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The leaders and bureaucrats of China have actively attended, initiated, promoted
or made skillful use of regional multilateral political, economic, and security
institutions to accelerate regional cooperation and integration with neighboring
states, convince Asian states that China’s rise will not threaten the regional order
and their national interests, and exploit its role and diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific
as a launch pad for greater influence in world affairs.
This book examines why, and to what extent China wishes to promote, acceler-
ate, delay, or overcome constraints to, the institutionalization of these regional
organizations. It explores the meaning, scope and repercussion in the drive that a
rising China has for institutionalizing multilateral cooperative processes in the
Asia-Pacific region, the extent to which its actions are motivated by concerns of
politics, economics or security, and the obstacles it faces for so doing. These
arrangements have varying effect on the diplomatic postures, economic develop-
ment, and strategic orientation of countries in Asia and the Western Pacific, and
hence the stability and prosperity of the entire region.
China’s Multilateral Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific will be of interest to
those studying the politics and international relations of China and the Asia-Pacific
region.
Chien-peng Chung
First published 2010
by Routledge
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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
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This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010.
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1 Introduction 1
2 China’s “Good Neighbor Policy” 13
3 China’s approaches to Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation 27
4 China’s approaches to the ASEAN regional forum 42
5 China’s participation in Shanghai Five and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization 55
6 China’s participation in ASEAN + 3 and
ASEAN + China 72
7 China’s participation in the Four-Party Talks and
Six-Party Talks 87
8 China’s venture into the Pacific 98
9 Conclusion 111
Notes 124
Bibliography 147
Index 159
Illustrations
Figure
8.1 Map of Pacific Islands Forum countries 104
Tables
5.1 Institutionalization of Shanghai Five vs. Shanghai Cooperation
Organization: Meetings and Organs 63
6.1 Institutionalization of ASEAN + 3 vs. ASEAN + China:
Meetings and Organs 83
7.1 Institutionalization of Four-party-talks vs. Six-party-talks:
Meetings 93
7.2 Institutionalization of Four-party-talks vs. Six-party-talks:
Level of meetings and number of sub-committees 93
8.1 China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and
Cooperation Forum 102
Preface
When China entered the global stage as a serious player, the established actors
assigned it a supporting role. But the new actor was too good a performer to
remain on the sidelines. It made its way into the limelight and not only joined the
act, but changed the allocation of roles and the setting of the stage.
John and Doris Naisbitt, authors of China Megatrends
The national leaders and bureaucrats of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
have actively attended, initiated, promoted or made skillful use of regional multi-
lateral political, economic, and security institutions like the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN +
China, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN + 3) / ASEAN + China, Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), Six-Party Talks (6PT) and the China–Pacific Island
Countries Economic Development and Cooperation (CPIC) Forum, to accelerate
regional cooperation and integration with neighboring states, convince Asian
states that China’s rise will not threaten the regional order and their national
interests, and exploit its role and diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific as a launch pad
for greater influence in world affairs.
In this sense, the Naisbitts are right. However, few assessments have been made
on how China intends to take the lead in institutionalizing regional groupings,
what are the factors impeding its push for greater institutionalization of regime
architectures, and why it might not want to see some arrangements institutional-
ized. Although Beijing is clearly the prime mover of the SCO, ASEAN + China
and CPIC Forum, and the principal mediator in the 6PT, it seems to have been
obstructed from institutionalizing ASEAN + 3 to any extent, and may be regarded
as a major obstacle to the structuring of both the APEC and ARF forums.
Thus, a major purpose of the book is to detail why and to what extent China
wishes to promote, accelerate, retard, or overcome constraints to, the institution-
alization of these regional organizations. It will explore the meaning, scope, and
repercussion in the drive that a rising China has for institutionalizing multilateral
cooperative processes in the Asia-Pacific region, the extent to which its actions
are motivated by concerns of politics, economics, or security, and the obstacles it
faces for so doing.
xiv Preface
China’s conduct in constructing multilateral regimes or institutions reflects not
only an increasing level of comfort in subscribing to norms of predictable inter-
dependent behavior with other states, but also an aspiration to shape the rules of
the game for regional cooperation. As such, although still professing and encour-
aging adherence to the norms of sovereignty and non-interference in what it
considers to be states’ internal affairs, its enthusiasm toward structuring, regular-
izing, and deepening regional multilateral institutions has been increasing.
The PRC’s active participation in regional multilateral arrangements thus
reflects its growing attention to, and serves to augment its influence in, its broad
Asia-Pacific neighborhood. Initially considered by the United States of America
(USA) and other countries as useful vehicles to “socialize” China to liberal capi-
talist and peaceful norms, respectively, APEC and ARF would prove to be impor-
tant platforms for China to improve, develop and extend its diplomatic profile,
economic relations, and security with countries in the Asia–Pacific.
China has since become motivated and confident enough to promote a regional
institution from which the USA and its allies are excluded – the SCO, which is a
PRC-sponsored group including Russia and Central Asian states to combat terror-
ism, separatism, and Islamic fundamentalism. The 6PT enables China to play a
crucial mediating role in North Korean nuclear disarmament. ASEAN + 3/
ASEAN + China allow the PRC to legitimize and consolidate its diplomatic,
economic, and even security presence in Southeast Asia, chiefly in the course of
negotiating the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and South China Sea
disputes. Through the CPIC Forum, China is staking a claim to a share of the
influence in, and fisheries and other resources from, the Pacific islands, mainly
by offering aid.
International relations in Asia are undergoing fundamental and irreversible
change – a principal cause being the rise of China and its increasing involvement
and leadership in regional multilateral institutions. These arrangements, through
their structures, member states’ interests and norms, and China’s roles and influ-
ence, have varying effect on the diplomatic postures, economic development, and
strategic orientation of countries in Asia and the Western Pacific, and hence the
stability and prosperity of the entire region. As such, a book on this subject
should make for absorbing, or at the minimum interesting, reading. At least this
is what the author hopes.
C. P. Chung
Hong Kong
December 2009
Acknowledgment
The author wishes to thank the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International
Scholarly Exchange for its generous support in funding in part the research that
resulted in the publication of this book.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders but if any have been
inadvertently overlooked please contact the publisher.
1 Introduction
Within the past two decades, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, a major develop-
ment in international politics has been the formation and development of multi-
lateral arrangements in Asia and the Pacific, with which China’s involvement in
regional cooperation and integration is closely associated. The People’s Republic
of China (PRC) has even been perceived as the main initiator in the institution-
alization of several regional multilateral processes in Northeast Asia, Southeast
Asia, Central Asia and the Pacific Ocean, or at least an active participant. There
seems to be little doubt that China has, in the words of a China scholar, “become
a born-again regional multilateralist.”1 This book will explore the meaning, scope
and implications for neighboring countries of a rising China’s drive for institu-
tionalizing multilateral cooperative processes in the Asia-Pacific region, and the
extent to which its actions are motivated by concerns of politics, economics or
security.
As recently as a dozen years ago, academic conventional wisdom held that
PRC officials conducted themselves at multilateral economic and security forums
in the East Asia-Western Pacific region in a tepid manner, and opposed efforts at
institutionalizing these forums, for fear that giving them structure would constrain
the PRC’s own national interests and provide a platform for other state representa-
tives to question its sovereignty claims over Taiwan. Scholars have since perceived
that the PRC government, in its conduct of diplomacy, has been moving from a
position of staunchly advocating state sovereignty, non-interference, and bilateral
relationships with powerful countries to an increasingly keen embrace of coop-
erative multilateralism, particularly in the regions surrounding China, with the
adoption of a “Good Neighbor Policy.”2 Yet, few investigations have been
conducted on how China intends to take the lead in institutionalizing some
regional groupings, what factors are impeding its push for greater institutionaliza-
tion of regime architectures, and why it might not want to see other arrangements
institutionalized.
This book will thus explore the meaning and extent of China’s on-going drive
for the institutionalization of regional cooperative processes in the Asia-Pacific
region, by positing two main considerations i) whether the major players are
well-disposed enough toward China to let it have its way, and ii) the importance
of the issues that the specific forum is set up to deal with, particularly to China.
2 Introduction
Although bilateral relations with great powers and interactions with the European
Union, the Arab World, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America and Latin America
are undeniably important considerations of China’s foreign policy, they are not
normally considered to be in the neighborhood of China and subject to the
conduct of its “Good Neighbor Policy,” and hence are excluded from the focus
of this book.
No major foreign policy initiatives or changes were carried out at the Chinese
Communist Party’s Seventeenth National Congress in October 2007 or the first
session of the People’s Republic of China’s 11th National People’s Congress in
March 2008. This was unsurprising, as they occurred around the mid-term of the
tenure of China’s current Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao leadership. Yet, as the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) celebrates October 1, 2009, the sixtieth anniversary of
its founding, China’s rising diplomatic, economic, and strategic profile in the
world means that closer attention should be paid to the continuities and adjust-
ments in the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, as they will have a
definite effect on the international community, particularly countries in China’s
neighborhood of Southeast Asia, Russia-Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and
South Asia.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a member of only two regular regional
security organizations in which representatives of national governments are the
participants – the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Shanghai Cooperative
Organization (SCO). The PRC plays salient roles in both the ARF and SCO,
although for different reasons.
The PRC’s participation in the ARF and SCO reflects its growing attention to
security-related matters in the Asia-Pacific and Central Asia-Eurasia regions,
respectively, since the mid-1990s. Both the ARF and SCO serve the PRC’s secu-
rity interests in its neighborhood: the ARF does so by giving the Chinese a major
voice in the process of conflict management in Southeast Asia, and the SCO does
so by pledging security cooperation with Central Asian states and Russia in a
Chinese sponsored grouping to fight the “three evils” of separatism, terrorism,
and Islamic extremism.1 The PRC’s involvement in both organizations also
demonstrates its pursuit of a foreign policy strategy to reduce perception of a
putative threat from an economically and militarily rising China to countries in
the surrounding Pacific and Asian regions.
APEC and ARF are consultative groupings where non-binding decisions are
reached gradually by consensus. Both may be regarded as large trans-Pacific or
trans-regional settings where the Chinese were principally concerned about seek-
ing a “voice” in policy consultations, and in many aspects, working to preclude
other participants from impinging on China’s political, economic, and security
interests. After participating, albeit defensively for a number of years, the
Chinese government became very active in facilitating the formation and devel-
opment of new associations that would reinforce a larger process of collaboration
and accommodation between Beijing and its geographically contiguous Asia-
Pacific region, and pursue closer comprehensive interdependence with its neigh-
bors, even to the point of excluding Western states. Perhaps the most notable
of these arrangements is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a
regional security organization of states.
Summit level
Head of State meeting Head of State meeting till June 2009 (9x)
till July 2000 (5x)
Prime Minister meeting till October 2009 (8x)
Meeting of Parliamentary Speakers till May
2006 (1x)
Ministerial level
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs till May
Affairs till April 2001 (2x) 2009 (12x) (three extraordinary)
Meeting of Ministers of Defense till Meeting of Ministers of Defense till April 2009
March 2000 (1x) (7x)
Meeting of Ministers of Culture till April 2008
(5x)
Meeting of Ministers of Economy and Tradetill
September 2008 (7x)
Meeting of Ministers of Transport till August
2004 (3x)
Meeting of Ministers of Education till October
2006 (1x)
Meeting of Ministers of Internal Affairs and
Public Security till May 2009 (1x)
Committee / Agency/ Department level
Heads of law-enforcement bodies Heads of law-enforcement bodies and security
and security services (Bishkek group services (Bishkek group meeting) till May 2002
meeting) till November 1999 (1x) (2x)
Meeting of Heads of Departments on prevention
and elimination of emergency events (Extreme
Measures) till June 2009 (4x)
Meeting of General Public Prosecutors till
September 2003 (2x)
Meeting of the SCO Council of National
Coordinators till April 2009 (23x)
Meeting of the SCO RATS Council till March
2008 (11x)
Meeting of the Heads of Supreme Courts till
September 2006 (1x)
Permanent staff
Secretariat – Beijing, PRC Headed by
Secretary-General Four Deputy Secretaries
30 Staff Members
RATS – Tashkent, Uzbekistan Headed by
Executive Director Permanent Representatives
64 China’s participation in Shanghai Five and SCO
The SCO since its seventh summit and China’s relations
with Russia
The seventh summit meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the
SCO was held on August 16, 2007, in Bishkek, capital city of Kyrgyzstan. This
meeting was substantive in witnessing a definite shift of the organization’s
priorities from combating terrorism, separatism, and Islamic fundamentalism in
general to four specific aspects that had been discussed at previous SCO summits
since 2004 but never highlighted until then – Afghanistan, membership qualifica-
tions, establishment of an energy club, and comprehensive military cooperation.
Afghanistan
The resurgence of the militant Islamist Taliban in Afghanistan is worrying
some SCO members, particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which share porous
borders with that country.36 Consequently, the summit in Bishkek spotlighted
security threats coming from Afghanistan following the less than successful mili-
tary operations conducted by the USA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) since the end of 2001 to flush out the Taliban fighters from their moun-
tain strongholds. The SCO resolved to address these problems with the authori-
ties of Afghanistan through the SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group, as well as with
those of Pakistan, where many Taliban fighters have sought refuge across the
border from their own country.
In the Bishkek Declaration, put out at the end of the summit, the Heads of State
expressed concern over the threat of narcotics smuggling coming from Afghanistan
and its destabilizing effect on Central Asia, and have called for the creation of an
“anti-narcotics belt” around Afghanistan,37 without specifying yet the form that
this cordon sanitaire should take. According to the World Drug Report,
Afghanistan accounts for more than 90 percent of world illegal opium produc-
tion, which is used to produce heroin.38 Then Russian President Vladimir Putin
urged the SCO to host an international conference on Afghanistan with the aim
of interdicting the drug trade and boosting stability there,39 which took place in
Moscow on March 27, 2009.40 The narcotics problem with Afghanistan was in
fact first raised at the Fourth SCO summit in June 2004 at the Uzbek capital of
Tashkent, where an accord was achieved to tighten customs regimes bordering
Afghanistan, improve anti-drug smuggling efforts, and develop and implement
relief programs for poppy farmers in that country.41 Apparently, few results must
have accrued from these labors to have the issues revisited repeatedly. This
reflected in all likelihood the Afghan authorities’ inability to eradicate the drug
situation in the country, as a result of their incomplete control over its territory.
By stating in the Bishkek Declaration that SCO member states stand ready to
participate in efforts to normalize the political situation in Afghanistan and
develop economic cooperation with it,42 the SCO is putting the USA and the
world on notice that it intends to arrogate for itself a larger role in Afghan affairs
on the eventual reduction and departure of US and NATO troops.
China’s participation in Shanghai Five and SCO 65
Membership
The Presidents of Iran and Mongolia attended the summit, as did the Foreign
Minister of Pakistan and the Gas and Oil Minister of India, all representing
observer states in the SCO. The President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, who has
attended SCO summits since 2004, the President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly
Berdymukhammedov, and United Nations Undersecretary-General Lynn Pascoe
attended the summit as guests of the SCO.
At the summit, both Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri, and Iran’s
President, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, said that they wanted their respective coun-
tries to receive full membership in the SCO.43 However, at the previous summit
meeting in 2006, the six SCO member states had already decided to place a
temporary ban on the admission of new members,44 and officials from China and
Russia have stated that new members will not be accepted at the present summit,
saying that a mechanism for adding new members has not yet been worked out.45
The organization’s charter does not, at present, contain procedures for the inclu-
sion of new members. If and when it does, Pakistan would seem like a natural
candidate for SCO membership, as its government is also in the fight against
terrorism. Bringing Iran fully into the SCO fold would firmly secure that coun-
try’s oil and natural gas supplies for China and allow China and Russia more
influence over Iran’s foreign policy. However, Chinese and Russian leaders are
concerned that extending membership to Iran would be read by the USA and the
European Union (EU) as an unnecessarily provocative endorsement of Iran’s
nuclear program, and it does not serve the interest of either China or Russia, at
least at this moment, to embark on a collision course with the West.
The attendance of Turkmenistan’s new President, Gurbanguly Berdymukham-
medov, marked the first time a leader from that country has ever participated in an
SCO event. Berdymukhammedov became Turkmenistan’s President only in
February 2007, two months after the death of his predecessor, Saparmurat
“Turkmenbashi” Niyazov, under whom the country practiced a foreign policy of
“positive neutrality” that prohibited it from joining any organization with a mili-
tary or counter-terrorism aspect.46 If and when Turkmenistan expresses its desire
to join the SCO, its request will very likely be honored, as the SCO was established
to manage the affairs of Central Asia, and Turkmenistan is a state in the region.
The mechanism for admitting new members may not have been devised
yet, but a set of “Regulations on Observer Status at the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization” was promulgated at the conclusion of the summit. For an observer
state or intergovernmental organization, perhaps the most interesting and relevant
aspects of this set of rules are the rights to attend open meetings of the organiza-
tion’s Heads of State Council, Council of the Heads of Government (Prime
Ministers), Council of Foreign Ministers, and conferences of Heads of Ministries
and Departments, and circulate through the SCO Secretary-General statements on
issues of their concern.47 Although observers do not have the right to vote, and
many meetings to decide the structure and policies of the organization take place
behind closed doors, the “Regulations” will have the effect of opening up more
66 China’s participation in Shanghai Five and SCO
avenues for inputs from observer states, and should be read as a sign of further
maturation and institutionalization of the organization.
Energy
One important reason why the SCO has been gaining clout and attention is that
the association spans a region that is rich in oil and natural gas reserves. The
President of oil-rich Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, stated that he believed
the region’s Soviet-era network of gas and oil pipelines could form the basis for
an Asian energy market, and told summit participants that a SCO Energy Club,
as the core of an Asian energy strategy, should function in the context of a
mechanism of meetings of energy ministers from SCO member and observer
states.48 A strategy to ensure steady energy supply for SCO states was in fact first
mooted at the Sixth SCO summit in Shanghai in June 2006. This SCO Energy
Club would unite energy producing, consuming and transit countries in coordi-
nating strategies with the aim of increasing energy security.49 In response, Iranian
President Ahmadinejad stated that he was prepared to organize a meeting of SCO
oil or energy ministers to discuss energy cooperation.50 An expanding trade in fuel
could also give impetus to regional projects, particularly those relating to infra-
structure such as the construction of roads, railways, and oil and gas pipelines.
The Energy Club idea was well-received by the Chinese, for it could lessen
China’s dependence on hydrocarbon imports from the volatile Middle East.
Given the vagaries of Russia’s monopolistic and unpredictable foreign energy
policies, Chinese interests in the energy resources of Central Asian states will
provide them with new markets and new opportunities in attracting major foreign
infrastructure investments. Although the US$700 million, 688-mile pipeline from
Kazakhstan’s Atasu to Western China’s Alashankou had barely become oper-
ational in 2007 with an initial throughput of 10 million tons per annum,51
Kazakhstan committed itself to investing US$800 million between 2006 and
2008 in gas pipelines to boost exports from its Kenkiyak and Kumkol oil fields
to China.52 China is also increasing the amount of oil it buys from Aktyubinsk or
Aktobe in Western Kazakhstan by purchasing another US$1.9 billion of Kazakh
oil reserves.53 Rising prosperity in Central Asia suits the Chinese just fine.
Chinese leaders want the region both to be a steady source of hydrocarbon supply
and a safe market for Chinese goods.
During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Bishkek ahead of the SCO
summit, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev asked that a gas pipeline
to be built from Turkmenistan, which is rich in natural gas, to China be allowed
to pass through Kyrgyzstan, so that the country can diversify its present sole
source of gas import from Uzbekistan.54 Under the terms of an agreement signed
in April 2006, Turkmenistan will supply China with 30 billion cubic meters
(bcm) of natural gas per year by pipeline, beginning in 2009. This figure has since
been raised to 40 bcm.55 In September 2006, China approved construction of a
multibillion-dollar gas pipeline from the Amu Darya in Turkmenistan to its
southern commercial metropolis of Guangzhou.56 In April 2007, Uzbekistan
China’s participation in Shanghai Five and SCO 67
signed an agreement with China to jointly construct a natural gas pipeline to
supply China with 30-40 bcm of gas within 30 years of 2010, by which time the
pipeline, which will be joined to the Turkmenistan–Kazakhstan-China pipeline,
should be operational.57 Aside from hydrocarbon, after Afghanistan’s President
Hamid Karzai opened the country to foreign investment of natural resources in
2007, the China Metallurgical Group won the rights to develop the world’s largest
undeveloped copper field at Anyak, for US$3.5 billion.58 This is demonstration
of China’s increased role in a neighboring observer member state of the SCO.
Russia is building its own network of oil and gas pipelines from Siberia to
China. According to Dmitri Trenin, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, by creating an energy club for the SCO, Moscow is
hoping to play up its role as principal supplier of oil and gas to China as the prin-
cipal energy importer, and also raise Russia’s state-owned oil and gas company
Gazprom’s stakes in Central Asia.59 The USA has long sought pipeline routes
from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea via the Caucasus that would circumvent
Russia and allow it to tap directly into Central Asia’s energy resources. If the
SCO does agree to coordinate controls over the production, transportation, and
export of hydrocarbon resources, it would certainly be to the interests of Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan as major producers of oil and gas and China as a
key consumer of these resources on which its phenomenal economic growth
depends. However, so doing may well adversely affect the prices and quantities
of Russian and Central Asian oil and gas that are piped to their Eastern and
Central European customers, and thereby harm the relationship between the EU
and the SCO. Hence, SCO hydrocarbon exporters will have to balance the fuel
interests of both West and East.
Military
On August 9, 2007, the SCO began military exercises involving some 6,500
soldiers from the organization’s six member states. Code-named “Peace Mission
2007,” this set of exercises is of the largest scale and longest duration conducted
by the SCO to date. The nine days of live-firing drills, from August 9 to 17, took
place in two phases. Phase One occurred in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region where the Chiefs-of-Staff of the six participating military forces held
discussions in the regional capital of Urumqi and gave orders for the exercise.
Phase Two saw the exercise grounds moving to a Russian military base at
Chelyabinsk in the Ural Mountains. For the exercise, the People’s Liberation
Army of China dispatched a 1,600-member contingent, 32 Mi-17 and Z-9 helicop-
ters, six heavy transport aircraft, eight attack aircraft, and a company of airborne
troops.60 Russia mobilized 4,700 soldiers, 36 aircraft, Mi-8, Mi-24, and Mi-28N
helicopters, and Su-25 fighters. Tajikistan and Kazakhstan each contributed
200 soldiers from paratrooper companies, Kyrgyzstan put in an air assault platoon,
and Uzbekistan made available a batch of staff officers for the exercise.61
One of the main scenarios of the exercises involved retaking a town that has
been overrun by militants. This is a scenario similar to threats faced by Russia in
68 China’s participation in Shanghai Five and SCO
Chechnya. On the threats to security in the SCO countries, Russian Chief-of-Staff
General Yury Baluyevsky cited terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking,
organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring
information security.62 “Peace Mission 2007” can also be regarded as a signal to
the West that the SCO have the capacity to deal with both conventional and
non-conventional threats, and may also be interpreted as a message by China and
Russia to convince the governments of Central Asia to rely less on security assist-
ance from the USA and its European allies in the future.
According to China’s current ambassador to Russia, Liu Guchang, the most
significant threats to China come from East Turkestan terrorist (or Xinjiang sepa-
ratist) forces operating both within China and outside its borders (in Central
Asia), of which he cited the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East
Turkestan Liberation Movement, the World Uygur Youth Congress, and the East
Turkestan Information Center.63 Indeed, Chinese police reportedly killed 18
suspected terrorists, captured 17 others, and seized a cache of hand grenades in a
raid on an alleged terrorist training camp operated by ETIM in Xinjiang as
recently as January 2007. China believes the exercises would step up coordina-
tion among SCO members in fighting separatism, terrorism, and extremism in
their countries,64 which in fact, was the original aim of the organization. By
participating in the exercises, particularly in practicing to free “hostages” from
their “captors” in a terrorist-held site, China was also rehearsing the security
measures to take in the event of terrorist acts during the Beijing Olympic Games
in August 2008.
While the exercises were going on, the Seventh SCO summit took place
outside Bishkek, just a few kilometers from the only remaining military base in
a SCO country operated by the USA. To downplay speculation that the US facil-
ity at Manas might be used in a strike against Iran, an observer SCO member, the
Kyrgyz foreign minister insisted that the terms of the lease agreement between
Kyrgyzstan and the USA stipulated that the base cannot be used for any oper-
ations not related to military actions in Afghanistan.65
The state presidents who had attended the summit flew to Chelyabinsk to
watch the final day of the biggest SCO military exercises ever. Putin used the
occasion to announce that Russian strategic bombers would resume regular long-
range patrols, for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia report-
edly paid most of the two billion rubles (∼US$78 million) that “Peace Mission
2007” cost,66 which, given the size of the exercise, seemed to be as much to
counter terrorist activities as to assert and safeguard the interests of both Russia,
and to a certain extent, China, in their common neighborhood. Along this vein,
“Peace Mission 2007” may be regarded as a follow-up on “Peace Mission 2005,”
a set of Sino-Russian joint military exercises that took place under the auspices
of the SCO in August 2005 and featured naval maneuvers off Russia’s
Vladivostok and amphibious landings on China’s Shandong Province. Putin also
suggested that joint military exercises among SCO states should become a regular
event,67 which, if realized, would greatly increase the degree of cooperation and
interoperability among their armed forces. In July 2009, a combined army and air
China’s participation in Shanghai Five and SCO 69
force “Peace Mission 2009” exercise was held between China and Russia involv-
ing about 1,300 soldiers on each side in China’s Taonan base in Jilin province
and Russia’s Khabarovsk.68
Although the “Peace Mission 2007” military maneuvers in Russia were already
winding down when the SCO leaders met, it was the first occasion in which a
SCO military exercise was, in a sense, combined with a Heads of State summit,
and where all the Heads of State of the SCO attended a set of war games together.
With this, the political and military objectives of the organization seem to have
come together to enable the group to turn into a security community should its
member governments perceive such a need, despite frequent denials by SCO
leaders.
Putin appeared eager to court China’s support in steering the SCO toward a
defense or security alliance. This came at the time when Moscow had serious
disagreement with Washington over US plans to deploy missile defense systems
in Poland and the Czech Republic. Whereas Russia might prefer to orientate the
SCO more toward the security realm, China would like to promote greater
economic cooperation within the organization, especially with respect to energy.
As much as Chinese leaders desire good relations with other SCO partners, they
want to minimize trouble in dealings with the USA, as the USA is among China’s
most important trading partners and China wants the USA to discourage pro-
independence and anti-Chinese sentiments on Taiwan. However, they are not
averse to letting Russia take the heat from the West at the moment, while they
continue with their Bismarckian foreign policy strategy of carefully avoiding
alienating the most powerful country in the world, which could conceivably put
a stop to China’s economic and military rise.
The rapid sell-off of local currencies and resultant financial and economic crisis
that hit East Asia during 1997–1999, and the mixed and uneven recovery among
affected countries, dealt a severe blow to the momentum of trans-regional coop-
eration ventures such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). From then on, the leading attempt to forge a
regional order in East Asia has been centered on the ASEAN + China, Japan
and Korea (ASEAN + 3), an arrangement that traces its roots back to the
East Asia Economic Group vision espoused by former Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammed in 1990, which has expanded into the East Asian Summit
since 2005.
Although the Chinese currency was relatively well-insulated against attacks
from speculators because of currency controls, the Asian financial crisis contrib-
uted within the Chinese leadership to widespread sympathy for the plight of its
Asian neighbors and an increasing sense of identification with them in a common
pan-Asian destiny. At the same time, resentment against the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for stipulating structural reforms as conditions for loans
led Asian countries, including China, to develop a sense of shared victim-hood
against the “West.” The creation of new economic and financial cooperative
arrangements, such as the ASEAN + 3, helped to induce China to root its identity
in the region, which, in turn, provides an important social context for China and
its neighboring countries to increase solidarity among East Asian states.1
Summit level
First round: 1997/12/15 First round:1997/12/16
President Jiang Zemin President Jiang Zemin
Second round: 1998/12/16 Second round: 1998/12/16
Vice President Hu Jintao Vice President Hu Jintao
Third round: 1999/11/28 Third round: 1999/11/28
Premier Zhu Rongji 10 + 3 regularized with Premier Zhu Rongji
“Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation”
Chiang Mai Initiative instituted
Fourth round: 2000/11/24 Fourth round: 2000/11/25
Premier Zhu Rongji Premier Zhu Rongji
GMS initiated by PRC: First summit 2002;
second summit 2005
Fifth round: 2001/11/5 Fifth round: 2001/11/6
Premier Zhu Rongji Premier Zhu Rongji
CAFTA proposed by Zhu
Sixth round: 2002/11/4 Sixth round: 2002/11/4
Premier Zhu Rongji Premier Zhu Rongji
CAFTA 10-year timeframe instituted
Seventh round: 2003/10/7 Seventh round: 2003/10/8
Premier Wen Jiabao10 + 3 headquarters Premier Wen Jiabao
established at ASEAN Secretariat – no PRC signed ASEAN TAC
constitution
Eighth round: 2004/11/29 Eighth round: 2004/11/29
Premier Wen Jiabao Premier Wen Jiabao
Ninth round: 2005/12/12 Ninth round: 2005/12/12
Premier Wen Jiabao Premier Wen Jiabao
First East Asian Summit on 2005/12/14
Tenth round: 2007/1/14 Tenth round: 2007/1/14
Premier Wen Jiabao Premier Wen Jiabao
Second East Asian Summit on 2007/1/15
Eleventh round: 2007/11/20 Eleventh round: 2007/11/20
Premier Wen Jiabao Premier Wen Jiabao
Third East Asian Summit on 2007/11/21
A Special ASEAN + 3 Summit was held
in Beijing on October 24, 2008 on the
sidelines of the seventh ASEAN-Europe
Meeting (ASEM) (as an informal working
breakfast to discuss how ASEAN + 3
countries can deal with the global financial
crisis)
Twelfth round: 2009/10/24 ASEAN-China Leaders Meeting on SARS
Premier Wen Jiabao held in Bangkok on 29 April 2003. Premier
Fourth East Asian Summit on 2009/10/25 Wen Jiabao
10+3 10+1
President meeting (1x) President meeting (1x)
Vice President meeting (1x) Vice President meeting (1x)
Premier meeting (9x) Premier meeting (9x+1 on SARS)
(Continued on next page)
Table 6.1 (Continued)
Muslim populations in the hunt for Islamic terrorists.59 The USA has also
preferred to deal with ASEAN countries individually rather than on a collective
basis as a grouping, and this preference did not seem to have been altered to any
extent. The USA seems to be contented with the seven functional mechanisms it
has developed with ASEAN over 30 years as a dialogue partner; even though
China already holds 48 such mechanisms with ASEAN over a much shorter
period of time (Japan has 33 such mechanisms with ASEAN over 25 years).60 As
to Taiwan, notwithstanding its robust trading and investment links with Southeast
Asian countries, it could not dissuade ASEAN, after years of dithering, from
ultimately endorsing the PRC’s One-China policy at the ASEAN + China summit
of 2004.61
Still, aside from the trade liberalization schedules of ACFTA, the 10 + 1 has
yet to establish specific rules or the mechanisms to make binding the common
objectives of member states, although they have agreed on many of these shared
goals, and Myanmar is never an issue where China-ASEAN relations are
concerned. Still, China’s sheer size, its authoritarian political structure, and its
86 China’s participation in ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + China
history of hegemonic attempts over parts of Southeast Asia, together with
the unresolved claims to the South China Sea islands, make it hard to dispel the
unease that Southeast Asian countries have toward China. On the last point, the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) held an exercise around the Paracel
Islands in November 2007 that led to a formal protest from Vietnam, which
claims both the Spratlys and Paracels. When the House of Representatives of the
Philippine Congress passed a bill in February 2009 describing the disputed
Spratly islands as lying within the country’s territorial waters, it prompted China
to protest within 24 hours, forcing the lawmakers to reword the bill.62 China’s
non-interference foreign policy principle and activism in a multilateral setting is
a reassuring signal to its neighbors, but not a guarantee of future non-aggressive
actions. Nonetheless, in the 10 + 1 and 10 + 3 meetings, the countries involved
have agreed to promote the establishment of an “East Asian Community;” now is
the time for the Chinese authorities to set this up as a specific goal in its regional-
ism efforts.63
To balance against the development and consolidation of economic blocs in
Europe and North America, Asian governments have been given a strong incen-
tive, especially since the 1990s, to pursue closer relations within the region.64
There is also an argument that, with the liberalization process in the World Trade
Organization bogged down, easing trade and investment flows within an area like
that covered by the East Asian Summit, which is larger than ASEAN + 3 but
more manageable than APEC, would benefit more people.65 At the ninth ASEAN
+ 3 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in August 2006, Japan suggested the
concept of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA)
embracing the countries represented in the East Asian Summit.66 There are also
arguments increasingly made by East Asians that the region needs to develop a
regional identity, to increase its weight in the world and, with the development of
an Asian regional economic and financial cooperation, have a stronger voice in
global financial and trade institutions that are still largely dominated by the West.
Indeed, the rise of new economic and financial cooperative mechanisms would
be an important step forward for an Asian regional integration project, but this
could not have been done without China’s enthusiastic embrace of, and desire to
set the pace for, the institutionalization of regional multilateralism. Nonetheless,
even if China becomes the primus inter pares of the East Asian-Western Pacific
region, regional order is hitched to a China-Japan relationship that is, if not
friendly, at least workable, for which China would have to convince everyone
that its rise is peaceful, and Japan would have to be more independent of the USA
in its strategic calculations.
7 China’s participation in
the Four-Party Talks and
Six-Party Talks
The Six-Party Talks (6PT), and before that, the Four-Party Talks (4PT), concern
international efforts to pressure and entice North Korea into giving up its nuclear
weapons-making capabilities. China’s approaches to both series of talks demon-
strate an attempt to balance its stated foreign policy principles of respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, non-aggression, and non-interference
in states’ internal affairs, which explains its reluctance to coerce North Korea
through conditionality on aid and trade, and a more recent foreign policy priority
of establishing an image of China as a responsible and pragmatic power willing
to cooperate with all countries regardless of their political systems, for the inter-
est of preserving and advancing peace and stability, foremost in its neighborhood
region.1 This balance means that, although China will not endorse or implement
policies that it believes could create instability or threaten its continued influence
on the Korean peninsula, it will also not tolerate North Korea’s erratic and
dangerous behavior that may pose a real risk of conflict.2 Through involvement
in the 6PT, China hopes to demonstrate its commitment to multilateralism and
exert influence in its Northeast Asian neighborhood.
Summit level
First Head of Government Meeting
April 5–6, 2006
Suva, Fiji
PRC represented by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
Ministerial level
First Investment, Trade and Tourism Ministerial Conference
7–10 September 2008
Xiamen, Fujian, PRC
Attended by relevant government ministers and representatives of the PRC and PIF states
with which it has diplomatic relations
US$375 million of preferential loans for four years from 2006 to boost coopera-
tion in natural resources development, agriculture, fisheries construction and
tourism.11 Starting from July 1, 2006, China granted zero tariff treatment to 278
tariff lines of products originated from Samoa and Vanuatu, canceled mature
debts of 170 million Renminbi (RMB) owed by the two countries, and also
reached agreements with Fiji and PNG on a moratorium on interest-free loans due
at the end of 2005.12
Monetary assistance aside, China also agreed at the CPIC Forum to provide
free anti-malaria medicine worth 1 million RMB to PNG and other affected
countries over the following three years. China gave Approved Destination
Status for these eight countries to would-be Chinese tourists.13 It also promised
to take in 2,000 government officials and technical staff from these countries to
be trained in China over the next three years.14 China would also establish a
specific fund to encourage Chinese business investments in the region. The
next CPIC Forum meeting, scheduled for 2010, will be held in Beijing, the PRC
capital.
Through this whole series of economic measures and sudden strong showing
at a Pacific venue, China is obviously aiming to increase its diplomatic standing
and political influence in Oceania. If there had been any doubts before, the Fiji
Forum affirmed China as a major player in the region, by making it the third-
largest aid donor to PICs overnight. Bilateral trade volume between China and
the PICs exceeded US$1.5 billion in 2007, and is expected to exceed US$2
billion in 2008.15 By acting as a rising Pacific power, China is in a way challeng-
ing Japan’s position as the principal Asian leader and benefactor of the island
countries there. China’s April 2006 CPIC Forum apparently touched a raw nerve
with the Japanese government, so much so that at the fourth Japan-PIF Meeting
just one month later, Japan promised to increase its ODA to PICs from a budgeted
US$279 million to US$357 million,16 to match China’s contribution to the region
to some extent.
China’s venture into the Pacific 103
Japan’s motives for engaging the PICs
As international relations are seldom, if ever, founded on an altruistic basis, the
PICs obviously have clear political, economic, and even security values for Japan
and China. For Japan, there are clearly two major values.
1 Introduction
1 Susan L. Shirk, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific.” Paper presenta-
tion, “China as an Emerging Regional and Technology Power: Implications for U.S.
Economic and Security Interests, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission,” February 12-13, 2004, www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/written_
testimonies/04_02_12wrts/shirk.htm (accessed on September 1, 2008).
2 Jane Perlez, “China Shoring Up Image as Asian Superpower,” International Herald
Tribune, December 2, 2004; Evan Medeiros and R. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New
Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November/December 2003): 22–35; and David
C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong; The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,”
International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57–85.
3 See G. W. Downs, D. M. Rocke and P. N. Barsoom, “Managing the Evolution of
Multilateralism,” International Organization 52, no. 2, (1998): 397–419; Kim Taeho,
“The Six-Way Multilateral Approach: Dilemma for Every Party,” Korea and World
Affairs 27, no. 3, (2003): 342–355; and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Society (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968).
4 This point was made by Alastair Iain Johnston in his chapter on “Socialization in
International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory,” in
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and
Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 107–162.
Johnston was describing China’s willingness to be “socialized” into certain norms
adopted by member-states of the ARF, but the parallel is close enough to be applied
here.
5 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution,
Characteristics, and Aspiration,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2005): 119.
6 Wang Jianwei, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” in China
Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Yong Deng and Fei-ling
Wang (Lanham Ma: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 188.
7 C. Fred Bergsten, “The New Asian Challenge,” (working paper no. 4, Peterson
Institute of International Economics, Washington DC, 2000).
8 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter
2004/05): 68–69.
9 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 73.
10 Ibid.
11 Susan L. Shirk, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific,” www.uscc.gov/
hearings/2004hearings/written_testimonies/04_02_12wrts/shirk.htm
12 Mike M. Mochizuki, “China – Japan Relations,” in Power Shift, ed. David Shambaugh
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 140–141.
Notes 125
13 Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2006), 129–130; and Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 166–167.
14 Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation, 130; and
Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 168.
15 Jiang Zemin, “Report of the 14th Chinese Communist Party National Congress,”
Beijing Review, October 6–12, 1997, 29–30.
16 Wang Yizhou, “Zhongguo yu guoji zuzhi guanxi yanjiu and ruogan wenti,” (“Several
issues concerning the study of China’s involvement with international organizations,”)
Zhongguo Waijiao (China’s Foreign Relations), no. 11 (August 2002): 51, 54.
17 In this article, the terms ASEAN + 3 and 10 + 3 are used interchangeably, as are the
terms ASEAN + China, ASEAN + 1, and 10 + 1, as all these terms are invariably used
in the scholarly literature to refer to these processes.
18 Fu Ying, “China and ASEAN in a New Era,” China: An International Journal 1, no.
2 (2003): 304–312.
19 See Elizabeth Bomberg, Laura Cram, and David Martin, “The EU’s Institutions,” in
The European Union: How Does It Work, ed. Elizabeth Bomberg and Alexander Stubb
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 43–68.; and Michael E. Smith, Europe’s
Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
20 See Amitav Acharya, “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power,
and Prospect for Peaceful Change,” in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and
Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2003), 210–240.
21 See Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas, eds, Advancing East Asian Regionalism
(London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Heribert Dieter, ed., The Evolution of
Regionalism in Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Naoko Munakata,
Transforming East Asia – The Evolution of Regional Economic Integration (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Christopher M. Dent, China, Japan and Regional
Leadership in East Asia (Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2008).
22 See C. P. Chung, “Chinese Approaches to Institutionalizing Regional Multilateralism.
Journal of Contemporary China 17, no.57 (2008): 747–764; “The Role of Asian-
Pacific Organizations in Maintaining Regional Security,” Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis 20, no. 2 (2008): 169–185; “Designing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,”
(working paper no. 189, Hong Kong: Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan
University, Tuen Mun, N.T. Hong Kong, 2007); “China and the Institutionalization of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Problems of Post-Communism 53, no. 5
(2006): 3–14; “Southeast Asia – China Relations: Dialectics of ‘Hedging’ and
‘Counter-Hedging’.” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2004, ed. Chin Kin Wah and Daljit
Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publications Unit, 2004):
287–318.
23 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International
Institutionalization (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 56.
24 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 79–95.
25 Elizabeth Bomberg, Laura Cram, and David Martin, “The EU’s Institutions,” 43–68.
26 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven, CT and
London: Yale University Press, 1968), 12–20.
27 See Michael E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization
of Cooperation (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
28 See Avery Goldstein, “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy,
A Neo-Bismarkian Turn,” in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed.
126 Notes
G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 2003), 107–162.
29 See Susan L. Shirk, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific,” www.uscc.
gov/hearings/2004hearings/written_testimonies/04_02_12wrts/shirk.htm
9 Conclusion
1 Shiping Tang, “China’s regional strategy: an interpretation” (working paper, Center for
Regional Security Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 2004). 18.
Notes 145
2 Robert Boyer, “Asian Integration: What can be learnt from the European Union?”
interview by Masahiro Katsuno (RIETI, February 6, 2003), www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/
bbl/03020601.html (accessed August 20, 2008).
3 Deepak Nair, “Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 2 (2008): 122; and East Asia Vision Group
(EAVG) Report, Towards an East Asian Community, 2001, 73, www.aseansec.
org/4918.htm (assessed July 1, 2009)
4 This linkage between institutional designs of regional processes and nature of coop-
eration was observed by Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Conclusion:
institutional features, cooperative effects, and the agenda for further research on
comparative regionalism,” in Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions
in Comparative Perspective, ed. Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 268–269.
5 Huntington, 22. Tae-hyo Kim, “The Six-Way Multilateral Approach: Dilemma for
Every Party,” Korea and World Affairs 27, no. 3 (2003): 353.
6 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Managing the Evolution
of Multilateralism,” International Organization 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 397–419.
7 “Chinese Delegation Submits Position Document on New Security Concept to ASEAN
Forum,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, August 1, 2002.
8 Goldstein, “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy, A Neo-Bismarkian
Turn?” 73.
9 Daniel C. Lynch, “China’s Quest for Soft Power and Cultural Security” (public lecture,
the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong, January 9, 2009).
10 Shirk, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific,” www.uscc.gov/
hearings/2004hearings/written_testimonies/04_02_12wrts/shirk.htm (accessed
September 1, 2008).
11 Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China’s Regional Strategy,” in Power Shift: China
and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA:
University of California, 2005), 52–53.
12 Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and East Asia Institute (EAI), www.icpsr.umich.
edu/cocoon/TPDRC/STUDY/04650.xml (accessed March 1, 2009).
13 Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and East Asia Institute (EAI), www.asiaing.com/
asia-soft-power-survey-2008.html (accessed March 1, 2009).
14 This argument is made in Joern Dosch, “Who’s leading who in ASEAN-China rela-
tions? Community-building versus Pax Sinica in the management of regional secu-
rity,” in China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, ed. Christopher M. Dent
(Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2008), 173.
15 Saori Katada, “From a supporter to a challenger? Japan’s currency leadership in dollar-
dominated East Asia,” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 3 (August
2008): 407.
16 Ba, “The Politics and Economics of ‘East Asia’ in ASEAN-China Relations,” 182.
17 Zhang Yunlin, “Tanqiu Dongya de quyu zhuyi,” (“Inquiring into East Asia’s regional-
ism,”) Dangdai Yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific), no. 12 (2004): 3–7.
18 Research Fellow at the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs who prefers to
remain anonymous, interview by author, Xian, China, November 7, 2007.
19 Editorial, “China must calm the waters as it builds navy,” South China Morning Post
(Hong Kong), October 10, 2009, A12.
20 Elizabeth Wishnick, interview by author, Hong Kong, September 25, 2008.
21 Hiro Katsumata, David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, “Correspondence –
ASEAN, Regional Integration and State Sovereignty,” International Security 33, no. 2
(Fall 2008): 186.
22 David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to
American Power (London: Bantam Press, 2009), 391.
146 Notes
23 Yu Xintian, “Zhongguo peiyang Dongya rentong de shikao,” (“Contemplating China’s
Cultivation of East Asian identity,”) Zhongguo Waijiao (China’s Foreign Affairs), no.
9 (2008): 15, 21.
24 The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008
Multinational Survey of Public Opinion,” www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/
Files/POS_Topline%20Reports/Asia%20Soft%20Power%202008/Chicago%20
Council%20Soft%20Power%20Reports-%20Final%206-11-08.pdf (accessed on August
30, 2008).
25 Shinzo Abe, “Confluence of the Two Seas” (speech, Parliament of the Republic of
India, New Delhi, India, August 22, 2007). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html (accessed January 16,
2008).
26 (Major-General) Dadi Susanto, “Yindunixiya xinfangwuzhanlue jiepou – liantan yu
Zhongguo zai diqu anquan fangmian de hezuo,” (“Analyzing Indonesia’s new lines of
defence – and speaking on cooperation with China on aspects of regional security,”)
Southeast Asian Studies (DongNanYa Yanjiu), no. 5 (2007): 6.
27 Xinhua, “China supports ‘East Asian Community’ concept mentioned by new Japanese
PM,” People’s Daily Online, http://english1.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/
6760964.html (accessed October 9, 2009).
28 Madhuchanda Ghosh, “India and Japan’s Growing Synergy: From a Political to a
Strategic Focus,” Asian Survey 48, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 293–294.
29 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2007), 61.
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160 Index
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Action Plans (IAPs) 35; Manila Action sovereignty 48; see also ARF, China’s
Plan 34–5; US hegemony 28; Western/ participation; ARF institutionalization;
Chinese competitive designs 31–4; ARF members/membership; ASEAN;
WTO 27, 28, 33, 36; see also APEC; China, institutionalization of multilateral
APEC institutionalization; China, cooperation
economics; China, institutionalization of ARF, China’s participation 7, 10, 15,
multilateral cooperation 48–52, 55, 62, 111, 113–14; aims 49,
APEC institutionalization 31, 32, 33, 36, 55; ASEAN 49, 50; ‘Asian’ design
38–9, 41, 113, 115; APEC Business 41; China's influence 43, 44, 46,
Advisory Council (ABAC) 33, 41; 48–9; China's role 3, 42, 47, 48–52;
Budget and Management Committee constraining/constrained force 8, 25,
(BMC) 31, 38; Committee on Trade 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 113; East China Sea
and Investment (CTI) 31; EAEG/EAEC 48, 51; multipolarity/US hegemony
31–2, 39; Early Voluntary Sectoral 10, 50; New Security Concept 116;
Liberalization (EVSL) scheme 35; security interest 42, 113; South China
Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) 5, 30–1, Sea disputes 43, 47–8, 50, 51; Southeast
33, 36, 39; Osaka Action Agenda 33–4, Asia 42, 50–2; Spratly Islands 43, 50;
39; Pacific Economic Cooperation see also ARF; China, institutionalization
Council (PECC) 27; Seattle Leaders’ of multilateral cooperation
Summit 29, 31, 32, 39; see also APEC; ARF institutionalization 44–6, 49,
APEC, China’s approaches 52, 55, 113, 115; ADMM-Plus 53;
APEC members/membership 27, 32, 35, agenda 45–6, 47, 51; ARF Unit 45;
39; 127; Australia 27, 28, 29–30, 31, 32, Confidence-building Measures (CBMs)
33, 37, 41, 113, 114, 127; Canada 28, 45, 46, 48, 49; Intersessional Meetings
29, 31, 35, 113, 127; Indonesia 30, 32, (ISMs) 46, 49, 50, 52, 53; Preventive
36, 127; Japan 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, Diplomacy (PD) 45, 46, 48, 49; under-
34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 113, 114, 127; institutionalized 10, 46, 49, 113; see
New Zealand 28, 29, 31, 35, 40, 127; also ARF; ARF, China’s participation
Singapore 30, 32, 38, 39, 40, 127; US ARF members/membership 43, 44, 45,
27–8, 29, 32, 33–4, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 113; Australia 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53,
41, 113, 114, 127; Western/Asian 114; Burma 51; Canada 43, 45, 48; East
camps 39; see also APEC; APEC, Timor 45, 48; India 50; Japan 11, 43,
China’s approaches 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 114; North
Arab World 2, 121; Middle East 60, 66, Korea 45, 47, 53; Singapore 44, 45, 50,
77, 105, 123; Saudi Arabia 6; see also 52, 53; US 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51,
Iran 52, 53, 54, 114; see also ARF; ARF,
ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) 2, 3, China’s participation
42–54, 72, 111, 113–14; achievement ASEAN (Association of Southeast
44; aims 43, 46, 49–50; ASEAN 10, Asian Nations) 10, 25; 6PT 8; APEC
43, 44–5, 46, 50, 51, 52 (driving force 28, 32, 34, 46; ARF 10, 43, 44–5,
44, 47, 52); ‘ASEAN Way’ 44, 46, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52; ASEAN Annual
48, 49; bilateral relations 43, 44, 47, Ministerial Meeting (AMM) 21;
48, 50, 52; characteristics 43–4, 55; ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meetings
Index 161
(ADMM) 53; ASEAN Treaty of Amity 83, 86, 114; East Asian Vision
and Cooperation (TAC) 51, 52, 80, Group 74; Network of East Asia
83; ‘ASEAN Way’ 32, 44, 46, 48, 49, Think-Tanks (NEAT) 74; obstacles
74, 75, 78, 80, 115; China 15, 20, 21, 75–8; see also ASEAN + 3;
32, 49, 50; China-ASEAN Free Trade ASEAN + 3, China’s participation
Area (ACFTA) 4, 21, 22, 40, 76–7, ASEAN + 3 members/membership 114;
79–80, 81–2, 83, 84, 85, 112; East Asian ASEAN countries 31, 72; East Asia 72,
Summit (EAS) 77, 78; Japan 36, 81, 82, 73–4; Japan 10, 21, 74, 76, 77, 82, 86,
85; Mischief Reef incident 15; regional 112, 122; Malaysia 31, 72, 75; Northeast
cooperation and integration 36–7; Asia 72–5; South Korea 72, 73, 74, 75,
security issues 52; state sovereignty 51; 77, 78, 122; Southeast Asia 4, 25, 72–5,
terrorism 85; US 81, 82, 85; 76; see also ASEAN + 3; ASEAN + 3,
see also ARF; ASEAN + 3; China’s participation
ASEAN + China ASEAN + China 2, 25, 40, 78–86, 115,
ASEAN + 3 (ASEAN + China, Japan and 121, 125; ‘ASEAN Way’ 78, 80; areas
Korea) 2, 7, 25, 72–8, 86, 111, 113, for cooperation 80; Asian Financial
122, 125; aim 73, 75; ‘ASEAN Way’ Crisis 78; China’s participation 3–4, 7,
74, 75; Asian Currency Unit 117; Asian 21, 25, 52, 72–86 (leading role 8, 78,
design 39; Asian Financial Crisis 72, 82); economic interests 10; effectiveness
73; currency 72, 73, 74; East Asian 114; energy 80, 81; Good Neighbor
Community 74, 77, 86; East Asian Policy 20; infrastructure development
Economic Caucus (EAEC) 31–2, 39, 80, 81; intra-Asian trade 78–82;
72; effectiveness 114; foreign direct Japan 82; Myanmar 79; origins 78–9;
investment (FDI) 73; Good Neighbor South China Sea disputes 4, 79, 86,
Policy 74; intra-Asian trade 73, 74, 113, 119; Southeast Asia 4, 78, 80,
136; non-binding principle 75; non- 81, 82, 86, 115; see also ASEAN +
traditional security 74, 75–6, 84, 85; China institutionalization; China,
origins 31–2, 72; political issues 74, institutionalization of multilateral
75, 78, 79, 82, 85; regional identity cooperation; Southeast Asia
72, 73–4, 86, 122; security 74, 75; ASEAN + China institutionalization
terrorism 74, 75; trade liberalization 78–86, 112, 115; ASEAN-China
73, 74; trans-national crime 74, 75, dialogue mechanisms 79; ASEAN-
76, 84, 85; US 73–4, 76, 122; see also China Joint Cooperation Committee
ASEAN + 3, China’s participation; (ACJCC) 79; China-ASEAN Free Trade
ASEAN + 3 institutionalization; Area (ACFTA) 4, 21, 22, 40, 76–7,
ASEAN + 3 members/membership; 79–80, 81–2, 83, 84, 85, 112;
China, institutionalization of multilateral Declaration on Conduct (DOC) 79;
cooperation; Japan; Southeast Asia Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) 21,
ASEAN + 3, China’s participation 3–4, 7, 80, 83; Joint Declaration on Cooperation
8, 21, 25, 40, 72–8, 111, 112, 115, 122; in the Field of Non-traditional
China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement Security Issues 79, 80; Memorandum
4; China-Japan rivalry 76–7, 112; of Understanding on Agricultural
currency 72, 73; economic interests Cooperation 79, 80; middle level 25,
73; leading role 8, 10, 21, 73, 74, 75; 112; see also ASEAN + China
see also ASEAN + 3; ASEAN + 3 Asia-Pacific region 1, 3, 31, 33; Asia-
institutionalization Pacific integration 8; Asian Currency
ASEAN + 3 institutionalization 72–5, Unit 117, 122; China 6, 15, 19, 28,
77–8, 83–5, 112, 115; ASEAN + 3 40, 49; features 33; Good Neighbor
‘e-government center’ 74; ‘ASEAN + 3 Policy 19; multipolarity 18–19;
Cooperation Work Plan 2007–2017’ 75; regional security instability 43;
Asian Bond Market/Asian Bond Fund security 4, 42, 43, 47; trade 20, 31;
74–5; Chiang Mai Initiative 73, 74, 83, United States 29, 40; see also APEC;
122; East Asian Summit (EAS) 72, 77, ARF; ASEAN
162 Index
Asian Development Bank 23, 80, 81 30, 49; Wen Jiabao 13, 20, 74, 78, 80,
Asian Financial Crisis (1997) 17, 20, 72; 83, 96, 101, 102, 109; Zhu Rongji 7,
APEC 35–6, 39, 72; ARF 72; ASEAN + 3 21, 83; see also other China’s entries,
72, 73; ASEAN + China 78; China 20; names of specific countries, and
currency 72, 73; International Monetary organizations
Fund (IMF) 36; Japan 36, 76; World China, economics 14, 17, 18, 20, 37, 119,
Bank 36 121; Africa 105, 121; China as regional
Australia 19, 98, 123; APEC 27, 28, power 2, 3, 20, 75; CPIC 101–2, 107,
29–30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 41, 113, 114, 108; currency 72, 73; developing
127; ARF 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53, country 34, 105; economic embargo
114; ‘Four States Alliance’ 122, 123; 14; economic growth 14, 73, 98, 100,
Keating, Paul 44; military 48, 53–4, 117, 119; foreign trade 5, 14, 20, 21,
106–7; Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 30; free trade agreement (FTA) 76,
99, 100, 101, 106–7, 109, 110, 115; 81, 82, 113; gross domestic product
Regional Assistance Mission to the (GDP) 5, 119; institutionalization of
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 107, 109; multilateral cooperation 1, 2, 7, 10, 15,
see also APEC; ARF; Pacific Island 18, 25, 26, 73, 107–8, 111; intra-Asian
Countries (PICs) trade 73, 74, 96, 136; investment 20,
21, 30, 66, 73, 107, 121 (second largest
Brunei 15, 44, 45, 52, 127 foreign direct investment (FDI) 5);
Burma/Myanmar 13, 14, 23, 121; Aung model for economic development 20;
San Suu Kyi 82; China 21, 51, 73, natural resources 4, 102, 107, 109, 121,
79, 81, 85, 121; see also ASEAN + 3; 122; open-door policy 5, 14, 20–1, 73,
ASEAN + China; Southeast Asia 100; SCO 61–2, 69, 70; second largest
economy 119; trade liberalization 27,
Cambodia 15, 21; China 73, 79, 80–1, 121; 32, 34, 36, 40, 85; WTO 27, 28, 33, 36;
see also ASEAN + 3; ASEAN + China; see also APEC, China’s approaches;
Southeast Asia China, institutionalization of multilateral
Canada: APEC 28, 29, 31, 35, 113, cooperation; CPIC; SCO
127; ARF 43, 45, 48; see also China, energy 3, 18, 22, 80, 81, 118, 120,
APEC; ARF 121, 123; ASEAN + China 80, 81;
Central Asia 1, 3; boundary issues 22; China-Japan rivalry 77; Kazakhstan
China 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 66, 68, 70, 120; Russia 66, 67, 71, 77, 120; SCO
117, 120; Chinese regional power 2; 60, 61, 62, 66–7, 69, 70, 71; Southeast
Good Neighbor Policy 13, 22–3; Asia 22; see also energy; SCO
non-interference 19; Russia 58, 60, 67, China, foreign policy 4–5, 6, 8, 11–12, 15,
71, 120; SCO 3, 25, 42, 55, 58, 59, 60, 40, 61, 82, 115, 118; anti-hegemonism
65, 71, 120; state sovereignty 19; 10, 14, 28, 50, 58, 60, 70, 112; Arab
trade 20; US 59–60; see also World 2, 121; bilateral relationships 1,
Russia; SCO 2, 6, 10, 17, 18, 121; boundary disputes
China: communist/authoritarian regime 21, 49, 55, 56, 119; containment policy
11, 53, 62, 85, 110, 112, 115, 119; Deng against 6, 9, 15, 17, 49, 51, 121, 122,
Xiaoping 14–15, 16, 17; hegemony 50, 123; diplomacy 1, 2, 17, 18, 116, 118,
52, 117; Hu Jintao 7, 13, 19, 61–2, 66, 119; European Union 2; ‘Five Principles
81, 83, 90, 91 (‘Harmonious World’ of Peaceful Co-existence’ 13, 17, 18,
19, 22, 121); Hu-Wen 25; Jiang Zemin 19, 22, 48, 80, 115; isolation 6, 14, 30,
6, 7, 16, 21, 32, 61, 83; Li Peng 16; 111; non-aggression 13, 80, 87; non-
Mao Zedong 13, 14; People’s Republic interference 1, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19,
of China (PRC), foundation 12, 13; 24, 37, 48, 62, 86, 87, 110, 115, 117,
population 7; rising power 3, 4, 5, 7, 122; multipolarity 14–17, 18–19, 20,
9, 13, 17, 18, 39, 49, 50, 69, 73, 117, 24, 40, 116; soft power 98, 117; state
119, 123 (peaceful rise 18–19, 49, 98); sovereignty 1, 6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 24, 32,
Tiananmen Incident (1989) 6, 14, 15, 37, 48, 58, 87, 110, 112, 117, 122;
Index 163
threat perceptions of China 9, 10, 15, weapons 70, 81, 106, 119; see also
18, 40, 42, 49, 50, 85–6, 116, 117, 118 China, security; SCO
(China Threat Theory 15); United China, politics 3; Hong Kong 30, 37;
Nations 18, 108, 122, 144; see also institutionalization of multilateral
other China’s entries, names of specific cooperation 1, 2, 7, 10, 25, 74, 105–6;
countries, and organizations; Good non-interference 1, 4, 5; sovereignty
Neighbor Policy claims over Taiwan 1, 4, 7, 26, 30, 37,
China, institutionalization of multilateral 48, 49, 62, 69, 78, 101, 109, 123; state
cooperation 5–8, 18, 20, 62, 86, 112, sovereignty 1, 3, 4, 5; see also
116–17, 123; aims 4, 11–12, 116; China, foreign policy; China,
appraisal 111–18; benefits 11, 34, 111, institutionalization of multilateral
115; constraining/constrained force 8, cooperation
11, 25, 33, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 113; costs China, regional cooperation and
4, 11, 115; disposition toward Chinese integration 1, 2, 16, 19–20, 75, 86;
lead 1, 2, 9, 10, 25, 61, 78, 112, 117, approaches to regional multilateralism
118; economical motivations 1, 2, 7, 23–6; Asia-Pacific integration 8;
10, 15, 18, 25, 26, 73, 107–8, 111; Chinese regional power 2; economic
from state sovereignty/non-interference issues 2, 19, 24; future trends 118–23;
to multilateralism 1, 2, 3, 4, 6–7, 10, multipolarity 14–17, 18–19, 20, 24, 40,
116; importance 8–12; leading role 116; open membership 24; prioritizing
8, 10–11, 21, 24, 41, 42, 52, 56, 60, regionalism and internationalism
61, 62, 64, 73, 74, 75, 78, 82, 86, 98, 17–18; quasi-alliance building 5;
101–2, 112, 113, 115, 117; limitations regional governmental organizations
117; main initiator 1, 2, 4, 7, 56, 61, 98, 2, 24; security issues 2, 19–20, 24;
100–1; membership size/effectiveness World Trade Organization 24; see
3, 25, 114; political motivations 1, 2, also APEC; ARF; ASEAN + 3;
7, 10, 25, 74, 105–6; power politics ASEAN + China; China, foreign
1, 2, 9, 25, 52, 111, 118; preference policy; China, institutionalization of
for economic/security forums 26, 114, multilateral cooperation; CPIC; Good
115; responsible great power 7, 18, Neighbor Policy; institutionalization of
37, 73, 75, 87, 90, 105, 120; security multilateral cooperation; SCO
motivations 1, 2, 7, 10, 15, 18, 25, China, security 2, 3, 4, 11, 19–20, 24,
26, 42, 74, 106–7, 111, 114; shaping 117, 119; China as regional power 2,
the rules 4, 41, 61, 116, 117; shared 3; institutionalization of multilateral
interests 1, 2, 9, 25, 58–60, 68, 111, cooperation 1, 2, 7, 10, 15, 18, 25, 26,
112, 113, 118; ‘socialization’ of 42, 74, 106–7, 111, 114; interrelated
China 3, 4, 10, 41, 49, 50, 124; success nature 17; New Security Concept 7,
2, 9–10; see also 6PT; APEC; ARF; 17, 18, 116; non-traditional security
ASEAN + 3; ASEAN + China; CPIC; 3, 10, 17, 23, 37–8, 41, 59, 64, 68, 69,
Good Neighbor Policy; institutionalization 74, 75–6, 79, 80, 118; SCO 10, 42,
of multilateral cooperation; multilateral 55, 56, 61, 68, 69–70; see also China,
organization; SCO institutionalization of multilateral
China, military 17, 18, 117, 119; ARF cooperation; China, military;
43, 47, 51; island chains 106, 143; non-traditional security; security;
military assistance 81 106, 109; military terrorism
exercises 51, 86; military expenditure Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 13, 14,
106; military integration 19–20; navy 119; Fourteenth CCP Congress 15,
86, 106; ‘Peace Mission 2005’ 68; 17; Fifteenth CCP Congress 16, 17;
‘Peace Mission 2007’ 67–9; ‘Peace Sixteenth CCP Congress 17, 18, 19;
Mission 2009’ 69; People’s Liberation Seventeenth CCP Congress 16, 17,
Army (PLA) 67, 79, 86, 109; Russian 18; Eighteenth CCP Congress 118;
arms sales to China 70, 106; troops in Nineteenth CCP Congress 118; see also
neighboring/foreign countries 17, 118; other China’s entries
164 Index
CPIC (China-Pacific Island Countries 33, 34, 35, 38, 39; regional cooperation,
Economic Development and market-driven 73; SCO, economic
Cooperation Forum) 2, 4, 25, 98–110, cooperation 56, 59, 60, 61, 64, 69;
114–15; aid 4, 11, 100, 101–2, 105, SCO Free Trade Area 62, 69; SCO
106, 107, 108, 110, 115, 144; aims trade, investment 3, 22, 56, 59, 60,
105–8; China-Japan rivalry 98–9, 102, 61; trade liberalization 27–8, 29–30, 32,
103, 106–7, 108, 109, 114; China-PICs 33, 34, 35–6, 38, 39, 40–1, 73,
relations 100–10; different modus 74, 117; see also APEC; China,
operandi 98; distinction as foreign economics; CPIC; regional
policy approach 98; economics 101–2, cooperation; SCO
107, 108; future of China’s Pacific energy 23; East Asian Summit (EAS)
islands diplomacy 108–10; initiator 77; India 122–3; Korean Energy
98, 100–1; institutionalization 25, Development Organization (KEDO)
101–2, 108, 114; Investment, Trade and 88; Middle East 60, 66, 77, 123; North
Tourism Ministerial Conference Korea 90, 91, 92, 94; Russia 60, 66,
of the CPIC Forum 108–9; leading 67, 71, 77, 120; SCO 3, 22, 59, 60, 61,
role 8, 52, 98, 101–2; military 106, 109; 64, 66–7, 69, 70, 112; see also China,
‘One China Policy’ 101, 105; security energy
106–7; Taiwan 99, 100, 101, 105–6, environmental protection 41, 50, 75, 84,
109, 110, 114, 115; United Nations 100; East Asian Summit (EAS) 77, 78;
108, 114, 144; see also Pacific Island environmental degradation 17, 37–8;
Countries (PICs) see also non-traditional security
CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Eurasia 3, 55, 61, 69, 70, 118
Organization) 69, 120, 136 European Union 2, 8, 21, 111–12; APEC
28, 29; as model of regional integration
democracy 14, 19, 29, 119; APEC 29; 8, 111–12; Euro 117; institution-
China 49, 60, 109, 121; democratic building 111; SCO 65, 67, 68
accountability 109, 121; ‘Greater Asia’
partnership of democracies 122; GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Pacific Islands 109, 110; SCO 60; Trade) 27, 33
Southeast Asia 50, 121; see also Good Neighbor Policy 1, 7, 11, 13–26,
United States 74, 117, 123; Central/South Asia 13,
developing country 14, 80; Africa 105; 22–3; China’s approaches to regional
APEC 32, 34, 35, 38, 129; China 34, multilateralism 23–6; ‘common
105; Latin America 105; development’ enterprise 20–1; ‘Five
Middle East 105 Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’
13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 48, 80, 115; interests
East Asia 72; ASEAN + 3 72, 73–4; and influence in Asia-Pacific region
China 122; East Asian Community 74, 19; multipolarity 14–17, 18; New
77, 86, 122; East Asian Summit International Order 16, 17, 18, 19, 22,
(EAS) 72, 77, 83, 86, 114; East Asian 118 (democratization of international
Vision Group 74; regional identity relations 16–17); New International
72, 73–4, 86, 122; see also ASEAN; Order + New Security Concept: ‘Five
ASEAN + 3 Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’
East Asia-Western Pacific region 1; China 17; Northeast Asia 13, 23; origin
52, 86; security 6, 43; trade 23, 117; and development 13–14; ‘Peaceful
United States 5, 6, 23 Rise/Peaceful Development’ thesis
East China Sea 50, 51, 77, 119 18–19; prioritizing regionalism and
economics 73, 74, 96, 117; bilateral internationalism 17–18; regional
trade agreements 40–1, 117; free trade integration 19–20; Southeast Asia 13,
agreement (FTA) 40, 76, 81, 82, 112–13; 15, 21–2; see also China, foreign policy;
intra-Asian trade 73, 74, 78–82, 96, 136; China, institutionalization of multilateral
investment liberalization 29, cooperation; China, security
Index 165
Hong Kong 30, 32, 37, 74, 75 Japan 5, 98; 6PT 8, 11, 47, 89, 94–5, 114;
human rights 121; China 24, 49, 50, 51, abduction of Japanese citizens to North
60, 121; Pacific Islands 109–10; SCO Korea 94; APEC 27, 28, 29, 31, 32,
58, 60; Shanghai Five 58 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 113, 114,
127; ARF 11, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50,
India 13, 70, 122; APEC 39; ARF 50; 51, 53, 114; ASEAN 36, 76, 81, 82;
China-India relation 5, 20, 119, ASEAN + 3 10, 11, 21, 74, 76, 77, 82,
122–3; ‘Four States Alliance’ 86, 112, 122; Asian Financial Crisis
122, 123; Japan-India relation 122–3; 36, 76; Asia-Pacific integration 8, 76;
military cooperation 53–4, 70; nuclear Aso Taro 78, 103; East Asian Summit
program 48; SCO 22–3, 56, 60, 62, 65, (EAS) 77; ‘Four States Alliance’ 122,
70, 114; Tibet 119; Vajpayee, 123; Hashimoto Ryutaro 21; Hatoyama
Atel Bihari 119 Yukio 78, 122; Koizumi Junichiro 77,
Indian Ocean 51, 52, 54, 123 78; nationalism 98, 103; New Miyazawa
Indonesia 6, 14, 15; APEC 30, 32, 36, 127; Initiative 76; SCO 11, 70; Shinzo Abe
Asian Financial Crisis 36; Suharto 32; 122; Southeast Asia 15, 76, 77, 122;
see also ASEAN United Nations 108, 122; US 76, 77,
institutionalization of multilateral 86; see also ASEAN + 3; Japan-China
cooperation 1, 8–12, 112; 6PT 25, relations; Japan, economics; Japan-
89–92, 93, 94–5, 96, 114, 115; APEC Pacific Island Countries; Japan, security/
31, 32, 33, 36, 38–9, 41, 113, 115; military
ARF 10, 44–6, 49, 52, 113, 115; Japan-China relations 6, 7, 10, 15, 36, 47,
ASEAN + 3 72–8, 83–5, 112, 115; 51, 77, 86, 94–5, 119, 122; ASEAN +
ASEAN + China 25, 78–86, 112, 115; China 82; boycott to China 6, 15;
CPIC 25, 101–2, 108; definition 9; China-Japan rivalry 49, 51, 76–7, 81,
effects on East Asia/ Western Pacific 4; 98–9, 102, 103, 106–7, 108, 109, 112,
importance 8–12; institutionalization 114; containment of China 15, 51, 122;
9, 11, 24, 111; measuring political East China Sea 50, 51, 77, 119; Spratly
institutionalization 9, 11, 24, 25; Islands 15, 43, 50, 79, 86; see also Japan
purpose 111; SCO 10, 25, 55, 56–8, Japan, economics 11, 21, 35, 36, 76, 82;
60–1, 62, 63, 66, 70–1, 112, 114, 115; economic recession 20, 76; foreign
Shanghai Five 63; see also 6PT; APEC; direct investment (FDI) 76, 82; free
ARF; ASEAN + 3; ASEAN + China; trade agreement (FTA) 40; intra-Asian
China, institutionalization of multilateral trade 73; revaluation of Japanese Yen
cooperation; CPIC; multilateral 76; see also ASEAN + 3; Japan
organization; SCO Japan-Pacific Island Countries 11, 99, 100,
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 36, 101, 102, 106–7, 108, 114; aid 100,
72, 76 103, 107, 108, 109, 115; motives for
international relations 103; ARF bilateral engaging the PICs 103; see also Japan;
relations 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, 52; Pacific Island Countries (PICs)
Asia 5; China 3, 32, 116, 118–23; Japan, security/military: military 11, 53,
Chinese bilateral relationships 1, 2, 95; military cooperation 53–4, 106–7;
6, 10, 17, 18, 121; democratization security 15, 95; US-Japan Alliance 50,
of international relations 16–17; 95; see also Japan
multipolarity 16; state sovereignty 32,
33; see also China, foreign policy; Kazakhstan 120; Nazarbayev, Nursultan
China, institutionalization of multilateral 66; SCO 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62, 66, 67,
cooperation; institutionalization of 70; see also SCO
multilateral cooperation Kyrgyzstan: Akayev, Askar 59, 60;
Iran 68; Ahmadinejad 66; China-Iran Atambayev, Almazbek 66; China
relations 62; nuclear weapons program 118–19; SCO 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62,
23, 60, 62, 65; SCO 56, 60, 62, 65, 114; 64, 66, 67, 68; US military bases 60, 68;
see also Arab World see also SCO
166 Index
Laos 21, 73, 79, 80, 81, 121; see also 94, 117, 120–1; Democratic People’s
ASEAN + 3; ASEAN + China; Republic of Korea (DPRK) 87–9, 90,
Southeast Asia 94, 95, 97; energy 90, 91, 92, 94; inter-
Latin America 2, 105, 121 Korean relations 23, 43; International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 89,
Malaysia 21; APEC 33; ASEAN + 3 31, 91, 92; Kim Il Sung 88; Kim Jong Il
72, 75; Mahathir Mohammed 72, 75; 88, 90, 91, 94, 96; Korean War 87, 88,
Spratly Islands 15; see also ASEAN; 90, 96–7; military 89; nationalism 92;
ASEAN + 3 nuclear disarmament 4, 20, 23, 25, 37,
Middle East 60, 66, 77, 105, 123; see also 47, 53, 78, 87–92, 94, 95–7, 114, 120,
Arab World; Iran 121; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
military issues: ARF 44, 45, 47; military (NPT) 89, 91; Pakistan 94; trade 87, 91;
cooperation 19–20, 53–4, 70, 106–7; unification of Korean peninsula 4, 96–7,
military pre-emption 18; SCO 55, 58, 120–1; UN Security Council 89, 91, 92,
61, 62, 64, 67–9, 71; Shanghai Five 95; US 87, 88–9, 92, 94, 95, 96; see also
55; Singapore 53–4; see also China, 4PT; 6PT
military; nuclear weapons; security; Northeast Asia 3; 6PT 96; alternative
US military security arrangements 95–8;
Mongolia 56, 60, 62, 65, 114; see also SCO ASEAN + 3 72–5; China 2, 23,
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 33 87, 96, 120; economic cooperation
multilateral organization 9–11; aims 9, 96; Good Neighbor Policy 13, 23;
11; definition 9, 24; institutionalization institutionalization of multilateral
9, 24, 25; membership size/ cooperation1, 23; Japan 23; North
effectiveness 3, 25, 114–15; regional Korea’s nuclear disarmament 23;
security organization 42–3; see also Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue
institutionalization of multilateral (NEACD) 23, 97; South Korea 23;
cooperation; regional cooperation and traditional/non-traditional security 23;
integration see also 6PT; ASEAN + 3; ASEAN +
China; Japan; North Korea;
New Zealand: APEC 28, 29, 31, 35, 40, South Korea
127; Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 99, nuclear weapons 68; ARF 37, 48, 53;
100, 106, 109, 110, 115 Indian nuclear program 48;
non-traditional security 3, 10, 17, 23, International Atomic Energy Agency
37–8, 41, 59; APEC 37–8, 41; ASEAN (IAEA) 89, 91; Iran 23, 60, 62, 65;
+ 3 74, 75–6, 84, 85; China 3, 10, 17, North Korea nuclear disarmament 4,
23, 37–8, 41, 59, 64, 68, 69, 74, 75–6, 20, 23, 25, 37, 47, 53, 78, 87–92, 94,
79, 80, 118; drug trafficking 64, 68, 69, 95–7, 114, 120, 121; Nuclear Non-
76, 80, 112; environmental degradation Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 89, 91;
17, 37–8; food contamination 37; illegal Pakistan 94; Southeast Asian Nuclear
immigration 59, 76; infectious diseases Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) 50–1;
17, 80, 100; mercenary activities 59; theater missile defense (TMD) 61, 95,
money laundering 10, 75, 76, 80, 91; 120; US 61, 69, 89, 120, 144; see also
piracy 51, 75, 76, 118; SCO 59, 64, 68, military issues; security
69; smuggling 56, 59, 64, 75, 76, 80,
118; trans-national crime 17, 59, 68, Oceania 2, 3, 43, 44, 96, 98, 102; see also
69, 74, 75, 76, 84, 85; see also security; CPIC
terrorism
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Pacific Island Countries (PICs) 98–110,
(NATO) 58, 60, 64, 70; see also SCO 114–15; aid 98, 99, 100, 101–2, 103,
North Korea: 4PT 88–9, 97; 6PT 23, 47, 105–6, 107, 108, 109–10, 115; Australia
53, 87, 88–97, 114 (withdrawal 91, 92, 99, 100, 101, 106–7, 109, 110, 115;
95); aid to 87, 88–9, 90, 91, 94, 95; development cooperation 99–100, 101;
ARF 45, 47, 53; China 87, 90, 91, 92, economic cooperation 98, 99, 101–2,
Index 167
108, 109; fisheries/other resources 4, 98, hegemony 58, 60, 69, 70; weapons 70;
99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 109; Gross see also Central Asia; SCO
Domestic Product (GDP) 99; Japan-PIF
11, 99, 100, 101, 102, 106–7, 108, 115; SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization)
Japan’s motives for engaging the PICs 2, 20, 55–71, 111; Afghanistan 59, 60, 64,
103; New Zealand 99, 100, 106, 109, 65, 67, 68, 70, 112; aims 55, 56, 57, 59,
110, 115; Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 68, 69–70, 112; anti-US feelings 59–60;
99–100, 104, 108, 109, 110; population Collective Security Treaty Organization
109; South Pacific Forum (SPF) 99; (CSTO) 69, 136; economic cooperation
security 99, 106–7; tourism 98, 99, 102, 56, 59, 60, 61, 64, 69; energy cooperation
107; US 106, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 3, 22, 59, 60, 61, 64, 66–7, 69, 70,
144; see also CPIC 112; Eurasian Economic Community
Pakistan 45; China-Pakistan relations 62; (EurAsEc) 69, 136; future developments
nuclear weapons 94; SCO 22–3, 56, 60, 69–71; infrastructure development 56,
62, 64, 65, 114 59, 61–2, 66; Japan 11, 70; model of
Philippines 14, 22, 34, 40, 123; Spratly economic and security cooperation 22;
Islands 15, 86; see also ASEAN; origins 17–18, 25, 55–6, 57, 127; SCO
Southeast Asia Free Trade Area 62, 69; ‘Shanghai
Spirit’ 22, 115; shared interests, norms
regional cooperation and integration 1; and threats 58–60, 68, 112, 113; trade/
APEC, divergent approaches 27–38; investment 3, 22, 56, 59, 60, 61, 112; US
ASEAN 36–7; Asia-Pacific integration 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71,
8; Asian regionalism 115; China 1, 8, 112; see also China, institutionalization
36–7, 40, 96; development cooperation of multilateral cooperation; military
24, 99–100, 101; East Asian Community issues; SCO, China’s participation; SCO
74, 77, 86, 122; East Asian regionalism institutionalization; SCO members/
10, 86; economics 73, 74, 96, 98, 99, membership; SCO, security/military;
101–2, 108, 109, 117; intra-Asian Shanghai Five
trade 73, 74, 78–82, 96, 136; market- SCO, China’s participation 7, 20, 25, 40,
driven 73; Northeast Asia, economic 60–3, 69, 70, 111, 113, 114, 115; aim
cooperation 96; Pacific Islands 56, 58, 60, 120; budgeting 11, 61–2,
(development cooperation 99–100, 101; 115; Central Asia 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 66,
economic cooperation 98, 99, 101–2, 68, 70, 117, 120; China-Russia relations
108, 109); principles 36–7; regional 64–9, 71, 112; China’s roles 60–3, 112;
identity 72, 73–4, 86, 122; regional economic cooperation 61–2, 69, 70;
security organization 42–3, 55–6, 57; energy interests 61, 62, 66–7, 69, 70,
SCO: model of economic and security 71; Good Neighbor Policy 20, 22–3;
cooperation 22; security issues 24, 97; initiator 2, 56, 61; leading role 8, 10, 42,
see also APEC; ARF; SCO 52, 56, 60, 61, 62, 64, 113; SCO Free
Russia 3; 6PT 8, 23, 47, 89, 94; arms Trade Area 62, 69; security interests 10,
sales to China 70, 106; boundary 42, 55, 56, 61, 68, 69–70; separatism 56,
disputes 56, 119; Central Asia 58, 60, 61, 68; ‘three evils’ 61; US hegemony
67, 71; Chechnya 55, 68; China-Russia 58, 60, 70, 112; Xinjiang 55, 56, 59, 62,
relations 5, 6, 22, 23, 55, 64–9, 71, 112, 67, 68; see also other SCO’s entries
120; China-Russia rivalry 69; Collective SCO institutionalization 55, 56–8, 60–1,
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 62, 63, 65–6, 70–1, 112, 114, 115;
69, 120; energy 60, 66, 67, 71, 77, 120; Charter 57, 58, 65, 71; Council of
Good Neighbor Policy 13, 22–3; ‘Peace National Coordinators 57, 58; Dushanbe
Mission 2005’ 68; ‘Peace Mission 2007’ Declaration 57, 58; high level 10,
67–9; ‘Peace Mission 2009’ 69; Putin, 25; regional anti-terrorist center 56,
Vladimir 64, 68, 69, 119; SCO 3, 10, 61; Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
11, 42, 55, 56–7, 58, 60, 62, 65, 66, (RATS) 57–8, 63; ‘Regulations on
67–9, 70, 71; state sovereignty 58; US Observer Status at the Shanghai
168 Index
Cooperation Organization’ 65–6; SCO- Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Afghanistan Contact Group 59, 64; (SARS) 39, 83, 84, 85
Secretariat 56, 57–8, 59, 61, 63; Seventh Shanghai Five 22, 25, 55, 56–7, 59, 127;
Summit 64–9; ‘Shanghai Convention ‘Agreement on Mutual Reduction of
against Terrorism, Separatism and Military Forces’ 57; border disputes 55,
(Religious) Extremism’ 57; see also 56–7; China’s participation 2, 52, 56,
other SCO’s entries 61, 115; institutionalization 63; military
SCO members/membership 55–6, 58, 64, 55; norms 58; Shanghai Five Council
65–6, 114; Central Asia 3, 25, 42, 55, of National Coordinators 57; ‘Shanghai
58, 59, 60, 65, 71, 120; India 22–3, 56, Spirit’ 22, 115; ‘three evils’ 57, 59;
60, 62, 65, 70, 114; Iran 56, 60, 62, 65, see also SCO
66, 114; Kazakhstan 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, Singapore 6, 15; APEC 30, 32, 38, 39, 40, 127;
62, 66, 67, 70; Kyrgyzstan 55, 56, 57, ARF 44, 45, 50, 52, 53; free trade agreement
58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68; Mongolia (FTA) 40; Lee Kuan Yew 15; military
56, 60, 62, 65, 114; Pakistan 22–3, 56, cooperation 53–4; see also ASEAN
60, 62, 64, 65, 114; Russia 3, 10, 11, 42, South Asia 14; Chinese regional power
55, 56–7, 58, 60, 62, 65, 66, 67–9, 70, 2; Good Neighbor Policy 13, 22–3;
71, 112; Tajikistan 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, South Asian Association for Regional
62, 64, 67; Uzbekistan 55–6, 59, 60, 61, Cooperation (SAARC) 22–3; see also
63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 114; see also other SCO
SCO’s entries Southeast Asia 1, 3, 19, 30; ASEAN + 3
SCO, security/military 58, 62, 64, 67–9; 4, 25, 72–5, 76; ASEAN + China 4, 78,
anti-terrorist exercises 56, 61, 67–9; 80, 81, 82, 86, 115; China 42, 47, 50–2,
Islamic extremism 3, 42, 55, 56, 57, 85–6, 117, 121 (tariffs reduction 11, 80,
59, 61, 68, 70; military alliance 58, 115); Chinese regional power 2, 121;
69; military exercises 55, 58, 67–9; democracy 50, 121; Good Neighbor
non-traditional security 59, 64, 68, 69; Policy 13, 15, 21–2; Japan 15, 76, 77,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 122; Mischief Reef incident 15, 16, 50,
(NATO) 58, 60, 64, 70; ‘Peace Mission 51, 79; SCO 22–3; South China Sea
2005’ 68; ‘Peace Mission 2007’ 67–9; disputes 4, 15, 21–2, 43, 47–8, 50, 51,
‘Peace Mission 2009’ 69; quasi-military 79, 86, 119 (ASEAN + China 4, 79,
bloc 56, 58, 61, 71; regional security 86, 113, 119; Declaration on Conduct
organization 42–3, 55–6, 57; security (DOC) 79); Southeast Asian Nuclear
cooperation 10, 55, 56, 58, 59, 67–70; Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ)
separatism 3, 42, 55, 56, 57, 59, 68; 50–1; Spratly Islands 15, 43, 50, 79, 86;
terrorism 3, 20, 22, 42, 55, 56, 57, Taiwan 21; US 82, 85, 123; see also
59, 61, 65, 68, 69, 112; see also other ARF; ASEAN; ASEAN + 3; ASEAN
SCO’s entries + China; Burma/Myanmar; Cambodia;
security 117; APEC 3, 10, 17, 23, 29, Laos; SCO; Vietnam
37–8, 41; ARF 10, 15, 43, 45, 47, 52, South Korea 6, 36; 4PT 88, 89; 6PT 23,
53 (mistrust 47, 51); ASEAN + 3 74, 47, 87, 88, 94, 96, 114; APEC 33;
75; Chinese regional power 2; Islamic ASEAN + 3 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 122;
extremism 3, 42, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 68, China-South Korea relations 7, 15, 87,
70 (East Turkestan Islamic Movement 95, 117; inter-Korean relations 23, 43;
(ETIM) 59, 68; Hizb-ut-Tahrir 59); Kim Dae-jung 73; Kim Young Sam
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 88; Korean War 87, 88, 90, 96–7; Lee
95; regional security organization Myung-bak 78, 94, 95; Proliferation
42–3; SCO 10, 55, 56, 58, 59, 67–70; Security Initiative (PSI) 95;
separatism 3, 42, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, Roh Moo-hyun 94, 96; unification
68; ‘three evils’ 57, 59, 61; see also of Korean peninsula 4, 96–7, 120–1;
China, security; non-traditional security; US-South Korea alliance 95, 97, 121
nuclear weapons; SCO, security/ (military presence in South Korea 88,
military; terrorism 97, 121); see also 6PT; ASEAN + 3
Index 169
Taiwan 6, 47; APEC 30; ASEAN 85; Island Countries (PICs) 106, 108, 109,
Chen Shui-bian 105; China's military 110, 114, 144; US-South Korea
exercises 51; China's sovereignty claims alliance 95, 97, 121; see also other US’s
over Taiwan 1, 4, 7, 26, 30, 37, 48, 49, entries
62, 69, 78, 101, 109, 123; China/Taiwan US-China relations 2, 6–7, 10, 17, 40, 50,
competition to secure diplomatic 69, 95, 119; containment of China 6, 15,
recognition 105–6; CPIC 99, 100, 101, 17, 49, 51, 121, 123; primus inter pares
105–6, 109, 110, 114, 115; Ma Ying- 120; USA-China G-2 120; see also
jeou 123; Southeast Asia 21; Spratly United States; China
Islands 15, 43, 50, 79, 86; United US economics: APEC 27–8, 29, 32,
Nations 108; US arms sales to 58, 95, 33–4, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 113,
123; see also CPIC 114, 127; free trade agreement (FTA)
Tajikistan 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62, 64, 67; 40; protectionism 28, 31, 50; world
Afghanistan 64; see also SCO recession 2008–2009 21, 123; see also
terrorism 18, 37, 118–19; 9–11 attacks 3, APEC
10, 37, 48, 56, 61, 89, 123; APEC 3, 10 US military 17, 43, 47, 70; Afghanistan 60,
(‘APEC Leaders’ Statement on Counter- 64, 122, 123; arms sales to Taiwan 58,
Terrorism’ 37; Counter-Terrorism Task 95, 123; ‘axis of evil’ 89; Central Asia
Force 37); ASEAN 85; ASEAN + 3 74, 56, 60, 61, 68, 70, 123; Guam 108, 144;
75; China 17, 118–19, 123; Proliferation Iraq 123; Kyrgyzstan 60, 68; military
Security Initiative (PSI) 95; SCO 3, bases 60, 68, 144; military cooperation
20, 22, 42, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 65, 67–9, 53–4; nuclear weapons 61, 69, 89, 120,
112; war on 48; see also Afghanistan; 144; South Korea 88, 97, 121; Southeast
non-traditional security; SCO, security/ Asia 82, 85, 123; Uzbekistan 60; see
military; security; US military also security; US security
Thailand 14, 21, 123; APEC 33; Asian US security 37, 43, 48; SCO 56, 58, 59,
Financial Crisis 36; China 81; Samak 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71; terrorism
Sundaravej 81; see also ASEAN 37, 48; US-Japan Alliance 50; see also
security; US military
United Nations: China 18, 108, 122, 144; Uzbekistan 55–6, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64,
Japan 108, 122; peacekeeping 15, 17, 66, 67; Afghanistan 64; Andijan riots
46, 48, 95, 109; regional organization 59, 60, 61; East Turkestan Islamic
42; Taiwan 108; UN Charter 16, 18, 42; Movement (ETIM) 59, 68; Karimov,
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Ismail 59, 61; US military bases 60; see
107; UN Register of Conventional Arms also SCO
46; UN Security Council 11, 60, 62, 77,
89, 91, 122 Vietnam 15, 22, 86; APEC 35, 37;
United States (US) 5, 14, 19, 21, 81, 98; ASEAN 21; China 21, 73, 79, 80, 81,
4PT 88–9; 6PT 8, 11, 23, 47, 53, 88, 117, 119, 121; Spratly Islands 15, 86;
91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 114; 9–11 attacks see also ASEAN + 3; ASEAN + China;
3, 10, 37, 48, 56, 61, 89, 123; anti-US Southeast Asia
feelings 59–60; ARF 43, 44, 47, 48,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 114; ASEAN the West 19, 65, 70, 72; Asian challenge
81, 82, 85; ASEAN + 3 73–4, 76, 122; to 5; boycott to China 6; see also United
Bush, George, Jr. 89, 90, 95, 123; Bush, States
George, Sr. 14; Clinton, Bill 7, 29, 32, Western Pacific region 3, 4, 51, 111,
34, 43, 88; energy 70; foreign policy 118, 120
70; ‘Four States Alliance’ 122, 123; World Bank 36, 81
hegemony 6, 10, 15, 16, 17, 20, 28, 49, world recession 2008–2009 21, 119, 123
50, 58, 60, 70, 74, 112, 115, 116, 120; WTO (World Trade Organization)
multilateralism 10, 116; ‘New World 24, 34, 82, 114; China 27, 28, 33, 36;
Order’ 14; North Korea 87, 88–9, 92, free trade 24, 40, 86; WTO’s Doha
94, 95, 96; Obama, Barack 123; Pacific Round 40, 41