CASE NO. 1
He would have remembered complainants had they actually appeared before him.
A.C. No. 5838             January 17, 2005
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, complainants, 
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,1 spouses Benjamin
Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious
misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyer’s oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of
land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by
respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page
No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that about six
years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo German over
the ownership of the land. The case was estafathrough falsification of a public
document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by
respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The spouses
allegedly forged his notarial signature on said deed.2
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of
sale contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an
impression of respondent’s notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in
the technicalities surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not
have forged the signature of herein respondent. They added that they had no access
to his notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have made any imprint of
respondent’s seal or signature on the subject deed of sale or elsewhere.3
In his answer4 to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He
denied having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed property. According
to respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law
Office where he was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that
he notarized several documents in that office, these, however, did not include the
subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents
underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was only when they gave their
approval that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions, the
secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior
associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent
added that he normally required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates
and made them personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary public.
While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latter’s
husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the
time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed
that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was
forged; the strokes were smooth and mild.l^vvphi1.net He suspected that a lady was
responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the
subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on
vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office and
enticed one of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize
the document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In a report5 it submitted to the Court, the
IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was
different from his signatures in other documents he submitted during the
investigation of the present case.6 However, it ruled that respondent was also
negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial functions,
including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register.7 It thus
recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent’s commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is
commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a commission as notary public for
two (2) years upon receipt hereof.8
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not
categorically state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale
notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that
respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The
records show that complainants themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed,
signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature
appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed
the signature of respondent on the deed.1awphi1.nét
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent’s contention that he only met
complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the deed of
sale. Respondent’s assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit
executed on November 17, 20019 wherein she stated that complainant Editha
Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her
husband since the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting between
complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted
that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another property
that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned
out: CASE NO. 2

xxx xxx xxx. EN BANC

Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent A.C. No. 5864             April 15, 2005
should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such
and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant, 
should not have been commissioned as notary public. vs.
ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document
for notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondent’s RESOLUTION
signature which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or
anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.
PER CURIAM:
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but
In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of
foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola,
notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should
the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional
not have relied on somebody else.10
Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly
the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of Juanito C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez
negligence in the performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already
SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is died on October 25, 2000.
commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary
public for a period of two years from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a
repetition of similar negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.
contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by
Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and
SO ORDERED. engineering designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to
supervise the project. For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur. issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C.
Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco.  The check was
Footnotes received and encashed by the latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by
1
 Rollo, p.1. respondent Ariola.
2
 Id., p. 2.
3
 Id.
4 Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized
 Rollo, p. 23.
5
 Notice of Resolution, Rollo, pp. 57-69. under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons
6
 Rollo, p. 67. participated in an act or proceeding when in fact they did not.
7
 Id.
8
 Id., Rollo, p. 69. In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had
9
 Annex 1, Rollo, p. 32.
10 already signed the SPA.  He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January
 Rollo. p. 68.
4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on
January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in
favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer
necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there
was no public document that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since similar charges had been filed with
the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings that the
assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD
1594,3 PD 1445,4 RA 71605 and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit
(COA). He stressed that no criminal and administrative charges were recommended
for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,6 the Court referred the complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its investigation report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney
dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after
Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that respondent cannot feign
innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at
the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and Awards
Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez
because the latter appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is
evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of
a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which
was allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special
Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans.7
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission be revoked
and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.8
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed
complainant's accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez
on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date,
Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation
imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve
the ends of justice,9 not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at all times
in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself
and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.10
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the respondent
notarized certain documents and made it appear that the deceased father of
complainant executed them, the Court declared the respondent there guilty of
violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.12 The Court
was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate
documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who
executed them and personally appeared before them to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries public must observe
utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise
the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be
undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000.
However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of
Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the latter's death. The
notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that Benitez "appeared before him
and acknowledged that the instrument was his free and voluntary act." Clearly,
respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless and routinary act.13 It converts a private document into a
public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.14
Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and
unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability.  His assertion
of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of
the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every
notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of
his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A
public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to his
constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive them and the
Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the
construction project could not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000
and could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract ― all to the extreme
prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator. According to the
COA Special Task Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article
171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the
transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects
Technical Management for the consultancy services in the conduct of
Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed
Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the
contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation,
manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of
facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the
purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit
perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and
partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence
of the required outputs. x x x15
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty
recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of
respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval- Complainant alleged that on 14 September 2000 respondent notarized a Special
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Power Attorney (SPA)2 supposedly executed by her. The SPA authorizes complainant’s
Tinga, Chico-Nazario,  and Garcia, JJ.,  concur. brother to mortgage her real property located in Antipolo City. Complainant averred
Footnotes that she never appeared before respondent. She maintained that it was impossible
for her to subscribe to the questioned document in the presence of respondent on 14
1 
Rollo, p. 1. September 2000 since she was in Germany at that time.
2 
Rollo, page 21.
3 
Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government Infrastructure
To support her contention, complainant presented a certified true copy of her
Contracts.
4 
Government Auditing Code. German passport3 and a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
5 
Local Government Code of 1991. (BID)4 indicating that she arrived in the Philippines on 22 June 2000 and left the
6 
Rollo, p. 40. country on 4 August 2000. The passport further indicated that she arrived again in
7 
Rollo, pp. 98-108. the Philippines only on 1 July 2001.
8 
Notice of Resolution, Rollo, p. 97.
9 
Essentials of Judicial and Legal Ethics by Sergio A. F. Apostol, p. 114.
10 
Id., p. 115.
Complainant submitted that because of respondent’s act, the property subject of the
11 
A.C. No. 4370, May 25, 2004. SPA was mortgaged and later foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Antipolo City.
12 
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. In his answer,5 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He narrated that
13 
Heck v. Judge Antonio E. Santos,  A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004. sometime in the middle of year 2000, spouses Wilfredo and Lorena Gusi approached
14 
Supra, at 5.
him to seek advice regarding the computer business they were planning to put up.
15 
"Annex B-2," Rollo, p. 54.
During one of their meetings, the spouses allegedly introduced to him a woman by
the name of Nesa G. Isenhardt, sister of Wilfredo, as the financier of their proposed
business.
CASE NO. 3
Respondent further narrated that on 14 September 2000, spouses Gusi, together with
SECOND DIVISION the woman purporting to be the complainant, went to his office to have the subject
SPA notarized. He maintained that the parties all signed in his presence, exhibiting to
A.C. No. 8254               February 15, 2012 him their respective Community Tax Certificates (CTCs). He added that the
(Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1310) complainant even presented to him the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT)6 of the property subject of the SPA evidencing her ownership of the
property.
NESA ISENHARDT, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. LEONARDO M. REAL, Respondent. Respondent noted that spouses Gusi even engaged his services as counsel in a civil
case filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City. The expenses
incurred for the case, which was predicated on the closure of their computer business
DECISION
for non-payment of rentals, was allegedly financed by complainant. The professional
engagement with the spouses was, however, discontinued in view of differences of
PEREZ, J.: opinion between lawyer and clients, as well as, non-payment of respondent’s
professional fees.
This case stemmed from the verified complaint1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on 9 September 2004 by Nesa G. Isenhardt (complainant), through Respondent concluded that complainant’s cause of action had already prescribed. He
her counsel Atty. Edgardo Golpeo, seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. argued that under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
Leonardo M. Real (respondent) for allegedly notarizing a document even without the of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a complaint for disbarment prescribes in two
appearance of one of the parties. years from the date of professional misconduct. Since the document questioned was
notarized in year 2000, the accusation of misconduct which was filed only in
The Antecedent Facts September 2004 had already prescribed. Moreover, respondent noted that the SPA in
question authorizing the grantee Wilfredo Gusi to mortgage the property of
complainant was not used for any transaction with a third person prejudicial to the
latter. The annotation at the back of the TCT7 would show that the property subject
of the SPA was instead sold by complainant to her brother Wilfredo for ₱500,000.00
on 12 January 2001. Thus, he submits that the SPA did not cause grave injury to the
complainant.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On 8 September 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-
405,8 which adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation9 of the
Investigating Commissioner. IBP Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa, after due
proceeding, found respondent guilty of gross negligence as a notary public and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year and
disqualified from reappointment as notary public for two (2) years.
Aggrieved, respondent on 13 November 2006 filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of
the aforesaid Resolution. This was, however, denied by the IBP Board of Governors in
a Resolution dated 11 December 2009.
Our Ruling
We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP. As stated by the IBP Board
of Governors, the findings of the Investigating Commissioner are supported by
evidence on record, as well as applicable laws and rules.
Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility11 when he made it appear that complainant personally appeared before
him and subscribed an SPA authorizing her brother to mortgage her property.
It cannot be overemphasized that a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the person who signs it is the same person who executed it, personally
appearing before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated
therein. This is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature
of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free
act.12
Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states:
The acknowledgement shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it,
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state.
Such requirement of affiant’s personal appearance was further emphasized in Section
2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by
the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules.
Respondent insists that complainant appeared before him and subscribed to the SPA
subject of the instant case. His contention, however, cannot prevail over the
documentary evidence presented by complainant that she was not in the Philippines
on 14 September 2000, the day the SPA was allegedly notarized. Respondent may
have indeed met complainant in person during the period the latter was allegedly
introduced to him by Spouses Gusi but that did not change the fact established by
evidence that complainant was not in the personal presence of respondent at the
time of notarization. It is well settled that entries in official records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.13 This principle aptly covers the Certification from the BID that
complainant left the Philippines on 4 August 2000 and arrived back only on 1 July
2001.
Respondent’s contention was further negated when he claimed that complainant
presented to him the original TCT of the property subject of the SPA. A perusal of the
TCT would reveal that ownership of the property was transferred to complainant only
on 10 January 2001. Thus, it could not have been presented to respondent by
complainant on 14 September 2000.
The allegation of respondent that there were other documents subscribed by
complainant during the interim of 4 August 2000 and 1 July 2001 or the time that she
was supposed to be in Germany deserves scant consideration. Such allegation was
refuted during the hearing before the Investigating Commissioner when counsel for
complainant informed Commissioner Funa that those documents are subjects of
criminal and civil cases pending before the Regional Trial Courts of Pasig, Antipolo
and Quezon City,14 where the documents are being contested for being spurious in
character.
Anent respondent’s claim of prescription of the offense pursuant to Section 1, Rule
VIII of the Rules of Procedure15of the Commission on Bar Discipline, we agree with
the Investigating Commissioner that the rule should be construed to mean two years
from the date of discovery of the professional misconduct. To rule otherwise would
cause injustice to parties who may have discovered the wrong committed to them
only at a much later date. In this case, the complaint was filed more than three years Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
after the commission of the act because it was only after the property was foreclosed and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
that complainant discovered the SPA. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
12 
Judge Lopena v. Atty. Cabatos, 504 Phil. 1, 8 (2005).
The duties of a notary public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public 13 
National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112287, 12 December
interest.16 It is not a meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging documents 1997, 283 SCRA 45, 76.
14 
executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is of no Rollo, p. 70.
15 
moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
Section 1. Prescription. A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
intended because the property was allegedly transferred from complainant to her
attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct.
brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them. What is being 16 
Lanuzo v. Bongon, A.C. No. 6737, 23 September 2008, 566 SCRA 214, 217.
penalized is respondent’s act of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of 17 
Gonzales v. Atty. Ramos, 499 Phil. 345, 351 (2005).
the parties. By notarizing the questioned document, he engaged in unlawful, 18 
Id. at 347.
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.17 A notarized document is by law entitled to 19 
Judge Lopena v. Atty. Cabatos, supra note 12; Lanuzo v. Bongon, supra note 16 at
full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the 218; Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, 517 Phil. 236 (2006); Tabas v. Atty. Mangibin, 466
basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public Phil. 297 (2004).
in notarized documents will be undermined.18 1âwphi1

In a catena of cases,19 we ruled that a lawyer commissioned as notary public having CASE NO. 4
thus failed to discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation of his notarial
commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period EN BANC 
of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year, are in order.
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real is hereby
REVOKED. He is disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of two PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, 
(2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, vs.
effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is directed to report the date of
receipt of this Decision in order to determine the date of effectivity of his suspension.
RESOLUTION
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information ROMERO, J.:
and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent’s personal record
as attorney. In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had
SO ORDERED. passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts
in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be could take his oath, however, complainant filed
the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a
Footnotes
child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated
* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 1195 dated 15 February 2012.
1 
Rollo, pp. 2-5. promises to many her.
2 
Id. at 6-7.
3 
Id . at 116-119. The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in
4 
Id. at 120-121. June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo.
5 
Id. at 15-18.
6  Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent
Id. at 32-35.
7 
Id. at 112. even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
8 
Id. at 125. fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in
9 
Id. at 126-130. 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.1 It
10 
Id. at 131-159. was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he
11 
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued
and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He
gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another
woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of
witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing  complainant's failure to comment
on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and that she
remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court
denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground
of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.2 Respondent's third
motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982.3 In
1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this
case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees.5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking.
On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and
that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the
charge of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore
an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he
did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The
Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy
between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither
so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into
sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even
after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable
and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual
congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively
pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led
astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with
another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into
because of love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman
scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent
suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very
hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other
indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age,
should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper
fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1 Respondent filed a Manifestation on December 4, 1995 informing the
Court of Rafael Barranco's death at age 28 years caused by cardio-
respiratory arrest and pancreatitis, Rollo, volume II, page 23.
2 Rollo, p. 238.
3 Rollo, p. 244.
 4 Appearance with Motion to Dismiss and to Allow Respondent to Take his
Oath and Sign Roll of Attorneys, September 2, 1988, Rollo, p. 247.
5 Rollo, p. 259. LAW OFFFICE
6 Reyes v. Wong, 63 SCRA 667 (January 29, 1975).
7 7 C.J.S. 959 cited in De los Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 (November 28, CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
1989).
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
8 106 SCRA 591 (August 14, 1981).
9 Also Radaza v. Tejano, 106 SCRA 250 (July 31, 1981) and Reyes v.
Wong, supra. Fe Marie L. Labiano
10 Bitangcor v. Tan, 112 SCRA 113 (February 25, 1982). Paralegal

CASE NO. 5
Tel: 362-7820
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr.
Fax: (632)
FIRST DIVISION Rm. M-01 
362-7821 
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Cel.: (0926)
A.C. No. 6672               September 4, 2009 Grace Park, Caloocan City
2701719

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, 
vs. Back
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:
SERVICES OFFERED:

This is a complaint for disbarment  filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan

1
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
of clients and encroachment of professional services.
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them ABROAD.
financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
1avvphi1
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit  of James
5

Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a
loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6
(emphasis supplied)
Front
Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO circulation of the said calling card.7

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting
cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27,
Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we
modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the
means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the
CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise
their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability
to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar
is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of
the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to
prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted
it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that
a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by
a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s
connection to his office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection
with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23Either of these circumstances may
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to
accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice
of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls
for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation
statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for
the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the
integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law
for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1
 Complaint dated February 1, 2005. Rollo, pp. 1-7.
2
 Overseas seafarers Cenen Magno, Henry Dy, James R. Gregorio and Noel Geronimo.
Id., pp. 2-3, 9-14.
3
 Id., p. 9.
4
 Involved benefits and disability collection cases. Id., pp. 2-3.
5
 Complaint, Annex "D." Id., pp. 12-14.
6
 Complaint, Annex "A." Id., p. 8.
7
 Answer dated April 26, 2005. Id., pp. 20-23.
8
 Resolution dated August 15, 2005. Id., p. 24.
9
 Report and recommendation penned by Commissioner Lolita Quisumbing dated
March 2, 2006. Id., pp. 106-111.
10
 Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 8.02 provides:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking
relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
11
 Rule 1.01; Canon 2; Rule 2.03; Canon 3; Rule 3.01; Canon 7; Rule 7.03; Canon 8;
Rule 8.01; Canon 9; and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rollo, p.
110.
12
 Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 27 provides:
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
13
 In Re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1933).
14
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 7th Edition (2002), p. 109.
15
 Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. See supra note 12.
16
 Supra  note 13.
17
 Agpalo. Supra  note 14, p. 72.
18
 McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 US 107, 64 L Ed 481, 40 S Ct 306 (1920).
19
 Or evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise (Portuguez
v. GSIS Family Savings Bank, G.R. No. 169570, 2 March 2007, 517 SCRA 309; Bautista
v. Sula, A.M. No. P-04-1920, 17 August 2007, 530 SCRA 406; ePacific Global Contact
 Center, Inc. v. Cabansay, G.R. No. 167345, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 498). interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Moreover, in In re: Improper Solicitation of Court Employees – Rolando H. Hernandez, Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
Executive Assistant 1, Office of the Court Administrator, A.M. No. 2008-12-SC, 24 April court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation
2009, the Court adopted the OCA’s evaluation which relied on the sworn statements
of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a
to support its conclusion that illegal acts were committed by respondents in this case.
20
 Supra note 14, p. 101. fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the
21
 Rollo, pp. 96-97. other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
22
 Agpalo, supra note 14, p. 240 citing  comments of the IBP Committee that drafted
the CPR, p. 90. Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
23
 Id.
24 Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6,
 Id.
25
 Supra  notes 10 and 12.
2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
26
 State Bar v. Kilpatrick, 874 SW2d 656 (1994, Tex). In this case, the lawyer was
disbarred. On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
27
 Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378. Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
28
 Id., p. 408. complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
CASE NO. 6 Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3

FIRST DIVISION In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
A.C. No. 5299               August 19, 2003 change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the
interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising;
that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
Information Office,Complainant, 
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling
vs.
that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
policy and public order as long as it is dignified.4

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053               August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,  Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in
his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the
July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
"ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation
of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
(1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299
per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether
or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is
not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its
early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the
other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in
which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow
considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14,
2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the
same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy &
Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the
Court’s authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society.
Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to
six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who
might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to
the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names
of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even
the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v.
Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer
may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of 21 
Id., p. 65.
22 
the profession. Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 407.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is CASE NO. 7
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The EN BANC
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a A.C. No. 6788               August 23, 2007
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis (Formerly, CBD 382)
and italics supplied)
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant, 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found vs.
GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise RESOLUTION
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely. PER CURIAM:

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
and guidance.
The Complaint
SO ORDERED.
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business. Elenita Jovellanos.2 She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter
issued a receipt for ₱5,000 only.3
Footnotes
1 
Rollo, p. 13.
2  The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Id., pp. 14-15.
3 
Id., p. 9. Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and
4 
Id., pp. 21-57. always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform
5 
Id., p. 60. her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.4 This happened six times
6 
Id., p. 62. and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her ₱350.
7 
Id., p. 72.
8 
Id., p. 75.
9 
Id., p. 73. After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She
10 
Id., p. 109. personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San
11 
Id., p. 110. Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case
12 
Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, 18 December 1989, 180 SCRA 246, 253. against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's
13 
Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 174. Office (PAO).5
14 
Agpalo R., LEGAL ETHICS, p. 12 [1997].
15 
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002.
16 
Agpalo, supra, at pp. 13-14, citing In re Sycip, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10; Pineda Respondent's Defense
E.L. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, p. 58 [1999].
17 
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 41. According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government
18 
Id., p. 110. service from the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a
19 
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.
20 
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, at p. 61.
district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of
Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.6
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages
against the Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the PAO and aware that the
complainant was not an indigent, he declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the
complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private
practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she
was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.10Notwithstanding Atty.
Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing
the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the complainant
asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's
acceptance fee.11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt
because one of her daughters asked her to account for the ₱5,000 she had previously
given the respondent for safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a friend, he
agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.13
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months later or in
September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the
Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to
prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with
the complainant.15
Recommendation of the IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from
the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and
recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.16
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was
still with the PAO.18 It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a
shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these
reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would
respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the
receipt to accommodate a friend's request.19 It found respondent guilty of violating
the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving
lawyer's fees other than their salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated
the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with
the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three
years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of
₱5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that
respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the
restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in
case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of
six months.22
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.23 More
specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of
their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of
the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.24
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public
service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)
(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.  -- In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws,
the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.25
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a
receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.26Respondent's
admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed
the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant.
Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was
still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private
practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO
was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent
litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative
Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-
judicial cases.28
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.29 Respondent violated
the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character
required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public
office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.321avvphi1
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the
benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the
amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in
satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)33 nor was it given to him
for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a government
lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.35
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath,
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to
return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned
from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and courts in the country.
promote respect for the law and legal processes.
SO ORDERED.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking includes the
observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent Footnotes
when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in * No part.
consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the 1
 Dated August 22, 1995.
cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 2
 Rollo  (Vol. I),  p. 1.
3
because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from  Id., pp. 1, 4.
4
acting as the complainant's counsel.  Id., p. 1.
5
 Id., pp. 1-2.
6
 Id., p. 11.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting 7
 Id.
attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only 8
 Id.
did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he 9
 Id.
10
should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really  Id., pp. 11-12.
11
filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were  Id., p. 12.
12
 Id.
being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that 13
 Id., p. 4.
never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath 14
 Id., p. 12.
not to do any falsehood.31 15
 Id., p. 13.
16
 Report and Recommendation of the CBD penned by Commissioner Acerey C.
Pacheco dated November 22, 2004. Rollo (Vol. III), p. 3-14.
 17
 Id. (Vol. I), p. 4. The document contains the text below: CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant, 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: vs.
RECEIVED from Mrs. Diana Ramos the amount five thousand pesos ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
(₱5000.00) in connection with her case entitled "DIANA RAMOS vs. ROQUE
& ELENITA JOVELLANOS for damages in the total amount of ₱150,000.00.
Pacita Complex, San Pedro, Laguna, RESOLUTION
July 15, 1992.
(Sgd.) ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG
PER CURIAM:
Rec'd. original:
(signature illegible)
18
 Id. (Vol. III), p. 11. For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency1 filed by
19
 Id., p. 11-12. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member
20
 Id., p. 12. of the Philippine Bar.
21
 Id.  (Vol. III), p. 14.
22
 Id., p. 2.
23
 De Guzman v. De Dios,  A.C. No. 4943, 26 January 2001, 350 SCRA 320, 324. Factual Background
24
 Vitrolio v. Dasig,  A.C. No. 4984, 1 April 2003, 400 SCRA 172, 179.
25
 Compare with Revised Rules on Civil Service, Rule XVIII, Sec. 12. The section
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the
provides:
[N]o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, practice of law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes;
vocation or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, filing of multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the to falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow
head of the Department. lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
See also Lorenzana v. Fajardo,  A.C. No. 5712, 29 June 2004, 462 SCRA 1.
26
 Amaya v. Tecson,  A.C. No. 5996, 7 February 2005, 450 SCRA 510, 515.
27
 Mandate of the PAO.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:
28
 See  RA 9407, Sec. 2.
29
 The mission of the PAO is: Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
"To provide indigent litigants free access to courts, judicial and quasi- professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
judicial agencies by rendering legal assistance in consonance with the imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of
constitutional mandate that 'free access to court shall not be denied by
one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we
reason of poverty.'"
30
 Lawyer's Oath. See also  Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20(a). limit ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of suspension for two (2) years.
31
 Lawyer's Oath. See also  Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 1.01.
32
 Supra  note 24 at 180. Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed,
33
 See Manalang v. Angeles,  A.C. No. 1558, 10 March 2003, 398 SCRA 687. and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules
34
 See Businos v. Ricafort,  A.C. No. 4349, 22 December 1997, 283 SCRA 407.
35 and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice,we believe and so
 Civil Code, Art. 2154. The article provides:
Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it and
hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him
it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of
Also  Civil Code, Art. 2159. The article provides: justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the
Art. 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment shall pay legal legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the
interest if a sum of money is involved, or shall be liable for fruits received interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else,
which should have been received if the thing produces fruits. particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice,
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of the thing this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
from any cause, and for damages to the person who delivered the thing,
until it is recovered.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical
infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo
Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before
CASE NO. 8 the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We
EN BANC showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We
cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any
A.C. No.7054               November 11, 2014 lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It
is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of the
public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164
dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11,
2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as
respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules
12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent
should be DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion3 praying that his license to practice law be restored based on
humanitarian considerations, but the Court En Bancresolved to deny the petition for
lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor,
and Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him.
He maintained that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe
penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame on another individual (a
certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to
free himself from liability by claiming that one of the charges leading to his
disbarment was not of his own doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the
Court’s compassion and mercy.6He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has
learned his lesson; but at the same time, questioning the Court’s finding for lackof
factual support. He appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP
membership dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of
Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by a Resolution10 dated August 2,
2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter  addressed to the Members of the
11
Court En Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He
alleged among others that for more than three years that he has been disbarred in
the practice of law, he has never been involved in any immoral or illegal activities,
has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine,
CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular monthly
lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has participated
as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged
the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose.
The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement
professing repentance and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Court’s
consideration, and vowed that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but
instead, devote his time and energy for its proper observance and implementation.
He also stated that for almost three years of being disbarred from the practice of law,
he has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He
promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal proficiency, morality,
integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in
accordance with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of
merit. Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court
to revisit his previousrequests for reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August
2, 2011, July3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe
motion with finality.16 On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for
Judicial Clemency17 reiterating his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty
of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail
and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5)
and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had
been excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity
pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal
Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law
again, but to be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have
peace of mind. Heexpressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full
responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and
that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he
submitted a Medical Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease,
and a certification19 from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City,
proving that he and his family are dedicated parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.20 It is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a
special privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness
inintellectual attainment and in moral character.21 The same reasoning applies to
reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant
reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their present
moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though
the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred
attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general
public to ensure that if the doors are opened,it is done so only as a matter of
justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the
lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and
character.23 Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to
a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.24 The lawyer has to demonstrate
and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character
and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and
the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.25
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent
had demonstrated an active involvement and participation in community and church
activities by joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing.
Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in
Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his townmates who were
inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the respondentwas appointed as a Municipal
Administrator and had continued extending assistance to the indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community
projects, through the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980
to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he
served as a member, Director, and President from 1982 to 1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his
indiscretions and claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike
in his previous petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no
longerquestioned the Court’s decision. According to him, he has long expressed deep
remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him
sufficient time to reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and
repentance, and to realize the gravity of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the
respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his time and effort in pursuing
civic and religious work that significantly contributed to his character reformation.He
professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he has been an active
member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and
through his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs in his
parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal
Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church
of St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral
fiber as shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he
had sufficiently achieved moral reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or
not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the
time hewas disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions
and to repent. The Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of
advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat
he had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing
his religious and social writings; and the religious organization named "El Cristo
Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court
considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he was
disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the
reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material
fact in a CA decision) and considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time
to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the
Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and
repeated pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty
of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the
document in court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15
years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been
persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and
civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and professional organizations,
government institutions, and members of the judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before
and after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere
realization and acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four
(4) years is sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his
professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was
found guilty of gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus
Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross
misconduct for committing willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing
court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law – mostly the same grounds
on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus
Builders, we granted the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reduced the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months 15
 Unpaged, Letter dated March 24, 2013.
out of compassion to the respondent. 16
 Unpaged, Notice dated June 4, 2013.
17
 Unpaged.
18
Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of  Unpaged, Medical Abstract dated July 1, 2014.
19
the penalty imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against  Unpaged, Letter from St. Peter Parish: Shrine of Leaders dated May 4,
him still pending review by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that 2014.
20
the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not  In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A.
considerably long considering the nature and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. Edillion, A.C. No. 1928, December 19, 1980, 101 SCRA 612.
21
We believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s  In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful
reinstatement. Bar Applicant Al C. Argosino, B.M. No. 712, July 13, 1995, 246 SCRA 14,
citing In Re Keenan, 314 Mass 544, 50 NE 2d 785 (1943).
22
 Scholl v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 213 S.W. 3d 687 (Ky. 2007).
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging 23
 McGuire v. The Mississippi Bar, 798 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 2001).
his guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full 24
 Bernardo v. Mejia, Adm. Case No. 2984, 558 Phil. 398, 401 (2007).
responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other 25
 Id., citing Cui v. Cui, 120 Phil. 725, 731 (1964).
individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted 26
 Id.
his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his 27
 G.R. No. 100643, 321 Phil. 556, 560 (1995).
contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is again 28
 A. C. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543, 579 Phil. 1 (2008).
worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that 29
 A.C. No. 7056, 533 Phil. 250 (2006).
the respondent had completely reformed.
CASE NO. 9
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate
physical condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to
the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established FIRST DIVISION
moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity.
Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself
and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from
the practice of law stands. LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed
by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.
DECISION

SO ORDERED.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Footnotes
* On official leave. On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1 was filed by complainant
** On official leave. Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross
*** On official leave. misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he
5
 Unpaged, Notice of Resolution dated February 8, 2011. neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing
6
 Unpaged, Most Respectful Appeal for Compassion and Mercy. attorney’s fees.
7
 Unpaged, OfficialReceipt No. 818682.
8
 Unpaged, Official Receipt No. UPD-2305656. According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in
9
 Unpaged, Letter from the Roman Catholic Bishop of Boac. January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters
10
 Unpaged, Notice of Resolution dated August 2, 2011. Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the
11
 Unpaged, Letter dated May 16, 2012. release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property
12
 Unpaged, Notice of Resolution dated July 3, 2012. identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said
13
 Unpaged, Most Respectful Petition for Judicial Clemency. bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending
14
 Unpaged, Notice of Resolution dated October 9, 2012.
before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case
No. B-2610.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the
hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in
the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case
No. B-2610.2
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he
received from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the
deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
The complaint was referred3 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner submitted his report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01
and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provide:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the
latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or
to the persons specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan,
even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be
made the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be
established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case
which compels the exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The
dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly
demonstrated. x x x.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the
Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00
savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit
is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the compromise
agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as
commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by
luring complainant to participate in a compromise agreement with a false and
misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her
foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.4
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the
public and the legal profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be
suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will
be severely dealt with.5
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating
commissioner.6
We agree with the findings of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected
to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct8 and are mandated to serve their clients with competence and
diligence.9 They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this
negligence in connection therewith shall render them liable.10
Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery of
complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s Development Bank cannot be sustained.
Records show that he acted as complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six
compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B- months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount
2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.19
complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02,
recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from
charge only fair and reasonable fees.11 the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED
that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered
Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to
in the compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance
foreclosure of her property; that the redemption period has already expired thus within three (3) days therefrom.
consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she releases her claims against it.12As
found by the Investigating Commissioner, complainant agreed to these concessions Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the
because respondent misled her to believe that she could still redeem the property IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client’s information and guidance.
interests commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or the final
disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client
SO ORDERED.
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client’s cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost Footnotes
1
devotion.13  Rollo, pp. 2-4.
2
 Position Paper for Complainant, id.  at 49.
3
 Id.  at 42.
Respondent’s admission14 that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a 4
 Id.  at 106-107.
referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to 5
 Id,  at 107.
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in
6
 Id.  at 102.
7
certain cases.15  Garcia v. Bala, A.C. No. 5039, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 85, 91.
8
 Rule 1.01.
9
 Canon 18.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be 10
 Rule 18.03.
disbarred or suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other 11
 Canon 20.
12
gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime  Rollo, pp. 37-39.
13
involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience to  Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda, A.C. No. 5162,
any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 296, 303.
14
 Rollo, p. 90.
party without authority. 15
 Rule 9.02.
16
 445 Phil. 1, 5 (2003).
In Santos v. Lazaro16  and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,17 we held that Rule 18.03 of the 17
 A.C. No. 5655, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 508, 514.
Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer
18
 Abiero v. Juanino A.C. No. 5302, February 18, 2005, 452 SCRA 1, 10.
19
takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting  Garcia v. Bala, supra note 7 at 95-96; Ferrer v. Tebelin, A.C. No. 6590, June 27,
2005, 461 SCRA 207, 217; Macarilay v. Seriña, A.C. No. 6591, May 4, 2005, 458 SCRA
his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such
12, 26; Dalisay v. Mauricio, supra at 515-516.
lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable
not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.

A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case. Once he
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he
fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept
only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his
clients’ interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle
the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost
fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client’s cause.18