Angel Naval Vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia

Group 4: Case Digests for Election Law Atty. Freddie H.
Baynosa II
Angel Naval vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia

G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014
Facts:
Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd District of CamSur. On October 12, 2009,
RA 9716 was approved, reapportioning the legislative district of Province of CamSur. Notably, 8 out of 98
10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The present
Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns
from the old First District. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the
Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-
elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District. Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member
candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the
entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian,
irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit rule’s application is more
with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical
territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative
of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be
strictly construed.
Issue:
Whether or not Naval’s, election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in
representation of the renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule.
Ruling:
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a
pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is
representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who
derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after
which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal.
R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be created, but the Third Districtis
to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers mean what they say. The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement
to achieve equality of representation among the districts. It is with this mindset that the Court should
consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and
2013.
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not
undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without
him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be
represented, albeit by another eligible person.
Submitted By: Javier, Magno, Malaluan, Mapandi & Matthews

Group 4: Case Digests for Election Law Atty. Freddie H. Baynosa II
People vs Corral
GR No L-42300, January 31, 1936
Facts:
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934.
After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal 98
disqualification. The judgement of conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with section
432 of the revised Administrative Code.
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgement of this court promulgated on
March 3, 1910 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence was presented to show
that prior to June 5, 1934, the voted in election precinct No. 18 of the Municipality of Davao, Province
of Davao.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the letter voted in 1928 his offense had already
prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on June
5, 1934.
Issue:
Whether or not the state has the right to deprive a person’s right to suffrage.
Ruling:
Under the law a person is disqualified to vote who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, has been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability
not having been removed by plenary pardon.
The modern conception of the suffrage is not voting is a function of government. It is right
created by law, not a natural right.
The exclusion from the exercise of suffrage must be adjudged a mere disqualification imposed for
protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal
right.

Kabataan Partylist vs Comelec

G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015
Facts:
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system

for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through
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the adoption of biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured
shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last
day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated
x x x.”
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013.
Among others, the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters without
biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications
for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the
biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional

requirement of literacy and property.
Ruling:
No. The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right
of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate.
The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process of registration is a procedural limitation
on the right to vote.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with the
registration procedure in order to vote.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or
other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person’s ability to
intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good -the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case.

Pungutan v Abubakar
43 SCRA 1, 12 (1972)
Facts:
In view of massive violence, terrorism and fraud that happened in the towns of Siasi, Tapul,
Parang and Luuk, it was alleged that no election were in effect. COMELEC concluded that based on
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the findings, supported by credible evidence, irregularities did attend the so-called elections and
decided to reject the returns of the said municipalities. Petitioner questioned the power of the
COMELEC in rejecting such returns, since it encroach the judicial power, the right to vote being
involved.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC is without power over the question.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the COMELEC is not devoid of power to disregard and annul the alleged
returns for being spurious or manufactured. The power of decision of the Commission is limited to
purely 'administrative questions.’ The right to vote or the determination of whether or not a person is
precluded from voting is excluded. As to whether an elect on has been held is a question of a different
type and is properly within the administrative jurisdiction of COMELEC. Hence, rejection of election
returns, as in this case, is within the authority of the COMELEC.

Nolasco v Comelec
275 SCRA 763 (1997)
Facts:
In the mayoralty election Blanco received higher votes than Alarilla. Later on, Alarilla
petitioned to disqualify Blanco and moved to suspend former’s proclamation for having committed
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massive vote buying and cheating. The COMELEC granted the said petition. Blanco moved for
reconsideration for having been denied due process and equal protection. Meanwhile, Nolasco as vice
mayor-elect intervened and contended that he should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was
finally disqualified.
Issue:
Whether or not Blanco was denied with his constitutional rights by the COMELEC.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that Blanco was not denied due process neither equal protection of law. The
COMELEC action is safely anchored on its Rules of Procedure that petitions for disqualification shall
be heard summarily after due notice. Also, COMELEC assumed direct jurisdiction over
disqualification case is not to favor anybody but to discharge its duty fair and fast. It further ruled that
this case concerns the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of republicanism. Suffrage is the means
by which our people express their sovereign judgment. Hence, its free exercise must be protected
especially against the purchasing power of the peso.

Abanil v. Justice of the Peace Court of Bacolod

G.R. No. 47243, [June 17, 1940], 70 PHIL 28-32
Facts:
In the year 1937 the total number of registered voters in the municipality of Talisay, Negros
Occidental, was 3,658. In 1938, the electoral census of the place showed that the number of registered
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voters had increased to 18,288. A few days before the election for Assemblymen, there were 17,344
petitions filed in the Justice of the peace court of Bacolod for the exclusion of the names of an equal
number of persons from the permanent list of registered voters on the grounds that (1) they were not
residents of Talisay in accordance with the election code, (2) that they could not prepare their ballots
themselves, and that (3) their registration as voters was not done in accordance with law. The hearing
of the petitions for exclusion was held and attorneys Hilado, Parremo, Remitio and Severino entered
their appearance for the challenged voters. The justice of the peace of Bacolod ascertained who of the
challenged voters were present in court and who were absent. Thereafter the said justice of the peace
declared those who were absent in default.
The attorneys for the petitioners in the said 17,344 exclusion cases objected on the ground that
the aforesaid attorneys had no authority to represent those who were absent. Thereupon the justice of
the peace of Bacolod ruled that said attorneys could represent only the 87 challenged voters who were
present in the court room and at the same time the justice of the peace dismissed 253 of the petitions
upon motion of the petitioners themselves. Although no evidence was presented by the petitioners in
support of their petition against those who, were declared in default, the justice of the peace of
Bacolod ordered their exclusion from the list of voters on the ground that it was the duty of the
challenged voters to appear in court in order to be personally examined in accordance with section 118
(f) of the election code.
Issue:
Whether or not the justice of the peace of Bacolod erred when it did not grant the motion to
remand all the exclusion cases to the CFI of Negros Occidental.
Ruling:
In the scheme of our present republican government, the people are allowed to have a voice
therein through the instrumentality of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing certain prescribed
qualifications (Art. V, Constitution of the Philippines; secs. 93 and 94, Election Code). The People in
clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent and perpetual
administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the performance of a duty in the
nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him a representative of the whole people. This
duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed should be exercised, not exclusively for the benefit of
the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the
general benefit and welfare of the state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 583.) In the last analysis,
therefore, the inclusion in or exclusion from the permanent electoral list of any voter concerns not
only the latter in his individual capacity but the public in general.

Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC
GR 222731, March 8 2016
Facts:
Bagumbayan-VNP and former Senator Gordon filed before the SC a petition for mandamus to
compel COMELEC to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) which is a security
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feature provided under RA 8346, as amended by RA 9369, to ensure the sanctity of the ballot. The
VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the
vote-counting machine. For the 2016 elections, the COMELEC opted to use vote-counting machines
instead of PCOS. The vote-counting machines are capable of providing the VVPAT functionality, and
for that the COMELEC is now being petitioned to have the vote-counting machines issue receipts once
the person has voted. The COMELEC, however, refused to enable this feature for reasons that the
receipts might be used by candidates in vote-buying and that it might increase the voting time in
election precincts.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC must activate the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting
machines.
Ruling:
Yes. The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436,
as amended, are mandatory. The law is clear that a “voter verified paper audit trail” requires the
following: (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count their votes;
and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based. Under the Constitution, the
COMELEC is empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
election, and one of the laws that it must implement is RA 8346 which requires the automated
election system to have the capability of providing a VVPAT. The COMELEC’s act of not enabling this
feature runs contrary to why the law requires this feature in the first place.

Garchitorena vs Crescini, December 18, 1918

39 Phil 258
Facts:
On the 6th of June 1918 an election was held in the province of Amobos, Camarines, for the
electoral position of governor and other provincial and municipal officers. The said governor position
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was being vied by the names of Andres Garchitorena, Manuel Crescini, Engracio Imperial and
Francisco Botor. After the elections were closed and the returns of the ballots were made by the
inspectors of the various municipalities to the provincial board of inspectors, the following are the
results of the said election,Andres Garchitorena had received 2,468 votes; that Manuel Crescini had
received 3,198 votes; that Engracio Imperial had received 1,954 votes and Francisco Botor had
received 692 votes. After the final examination and tallying of votes by the Board of Inspectors, they
declared Manuel Crescini as the newly elected Governor, for he received the plurality of votes cast.
They issued a certificate to him as he was proclaimed the winner. Upon notice of said proclamation,
immediately the runner up, Andres Garchitorena presented a protest against said election, contending
that there were many frauds and irregularities committed in various municipalities of the said
province, also he alleged that he received a majority of all the legal votes cast. Two trials were
conducted, and the judges (Mina and Paredes) both found in favor of petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner won the elections.
Ruling:
Petitioner, in this case is the winner in the elections. The presumption is that an election is
honestly conducted, and the burden of proof to show it otherwise is on the party assailing the return.
but when the return is clearly shown to be willfully and corruptly false, the whole of it becomes
worthless as proof. When the election has been conducted so irregularly and fraudulently that the true
result cannot be ascertained, the whole return must be rejected. It is impossible to make a list of all
the frauds which will invalidate an election. Each case must rest upon its own evidence.
The record of the frauds and irregularities committed in the said municipalities in which
Judges Mina and Paredes annulled the entire vote, not only shows that legal voters were prevented
from voting, but in some instances, legal ballots were tampered with and destroyed after they had
been cast, to such an extent that no confidence can be placed in the return. The return in no sense
discloses the expressed will of the voters. Search has been made in vain for cases in jurisprudence in
which the frauds and irregularities committed were more glaring and more atrocious, and in which
the real will of the voters were more effectively defeated, than is found in the records in said
municipalities in the present case. The statements of fact made by Judges Mina and Paredes relating
to said frauds and irregularities are fully sustained by the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause.

CARLOS v. ANGELES
G.R. No. 142907 (November 29, 2000)
Facts:
On May 21, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, proclaimed
petitioner Jose Emmanuel L. Carlos as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela having obtained 102,688
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votes, the highest number of votes, over that of respondent Antonio M. Serapio who obtained 77,270
votes. On June 1, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, an
election protest challenging the election results. The RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 125, rendered its
decision and set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of "significant badges of
fraud." Despite the plurality of valid votes in favor of protestee Carlos, the trial court set aside his
proclamation and declared protestant Serapio as duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City. On May 4,
2000, petitioner appealed to the Comelec, but on May 8, 2000, petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction over election protest.
Ruling:
By Constitutional fiat, COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction over election protest cases
involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction in election cases involving elective officials.

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PENERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613 (September 11, 2009)
Facts:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to disqualify
petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for
engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas
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Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the
supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law
authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of
votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera is guilty of premature campaigning.
Ruling:
Motorcades conducted after filing of the certificate of candidacy prior to the campaign period
constitute premature campaigning. When the campaign period starts and a person proceeds with
his/her candidacy, his/her acts, after the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy and prior to the
campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, constitute premature
campaigning, for which s/he may be disqualified.

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RULLODA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198 (January 20, 2003)
Facts:
Comelec denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay
Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when
constituents wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the
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Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido
contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a
certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request
that she be allowed to run for elections.
Ruling:
It is incorrect to say that there can be no substitution because there is no political party from
which to designate the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the
purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a
solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case
of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. The absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates
in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive
construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason
to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than when political
considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.

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SUNGA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125629 (March 25, 1998)
Facts:
Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig,
Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then
incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality.
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On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint for disqualification against
Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of
Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995,
Sunga filed another lettercomplaint3 with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with violation of
Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the
Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first
lettercomplaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition4 for disqualification consolidating the
charges in the two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details of
the violations committed by Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes,
while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However,
notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file
another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the
COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report to the COMELEC En Banc
recommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats,
intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any
equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The Law Department
likewise recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly
elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct
Sunga to take his oath and assume the duties and functions of the office.
Issue:
Whether or not the fact of proclamation of Trinidad will not affect the pending disqualification
against him.
Ruling:
An amendment which merely supplements or amplifies the Facts: originally contained in the
complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action or the filing of the initiatory
complaint. Hence, the same is not yet barred by the statue of limitations. An election offense has two
aspects, criminal and electoral. The criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of his/her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, while the electoral aspect involves the determination of whether he should be
disqualified. The former involves a full-blown trial, while the latter is summary in nature.

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LUCERO v. COMELEC and ONG, G.R. No. 113107 (July 20, 1994)
Facts:
The petitioners were two of the five candidates for the Second Legislative District of Northern
Samarin the synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.
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The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L.
Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes.
However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos,
where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible; of Precinct
No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and no election was held.
The COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the Provincial Board of
Canvassersto desist from reconvening until further orders.
On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en banc

promulgated a resolution calling for a special election inthe last remaining Precinct No. 13 (Barangay
Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justifiedby the result of the canvass by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and to notifythe parties of the schedule of election activities
for that precinct.
Both Lucero and Ong filed with SC special civil actions for certiorari to challenge the
Resolution.
In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of
SilvinoLobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his
chancesin the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the returns for
PrecinctNo. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass.
In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election
inPrecinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted in grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
Under Section 6 of the OEC, the two (2) requirements for the holding of a special election are:
(1) that there is a failure of elections and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election.
This “result of the election” means the net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given
constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his/her closest rival in the
latter precincts is less that the total number of votes in the precinct where there was a failure of
election, then such failure would certainly affect “the result of the election.”

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Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term ending in 1992. In
1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.
Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. In 1998,
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Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner
Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the
ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998;
hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared
Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run
for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and
serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of
the three-term limit.
Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified
to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first
term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term
because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-
mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of
design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A
consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members
of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of
the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term
limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were
serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly
restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.

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PADILLA v. COMELEC
214 SCRA 735
Facts:
Pursuant to RA 7155 and Resolution No. 2312 enacted by the respondent, the respondent
conducted a plebiscite in both the proposed municipality and the mother municipality. In the
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plebiscite, the creation of the proposed municipality was declared rejected. Petitioner herein contends
that the plebiscite is invalid because the Constitution requires that the plebiscite should only be
conducted in the areas comprising the proposed municipality. He claimed further that the ruling in
Tan v. COMELEC has been abandoned by the Court, readopting the ruling in Paredes v. COMELEC,
and that this is justified by the deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution from its precursor.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebsicite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed municipality and
the remaining areas of the mother municipality is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the
political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.
Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such
political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

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TAN v. COMELEC
142 SCRA 727
Facts:
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in
the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, Petitioners herein, who are
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residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, filed a
case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents from conducting the plebiscite which
was scheduled "to be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected, excluding
the original province."
Issue:
Whether or not the law is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the LGC as in
Art. XI, Sec. 3, of the Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes. The cited provision plainly provides that, "no province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The phrase "the unit or units affected" refers to both
the original province and the new province sought to be created as these political groups will both be
affected. Hence, the two must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.

17
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-44640, OCTOBER 12, 1976
Facts:
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to
call for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies
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(“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length
of effectivity).On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the
questions that are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or
not the citizen wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several
proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive
supervision and control of the national referendum in October 16.Father and son, Pablo and Pablito
Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.
Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that
the power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the
Constitution. Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16. They assert that the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for
deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the
people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age
and above. The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue
raised is political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also
asserts that at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to
exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of
PDs 991 and 1033).
Ruling:
YES. The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political
one. This is because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments
to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.
After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly.
The normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
president undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect,
through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment
procedure raises a contestable issue.

18
CITY OF PASIG V. COMELEC
Facts:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated
from its mother Barangays and converted into a separate one, the City Council of Pasig passed and
approved an ordinance, creating Barangay Karangalan scheduling the plebiscite on the creation of
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said barangay on June 22, 1996. Upon learning of the ordinance, the Municipality of Cainta filed a
petition on June 19, 1996 to the Commission on Elections to suspend or cancel the scheduled
plebiscite. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangay involve areas included in
the pending case before the RTC Antipolo Rizal, Br. 74 for settlement of boundary dispute, hence the
plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by
the court. Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued another ordinance,
creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997. Again
the Municipality of Cainta filed another petition on March 12, 1997 to suspend or cancel the plebiscite
on the same ground as for the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan.The COMELEC ordered the
plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until the boundary dispute is
settled because it presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided. The City of Pasig filed
the petition (G.R. No. 125646) to the Supreme Court, arguing that there is no prejudicial question
since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases
are civil, as in the instant case. In the case of Barangay Napico, the COMELEC dismissed the petition
for being moot because the plebiscite was already held and the creation ratified and approved by the
residents. Hence, the Municipality of Cainta filed a petition (G.R. No. 128663) to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the pending civil case on boundary dispute presents a prejudicial question
which must first be decided before the creation of the proposed barangays. While the City of Pasig
argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action
and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case, still in the interest of
good order, the Court can suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case
closely interrelated or linked to the first.
The decision on whose territorial jurisdiction the areas fall has material bearing to the creation
of the proposed Barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is properly identified territorial
jurisdiction for these define the limits of the exercise of the governmental powers of the LGU. Beyond
these limits, its acts are ultra vires (beyond the legal capacity). Moreover, considering the expenses
entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the
same until the resolution of the boundary dispute.
In the case of Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the petition of the Municipality
of Cainta has been rendered moot and academic because the plebiscite was already held. The issues
raised are still pending and must first be resolved.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance; and the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico should be annulled and
set aside, and any plebiscite thereto is hold in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary
dispute.

19
Buac v. COMELEC
Facts:
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the
conversion of this municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487.
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of
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sixty-four (64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes won, indicating that the people
rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city. However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the
PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that
the negative votes still prevailed. Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and
counting of votes, private respondents, filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of
the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. The
COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed as EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to
the Second Division. Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a
plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest.
The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioner’s motion and
dismissing the petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The
COMELEC en banc affirmed this Resolution.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-
102 constituting the committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.
On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its termination, the
Committees on Revision submitted their complete and final reports.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no witnesses were
presented by petitioner, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which they
did.
Petitioner contends that “the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the
determination of the will of the electorate” because “the revision is incomplete. He claims that:
“Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision
Committees, the revision of ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for ‘Yes’ and a total of 12,602 votes
for ‘No.’ The revision committee thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
Ruling:
Petitions dismissed for lack of merit.The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by
evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but finality. This is so because “the conduct of plebiscite and
determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts.
Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent
constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the
COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws.” Its acts, therefore,
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order in these twin petitions, the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion.

20
SECTION 2. ARTICLE XVII

The 1987 Constitution, [February 2, 1987]
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
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ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

21
SECTION 32. ARTICLE VI

The 1987 Constitution, [February 2, 1987]
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and
the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject
any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
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every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
thereof.

22
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Facts:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term
limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise
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said people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you
approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose
Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the
1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and
after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally
filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al
moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented
by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission
indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.d. People’s initiative is
limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits
constitutes a revision.e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for
people’s initiative.
Issue:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution but,
as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution via
PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a
delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the
Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as
to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope.
Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.

23
Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
Facts:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
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will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The Lambino Group
alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino Group’s initiative
petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group
filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v.
COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
Ruling:
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People. The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign
such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.” The essence of
amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign
on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus,
an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in

gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated
by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy
of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

24
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996
Facts:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the
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declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the
Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by
the American navy. On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said
Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the
President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993. The petition prayed for the following: a)
to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to
allow Morong to join provided conditions are met. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the
petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the
Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their
power initiative under the LGC of 1991. On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local
initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. On
February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the
SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong. On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and
2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and
guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum. On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for
certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10
Ruling:
YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The process started by private
respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM
only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec
labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the
word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject
them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right
reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative
body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the
people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of
legislation.

25
Angubong vs Comelec
GR NO 126576, March 5, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo M. Angobung was the elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini,
Isabela in the local elections of 1995. Private respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said
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elections. In September 1996, de Alban filed with the Local Elections Registrar of Tumauini, Isabela, a
Petition for Recall against Angobung. Said petition was forwarded to the Regional Office of
Tugegarao, Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval. Deputy
Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson then submitted to the COMELEC en banc, a
memorandum which recommends the approval of the petition for recall filed by de Alban and its
signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters as required by section 69[d] of the Local Government Code of 1991. The COMELEC en banc,
acting on said Memorandum, issued the herein assailed Resolution No 96-2951.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the resolution violated the one-year bar on recall elections.
2. Whether or not the resolution violated the statutory minimum requirement of 25% as to the
number of signatures supporting any petition for recall.
Ruling:
1. NO. The recall election scheduled on 02 December 1996 is not barred by the May 1997
Barangay Election. The one-year bar finds no application in the case; Resolution No 96-
2951 is therefore valid on this ground.
2. Yes . Private respondent de Alban filed the petition for recall with only herself as the filer
and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in
Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner. The petition, however,
does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also
become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor.

26
PARAS v COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169
Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in

October 1995, A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public
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respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In
view of the petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December
16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction
before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date
January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for
certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996
recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of
the Local Government Code.
Ruling:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the
law is too literal that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather
that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local election”
refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.

27
Gregorio Nuval v. Norberto Guray

GR No L-30241 | Dec. 29, 1928
Facts:
On May 11, 1928, within the period fixed by Sec. 437 of the Administrative Code, Nuval filed in
Civil Case 1442 in CFI-La Union, inhis dual capacity as a registered voter and a registered candidate
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for the office of municipal president, a petition filed against Guray, asking for the exclusion of the
latter’s name from the election list since he has not fulfilled the residency requirement.
The Judge dismissed the petition, opining that Guray was a bona fide resident of the
municipality from Jan. 1, 1927; since the orde was not appealable, Guray’s name remained in the
election list.
Guray was elected as municipal president, with Nuval obtaining second place.-
Nuval filed the present quo warranto action, based on Sec. 408 of the Administrative Code,
asking that Guray be declared ineligibledue to non-fulfillment of the residency requirement which is
required to be eligible in an elective office.
Issue:
Whether Guray, at the time of his election, was ineligible for office of the residence in the
municipality.
Ruling:
On June 27, 1922, Guray was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union. A
requirement of the post is that he live continuously in themunicipality where he performs such official
duties. Due to this, Guray asked for the cancellation of his name in the election list of Luna (wherehe
has lived since forever). In 1926, Guray and his family went back to live in Luna at his in-law’s house
due to high costs of living in Balaoan.
In 1927, he began construction of a house which remained incomplete. On February 1928, he

applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spentin Luna, and filed his resignation on the same
month. Despite having a cedula declaring him a resident of Balaoan, he obtained another cedulafrom
the municipality of Luna on Feb. 20, 1928, which was dated January 15, 1928. He then applied for
registration as a voter of Luna, allegingthat he had been residing in the municipality for 30 years.In
view of the Facts: just related, the question arises whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal
residence of one year immediately prior to thegeneral elections of June 5, 1928, in order to be eligible
to the office of municipal president of Luna, Province of La Union.It is an established rule that "where
a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in another state, he cannot again vote in
the state ofhis former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence". "The term
'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' whichimports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention."Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and
acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be acandidate in the municipality of Luna, he
needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time prescribed by the law,
andfor such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so, but his personal presence in said
municipality.For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and in law
Norberto Guray only abandoned his legal residence in theMunicipality of Balaoan, and began to
acquire another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he filed his resignation
fromthe office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding, and which resignation
was accepted; and on being elected municipal president of Luna in the general elections of June 5,
1928, he had not reacquired the legal residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.

28
FAYPON VS QUIRINO
G.R. No. L-7068, December 22, 1954
Facts:
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to
United States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work
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in Manila, and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was
proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto was
filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's ineligibility for the said office because of alleged
lack of residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City
in 1946 and 1947.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment or loss of
his residence of origin.
Ruling:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin - domicile - to
pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to improve his lot.
When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return
to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reason, he may not be absent
himself from the place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the
animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus,
registration of a voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or
loss of such residence.

29
Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was
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seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification
with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to
since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one
year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
Ruling:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of
a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the Facts: supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to
run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is
directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

30
Domino vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency
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where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the
certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani
where he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May
11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voter’s Registration Record and his address indicated as
24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections
Ruling:
The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991,
he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is
now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a
new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in
Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s
original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack
of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter
in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption
of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.

31
De los Reyes v. Solidum

G.R. No. 42798, [August 31, 1935], 61 PHIL 893-900
Facts: :
This is an appeal taken by the petitioner Guillermo de los Reyes from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Capiz the dispositive part of which reads:
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"Wherefore, it is held that the respondent is eligible to the office of municipal president of Ibajay,
Capiz, and that the remedy applied for does not lie. Without costs."
Issue:
Whether or not the CFI erred in declaring Solidum as eligible for the position.
Ruling:
The respondent, born in the municipality of Ibajay, baptized, grown up, married, paid his
cedula tax, registered as a voter, exercised the right of suffrage, and elected once as councilor and
three times as municipal president of said municipality, is legally a resident thereof notwithstanding
the fact that he constructed a house in another municipality for purposes of business, had his family
lived there and educated his children in the schools of said municipality.

32
Sabili vs COMELEC
Facts:
COMELEC denied Sabili’s Certificate of Candidacy formayor of Lipa due to failure to comply
with the one year residency requirement. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the
2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8)
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months. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed hisCOC during the 2007 elections, he
and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been
a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local
elections.
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition
of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa
City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his
failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the 26 January2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which
the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of
Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly filed a
Manifestation with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010, the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari
with Extremely Urgent Applicationfor the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a
Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.
Issues:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to
provecompliancewith the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
Ruling:
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily reviewthe COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the
COMELEC'sappreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into
an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty
to interveneandcorrect the COMELEC's error.
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exactdefinition; generally, it refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of
wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action
with graveabuse of discretion.4. Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the
condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC,
supported by substantial evidence, shall be finaland non-reviewable.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a
certiorari casethe COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the
COMELEC in this regardgenerally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC'saction on the appreciation and evaluation
of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court
is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is
present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of
jurisdiction.

33
Jalosjos vs Comelec
G.R. No. 193314 : February 26, 2013
Facts:
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of
Baliangao, MisamisOccidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth
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and residence as BarangayTugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course
to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely represented her
place of birth and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not
totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had failed
to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
Ruling:
Petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod,
Estrellada,Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol, Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation, Maghilum and Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual and physical resident of
Brgy. Tugassince 2008. However, they declared in the same Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta
Miray while her house was being constructed in Brgy. Tugas.
Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and Estrellada asserted that
in December 2009, construction was still ongoing. By their assertion, they were implying that six
months before the 10 May 2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her house at Brgy. Tugas.
Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only visited Baliangao
occasionally when they stated that "at times when she (petitioner) was in Baliangao, she used to stay
at the house of Lourdes Yap while her residential house was being constructed."
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that petitioner was not
and never had been a resident of their barangay. At most, the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show
that petitioner was building and developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and that she
only stayed in Brgy. PuntaMiray whenever she wanted to oversee the construction of the resort and
the house.
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez v.

COMELEChas established that the ownership of a house or some other property does not establish
domicile. This principle is especially true in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily
presence in the locality and her intent to stay there at least a year before the elections.
Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a voter only shows, at
most, that she had met the minimum residency requirement as a voter. This minimum requirement is
different from that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public office.

34
Mitra vs Comelec
G.R. No. 191938 : October 19, 2010
Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the
incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other
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territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a
domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms
immediately before the elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra's second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City
was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of
Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City
residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the
transfer of his Voter's Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto
Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed
a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra's COC. They essentially argued that Mitra remains a
resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not
qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Mitra insisted in his Answer that he has successfully
abandoned Puerto Princesa City as his domicile of origin, and has established a new domicile in
Aborlan since 2008.
Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run.
Ruling:
The First Division defined the governing law with the statement that residence means domicile
under the Court's consistent rulings since 1928 in Nuval v. Guray. 2Domicile imports not only the
intent to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of this intention.
To acquire a new domicile — a domicile by choice – the following must concur: (1) residence or
bodily presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon
the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus non revertendiwith respect to the old
domicile, and an animus manendi at the domicile of choice. The intent to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time and the acts of the person must be consistent with
this intent.

35
Asistio vs Aguirre
G.R. No. 191124; April 27, 2010
Facts:
On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri (Echiverri) filed against
petitioner Luis A. Asistio (Asistio) a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters
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of Caloocan City (Petition for Exclusion) before the MeTC, Branch 52,Caloocan City presided over by
public respondent Judge Arthur O. Malabaguio. Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of
Caloocan City, specifically not of123 Interior P. Zamora St.,Barangay 15,Caloocan City, the address
stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections. Echiverri, also a candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City, was the respondent in a Petition to
Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Asistio. According to
Echiverri, when he was about to furnish Asistio a copy of his Answer to the latters petition, he found
out that Asistios address is non-existent. To support this, Echiverri attached to his petition a
Certification issued by the Tanggapan ng Punong Barangay of Barangay 15 Central, Zone 2, District II
of Caloocan City. He mentioned that, upon verification of the 2009 Computerized Voters List (CVL)
for Barangay 15, Asistios name appeared under voter number 8, with address at 109 Libis
Gochuico,Barangay 15,Caloocan City. Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision removing the name of
Asistio from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.
Meanwhile, Echiverri filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification,which was
docketed as SPA No. 10-013 (DC). The Petition was anchored on the grounds that Asistio is not a
resident ofCaloocanCityand that he had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Asistio, in his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses (Com Memorandum),raised
the same arguments with respect to his residency and also argued that the President of thePhilippines
granted him an absolute pardon.
Issue:
Should Asistios name be removed from the permanent list of voters in Precinct 1811A of
Caloocan City?
Ruling:
The residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at
least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. Residence, as used in
the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean
domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons acts, activities, and
utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in
each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3)
that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1)
an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must
be animus manendi coupled with animo non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

36
PANLAQUI v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188671 (February 24, 2010)
Facts:
Petitioner Mozart Panlaqui (Panlaqui) assails the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc
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Resolution of June 17, 2009 denying his motion for proclamation, which he filed after this Court
affirmed in G.R. No. 180051 1 the nullification of the proclamation of private respondent Nardo
Velasco (Velasco) as mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga.
Velasco was born in Sasmuan on June 22, 1952 to Filipino parents. He married Evelyn Castillo
on June 29, 1975. In 1983, he moved to the United States where he subsequently became a citizen.
Upon Velasco's application for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 2 was approved
on July 31, 2006, he took on even date his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, which application
was denied by the Election Registration Board (ERB). He thus filed a petition for the inclusion of his
name in the list of voters before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sasmuan which, by Decision of
February 9, 2007, reversed the ERB's decision and ordered his inclusion in the list of voters of
Sasmuan.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, by Decision of March 1,
2007, reversed 3 the MTC Decision, drawing Velasco to elevate the matter via Rule 42 to the Court of
Appeals which, by Amended Decision 4 of August 19, 2008, dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
In the meantime, Velasco filed on March 28, 2007 his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
mayor of Sasmuan, therein claiming his status as a registered voter. Panlaqui, who vied for the same
position, thereupon filed before the Comelec a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or to Cancel
Velasco's COC based on gross material misrepresentation as to his residency and, consequently, his
qualification to vote. ATCEIc
In the electoral bout of May 2007, Velasco won over Panlaqui as mayor of Sasmuan. As the
Comelec failed to resolve Panlaqui's petition prior to the elections, Velasco took his oath of office and
assumed the duties of the office.
Finding material misrepresentation on the part of Velasco, the Comelec cancelled his COC and
nullified his proclamation, by Resolutions of July 6, 2007 and October 15, 2007, which this Court
affirmed in G.R. No. 180051.
Panlaqui thereafter filed a motion for proclamation which the Comelec denied by the assailed
Resolution, pointing out that the rule on succession does not operate in favor of Panlaqui as the
second placer because Velasco was not disqualified by final judgment before election day.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC erred in its decision.
Ruling:
Finding that a candidate is not qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does not
amount to a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would render such
candidate ineligible for an elective position. It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter’s
inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and determined the presence of a false
representation of a material fact. It does not have jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the
misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was an intention to deceive the electorate
in terms of one’s qualifications for public office.

37
Pungutan v Abubakar
43 SCRA 1, 12 (1972)
Facts:
In view of massive violence, terrorism and fraud that happened in the towns of Siasi, Tapul,
Parang and Luuk, it was alleged that no election were in effect. COMELEC concluded that based on
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the findings, supported by credible evidence, irregularities did attend the so-called elections and
decided to reject the returns of the said municipalities. Petitioner questioned the power of the
COMELEC in rejecting such returns, since it encroach the judicial power, the right to vote being
involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant case calls for special election.
Ruling:
There is no reason to order the holding of a special election in all of the 290 precincts in the 4
municipalities concerned because of the failure to meet the requirements for the calling of a special
election, as laid down in the case of USMAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, L-33325 and L-
34043, December 29, 1971 to wit: ascertainment by the Comelec that (1) no voting has been held in
any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and (2) that the votes not
cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections.

38
Canicosa v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 120318, [December 5, 1997], 347 PHIL 189-201
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo Canicosa and private respondent Severino Lajara were candidates for mayor
in Calamba, Laguna during the May 8, 1995 elections. After the canvassing, private respondent was
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proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvasser. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to declare failure of election and to declare null and
void the canvass and proclamation because of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and
accounting of votes, preparation of election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying,
unregistered voters voting and delay in the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the
precincts to the office of the Municipal Treasurer. In its decision, the COMELEC en banc dismissed
the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of
election.
Issue:
Whether or not failure of election exist in the present case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the grounds cited by Canicosa do not warrant a declaration of
failure of election. Clearly, none of the grounds invoked by petitioner falls under those instances
enumerated under Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. In view
thereof, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent, the petition is
dismissed and the challenged resolution is affirmed.
There are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely: (a) the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.

39
Domino vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency
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where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the
certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani
where he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May
11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voter’s Registration Record and his address indicated as
24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections
Ruling:
The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in
1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for
the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner
is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a
new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention
to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent
residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the
absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his
act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise
to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former
barangay.

40
AKBAYAN YOUTH v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147066, 26 March 2001
Facts:
Petitioners―representing the youth sector―seek to direct the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the 14 May 2001 General Elections, of new voters
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ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the 27
December 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.
Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of
New Voters Only is submitted but was then denied by the COMELEC under Resolution No. 3584 on 8
February 2001.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Section 8 (System of Continuing Registration of Voters) of R.A. No. 8189 The Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996 provides:
The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office
of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90)
days before a special election.
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing

COMELEC Resolution dated 8 February 2001.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period
between the COMELEC’s imposed 27 December 2000 deadline and the 14 May 2001 general
elections.
Ruling:
It is well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. A two-day special
registration for new voters would give rise to time constraints due to additional pre-election matters.
Accordingly, COMELEC acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter. In
issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
The Supreme Court cannot control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. The remedy
of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.

41
Macalintal vs Comelec
GR No. 157013, July 10 2003
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189
98
(The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he
has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds
are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and
as a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit
prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to
return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may have
to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption
of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an
affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his
domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the
promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after
approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a
temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met
according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to
vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law
is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this
probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised
stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he
was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is
prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of
the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally
defective.

42
NICOLAS-LEWIS v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners were successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225,
which accords to such applicants the right to suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004
national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee
98
voter” only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter
to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such
elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their
campaign for voter’s registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect
merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners on the ground that to exercise
absentee voting; the one-year residency requirement should be fulfilled.
Ruling:
RA 9189 provides a list of those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting
mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule.
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is
“recognized as such in the host country” because immigration or permanent residence in another
country implies renunciation of one’s residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as
voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile
in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that “all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law” must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage
and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to
mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225 – requiring
“duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are
most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an
absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope
of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise
the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.

43
ALCANTARA VS COMELEC
GR NO. 203646, April 16, 2013
Facts:
Sometime between January and April 2003, Alcantara, et al., along with their fellow law
teachers, organized a party named Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and
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Allied Workers. The party has a constitution and by-laws (CBL) and a principal office at the same
location as Atty. Alcantara’s law office. On May 14, 2004, the party name was amended and changed
to Abakada Guro Party list. The change was duly approved by the COMELEC. In the May 2007
elections, where ABAKADA participated and won a seat, Jonathan de la Cruz (De la Cruz), its first
nominee, became the party’s sole representative in Congress. On December 15, 2009, an All Leaders
Assembly was convened. While Alcantara failed to attend the meeting, he sent Noel Tiampong in his
stead. The convening of a Supreme Assembly was proposed at the meeting, with the agenda of
amending the ABAKADA CBL, the election of new officers, and the discussion of other election related
matters. The proposal was to hold the meeting sometime in February 2010. Accordingly, in a letter
dated January 23, 2010, Ed Vincent Albano (Albano), acting as the party’s Secretary, notified the
party’s chapters and members that the party would hold its first Supreme Assembly on February 6,
2010 “pursuant to the resolution adopted by the party during its First All Leaders Assembly held last
December 15, 2009.”9 As scheduled, the respondents proceeded to hold a Supreme Assembly that
resulted in the approval and ratification of the revised ABAKADA CBL; the ouster of Alcantara et. al
from their positions; the expulsion of the petitioners from the party; and the election of De la Cruz
and Albano as new President and Secretary-General, respectively. This prompted the petitioners to
file a petition with the COMELEC to (i) declare the meeting held on February 6, 2010 void and (ii)
restrain the respondents from falsely representing themselves as the duly elected officers of
ABAKADA.
Issue:
Whether or not ABAKADA is a political party prescribed under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
Ruling:
No. ABAKADA is registered as a sectoral party, the general principles applicable to political
parties as a voluntary association apply to it. Political parties constitute a basic element of our
democratic institutional apparatus.2Among others, political parties help stimulate public
participation in the political arena and translate the results of this participation into meaningful
policies and programs of government offered to the electorate. Once in government, they are able to
significantly contribute in forging linkages between the government and the society by adjusting these
policies with the varying and often conflicting interests of the different segments of society. Should
they belong to the minority, they also provide a check to counterbalance those who are in power.
For these reasons, particularly, for the role they play in the general political process, political
parties are generally free to conduct its internal affairs pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right
to free association. The political parties, through their members, are free to adopt their own
constitution and by-laws that contain the terms governing the group in pursuing its goals. These
terms, include the terms in choosing its leaders and members, among others. To the group belongs
the power to adopt a constitution; to them likewise belongs the power to amend, modify or altogether
scrap it.

44
LOKIN VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012
FACTS:
The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list organization,
manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
98
They submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC
obtain the number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was
amended: the nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn;
Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were
retained. Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as second
nominee on the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of nominees and the
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-
Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-
List Representative of CIBAC. Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC
to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for
certiorari assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its nominees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-
List System Act
RULING:
The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot
amend an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it
administers and enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each registered party,
organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in
case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only
persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include
any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shal be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. The
above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite meaning, there is no
room for interpretation or construction but only for application. Section 8 clearly prohibits the change
of nominees and alteration of the order in the list of nominees’ names after submission of the list to
the COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which an organization can substitute another
person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the
nominee fies; (2) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee
becomes incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of the general
rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it provided four instances by adding
“nomination is withdrawn by the party” as statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC
had no authority to expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should
remain consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR
adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law
prevails.

45
ATIENZA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010
FACTS:
Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) announced that his party withdrew
support for the administration of former Pres. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo. However, Atienza,
98
LPChairman, alleged that Drilon made the announcement without consulting first the party. Atienza
hosted a party conference which resulted to the election of new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said election claiming that it was
illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, NECO and NAPOLCO, were not properly
convened. Moreover, Drilon claimed that under the LP Constitution, there is a three-year term.
Meaning, his term has not yet ended. However, Atienza contested that the election of new officers
could be likened to people power removing Drilon as president by direct action. Also, Atienza alleged
that the amendment to the LP Constitution providing the three-term had not been properly ratified.
The COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since the electing assembly did
not convene in accordance with the LP Constitution. The COMELEC ruled that since the said
Constitution was not ratified, Drilon was only sitting in a hold-overcapacity since his term has been
ended already. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon’s term expired which resulted to the election of Roxas as the new LP president.
Atienza et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP questioning the validity
of the quorum. The COMELEC issued resolution denying petitioners Atienza et al’s petition. As for the
validity of petitioners Atienza, et al’s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was
a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC
treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over intra-party dispute.
RULING:
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally
free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in
disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The
Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity of the political
party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts.” Moreover, the COMELEC’s power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf.
Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it,
as an incident of its power to register political parties. The COMELEC did not err when it upheld
Roxas’s election but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza’s expulsion.

46
LIKO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015
FACTS:
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation for the May 2010 Elections. Also, a list of its nominees was filed with the COMELEC,
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the list includes petitioner Atty. Isidro Lico. Subsequently, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one
of the winning party-list groups and Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Lico took his oath of office and thereafter assumed office. Several months prior to its
proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, Ating Koop issued Central Committee
Resolution2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees. Under the
agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year
term Ating Koop introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes
was the composition of the Central Committee. The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an
election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second National Convention. In
effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred to
hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee. The said Interim Central
Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group. Almost one year after petitioner Lico had
assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart
from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's
refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his
expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws. Rimas Group lodged a petition
with COMELEC against petitioner Lico and prayed that petitioner Lico. be ordered to vacate the office
of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives. The COMELEC En Banc held that it had no
jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his
expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House of Representatives, and
it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition.
However, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop,
explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said
Committee's members remained in hold-over capacity even after their terms had expired and that the
COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the
cause of the expulsion.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC is vested with jurisdiction to rule upon the validity of the expulsion of
Atty. Lico from Ating Koop.
RULING:
While the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House
of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the
validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview. Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of
members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representative. In this case, the COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and subsequently,
assumed office in the House of Representatives.

47
LIBERTY PARTY VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010
FACTS:
On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 setting August 17, 2009as
the last day for the filing of petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21, 2010, the
98
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752, providing, among others, for the rules for the filing of
petitions for accreditation for the determination of the dominant majority party, the dominant
minority party, ten major national parties, and two major local parties for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Resolution No. 8752 also set the deadline for filing of petitions for accreditation on February 12,
2010and required that accreditation applicants be registered political parties, organizations or
coalitions.
On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as
dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples
Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that it be
recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010elections.
It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 that it
was an accreditation case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC can accredit dominant parties.
RULING:
The petition expressly and frontally sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition and restraining
order to prevent the COMELEC from accrediting a coalition that is not registered as a party. The
combination of a petition for certiorari and for prohibition under the circumstances of the present
case is fully justified, as the registration and the accreditation that the petition covers are linked with
and in fact sequentially follow one another. Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political
party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request
for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural
step to follow. Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule32 of the COMELEC Rules
regulate the registration of political parties, organizations or coalitions of political parties.
Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8752, Section 1 of which
states that the petition for accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the Commission who shall
docket it as an SPP (DM) case, in the manner that the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC was
docketed. While the registration of political parties is a special proceeding clearly assigned to a
Division for handling under the COMELEC Rules, no similar clear-cut rule is available for a petition
for accreditation as a dominant party. Under the circumstances of the present case where the
registration was handled at the en banc, action at the COMELEC ended upon the en banc issuance of
the assailed Resolution; under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules, a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling is a prohibited pleading, except in election offense cases. Any
request for accreditation that may be filed is conceptually a separate matter for the COMELEC to
handle. Thus, after the en banc issued the assailed Resolution resolving the NP-NPCs application for
registration as a coalition, the COMELECs part in the registration process was brought to a close,
rendering the Resolution ripe for review by this Court.

48
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO VS THE COMMISION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. NO. 161265. February 24, 2004
FACTS:
The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered political
party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator
98
Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the
party’s official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP
Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on “indefinite forced leave.” In the meantime,
Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General. However, Rep. Aquino
filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose
disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General
Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its officers is within
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
RULING:
The COMELEC correctly stated that “the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and
its legitimate officers” is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no
other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise
of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample
“wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest
elections.” However, by giving both wings representatives in the election committees, the COMELEC
has eroded the significance of political parties and effectively divided the opposition. The purpose of
according dominant status and representation to a minority party is precisely to serve as an effective
check on the majority. The COMELEC performed a disservice to the opposition and, ultimately, to
the voting public, as its Resolution facilitated, rather than forestalled, the division of the minority
party. The assailed COMELEC Resolution does not advance, but subverts, this philosophy behind
political parties.

49
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE (A-IPRA) VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 204591, April 16, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance (A-IPRA) is a sectoral political party
98
whose primordial objectives are the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of the
indigenous people. It was allowed registration and accreditation by the COMELEC Second Division in
its Resolution dated January 13, 2010 in SPP Case No. 09-214 (PL), which reads: As borne by the
evidence, petitioner has ably complied procedurally and substantially with the requirements of
Republic Act No. 7941 or Party-List Law as well as with the guidelines enumerated in the case of Ang
Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec. It has coordinators in almost all of the provinces and cities of Region III.
Petitioner committed itself to protect and work for the betterment of the underrepresented and
marginalized sector of indigenous peoples by ensuring that their rights, cultural communities and
ancestral domains are accorded priority and recognition. Petitioner likewise committed itself to
promote the culture of the indigenous people through education and the delivery of basic services to
the indigenous cultural communities. Its track record is manifested by its active advocacy for the
passage of the IPRA Law (Republic Act No. 8371) by conducting a series of campaigns and seminars
to educate and inform the indigenous people of their rights. When the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act was challenged before the Courts, petitioner A-
IPRA gave valuable inputs to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, resulting in the
dismissal of the petition to declare said law unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to determine political parties.
RULING:
Yes. In Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. COMELEC, this Court held that the COMELEC
correctly ruled that "the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its legitimate officers is a
matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental
law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this
Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the
party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party list system, and to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

50
ATTY. LUCKY M. DAMASEN vs. OSCAR G. TUMAMAO

G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010
FACTS:
The Vice-Mayor of San Isidro, Isabela, died. The highest-ranking member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), was elevated as Vice-Mayor. Mayor
98
Abraham T. Lim (Mayor Lim) recommended to Governor Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca (Governor
Padaca) the appointment of Oscar G. Tumamao (Tumamao), also a member of the LDP, to fill up the
vacancy in the Sanggunian. Tumamao took his oath before the mayor as Sangguninan member and
attended its regular sessions. After a few days, Atty. Lucky Damasen (Damasen) took his oath of
affiliation to the LDP before the LDP Provincial Chairman, Ms. Ana Benita Balauag (Provincial
Chairman Balauag), and secured from her a letter of nomination addressed to Governor Padaca for
his appointment to the Sangguniang Bayan. He was appointed as Sanggunian member by the
governor and took his oath before her. Damasen attended the Sangguniang Bayan session but was not
duly recognized. Damasen filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition seeking to be declared as the
rightful member of the Sanggunian by reason of the provincial chairman’s nomination and the
governor’s appointment. The RTC ruled in favor of Damasen. It based its decision on Sec. 45 (b) of RA
7160. This law provides for the rule on succession in cases of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian:
first, that the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian member
who caused the vacancy and; second, that the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of
Membership from the highest official of the political party concerned. Tumamao appealed the RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA held that Damasen was not entitled to assume the vacant
position in the Sangguniang Bayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Damasen is entitled to assume the vacant position in the Sangguniang Bayan.
RULING:
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the
people in the election. With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to
the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with
someone belonging to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s
representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. Xxx. As earlier pointed out, the reason behind
Par. (b), Sec. 45 of the Local Government Code is the maintenance of party representation in the
Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate. Like the CA, this Court has no reason to
doubt the veracity of the letter coming from the LDP leadership. Quite clearly, from the tenor of the
letter, it appears that the membership of Damasen still had to be approved by the LDP National
Council. Thus, notwithstanding Damasen’s procurement of a Certificate of Membership from LDP
Provincial Chairman Balauag, to this Court’s mind, the same merely started the process of his
membership in the LDP, and it did not mean automatic membership thereto. While it may be argued
that Damasen was already a member upon receipt of a Certificate of Membership from LDP
Provincial Chairman Balauag, this Court cannot impose such view on the LDP. If the LDP leadership
says that the membership of Damasen still had to be endorsed to the National Council for approval,
then this Court cannot question such requirement in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is well
settled that the discretion of accepting members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a purely
internal matter, which this Court cannot meddle in.

51
ATONG PAGLAUM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
The case constitutes 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
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registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups
and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party
in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB
does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. 13 petitioners were not able to
secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution
No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official. Pursuant to
paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings
to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in
the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). 39 petitioners were able to secure a
mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo
Ante Orders in all petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.
RULING:
No. the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. Moreover, Section 5(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not
exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. First, the other one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly
negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to
sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or
type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system. Hence, the clear
intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for
non-sectoral parties. R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive
and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.
How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle,
leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart
from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

52
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) is an

organization and sectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector, particularly the
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coconut farmers and producers. On May 29, 2012, COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC its
intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the names of only two
nominees Atty. Emerito S. Calderon (first nominee) and Atty. Domingo P. Espina. On August 23,
2012, the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513, to
determine whether COCOFED, among several party-list groups that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections, had continuously complied with the legal
requirements. In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFEDs registration
and accreditation as a party-list organization on several grounds. Notably, the Concurring Opinion of
Commissioner Christian Lim cited, as additional ground, that since COCOFED submitted only two
nominees, then it failed to comply with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941that requires the party
to submit to COMELEC a list of not less than five nominees. On December 4, 2012, COCOFED
submitted the names of Charles R. Avila, in substitution of Atty. Espina, as its second nominee and
Efren V. Villaser as its third nominee. COCOFED, among several others, questioned the COMELECs
cancellation of its registration and accreditation before this Court, with a prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. By reason of the status quo ante order
issued by the Court, COCOFEDs name was included in the printing of the official ballots for the May
13, 2013 elections. On April 2, 2013, the Court rendered its Decision in Atong Paglaum, Inc., etc., et al.
v. Commission on Elections. The Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC to determine
their compliance with the new parameters and guidelines set by the Court in that case. On May 10,
2013, the COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its earlier ruling cancelling
COCOFEDs registration and accreditation for its failure to comply with the requirement of Section 8
of RA No. 7941, i.e., to submit a list of not less than five nominees. The COMELEC noted that all
existing party-list groups or organizations were on notice as early as February 8, 2012 (when
Resolution No. 9359 was promulgated) that upon submission of their respective manifestations of
intent to participate, they also needed to submit a list of five nominees. During the hearing on August
23, 2012, the COMELEC pointed out to COCOFED that it had only two nominees. COCOFED moved
for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later. Instead, on May 20, 2013, COCOFED filed a
Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees with the COMELEC, namely: (i)
Felino M. Gutierrez and (ii) Rodolfo T. de Asis. On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution
declaring the cancellation of COCOFEDs accreditation final and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not can COCOFED's registration can be cancelled.
RULING:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of
supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. In the present
case, while the COMELEC counted and tallied the votes in favor of COCOFED showing that it failed to
obtain the required number of votes, participation in the 2013 elections was merely one of the reliefs
COCOFED prayed for. The validity of the COMELECs resolution, canceling COCOFEDs registration,
remains a very live issue that is not dependent on the outcome of the elections. COCOFEDs failure to
submit a list of five nominees, despite ample opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation
imputable to the party under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941. In fact, almost all of the petitioners in A
tong Paglaum were disqualified on the ground that the nominees failed to "qualify," as this word was
interpreted by the COMELEC. In other words, the Court in no way authorized a party-list group's
inexcusable failure, if not outright refusal, to comply with the clear letter of the law on the submission
of at least five nominees.

53
ABANG LINGKOD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206952, OCTOBER 22, 2013
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod challenging the May 2013 resolution
issued by COMELEC cancelling the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration. COMELEC says that it is
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not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented because representation is easy to claim. Records shows that Abang Lingkod failed
to stablish its track record which is important to prove that the party-list continuously represents the
marginalized. Abang Lingkod merely offered pictures of some alleged activities they conducted after
the 2010 elections. These pictures appear to be edited. Under The Party-List System Act, a group’s
registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images
to establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this
ground that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD’s registration. Abang Lingkod filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied by COMELEC, thus this current Petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in cancelling
ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system.
RULING:
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. A party, by law, is either "a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." A political party is defined as:
x x x an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office. (Emphasis provided)
A party is a national party "when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region."
On the other hand, a sectoral party:
x x x refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. Petitioner is a
sectoral party-list group that purports to represent the peasant farmers. However, it did not even
comply with the bare requirement that sectoral party-list groups representing a sector should show
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. As correctly
argued by the public respondent, petitioner will not, therefore, qualify even under the new parameters
set forth in Atong Paglaum.

54
LOKIN VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012
FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list organization,
manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
They submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC
obtain the number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was
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amended: the nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn;
Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were
retained. Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as second
nominee on the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of nominees and the
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-
Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-
List Representative of CIBAC. Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC
to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for
certiorari assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its nominees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-
List System Act
RULING: The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot
amend an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it
administers and enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each registered party,
organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in
case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only
persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include
any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shal be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. The
above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite meaning, there is no
room for interpretation or construction but only for application. Section 8 clearly prohibits the change
of nominees and alteration of the order in the list of nominees’ names after submission of the list to
the COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which an organization can substitute another
person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC: (1) when the
nominee fies; (2) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee
becomes incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of the general
rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it provided four instances by adding
“nomination is withdrawn by the party” as statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC
had no authority to expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should
remain consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR
adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law
prevails.

55
ANAD VC COMELEC
G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013
FACTS:
ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National
and Local Elections as required by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 ("R.A. No. 7166"). ANAD went
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before this Court challenging the above-mentioned resolution. In Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Comelec, the
Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance with the parameters
prescribed in the aforesaid decision. In the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013, the COMELEC
affirmed the cancellation of petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and
disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections. The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be
classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political constituencies, its disqualification still
subsists for violation of election laws and regulations, particularly for its failure to submit at least five
nominees, and for its failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007
Elections. Hence, the present petition raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without the benefit of a summary
evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause, and whether or not the COMELEC erred in
finding that petitioner submitted only three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007Elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ANAD failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements as the exhibits
submitted.
RULING:
As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections. Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC when it issued the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013. In any event, the official tally
results of the COMELEC show that ANAD garnered 200,972 votes. As such, even if petitioner is
declared qualified and the votes cast for it are canvassed, statistics show that it will still fail to qualify
for a seat in the House of Representatives. As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons,
submitted only three nominees instead of five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941 (An Act
Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor). Such factual finding of the COMELEC was based on the Certificate of
Nomination presented and marked by petitioner during the 22 and 23 August 2012summary
hearings. Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard
against arbitrariness.1âwphi1 Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941rids a party-list organization of the
prerogative to substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after
submission of the list to the COMELEC.

56
ABAYON VS HRET
G.R. No. 222236
FACTS:
Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Representative in the First Legislative
District of Northern Samar during the May 13, 2013 Elections. Abayon was declared as the winner.
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However Daza filed his Election Protest challenging the elections results. He said that terrorism was
committed by the latter and his unidentified cohorts, agents and supporters. Abayon filed his Verified
Answer raising special and affirmative defenses as well as his Counter-Protest. In his Urgent
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, dated September 3, 2015, Daza moved for the withdrawal of his
cause of action for the recount, revision and re-appreciation of the ballots in the clustered precincts in
the municipalities of Biri, Capul and San Isidro. He likewise prayed that the validity and legitimacy of
his separate and distinct cause of action for the annulment of election results in certain identified
precincts on the ground of terrorism be upheld. The HRET granted Daza's motion. Thereafter, Daza
filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion, dated November 4, 2015, praying that Abayon's counter-
protest be dismissed as a consequence of the withdrawal of his (Daza's) cause of action for the
recount, revision and re-appreciation in the concerned clustered precincts. The HRET granted Daza's
motion and dismissed Abayon's counter-protest. Abayon moved for reconsideration but his motion
was denied by the HRET in its January 21, 2016 Resolution. Aggrieved, Abayon filed a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for the urgent issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a status
quo ante order and/or Preliminary injunction before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not HRET have jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners as
nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the
House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
RULING:
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for
him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization in the context
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively,
and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. Parenthetically,
although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it
resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its
authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties. What is inevitable is that
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Hence,
respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

57
PGBI VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its
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resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of
Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. [Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others
the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner
elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it
became the law in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
RULING:
No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it
cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second,
MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited
congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

58
PGBI VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its
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resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of
Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. [Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others
the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner
elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it
became the law in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
RULING:
No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it
cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second,
MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited
congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

59
AMORES VS HRET
G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010
FACTS:
Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009 and Resolution No.
09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public respondent),
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which respectively dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the
assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the
party-list organization Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives,
and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. In her Petition for Quo Warranto seeking the
ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed
office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was
disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his
certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30
pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act;
and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be
qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 7941 is applicable to private respondent.
RULING:
The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9 applied
only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing
the youth sector. As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it
must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector
nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL
youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats. What is clear is that the wording of
Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur
within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the
Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same
party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been
effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is
the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the
index of intention. As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is
thus no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first
three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation,
the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law was
enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been the objective of RA No.
7941. There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination that after the third
congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA
No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.
This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. It
not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a party-list
representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep the compensation and
emoluments provided by law for the position until he is properly declared ineligible to hold the same.

60
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),
98
as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec
alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
RULING:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted. Comelec’s citation of
the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation of the non-establishment
clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts
against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be
repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to
substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The
LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of
their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own
laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

61
VETERANS FEDERATION VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000
FACTS:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2%

of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives.
98
Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-
list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time.
RULING:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative,
Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the
total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure
that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure
that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of
the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is
exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that
features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.

62
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
FACTS:
98
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-
list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the
party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which
Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
RULING:
The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies
"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency."
The Facts: attendant to the case rendered it justiciable. Political Parties -- even the major ones --
may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System. Under the Constitution
and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members
of the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the COMELEC to
determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for
participation in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble
purpose of the party-list system. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the
inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was
necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of Facts: . However,
seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the
Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec
in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance
by the party lists.

63
AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG LIPUNAN AT ADHIKAIN PARA SA

TAO, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 162203 April 14, 2004
FACTS:
On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a party-list
98
organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its petition that it participated in
the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the Comelec as it was found not to have complied with the
guidelines set by the Court in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec for party-
list organizations to qualify and participate as such in the party-list elections. Accordingly, Aklat “re-
organized itself in order that it will comply with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the Supreme
Court” in the said case. The Comelec dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot be considered as
an organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified under
Section 5 R.A. 7941. Further, the Comelec held that “AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups
imaginable under the classification of regular members just to convince us that itis now cured of its
defect.” Aklat filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Comelec denied the motion in its questioned
Resolution dated February 13,2004, on three grounds, namely: the petition was filed beyond the
deadline set by the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320for registration of party-list organizations; the
petition was not one for re-qualification as Aklat was never a registered party-list organization having
failed to meet the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in the Bagong Bayani case; and that its
decision not to extend the deadline for registration of party-list organizations is valid, the Comelec
being in thebest position to make such a determination. In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that
under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions for registration as a party-list organization may be filed not
later than 90 days before the elections. It therefore had until February 10, 2004, the ninetieth (90th)
day before the elections on May 10, 2004, within which to file its petition. Hence, its petition, which
was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within the allowed period. Section 5 of Resolution No.
6320 which requires the filing of such petitions not later than September 30, 2003, is null and void as
it amends R.A. 7941.It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-point guidelines set in the
Bagong Bayani case. Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000 persons who belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented groups. It has established information and coordination centers
throughout the country for the benefit and in representation of indigenous cultural communities,
farm and factory workers including fisher folk and the youth. Aklat also asserts that itis different from
Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Industria ng Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.) which was previously de-registered
by the Comelec.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it denied its petition for re-
qualification.
RULING:
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. According to the OSG, Resolution No. 6320 is not in
conflict with and is, in fact, germane to the purpose of R.A. 7941. It was within the scope of the
authority granted to the Comelec that it issued Resolution No. 6320setting the deadline for filing
petitions for registration under the party-list system on September 30, 2003. In line with the purpose
of R.A. 7941 to enable marginalized sectors to actively participate in legislation, the Comelec must be
given sufficient time to evaluate all petitions for registration, at the same time allowing oppositions to
be filed to the end that only those truly qualified may be accredited under the party-list system.
Besides, Republic Act No. 8436 allows the Comelec to change the periods and dates prescribed by law
for certain pre-election acts to ensure their accomplishment.

64
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941 vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007
FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which
have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007. A number
98
of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor
for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition seeking to disqualify the
nominees of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314,
addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’
nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc
Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential
and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. According to COMELEC, there
is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party
list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos. In the first petition
(G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private
respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector each seeks to. In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners
Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec
Resolution dated April 3, 2007. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions,
BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be
"declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined
from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the
respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their
respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
RULING:
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners’ BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the partylist groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of
the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. The last sentence
of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us,
the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,
meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the
polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into
the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified
List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited nondisclosure
aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The
interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last
sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

65
BANAT VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
98
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining
20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it
is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of
Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the
votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the
2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for
a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not
supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the
20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere
ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be
instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of
this digest). On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of
the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral
parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
RULING:
No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes
of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections. Although the ponencia (Justice
Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941
against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was
not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed
major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral
wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion,
concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of
the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the
will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list
elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.

66
AKMA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 207134 June 16, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative during the
national and local elections held on May 13, 2013. On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc sitting as
98
the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), under NBOC Resolution No. 0006-13, proclaimed
fourteen (14) party-list groups, which obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list
system and were thus entitled to one (1) guaranteed seat each, pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941. The petition was filed with this Court on May 30, 2013. The Court did not issue a
temporary restraining order. Subsequently, the Court admitted the petition-in-intervention4 filed by
Abante Katutubo (ABANTE KA), Froilan M. Bacungan and Hermenegildo Dumlao who claim to have
"demonstrable, legal, moral and compelling interest in the outcome of the case and the controversy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allocating the additional seats
for the 38 party-list candidates proclaimed as winners in the May 13, 2013 elections.
RULING:
COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the remaining uncanvassed

election returns will not affect the result of the elections. An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and
cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the
electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and omits none. However, this is true
only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election.
Apparently, petitioner mistakenly assumed that the statement in BANAT disallowing fractional seats
insofar as the additional seats for the two-percenters in the second round should also apply to those
party-list groups with less than 2% votes. But as demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share in
representation may never be filled up if the 2% threshold is maintained. In the same vein, the
maximum representation will not be achieved if those party-list groups obtaining less than one
percentage are disqualified from even one additional seat in the second round.

67
BENGSON III vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
FACTS:
The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that
he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time
when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps 98
and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his
nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of
the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized
citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a
former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on
the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman
to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.

68
G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA), respondents.
98
FACTS:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, a.k.a. the Comprehensive

Drugs Act of 2002. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, particularly those who are
charged with offenses punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of imprisonment.
On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, which provides the rules on the
mandatory drugs testing of candidates for public office. It requires the COMELEC offices and
employees concerned to submit two separate lists of candidates: one for those who complied with the
mandatory drug testing and the other of those who failed to comply.
It was Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who opposed such resolution, contending that it was unconstitutional as
it imposes an additional qualification for senators.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution 6468 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator.
RULING:
Yes. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Section 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution provides. The COMELEC resolution
effectively enlarges that qualification requirements for senator, enumerated under Section 3, Article
VI of the Constitution. The provision of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for students
(Section 36[b]) are constitutional as long as they are random and suspicion less. This is because
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students, and schools
have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair and non-discriminatory.
The provision requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private
offices (Section 36[d]) are also justifiable. The privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is
reduced. A degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. To the Court, the need for
drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual’s
privacy interest under the premises. On the other hand, the Court finds no justification in the
mandatory drug testing of those prosecuted for crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than 6
years and 1 day (Section 36[f]). The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness
and suspicion less. In this case, it cannot be said that the drug testing is random. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. In sum, Section 36(c) and (d) are
constitutional, but 36(f) is not.

69
G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.
FACTS:
98
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In
1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making
several trips to the United States. Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171
which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On
November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was
approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been
a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years. Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-
election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the
two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months
after his oath as a citizen. Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and
Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and
ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether
the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering
such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement
concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This
is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

70
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
98
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days after, the
petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November
3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner argues
that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because
he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing.
Petitioner speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political
contest, and should have either won or lost".
ISSUE:
Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and expenditures
after he has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.
RULING:
The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of
candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may
have incurred. Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
administrative fine. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted
contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be
prevented by the law is not all too remote. Courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory
as to the requirement of filing.

71
CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES,
QUEZON, VIVENCIO G. LIRIO respondents.
FACTS:

   98
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

72

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'- 98
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#

73
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& # 98
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"

74
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")"" 98
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"

75
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 " 98
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#

76
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%" 98
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##

77
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"** 98
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#

78
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#"" 98
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*

79
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$"" 98
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  

80
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'
 98
"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#

81
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& # 98
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"

82
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")"" 98
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"

83
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 " 98
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#

84
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%" 98
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##

85
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"** 98
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#

86
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*
,
"'&&"""*#"" 98
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:

  
 !" #$""
%" #"&'(
)
#)#))##'*
+)#
%,"'-
"*#""'&,"'

"#)#'"&'#
.")"
''
%,"''
#& #
'&%)""&""
%,"'&&""#*"#
(.""))#)#*/
#""&*)"
/.")""
()#) 
+
ISSUE:
012"#
%"3#* 
&#
 "
HELD:
24#
#(.")#))"")"
#)##
"#%"
"#''.") 
"#"%"
5"#")#)*##
"&###"
"#%""#*
%&"%"#
 #"**
%#* #'"
%,"'
&&""4#"'
#)##"*"#
#*

87
,
"'&&"""*#""
 "6&)#)
"%" #'""""
FACTS:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for
the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without 98
oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all
his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioners
candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the
proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendozas unsworn
withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was effective, Petitioners candidacy was not valid
since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects.
RULING:
No. The fact that Mendozas withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which should not be
used to frustrate the peoples will in favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Also, his
withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been
made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by
Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided
Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other
persons as candidates.

88
G.R. No. 147741 May 10, 2001
CATALANI VS COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose
term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001. On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the
98
municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Baybay, Leyte. On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the
province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election
supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte.
However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and
suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election
officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. At that later hour, with
only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof,
and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to
send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax 4 to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the
same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001. 5 On the same
day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of
withdrawal. On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of
petitioner. Respondent Antoni filed a similar petition, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and
that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both. On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L.
Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, by 1 st indorsement, referred the cases to the
Commission on Election, Manila, Law Department, on the ground that he was inhibiting himself due
to his prior action of refusing to receive the petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal tendered
simultaneously with the filing of the certificate of candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001. In the
meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the
cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings. On
05 April 2001, they submitted a report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of
Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions.
RULING: It annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions of
governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of
withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial
compliance with the requirement of the law. 14 We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her
certificate of candidacy for governor. There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the
affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be
withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of
the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the
province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of
the said municipality. While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A,
adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the
place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, 16 such requirement is merely directory, and is
intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution cannot
contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. 17 Hence, the filing of
petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it declares petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed
certificates of candidacy

89
G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012
MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.
98
FACTS:
Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo... respectively filed their certificates of
candidacy... for the position of Mayor of Lucena City. Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition. He
alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three
consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City... in the May
10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively
suspended him from office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did
not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence... the Court promulgated the ruling in
Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections... holding that when respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the rule that 'where the separation from office is
caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer i.e. involuntary the service of term is deemed
interrupted'... has not yet been overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court. The prevailing
rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its
decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo where it... stated that COMELEC First Division
issued... the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED... the name of Ramon remained printed on the
ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute
candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo's
39,615 votes. Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the
suspension of Barbara Ruby's proclamation. Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in
Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable. Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for
Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes but should be counted in favor of Ruby since the
substituted and the substitute... carry the same surname Talaga, as provided in Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 9006.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the determination of who among the contending parties should assume the
contested elective position.
RULING:
The preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for
avoiding the effect of the... three-term limit rule. The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule
was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. Declaration of Ramon's disqualification
rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted. A person
who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC
is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his
status is that of a person who has not... filed a CoC.

90
[G.R. No. 135691 September 27, 1999]
EMMANUEL SINACA, Petitioner,
vs.
MIGUEL MULA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
98
FACTS:
In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the
mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified
for being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing. (Matugas Wing was a
faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well as the Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate
candidates for the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.) Respondent
Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before
the COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because:
a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a substitute; and
b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution.
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However, when respondent Mula
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division
and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political party as the substituted
candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor
prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a
Lakas party member.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
RULING:
No. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should
be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced.
Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of
candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the
LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his
certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written
acceptance of the party's nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member. There is nothing in
the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate
must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be
nominated as such.

91
G.R. No. 189698 December 1, 2009

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
98
The court declared as unconstitutional the second provision in the third paragraph of sec 13 of
RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second
proviso in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of
the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional. Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for
reconsideration. The second provision in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of
his certificate of candidacy.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second provision in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection
clause of the constitution.
RULING:
The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second proviso in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8679 as constitutional. These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering
or partisan political campaign. The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil
service officers and employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable. The equal protection of
the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification if the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated different from the other. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate
of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing
authority.

92
G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003

PETRONILA S. RULLODA
vs.
COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO
FACTS:
COMELEC denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay 98
Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when
constituents wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the
Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido
contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a
certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when COMELEC denied petitioner’s
request that she be allowed to run for elections.
RULING:
There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a
prohibition against said substitution cannot be said to exist. Petitioner’s letter-request was considered
a certificate of candidacy when COMELEC issued its resolution denying the same. In the contested
election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities and procedural niceties in
election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

93
G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999
MIRANDA VS ABAYA
FACTS:
Jose Pempe Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Private 98
respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and his petition was granted by the COMELEC and disqualified Jose Pempe Miranda. On
May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda
filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose
Pempe Miranda. Miranda garnered 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got
only 20, 336 votes. On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void
Substitution. He prayed for the nullification of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy for being void ab
initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to
substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is qualified to substitute a candidate whose COC was already
cancelled?
RULING:
No. In Bautista vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly
ruled that a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy. A person without a valid
certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who
has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a
candidate at all.
Besides, if we were to allow the so-called substitute to file a new and original certificate of
candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection
of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution. The invalidation of petitioners supposed substitution
of Jose Pempe Miranda brings about the disqualification of petitioner in the mayoralty race. However,
the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case
the winning candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field
which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are
not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

94
G.R. No. 197015

PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A.
ALCALA, Respondents.
FACTS: 98
In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who
was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the
office following the substitute's disqualification. Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition. He
alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three
consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City... in the May
10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively
suspended him from office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did
not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence... the Court promulgated the ruling in
Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections... holding that. When respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the rule that 'where the separation from office is
caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer i.e. involuntary the service of term is deemed
interrupted'... has not yet been overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court. The prevailing
rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its
decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo where it stated that COMELEC First Division issued
the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the
votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in
Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo's 39,615 votes Castillo
promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of Barbara
Ruby's proclamation. Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is
not applicable. Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be
considered as stray votes but should be counted in favor of Ruby since the substituted and the
substitute... carry the same surname Talaga, as provided in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006 even
though he wasn't. This is in violation of Section 78 of the OEC. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the determination of who among the contending parties should assume the
contested elective position.
RULING:
Declaration of Ramon's disqualification... rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not... a valid
candidate to be properly substituted. A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to
continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is
not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not... filed a CoC. To
be sure, the cause of Ramon's ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the
Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the... office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all elective
local officials.

95
98

96
G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007
REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN
BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.
98
FACTS:
Fr. Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004
elections in Buguias Benguet. Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the
ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents himself when he declared in
his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is serving probation after
being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness. Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and
Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing
fee and hence, it was declared final and executory. Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as
the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as
the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor. Bayacsan argues that he
should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.
RULING:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final
and executory before the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of. The law
expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted
for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly
elected mayor. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present
case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on
election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias,
Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final only after the
elections.

97
98

98
G.R. No. 193314 : February 26, 2013
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG and RODOLFO Y.
ESTRELLADA, Respondents.
98
FACTS:
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth
and residence as BarangayTugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely represented her place of
birth and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally
abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City. On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had
established her residence in the said barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels
of land there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while
the former was overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the
error in her place of birth was committed by her secretary. Nevertheless, in aCoC, an error in the
declaration of the place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to
disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications provided by law. The Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy remained pending as of the day of the elections, in
which petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly elected municipal mayor.
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent was DISQUALIFIED for the
position of mayor. The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August 2010 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the Second
Division denying due course to or cancelling her CoC.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had failed
to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
HELD:
Petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
Petitioner uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question is whether she was able to
establish, through clear and positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections. When it comes to the qualifications for running
for public office, residence is synonymous with domicile.
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the date of
acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be within at least
one year prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence. In the instant case, we find that
petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.

99
G.R. No. 193261 April 24, 2012
MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.
98
FACTS: COMELEC denied Sabili’s Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply
with the one-year residency requirement. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the
2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8)
months. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he
and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been
a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local
elections. In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, the COMELEC Second Division granted the
Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in
Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his
failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which
the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of
Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly filed a
Manifestation with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact. In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,
the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed
with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance
of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August2010
Resolutions of the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili
failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
RULING: As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into
an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Courts compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the COMELEC's error. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact
definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the
use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's
action with grave abuse of discretion. Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is
the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC,
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. In light of our limited authority
to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally
involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. In exceptional cases, however, when the
COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising
from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

100
G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR.,
FACTS:
98
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived
with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009. He acquired
residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His
application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was
eventually granted by the ERB. A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was
then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who
also affirmed the lower court's decision. On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel
said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one-year residency requirement
of the local government code. COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency
requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish
his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intention of making it his domicile. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in
the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed
correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived.
Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies
like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable
misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is
sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial
race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and
resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

101
G.R. No. 181097 June 25, 2008

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MALIK "BOBBY" T. ALINGAN, respondents.
FACTS: 98
Petitioner Norlainie Limbona, her husband, and respondent Malik Alingan were mayoralty
candidates in Pantar, Lanao Del Norte. After filing their Certificate of Candidacy, Respondent filed a
petition of disqualifying the husband of petitioner for non-compliance with the one-year residence
requirement. Subsequently, respondent also filed the same petition, this time against the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a withdrawal of her candidacy which the COMELEC granted. The COMELEC granted
the disqualification of petitioner’s husband. Petitioner filed a new Certificate of Candidacy as
substitute candidate for her husband which was approved by COMELEC. Respondent yet again
sought Petitioner’s disqualification. Petitioner claimed that she has been staying , sleeping and doing
business in her house for more than 20 months in Lower Kalangaan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement and qualify to run for
the office mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
RULING:
No. Petitioner failed to qualify the one-year residence requirement. In order to acquire
domicile by choice, there must be residence or bodily presence in the new locality, an intention to
remain there, and intention to abandon the old domicile. A person’s domicile once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. The court noted the
findings of the COMELEC that petitioner’s domicile of origin is Manguing, Lanao Del Norte, which is
his also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapusan,
Marawi City. Hence, failure to comply with the residence requirement, Petitioner is disqualified to run
for the office of mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.

102
[G.R. No. 133944 October 28, 1999]

MARCITA MAMBA PEREZ, Petitioner,
v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, Respondents.
FACTS: 98
On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of
the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30, 1998,
petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one
(1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution. On
May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution, dismissed the petition
for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the
Third District of Cagayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and
eventually pass upon private respondent’s eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third
District of Cagayan.
RULING:
In the case of Lonzanida where this court held that the clear legislative intent is that the
COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e.,
until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the
election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be
disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics
to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.” The following provision
of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC)
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
“As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by the
First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections were
held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16, 1998
and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on
May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this could not be
done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even
after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no
jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further
consideration of petitioner’s action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this
petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives,
this Court has no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the
declaration of private respondent’s ineligibility.

103
G.R. No. 137329 August 9, 2000

ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M.
SERIÑO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y. EMANO, respondents.
FACTS: 98
Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995 election
and his certificate of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. On 14
June 1997, while still governor he executed a voter registration record in Cagayan de Oro City which is
geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming 20 years of residence. He filed candidacy for
mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was in
the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the
residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for
annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement.
RULING:
Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming choice of the
people of Cagayan de Oro. The court finds it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the
people as expressed through the ballot be given the fullest effect. Emano was actually and physically
residing in CDO while discharging his duties as governor and even paid his community tax certificate
in the same. The residency requirement intends to prevent the possibility of a “stranger unacquainted
with the conditions and needs of the community from seeing an elective office to serve that
community.”

104
Ong vs. Alegre 479 SCRA 473
Facts:
A candidate was disqualified by the COMELEC En Banc to run for mayor for he has served for
three-consecutive terms. During his second term, the opposing party filed a protest and the RTC
98
declare the opposing party as the duly elected mayor. However, such decision came out three years
after and when the candidate has already started his third term. Since the COMELEC disqualified the
candidate, his political party nominated the brother of the candidate as a substitute. The COMELEC
denied due course the certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his
brother.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the assumption of office as mayor from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may
be considered as one full term service in the context of consecutive three-term rule.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due
course to the certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his
brother.
Ruling:
1. We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, “service for the full term”, and should
be counted as full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being
elected and serving more than three consecutive term for the same position. For the three-
term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.
2. A candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course
cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the former.
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much
the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by
any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

105
Rivera III vs. COMELEC 523 SCRA

Facts:
In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for
mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. Petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC
98
a petition to cancel Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had
served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy
violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term 1995-1998
(first term) and 2001-2004 (third term), but he served the second term from 1998-2001 only as a
"caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti--
graft case from January to July 1999.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Morales already served his three consecutive terms and if so, who should
take his position?
Ruling:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the position. He was mayor for
the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by
petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as mayor (because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only
after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term). Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has
been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since 1995. In just over a month, by June
30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of
office for the second term constituted “service for the full term” and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive terms for the same position. The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception,
wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of
consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of
Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for
him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.
The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the
remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second
place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:
“The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.”

106
Aldovino Jr., vs. COMELEC 609 SCRA 234 (2009)
Facts:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive
terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office,
98
the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a
criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the
performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification
was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three
consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
Issue:
Whether or not the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of
COMELEC.
Ruling:
No. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of
the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007
elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since
his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC
granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking
Asilo’s disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service
within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court.
It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary
renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to
undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon
after a preventive suspension has been imposed.

107
Social Welfare Station, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc. vs. COMELEC 755 SCRA 124
Facts:
Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc., two social research institutions sought help
from Supreme Court in nullifying and setting aside Resolution No. 9674 on April 23, 2013, a
98
resolution Commission on Elections’ proclaimed to regulate their publishing of pre-election surveys.
COMELEC ordered survey firms to either comply with the directive in the Fair Election Act and
Resolution No. 9674 and submit within three (3) days from receipt of such Resolution the names of
the subscribers who paid for the pre-election survey conducted from February 15-17, 2013, or be liable
for the violation thereof, an act constitutive of an election offense.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 9674 is invalid in requiring the disclosure of the names of
subscribers of election surveys; in curtailing the petitioner’s freedom of speech; and in impairing
petitioner’s contracts.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition on the grounds that it sustains the validity of
Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including
subscribers of survey must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2 (a) of the Fair Election Act. This, for
the Supreme Court is a requirement, a valid regulation guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for
public service.
Such requirement, the court declares, neither curtails petitioner’s free speech rights nor
violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts. The freedom to publish
election survey results still remains. The survey firms just have to abide the law in disclosing their
sponsors. However, COMELEC is enjoined from prosecuting Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse
Asia, Inc. for they were also not served copies of the Criminal complaint subject of E.O. Case No. 13-
222. Petitioners’ right to due process was, thus, violated.

108
United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) vs. COMELEC 755 SCRA 441
Facts:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the
rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections
98
and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election
propaganda, pertinently provides: “SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the
campaign period, it is unlawful: (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda
material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without
the consent of the owner thereof. (g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include
any of the following: 5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries,
pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not; 6. Within the premises of public transport
terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.”
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the
public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or
terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by
Section 18 (n) of these Rules. Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the
application of REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner
then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow
private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles
and transport terminals. The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied
the petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation
to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 are constitutional.
Ruling:
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free
speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power of
the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and
opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also
violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s
and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is
clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or
reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.

109
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC 323 SCRA 811

Facts: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll
body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups,
its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable
Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the COMELEC allegedly upon
"information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR 98
groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote
during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of
which shall be [broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict
with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for
Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to
undertake the exit survey. On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed
for by petitioner. We directed the COMELEC to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact,
the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting ABS CBN in
conducting exit polls during the election
Ruling: Two theoretical test in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows:
These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. . . . The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, . . if
the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words
are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence,
or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring
about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent A limitation on the freedom of
expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to
prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also
present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to
be inevitable.33 The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's
mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or
reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey
result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official COMELEC count. It consists merely of the
opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the
limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the
integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls.
The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections,
since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the
other.

110
Social Weather Station vs. COMELEC 357 SCRA 496

Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social
research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.
98
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: “Surveys affecting
national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting
local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election”.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of
surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day
without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical
evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting
process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining
their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning
political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters
to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as
necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and
erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of
election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective
of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated
surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought
to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being
limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a
local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom

of speech, expression and the press.
Ruling:
Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the

press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.
It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as
diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

111
Francisco Chaves vs. COMELEC et. al. G.R. No, 162777 31 August 2004
Facts: In this petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
Francisco I. Chavez stands as a taxpayer and a citizen asking this Court to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520, dated January 6, 2004.
On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew So to use his name and image for 96° North, a
clothing company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka International Plastics
Manufacturing Corporation and another corporation involved in the amusement and video games 98
business, G-Box. These last two agreements were entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10,
2003, respectively. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak
Interchange of the North Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the plastic
products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the other two showed
petitioner endorsing the clothes of 96° North. One more billboard was set up along Roxas Boulevard
showing petitioner promoting the game and amusement parlors of G-Box.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI,
REPORMA, and Aksyon Demokratiko., 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520,
which contained Section 32, the provision assailed herein. On January 6, 2004, respondent
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32, the provision assailed herein. On
January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law
Department. He replied, on January 29, 2004, by... requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as
to how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter dated February 23, 2004,
this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering
that the billboards adverted to are... mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as
paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC answered petitioner's request by issuing another letter, dated February 27,
2004, wherein it ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from
public view pending the approval of his requests. Petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the
COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision.
Issue: Whether or not it is proper to urge this Court to declare the assailed provision
unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause.
Ruling: Neither is Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 a gross violation of the non-impairment clause.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has
the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has said
that contracts affecting public... interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a
postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions
of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare.
Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power.
Finally, petitioner contends that Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is invalid
because of overbreadth. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6520 is declared valid and constitutional. The prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby denied. No costs.

112
Lanot vs. COMELEC, 507 SCRA 114 (2006)
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC stating that the latter engaged in an election
98
campaign in various forms on various occasions outside the designated campaign period, such as (1)
addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government;
(2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release
predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his
surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to
induce their parents to vote for him. Eusebio won the election and any other complaints was
dismissed by the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a pre-campaign offense committed by Eusebio.
Ruling:
There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities
were committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who files his
certificate of candidacy on 19 December 2003, was a “candidate” when committed those acts before
the start of campaign period on 24 March 2004. Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a
“candidate”, for purpose of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 23 rd March 2004, the
last day for filling certificates of candidacy. Applying facts, as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by
the COMELEC First Division – to Section 11 RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code which requires the existence of a “candidate”, one who has filed his
certificate of candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.

113
Dibaratun vs. COMELEC 611 SCRA 367
Facts:
The COMELEC En Banc ruled a failure of elections in precinct No. 6a/7a, Lanao del Sur on the
second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling
98
place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The Election on said precinct was
disrupted by a commotion, was untimely suspended and never resumed. The COMELEC decision,
consequently nullified the proclamation of herein petitioner Dibaratun as winner.
Petitioner Dibaratun contended that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections for acting on herein
respondents’ petition even if such petition was filed out of time.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections.
Ruling:
The Court found the petition for declaration of failure of elections under Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code to be in order, and it was properly disposed of by the COMELEC en banc.
The Court noted that the provisions on failure of elections in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Sec. 2, Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure do not provide for a prescriptive period
for the filing of a petition for declaration of failure of elections. It appears that the COMELEC en banc
had the discretion whether or not to take cognizance of such petition. In this case, the petition was
filed 11 days after the scheduled election. The Court held that the findings of fact of the COMELEC en
banc are binding on this Court. There was no grave abuse of discretion imputable to COMELEC in the
exercise of its functions and duties.

114
Banaga, Jr. vs. COMELEC 336 SCRA 701 (2000)

Facts: Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-mayor of the
City of Parañaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city board of canvassers proclaimed
respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for having garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner Banaga, Jr.’s
68,970 votes. Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a Petition
to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging that said election was
replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged that numerous 98
Election Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque appear to be
altered, falsified or fabricated. In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election
offenses. Therefore, the incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be
considered as the true will of the people. Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should be adjudged
as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque, during the May 1998 local elections.
Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit and held that the election offenses relied upon by
petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an
election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot be viewed as an
election protest. Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu
propio without any basis whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
Issue: (1) Whether or not petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of election is
considered as an election protest. (2) Whether or not respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioners petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.
Ruling: (1) No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.’s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the COMELEC was a
special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An election protest is an ordinary
governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is covered by
Rule 26 under special actions. Petitioner also did not comply with the requirements for filing an
election protest such as failing to pay filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest.
(2) No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless. The
petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the
conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. Respondent COMELEC only based its
decision on the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring a failure of election.
There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC have no
other recourse but to dismiss the petition.

115
Canicosa vs. COMELEC 282 SCRA 517

Facts:
Petitioner Canicosa and private respondent Lajara were candidates for mayor in Calamba,
Laguna during the May 1995 elections. After canvassing, Lajara was proclaimed winner by the
Municipal Board of Canvasser. Thereafter, Canicosa filed with the COMELEC a petition to declare
failure of election and to declare null and void the canvass and proclamation because the alleged 98
widespread of frauds and anomalies in casting and accounting of votes, preparation of election
returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting and delay in the
delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the office of the Municipal
Treasurer. In its decision, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the
allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of election.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a failure of election that has transpired.
Ruling:
There are only three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
i. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
ii. The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or
iii. After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
Averment that more than one-half of the legitimate voters were not able to vote is not a ground
which warrants a declaration of failure of election. The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list
of voters involves the right to vote which is a justifiable issue properly recognized by the regular
courts. Fifteen days before the regular elections, the final list of voters was posted in each precinct.
Based on the lists thus posted, Canicosa could have filed a petition for inclusion of registered voters
with regular courts. The correction of the manifest mistake in mathematical addition calls for a mere
clerical task of the board of canvassers. The remedy invoked was purely administrative. The issue
concerning registration of voters, which Canicosa cited as a ground in his petition for declaration of
failure of election, is an administrative question. Likewise, questions as to whether elections have
been held or whether certain returns were falsified or manufactured and therefore should be excluded
from the canvass do not involve the right to vote. Such questions are properly within the
administrative jurisdiction of COMELEC, hence, may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC en
banc without having to pass through any of its divisions. The provision in the constitution mandating
the COMELEC to hear and decide case first by division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by
COMELEC en banc, not applicable if the case about to be resolved is purely administrative in nature.

116
Sanchez vs. COMELEC 193 SCRA 849

Facts:
Sanchez filed his petition praying that the COMELEC conduct a recount of the votes cast in the
May 11, 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of votes to be credited to him. He
prayed that the COMELEC withhold the proclamation of the last 4 winning candidates because the
votes intended for him were declared as stray votes in favor of a disqualified candidate with the same 98
surname as him, who was not crossed out from the election returns and other election forms. Sanchez
asserted that the invalidation of “Sanchez” votes occurred in all regions where the assailed COMELEC
forms were distributed and cited specific precincts without any particulars as to the number of votes.
Candidates Rasul and Enrile opposed and filed a motion for intervention.
COMELEC promulgated a decision dismissing petitioner Sanchez’ petition for recount.
However, respondent COMELEC, announced its second decision reversing its earlier decision of
dismissal of Sanchez’ petition and that it was instead granting Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-
appreciation of ballots. In opposing said decision, Enrile alleged that the COMELEC exceeded its
jurisdiction in granting Sanchez’ petition for recount and abused its discretion in refusing to proclaim
him on the ground that Sanchez’ petition for recount is not pre-proclamation controversy which
involves issues affecting extrinsic validity, and not intrinsic validity, of the said election returns.
Issue:
Whether or not Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the
COMELEC election does not present a proper issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy.
Ruling:
No. Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of the ballots cast in the senatorial elections
does not present a proper issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy. By legal definition and
by the very instructions of the COMELEC, an election return is incomplete if there is “omission in the
election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his corresponding votes” (Sec. 234) or “in case
the number of votes for a candidate has been omitted.” Here, the election returns are complete and
indicate the name of Sanchez as well as the total number of votes that were counted and appreciated
as votes in his favor by the boards of inspectors. It is established by the law as well as jurisprudence
that errors in the appreciation of ballots by the boards of inspectors are proper subject protest and not
for recount or re-appreciation of the ballots.
The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243
of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-
proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive. The other irregularities, such as the omissions
of the Commission on Elections in distribution and protection of the election forms and
paraphernalia, involve the discharge of its administrative duties and so do not come under the
jurisdiction of this Court, which can review the decisions, orders and rulings of the body only in cases
of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers.

117
Pasandalan vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 150312 July 18, 2002

Facts:
98

118
Basher vs. COMELEC 330 SCRA 736

Facts:
Failure of elections in Barangay Maidan, Lanao del Sur happened twice (May and June 1997),
and a special elections was scheduled for August 30. During the said election, voting started only
around 9:00 pm because of the prevailing tension in the said locality. Election Officer Diana Datu-
Imam claimed that the town mayor was too hysterical, yelled and threatened her to declare failure of 98
election in Maidan as the armed followers pointed their guns at her and her military escorts
responded in the same manner. With the arrival of additional troops, the election officer proceeded to
Maidan to conduct the election starting at 9:00 pm until early morning of the following day at the
residence of the former mayor. The tally sheet showed that Ampatuan got 250 votes; Basher got 15
votes and Razul got 10 votes. Ampatuan was proclaimed the winner. Basher now assails the validity of
the COMELEC Resolution dismissing the Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Call Special
Election in Precinct No. 12 Branggay Maidan.
Issue:
Whether or not there was failure of election.
Ruling:
First, the place where the voting was conducted was illegal. Omnibus Election Code provides
that the election tellers shall designate the public school or any public building within the Barangay to
be used as polling place, election was held in the residence of the former mayor which is located in
Barangay Pandarianao. Second, the law provides that the casting of votes start at 7 am and end at 3
pm except when there are voters present within 30 meters in front of the polling place who have not
yet cast their votes. Election was held after 9;00 pm until wee hours the following day, certainly such
was not in accordance with the law. Third, Election Day was invalid because suspension of
postponement of election is governed by law and it provides that when for any serious cause such
rebellion, insurrection, violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia and any
analogous causes such nature that the free, orderly and honest election should become impossible the
COMELEC motu proprio or upon written petition by 10 registered voter after summary proceedings
shall suspend or postpone the proceedings. The election officer is without authority to declare a
failure of election for is it only the COMELEC itself has legal authority to exercise such awesome
power. Election Officer did not follow the procedure for the postponement or suspension or
declaration of failure of election. She did not conduct any proceeding summary or otherwise to find
out any legal grounds for the suspension or postponement or declaration of failure of election. Finally,
the electorate was not given ample notice of the exact schedule and venue of the election, mere
announcement over the mosque is insufficient.

119
Ampatuan et. Al. vs. COMELEC #149803, January 31, 2002
Facts:
The COMELEC lifted its order suspending the proclamation and thereafter proclaimed
petitioners as the victors in the May 14, 2001 Maguindanao Provincial election. Respondents
98
petitioned before the Supreme Court the suspension of the effects of the said proclamation and
insisted that there had been a “failure of election”. The COMELEC ordered the consolidation of
respondents’ petitions and a random technical examination on several precincts.
Petitioners contended that by virtue of their proclamation, the proper remedy available to
respondents was not a petition for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC had jurisdiction to act on respondents’ petitions even after
proclamation of petitioners as winners.
Ruling:
The COMELEC en banc has the authority to annul election results and/or declare a failure of
elections.
The Court held that respondents’ allegations of massive fraud and terrorism, which led to a
failure to elect, fell squarely within Sec 6. Of the Omnibus Election Code (Failure of Election).
“The COMELEC is duty-bound to conduct an investigation as to the veracity of respondents’
allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the conduct of the May 14, 2001 election”.
There can be no assumption that petitioners’ proclamation and assumption into office on June 30,
2001, was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by
respondents.
The Court, in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, directed COMELEC to proceed with the
hearing of the consolidated petitions and the technical examination with deliberate dispatch.

120
Typoco vs. COMELEC 614 SCRA 391

Facts:
In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, petitioner and private respondent vied for
the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes, petitioner
Jesus O. Typoco was proclaimed winner with 80,830 votes, as opposed to respondent, Edgardo A.
Tallado's 78,287 votes. 98
Respondent Tallado filed before the COMELEC a petition for correction of manifest error,
docketed as SPC No. 07-312. He claimed that, after he reviewed and examined the figures in the
Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOVP) vis-à-vis the Certificate of Canvass of Votes (COC) in the
municipalities in the province, he found that, in the municipalities of Labo and Jose Panganiban,
errors were committed in the transposition of votes from the SOVP to the COC.
In Labo, the SOVP revealed that respondent Tallado's votes were 13,174 but when the figure
was... transferred to the COC, it was reduced to 11,490; whereas petitioner Typoco's votes were
increased from 11,359 to 12,285. In Jose Panganiban, respondent Tallado's votes, per the SOVP,
totaled 6,186; the same, however, was reduced to 5,460 when transposed to the COC. Respondent
contended that if the errors were corrected, he would obtain a total of 80,697 votes and petitioner,
79,904 votes; thus, he would be the true winner in the Gubernatorial race in the province.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC First Division, on April 30, 2008, rendered the assailed
Resolution [9] granting respondent Tallado's petition. It ruled that, based on the COMELEC copies
(in the custody of the Election Records and Statistics Division [ERSD] of the Commission) of the
concerned SOVPs and COCs, the votes in Labo, as recorded in the said documents, did not
correspond; while those in Jose Panganiban actually tallied.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it failed to proclaimed
Typoco as the winner in the Gubernatorial race.
Ruling:
If the Court were to tabulate the results reflected in the ERs, it would, in effect, convert itself
into a board of canvassers. This would entail a function which, obviously, this Court, in a petition for
certiorari, cannot perform. In sum, the petition must, of necessity, fail. The COMELEC, therefore, had
no choice but to dismiss TYPOCO's petition in accordance with clear provisions of the law and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent
Commission on Elections, the petition is DISMISSED and its Resolution En Banc of October12,1998
dismissing the petition before it on the ground that the allegations therein do not justify a declaration
of failure of election is affirmed.

121
Typoco vs. COMELEC 614 SCRA 391

Facts:
In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, petitioner and private respondent vied for
the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes, petitioner
Jesus O. Typoco was proclaimed winner with 80,830 votes, as opposed to respondent, Edgardo A.
Tallado's 78,287 votes. 98
Respondent Tallado filed before the COMELEC a petition for correction of manifest error,
docketed as SPC No. 07-312. He claimed that, after he reviewed and examined the figures in the
Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOVP) vis-à-vis the Certificate of Canvass of Votes (COC) in the
municipalities in the province, he found that, in the municipalities of Labo and Jose Panganiban,
errors were committed in the transposition of votes from the SOVP to the COC.
In Labo, the SOVP revealed that respondent Tallado's votes were 13,174 but when the figure
was... transferred to the COC, it was reduced to 11,490; whereas petitioner Typoco's votes were
increased from 11,359 to 12,285. In Jose Panganiban, respondent Tallado's votes, per the SOVP,
totaled 6,186; the same, however, was reduced to 5,460 when transposed to the COC. Respondent
contended that if the errors were corrected, he would obtain a total of 80,697 votes and petitioner,
79,904 votes; thus, he would be the true winner in the Gubernatorial race in the province.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC First Division, on April 30, 2008, rendered the assailed
Resolution [9] granting respondent Tallado's petition. It ruled that, based on the COMELEC copies
(in the custody of the Election Records and Statistics Division [ERSD] of the Commission) of the
concerned SOVPs and COCs, the votes in Labo, as recorded in the said documents, did not
correspond; while those in Jose Panganiban actually tallied.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it failed to proclaimed
Typoco as the winner in the Gubernatorial race.
Ruling:
If the Court were to tabulate the results reflected in the ERs, it would, in effect, convert itself
into a board of canvassers. This would entail a function which, obviously, this Court, in a petition for
certiorari, cannot perform. In sum, the petition must, of necessity, fail. The COMELEC, therefore, had
no choice but to dismiss TYPOCO's petition in accordance with clear provisions of the law and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent
Commission on Elections, the petition is DISMISSED and its Resolution En Banc of October12,1998
dismissing the petition before it on the ground that the allegations therein do not justify a declaration
of failure of election is affirmed.

122
Matalam vs. COMELEC 271 SCRA 733/BP 881

Facts:
Petitioner Norodin M. Matalam and private respondent Zacaria A. Candao were both
candidates for Governor of the Province of Maguindanao in the May 8, 1995 elections.
During the canvass of the election returns in the municipalities of Datu Piang and Maganoy,
98
both in the Province of Maguindanao, petitioner Matalam challenged before the respective Municipal
Boards of Canvassers the authenticity of the election returns in said towns. Because the MBC merely
noted his objections, petitioner reiterated the same before the Provincial Board of Canvassers. In
those two municipalities, petitioner was accredited only 3, 641 votes, while private respondent
received 44, 654 votes. It is the contention of petitioner that the exclusion of the results is enough to
overhaul the lead of Candao. Because the PBV rejected pleas of petitioner and included the challenged
certificates of canvass for Datu Paiang and Maganoy in the provincial canvass, petitioner filed the
above-mentioned petitions before the COMELEC. During pendency of petition, PBC proclaimed
Candao as Governor of Maguindanao but it was nullified because it was not authorized by COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not the questioned election returns for the municipalities of Maganoy anf Datu
Piang could be the proper subjects of a pre-proclamation controversy and corollarily, whether said
returns should be excluded from the canvass.
Ruling:
In such controversy, the COMELEC restricted to an examination of the election returns. In a
pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC, as a rule, is restricted to an examination of the election
returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities.
“Section 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. The following shall be
proper issues that may raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion or intimidation, or they
are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) Then substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.”

123
Sano, Jr. vs. COMELEC 611 SCRA 475

Facts:
Petitioner insists that all five contested ERs were written by only one person, and these ERs
were surreptitiously presented before the MBOC. Thus, he argues that the issues raised before the
MBOC, namely, that the contested ERs were tampered with and/or falsified, obviously manufactured,
and subject of massive fraud, are pre-proclamation controversies as defined in Section 241 of the 98
Omnibus Election Code and fall within the contemplation of Section 243(b) of said Code. As such, the
contested ERs should have been excluded from the canvass. Consequently, the MBOC's proclamation
of Que violated Section 39 of Commonwealth Act No. 7859 and Section 20 of RA 7166.
On the other hand, Que argues that the allegations raised by petitioner on the contested ERs
are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; that petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that
the contested ERs were obviously manufactured, tampered with, or falsified; and that petitioner failed
to follow the strict and mandatory procedure under Section 20 of RA 7166 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 8969 for manifesting an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition will prosper.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit. A pre-proclamation controversy, as defined in Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, is: “any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or
directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of the election returns.”
It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character; indeed, it is the
policy of the law that pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass
and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers (BOC) will not look into allegations of irregularity that are
not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished.
Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 provide that any
candidate may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the time the questioned
return is submitted for canvass; the objecting party shall also submit his objections in writing
simultaneously with the oral objections. The BOC shall consider the written objections and
opposition, if any, and summarily rule on the petition for exclusion. Any party adversely affected by
such ruling must immediately inform the BOC if he intends to appeal such ruling.

124
Macabago vs. COMELEC 392 SCRA 178

Facts:
Petitioner Sabdullah T. Macabago was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the
winning candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur in the May 2001
elections. Private respondent Jamael M. Salacop, the losing candidate, filed a petition with the
COMELEC against the petitioner and the proclaimed Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors, as well 98
as the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, to annul the elections and the proclamation of
candidates, alleging that there was a massive substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive
irregularities in voting procedures in Precincts Nos. 19, 20, 28 and 29, and a failure of the Board of
Election Inspectors to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3743 and Section
193 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, rendering the election process in those precincts a sham and
a mockery and the proclamation of the winning candidates a nullity.
The COMELEC took cognizance of the petition and issued an order directing the Election
Officer of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, to bring to and produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the
original VRRs of the questioned precincts for technical examination.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition of private
respondent and in issuing the assailed Order. Petitioner filed with the Court a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, praying for the reversal of
the order of the COMELEC En Banc.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld petitioner’s contention and granted the petition. According to the
Court, the grounds alleged by private respondent are not proper bases for a pre-proclamation
controversy but are appropriate for a regular election contest within the original jurisdiction of the
RTC. The Court stressed that pre-proclamation controversies are limited to challenges directed
against the Board of Canvassers and are summary in nature; thus, the reception of evidence
aliunde,e.g., the original copies of the VRR, is proscribed. In his petition with the COMELEC, private
respondent alleged that fraud and irregularities allegedly perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals
who substituted for the registered voters and voted for the latter in the subject precincts, in
conspiracy with the Board of Election Inspectors, or abetted by the members thereof, attended the
electoral process in the subject precincts. The fraud and irregularities catalogued by private
respondent required the reception of evidence aliunde and would compel or necessitate COMELEC to
pierce the veil of election returns which appear to be prima facie regular and authentic. Said issues,
according to the court, are anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy and should be posed and
resolved in a regular election contest. The assailed order was set aside by the Court without prejudice
to the filing of a regular election protest, the period for the filing of which is deemed suspended by the
filing of the petition before the COMELEC which gave rise to the present petition.

125
Sandoval vs. COMELEC 323 SCRA 407

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the
Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the
municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly
elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed 98
with the COMELEC a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged
that there was a verbal order from the COMELEC Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation
of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and
proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election
returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The
COMELEC en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the
proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the
COMELEC order.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
Ruling:
Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC
No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold
that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without
due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that
COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and
it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations. Public respondent
submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely
exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of
canvassers. Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's
proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative
powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places,
appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement
agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections, register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or
imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation
or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and
supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the
adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the
questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the
Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether
the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the
COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or
discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of
a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.

126
Velayo vs. COMELEC 327 SCRA 713
Facts:
The COMELEC issued a resolution annulling the proclamation of Velayo as mayor. Velayo
claimed that he was denied due process because he was not furnished any notice of the pre-
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proclamation proceedings against him from beginning to end. All that petitioner received from the
COMELEC was its en banc resolution annulling his proclamation.
Issue:
Whether or not Velayo was denied of due process when his proclamation was annulled.
Ruling:
Velayo is a real party-in-interest since he was the proclaimed mayor. His non-inclusion as
respondent and his lack of notice of the proceedings in the COMELEC which resulted to the
cancellation of his proclamation constitute clear denial of due process.

127
Lagumbay vs. COMELEC 16 SCRA 175 (1966)

Facts:
This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining to reject
the returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The Constitution provides for
review by this Court of the rulings of the said Commission. The matter being urgent, and having
reached the conclusion that the returns of certain questioned precincts were "obviously 98
manufactured" within the meaning of pertinent jurisprudence, particularly Mitchell v. Stevens,1 we
issued on December 24, 1965, a short resolution upholding the Commission's power and duty to reject
the returns of about fifty precincts. It appearing therein that — contrary to all statistical probabilities
— in the first set, in each precinct the number of registered voters equalled the number of ballots and
the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the
party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party got exactly zero; and in the
second set, — again contrary to all statistical probabilities — all the reported votes were for candidates
of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same number of votes in each precinct,
ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650 in another precinct; whereas, all the candidates of the
Nacionalista Party were given exactly zero in all said precincts.
Issue:
Whether or not fraud was committed in the election.
Ruling:
The same ratio decidendi applies to the situation in the precincts herein mentioned. These
returns were obviously false or fabricated — prima facie. Let us take for example, precinct No. 3 of
Andong, Lanao del Sur. There were 648 registered voters. According to such return all the eight
candidates of the Liberal Party got 648 each,3 and the eight Nacionalista candidates got exactly zero.
We hold such return to be evidently fraudulent or false because of the inherent improbability of such a
result — against statistical probabilities — specially because at least one vote should have been
received by the Nacionalista candidates, i.e., the vote of the Nacionalista inspector. It is, of course,
"possible" that such inspector did not like his party's senatorial line-up; but it is not probable that he
disliked all of such candidates, and it is not likely that he favored all the eight candidates of the Liberal
Party. Therefore, most probably, he was made to sign an obviously false return, or else he betrayed his
party, in which case, the election therein — if any — was no more than a barefaced fraud and a brazen
contempt of the popular polls. Of course we agree that frauds in the holding of the election should be
handled — and finally settled — by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general
rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence, is necessary; but where the fraud is so palpable
from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it
and give it prima facie value.
At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts may ultimately be ascertained before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal.4 All we hold now, is that the returns show "prima facie" that they do
not reflect true and valid reports of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by candidate Climaco
— in the corresponding election protest. Indeed, social scientists might wonder whether courts could,
consistently with morality and public policy,5 render judgment acknowledging such "control" or
validating such "controlled votes" as candidate Climaco chose to call them.

128
Ocampo vs. COMELEC 325 SCRA 636
Facts:
In the case at bar, private respondent, a duly elected congressman, was declared disqualified
22 months after the May 14, 2001 elections. Petitioner avers that, having garnered the second highest
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number of votes, the same should be declared the winner in the said elections.
Issue:
Whether or not a second placer in congressional elections can be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman.
Ruling:
No, it is settled jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number
of votes to be declared the winner. The latter could not be proclaimed winner as he could not be
considered the first among the qualified candidates.

129
Imelda Dimaporo vs. COMELEC/Vicente Belmonte 544 SCRA 381

Facts:
Petitioner Dimaporo and private respondent Belmonte were both candidates for
Representative of the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Norte during the May 14, 2007 elections.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the COC’s for the City of Iligan and four
other municipalities. Upon adjournment, the said PBOC issued a Certification showing respondent 98
Belmonte in the lead. Prior to its adjournment, the said ballot boxes containing COC’s of Kauswagan
Bacolod and Miago were allegedly forcibly opened, their padlocks destroyed and the envelopes
containing the COC’s and the SOV opened and violated.
COMELEC issued Resolution NO. 8073 adopting in part the recommendation of Atty. Ausan
directing the PBOC of Lanao del Norte to “immediately reconvene solely for the purpose of retrieving
the three envelopes supposedly containing COCs from the municipalities of Kauswagan, Bacolod and
Miago” and to “open the same in the presence of all watchers, counsels, and representatives of all
contending parties and the accredited Citizens Arm of the Commission and right there and then to
direct the representatives of the dominant majority and minority parties to present their respective
copies of the COCs for comparison with the COCs intended for the COMELEC and with the COCs
inside the envelope just opened.” However, no canvassing took place. As the PBOC proceeded with the
canvass, Belmonte objected to the inclusion of the COCs of the concerned municipalities but the
former denied it due to lack of jurisdiction. Belmonte filed his verified notice of appeal and the Second
Division of the COMELEC granted it. Dimaporo filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction questioning the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the case. Dimaporo was also granted a status quo ante order.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in proclaiming Belmonte winner even though a Status
Quo Ante Order was granted.
Ruling:
Petition dismissed. The COMELEC has duly proclaimed Belmonte, thus if Dimaporo wants to
pursue a case, he must file with the HRET. Belmonte filed his comment even before the issuance of
the status quo ante order of the Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del
Norte. In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. When there has been a proclamation and a defeated
candidate claims to be the winner, it is the Electoral Tribunal already has jurisdiction over the case.
The COMELEC was not amiss quickly deciding Belmonte’s petition to correct manifest errors then
proclaiming him the winner. Election cases are imbued with public interest. They involve not only the
adjudication of the private interest of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the
prerogatives of the offices within their gift. Considering that at the time of proclamation, there had
been no status quo ante order or temporary restraining order from the Court, such proclamation is
valid and, as such, it has vested the HRET with jurisdiction over the case as Belmonte has, with the
taking of his oath, already become one of their own.

130
Rommel Munoz vs. COMELEC, Carlos Baldo Jr. 495 SCRA 407
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor in Camalig, Albay in the May 10,
2004 election. At 6:00 o’clock in the evening of May 10, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
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convened and canvassed the election returns. On May 11, 2004, the lawyers of private respondent
objected the inclusion of the 26 ERs from various precincts based on the following grounds: (1) eight
ERs lack inner seal; (2) seven ERs lack material data; (3) one ER lack signatures; (4) four ERs lack
signatures and thumb marks of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors on the envelope
containing them; (5) one ER lack the name and signature of the poll clerk on the second page thereof;
(6) one ER lack the number of votes in words and figures; and (7) four ERs were allegedly prepared
under intimidation. On May 13, 2004, the MBC denied the objections and ruled to include the
objected ERs in the canvas. Private respondent appealed the said ruling to the COMELEC on May 18,
2004 and was docketed as SPC No. 04-087 and raffled to the COMELEC First Division. Despite the
pendency of the appeal, petitioner was proclaimed on May 19, 2004 by the MBC as the winning
candidate for mayor of Camalig, Albay. On May 21, 2004, private respondent filed with the
COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of the petitioner for being premature and illegal. The
case was docketed as SPC No. 04-124 and raffled to the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC
granted the petition. The CA affirmed. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC En Banc correctly ordered the new MBC to re canvass all the ERs
and to proclaim the winner on the basis thereof the pendency of the appeal with the First Division.
Ruling:
By ordering the re-canvass of all the election returns, the COMELEC En Banc in effect
rendered a decision on the merits of a case which was still pending before its First Division. This is in
violation of the rule that it does not have the authority to decide and hear election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies, at the first instance. Election cases must first be heard and decided
by a Division of the COMELEC. COMELEC, sitting En Banc, does not have authority to hear and
decide the same at the first instance. COMELEC has no authority to decide cases: one involving a pre-
proclamation controversy on the preparation of election returns, and the other an annulment of
proclamation 2 since proclamation was made by the BOC without COMELEC authority – when the
cases do not involve similar questions of law and fact.

131
Rosal vs. COMELEC 518 SCRA 473 (2007)

Facts:
On June 15, 2005, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (docketed as G.R. No. 1628253) assailing the April 25 and May 12, 2005 orders of the
COMELEC Second Division for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Meanwhile, the
Second Division continued with the proceedings and, following the submission of the parties 98
memoranda, considered EPC No. 2004-61 submitted for resolution. In a resolution dated January 23,
2006, the Second Division then composed of only two sitting members, namely, Presiding
Commissioner Mehol Sadain (now retired) and Commissioner Florentino Tuason, Jr. declared private
respondent Imperial the winning candidate for mayor of Legaspi City and ordered petitioner Rosal to
vacate said office and turn it over peacefully to private respondent. On January 30, 2006, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Second Divisions resolution. The motion was denied by the
COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated May 29, 2006. In due time, petitioner came to this Court
with a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the COMELEC en banc resolution.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC erred in denying the petitioner’s motion.
Ruling:
An interlocutory order rendered by a division of the COMELEC, cannot be assailed by means of
a special civil action for certiorari, as only final orders of the COMELEC En Banc can be brought to
the Supreme Court by that mode.
We summarize the foregoing doctrines: (1) the ballots cannot be used to overturn the official
count as reflected in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have
been preserved with a care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and all suspicion of change,
abstraction or substitution; (2) the burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved in such a manner is on the protestant; (3) where a mode of preserving the ballots is
enjoined by law, proof must be made of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that
mode as would provide assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight
deviations from the precise mode of achieving that end; (4) it is only when the protestant has shown
substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of
proving actual tampering or the likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee and (5) only if it appears to
the satisfaction of the court or COMELEC that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved should it
adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in the election returns. The procedure
adopted by the Second Division was a complete inverse of the one outlined above and was contrary to
reason. There was complete arbitrariness on its part. First, there was no indication at all that it ever
considered the condition of the ballot boxes at the time they were delivered to the COMELEC for
revision. Second, it placed the burden of proving actual tampering of the ballots on petitioner herein
(the protestee below) notwithstanding private respondents previous manifestation that most of the
ballot boxes bore overt signs of tampering[28] and only 79 ballot boxes were found intact. Third,
instead of diligently examining whether the ballot boxes were preserved with such care as to preclude
any reasonable opportunity for tampering with their contents, the Second Division made the
probative value of the revised ballots dependent solely on whether spurious ballots were found among
them.

132
Jaime c. Regio vs. COMELEC and Ronnie C. Co., 711 SCRA 448
Facts:
Petitioner Regio and private respondent Co, among other candidates, ran in the October 25,
2010 barangay elections in District III of the City of Manila for the position of punong barangay.
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Immediately following the counting and canvassing of the votes, from 7 clustered precincts in the
adverted barangay, Regio, who garnered highest votes was proclaimed winner for the contested post.
On November 4, 2010, Co filed an election protest before the MeTC. He claimed, among other things,
that the Board of Election Tellers (BET) did not follow COMELEC Resolution No. 9030, as it ignored
the rules on appreciation of ballots, resulting in misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of
ballots. The trial court dismissed Cos protest and declared Regio as the duly-elected punong
barangay. Aggrieved, Co filed an appeal before the COMELEC First Division who dismissed the
appeal. Co then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc reconsidered the
Resolution of the First Division, and accordingly declared Co as the duly elected punong barangay.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Co had successfully discharged the burden of proving the integrity
of the ballots subjected to revision.
Ruling:
COMELEC En Banc, committed grave abuse of discretion by the specifically ignoring the rules
on evidence, merits consideration. Still in line with the Courts decision in Malaluanto the effect that
the Court can decide on the merits a moot protest if there is practical value in so doing. We find that
the nullification of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution is in order, due to its gross contravention of
established rules on evidence in election protest cases.
Petitioner need not prove actual tampering of the ballots Corollarily, the COMELEC En Banc
had ruled that petitioner, as protestee, failed to adduce evidence that the ballots found inside the
ballot boxes were compromised and tampered. This strikes us as baseless and a clear departure from
the teachings of Rosal.
The duty of the protestee in an election contest to provide evidence of actual tampering or any
likelihood arises only when the protestant has first successfully discharge the burden or providing
that the ballots have been secured to prevent tampering or susceptibility of charge, abstraction or
substitution. Such need to present proof of tampering did not arise since protestant himself failed to
provide evidence of the integrity of the ballots.

133
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez vs. Eufrocino C. Codilla 668 SCRA 600 (2012)
Facts:
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134
Salvador D. Viologo, Sr., vs. COMELEC 658 SCRA 516 (2011)
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for the mayoralty race in the City of
Meycuayan, Bulacan. Respondent was proclaimed the winner. The petitioner filed a petition with the
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COMELEC questioning the proclamation on the grounds of massive vote-buying; intimidation and
harassment; election fraud; non-appreciation by the Precinct Count Optical Scan machines of valid
votes cast during the said election; and irregularities due to non-observance of the guidelines set by
the COMELEC. The COMELEC Second Division issued an Order setting the preliminary conference
and directing the parties to file their Preliminary Conference Briefs. The COMELEC Second Division
dismissed petitioner’s protest on the ground that the latter belatedly filed his Brief in violation of the
COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs and the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc erred in denying petitioner’s MR.
Ruling:
The Court finds no justifiable reason why the COMELEC 2 nd Division hastily dismissed
petitioner’s election protest. There is no indication that the COMELEC 2 nd Division made prior
verification from the proper or concerned COMELEC department or official of petitioner’s allegation
that he did not receive a copy of the subject order. He was not given sufficient time to thoroughly
prepare for the said conference. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify the outright dismissal
of the protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the rules on
the part of the petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable. Thus, the COMELEC 2 nd
Division committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s protest.

135
Quintos vs. COMELEC 21 November 2002

Facts:
December 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of
RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
unconstitutional. On December 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
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The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his
certificate of candidacy“.
Issue:
Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection
clause of the constitution.
Ruling:
The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8679 as constitutional. These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering
or partisan political campaign. The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil
service officers and employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and
reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials.
Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

136
Pacanan vs. COMELEC 597 SCRA 189 (2009)

Facts:
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137
Douglas R. Cagas vs. COMELEC/Bautista 663 SCRA 644 (2012)
Facts:
On November 28, 2012 R.A. No. 10370 was passed, the Charter of the Province of Davao
Occidental. It provided for the creation of a new province consisting of several municipalities. The
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date of the Plebiscite was to be held within 60 days from the date of effectivity of this charter.
However, COMELEC deferred conduct of all plebiscites in preparation for the May 13, 2013 National
and Local Elections. Subsequently, by minute resolution, COMELEC decided to hold the said
plebiscite on October 28, 2013.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC may conduct a plebiscite beyond schedule provided by law.
Ruling:
Yes. The COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of
election, plebiscite, referendum, initiative, and recall. Applying the OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, the
COMELEC may postpone election for serious causes such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia, force majeure, and other causes. In the instant case, the postponement of the
plebiscite was warranted due to the tight time frame from the enactment of the charter and
subsequent conduction of National Elections. The instant case is analogous to force majeure covered
by the Omnibus Election Code.

138
Maria Laarni L. Cayetano vs. COMELEC/Dante Tinga 648 SCRA 561 (2011)
Facts:
In the automated national and local elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner and private
respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was proclaimed the
winner thereof, receiving a total of 95,865 votes as against the 93,445 votes received by private
respondent. The private respondent filed an Election Protest against petitioner before the COMELEC 98
for allegedly committing election frauds and irregularities which translated to the latter’s ostensible
win as Mayor of Taguig City. On the whole, private respondent claims that he is the actual winner of
the mayoralty elections in Taguig City. In the petitioner’s Answer with Counter-Protest and
Counterclaim, she raised, among others, the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content
of the Election Protest and prayed for the immediate dismissal thereof. However, it was denied by the
COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent for insufficiency in form and
content.
Ruling:
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated
directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider
a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be
resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the
division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of
a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari.
This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the
motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in
the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. The
exception enunciated is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity
because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division
issued a temporary restraining order without a time limit, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an
answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary period.
The Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final
resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a
decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. In short, the final order of the COMELEC
(Second Division) denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before this
Court even via a petition for certiorari. Although the rule admits of exceptions as when the issuance of
the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the
same. However, none of the circumstances permitting an exception to the rule occurs in this instance.
The protest filed by private respondent and the counter-protest filed by petitioner remain pending
before the COMELEC, which should afford petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate her grievances.

139
Ceriaco Bulilis vs. Victorino Nuez 655 SCRA 241 (2011)

Facts:
On October 25, 2010, petitioner Ceriaco Bulilis was proclaimed winner of the elections
forpunong barangay of Barangay Bulilis, Ubay, Bohol. He won over Victorino Nuez by a margin of 4
votes. On November 2, 2010, Nuez filed an Election Protest. It was inexplicably docketed as Civil Case
No.134-10.Bulilis denied the allegations in the protest and praying for its dismissal on the ground that 98
the MCTC had no jurisdiction since the protest failed to implead the Chairman and the Members of
the Board of Election Inspectors who were purportedly indispensable parties. On the same date, the
Clerk of Court of the MCTC issued a notice of "hearing" for November 9, 2010. However, counsel for
Bulilis claimed that he never received said "notice" nor was he in any way informed that the
November 9, 2010hearing was a preliminary conference. At about 1:45 p.m., on November 9, 2010,
counsel for Bulilis filed his Preliminary Conference Brief with the Clerk of Court and also furnished
Nuez counsel with a copy. However, when the case was called at 2:10 p.m., counsel for Nuez moved in
open court to be allowed to present evidence ex parte. Noting that counsel for Bulilis failed to file his
brief and to furnish a copy of the brief on the other party at least one (1) day prior to the preliminary
conference as required by Section4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, Judge Daniel Jose J.
Garces granted Nuez motion to present evidence ex parte.
Counsel for Bulilis filed a motion for reconsideration on November 10, 2010, asserting the
lackof proper notice to him of the preliminary conference. The MCTC denied the motion. The RTC
likewise denied Bulilis subsequent petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
NO. It appears from the record that the questioned notice of preliminary conference issued in
the instant election protest may have been defective in that (1) the notice issued by the MCTC clerk of
court was a generic notice of hearing without any mention that it was for preliminary conference, and
(2) it was served on the party himself despite being represented by counsel in contravention of Rule 9,
Section 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. For this reason the Court disagrees with the RTC finding that
impliedly ascribed all fault to petitioner in failing to timely file his preliminary conference brief. We,
nonetheless, finds that the RTC and even the Court itself have no jurisdiction to correct any error that
may have been committed by MCTC Judge Garces in his order to allow the protestant to present
evidence ex parte. Petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari that he filed with the RTC was
"not an election case", but one imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MCTC judge in
his issuance of an interlocutory order. There is no merit in petitioner argument that Rule 28, Section
1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure limits the COMELEC's jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
in election cases to issues related to elections, returns and qualifications of elective municipal and
barangay officials. Said provision taken together with the succeeding section, undeniably shows that
an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC whenever a judge hearing an
election case has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

140
Galang, Jr. vs Geronimo 643 SCRA 631 (2011)
Facts:
Private respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. The court
sheriff went to petitioner's residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff's
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Return of Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner.
Petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared in court and
requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. One of his affirmative defenses
was that the electoral protest was filed out of time, since it was filed more than ten (10) days after the
date of proclamation of the winning candidate.
The trial court then issued the assailed Order finding the service of Summons on petitioner as
valid, and declaring the Answer filed on as filed out of time.
Petitioner then filed before the Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65,
alleging that respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in considering as valid, the Sheriff's Service of
Summons. However, respondents pointed out that the petition for certiorari should not be filed with
this Court but with the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedy was proper.
Ruling:
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC provides that “in
election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall
be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” Also, a
petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of the regional trial court in an electoral
protest case is considered in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. DISMISSED.

141
Velasco vs. Belmonte 780 SCRA 81
Facts:
COMELEC has cancelled BB’s CoC, acting upon the petition of AA, for alleged
misrepresentations in BB’s CoC. While the motion for reconsideration filed by BB was pending, the
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election was held and BB was proclaimed as winner. CC filed an Election Protest in the HRET.
COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality on its cancellation of BB’s CoC. Despite it, Speaker DD
administered the oath of office to BB. BB challenged COMELEC’s action and the SC upheld that there
was no grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC. AA filed for an immediate execution of COMELEC’s
previous resolution and to declare CC as winner. COMELEC declared the proclamation of BB as null
and void. CC filed a petition for the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel Speaker DD to
proclaim him as a winner, despite notice given to him by COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for mandamus will prosper.
Ruling:
Yes. Speaker DD has no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to CC and to
register the latter’s name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act
or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that there is in
existence final and clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. It is beyond cavil that there is
in existence final and executor resolutions of this Court affirming the final and executor resolutions of
the COMELEC cancelling BB’s Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory
resolution of the COMELEC declaring null and void the proclamation of BB, and proclaiming CC as
the winning candidate for the position of Representative. The foregoing state of affairs collectively
leads this Court to consider the facts as settled and beyond dispute. CC is proclaimed winning
candidate.

142
Republic vs. Dela Rosa 232 SCRA 785
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A.
No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the
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Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted private respondent as a
Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and
(2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.
Petitioner then filed a petition on September 20, 1991 for naturalization captioned to be re-
admitted as citizen of the Philippines. On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set
Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done on January instead of having it on March,” where he
manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. The motion was granted
and the hearing was moved on February.
On February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Petitioner
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization,
thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen. The Solicitor
General subsequently interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as Filipino.
Ruling:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. The proceedings of the trial
court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the
petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4)
petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

143
Virgnio Villamor vs. COMELEC & de 496 SCRA334 Dios-Batao

Facts:
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144
Basarte vs. COMELEC 523 SCRA 76
Facts:
Basarte and Noel were candidates for municipal mayor. After the MBC canvassed the election
returns, Basarte filed an objection regarding the inclusion of a certain election return alleging that it
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was tampered, altered, and the second page was missing. The respondent dismissed Basarte’s action.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject election return should be excluded.
Ruling:
No. Basarte failed to prove that the election return sought to be annulled would materially
affect the results of the election as required under Section 23(d) of the Omnibus Election Code.

145
Mendoza vs. COMELEC 616 SCRA 443

Facts:
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of
times:
a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to
1988 98
b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June
1994 and served up to 1995
d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in
the May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Bataan. Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare
respondent Roman’s election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to
Art. X, §8 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be
included in determining the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law.
Ruling:
No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely
serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-year term. The law contemplates a
continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply, providing for only one exception,
i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary severance from the service
which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through
valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for purposes of applying the three-term limit, it stands to
reason that the balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election
should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the three-term limit.
In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the
elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official following the
recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year term set by the Constitution. The
Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive
terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service,
so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent.
Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman
served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since
on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive
terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the
same position.

146
Maliksi vs. COMELECand Saquilayan March12, 2013

Facts: During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the
winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared
Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from 98
performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the
RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to
recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it
issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray
the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated
April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
Issue: Whether or not the conduct of recount by the first division of the COMELEC is proper.
Ruling: No. It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the
assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no
existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount
proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are
to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction
over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city
officials.
The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the
ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by
the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be
exact, the motion for reconsideration was actually directed against the entire resolution of the First
Division, while Maliksi’s claim of due process violation is directed only against the First Division’s
recount proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him. Notably, the First
Division did not issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was
deprived of the chance to seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount
through a seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity
to assail the conduct of the recount proceedings.
The service of the First Division orders requiring Saquilayan to post and augment the cash
deposits for the printing of the picture images did not sufficiently give Maliksi notice of the First
Division’s decision to print the picture images. The said orders did not meet the requirements of due
process because they did not specifically inform Maliksi that the ballots had been found to be
tampered. Nor did the orders offer the factual bases for the finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for
Maliksi to surmise on the factual bases for finding the need to print the picture images still violated
the principles of fair play, because the responsibility and the obligation to lay down the factual bases
and to inform Maliksi as the party to be potentially prejudiced thereby firmly rested on the shoulders
of the First Division.

147
Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690 (1995)
FACTS: In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, Relampagos and Rosita Cumba were
candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan Del Norte. Cumba
was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over Relampagos.
Unwilling to accept defeat, Relampagos filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court of
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Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City under Judge Rosarito F.
Dabalos, and found Relampagos have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent
Cumba and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner Relampagos.

As a result, Cumba then filed with the respondent Comelec a petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of
execution.
The Comelec promulgated its resolution stating that, the Commission has exclusive authority to hear
and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law,
and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby granted and
that the Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared null and void and the Writ of
Execution issued on August 4, 1994 is lifted.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Commission on Elections has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. --- YES.
RULING: Simply put, the Comelec has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
“The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases” remains in full force and effect
but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

Since the Comelec, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a
court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily
follows that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction

148
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342
FACTS: This case could have been an ordinary election contest. However, this case shows that, while
blood is usually thicker than water, politics, in some very few instances, may actually be thicker than
blood and may be no respecter even of family ties.
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Respondent Ramon M. Calo was proclaimed winner in the May 14, 2007 mayoralty race in the
Municipality of Carmen, Province of Agusan del Sur. His opponent, petitioner Jesus M. Calo, is his
brother, whom he beat by 278 votes. Jesus filed an election protest in the RTC of Butuan City, Branch
3, questioning the election results in 36 of out of the 56 precincts. The RTC issued its decision on the
protest finding Jesus to have received the majority votes and declaring him the duly elected mayor.
Jesus filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal on February 12, 2008. On
the same date, Ramon filed his notice of appeal.
The RTC issued its special order granting Jesus' motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal. Ramon sought reconsideration of this special order. On the same date, the RTC ordered the
transmittal of the records to the Comelec. Before the RTC could act on the motion for reconsideration
filed by Ramon, respondent forthwith filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Comelec,
raising as ground the grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC.
The Comelec 1st Division issued its resolution granting the petition, setting aside the RTC special
order, quashing the accompanying writ of execution, issuing a status quo ante order directing the
parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the special order and directing Ramon Calo to
continue as the municipal mayor of the Municipality of Carmen. Jesus Calo filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the Comelec En Banc. Hence, the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the RTC has jurisdiction in proclaiming Jesus Calo as the winner in the
mayoralty election protest. --- YES.
HELD: The Comelec should have accorded respect and weight to the RTC's decision proclaiming
petitioner as winner.
Note that aside from the evidence presented by the parties during the election contest and the expert
testimony of the witnesses from the NBI, the RTC made its own assessment and findings on the
contested ballots. On the basis of all this, the RTC concluded that "Jesus will still have the plurality of
981 votes in his favor and 315 votes for Ramon, respectively." It was also the RTC's conclusion that
"the victory of the protestant has been clearly established." Aside from these, the RTC also laid down
the superior circumstances necessitating the grant of execution pending appeal: (1) allowing the
status quo to continue would unjustly give premium to the perpetrators of fraud, anomalies and
irregularities and suppress the will of the electorate; (2) the sovereign will of the people should be
given utmost respect and (3) the injury or damage to be sustained by petitioner would outweigh the
injury or damage of respondent.
Given that the RTC's exercise of its discretionary power to grant execution pending appeal per special
order was not tainted with any bias or capricious and whimsical arbitrariness, we find that the
Comelec committed an error in annulling and setting it aside.

149
Pecson v. Comelec 575 SCRA 634
Facts: Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of
Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the May 2007 elections. Cunanan was proclaimed the winning
candidate against Pecson with a margin of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position
of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, while Pecson filed an election protest with the RTC, which
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rendered a Decision in Pecson's favor. The RTC ruled that Pecson received a total of 14,897 votes as
against Cunanan's 13,758 - a vote margin of 1,139.
Cunanan received a copy of the Decision and filed a Notice of Appeal the day after. The RTC issued an
Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directing the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of
the Comelec. Pecson, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending
Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the
Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials allows this remedy.
The RTC granted Pecson's motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order but suspended,
pursuant to the Rules, the actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty days. Expectedly,
Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. The 2 nd
Division of the Comelec issued a 60-day TRO directing the RTC to cease and desist from issuing or
causing the issuance of a writ of execution or implementing the Special Order and for Cunanan to
continue performing the functions of Mayor of Magalang. Pecson filed his Answer and/or Opposition,
with Prayer for Immediate Lifting of TRO and asked for the issuance of a writ of execution via an Ex-
Parte Motion. Despite Cunanan's opposition, the RTC granted Pecson's motion and issued the writ of
execution on March 11, 2008. Pecson thereafter assumed the duties and functions of Mayor of
Magalang. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Comelec correctly ruled that the RTC could no longer actually issue the writ
on March 11, 2008 because it no longer had jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period lapsed and
after the records were transmitted to the ECAD-Comelec. --- NO.
HELD: Another legal reality is that the Comelec is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could no longer
actually issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no longer had jurisdiction to do so after the
appeal period lapsed and after the records were transmitted to the ECAD-Comelec. That the RTC is
still in possession of the records and that the period to appeal of both contending parties must have
not lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the RTC to grant
a Special Order allowing execution pending appeal; they are requisite elements for the exercise by
the RTC of its residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution pending appeal, not for the issuance
of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited provision of the Rules which does not require
the issuance of the implementing writ within the above limited jurisdictional period. The RTC cannot
legally issue the implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1) the cited twenty-day
waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory immediate transmittal of the records to the
ECAD of the Comelec under Section 10 of the Rules.
In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the Comelec erred in nullifying the RTC's Special
Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed
grave abuse of discretion when it looked at wrong considerations and when it acted outside of the
contemplation of the law in nullifying the Special Order.

150
Mananzala vs. Comelec and Julie Monton 523 SCRA 31
FACTS: Petitioner Ibarra R. Mananzala and private respondent Julie R. Monton were mayoralty
candidates in the Municipality of Magdiwang, Romblon, during the May 10, 2004 National and Local
Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Julie Monton as the duly elected Municipal
Mayor with 2,579 votes, or a margin of 13 votes, over petitioner’s 2,566 votes.
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Mananzala filed an election protest with the RTC of Romblon, Branch 81, seeking recount
in the 10 precincts of Magdiwang on the grounds of fraud, serious irregularities, and willful violation
of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Bilang 881) and other pertinent Comelec rules allegedly
committed by the voters and the Chairman and members of the Board of Election Inspectors during
the election. Monton filed an Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, averring that the
election was held peacefully with no irregularity whatsoever. A revision of ballots was later
conducted. In its decision, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ibarra Mananzala, who then
moved for the execution of the decision pending appeal which the trial court granted. Monton filed
her appeal. The Former Second Division of the Comelec issued a Resolution which reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court. It found that Julie Monton obtained 2,560 votes, or a margin of 17
votes, over Manzala’s 2,543 votes.
Mananzala’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Comelec en banc. It affirmed
the earlier Resolution proclaiming Julie Monton as the duly elected Municipal Mayor with
modification as to the number of votes obtained by both parties after re-appreciation, and directed
the implementation of the writ of execution ordering Mananzala to cease and desist from discharging
the powers and functions of the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon; to relinquish
and vacate the post in favor of Monton; and to cause the smooth turn-over of the office to the latter.
Mananzala filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring Monton
as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon with a prayer that the Comelec be
directed to cease and desist from implementing the challenged Resolutions.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Comelec has appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, modify or even reverse
and set aside the decision of the RTC. --- YES.
HELD: The Comelec exercises appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, modify, or even reverse and set
aside the decision of the former and substitute it with its own decision. Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution provides the Comelec with quasi-judicial power to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution also mandates the
Comelec to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the
Comelec en banc. Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where, upon
appeal from a conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for review and the appellate
court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings. In the present case, the
Comelec en banc had thoroughly reviewed the decision of its Former Second Division and affirmed
the findings thereof with modification as to the number of votes obtained by both parties after re-
appreciation, that is, private respondent obtained 2,535 votes, or a margin of 60 votes, over
petitioner’s 2,475 votes.

151
Angelia v. Comelec & Florentino Tan; 332 SCRA 757
FACTS: Dioscoro O. Angelia and private respondent Florentino R. Tan were candidates for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Abuyog, Leyte in the elections held on May 11, 1998.
After the canvass of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the duly elected members of
the Sangguniang Bayan. Tan, who received four votes less than those obtained by Angelia — ranked
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ninth among the candidates. Tan filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC of Abuyog, Leyte
against Angelia, alleging that in Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1, he was credited with only 82 votes, when
he actually obtained 92, while in Precinct No. 23-A, Angelia was credited with 18 votes, when he
actually garnered only 13 votes. According to Tan, he actually received a total of 7,771 votes, while
Angelia actually garnered 7,760 votes. Angelia took his oath and assumed office as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. Tan filed a motion to withdraw his petition. Subsequently, he filed a petition for
annulment of proclamation of Angelia with the COMELEC. In a resolution, the COMELEC annulled
the proclamation of Angelia as member of the Sangguniang Bayan and ordered the Municipal Board
of Canvassers to make the necessary corrections in the election returns from Precinct Nos. 84-A/ 84-
A-1 and Precinct No. 23-A and, thereafter, to proclaim the winning candidate or candidates on the
basis of the amended results.
Accordingly, the Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened and, after making the necessary
corrections in the election returns, proclaimed Tan a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Angelia filed
a motion for reconsideration alleging that he was not given due notice and hearing. Then, without
waiting for the resolution of his motion, he filed the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Comelec has jurisdiction to order the Board of Election Canvassers to effect
the necessary corrections, if any, on the subject Election Returns. --- YES.
HELD: Although the Comelec annulled the proclamation of Angelia, it merely directed the Municipal
Board of Canvassers to "Reconvene within five days from receipt hereof and effect the corrections in
the total number of votes received by the candidates in Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 (clustered) and
Precinct No. 23-A and thereafter Proclaim the winning candidate/s for Municipal Kagawad based on
the corrected results."
It was the Municipal Board of Canvassers which the Comelec ordered to actually effect the necessary
corrections, if any, in the said election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim the winning
candidate or candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan. In accordance with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Castromayor, the expedient action to take is to direct the Municipal Board
of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance with Rule 27, §7 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, to effect the necessary corrections, if any, in the election returns and, on
the basis thereof, proclaim the winning candidate or candidates as member or members of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
The en banc resolution of the Comelec is Affirmed by the Supreme Court with the Modification that
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Abuyog, Leyte is ordered to reconvene and, after notice to the
parties and hearing in accordance with Rule 27, §7 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, to effect the
necessary corrections, if any, in Election Return No. 3700088 from Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 and
Election Return No. 3700023 from Precinct No. 23-A and, based on the amended results, proclaim
the winning candidate or candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan of said
municipality.

152
Garces v. Court of Appeals 259 SCRA 99 (1996)
FACTS: Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte. She was
to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte. Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion,
however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of
Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post, but she was not able to do so because of 98
a Memorandum issued by Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her
from assuming office as the same is not vacant. She received a letter from the Acting Manager,
Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of
polling booths. It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte” which
Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion
continued occupying the Gutalac office, the Comelec en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the Comelec en
banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered
that the appointments of Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered
moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the
COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should
be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court
becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the
proper remedy, and (2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under the constitution pertain only to
those involving the conduct of elections. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the
case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court. --- NO.
HELD: The case is cognizable in the RTC. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members

any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission
or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the supreme court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the Comelec. On the
contrary, it was the Comelec 's resolution that triggered this controversy. The "case" or "matter"
referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the Comelec, i.e., it must
pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that "decision, rulings, order" of the Comelec that
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the
Comelec's exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving "elective regional, provincial,
and city officials."
In this case, what is being assailed is the Comelec's choice of an appointee to occupy Gutalac’s post
which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy
involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial
administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC., a court which the law vests with the
power to exercise original jurisdiction over "all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction over of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."

153
Loyola v. CA 245 SCRA 477 (1995)
FACTS: In the barangay election of May 1994, Alan Loyola was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of
Canvassers as the duly elected Punong Barangay of barangay Poblacion of the Municipality of
Tangalan, Aklan. Aniceto Fernandez III, the defeated candidate for Punong Barangay, filed with the
4th MCTC of Macato-Tangalan an election protest against Loyola. On that same date, respondent
Judge Eduardo R. Avelino issued an order directing the issuance of summons to Loyola, directing him 98
to answer the petition within five days from receipt thereof, and setting the hearings of the case. The
protest was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping required under Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 of this Court. However, the following day or on May 19, 1994, in compliance with
the said circular, Aniceto Fernandez III submitted to the MCTC his certification of non-forum
shopping. Loyola filed a motion to dismiss the protest for Fernandez's failure to strictly comply with
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. He claims that the filing of the certification on May 19, 1994 was
merely Fernandez's desperate attempt to cure the jurisdictional flaw of his petition. The MCTC issued
an order denying the motion to dismiss.
Contesting the denial of his motion to dismiss, Loyola filed with Branch 6 of the RTC of Aklan a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with damages and attorney's fees, praying that a temporary
restraining order be issued enjoining respondent Judge Avelino from proceeding with the hearing,
revision, and recount in the election protest case. He also prayed that, after hearing, Judge Avelino be
directed to dismiss the election protest and that Fernandez be ordered to pay to Loyola actual
damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
The RTC of Aklan, denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the submission of the certification of non-forum shopping the day after the
election protest was filed in court is substantial compliance of Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
---YES.
HELD: It is a fact that the certification of non-forum shopping was filed by Fernandez on 19 May
1994, a day after he filed his election protest. Since the proclamation of the results of the election was
made by the barangay board of canvassers on 10 May 1994, Aniceto Fernandez III, pursuant to
Section 9 of R.A. 6679, had ten days therefrom or until 20 May 1994 within which to file an election
protest. The filing of the certification was therefore still within the period for filing an election protest.
Accordingly, although the certification was not filed simultaneously with the initiatory pleading, its
filing within the reglementary period was a substantial compliance with Administrative Circular No.
04-94.
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not
thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
Finally, the Supreme Court opined that since the MCTC in this case is a single sala court, Fernandez
cannot go elsewhere but to such court; besides, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is a formal
procedural requirement which could be cured before the actual trial is conducted and that since the
certification of non-forum shopping was filed within a reasonable time before Alan Loyola filed his
answer, the Circular was substantially complied with.

154
Tomarong v. Lubguban 269 SCRA 624 (1997)
FACTS: Herminigildo Tomarong, Venancio Sumagang, Francisco Magsayo and Federico Cuevas were
candidates for Punong Barangay of Lazi, Siquijor and were defeated in the May 11, 1994 Barangay
Elections. Each of them timely filed an election protest before the 2 nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Lazi, Siquijor, presided over by Judge Antonio C. Lubguban. The winning candidates filed individual
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answers praying for the dismissal of the protests respectively filed against them based on the
affirmative defense that the protestants failed to attach to their petitions the required certification on
non-forum shopping pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Tomarong et al., vehemently argued that compliance with the Circular was not required in election
contests. Nonetheless, eighteen days after the election cases were filed, protestants submitted the
required certification with prayer that the same be admitted as integral part of their protests.
During the preliminary hearings, the court a quo rejected protestees’ affirmative defense and gave due
course to the protests, holding that election cases are not covered by Administrative Circular No. 04-
94. Later, however, the MTC agreed with the joint suggestion of counsel for the protestants and the
protestees to seek a clarification from higher authorities as to the applicability of the Circular to this
case. A query was then addressed to the Secretary of Justice requesting for an opinion on the matter.
The Secretary however declined to render an opinion but advised the trial court to refer the issue to
the Court Administrator. The query was thus sent to the Court Administrator who opined that the
certification on non-forum shopping should be required in election contests before the Municipal Trial
Courts.
In addition, protestants who are now petitioners herein assert that the jurisdiction of the MTC over
election protests is exclusive and intransferable to any other court hence the "judicial plague" called
forum shopping that is sought to be curbed by the subject Circular could not occur in the proceedings
before it as the filing of protests before any other court, tribunal or agency would have fatally vitiated
them and merited their instantaneous dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the submission of the certification of non-forum shopping eighteen days
after the election protest was filed in court is substantial compliance of Administrative Circular No.
04-94.. --- NO.
HELD: In the instant case, we cannot consider the subsequent filing of the required certification a
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Circular, the same having been submitted only
after the lapse of 18 days from the date of filing of the protests. Quite obviously, the reglementary
period for filing the protest had, by then, already expired.
It should be emphasized that the mere submission of a certification under Administrative Circular No.
04-94 after the filing of a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-compliance thereof does not
necessarily operate as a substantial compliance; otherwise, the Circular would lose its value or
efficacy.
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely its mandatory nature in that
it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby
interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

155
Pacanan, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 597 SCRA 189
FACTS: Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr. and Francisco M. Langi, Sr. were candidates for mayor in the
municipality of Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. After the canvassing of votes, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Motiong, Samar proclaimed Pacanan as the duly elected mayor,
having garnered a total of 3,069 votes against Langi's 3,066 votes. Thereafter, Langi filed with the
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RTC a Protest, contesting the results of the elections in 10 of the 49 precincts in Motiong, Samar, and
alleging acts of violence and intimidation and other election irregularities in the appreciation of the
votes by the MBC. Thereafter, Pacanan filed his Verified Answer with Counter-Protest, asserting that
Langi's allegations of threat and intimidation, fraud and other irregularities in the conduct of elections
were mere allegations unsupported by any documentary evidence. Pacanan also disputed the election
results with respect to seven 7 precincts.
The RTC rendered a decision, declaring Francisco Langi as the winner in the mayoralty race for
Motiong, Samar with a plurality of six votes.
Pacanan filed a notice of appeal and paid P3,000.00 appeal fee per Official Receipt No. 6822663
before the RTC, Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar. He also appealed the RTC decision dated January 7,
2008 to the COMELEC. Out of the P3,000.00 appeal fee required by Section 3, Rule 40 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, Pacanan only paid the amount of P1,000.00 (plus P200.00 to cover the
legal research/bailiff fees) to the Cash Division of the Comelec, per Official Receipt No. 0510287. The
said payment was made on February 14, 2008.
The Comelec First Division issued an Order dismissing the appeal. Pacanan filed a Motion for
Reconsideration9 which the Comelec En Banc denied, declaring that the appeal was not perfected on
time for non-payment of the complete amount of appeal fee and for late payment as well. The Comelec
En Banc held that the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-
payment of the appeal fee on time. Thus, the Comelec First Division correctly dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in holding that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time. --- YES.
HELD: The Court finds that the Comelec First Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
order dismissing Pacanan's appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the P1,000.00
appeal fee were, respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 21,
2008. On that date, Pacanan's appeal was deemed perfected. Comelec issued Resolution No. 8486
clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three months after
the appeal was perfected. Yet, on July 31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of Resolution
No. 8486, the Comelec First Division dismissed Pacanan's appeal for non-payment to the Comelec
Cash Division of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Considering that Pacanan filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees,
Pacanan's appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by Comelec Resolution No. 8486. Fairness and
prudence dictate that the Comelec First Division should have first directed Pacanan to pay the
additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution, and if the latter should refuse to
comply, then, and only then, dismiss the appeal. Instead, the Comelec First Division hastily dismissed
the appeal on the strength of the recently promulgated clarificatory resolution - which had taken effect
only a few days earlier. This unseemly haste is an invitation to outrage.

156
Aguilar v. Comelec 591 SCRA 491
FACTS: In the October 2007 barangay elections, Aguilar won the chairmanship of Brgy. Bansarvil,
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, over Insoy by a margin of one vote. Not conceding his defeat, Insoy
timely instituted a protest in the MTC of Kapatagan, which rendered its Decision finding Insoy, who,
during the revision garnered 265 votes as against Aguilar’s 264 votes, as the duly elected punong
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barangay. The trial court consequently nullified the proclamation of Aguilar and directed him to
vacate the office. Aggrieved, Aguilar filed his notice of appeal and paid to the trial court the appeal fee
of ₱1,000.00 in accordance with Rule 14, Sections 8 and 9 of the recently promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-
15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal
and Barangay Officials. The Comelec dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee as
prescribed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-day reglementary period. Adversely
affected, Aguilar moved for reconsideration, arguing that the newly promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC
only requires the payment of ₱1,000.00 as appeal fee. The Comelec 1st Division, however, issued an
Order denying the instant motion for Aguilar’s failure to pay the complete P700.00 motion fee.
Unperturbed, Aguilar filed another motion for reconsideration, contending, among others, that the
order was null and void because it was issued in violation of the rule that motions for reconsideration
should be resolved by the Comelec en banc, which the Comelec 1 st Division denied for being a
prohibited pleading. And considering that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Aguilar was denied
per Order by the Comelec 1st Division for movant’s failure to pay the complete motion fee, the Order is
now final and executory. Faced with imminent ouster from office, Aguilar instituted the instant
petition to assail the aforementioned issuances of the Comelec 1 st Division.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Comelec 1st Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time. --- YES.
HELD: The Court still finds that the Comelec 1st Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
order dismissing Aguilar’s appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the ₱1,000.00 appeal
fee were, respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 21, 2008.
On that date, Aguilar’s appeal was deemed perfected. Comelec issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying
the rule on the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three months after the appeal
was perfected. Yet, on July 31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of Resolution No. 8486,
the Comelec 1st Division dismissed Aguilar’s appeal for non-payment to the Comelec Cash Division of
the additional ₱3,200.00 appeal fee.
Considering that Aguilar filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees,
Aguilar’s appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by Comelec Resolution No. 8486. Fairness and
prudence dictate that the Comelec 1st Division should have first directed Aguilar to pay the additional
appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution, and if the latter should refuse to comply,
then, and only then, dismiss the appeal. Instead, the Comelec 1 st Division hastily dismissed the appeal
on the strength of the recently promulgated clarificatory resolution—which had taken effect only a few
days earlier. This unseemly haste is an invitation to outrage.
The Comelec 1st Division should have been more cautious in dismissing Aguilar’s appeal on the mere
technicality of non-payment of the additional ₱3,200.00 appeal fee given the public interest involved
in election cases. This is especially true in this case where only one vote separates the contending
parties. The Court stresses once more that election law and rules are to be interpreted and applied in a
liberal manner so as to give effect, not to frustrate, the will of the electorate.

157
Villagracia v. Comelec 513 SCRA 655 (2007)
FACTS: Villagracia was proclaimed as winning candidate for the position of Punong Barangay in
Barangay Caawigan, Talisay, Camarines Norte, in the July 15, 2002 barangay elections by a margin of
six votes. Dela Punta filed an election protest with the MTC of Talisay, Camarines Norte. After the
revision of ballots, the trial court invalidated 34 of the ballots for being marked and were deducted
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from the votes of Villagracia. The trial court adjudged Dela Punta as the true winner and nullified the
proclamation of Villagracia. The earlier proclamation made by the Barangay Board of Canvassers of
Precinct No. 15-A and 15-A-2 and 15-A-1 of Barangay Caawigan, Talisay, Camarines Norte is declared
null and void. Villagracia appealed the decision with the Comelec 1 st Division raising for the first time
on appeal the issue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the election protest for failure of Dela
Punta to pay the correct filing fees.
The 1st Division set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed the election protest of Dela
Punta for lack of jurisdiction. The payment credited to the general fund which could be considered as
filing fee is incomplete considering that Section 6 of Rule 37 of the Comelec Rules on Procedure
requires that it should be One Hundred Pesos. Hence, the trial court could not have acquired
jurisdiction over Dela Punta's case.
Dela Punta moved for reconsideration. In an Order, the 1 st Division elevated the motion for
reconsideration to the Comelec En Banc which granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstated
the decision of the trial court. It issued a writ of execution ordering Villagracia to vacate his post as
Punong Barangay of Caawigan, Talisay, Camarines Norte, in favor of Dela Punta. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
to hear the election protest due to Dela Punta's failure to pay the correct filing fees. --- NO.
HELD: While it is true that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case upon complete payment of the
prescribed filing fee, the rule admits of exceptions, as when a party never raised the issue of
jurisdiction in the trial court. As we stated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, et al., viz.:
xxx It is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. xxx It is not
right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter
to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
It was therefore error on the part of the Comelec's 1 st Division to indiscriminately apply Soller to the
case at bar. As correctly pointed out by Comelec in its questioned Resolution, Villagracia never
assailed the proceedings of the trial court for lack of jurisdiction during the proceedings therein.
Instead, he filed an Answer to the Protest and then actively participated during the hearings and
revision of ballots and subsequently filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits. The issue on the filing fees was
never raised until the Decision adverse to his interest was promulgated by the trial court and only on
appeal to the Comelec. Necessarily, we apply the case of Alday v. FGU Insurance Corporation where
the Supreme Court instructed that "although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in
the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court's jurisdiction in the event
that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him." Villagracia is therefore estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court only on appeal.

158
Gomez-Castillo v. Comelec 621 SCRA 499
FACTS: Castillo and Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite during the May 14,
2007 local elections. After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla as the elected
Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the RTC in
Bacoor, Cavite, which was eventually raffled to Branch 19.
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Through his Answer, Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was filed in
the wrong Branch of the RTC. He pointed out that SCAO No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22 of the
RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and decide election contests
involving municipal officials in Cavite; and that contrary to SCAO No. 54-2007, Castillo filed his
protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, which was not the proper court. On November 21, 2008, Branch
19 dismissed Castillo’s election protest for being violative of SCAO No. 54-2007. On December 23,
2008, Castillo presented a notice of appeal. Thereupon, the RTC ordered that the complete records of
the protest be forwarded to the Election Contests Adjudication Department of the Comelec.
The 1st Division of the Comelec dismissed the appeal for being brought beyond the five-day
reglementary period, noting that although Castillo had received the November 21, 2008 order of the
RTC on December 15 , 2008, and she filed her notice of appeal on December 23, 2008, a day too late
to appeal.
Castillo moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of her appeal, but the Comelec denied the
motion because she did not pay the motion fees required under Sec. 7 (f), Rule 40 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, as amended by Comelec Resolution No. 02-0130. Castillo has brought the present
recourse, contending that the Comelec’s orders dismissing her appeal and denying her motion for
reconsideration were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction to hear the election protest due to Castillo's failure to pay the correct filing fees. --- NO.
HELD: The Comelec correctly dismissed Castillo’s appeal for being filed beyond the five-day
reglementary period prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. That A.M.
No. 07-4-15-SC, otherwise known as The Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Involving Elective
Municipal and Barangay Officials, clearly and categorically directed:
Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the commission on
Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by
counsel.
That the period for filing an appeal is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and the right to
appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law;
that the notice of appeal, even on the assumption that it was filed on time, still remained futile due to
the Castillo’s failure to pay the corresponding fee for the motion for reconsideration; that the failure
to pay the filing fee rendered the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, because it
prevented the Comelec from acquiring jurisdiction over the protest; and that the Comelec could not
be faulted for applying its procedural rules to achieve a just and expeditious determination of every
proceeding brought before it.

159
Zamoras v. Comelec G.R. No. 158610 November 12, 2004
FACTS: Zamoras and Bartolome Bastasa were candidates for punong barangay of Barangay Galas,
Dipolog City in the elections held on July 15, 2002. The Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Bastasa as the duly elected punong barangay with a margin of 55 votes.
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Zamoras filed an election protest before the MTCC Branch 1, Dipolog City, claiming that fraud and
serious irregularities marred the elections in nine precincts, and prayed for revision or recount of the
ballots in these nine precincts. The MTCC rendered its Decision, dismissing the Protest and declaring
Bastasa as having garnered and/or obtained 212 Votes in his favor as determined by the Court’s
appreciation of the recounting and/or revision of the Ballots in this instant Case, and declaring
Zamoras as having garnered and/or obtained 11 votes in his favor.
Aggrieved, Zamoras filed a notice of appeal with the MTCC. In a notice, the Comelec’s Judicial
Records Division directed Zamora to remit P2,600 representing the deficiency in the payment of the
required filing fees within three days from receipt of the notice. Zamoras allegedly received the notice
on January 28, 2003 and remitted the deficiency by postal money order on the same day.
The Comelec issued an Order dismissing Zamoras’ appeal for failure to perfect his appeal within the 5-
day reglementary period pursuant to Sections 3 and 9 (d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Zamoras filed a motion for reconsideration by registered mail on 21 March 2003. In its
Order, the Comelec denied the motion for reconsideration "for failure of the movant to pay the
necessary motion fees under Sec. 7 (f), Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure."
Meanwhile, Zamoras filed another motion for reconsideration by registered mail on 16 May 2003. He
also remitted the fees required for the motion by postal money order on the same date. The Comelec
deemed the Orders final and ordered their entry in the Book of Entries of Judgment on 12 May 2003.
Zamoras received by registered mail a copy of the Order dated 8 May 2003 and a copy of the Entry of
Judgment on 27 May 2003. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the subsequent full payment of the filing fee after the lapse of the
reglementary period cure the jurisdictional defect of Zamoras appeal. --- NO.
HELD: The subsequent payment of the filing fee on January 28, 2003 did not relieve Zamoras of his
mistake. A case is not deemed duly registered and docketed until full payment of the filing fee.
Otherwise stated, the date of the payment of the filing fee is deemed the actual date of the filing of the
notice of appeal. The subsequent full payment of the filing fee on January 28, 2003 did not cure the
jurisdictional defect. The date of payment on January 28, 2003 is the actual date of filing the appeal
which is almost two (2) months after Zamoras received the MTCC Decision on November 29, 2002.
This is way beyond the 5-day reglementary period to file an appeal.
Zamoras is not only chargeable with the incomplete payment of the appeal fees but he also failed to
remit the required filing fees for his motion for reconsideration. The payment of the filing fee is a
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance is a valid basis for the dismissal of the case. The
subsequent full payment of the filing fee after the lapse of the reglementary period does not cure the
jurisdictional defect. Such procedural lapse by Zamoras clearly warrants the outright dismissal of his
appeal. This left the Comelec with no choice except to declare the Orders final and executory.

160
Loyola v. Comelec 337 SCRA 134 (1997)
FACTS: On May 9, 1995, Roy M. Loyola was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the
duly elected Mayor of the municipality of Carmona, Cavite. An election protest was filed by Rolando
Rosas before the RTC Branch 89 of Bacoor, Cavite. Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Protest on the
ground that Rosas failed to pay the filing fee of P300.00 at the time of the filing of the protest. He
contended that the failure of Rosas to pay the correct amount of filing fee did not vest jurisdiction on 98
the court to take cognizance over the protest. In his opposition, Rosas posited the argument that the
factual circumstances obtaining in the case of Gatchalian do not fall squarely with the present case as
the latter involves non-payment of filing fee while the present case contemplates a situation where
there was only an incomplete payment of filing fee. The Motion to Dismiss Protest is denied for lack of
merit holding that there was only an incomplete payment of the correct filing fee and that Rosas,
pursuant to the court's order, paid the correct amount on October 16, 1995. By virtue of the trial
court's order, Loyola resorted to the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of herein public respondent Judge Tanguangco in denying his "Motion to Dismiss
Protest."
Rosas filed his answer alleging, among others, that the case is not a case of non-payment of filing fee
but a clear case of incomplete payment of filing fee and not a ground for dismissing the election
protest. He advanced the argument that both Loyola and Rosas have complied with the order of
Judge Tanguangco to pay the balance of the correct amount of filing fee for Loyola's counter-protest
and for Rosas' election protest.
The Comelec held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the protest pursuant to this Court's
ruling in Pahilan v. Tabalba, where there was merely incomplete payment of the filing fee. It
disagreed with Loyola's view that the applicable doctrine was that laid down in Gatchalian v. Court of
Appeals.
Aggrieved, Loyola filed the instant special action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
contending that respondent Comelec "gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in not sustaining his contention and submission that said electoral protest deserves outright dismissal
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to hear and decide the same."
ISSUE: Whether Or Not there is substantial compliance in incomplete payment of filing fee provided
the parties concerned pay the deficiency within the period fixed by the court. --- YES.
HELD: Indisputably, there was only incomplete payment of the filing fee under Section 9 of Rule 35
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which was not at all attributable to Rosas, who forthwith paid
the deficiency upon a subsequent order by the RTC. In short, there was substantial compliance with
the filing fee requirement in election cases.
The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily serve the purpose of election cases,
especially if we consider the fact that election laws are to be accorded utmost liberality in their
interpretation and application, bearing in mind always that the will of the people must be upheld.
Ordinary civil actions would generally involve private interests while all election cases are, at all
times, invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere procedural or technical
infirmities.
Well settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination
of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also settled is the rule that
laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case the
court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate
elected by the electorate.

161
Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Bautista et.al 678 SCRA 267 (2012)
FACTS: Teodora Sobejana-Condon is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino
parents. She became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas
Condon. On September 18, 2006, Condon filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which
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in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. Condon ran for
Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections and lost in her bid. She again sought
elective office during the May 2010 elections for the position of Vice-Mayor and obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Soon thereafter, private respondents
Picar, Pagaduan and Bautista, all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning Teodora S. Condon’s eligibility before the RTC and sought Condon’s
disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she
failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The RTC held that Condon’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her
ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by Condon herself during trial, the personal
declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. She appealed to the Comelec but
was dismissed for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period.
On motion for reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the Comelec En Banc. In the same
issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The Comelec En Banc concurred
with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal filed by the private respondents. Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to the Comelec En Banc.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it
proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the Condon’s appeal after ruling for its reinstatement.
--- NO.
HELD: An appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively resolved by the Comelec en banc
in a resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration. The power to decide motions for
reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the Comelec en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of
the Constitution. A complementary provision is also present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure.
Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the Comelec en banc’s prerogative in
resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating
the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to
the division that initially dismissed it. We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Comelec en banc when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of
the petitioner’s appeal after ruling for its reinstatement.
Further, records show that, in Candon’s motion for reconsideration before the Comelec en banc, she
not only proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She
even filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting documents to
her contention that she is no longer an Australian citizen. Candon, after obtaining an unfavorable
decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en banc’s exercise of discretion on the substantial merits
of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first place.
The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division that initially
dismissed them cannot serve as a precedent to the disposition of Candon’s appeal. A decision or
resolution of any adjudicating body can be disposed in several ways. To sustain Candon’s argument
would be virtually putting a straightjacket on the Comelec en banc’s adjudicatory powers.

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Saludaga vs. Comelec 617 SCRA 601
FACTS: Quintin B. Saludaga and Artemio Balag were candidates for Mayor of Lavezares, Northern
Samar in the May 14, 2007 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saludaga as the
duly elected Mayor with a margin of 635 votes over Balag who obtained 5,278 votes. Balag filed an
election protest against Saludaga, before the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar, Branch 23., contesting
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the results of the election in 18 precincts. The RTC declared Balag as the winning mayoralty candidate
of Lavezares, Northern Samar with 71 votes more than Saludaga’s 5,180 votes. Saludaga appealed the
RTC Decision to the Comelec. The Comelec, 2 nd Division, affirmed with modification the Decision of
the RTC where it found that Balag won by 127 votes compared to Saludaga. Balag again promptly
moved for execution and filed a Motion for Execution Pending Motion for Reconsideration. Saludaga,
for his part, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration. On August 18, 2009, the 2 nd Division directed
Saludaga to file his Comment within five days from notice, which he complied only on September 1,
2009.
On September 4, 2009, the 2 nd Division of Comelec issued an Order, signed solely by Presiding

Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, granting Balag’s Motion for Execution Pending Motion for
Reconsideration. The order directed the 2nd Division clerk of court to issue a writ of execution
ordering Saludaga to cease and desist from discharging the powers and duties of Mayor of Lavezares,
Northern Samar and to relinquish said office in favor of Balag. The Order cited the briefness of the
remaining term for Mayor as a good reason for immediate execution. Aggrieved, Saludaga filed an
Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec en banc. He also filed a Petition for
Certiorari with this Court, challenging the September 4, 2009 Order of the Comelec 2 nd Division.
Balag in the meantime had taken his oath and assumed the post of Mayor of Lavezares, Northern
Samar.
While the petition was pending, the Comelec en banc issued the assailed Resolution denying motions
for reconsideration, and granting Balag’s motion to dismiss. Hence, the Ad Cautelam Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the September 4, 2009 Order granting execution pending resolution of the
motion for reconsideration is void. --- YES.
HELD: In accordance with the express provision of the law, the 10 days within which a division of the
Comelec may suspend elevating the case to the Commission en banc is to be counted from the filing of
the motion for execution. After the lapse of the 10-day period, the only power and duty that a division
has is to certify and elevate the case, together with all the records, to the Commission en banc, for
appropriate action. Hence, upon the lapse of the 10-day period or after August 23, 2009, the 2 nd
Division no longer had jurisdiction to rule on respondent’s motion for execution. Having done so, the
September 4, 2009 Order is void for having been issued by the Comelec 2 nd Division without
jurisdiction.
Indeed, even if said Order was promulgated within 10 days from the filing of the motion for execution,
it would still be void because Presiding Commissioner Ferrer alone signed it.
An order resolving a motion for execution is one such order of substance that requires more than the
lone imprimatur of the Division Chairman. This is so because execution pending resolution of the
motion for reconsideration may issue only upon good or special reasons contained in a special order.
Hence, the need to refer such order for clearance by the Division or the Comelec en banc, as the case
may be.
The discretion to allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the
assailed decision, order or resolution, or the Comelec en banc, as the case may be – not to the
Presiding Commissioner. To be sure, a writ of execution pending resolution of the motion for

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reconsideration of a decision of the division is not granted as a matter of right such that its issuance
becomes a ministerial duty that may be dispensed even just by the Presiding Commissioner.
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164
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342
FACTS: Ramon M. Calo was proclaimed winner in the May 14, 2007 mayoralty race in the
Municipality of Carmen, Province of Agusan del Sur over his opponent, petitioner Jesus M. Calo, is his
brother, whom he beat by 278 votes. Jesus filed an election protest in the RTC of Butuan City, Branch 98
3, questioning the election results in 36 of out of the 56 precincts. The RTC issued its decision on the
protest finding Jesus to have received the majority votes and declaring him the duly elected mayor,
and then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. On the same date,
Ramon filed his notice of appeal. The RTC issued its special order granting Jesus’ motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. Ramon sought reconsideration of this special order,
and on the same date, the RTC ordered the transmittal of the records to the Comelec. Before the RTC
could act on the motion for reconsideration filed by Ramon, the latter forthwith filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Comelec, raising as ground the grave abuse of discretion
committed by the RTC. The Comelec 1st Division issued its resolution granting the petition, setting
aside the RTC special order, quashing the accompanying writ of execution, issuing a status quo
ante order directing the parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the special order and
directing Ramon to continue as the municipal mayor of the Municipality of Carmen. Jesus filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Comelec En Banc. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the RTC had abided by the standards set forth in the foregoing rule when it
granted Jesus Calo’s motion for execution pending appeal. --- YES.
HELD: Given that the RTC’s exercise of its discretionary power to grant execution pending appeal per
special order dated February 15, 2008 was not tainted with any bias or capricious and whimsical
arbitrariness, we find that the Comelec committed an error in annulling and setting it aside.
The relevant rule provides that a motion for execution pending appeal filed by the prevailing party
shall contain a three-day notice to the adverse party and execution pending appeal shall not issue
without prior notice and hearing. It should be emphasized that these requirements are for the purpose
of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party who must be given time to study and
meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. Where a party had the opportunity
to be heard, then the purpose has been served and the requirement substantially complied with. In
this case, even the Comelec admitted that Ramon was heard and afforded his day in court; hence, it
should not have annulled the RTC special order on said ground.
Similarly in this case, the COMELEC should have accorded respect and weight to the RTC’s decision
proclaiming Jesus as winner. Note that aside from the evidence presented by the parties during the
election contest and the expert testimony of the witnesses from the NBI, the RTC made its own
assessment and findings on the contested ballots. It was also the RTC’s conclusion that "the victory of
the protestant has been clearly established."
Aside from these, the RTC also laid down the superior circumstances necessitating the grant of
execution pending appeal: (1) allowing the status quo to continue would unjustly give premium to the
perpetrators of fraud, anomalies and irregularities and suppress the will of the electorate; (2) the
sovereign will of the people should be given utmost respect and (3) the injury or damage to be
sustained by petitioner would outweigh the injury or damage of respondent.

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Miguel vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 424
FACTS: James Miguel and Eladio Lapuz were candidates for the mayoralty post in the Municipality
of Rizal, Nueva Ecija in the May 11, 1998 elections. Miguel was proclaimed Mayor-elect over Lapuz
who filed a verified Petition of Protest against Miguel before the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23,
impugning the results of the elections for the mayoralty position in all 105 precincts of the
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Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Miguel filed an "Answer/Comment to Petition with Counterclaim,"
interposing the affirmative defense that herein Lapuz had "no valid cause of action" inasmuch as the
grounds for protest "were all couched in general terms" and that the conduct of the election was
"clean, honest and peaceful" as certified by the Narrative Report of Acting Election Officer Lourdes C.
Barroga.
The court scheduled a conference for the purpose, among others, of discussing and resolving matters
relating to the "constitution of Board of Revisors, deposit of the requisite sum for revision of ballots
and the commencement of presentation and reception of evidence." Miguel moved to reconsider the
lower court’s order, and prayed for the conduct of a "preliminary hearing on the merits" to prove
Lapuz’s allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities, and further prayed that in the absence of such
preliminary hearing, the opening of the ballot boxes and recounting of ballots should not be
undertaken. Relying on the Narrative Report of Acting Election Officer Lourdes C. Barroga, the court
granted Miguel’s motion for reconsideration, and in effect sanctioned the conduct of a preliminary
hearing and set a date therefor, as prayed for. Lapuz filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration"
which the lower court denied. Lapuz questioned before the COMELEC the twin orders of the court a
quo, in a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order to which herein petitioner Miguel filed Comment.
Comelec issued a Resolution finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of herein respondent Judge,
the two orders dated July 7, 1998 and August 11,1998 are hereby SET ASIDE; respondent judge is
hereby Directed to immediately order the transfer of all the ballot boxes comprising the entire 105
precincts of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Rizal, Nueva Ecija or
wherever they may have been deposited, to the trial court for safekeeping and revision of ballots.
Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Miguel is correct that the general allegations of fraud and irregularities are
not sufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. --- NO.
HELD: The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of
categorical pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in an election
protest that would require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the
ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and
counting of ballots deposited therein.
In the case before us, the serious allegations embodied in the election protest mandates and
necessitates the opening of the subject ballot boxes to the end of resolving the issue of fraud and
irregularities in the election. Precisely, the purpose of ordering the opening of the ballot boxes is to
ascertain, with the least amount of protracted delay, the veracity of the allegations of fraud and
anomalies in the conduct of the electoral exercise. Thus, a preliminary hearing set for the same
purpose is a mere superfluity that negates the essence of affording premium to the prompt resolution
of election cases and incidents relating thereto.

166
Malaluan v. Comelec 254 SCRA 397
FACTS: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty
candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local
Elections held on 1992. Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as
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the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes as against Malaluan’s 9,792 votes. Malaluan
filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said
municipality. The trial court declared Malaluan as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan,
North Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found Joseph
Evangelista liable not only for Malaluan’s protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees. Evangelista appealed the trial court decision to the Comelec. Malaluan filed a
motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by the trial court in an order after Malaluan
posted a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. By virtue of said order, Luis P. Malaluan assumed the
office of Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of
said office. Such exercise was not for long, though. In the herein assailed decision adverse to
Malaluan’s continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the First
Division of the Commission on Elections ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having
found and so declared Joseph Evangelista to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality.
The Comelec en banc affirmed said decision. Hence, Malaluan filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Comelec is correct when it found the order granting execution of judgment
pending appeal to be defective because of alleged non-compliance with the requirement that there be
a good and special reason to justify execution pending appeal. --- NO.
HELD: The Supreme Court find that the trial court acted judiciously in the exercise of its prerogatives
under the law in issuing the order granting execution pending appeal. It should be noted that the
applicability of the provisions of the Rules of Court, relating to execution pending appeal, has ceased
to be debatable after we definitively ruled in Garcia vs. de Jesus that "Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, which allows Regional Trial Courts to order executions pending appeal upon good reasons
stated in a special order, may be made to apply by analogy or suppletorily to election contests decided
by them." It is not disputed that petitioner filed a bond in the amount of P500,000.00 as required
under the Rules of Court. It is also now a settled rule that "as much recognition should be given to the
value of the decision of a judicial body as a basis for the right to assume office as that given by law to
the proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers."
Without evaluating the merits of the trial court's actual appreciation of the ballots contested in the
election protest, we note on the face of its decision that the trial court relied on the findings of the NBI
handwriting experts which findings Evangelista did not even bother to rebut. We thus see no reason to
disregard the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the trial
court judge. Capping this combination of circumstances which impel the grant of immediate execution
is the undeniable urgency involved in the political situation in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North
Cotabato. The appeal before the COMELEC would undoubtedly cause the political vacuum in said
municipality to persist, and so the trial court reasonably perceived execution pending appeal to be
warranted and justified. Anyway, the bond posted by Malaluan could cover any damages suffered by
any aggrieved party. It is true that mere posting of a bond is not enough reason to justify execution
pending appeal, but the nexus of circumstances aforechronicled considered together and in relation to
one another, is the dominant consideration for the execution pending appeal.

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Camlian v. Comelec 271 SCRA
FACTS: Asan "Sonny" Camlian and Leonardo A. Pioquinto were among the candidates for the
mayoralty of Isabela, Basilan during the May 8, 1995 elections. After the canvassing, Pioquinto was
found to have obtained a total of 8,217 votes while petitioner garnered a total of 5,946 votes.
Consequently, Pioquinto was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Isabela,
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Basilan and thereafter, assumed office and discharged the duties and responsibilities of the same.
Camlian filed an electoral protest before the RTC of Basilan, Branch II, which rendered a decision
declaring Camlian as the duly elected mayor of Isabela, Basilan after finding that he obtained a total of
5,836 votes over Pioquinto’s 2,291 votes. On the same day, Pioquinto filed a notice of appeal while
Camlian filed a motion for execution pending appeal. A hearing was conducted on the motion for
execution pending appeal, wherein the RTC issued an order granting Camlian’s motion for execution
pending appeal. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued. On the same day, Camlian assumed
office and commenced to discharge the functions appurtenant thereto.
Pioquinto filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and issuance of a
temporary restraining order with respondent Comelec, which was granted, directing Judge Salvador
Memoracion to cease and desist from implementing the order of execution and for Camlian from
assuming and discharging the functions of the office of the mayor of Isabela, Basilan until further
orders therefrom. Camlian filed the petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the orders of
respondent Comelec.
The Court issued a TRO ordering respondent Comelec to cease and desist from implementing and
enforcing its March 14, 1996 order. However, respondent Comelec issued yet another resolution
resolving among others the order directing Asan Camlian to vacate the office of Mayor of Isabela,
Basilan and to relinquish the said position to Leonardo A. Pioquinto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the
Regional Trial Court’s order of execution pending appeal of its decision declaring Camlian as duly
elected mayor of Isabela, Basilan in the May 8, 1995 elections. --- NO.
HELD: It must be emphasized that Section 2 of Rule 39 must be strictly complied with. The reason
advanced by the respondent judge that his ruling finding that protestee manufactured votes in his
favor is one of the good reasons is untenable.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which allows Regional Trial Courts to order execution pending appeal upon good reasons
stated in a special order, may be made to apply suppletorily or by analogy to election cases decided by
them. While execution pending appeal may be allowed under the foregoing rule, the said provisions
must be strictly construed against the movant as it is an exception to the general rule on execution of
judgments. Following civil law jurisprudence, the reason allowing for immediate execution must be of
such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should it secure a reversal of the
judgment on appeal. Absent any such justification, the order of execution must be struck down as
flawed with grave abuse of discretion.

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Ramas v. Comelec 286 SCRA 189
FACTS: The petitioners and the private respondents were the official candidates of the Nationalist
People's Coalition and the Lakas-NUCD, respectively, for the elective municipal positions of Guipos,
Zamboanga del Sur, in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the election returns, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Guipos declared and proclaimed the petitioners Ramas as Mayor; Oraiz as
Vice Mayor; Miranda as 5th; Baterna as 6th; Lacierda as 7th; and Calimot, Jr.as the 8th Member of the 98
SB., as the duly elected municipal officials. Famor and Cajeta, the losing candidates for mayor and
vice mayor, respectively, as well as Rabe, Boiser, Revelo, and Mabascog, the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th
placers, respectively, for members of the SB, seasonably filed separate election protests with the RTC
of Pagadian City and thereafter consolidated and jointly tried. A 103-page decision was rendered by
the court declaring Miranda and all the private respondents except Mabascog as winners in the May
1995 elections who then filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of Decision Pending Appeal alleging
that pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on the ground that RTC’s can order execution
pending appeal; that there are good reasons in granting the execution of the decision pending appeal;
and that protestants are willing to put up bond in the amount of P500,000.00, to answer for any
damages protestee may suffer in the event protestants are not entitled to the immediate execution.
Ramas et al., filed their Opposition to the Motion for Immediate Execution of the Consolidated
Decision, as well as their respective Notices of Appeal, which were denied. The next day, the trial
court issued an order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. They assailed the trial court's
order granting execution pending appeal in a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order filed with the Comelec. The Comelec
issued an Order requiring Famor et al., to answer the petition within ten days; setting for hearing the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction; and ordering the issuance of a TRO directing Famor,
Cajeta, Rabe, Boiser, and Revelo to cease and desist from assuming the positions of mayor, vice
mayor, and councilors of Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur, respectively, until further orders from the
Commission. A TRO was forthwith issued. Unsatisfied, Ramas et al., filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the questioned order of the trial court granting execution pending appeal
which cited insufficient reasons is proof of such grave abuse of discretion. --- NO.
HELD: In the instant case, the trial court relied on the following as "good reasons" for its grant of
execution pending appeal: (1) public interest, (2) near expiration of the term of the office involved,
and (3) pendency of the election protest for one year. The trial court cannot, therefore, be said to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the Comelec acted correctly when it denied SPR No. 14-
96.
If any error was committed by the Comelec, it was in the failure to resolve private respondents'
Motion To Dissolve/Recall Temporary Restraining Order and the petitioners' opposition thereto, as
well as the Urgent Motion to Cite for Contempt, although the motions were heard. Because of
Comelec's inaction on the first motion, the TRO issued on 6 June 1996 was taken full advantage of by
Ramas, who then refused to surrender to the prevailing private respondents their offices. This created
an unwholesome spectacle: two sets of officials exercising the functions of the elective local positions
of Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur. Such a situation was inimical to public interest and was a potential
source of trouble and even bloodshed between the contending partisan forces. The Comelec should
have taken a more drastic and positive action to prevent such a situation by complying strictly with
the rule on restraining orders. Under Section 5, Rule 30 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the lifetime of a restraining order is only twenty days. This
period is nonextendible.
If the Comelec wanted to restrain further the implementation of the trial court's order granting
execution pending appeal and the writ of execution, it should have, if warranted, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction; but it did not.

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Fernando U. Batul v. Lucilo Bayron, et. al. 424 SCRA 26
FACTS: Batul and Bayron were candidates for vice-mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in the
May 14, 2001 elections. The Board of Canvassers of Puerto Princesa City proclaimed Batul as the vice-
mayor with 18,095 votes against Bayron’s 15,810 votes. Bayron filed an election protest with the
Comelec, protesting the election results in the 392 precincts of Puerto Princesa City, claiming that
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anomalies and irregularities marred the conduct of the elections. Batul filed an Answer with Counter-
Protest and Counterclaim denying all the material allegations in Bayron’s protests.
Bayron filed his formal Offer of Evidence which included the Final Reports of the 4 Revision
Committees and a summary tabulation showing him with 17,248 votes against Batul’s 16,581 votes or
a winning margin of 667 votes. Batul filed his Comment/Opposition to respondent Bayron’s Offer of
Evidence. The Comelec 1st Division admitted Bayron’s exhibits, and directed Batul to present his
evidence. Batul presented as his first witness, BEI chairperson Brenda Landicho who testified that
some ballots do not bear her signature as BEI chairperson. He then filed a motion to allow him to
present 49 more BEI chairpersons to testify on the genuineness of the signatures of the BEI
chairpersons on the revised ballots. The Comelec 1 st Division denied Batul’s motion to allow 50 BEI
chairpersons to testify on the signatures appearing at the back of the ballots from the precincts where
"reversals" were found during revision.
Batul filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. He filed his formal Offer of Evidence with
Tender of Excluded Evidence, pointing out that the 50 BEI chairpersons would have testified on the
genuineness of the signatures appearing at the back of the revised ballots where "there were
discrepancies between the election returns and the tally sheets on one hand, and the physical count of
the ballots during revision on the other." Bayron filed his Comment/Objections to Batul’s Offer of
Evidence. The Comelec 1st Division admitted Batul’s exhibits.
The case was deemed submitted for resolution after Bayron filed his memorandum and Batul filed his
memorandum. The Comelec 1st Division decided the merits of the case, and resolves to annul and set
aside the May 21, 2001 proclamation of Fernando U. Batul as Vice-Mayor of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan, and ordering him to vacate the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and
to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Batul filed a motion for
reconsideration, in the meantime, Bayron filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment which
Batul opposed. The Comelec 1st Division issued a writ of execution on the same date. Bayron took his
oath and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Puerto Princesa City on 22 July 2003. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Comelec 1 st Division violated its own rules of procedure in allowing
immediate execution of its judgment despite the filing of Batul’s motion for reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc. --- NO.
HELD: As we have held before, only a more compelling contrary policy consideration can prevent the
suppletory application of Section 2. The primary reason advanced by Batul – that Section 2 does not
apply to election contests involving city, provincial and regional officials, simply because these cases
are originally cognizable by the Comelec – cannot negate this public policy. Such a reason cannot
frustrate or further delay the assumption of public office by the lawful choice of the people as
determined by the Comelec. Batul did not contest the good reasons cited by the Comelec First
Division in granting immediate execution. Hence, we see no reason to discuss the Comelec’s findings
on this matter.
In sum, the Court holds that the Comelec 1 st Division did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed orders. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of
passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount

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to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. This does not obtain in the instant
petitions.
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171
Navarosa v. Comelec 411 SCRA
FACTS: Charito Navarosa and Roger M. Esto were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the May
14, 2001 elections. The Comelec Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao proclaimed Navarosa as
the duly elected mayor, with a winning margin of 3 votes over respondent Esto. Claiming that
irregularities marred the canvassing of ballots in several precincts, Esto filed an election protest in the 98
RTC Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan. Navarosa, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities prejudiced
her, filed a counter-protest in the same case. After revision of the contested ballots, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Esto, and declared him the elected mayor of Libacao by a margin of 42
votes and annulled the earlier proclamation of Navarosa. The trial court also ordered Navarosa to pay
Esto actual damages and attorney’s fees. Navarosa appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Comelec.
Esto, on the other hand, filed with the trial court a motion for execution of the judgment pending
Navarosa’s appeal, which Navarosa opposed. In the alternative, Navarosa offered to file a supersedeas
bond to stay execution pending appeal, should the trial court grant respondent Esto’s motion. In its
Order, the trial court granted Esto’s motion subject to the filing of a P300,000 bond. However, in the
same order, the trial court also granted Navarosa’s prayer to stay the execution pending appeal, upon
filing a P600,000 supersedeas bond. The court finds that Esto is entitled to the execution of the
decision pending appeal, upon the filing of a bond which covers the salary and emoluments of the
office of the Municipal Mayor of Libacao, Aklan and or the payment of all damages in the amount of
P300,000.00. Navarosa, considering that the margin is not so insurmountable as to be beyond
reversal by the higher court, is hereby allowed to stay the execution pending appeal, by filing a
supersedeas bond in double the amount posted by the protestant. Both petitioner Navarosa and
respondent Esto sought reconsideration of the Order but the trial court denied their motions.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution
pending appeal of the trial court’s decision. --- NO.
HELD: The trial court in the present case, relying on cases reviewed in Ramas, invoked two "good
reasons" to justify its order allowing execution pending appeal. First, the order will "give substance
and meaning to the people’s mandate." Second, "more than 10 months or nearly 1/3 of the 3-year
term" of the office in question had already lapsed. The Comelec found these "good reasons" sufficient.
Being consistent with Ramas, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the trial court or of
the Comelec.
To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be
"good reasons" for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order granting execution pending appeal
must state the "good reasons." Navarosa concedes respondent Esto’s compliance with the first and
third requisites. What she contests is the trial court’s finding that there are "good reasons" to order
discretionary execution of its decision.
In sum, the Court holds that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering
execution pending appeal of the trial court’s decision. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of
power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. This does not obtain in
the present case.

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Lim v Comelec #171952 March 08, 2007
FACTS: Diego T. Lim and Francisco C. Adalim, were candidates for mayor in Taft, Eastern Samar
during the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On May 12, 2004, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Taft proclaimed Lim as the duly elected mayor with a lead of 45 votes. Adalim then filed
with the RTC Branch 1, Borongan, Eastern Samar an election protest against Lim.
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Lim filed a motion to dismiss the election protest on the ground that Adalim failed to pay the exact
amount of docket and other legal fees prescribed by the Comelec, but the motion was denied. His
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Subsequently, Lim filed with the Comelec 2 nd
Division a petition for prohibition and injunction praying that the trial court be enjoined from hearing
Adalim’s election protest, which was denied. Lim seasonably filed with the Comelec En Banc a motion
for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, upon Adalim’s motion, respondent Judge directed the parties to proceed with the
photocopying of contested ballots and to formally offer their evidence in writing on or before March 4,
2005. Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an Order setting the promulgation of her Decision in
the election protest. This prompted Lim to file with the Comelec En Banc an urgent motion for the
issuance of a status quo order. Respondent Judge declared Adalim the winning candidate in the May
10, 2004 mayoralty race in Taft, Eastern Samar with a lead of 456 votes as against Lim. Thereupon,
Lim filed a notice of appeal. For his part, Adalim filed a motion for execution pending appeal, an
opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
The trial court issued a Special Order granting Adalim’s motion for execution pending appeal. On the
same date, the sheriff implemented the writ of execution. Immediately, Lim filed with the Comelec
2nd Division a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order or Status Quo Order, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting Adalim’s motion for execution pending appeal, which was denied for lack of
merit. Lim then filed with the Comelec En Banc a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by granting Adamin’s
motion for execution pending appeal. --- NO.
HELD: As correctly found by the trial court, the grant of the execution pending appeal is justified
considering the presence of these good reasons: the public interest or will of the electorate, as well as
the shortness of the remaining term of the contested office.
There being, good reasons to grant the execution pending appeal, taking into consideration that this
involves public interest which will be better served and it would give meaning to the electoral will in
Taft, Eastern Samar, if their chosen Mayor, the protestant herein, should immediately sit as Mayor
and govern them, as the one being found to be the true winner in the mayoralty race for Taft, Eastern
Samar and should have been sitting as such from July 1, 2004 to the present but was not able to sit;
that as of today, more than one-third of the very short term of office of 3 years has already expired or
lapsed; and, further, depriving Adamin the assumption of the duties and functions of the Office of the
Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar will only resurrect the evils that the Court has long sought to contain,
the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest" technique, which route herein protestee Lim is now
taking.

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Torres vs. Abundo, Sr. 512 SCRA 556
FACTS: Jose Torres and Abelardo Abundo, Sr. were candidates for mayor of Viga, Catanduanes in
the May 10, 2004 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Torres as the duly elected
mayor. Claiming that irregularities attended the canvassing of ballots in 17 precincts, Abundo filed an
election protest in the RTC Branch 42, Virac, Catanduanes. Torres, who also claimed that canvassing
irregularities prejudiced him, filed a counter-protest in the same case impugning the results in 12 98
precincts.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Abundo who obtained 4,230 votes over Torres' 4,121
votes, and declaring him the elected mayor of Viga, Catanduanes and annulled the earlier
proclamation of Torres who appealed to the Comelec. Abundo, for his part, filed with the trial court a
motion for execution of the judgment pending appeal.
In its Order, the trial court granted Abundo's motion, subject to the filing of a P100,000 bond based
on the following good reasons: having been declared by the Court as the duly elected Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes with a margin of 109 votes over the protestee, the protestant has the right to assume the
Office of the Municipal Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes; and barely 18 months is left to the tenure of the
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes and the people have the right to be governed by the true winner of the
election and their chosen official .
A writ was issued and served on Torres who, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's Order, filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction before the Comelec. In an Order, Torres' prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order was granted, directing him to continue performing his functions as
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes until final orders. However, the Comelec's 1 st Division issued the
Resolution dismissing the petition for Torres’ failure to fulfill an important procedural pre-requisite,
which is the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order. Torres filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the Comelec En Banc. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that there are
"good reasons" to order execution of its decision pending appeal --- NO.
HELD: The trial court in the instant case, relying on the cases of Lindo v. Commission on
Elections and Gutierrez v. Commission on Elections, invoked two "good reasons" to justify its order
allowing execution pending appeal. First, the order would "give substance and meaning to the
people's mandate, especially since the RTC has established private respondent's right to office."
Second, "barely 18 months is left to the tenure of the mayor of Viga, Catanduanes and the people have
the right to be governed by the true winner of the election and their chosen official." The Comelec
found these "good reasons" sufficient.
Finding the rulings of the Comelec consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we hold that the Comelec
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being
procedurally and substantially infirm. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power
because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. This does not obtain in the
instant case.

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Istarul vs. Comelec 491 SCRA 300 (2006)
FACTS: During the 2004 elections, Maturan, Istarul, as well as Munap H. Pacio and Ahmad Atahal
ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan. Maturan was eventually
proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected mayor of Tipo-Tipo. Thereafter,
Istarul and Pacio, another losing candidate filed their election protest cases, who for reason of
consistency, were jointly tried by the respondent judge. 98
Istarul filed his Notice of Appeal. The following day, Maturan filed his Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal which was opposed thereto by Istarul. A Special Order granting Maturan’s Motion and Writ of
Execution were issued on the same day. Thus, the instant petition was filed. On the same day, the
Comelec 1st Division issued a Temporary Restraining/Status Quo Ante Order. After the hearing, both
parties filed their respective memoranda. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
The Comelec 1st Division issued a Resolution holding that there are no good reasons to justify the
issuance of the Special Order granting execution pending appeal. It ruled that Judge Danilo Bucoy’s
failure to establish that public interest would be served; and that a mere statement about the length of
time that the case had been pending in the trial court do not support the issuance of said Order. It
further noted in its Resolution that Judge Bucoy failed to state in the Joint Decision his explanation
for crediting certain ballots in favor of either of the parties, thus, violating the principle that a decision
should clearly show the basis for the judge’s rulings. It then concluded that the decision is seriously
impaired and cannot be the source of a valid execution pending appeal.
Istarul then filed a motion for reconsideration which was referred to the Comelec En Banc, which
issued a Resolution affirming the Resolution of the Comelec 1st Division, and reiterated that there
were no good reasons for the issuance of execution pending appeal because a final determination of
the true will of the people would be had only after the resolution of the appeal pending with the
Comelec 1st Division. Aggrieved by the actions of the Comelec 1st Division and the En Banc, Istarul
then filed the present petition for certiorari assailing said Tribunal’s Resolutions.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Comelec 1st Division and the En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding that there are "no good reasons" to order execution of its decision pending
appeal --- NO.
HELD: There is no showing whatsoever that the Comelec disregarded the jurisprudential rule on
execution pending appeal. On the contrary, the Comelec 1 st Division and the Comelec En
Banc proceeded on the premise that, indeed, execution pending appeal may be granted in election
cases provided there are good reasons therefore as held in a long line of cases. Unfortunately, in this
case, the Comelec 1st Division and Comelec En Banc found the "good reasons" alleged by Istarul and
relied on by the trial court to be insufficient to justify the issuance of the special order granting
execution pending appeal.
Istarul cites as one of the "good reasons" for execution pending appeal, the will of the electorate,
based on the finding of the trial court that he garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
mayor of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan during the May 2004 elections. However, the Comelec 1 st Division, in its
Resolution, found the trial court’s Joint Decision to be "seriously impaired" for its trial court’s failure
to state any explanation as to its rulings regarding the crediting of votes in favor of the candidates and
the Comelec concluded that "a decision suffering from grave infirmities cannot be a source of a valid
execution."
A perusal of the Joint Decision of the trial court, on its face, shows that the Comelec’s observation that
there was a total lack of explanation for the trial court’s rulings for crediting ballots or votes in favor of
the candidates, is correct. Apparently, the supposed victory of Istarul has not been clearly established.
Hence, the Comelec has a valid basis for not considering the supposed will of the electorate as a "good
reason" to allow execution pending appeal. Having such a basis for its ruling, the COMELEC cannot
be deemed to have gravely abused its discretion.

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Trillanes IV. Vs. Pimentel, Sr. 556 SCRA 471
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations,
military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood
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Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati.
Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his
term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill
his functions as senator. The RTC however denied all his requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Thus, Trillanes filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in not allowing Trillanes
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment pending appeal. --- NO.
HELD: Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, Trillanes
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed Trillanes to register as a voter in
December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to
bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, Trillanes
largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket
authorizations.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of
the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of
the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the
rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious.
Trillanes asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. Trillanes is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

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Malaluan vs Comelec G.R.#120193 (1996)
FACTS: Luis Malaluan and Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of
Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on 1992. Joseph
Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for
having garnered 10,498 votes as against Malaluan’s 9,792 votes. Evangelista was, thus, said to have a
winning margin of 706 votes. Malaluan filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the 98
total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial court declared Malaluan as the duly elected
municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without
precedent, the court found Joseph Evangelista liable not only for Malaluan’s protest expenses but also
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Evangelista appealed the trial court decision to
the Comelec.
It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections
expired on June 30, 1995. Indeed, this petition appears now to be moot and academic because the
herein parties are contesting an elective post to which their right to the office no longer exists.
However, the question as to damages remains ripe for adjudication. The Comelec found Malaluan
liable for attorney’s fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments
from March, 1994 to April, 1995, denominated as actual damages, default in payment by Malaluan of
which shall result in the collection of said amount from the bond posted by Malaluan on the occasion
of the grant of his motion for execution pending appeal in the trial court. Malaluan naturally contests
the propriety and legality of this award upon Evangelista on the ground that said damages have not
been alleged and proved during trial.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in
awarding actual damages to private respondent Joseph Evangelista. --- YES.
HELD: We deem the award of salaries and other emoluments to be improper and lacking legal
sanction. Respondent Comelec ruled that inapplicable in the instant case is the ruling in Rodriguez
vs. Tan because while in that case the official ousted was the one proclaimed by the Comelec, in the
instant case, Malaluan was proclaimed winner only by the trial court and assumed office by virtue of
an order granting execution pending appeal. Again, respondent Comelec sweepingly concluded, in
justifying the award of damages, that since Malaluan was adjudged the winner in the elections only by
the trial court and assumed the functions of the office on the strength merely of an order granting
execution pending appeal, Malaluan occupied the position in an illegal manner as a usurper.
To recapitulate, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in election
cases of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. The victorious party in an election
case cannot be indemnified for expenses which he has incurred in an electoral contest in the absence
of a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly attributable to the losing party. Evidently,
if any damage had been suffered by Evangelista due to the execution of judgment pending appeal, that
damage may be said to be equivalent to damnum absque injuria, which is, damage without injury, or
damage or injury inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a
wrong done to a man for which the law provides no remedy.
Therefore, that portion of the decision awarding actual damages to private respondent Joseph
Evangelista is hereby declared null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of jurisdiction.

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De La Victoria vs Comelec #95275-76 July23,1991
FACTS: Sixto Dela Victoria, the late Genoveva S. Mesina, and Loly C. Fian were the contenders for
the mayorship of Albuera, Leyte in the special local elections held on February 1, 1988. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mesina as the duly elected municipal mayor of Albuera, Leyte and
Aquilino Cantiga, Jr as the vice-mayor. In due time, the defeated mayoral candidate, De la Victoria,
filed two pre-proclamation cases in the Comelec but even while they were still pending in the
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commission, he filed in the RTC, Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte, an election protest ex abundante
cautela against Mesina with claims for damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Mesina filed an Answer
with counterclaims for damages and attorney’s fees.
On July 22, 1989, Mesina died and was substituted as protestee by her Vice-Mayor, Aquilino Cantiga,
Jr., who assumed the mayorship by operation of law. Neither Mesina’s heirs, nor her counsel
informed the trial court about her death. Dela Victoria’s withdrawal of his pre-proclamation
complaints from the Comelec En Banc was granted. The incumbent Mayor, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr., filed
in the RTC a verified "Petition to Intervene" in the election protest of De la Victoria, and a
"Manifestation/Motion" waiving his claim for damages and costs against the deceased protestee,
Mesina. The trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for Mesina filed a Notice of Death and Motion for Substitution of the deceased protestee by
her heirs, and requested that his motion be set for hearing. Dela Victoria opposed the motion for
substitution on the ground that the heirs of Mesina are not the "real party in interest" and that since
he had waived his claim for damages against the deceased, her heirs have no more right to intervene
in the case or have been "erased from the picture altogether." The trial court noted the Motion for
Substitution filed by the heirs of Mesina and ruled that Dela Victoria’s waiver of his claim for damages
against the said protestee rendered the Motion for Substitution without basis in law, or moot and
academic, and then declared De la Victoria as the duly elected Mayor of Albuera, Leyte by a margin of
134 votes over the deceased protestee, Genoveva S. Mesina.
The heirs of Mesina appealed to the Comelec, which was later denied and ordered its expulsion from
the record of the case. Dela Victoria filed an "Urgent Motion to Disregard Notice of Appeal" on the
ground that the heirs had no standing in the case as they failed to appeal the July 2, 1990 Order of the
trial court denying their motion for substitution and he also filed a motion for execution of the trial
court’s decision which was granted by the court. On the same day, De la Victoria was sworn into office
as the duly elected Mayor of Albuera. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the heirs of the deceased protestee in an election protest may be considered
as real party-in-interest even if the vice-mayor has been allowed to intervene and the protestant had
waived his claim for damages and costs in the proceedings. --- NO.
HELD: The late Genoveva Mesina’s claim to the contested office was not in any sense a transmissible
right that devolved upon her surviving spouse and her children after her death. "Public office is
personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs" Private respondents’ only
interest in the outcome of the case is limited to no more than their interest in defending her against
the protestant’s claim for damages and costs, which the protestant, herein petitioner, has already
waived. They may no longer prosecute her own counter-claim for damages against the protestant for
that was extinguished when death terminated her right to occupy the contested office of mayor of
Albuera, Leyte.
Vice Mayor Aquilino Cantiga’s accession, by operation of law, to the position of Municipal Mayor
upon the death of Mesina on July 22, 1989, automatically made him the real party-in-interest in the
election contest for his right to hold the office of municipal mayor is in jeopardy of being lost should
De la Victoria win his protest. Thus did this Court hold in Lomugdang v. Javier, 21 SCRA 403: "The
vice-mayor elect has the status of a real party-in-interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is
entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor
succeeds to the office of mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume the post."

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Fernando Poe v. Arroyo March 29, 2005
FACTS: Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of
the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call
vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines.
She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie actor
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Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on
June 30, 2004. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed
seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her
Answer with Counter Protest. As counsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the
presentation of their respective positions on the controversy, an act of God intervened. On December
14, 2004, FPJ died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. However, neither the
Protestee’s proclamation by Congress nor the death of her main rival as a fortuitous intervening
event, appears to abate the present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of
periodic mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the
electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all. Together with the formal Notice of
the Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a
Manifestation with Urgent Petition/Motion to Intervene as a Substitute for Deceased Protestant FPJ,
by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe claiming that because of the untimely demise of her husband
and in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount
interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late
husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the
electorate in the 2004 elections.
In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and subsequent
cases including analogous cases decided by the HRET, asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate
is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a
property that passes on to the heirs. GMA also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased
husband because under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered
candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of
the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not receive the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for she was not
even a candidate for the presidency in the election that is being contested. Citing pertinent PET
Rules, protestee also stresses that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of surviving spouses
to ascertain the vote of the electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over election protests and
quo warranto cases. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s protest case. --- NO.
HELD: The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET
Rules, which states that, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this
express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest
concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had
not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rdhighest
number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest. This Tribunal,
however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous
and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decision of
the electoral tribunals.
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution by a
legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to
appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by
said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time
ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs
upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests

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where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.
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181
De mesa vs Mencias 18 SCRA 533 (1966)
FACTS: Francisco De Mesa and Maximino A. Argana were opponents for the mayoralty of
Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections. De Mesa was declared winner together with Demetrio R.
Loresca as his vice-mayor. Duly, proclaimed elected, these two qualified and assumed their respective
positions upon the commencement of their term of office. Meanwhile, defeated candidate Argana,
charging De Mesa of perpetration of frauds, terrorism and other irregularities in certain precincts,
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protested the election. De Mesa filed his counter protest, shifting responsibility for irregularities to
the protestant and his followers, impugning the results in some thirteen precincts. However, while the
case is pending, De mesa was assassinated. The protestant Argana moved for the constitution of
committees on revision of ballots. Accordingly, the court a quo required the protestee's widow and
children to appear within fifteen days from notice in order to be substituted for said protestee, if they
so desired. They did not, however, comply. Proceeding ex parte, on June 11, 1964, the protestant
Argana reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioners on revision of ballots, and so,
without notice to the protestee and/or his legal representative, as indeed none has thus been named,
and the trial court granted the motion. With the constitution of the committee on revision of ballots in
which, incidentally, Ramon Antilon Jr. was motu proprio named and then served as commissioner
for the deceased protestee, the completion of the proceedings on revision, and the submission of the
report thereon, the trial court, in its decision of August 10, 1964, adjudged the protestant Maximino A.
Argana as the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections. De Mesa’s widow and
the local chapter of the Liberal Party of which the deceased protestee was a member filed a petition
which include among others the reconsideration of the August 10,1964 Decision upon the ground
that, for failure to order the protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased protestee after his widow and children had failed to appear, pursuant to the applicable
provisions of the Rules of Court, it was legally improper for the trial court to have proceeded ex
parte with the election case; and third, they filed a "Cautionary Notice of Appeal" in anticipation of
the possible denial of their said motion for reconsideration and new trial. Pleading lack of personality
both of De Mesa's widow and the local Liberal Party Chapter to intervene in the case, as well as the
absence of any ground for a new trial, the protestant opposed the foregoing moves. The court a quo,
subscribing to the position taken by the protestant, denied the movants' petition for leave to represent
the deceased protestee, and order stricken from the record their motion for reconsideration and new
trial and their cautionary notice of appeal. On October 6, 1964 Argana qualified as mayor and
assumed office. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the widow or the local Liberal Party chapter of Muntinlupa may
substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case. ---
NO.
HELD: The protestee's claim to the contested office is not in any sense a right transmissible to this
widow or heirs. Said widow's only remaining interest in the outcome of the case is limited to no more
than the possible award of costs against the deceased protestee. Besides not being such an interest as
would justify her substitution for her deceased husband as an indispensable legal representative, the
right to such an award if eventually made has already been waived by the protestant Argana.
This effectively withdraws the widow from the picture altogether. Much less has the local Liberal
Party Chapter any claim to substitution. Not being duly incorporated as a juridical person, it can have
no personality to sue or be sued as such. And while it conceivably may derive some indirect benefit
consequent to the resolution of the contest in favor of the deceased protestee, neither the chapter
itself nor the officers thereof would become entitled thereby to any right to the contested office in case
of a favorable judgment, nor, for that matter, do they stand to sustain any direct prejudice in case of
an adverse one. No basis therefore exists upon which to predicate their claim to substitution.

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Lomugdang vs Javier 21 SCRA 402 (1967)
FACTS: On May 17, 1966, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Culasi, Antique, certified and
proclaimed Paterno Javier as the winning Mayor. Felix Lomugdang, having obtained the second
placeprotested against the election of Paterno Javier. In his motion of protest, Lomugdang impugned
the result of the election in Precinct No. 4, Culasi, Antique, alleging as grounds the commission of
errors or irregularities by the Board of Election Inspectors; erroneous appreciation of ballots, and
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improper adjudication of votes. Paterno Javier in due time filed his answer and counter-protest.
Shortly before the case was first set for hearing, and before any evidence could be adduced in the
hearing of the protest, the protestant met an untimely death. The protestee, through counsel, moved
to dismiss the protest. Pablo Pe Alolod who was elected Vice-Mayor of Culasi, Antique, filed a motion
to intervene and/or for substitution, alleging that he would be entitled to the office in the event the
protestant would prevail over the protestee in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act 2264. The
protestee opposed this motion, alleging that Alolod has no right to intervene under the provisions of
Section 176(g) of the Revised Election Code. The trial court denied protestee's motion to dismiss the
protest and allowed Vice-Mayor Alolod to intervene in the case. The protestee filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his motion to dismiss and allowing the vice-mayor to intervene,
which was denied. The intervenor, Vice-Mayor Pablo Pe Alolod moved for the dismissal of the
counter-protest, on the ground that all the ballots in the counter-protested precincts, except those in
Precinct No. 4, have been burned pursuant to Section 157 of the Revised Election Code, and that
evidence aliunde is not admissible to prove the allegations in the counter-protest, since the burning of
the ballots was done without the intervention or fault of either party. The protestee opposed the
intervenor's motion to dismiss the counterprotest, for the reason that in said counter protest, he
impugned the correctness of the certificate of canvass and the correctness of the election returns in
twenty-two (22) precincts; and that the ballots in the counterprotested precinct except those in
Precinct No. 4, having been burned in accordance with law, he is entitled to prove by testimony of the
individual voters that they have voted for the protestee, in numbers exceeding those returned by the
inspectors as having cast their votes for the protestee in the counterprotested precincts.
The trial Court denied the petition of the protestee to present evidence aliunde in connection with the
precincts involved in the counterprotest, and considered the case submitted for decision. In its
decision, the Court declared the protestant, Felix Lomugdang, the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
Culasi, Antique in the elections of November 12, 1963, with a plurality of seven votes over the
protestee, Paterno Javier, and held Vice-Mayor Pablo Pe Alolod entitled to the office. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the trial court erred in allowing Vice-Mayor Pablo Pe Alolod to intervene in
the case. --- NO.
HELD: Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public
interest, wherefore, public policy demands that an election contest duly commenced, be not abated by
the death of the contestant. We have squarely so rule in Sibulo Vda. de Mesa. vs. Judge Mencias, G.R.
No. L-24583, October 29, 1966, that the ineligibility of the protestant is not a defense, and that the
protestee's cessation in the office is not a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor detract the
Court's jurisdiction to decide the case.
In the same Sibulo case, already cited, this Court likewise ruled that by virtue of Section 7, of Republic
Act 2264, the vice-mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the
proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds and the protestee is
unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected
can not assume the post.
Hence, no error was committed by the Court below in allowing Vice-Mayor Alolod to intervene in the
protest at bar.

183
Garcia v. Comelec 611 SCRA 55 Jan. 2010
FACTS: Tomas R. Osmeña, then mayoral candidate in the 2004 national and local elections in Cebu
City, filed an election offense case against his rival, Alvin B. Garcia, for the publication of political
advertisements that allegedly violated the thrice-a-week publication requirement and failed to
indicate the name and address of the party or candidate for whose benefit the advertisements were
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published. He averred that the publication of the political advertisements was in violation of Sections
4 and 6 of R.A. No. 9006 and Sections 11 and 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 6520. Osmeña averred
that “Mayor sa Katawhan” was published four times, that is, on April 27 and 29, 2004 and May 1 and
2, 2004, all one-half page in size, in the Sun Star tabloid. Moreover, the “It’s a No-Contest” political
advertisement was printed daily, in Sun Star, all one-half page in size, from April 26 to May 2, 2004.
The “No to Tom Tax Osmeña” advertisement appeared thrice, or on April 28 and 29, 2004 and May 1,
2004, also one-half page in size, in the same tabloid. The “Mayor Alvin Garcia” advertisement was
published once. Osmeña alleged that all the political advertisements did not indicate the true and
correct name and address of the party or candidate for whose benefit the advertisements were
published.
In his Answer, Garcia denied Osmeña’s allegations. He contended that the political advertisements
had been made not for a single candidate, but for the entire slate of his party, KusugKNP Party,
consisting of 20 local candidates, plus presidential and vice-presidential candidates Fernando Poe, Jr.
and Loren Legarda, respectively. Garcia asserted that “22 candidates x 3 a week results to 66 times a
week publication for all the candidates” of the Kusug-KNP Party. Thus, the publication of the political
advertisements, may it be seven or 15 times, was way below the allowable limit of 66 times for the 22
political candidates of the Kusug-KNP Party. Consequently, the political advertisements in question
had not exceeded the legal limit provided by R.A. No. 9006, as implemented by Comelec Resolution
No. 6520. Further, Garcia stated that the political advertisements in question reflected that they were
really campaigns for the benefit of the candidates of the Kusug-KNP Party, as in fact, they contained
the pictures and names of the party’s political candidates. Hence, he contended that the political
advertisements substantially complied with the requirement provided by the Fair Elections Act that
the advertisement shall contain the true and correct name and address of the party or candidate for
whose benefit the election propaganda was printed.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Garcia violated the rule on published campaign materials. --- NO.
HELD: To emphasize, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 requires that print advertisements donated to a
candidate shall not be published without the written acceptance of the said candidate, which written
acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to the COMELEC. The
requirement for a written acceptance by a candidate of donated advertisements is a safeguard
provided by law against the danger of publishing or broadcasting election propaganda beyond the
required frequency, size and other limitations imposed by law without the candidate’s express
agreement, since the violation of such requirements results in the prosecution of the candidate for an
election offense punishable under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, a person found guilty of an election
offense “shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years
and shall not be subject to probation.” In addition, “the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.”
In this case, the Comelec did not question Garcia’s averment that the advertisement in question was
paid for by the organization named Friends of Alvin Garcia. The advertisement may be considered as a
donation to Garcia under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 and its IRR. Paragraph 4.3, Section 4 of R.A. No.
9006 explicitly requires that “print x x x advertisements donated to the candidate or political party
shall not be printed, published x x x without the written acceptance by the said candidate.” Since the
advertisement in question was published by the Sun Star, there arises a presumption that there was
written acceptance by Garcia of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.

184
Arroyo v. Department of Justice 701 SCRA 753
FACTS: On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and
2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. In its Initial Report, the Fact-Finding
Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the
provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding
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Team recommended, among others, that Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and
South Cotabato; that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and Abalos be subjected to another preliminary
investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; and, that Mike Arroyo be
subjected to further investigation. Senator Pimentel filed a Complaint Affidavit for Electoral Sabotage
against Arroyo and twelve others, and several John Does and Jane Does. Thereafter, Arroyo et al.,
filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of
the Joint Panel. The Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to the
Comelec en banc, which issued a Resolution approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to
modifications. The Comelec resolved, among others, that an information for electoral sabotage be filed
against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. The RTC issued a Warrant for GMAs arrest which was duly served. GMA was later arraigned
and she entered a plea of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but was able to obtain
temporary liberty when her motion for bail was granted. At present, she is again on hospital arrest by
virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal case. The Court denied the petitions and supplemental
petitions of herein petitioners. Hence, this motion for reconsideration. Mike Arroyo reiterates his
arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec
resolutions. Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only
when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Finally, as has been
repeatedly pointed out in his earlier pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the
proceedings involving the electoral sabotage case were rushed because of pressures from the executive
branch of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Joint Panel is valid. --- YES.
HELD: This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the Comelec
has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. While
recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very
well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued when Section 265 of the Omnibus
Election Code was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos.
8733and 9057 mentioned in the assailed decision but missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued
during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government the concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses. This
amendment paved the way for the discrepancy.
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included
a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding
probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the
Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

185
Lozano v. Comelec G.R. No. 94521, 28 October 1991
FACTS: On January 11, 1988, prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections, Lozano and Bernadette
Agcorpa, a registered voter of Makati, filed with the Comelec a petition for disqualification against
then candidate for mayor Jejomar C. Binay on the ground that respondent Binay used P9.9 million of
municipal funds to enhance his candidacy and his entire ticket under the Lakas ng Bansa. The
disqualification case was assigned to the Second Division of the Comelec composed of Commissioner
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Haydee B. Yorac, as presiding officer, and Commissioners Andres R. Flores and Magdara B.
Dimaampao, as members. The Second Division, through its Presiding Commissioner, referred the case
to the Law Department of respondent commission for preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect.
Binay filed his counter-affidavit with said department. Lozano filed an Omnibus Motion praying for
the inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioners Yorac and Africa. This was the first of several
motions for inhibition filed by Lozano before respondent commission. Lozano also prayed that the
disqualification petition be referred for consideration en banc. Commissioner Yorac denied the
motion for inhibition. The Comelec en banc denied the prayer that the case be heard en banc, ruling
that "no substantial reason exists why this case should be taken en banc; and considering finally that
the case is set for hearing by the Second Division." Lozano himself filed a motion to disqualify
Commissioner Yorac because she postponed motu proprio a hearing set on the ground that she will
study the issue of jurisdiction. Said motion was denied. The Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution
No. 2050 which provides that petitions for disqualification filed prior to the January 18, 1988 local
elections based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code but not resolved before the elections shall
be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department which shall submit its report to the
Commission en banc. Pursuant to said resolution, the Second Division on even date referred back the
disqualification case against respondent Binay to the Law Department "before taking any action
thereon." The Law Department submitted its investigation report 5 recommending that criminal
charges be filed against respondent Binay for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Lozano filed a third motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioner
Yorac for having issued a previous memorandum addressed to the chairman and members of
respondent commission expressing her opinion that Binay should first be convicted by the regular
courts of the offense of vote buying before he could be disqualified, which was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Comelec committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in not finding Binay guilty of vote-buying, contrary to the evidence presented by Lozano.
--- NO.
HELD: We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by respondent
Comelec, in dismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent Binay.
No clear and convincing proof exists to show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote
buying. The traditional gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the Christmas season is not
refuted. That it was implemented by respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not
sufficiently establish that Binay was trying to influence and induce his constituents to vote for him.
This would be stretching the interpretation of the law too far. Lozano deduces from this act of gift-
giving that Binay was buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requires more than a mere tenuous
deduction to prove the offense of vote-buying. There has to be concrete and direct evidence or, at
least, strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge that respondent was indeed engaged in
vote-buying. We are convinced that the evidence presented, as swell as the facts obtaining in the case
at bar, do not warrant such finding.
The charge against respondent Binay for alleged malversation of public funds should be threshed out
and adjudicated in the appropriate proceeding and forum having jurisdiction over the same.
Consequently, it was properly dismissed by the Commission on Elections.

186
Ong v. Martinez G.R. 87743, 21 August 1990
FACTS: Saturnino Herrera, who was the father of respondent Martinez, was one of the Liberal Party
candidates duly elected as Councilor for Manila’s Third District in the local elections of January 1988.
He performed his duties as such councilor until his death on October 14, 1988, thus leaving the
position open for the appointment of a qualified replacement from the same political party where the
deceased councilor belonged. Ong, who was a defeated candidate of the Liberal Party in the Third
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District of Manila, on the strength of an indorsement by the Treasurer of the said party in the district,
was appointed as member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod by the Secretary of Local Government to fill
the vacancy created by the late Councilor Saturnino Herrera. Ong took his oath of office as such
councilor after which the Secretary of Local Government informed Mayor Lopez, Jr. and Vice-Mayor
Lacuna of the appointment of Ong. In the regular session of the City Council, Ong and his co-
appointees were formally excluded from the session hall with sixteen councilors voting for such
exclusion and none against it, with the rest of the Council members abstaining. The records show that
Martinez went through the legal formalities or standard procedure prior to her appointment to the
vacated position subject of this controversy. Thus, 9 out of the 11 incumbent LP Councilors in the City
Council endorsed the appointment of Martinez per their resolution which was forwarded to the Office
of the Chairman of the Liberal Party, Manila Chapter, who in turn, nominated Martinez for
appointment to President Corazon Aquino thru the Secretary of Local Government. Congressman
Leonardo Fuguso as President of the LP Third District Chapter also nominated Martinez to National
President Salonga of the Party. Salonga, in turn, nominated Martinez to Secretary Luis Santos of the
Dept. of Local Government pursuant to Section 50 of the Local Government Code, who, acting for the
President, issued an appointment to Martinez. On the first session day after Martinez’s appointment,
the City Council, by a vote of twenty-four members in favor with no member opposing, recognized her
as member of said Council. Finally, the Presiding Officer of the City Council directed its Secretariat to
include the name of Martinez in the payroll of the City Council, and she thus assumed and performed
her duties as Councilor for the Third District of Manila until the restraining order of the Court issued
she received. This petition now seeks to annul the appointment of respondent Martinez and to declare
Ong to be the holder of the position of Councilor in place of deceased Saturnino Herrera.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the appointment of Martinez possesses all the requisites of a valid
appointment according to legal and regular procedures. --- YES.
HELD: Martinez had gone through the regular and standard nomination process which had been
officially acknowledged by the Secretary of Local Government in conformity with Sec. 50 of the Local
Government Code.
Since deceased Councilor Saturnino Herrera who had caused the contested vacancy comes from the
Liberal Party, it follows that his mode of replacement should be governed by the standing rules of the
aforenamed Party. Logically and by analogy, the National Directorate or in its stead, the Executive
Committee or the Party President may choose and nominate the party’s proposed appointee, from
among its members, to the position vacated by a deceased city councilor. Acting on the solid
recommendation of the LP hierarchy, from the district level up to the national level, the Secretary of
Local Government correspondingly issued the letter-appointment to respondent Martinez.
Notably, Martinez’s appointment was accepted or recognized by the City Council in its session of
March 21, 1989. The minutes of said session reveal that twenty-four councilors voted to accept the
appointment of respondent and not a single member objected to or opposed the acceptance. Right
then and there, the Presiding Officer announced the acceptance of Martinez’s appointment and the
Chair directed the Secretariat to include her name as a new member of the City Council. For having
satisfied the formal requisites and procedure for appointment as Councilor, which is an official
position outside the contemplation of the election ban, Martinez’s appointment is declared valid.

187
Regalado v. CA G.R. No. 115962 15 February 2000
FACTS: On January 15, 1987, complainant Editha Barba was appointed nursing attendant in the
Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros Oriental by then OIC Mayor Rodolfo Navarro. Although she
was detailed at, and received her salary from, the Office of the Mayor, she reported for work at the
Puriculture Center, Poblacion, Tanjay. As Navarro decided to run for mayor of Tanjay in the January
1988 elections, petitioner Dominador Regalado, Jr. was appointed substitute OIC-Mayor. His brother, 98
Arturo S. Regalado, was also a mayoralty candidate.
Dominador's brother won in the elections. Four days later, Dominador, still sitting as OIC-Mayor,
issued a memorandum to Barba informing her that she would be reassigned from Poblacion, Tanjay
to Barangay Sto. Niño, about 25 kilometers from Poblacion. The transfer was made without the prior
approval of the Comelec. Barba continued to report at the Puriculture Center, however. Hence,
Dominador issued another memorandum directing Barba to explain, within 72 hours, why she refuses
to comply with his memorandum. In response, Barba, sent a letter to Dominador Regalado protesting
her transfer which she contended was illegal. She then filed, a complaint against him for violation of
Section 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, and after preliminary investigation, the
Provincial Election Officer of Negros Oriental, charged Dominador Regalado before the RTC Branch
38, Negros Oriental, which rendered a Decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 261, paragraph (h), of the Omnibus Election Code, and is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from one (1) year minimum to three (3) years
maximum without the benefit of probation and to suffer disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage. He is further sentenced to indemnify the offended party, Editha P.
Barba, as civil liability arising from the offense charged, in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos for moral
damages. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Dominador Regalado is correct that the memorandum he issued did not
effect a transfer, but merely a "re-assignment" of Barba. --- NO.
HELD: The two elements of the offense prescribed under §261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as
amended, are: (1) a public officer or employee is transferred or detailed within the election period as
fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the
COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.
The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one organizational unit to
another in the same department or agency: Provided, however, That any movement from the non-
career service to the career service shall not be considered a transfer. Thus, contrary to Dominador's
claim, a transfer under §24(c) of P.D. No. 807 in fact includes personnel movement from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency.
Moreover, §261(h) of B.P. No. 881, as amended, provides that it is an election offense for — Any
public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the
civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of
the Commission.
As the Solicitor General notes, "the word transfer or detail, as used above, is modified by the
word whatever. This indicates that any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether
or not in the same office or agency, during the election is covered by the prohibition."
Finally, the memorandum itself issued by petitioner to Barba on January 22, 1988 stated that the
latter was being "transferred," thus: Effective Monday, January 25, 1988, your assignment as
Nursing Attendant will be transferred from RHU I Tanjay Poblacion to Barangay Sto. Niño, this
Municipality. You are hereby directed to perform the duties and functions as such immediately in
that area. For strict compliance.(Emphasis added)

188
Comelec v. Noynay, July 9, 1998
FACTS: Pursuant to a minute resolution by the Comelec on October 29, 1996, nine informations for
violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code were filed with Branch 23 of the RTC of Allen,
Northern Samar. In an Order issued on August 25, 1997, Tomas B. Noynay, presiding judge of Branch
23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the Comelec Law
Department to file the cases with the appropriate MTC on the ground that under B.P. Blg. 129, the
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RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does
not exceed six years of imprisonment. All the accused are uniformly charged for Violation of Sec.
261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which carries a penalty of not less than one year but not more
than six years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office
or deprivation of the right of suffrage. Motions for reconsiderations filed by the Comelec have been
denied, hence, this instant petition.
In its Manifestation, the Office of the Solicitor General, it is “adopting” the instant petition on the
ground that the challenged orders of Judge Noynay “are clearly not in accordance with existing laws
and jurisprudence.” Judge Noynay avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents
interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the RTC’s of
jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment;
moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its
provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election
offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by
Municipal Trial Courts.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not R.A. No. 7691 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election
offenses which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six years. --- NO.
HELD: Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.
In Morales v. Court of Appeals, the court held that by virtue of the exception provided for in the
opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exclusive original jurisdiction of MTC’s, MTCC’s,
and MCTC’s does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of RTC’s and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed
therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not
exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction
thereon is retained by the RTC’s or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be. Among the examples cited
in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases
under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the
Decree on Intellectual Property; and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within
the exception. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon RTC’s or
the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That
Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably
evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129
providing for the exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his
duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of
the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.

189
Garcia v. Commission on Elections 611 SCRA 55
FACTS: On May 6, 2004, Tomas R. Osmeña, then mayoral candidate in the 2004 national and local
elections in Cebu City, filed an election offense case against his rival Alvin B. Garcia, for the
publication of political advertisements that allegedly violated the thrice-a-week publication
requirement and failed to indicate the name and address of the party or candidate for whose benefit
the advertisements were published. He averred that the publication of the political advertisements
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was in violation of Sections 4 and 6 of R.A. No. 9006 and Sections 11 and 13 of Comelec Resolution
No. 6520.
Osmeña averred that “Mayor sa Katawhan” was published four times, that is, on April 27 and 29,
2004 and May 1 and 2, 2004, all one-half page in size, in the Sun Star tabloid. Moreover, the “It’s a
No-Contest” political advertisement was printed daily, or seven times in Sun Star, all one-half page in
size, from April 26 to May 2, 2004. The “No to Tom Tax Osmeña” advertisement appeared thrice, or
on April 28 and 29, 2004 and May 1, 2004, also one-half page in size, in the same tabloid. The “Mayor
Alvin Garcia” advertisement was published once. Osmeña alleged that all the political advertisements
did not indicate the true and correct name and address of the party or candidate for whose benefit the
advertisements were published.
In his Answer, Garcia denied Osmeña’s allegations, contending that the political advertisements had
been made not for a single candidate, but for the entire slate of his party, KusugKNP Party, consisting
of 20 local candidates, plus presidential and vice-presidential candidates Fernando Poe, Jr. and Loren
Legarda, respectively. Garcia asserted that “22 candidates x 3 a week results to 66 times a week
publication for all the candidates” of the Kusug-KNP Party. Thus, the publication of the political
advertisements, may it be seven or 15 times, was way below the allowable limit of 66 times for the 22
political candidates of the Kusug-KNP Party. Consequently, the political advertisements in question
had not exceeded the legal limit provided by R.A. No. 9006, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution
No. 6520. Further, Garcia stated that the political advertisements in question reflected that they were
really campaigns for the benefit of the candidates of the Kusug-KNP Party, as in fact, they contained
the pictures and names of the party’s political candidates. Hence, he contended that the political
advertisements substantially complied with the requirement provided by the Fair Elections Act that
the advertisement shall contain the true and correct name and address of the party or candidate for
whose benefit the election propaganda was printed.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not Garcia violated the rule on published campaign materials. --- NO.
HELD: Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 provides for the requirements for published or printed election
propaganda, and paragraphs 4.1 and 4.3, Section 4 are reflected in Section 13 (3) and Section 14 of
Comelec Resolution No. 6520.
To emphasize, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 requires that print advertisements donated to a candidate
shall not be published without the written acceptance of the said candidate, which written acceptance
shall be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to the Comelec.
In this case, the Comelec did not question Garcia’s averment that the advertisement in question was
paid for by the organization named Friends of Alvin Garcia. The advertisement may be considered as a
donation to Garcia under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 and its IRR. Paragraph 4.3, Section 4 of R.A. No.
9006 explicitly requires that “print x x x advertisements donated to the candidate or political party
shall not be printed, published x x x without the written acceptance by the said candidate.”
Since the advertisement in question was published by the Sun Star, there arises a presumption that
there was written acceptance by Garcia of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Under the Rules on Evidence, it is presumed that the law has
been obeyed, and that private transactions have been fair and regular.

190
Faelnar v. People 331 SCRA 429
FACTS: Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. On April 9, 1997, a basketball
tournament, dubbed the "2nd Jing-jing Faelnar’s Cup," opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and
lasted up to April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering filed against Faelnar and
Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy.
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The complaint alleged that the basketball tournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged
outside the campaign period which officially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. Luy alleged that: (1) during the tournament, a streamer bearing Faelnar’s name was
placed on the facade of the Guadalupe Sports Complex; (2) Faelnar’s name was repeatedly mentioned
over the microphone during the games; (3) the tournament was widely published in the local
newspaper; and (4) a raffle sponsored by Cecilio Gillamac was held with home appliances given away
as prizes.
Faelnar denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor was Gillamac
Marketing, Inc. He contended that the same was purely a sporting event for the benefit of the youth.
The complaint was investigated by Atty. Edwin Cadungog, election officer of Cebu City, who later
recommended the dismissal of the charges against Faelnar and Gillamac. On the other hand, the Law
Department of the Comelec recommended the filing of a case against Faelnar and Gillamac for
violation of §80, 3 in relation to §262, 4 of the Omnibus Election Code, and §50 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2888, in relation to §12 of Republic Act No. 6679.
In its Resolution, the Comelec en banc resolved to dismiss the case. However, on motion of Antonio
Luy, the Comelec reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary Informations against
Faelnar and Gillamac. Accordingly, they were formally charged in the RTC of Cebu City under two
Informations in Criminal Cases.
Faelnar moved to quash the information or, in the alternative, for reinvestigation of the case,
contending that Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint against him, was
immediately executory and could no longer be reconsidered, which was denied. He moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was likewise denied by the court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the resolution of the Comelec dismissing the criminal complaint for
violation of the election laws immediately final and executory, as Faelnar contends. --- NO.
HELD: The contention is untenable. Under the present rule, a motion for reconsideration of a ruling,
resolution or decision of the Comelec en banc is allowed in cases involving election offenses.
Here, there is no question that what is involved is a resolution of the Comelec en banc in an election
offense. Hence, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed under the Rules of
Procedure of the Comelec.

191
Laurel vs. RTC Manila Branch 10 and Comelec #131778
FACTS: Bernardo P. Pardo, Chairman of Comelec sent a verified letter-complaint to Jose P.

Balbuena, Director of the Law Department, charging Laurel with "Falsification of Public Documents"
and violation of Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, stating in the same letter the facts on which
he relies upon to support his accusations, which are, inter alia, that petitioner "was born in Manila on
October 8, 1951 . . . and at the time of his birth, both his father and mother were Chinese citizens. . . 98
On February 20, 1995, Herman Tiu Laurel filed a certificate of candidacy with the Law
Department . . . for the position of Senator, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen . . . This
statement . . . is false and constitutes not only a falsification of public documents but also a violation
of the Omnibus Election Code.
On the basis of the said Complaint, an investigation was conducted by the Comelec Law Department.
Thereafter, a Report was made recommending the filing of an Information against Laurel for violation
of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised
Penal Code.
After the filing of the Information, Laurel filed a Motion for Inhibition, seeking the inhibition of the
entire Comelec, alleging that "he is not confident that this present forum is capable of fairly and
impartially rendering a resolution on the merits of the above-captioned complaint", which was
denied. Laurel filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was again denied. He then filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. He alleged, in essence, that the Comelec violated its own
rules of procedure on the initiation of the preliminary investigation and the consequent filing of a
criminal complaint against him. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court and ruled that the proper
procedure was followed by the Comelec.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Court of Appeals erred when it held that there was no flaw in the
procedure followed by the Comelec in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. --- NO.
HELD: We fail to see from Section 5 the requirement that only the Comelec en banc may refer a
complaint to the Law Department for investigation. What Section 5 states only is that it is the Law
Department, not another office, of the Comelec which may conduct an investigation into the
allegations in the complaint. There is no specific requirement as to how referral to the department
shall be made. We cannot read into the rules what simply is not there.
There is likewise no rule against the Comelec chairman directing the conduct of a preliminary
investigation, even if he himself were the complainant in his private capacity. In fact, under Section 5,
the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any of those officials specified in the rule, upon the
direction of the Comelec chairman. We agree with the Court of Appeals' observation that,
“Even if we regard the complaint to have been filed by Chairman Pardo as a private citizen, there is no
rhyme nor reason why he cannot direct the Law Department to perform an investigation and delegate
the conduct of preliminary investigation to any lawyer of said Department in his capacity as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections. The justification is, in so doing, he was merely acting pursuant to
Section 5 of Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. No clash or conflict could be attributed in his
performance of the said acts, one as a private citizen, and the other as Chairman of Comelec, as it
would not be him but another lawyer in the Legal Department that would actually be carrying but the
preliminary investigation. The outcome of the inquiry, therefore, could not, per se, be considered as
sullied with bias.”
Clearly, the applicable rules were followed in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of Pardo's
complaint against Laurel, contrary to the latter's assertion.

192
Diño vs. Olivares 607 SCRA 251 (2009)
FACTS: Diño and Comparativo instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo
Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by Assistant City
Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor of Parañaque, two
Informations were filed before the RTC charging Olivarez with Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a,
b and k of Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code, for on election day of May 10, 2004 they
98
distributed Uniwide gift certificates, a thing of value, as consideration to induce or influence the voters
to vote for candidate Pablo Olivarez, a candidate for the City Mayor of Parañaque. Olivarez filed
before the Law Department of the Comelec an "appeal of the Joint Resolution with Motion to Revoke
Continuing Authority" pursuant to Section 10, Rule 34 of the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure,
arguing that the charges made against him were groundless. The Law Department of the Comelec
directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records of the case and to suspend further
implementation of the Joint Resolution dated until final resolution of the said appeal before the
Comelec en banc.
Olivarez filed a Motion to Quash the two criminal informations, however, before Judge Madrona
could act on the motion to quash, Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, filed its "Opposition to the
Motion to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informations", which sought to be admitted
paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code.
Olivarez filed an "Opposition to the Admission of the Amended Informations." Moreover, he averred
that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the informations, since the Comelec had
already directed it to transmit the entire records of the case and suspend the hearing of the cases
before the RTC until the resolution of the appeal before the Comelec en banc. Judge Madrona denied
Olivarez’s Motion to Quash and admitted the Amended Informations. Olivarez filed an Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration thereon. Judge Madrona, in open court, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order denying the Motion to Quash and admitting the Amended Informations, and ordered the
arrest of Olivarez and the confiscation of the cash bond. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque had acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it filed the Amended Informations. ---NO.
HELD: This Court finds that the public prosecutors, in filing the Amended Informations, did not
exceed the authority delegated by the Comelec. Resolution No. 7457, which effectively revoked the
deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque, was issued after the Amended
Informations were filed. The letter written by Director Alioden D. Dalaig of the Comelec Law
Department, did not revoke the continuing authority granted to the City Prosecutor of Parañaque.
The filing of the Amended Informations was not made in defiance of these instructions by the
Comelec; rather it was an act necessitated by the developments of the case. Olivarez filed a Motion to
Quash on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein. Since the Rules of Court
provided for a remedy that would avert the dismissal of the complaints on the ground that more than
one offense was charged, the public prosecutor filed the Amended Informations. The instructions of
the Comelec, were clearly intended to allow sufficient time to reconsider the merit of the Joint
Resolution, not to have the public prosecutor abandon the prosecution of the case and negligently
allow its dismissal by not filing the Amended Informations, thus, leaving the Comelec in a quandary
should it later dismiss the appeal before it.
By filing the Amended Informations, the public prosecutor had avoided such an undesirable situation,
which would have forced the Comelec to re-file the cases, waste government resources, and delay the
administration of justice. Thus, the precautionary measure taken by the public prosecutor was clearly
not intended to disobey the Comelec, or to flout its authority or diminish its powers to review the
appealed Joint Resolution, as such, cannot in any way be considered improper. Consequently, Judge
Madrona acted in accordance with law when he admitted these Informations and dismissed the
Olivarez’s Motion to Quash, as the ground stated therein—the informations charged more than one
offense—could no longer be sustained.

193
Kilosbayan vs. Comelec 280 SCRA 892
FACTS: Cesar Sarino, then Secretary of DILG, requested for authority to negotiate with accredited
NGO’s in order to utilize them to implement the projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. No. 7180
which was granted by the then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon. Such an authority was extended
to all the Regional Directors of the DILG. Salvador Enriquez, then Secretary of the DBM, signed and
released Advice of Allotment allocating the amount of 70 Million Pesos from the CDF under object to 98
cover financial assistance for sports, health and cultural programs and other related activities in the
various barangays in the National Capital Region.
Comelec received from Kilosbayan a letter informing of "two serious violations of election laws." The
evidence proffered by Kilosbayan in support of its letter-complaint consisted of the published writings
of Teodoro Benigno in his column in the Philippine Star newspaper imputing to the so-called Sulo
Hotel Operation headed by PYHSDFI’s chairman, Ronaldo Puno, the commission of illegal election
activities during the May 11, 1992 elections, including the obtention of government funds for
electioneering purposes; the transcripts of record of the testimony of Secretary Enriquez before the
Coa during a hearing on October 5, 1993 and of the testimony of DILG Budget Officer Rafael Barata
before the Senate Finance Committee during a hearing on November 22, 1993; and an Affidavit
executed by Norberto Gonzales, a congressional candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections, who alleged
therein that at the Makati Headquarters of the Lakas-NUCD, in February, 1992, he overheard
respondents Franklin Drilon and Leonora de Jesus discussing party plans to use the funds of various
government offices to finance the party’s election campaign and that ten days or so before May 11,
1992, he obtained his election propaganda materials, following instructions from the party’s National
Headquarters, from the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City.
Then Comelec Chairman Christian Monsod resolved to refer Kilosbayan’s letter-complaint to the Law
Department for comment and/or recommendation. No rebuttal evidence was tendered by Kilosbayan
to dispute the counter-allegations of herein respondents.
The Law Department finds that there is insufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
respondents have Committed the acts being complained of and are probably guilty thereof and should
be held for further proceedings considering that the allegations in the complaint are plain conjectures,
speculations and based on hearsay evidence. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Or Not the claim of Kilosbayan that it is merely the "informant" and not the private
complainant with the burden to prove probable cause is correct. --- NO.
HELD: The claim of petitioner Kilosbayan that it is merely the "informant" and not the private
complainant with the burden to prove probable cause, borders on the ridiculous. Kilosbayan filed
before the Comelec a letter-complaint dated December 14, 1993 in support of which documentary
evidences like copies of Teodoro Benigno’s newspaper articles on the SHO’s use of PYHSDFI-obtained
CDF, of respondent Enriquez’s testimony before the Commission on Appointments, of DILG Budget
Officer Barata’s testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, and of Norberto Gonzales’ affidavit,
were likewise submitted by petitioner. The letter-complaint not being verified, it is not disputed that
Kilosbayan subsequently caused its verification; when later asked to give the names of the other John
Does in its letter-complaint, Kilosbayan obliged with a list, under oath, of additional respondents.
Kilosbayan initiated the complaint against herein respondents; it filed numerous pleadings before the
Comelec as a private complainant in E.O. Case No. 93-193; it proceeded in the case in accordance with
the Comelec Rules of Procedure pertinent to the prosecution of cases of election offenses. After all, the
Kilosbayan should have presented evidence and not proceeded and relied on mere conjecture and
hearsay evidence.
We cannot avoid to point out that no novel legal theory can distract even an ordinary layman from the
plain dearth of evidence of respondents’ culpability on the record.

Angel Naval Vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia

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Group 4: Case Digests for Election Law Atty. Freddie H.

Angel Naval vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia

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