FERRER, REGINA COELI S.

CASE NO. 26
ART. 420. PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION
SALVADOR LAUREL v. RAMON GARCIA (Asset Privatization Trust Head), RAUL MANGLAPUS (Secretary of Foreign
Affairs), and CATALINO MACARAIG (Executive Secretary) | DIONISIO S. OJEDA v. MACARAIG, ET. AL
GR No. 92013, July 25, 1990 | G.R. No. 92047, July 25, 1990

FACTS: These petitions for prohibition sought to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179
square meters of land at Roppongi, Tokyo, Japan. The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese govt through Reparations
Contract No. 300. The Roppongi property consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. It became the
site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to
the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to Pres Corazon Aquino by former PH Ambassador to Japan, Valdez, to make the property the subject
of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm, Kajima Corporation. However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal.
Instead, Pres Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of PH govt properties in Japan. Pres issued EO 296
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition. The 4 properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned.
Petitioner Vice Pres Laurel stated that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership
under Article 420 of the Civil Code, that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of
the said provision. Being one of public dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach to it, not even by the State.
The respondents refuted the petitioner's contention by saying that the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public
dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over 13
years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because the intention by the Executive Dept and the Congress to convert it to private
use has been manifested by overt acts, among others: (1) the transfer of the PH Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the issuance of AOs for
the possibility of alienating the 4 govt properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of EO. 296; (4) the enactment by the Congress CARL
which contains a provision stating that funds may be taken from the sale of PH properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding of the
public bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed.

ISSUE: W/N the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government.

RULING: NO. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the PH govt and the Japanese govt. There can be no doubt
that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. The purpose is not to serve
the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of
appropration.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part
of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such. The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials
insinuating a change of intention. An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the property. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal
premises.

CASE NO. 27
PRIVATE LANDS
NATIVIDAD ET. AL. v. CA & REPUBLIC OF PH (Director of Lands)
G.R. No. 88233, October 4, 1991
FACTS:
Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. (TCMC) filed in the CFI-Rizal an application for registration of title to 6 parcels of
land situated in Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal. The Director of Lands opposed the application on the grounds among others that:
o The parcels applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the PH not subject to private
appropriation; and
o The applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the Consti to hold alienable land of the public domain.
TCMC filed a motion for substitution, praying that it be substituted by petitioners Oscar Natividad, Eugenio Pascual and
Bartolome Ramos because TCMC sold to them the six parcels of land subject of its application. The motion was granted. In lieu of
TCMC, the petitioners thereafter adduced evidence in support of the application, showing that the original owners had possessed and
cultivated the land as owners for more than 30 years before they were sold to TCMC. CFI granted and ordered the registration of the
lots.

ISSUE: W/N the subject lots were already private when the registration proceedings were commenced.

RULING: YES. In this case, the parcels of land in question had already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive
prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them. All that was needed was the confirmation of the
titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC. Being already private land when TCMC bought them, the
prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through lease (Article
XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private
property.
 CASE NO. 28
ART. 339. PUBLIC DOMAIN; PLAZA
HARTY VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA,
13 Phil. 152 | G.R. No. L-5013, March 11, 1909

FACTS: On 1908, the representative of Harty (archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church) as the legal administrator of all the
properties and rights of the Catholic Church within the archbishopric of Manila, filed a written complaint in the CFI-Tarlac against the
municipality of Victoria, alleging that:
o the parish of the said town had been and was then the owner of a parcel of land within the said municipality, known as
the plaza of the church of Victoria;
o that it had acquired said parcel of land more than 60 years previously from late Taneda who donated it, and had
continued to possess the same ever since up to 1901, in which year the defendant municipality unlawfully and forcibly
seized the said property, claiming to be entitled thereto and retaining it to the present day.
The plaintiff prayed that judgment be entered holding that the said land was the property of the parish of Victoria, of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church, and that the defendant be ordered to vacate the same.
The defendant municipality answered that the plaza was founded when the sitio Canarum, a barrio of the town of Tarlac, was
converted into a civil town in 1855; that the parish of Tarlac was established many years after the civil town, and that therefore, it
neither had then, nor has now any title to the plaza claimed.

ISSUES: W/N the parish of Victoria is the rightful owner of the land in question
W/N the land in question can be subject of prescription.

RULING: NO.
1) The whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish home is a public plaza of the said town for
public use. Article 339 of the Civil Code reads:
Property of public ownership is:
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and
banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
Article 344 of said code also reads:
Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains,
and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces.
Although the late Tañedo, who owned the space of land where the church and parish house were erected, had voluntarily donated it to
the Catholic Church, but proper proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the said Tañedo comprehended the whole of the large
tract which constitute the plaza of the town. Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of
Victoria was the owner or proprietor of the said land, nor that it was in possession under the form and conditions required by law.
It has been fully proven that said plaza has been used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents of the town of Victoria
ever since its creation. Thus, the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public
plaza of the said town, of public use.
2) It should be noted that, among other things, plazas destined to the public use are not subject to prescription. (Art. 1936, Civil
Code.)

CASE NO. 29
ART. 339. PUBLIC DOMAIN; CREEK
MANECLANG v. IAC & MAZA ET. AL, 144 SCRA 553

FACTS: Petitioners Maneclang et.al. filed with the CFI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within the 4
parcels of land belonging to them. The CFI dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing their land is a
creek constituting a tributary to Agno River and hence public in nature and not subject to private appropriation.
The Maneclangs appealed the decision to the IAC but the IAC affirmed the CFI’s decision, they manifested that for lack of
interest on the part of Maza (the awardee in the public bidding), the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting a
Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing their ownership over the land and the body of water
found within their titled properties. Petitioners stated that there would be no benefit on their part, but to the advantage of the
municipality instead, since it is clear that after the National Irrigation Authority built the dike over the land, no water gets in
or out of the land.
The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of
petitioners of the fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and appellate courts, was originally a creek forming a
tributary of the Agno River.

ISSUE: W/N the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement adjudicating ownership over the questioned fishpond in favor of the
Maneclangs were valid.

RULING: NO. The stipulations in the Compromise Agreement were null and void and have no legal effect for being contrary to law
and public policy. The stipulations partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of the Maneclangs of the questioned
fishpond that was clearly found to be originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River, which belongs to the public domain and
is thus not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property
belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public
water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual.
Considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the NIA which prevented the water from flowing in and
out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public
domain. The finding that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain is a factual determination binding upon
the SC. The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with authority to pass, as it did, the
two resolutions dealing with its municipal waters, and it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process as
mere publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world.