deviation from the established procedures in conducting the preliminary
investigation. Added to this, the Court stated that the delay was not justified considering
that the case was not at all complex, involving as it did, a violation of the Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth law, which did not necessitate a gruelling examination
of the evidence.

Similarly, in the case of Duterte, the Court found that there was an irregular conduct of
the preliminary investigation. Here, the accused were completely unaware that the
preliminary investigation against them was actually ongoing.

Finally, in Sandiganbayan, the Court, in determining whether the delay that attended the
case was vexatious and inordinate, took into account the time of the supposed
commission of the offense to the filing of the Information. It bears stressing that this rule
has already been abandoned.[49]

All too clearly, the petitioners cannot seek refuge from the ruling in Tatad,
Duterte and Sandiganbayan. They were not victims of political persecution, nor was the
investigation against them irregular. On the contrary, the OMB strictly followed the
proper procedures in conducting the investigation against them, sans any bad faith or ill-
motive.

In fine, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioners' Motion to Quash the Information.
To emphasize, a simple mathematical reckoning of time shall never suffice. Rather, each
case shall be scrutinized according to the facts and circumstances peculiar thereto.
Considering that the perceived delays in the instant case were justified, the case against
the petitioners shall not be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., designated as additional Member per Special Order

No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.)