DICIEMBRE, 3

   
@  RESEÑA H
AS SALAMU ALEIKUM WA RAHMATULLAHI WA BARAKATU

Muchas veces se cree que el Islam llego hace muy poco tiempo al Perú y en América en
general cuando la realidad es que antes de que el navegante genovés de origen Judío
Cristóbal Colon llegara ya había una expedición de Musulmanes Españoles que habían
tocado las costas del continente hoy llamado América y a su regreso a España se preparo
una expedición que tenia planos y cartas de navegación, sin temor a que los buques
caigan en el abismo en el horizonte como creían todos lo europeos basándose en
supersticiones. Pues el Quran afirma que la Tierra es redonda.

Ante la inminente caída del Soberano Islámico en Granada los musulmanes cancelaron la
expedición y entregaron los planos y cartas de navegación a Cristóbal Colon el cual
formo su tripulación con musulmanes que a la fuerza fueron convertidos al catolicismo y
que la historia los llama erróneamente "ladrones sacados de las cárceles". El objetivo era
que si se caía el buque o los buques al abismo que se cayeran con los musulmanes a
bordo y no con los otros ciudadanos españoles.

Al llegar a América en posteriores viajes se establecieron y empezaron a construir las

ciudades siguiendo el clásico trazado de las calles y edificación de la casa Islámica con
calles estrechas, amplios portones, zaguanes y la fuente de agua en el centro del patio.

Obviamente también construyeron mezquitas para cumplir con sus oraciones pero con la
llegada de la inquisición estas mezquitas fueron transformadas en Iglesias y los clásicos
xxx convertidos en campanarios y la media luna reemplazada por cruces.

Estos musulmanes al ser perseguidos por la inquisición no enseñaron el Islam a sus hijos
y así se perdió la fuerza esta generación de musulmanes venidos de España.
Posteriormente llegó la segunda migración de musulmanes procedente del África Negro
en condición de esclavos los que a punta de latigazos y torturas fueron también obligados
a cambiar su cultura y su religión el Islam.

Siglos después ante la caída del Imperio Turco muchos musulmanes procedentes del
Medio Oriente comenzaron a llegar en condición de comerciantes que iban de pueblo en
pueblo vendiendo desde telas hasta agujas al crédito y eran llamados los "Turcos" debido
a su trabajo y a su poca practica del Islam prácticamente también se perdió esa
generación de musulmanes.

A raíz de la ocupación arbitraria de Palestina por los Judíos Sionistas y la guerra civil en
el Líbano llega otra oleada de musulmanes Árabes Palestinos, Libaneses y Sirios en
calidad de refugiados los cuales también trabajaron como comerciantes de telas y ropa de
pueblo en pueblo al igual que los llamados "Turcos", tampoco practicaron el Islam y

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 mucho menos lo enseñaron a sus hijos hasta el punto que muchos de sus descendientes
hoy en día no son musulmanes.

Sin embargo hace unos trece años atrás un grupo de Musulmanes crearon una Institución
Islámica que tiene una casa en el distrito de Magdalena don de se reúnen para realizar sus
oraciones. Durante mucho tiempo la población del Perú creyó que el Islam era una
religión para los Árabes y esa impresión se vio apoyada por el escaso interés en difundir
el Islam.

Posteriormente en Lima se creo otra institución islámica llamada Asociación Islámica

Latinoamericana del Perú que llegó a tener una Mezquita llamada Misyid An Nur la que
funcionaba en el distrito de Breña y su único objetivo era la difusión del Islam. Su
comunidad era multinacional con Árabes, del norte de África, Pakistaníes, Bangladeshis,
peruanos convertidos al Islam, etc.

Simultáneamente en el sur del Perú en la ciudad de Tacna se aperturó la importación de

autos usados lo que trajo una migración de musulmanes de origen Pakistaní en su
mayoría los que en poco tiempo se instalaron en esta ciudad y alquilaron una casa para
que sirva como Mezquita en la calle Tauro Urbanización Rosa Ara. Poco tiempo después
se compro un terreno donde se construyo la única Mezquita con arquitectura Islámica
Bab-UL-Islam (La puerta del Islam) la cual haciendo honor a su nombre a abierto sus
puertas a todo aquel que quiera conocer la cultura y religión Islámica.

La población Islámica de Tacna esta compuesta por unos 300 miembros actualmente
cuyo 50% lo constituyen pakistaníes siendo los peruanos el segundo grupo uno 100
aproximadamente siendo la mayoría mujeres. El resto lo conforman musulmanes de India
y algunos países Árabes aparte de algunos chilenos, colombianos, etc.

El Islam no es una religión que sea propiedad de Árabes, Pakistaníes o conversos. Es un

regalo de Allah y una forma de vida para toda la humanidad los miembros de la Mezquita
Bab-UL-Islam rechazamos expresiones como ("gracias a nosotros lo inmigrantes" o
"gracias a nosotros lo conversos" se ha podido establecer el Islam).

Nosotros todos sin excepción somos siervos de Allah y tenemos la obligación de

practicar, difundir y enseñar El Islam a quien lo quiera conocer sin tener que darle tintes
nacionalistas sino mas bien buscando la integración de todos los seres humanos, puesto
que todos descendemos de Adam (as) y de Hawa (Adán y Eva)

AS SALAMU ALEIKUM WA RAHMATULLAHI WA BARAKATU

 
31 Diciembre 2002

EL ISLAM Y EL MUSULMÁN

 La palabra "Islam", significa paz, obediencia o sumisión en el idioma árabe y en el sentido
religioso, quiere decir la sumisión de la humanidad a la voluntad de Dios. El hombre o la

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mujer que acepta la soberanía de Dios Único y se rinde completamente a su voluntad es
conocido como "muslim" o en español "musulmán". El nombre "mahometano" que se
emplea a menudo en español, es erróneo y ofensivo al espíritu mismo del Islam. 

Continuidad del mensaje de Dios

 El Islam no es una religión nueva; en su esencia es la misma que Dios les reveló a todos
sus profetas. Nuestra escritura sagrada, el Corán, nos dice: "creemos en Dios y en todo lo
que se nos ha revelado; y en todo lo que se les reveló a Abraham, Ismael, Isaac, Jacob, a las
tribus, a Moisés, Jesús, y a todos los profetas de parte de Dios" (El Corán, Capitulo II, "La
Vaca", verso 136). 

PATRIMONIO HISPANO DESCONOCIDO

 El Islam entró de lleno en el patrimonio hispano sólo ochenta años después de la muerte
del Profeta Mohammad (¡Qué Dios lo bendiga y lo mantenga en su santa paz!). Durante
ocho siglos gloriosos, del año cristiano 711 hasta 1492, el Islam se mantuvo como la
religión mas tolerante de la Península Ibérica, hasta que la Inquisición, falsamente llamada
"El Santo Oficio" lo derrocó entre los años 1480 y 1550 aproximadamente. Durante la
época de los musulmanes españoles, se edificaron monumentos tan celebres, como la Gran
Mezquita de Córdoba (la cual era capital del estado Hispano-Islámico), el Alcázar de
Sevilla y el Alhambra de Granada, que siguen atrayendo a los turistas como verdaderas
joyas arquitectónicas Islámicas. 

CREENCIAS FUNDAMENTALES 

Un musulmán cree en la unicidad de Dios Único, en todos sus mensajeros, en todos sus
mensajes o libros sagrados, en sus ángeles creados por El para servirle como funcionarios
en el Día del Juicio Final, y también cree que cada persona es responsable por sus hechos y
acciones; el musulmán cree en una vida futura después de la muerte. 

LA UNIDAD DE DIOS (TAWHEED) 

El Islam ordena la fe en la unicidad y soberanía de Dios, lo cual hace que el hombre o la

mujer conozca la significación del universo y asimismo, su propio lugar en El. Libra al
hombre de todos los miedos y supersticiones, haciéndole consciente de la omnipresencia de
Dios, su ser todopoderoso y de sus obligaciones para con El. La fe no basta en si misma
para el Islam, sino que debe reflejarse en acciones efectivas. Para creer en un Solo Dios
Único, se necesita contemplar a toda la humanidad como una sola familia que existe bajo la
benevolencia de Dios, el Creador y Sostén Común de todo y de todos. El Islam rechaza la
idea de una gente o una raza escogida, haciendo de la fe en Dios Único y de las buenas
acciones, la única llave para entrar al paraíso, estableciendo así una relación directa hacía
Dios, que se ofrece a todo el mundo sin distinción alguna y sin necesidad de ningún
intermediario.

EL HOMBRE COMO AGENTE LIBRE

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 El hombre existe como la suprema creación de Dios y es arquitecto de su propio destino.
Creado con las mayores potencialidades, el hombre es libre en su voluntad, sus acciones y
en su libre albedrío. Dios le ha enseñado el camino recto, la vida del Profeta Mohammad
(¡Qué Dios lo bendiga y lo mantenga en su santa paz!), nos sirve como el ejemplo perfecto
para alcanzar este ideal. La grandeza del hombre y su salvación eterna consisten en
seguirlos. El Islam demuestra la pureza de la personalidad humana, les confiere igualdad de
derechos a todos sin distinción alguna respecto al color de la piel ni al género masculino o
femenino. Sujeta al príncipe y al campesino, al rey y al humilde igualmente a la soberanía
de la Ley Divina tal como se enuncia en el Corán y se ejemplifica en la vida del Profeta
Mohammad (¡Qué Dios lo bendiga y lo mantenga en su santa paz!). 

EL CORÁN Y LA TRADICIÓN PROFÉTICA 

El Corán es la última palabra que Dios reveló, y a la vez, la fuente básica de los mandatos y
leyes del Islam. El Corán trata de los fundamentos de las relaciones entre Dios y el hombre,
como también de las relaciones entre el hombre y su prójimo, en todas las esferas posibles.
Las bases comprensivas por las que se pueden edificar los sistemas sólidos de justicia
social, economía, política, legislación, jurisprudencia, derecho, leyes y relaciones
internacionales, son el contenido más importante que abarca el Corán. Mohammad (¡Qué
Dios lo bendiga y lo mantenga en su santa paz!) era un hombre sencillo, sin instrucción
formal, quien no sabía leer ni escribir, y no obstante, el Corán fue memorizado, tal como le
fue revelado, y dictado durante toda su vida por orden suya a todos sus seguidores. Todavía
se puede consultar el Corán en su forma completa y original, y en la lengua árabe tal como
le fue revelado al Profeta Mohammad (¡Qué Dios lo bendiga y lo mantenga en su santa
paz!). El Hadiz, osea la relación de las enseñanzas y los hechos máximos del Profeta
Mohammad (¡Qué Dios lo bendiga y lo mantenga en su santa paz!), explica y elabora estas
enseñanzas en el Corán. 

CONCEPTOS DEL CULTO DIVINO

El Islam no cree en el puro ritualismo, sino que insiste en que nuestras intenciones y
acciones sean buenas. Para adorar totalmente a Dios, tenemos que conocerlo, amarlo y
comportarnos según sus leyes en todos los aspectos de la vida; debemos ordenar la bondad
y prohibir lo malo, ejercer la caridad y la justicia y servirle a Dios Único al servirle a la
humanidad. El Corán nos ofrece estos conceptos de la siguiente manera sublime: "No es la
virtud orientar nuestras caras hacía el Oriente ni al Occidente; sino el virtuoso es él que cree
en Dios Único y en el Día del Juicio Final, en los ángeles, en las Escrituras y los Profetas; y
el que ofrece su hacienda por amor a Dios, a sus parientes, a los huérfanos, a los pobres, al
viajero, a los mendigos y para el rescate de cautivos, y mantiene la oración y da la limosna
prescrita; y los que cumplen los pactos cuando pactan, los constantes en la adversidad, en la
desgracia y en los momentos de calamidad; ésos son los veraces y ésos son los temerosos
de Dios" (El Corán, Capitulo II "La Vaca", Verso 177). 

LOS CINCO PRINCIPIOS BÁSICOS DEL ISLAM 

Según el Islam, cada acto que se lleve a cabo con la conciencia de que uno cumple con la
voluntad de Dios, se considera como un verdadero acto de adoración. Sin embargo, los

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actos específicos de oración se conocen como los "Cinco Pilares de la Fe Islámica", y están
considerados en un nivel más alto de espiritualidad y son los siguientes: 

1) El credo o la Declaración de la Fe, que dice así: Doy testimonio de que no hay más
divinidad que un solo Dios y que Mohammad es su siervo y mensajero. La misión
apostólica de Mohammad (¡que Dios lo bendiga y que lo mantenga en Su santa paz!)
convida a los musulmanes a que sigan la vida ejemplar del profeta en todos los sentidos. 

2) El Islam ordena cinco oraciones al día como obligación a Dios. Se debe rezar cinco
veces al día como obligación personal hacia a Dios. Nos ofrece una manera de darle fuerza
y vida a nuestra creencia en Dios Único, inspira una moralidad superior en el creyente, le
purifica el corazón y suprime las inclinaciones indecentes y dañinas. 

3) El Islam ordena el Ayuno durante el mes de Ramadan Se practica el ayuno durante el

santo mes de Ramadan, que es el noveno mes del calendario lunar Islámico. Durante este
mes se abstiene de comer y de beber desde el amanecer hasta el anochecer(la puesta del
sol). También se abstiene de malas intenciones y malos deseos, incluso pleitos. El Ayuno le
enseña al hombre el amor, la sinceridad y la devoción; le cultiva una conciencia pura y
firme al mismo tiempo le cultiva la paciencia, generosidad, disciplina y fuerza de
voluntad(el musulmán no toma bebidas embriagantes ni come puerco). 

4) El Zakat o tributo El Islam ordena que un musulmán dé anualmente el 2.5% de su

ingreso neto como caridad obligatoria para ser distribuido entre la gente pobre y las
comunidades necesitadas. 

5) La Peregrinación a la Kaba en Mec'ca (Arabia Saudita) Se debe efectuar aunque sea una
sola vez en la vida, la Peregrinación a la Kaba en Mec'ca, a condición de que se tengan los
medios económicos disponibles para hacer el viaje. 

LA VIDA ISLÁMICA 

El Islam dispone de guías muy definidas para que toda la humanidad las siga en todos los
aspectos de la vida, ya sea en el campo político, económico, moral y espiritual. La vida de
monasterio y de convento se rechaza en el Islam. Se le recuerda al creyente en varios
capítulos de El Corán, su última finalidad en esta vida, sus deberes y obligaciones hacia sí
mismo, sus parientes y amigos; para su comunidad, su prójimo y hacia su Creador. Al
hombre se le han dado guías fundamentales para que lleve una vida bien orientada, de
modo que cuando se encuentre ante el desafío de la vida, sepa poner en práctica los altos
ideales descritos en El Corán. 

LA PERSPECTIVA HISTÓRICA 

Mohammad (¡que Dios lo bendiga y que lo mantenga en Su santa paz!) nació en el año 570
de la era cristiana en la ciudad de Mec'ca en Arabia. Descendió de una ilustre familia árabe,
los Quraish. Su primera revelación la recibió a la edad de cuarenta años. Desde que empezó
a predicar el Islam, él con los creyentes, fueron sometidos a toda clase de pruebas y fue

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preciso que se transladaran con sus compañeros a Medina, otra ciudad en el norte de
Arabia. Durante el breve período de veintitrés años, el cumplió con su misión de Profeta, y
a la edad de sesenta y tres años entregó el alma a su Creador y fue sepultado en la ciudad de
Medina. Mohammad(¡que Dios lo bendiga y que lo mantenga en Su santa paz!) vivió una
vida ejemplar para toda la humanidad; la grandeza del hombre y su salvación consisten en
seguir su ejemplo. Su vida es un reflejo de las enseñanzas de el Corán puestas en práctica. 

EL ISLAM Y SU LLAMADO UNIVERSAL

 Por su manera sencilla directa de expresar la verdad el Islam atrae poderosamente a

cualquier mente que sea sincera y racional. El Islam ofrece una solución para todos los
problemas de la vida, es una guía hacia una vida superior y feliz que glorifica en todas sus
fases a nuestro Creador todopoderoso y misericordioso. Se cuenta que con cincuenta y siete
países en el mundo donde la mayoría de los habitantes son musulmanes. Se calcula que en
el año 1980 de la era cristiana, la población musulmana ha sobrepasado el billón de
personas, aproximadamente ¼ de la humanidad.

EL ISLAM Y EL PORVENIR LATINOAMERICANO 

La herencia Islámica ha estado íntimamente vinculada con la cultura hispanoamericana. Las

ciudades mineras del Perú y Bolivia muestran todavía la mano de obra de los desterrados
artesanos mudéjares de los siglos XVI y XVII. La capilla real de Cholula en México, es una
auténtica copia de la Gran Mezquita de Córdoba, con sus bóvedas y arcos que consuelan
como un oasis en el desierto espiritual Mexicano. Nietos de estos artesanos construyeron el
Claustro Mudéjar de la Universidad Nacional de San Carlos, en la Antigua Guatemala, a
mediados del siglo XVII; el cuál se conserva hasta la fecha. Es necesario hacer notar, que
los hispanoamericanos tienen una herencia hispano-musulmana de aproximadamente 800
años(750-1550); y una herencia cristiana en Hispanoamérica de solamente unos 400
años(1580-1980 o hasta la fecha). Ojalá que algún día pueda volver la Fe ISLÁMICA A
LA GENTE HISPANOAMERICANA. 

OPINIONES ERRÓNEAS SOBRE EL ISLAM 

Desgraciadamente algunas enseñanzas contemporáneas sobre el Islam han sido mal

entendidas o mal representadas en el mundo cristiano. Aquí ofrecemos el verdadero punto
de vista Islámico de varios conceptos del Islam: 

a) La condición de la mujer: El Islam no practica ninguna forma de discriminación contra la

mujer; pero el Islam si le indica a cada uno como puede perfeccionar en las esferas
correspondientes las capacidades potenciales de cada sexo y, por lo tanto, las
responsabilidades respectivas a cada uno, las cuales son igualmente importantes; aunque no
sean precisamente idénticas. 

b) Matrimonio y Divorcio: El Matrimonio es un contrato sagrado y de suma importancia

entre el hombre y la mujer y ofrece un paso mas hacía una vida de perfeccionamiento sana
y feliz. El Islam le ofrece tanto al hombre como a la mujer el derecho al divorcio como
último recurso, más no como primera intención. 

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c) La lucha, esfuerzo o "Yihad": Aquellos que creían que Yihad en el Islam significa
"Guerra Santa". El Yihad es un esfuerzo y un deber que cumplen los musulmanes
individualmente o en grupos, por la felicidad de la sociedad y el bien común, con la
condición de que esta lucha se lleve a cabo en el nombre de y por Dios, para conseguir su
bendición y complacencia divina sin ningún objetivo personal. En el Islam se encuentran
leyes divinas para gobernar un país, derrumbando de esta manera los regímenes
corrompidos hechos por los tiranos. El Yihad es un esfuerzo o lucha para conseguir la meta
divina que es la de reformar la humanidad en esta tierra, aunque para lograrlo se tenga que
usar la mano, la lengua, la pluma y todos los medios económicos disponibles con la única
intención de obedecer y complacer a Dios para conseguir una sociedad de justicia,
igualdad, tolerancia y respeto sin permitir el dominio de intereses particulares o de grupo
con el perjuicio de los demás seres humanos.

Los primeros musulmanes

La historia de la llegada de los musulmanes al Perú suele circunscribirse a las oleadas migratorias
llevadas a cabo a partir del siglo XIX hasta el siglo XX. Sin embargo, debe tenerse muy en cuenta
migraciones anteriores a éstas y para ello debemos intentar retroceder en el tiempo, hasta el siglo
XV.

Desde el año 711, comienza formalmente una nueva época para la península ibérica, al recibir la
llegada de los primeros musulmanes al mando del comandante bereber Tariq ben Ziyad. Esta
noción tradicional y ampliamente difundida por la historiografía occidental ha sido rebatida por el
historiador Ignacio Olagüe, quien afirma - en lo referente a la entrada del Islam en Andalucía- que
no fue por invasión alguna de árabes, sino más bien a través de una lenta asimilación de unas
ideas revolucionarias que llegaban de oriente hasta los puertos andaluces en los intercambios
comerciales, especialmente en la Andalucía oriental (Almería, Murcia y Málaga), las primeras en
islamizarse en el S.VIII. El Islam era desconocido en la parte occidental de Andalucía (Córdoba y
Sevilla), hasta el S.IX. En este sentido, nunca ha debido hablarse de invasión islámica de España
("La Revolución Islámica en Occidente" de Ignacio Olagüe).

La permanencia islámica en tierras ibéricas dura casi 8 siglos (más de lo que tiene de vida la
España católica actualmente), tiempo en el cual existió una notable convivencia entre las diferentes
culturas y creencias: musulmana, cristiana y judía. Aunque, de más está decir, el modo de vida
arabo-islámico primaba en todo ámbito de la vida: el uso de la lengua del Corán, el árabe (las obras
de estudiosos de cualquier religión se encontraban en árabe); la arquitectura; la vida literaria y
académica, en general; las comidas y los nombres, etc.

Luego de la caída del último reducto musulmán en Granada, en 1492 comienza la expulsión - a
cargo de los Reyes Católicos- de la población musulmana y judía. Aunque algunos musulmanes
optaron por la conversión forzada como medio para permanecer en el país (su propio país, así
como país de sus padres), muchos de ellos decidieron salir y llegar a tierras musulmanas.

En esos años, la euforia por la guerra conllevó también a una euforia religiosa dentro del
catolicismo, materializada en los Tribunales de la Inquisición. Martín Jaime Ballero, en su tesis
sobre la Metafísica del Poder Excursus Histórico sobre la Identidad Cultural a Partir de Estudios de
La Producción y Reproducción del Capital Religioso de las Comunidades Judía e Islámica en Lima,
menciona que la gran ofensiva inquisitorial se dio en el año 1492 llegando a “433 relajados
(quemados) en persona, relajados en efigie y reconciliados en un año”.

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Así, con la llegada de los barcos españoles a América, desembarcan también esos musulmanes
supuestamente conversos. Este hecho generó una gran preocupación en las autoridades españolas,
como se puede desprender de la Real Cédula de 1501, por la cual la Reina Católica instruye a su
enviado Fray Nicolás de Obando: “No consentiréis ni daréis lugar que allá vayan moros ni judíos, ni
herejes ni reconciliados ni personas nuevamente convertidas a nuestra Fe, salvo si fuese esclavos
negros...”.

A pesar de estos hechos los musulmanes llegados a América legaron mucho de su arte. Por
ejemplo, hasta ahora se pueden observar en la ciudad de Lima (e iniciadas en la Lima colonial)
construcciones con diseños mudéjares, tales como las casonas de dos plantas, organizadas como
habitaciones en cuadrángulo y abiertas hacia un patio interior cuadrado al que se llega a través de
un zaguán acoderado, denotando claramente su origen andaluz.

En cuanto a comida, podemos aún deleitarnos con mazapanes, turrones, alfeñiques y mazamorras
(derivado de masa mora), entre otros. Y en música, la Zarabanda y las Zambras. No cabe olvidar el
origen de muchos apellidos.

La migración islámica no termina ahí. Muchos de los esclavos que eran traídos de la costa
occidental africana eran musulmanes, a los que de mil formas apagaron su fe y la de sus
descendientes nacidos en el Perú.

Migración desde Medio Oriente

Si bien, como se ha visto, los musulmanes llegaron ya hacía varios siglos, la más palpable
migración musulmana es la que se dio durante finales del siglo XIX y durante el siglo XX.

El Califato Otomano que había empezado a sufrir los embates de la usura occidental, dominaba
gran parte del Medio Oriente árabe. Muchos de los musulmanes árabes que vivían bajo el gobierno
califal, ante la decadencia otomana (que coincidía, asimismo, con el ataque napoleónico a Egipto y
el avance del colonialismo europeo), decidieron emigrar a América en busca de mejores
oportunidades de vida. Así, llegan al Perú viajando, en su ruta a América, por los puertos nor
africanos del Mediterráneo, atravesando el océano Atlántico y el Canal de Panamá, hasta llegar al
puerto del Callao.

La cantidad de emigrantes, tal como lo hace notar el investigador Martín Jaime Ballero, no es
exacta, pero incluía a libaneses, sirios y palestinos, quienes llegan en gran medida desde 1904 a
1925. El 90% eran comerciantes y con el paso de los años perdieron su identidad religiosa,
mezclándose finalmente con la sociedad peruana. Debe recordarse que gran parte de la población
de origen árabe son católicos y ortodoxos, pero cuyos padres fueron originalmente musulmanes.

La segunda oleada migratoria de árabes musulmanes se da a partir de 1948, cuando se crea el

Estado de Israel y se inicia el triste y sangriento período de traslado de los refugiados ante la
ocupación de sus hogares por parte de la entidad sionista. Igual que el primer grupo de
musulmanes que llegó a principios del siglo XX, los recién llegados eran comerciantes. Aunque
también han tenido que enfrentar los problemas para preservar su identidad religiosa (muchas de
las generaciones posteriores han perdido el Islam de sus padres), son ellos los que lograron
establecer el primer centro religioso islámico en el Perú, 40 años después. El Centro Islámico, en la
actualidad, se ubica en el distrito de Magdalena del Mar, en la ciudad de Lima. La llegada de
musulmanes provenientes de Marruecos, Egipto, Pakistán y Bangla Desh, así como las
conversiones, han ampliado el crisol diverso del Islam.

8
Última Migración

Algo distinto con respecto a anteriores migraciones fue la que se dio en el departamento de Tacna,
al sur peruano, en la frontera con Chile. Al llevarse a cabo la apertura para la importación de autos
usados en la ciudad de Tacna, comienzan a llegar comerciantes musulmanes de origen pakistaní,
los que en muy poco tiempo alquilaron una casa que fungió de Mezquita, además de tener diversas
musallas en sus lugares de trabajo. La actual mezquita, con un extraordinario diseño que embellece
la ciudad, fue terminada hace cerca de 4 años. La comunidad musulmana llegó a tener poco más
de 600 miembros, número que ha ido disminuyendo paulatinamente por el cambio de la política
económica y que ha motivado la emigración por razones comerciales. A pesar de ello, muchos
musulmanes pakistaníes permanecen en el Perú, con familias establecidas en Tacna y forman parte
activa de la vida económica de la ciudad. Igual que la herencia árabe en nuestra comida, la comida
pakistaní se ha hecho popular gracias a los tres restaurantes que existen en la ciudad, propiedad de
musulmanes de esa nacionalidad y que -además- proveen de productos halal a la comunidad.

Actualmente hay cerca de 300 musulmanes pakistaníes, recalcando el número elevado de

conversiones, en especial de mujeres. También hay inmigrantes de India, algunos países árabes,
así como chilenos y colombianos.

Musulmanes Oriundos del Perú

Las conversiones en el Perú no resultan ser algo nuevo, aunque haya sido muy escasa en los
primeros años de las migraciones hasta los últimos 10 años. Uno de los primeros musulmanes
peruanos tomó el Islam hace 28 años (paradójicamente aceptó el Islam en Venezuela, donde ya
existía una comunidad islámica), siendo también uno de los primeros en realizar la peregrinación a
la Ciudad Sagrada de La Meca.

Paulatinamente, dentro del lapso de los últimos 10 años, varios jóvenes peruanos comenzaron a
acercarse al Islam, algunos de los cuales participaron en el establecimiento de la Mezquita An Nur,
ubicada en el distrito de Breña en la ciudad de Lima, que tuvo un año de existencia y que atrajo al
Islam a muchas personas.

A pesar de los terribles acontecimientos de septiembre del año 2001, las conversiones de peruanos-
luego de esa fecha- alcanzaron niveles mayores a cualquier otra época, siendo en la actualidad el
grupo de mayor actividad. Tal vez, para muchos peruanos (e hispanoamericanos), esta conversión
sea únicamente cerrar el círculo, que permaneció abierto durante siglos, con su pasado islámico.

El Futuro

En los últimos años, el trabajo de difusión del Islam -tanto en la ciudad de Lima como en Tacna- ha
aumentado progresivamente, de la mano de la primera generación de musulmanes conversos y de
muchos descendientes. Así, podemos decir que se ha iniciado una nueva etapa del Islam en el
Perú, con un trabajo conjunto entre musulmanes de diferentes orígenes, en un esfuerzo por
presentar el Islam a la población peruana y latinoamericana, en general.

LA MUJER MUSULMANA

Durante miles de años, con contadas excepciones la mujer ha estado sometida y dominada
por el hombre, quien le restringe sus derechos y libertades, así como pisotea y humilla su
personalidad y orgullo.

9
La historia nos demuestra como en Europa y en todo el mundo la mujer era despreciada, se
le trataba sin darle ninguna importancia, los sabios y filósofos discutían sobre ella, si poseía
alma o no, y en caso de tener alma ¿sería humana o animal? y suponiendo que si posee un
alma humana, entonces, su posición social en cuanto al hombre, ¿Es la posición de los
esclavos, o es un poco más elevada que ellos?

En otras civilizaciones como la del Imperio Romano que abarca casi diez siglos, años 500
antes de nuestra era hasta 476 de nuestra era, la mujer se encontraba en una tutela
permanente de su padre o de su marido, la mujer no podía sin ayuda o consentimiento
previo del tutor escoger a su futuro esposo o contraer matrimonio, tampoco podía disponer
de sus bienes, testar o ejercer cualquier actividad.

Esta situación de la mujer continuó por mucho tiempo, sin que existiera ningún cambio
práctico, aproximadamente hasta el año 1900 una mujer tenía difícilmente algún derecho, la
peor catástrofe que ha afectado a la mujer, llegó con la Revolución Industrial, ellas eran
explotadas por ser más baratas como trabajadoras que el hombre.

Entre los principales logros en la emancipación de la mujer fue la legislación de 1882, por
medio de la cual se decretó, que en adelante las mujeres de Gran Bretaña gozarían del
privilegio sin precedentes de quedarse con el dinero que ganasen.

En nuestros tiempos vemos como la mujer, a través de miles de engaños y fraudes por
medios auditivos, visuales, psicológicos, sensoriales, estéticos, artísticos y banales, utilizan
su existencia para persuadir a los consumidores a adquirir innecesariamente productos,
mancillando su honor y dignidad. Vemos como es desnudada en almanaques, revistas,
reinados de belleza, vallas publicitarias, en programas de televisión y en prostíbulos en
general. La mujer dentro del medio social actual, ha caído en un irrespeto tal que sólo se le
mira desde un punto de vista material, vemos como una persona invita a su hogar a un
amigo y éste a la primera oportunidad falta el respeto a sus hijas, a su esposa o a su madre.

LA MUJER Y SUS VALORES EN EL ISLAM

Algunas personas que no conocen la realidad del Islam, o que conociéndola y luego
intencionalmente tratan de ocultar lo justo par desviar a la gente del conocimiento del
Islam, dicen que el Islam es enemigo de la mujer, que degrada su dignidad y humilla su
orgullo, y la deja aun nivel más cerca del estado puramente animal, que solamente es un
goce sensual para el hombre y un instrumento para engendrar, de tal suerte que la mujer
está en una posición inferior al hombre y dominada por él. No existe otra cosa más falsa y
fuera de la realidad que esta afirmación, quien así lo dice ignora totalmente las normas
islámicas. Dios todopoderosos en el Islam desde hace más de 14 siglos, por medio del
Sagrado Corán declara la igualdad de hombres y mujeres en la vida, el honor, la dignidad y
en la sociedad en general, respetando los bienes de ambos(hombres y mujeres), Dios nos
dice que los bienes de todas las personas son sagrados y por lo tanto está prohibido
menoscabar directa o indirectamente, todos estos derechos son comunes a hombres y
mujeres sin ninguna distinción.

10
En el Sagrado Corán, Dios todopoderoso nos enseña esta igualdad entre el hombre y la
mujer, no solamente porque nos lo ordena de una manera clara, sino también por cuanto en
muchas Ayas Dios se refiera tanto a la mujer como al hombre en sus derechos y
obligaciones sin hacer distinción. Veamos al Sura 33, Aya 35: "Dios ha preparado perdón y
magnífica recompensa para los musulmanes y las musulmanas, los creyentes y las
creyentes, los devotos y las devotas, los sinceros y las sinceras, los pacientes y las
pacientes, los humildes y las humildes, los que y las que dan limosna, los que y las que
ayunan, los castos y las castas, los que y las que recuerdan mucho a Dios". También en el
Sagrado Corán Dios les dedicó un capítulo entero (Sura) la número 4, dándole por nombre
"Las Mujeres". Se necesitarían muchos volúmenes, para analizar todas las bondades y
derechos que Dios le ha dado a la mujer en el Islam hace más de 14 siglos y que están
escritos en el Sagrado Corán y los Hadices del Profeta -La paz y las bendiciones de Dios
sean con él.

EL MATRIMONIO

Es importante resaltar que la mujer antes de la Revelación del Sagrado Corán, no tenía el
derecho a elegir su futuro esposo, eran los padres de ella quienes lo escogían y ella debía
aceptar así no fuera de su agrado, pero desde la Revelación del Sagrado Corán (hace 1,426
años). La mujer es quien elige o rechaza al hombre con el cual quiere formar su hogar (este
derecho fue conquistado por la mujer mucho después en otras sociedades).

El Islam, considera el matrimonio un compromiso sumamente serio, por eso los esposos
deben esforzarse por lograr una comprensión y estabilidad general de pareja, no es
permitido en el Islam los matrimonios de prueba, de duración determinada, el Profeta (La
paz y las bendiciones de Dios sean siempre con él) declaró que se condenan a los hombres
y mujeres que gozan cambiando frecuentemente de cónyuge, que disfrutan de pareja por un
tiempo, y luego la cambian por otra, después por una tercera y así sucesivamente. También
es sumamente grave y condenable a los ojos de Dios y de los hombres el adulterio o la
fornicación, por eso el musulmán nunca realiza tal acto y su vida la dedica a su hogar y a su
esposa, siempre esta recordando las consecuencias de este acto que trae consigo la
desintegración de la familia, las enfermedades venéreas, la inmoralidad y la criminalidad.

LA VIDA FAMILIAR

El Profeta (La paz y las bendiciones de Dios sean con él) llegó a afirmar que el mejor
musulmán es aquel que mejor se comporta con su familia, y que el mayor y más bendito
gozo de la vida se encuentra en una esposa buena y recta, por eso el musulmán se dedica a
su esposa y sigue las indicaciones del Sagrado Corán y la Sunnah del Profeta (La paz y las
bendiciones de Dios sean con él) que ordenan la gentileza con su esposa, es un deber del
marido armonizar con su esposa de manera equitativa y amable, cumpliendo el mandato
divino, es su responsabilidad en cuanto el entero mantenimiento de la mujer, que debe
cumplir alegremente sin reproches, injurias o condescendencias. Este mantenimiento

11
implica el darle vivienda, vestirla, alimentarla, darle atención y bienestar en general de
acuerdo a sus medios y estilo de vida.

Además el musulmán debe tratar a su esposa con justicia, respetar sus sentimientos, hacerla
objeto de gentilezas y consideración. No debe la mujer recibir animadversión alguna por
parte del marido, ni ser sometida a ansiedades o incertidumbres. El musulmán también
recuerda el último sermón del Profeta(La paz y las bendiciones de Dios sean siempre con
él) cuando durante la peregrinación dijo entre otras cosas: "¡Vosotros! tenéis derechos
sobre vuestra esposa y vuestra esposa tienen derecho sobre vosotros. Tratad a vuestra
esposa con amor y gentileza. Es verdad la habéis tomado como un encargo de Dios y la
habéis hecho legitima con la palabra de Dios. Sed siempre fieles al encargo que os confía y
evitad los pecados".

EL DIVORCIO

Además de la breve exposición anterior, sobre el significado del matrimonio en el Islam,

hagamos énfasis en que es solemne, sagrado, en el que Dios interviene como primer testigo
y primera parte, se suscribe en Su nombre, en obediencia a Dios y de acuerdo con sus
mandatos. Por lo tanto no es un simple contrato civil o comercial en el que se evalúan
beneficios materiales y obligaciones contrapuestas entre sí.

El musulmán desde el momento en que se casa, sabe que es una relación permanente y de
continua armonía no sólo entre el hombre y la mujer, sino también entre éstos y Dios. El
divorcio es el último recurso al que la pareja debe acudir si existen obstáculos muy graves
que no permiten la reconciliación el Profeta(La paz y las bendiciones de Dios sean con él),
lo describe como la cosa más detestable de todos los medios legítimos a los ojos de Dios.
Para llegar al divorcio tanto el hombre como la mujer deben cumplir con los siguientes
pasos:

1. Las dos partes afectadas deben tratar de resolver sus disputas entre sí, tratando el tema de
la mejor manera.

2. Si no lo consiguen, deben encargarse dos árbitros, uno de la familia del marido y otro de
la familia de la esposa quienes tratarán de poner paz entre ellos y zanjar sus diferencias, si
esto fracasa viene el 3er. paso.

3. Se aplica el divorcio. La Ley Islámica requiere que sea aceptado por ambas partes y que
se conceda con dignidad y con el debido respeto.

Fuente: http://es.geocities.com/khiroune

The Myth of a 'Land Without People for a People

Without Land'

12
Roger Garaudy

Immediately following its publication in late 1995, Les mythes fondateurs de la politique
israélienne ("The Founding Myths of Israeli Policy"), touched off a storm of controversy.
Its octogenarian Communist-turned-Muslim author had taken aim at the historical legends
cited for decades to justify Zionism and the Jewish state, including the most sacred of
Jewish-Zionist icons, the Holocaust extermination story. (Les mythes was reviewed in the
March-April 1996 Journal, pp. 35-36.)

Roger Garaudy brought impressive credentials to this task. During the Second World War
he was active in the anti-German Résistance (for which he was arrested and interned).
Afterwards he joined the powerful French Communist Party, soon making a name for
himself as a Communist deputy in the French National Assembly, and as a leading Marxist
intellectual and theoretician. Later he broke with Communism and became a Muslim.

Soon after the publication of Les mythes, he was charged with violating France's notorious
Gayssot law, which makes it a crime to "contest" the "crimes against humanity" as defined
by the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1945-46. A Paris court found him guilty and, on February
27, 1998, fined him 240,000 francs ($40,000). His trial and conviction for Holocaust heresy
prompted wide international support, above all from across the Arab and Muslim world.
(See: T. O'Keefe, "Origin and Enduring Impact of the 'Garaudy Affair'," July-August 1999
Journal, pp. 31-35; R. Faurisson, "On the Garaudy/Abbé Pierre Affair," July-August 1997
Journal, pp. 26-28.)

In the following essay, adapted from the forthcoming IHR edition of The Founding Myths
of Modern Israel, Garaudy takes on a key historical myth used to justify the founding of
Israel, and its on-going policies of discrimination and oppression.

-- The Editor

Zionist ideology rests on a very simple postulate: it is written in Genesis (15:18): "... the
Lord made a covenant with Abraham, saying, 'To your descendants I give this land, from
the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates,...'"

Starting from this, without asking themselves what the covenant consisted of, to whom the
promise had been made, or if the Lord's choice had been unconditional, the Zionist leaders,
even the agnostics and atheists, proclaimed: Palestine was given to us by God.

The statistics, even those of the Israeli government, show that 15 percent of Israelis are
religious. This doesn't stop the other 85 percent from also claiming that this land had been
given to them by God ... in whom they don't believe.

The great majority of modern Israelis neither practice nor believe in a religion, while the
different "religious parties," despite comprising only a small minority of the Jewish

13
population, play an important role in the state. This apparent paradox is explained by
Nathan Weinstock in his book Le sionisme contre Israël ("Zionism Against Israel"):

If rabbinical obscurantism prevails in Israel, it is because the Zionist mystique is coherent

only in light of the Mosaic religion. Take away the concepts of a "Chosen People" and a
"Promised Land," and the foundation of Zionism crumbles. This is why the religious parties
paradoxically draw their strength from the complicity of agnostic Zionists. The inner
cohesion of Israel's Zionist structure has compelled its leaders to strengthen the power of
the rabbis. It was the social democratic "Mapai" party, not the religious parties, which, at
Ben-Gurion's prodding, made courses in religious instruction an obligatory part of the
school curriculum.

Weinstock, Le sionisme contre Israël, 1969, p. 315

This country exists as the fulfillment of a promise made by God Himself. It would be
ridiculous to ask Him to account for its legitimacy. Such is the basic axiom formulated by
Mrs. Golda Meir.

Le Monde, October 15, 1971

Begin restated this as:

This land has been promised to us and we have a right to it.

Begin's statement at Oslo, Davar, December 12, 1978

If you have the Book of the Bible, and the People of the Book, then you also have the Land
of the Bible -- of the Judges and of the Patriarchs in Jerusalem, Hebron, Jericho and
thereabouts.

Moshe Dayan, Jerusalem Post,

August 10, 1967

Significantly, Ben-Gurion evoked the American "precedent" in which, over the course of a
century, the frontier continuously advanced westward, all the way to the Pacific, where the
"closing of the frontier" was proclaimed, thanks to the success of the "Indian wars" in
driving off the original Americans and seizing their lands.

Ben-Gurion made it very clear:

To maintain the status quo will not do. We have set up a dynamic state, bent on expansion.

Ben-Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, p. 419

Zionist policy has corresponded to this singular theory: take the land and drive out the
inhabitants, as did Joshua, the successor to Moses.

14
Menachem Begin, the Israeli leader most profoundly imbued with biblical tradition,
declared:

Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And for ever.

Begin, The Revolt: The History of Irgun, p. 33

Thus, from the outset, the State of Israel places itself above all international law.

Imposed on the United Nations May 11, 1949, by the will of the United States, the State of
Israel was only admitted on three conditions:

1. That the status of Jerusalem would not be tampered with;

2. That the Palestinian Arabs would be allowed to return to their homes;
3. That the borders established by the partition decision would be respected.

Commenting on the UN resolution to "partition" Palestine, adopted long before Israel's

admission, Ben-Gurion declared:

The State of Israel considers the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, to be null and void.

New York Times, December 6, 1953

Echoing the concept of a parallel between American and Zionist expansion, General Moshe
Dayan wrote:

Take the American Declaration of Independence. It contains no mention of territorial limits.

We are not obliged to fix the limits of the State.

Jerusalem Post, August 10, 1967

Israeli policy corresponds precisely to the law of the jungle: the UN resolution mandating
the partition of Palestine was never honored.

The resolution on the partition of Palestine, adopted by the UN General Assembly (at that
time made up almost entirely of Western nations) on November 29, 1947, signaled the
West's designs on its "forward stronghold": on that date, the Jews were 32 percent of the
population and owned 5.6 percent of the land. Partition awarded them 56 percent of
Palestine, including the most fertile land. The terms of the partition were agreed to by the
General Assembly under pressure from the United States.

President Harry Truman exerted unprecedented pressure on the State Department.

Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles wrote:

15
By direct order of the White House every form of pressure, direct and indirect, was brought
to bear by American officials ... to make sure that the necessary majority would be at length
secured.

Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail,

Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948, p. 63

The secretary of defense at that time, James Forrestal, confirmed:

... The methods that had been used ... to bring coercion and duress on other nations in the
General Assembly bordered closely on to scandal.

James Forrestal, Forrestal's Memoirs,

New York: Viking, 1951, p. 363

The power of private monopolies was mobilized.

Drew Pearson, in the Chicago Daily News of February 9, 1948, provided some details:

Harvey Firestone, owner of rubber plantations in Liberia, used his influence with the
Liberian government ...

Beginning in 1948, the Israelis violated these pro-Zionist decisions.

The Israeli leaders took advantage of the Arabs' refusal to accept such injustice by grabbing
new territories, notably Jaffa and Acre -- so much so that by 1949, the Zionists controlled
80 percent of the country and 770,000 Palestinians had been driven out.

The method was terror.

The most striking instance was at Deir Yassin, on April 9, 1948: 254 inhabitants of this
village (men, women, children, and the elderly) were massacred by troops of the Irgun, led
by Menachem Begin, by methods indistinguishable from those the Nazis used at Oradour.

In his book The Revolt: The History of Irgun, Begin wrote that there would have been no
security for the State of Israel without the "victory" of Deir Yassin (p. 162). He added:

Meanwhile, the Haganah was carrying out successful attacks on the other fronts ... The
Arabs began fleeing in panic, shouting: "Deir Yassin!"

Begin, Revolt, p. 165

Any Palestinian who left his residence before August 1, 1948 was considered "absent."

In this way, two thirds of the land owned by the Arabs (70,000 hectares out of 110,000)
was confiscated. When the law on landed property was passed in 1953, compensation was

16
fixed at the value of the land in 1950; in the interim the Israeli pound had dropped to a fifth
of its value.

Moreover, from the beginning of Jewish immigration (here again in the truest colonialist
style), land was bought from feudal, non-resident landowners (the "effendis"). Through
arrangements between the former masters and the new occupants, the poor peasants, the
fellahin, who had no say in the matter, were evicted. Deprived of their land, there was
nothing left for them but to flee.

The United Nations appointed a mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden. In his first
report, Count Bernadotte wrote:

It would offend basic principles to prevent these innocent victims of the conflict from
returning to their homes, while Jewish immigrants flood into Palestine and, furthermore,
threaten, in a permanent way, to take the place of the Arab refugees who have been rooted
in this land for centuries.

He described

Zionist pillaging on a grand scale and the destruction of villages without apparent military
necessity.

This report (UN Document A, 648, p. 14) was filed on September 16, 1948. On September
17, 1948, Count Bernadotte and his French assistant, Colonel Serot, were assassinated in
the part of Jerusalem occupied by the Zionists.

It was not the first Zionist crime against someone who criticized their treachery.

Lord Moyne, the British secretary of state in Cairo, declared on June 9, 1942, in the House
of Lords that the Jews were not the descendants of the ancient Hebrews and that they had
no "legitimate claim" on the Holy Land. A proponent of curtailing immigration into
Palestine, he was accused of being "an implacable enemy of Hebrew independence."

In Isaac Zaar, Rescue and Liberation:

America's Part in the Birth of Israel,
New York: Bloch, 1954, p. 115

On November 6, 1944, Lord Moyne was assassinated in Cairo by two members of the Stern
Gang (Yitzak Shamir's group).

Years later, on July 2, 1975, The Evening Star of Auckland revealed that the bodies of the
two executed assassins had been exchanged for twenty Arab prisoners for burial at the
"Heroes' Monument" in Jerusalem. The British government deplored that Israel should
honor the assassins and make heroes of them.

17
On July 22, 1946, the wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem occupied by the British
civil and military authorities for Palestine was blown up, causing the deaths of nearly a
hundred people, British, Arabs, and Jews. The Irgun, Begin's group, had carried out the
attack, and claimed responsibility.

The State of Israel replaced the British colonialists, then used their methods. For example,
agricultural aid for irrigation was distributed in a discriminatory fashion, so that Jewish
landholders were systematically favored. Between 1948 and 1969, the area of irrigated land
rose, for the Jewish sector, from 20,000 to 164,000 hectares; for the Arab sector, from 800
to 4,100 hectares. The colonial system was thus perpetuated, growing even more
oppressive: Doctor Rosenfeld, in his book Arab Migrant Workers, published by the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem in 1970, recognized that Arab agriculture had been more
prosperous during the British mandate than it was under the Israelis.

Segregation also figures in housing policy. The president of the Israeli Human Rights
League, Doctor Israel Shahak, a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, relates in
his book Le racisme de l'État d'Israël ("The Racism of the Israeli State") (Paris: G. Authier,
1975, p. 57), that in Israel there are whole towns (Carmel, Nazareth, Illith, Hatzor, Arad,
Mitzphen-Ramen, and others) where non-Jews are forbidden by law to live.

In cultural matters the same colonialist spirit reigns.

In 1970, the Minister of National Education proposed two different versions of the prayer
"Yizkor" for high school students. One version proclaimed that the death camps had been
built by "the diabolical Nazi government and the German nation of murderers." The second
version alluded more generally to "the German nation of murderers...." Both contain a
paragraph ... calling on God "to avenge before our eyes the blood of the victims."

"Ce sont mes frères que je cherche,"

Ministry of Education and Culture, Jerusalem, 1990

This culture of racial hatred has borne fruit:

"In the wake of Kahane, we heard more and more about soldiers who, exposed to the
history of the Holocaust, were planning all sorts of ways to exterminate the Arabs," recalled
education-corps officer Ehud Praver. "It concerned us very much, because we saw that the
Holocaust was legitimizing the appearance of Jewish racism. We learned that it was
necessary to deal not only with the Holocaust but also with the rise of fascism and to
explain what racism is and what dangers it holds for democracy." According to Praver, "...
too many soldiers were deducing that the Holocaust justifies every kind of disgraceful
action."

Tom Segev, Seventh Million, p. 407

The problem had been expressed very clearly even before the State of Israel came to be.
The director of the Jewish National Fund, Yossef Weitz, wrote in 1940:

18
It should be clear to us that there is no room for two peoples in this country. If the Arabs
leave it, that will satisfy us ... There is no other way but to remove them all; there must not
be a single village left, or a single clan ... It must be explained to Roosevelt and to all the
heads of friendly states that the land of Israel is not too small if all the Arabs leave and if
the borders are pushed back a little to the north, as far as the Litani, and toward the east, to
the heights of the Golan.

Yossef Weitz, Diary and Letters to My Sons, Tel Aviv, 1965

In the major Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot (July 14, 1972), Yoram Ben-Porat
forcefully reminded Israelis of the Zionist objective:

It is the duty of Israeli leaders to explain clearly and courageously for public opinion a
certain number of facts which time causes to be forgotten. The first of these is that there is
no Zionism, colonization or Jewish State without the eviction of the Arabs and the
expropriation of their land.

Here again we observe the most exacting logic of the Zionist system: How to create a
Jewish majority in a country populated by a native Palestinian Arab community?

Political Zionism provided the only solution possible within the framework of its
colonialist program: create a settler colony while driving out the Palestinians and promoting
Jewish immigration.

Driving out the Palestinians and taking over their land was a deliberate and systematic
undertaking.

At the time of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the Zionists possessed only 2.5 percent of
the land; at the time UN resolution to partition Palestine in 1947, they had 6.5 percent. By
1982, they possessed 93 percent.

The methods used to dispossess the natives of their land have been those of the most
ruthless colonialism, with Zionism adding an even more pronouncedly racist taint.

The first stage bore all the hallmarks of classic colonialism: exploitation of the local work
force. This was Baron Édouard de Rothschild's metier: just as he had previously exploited
the cheap labor of the fellahin on his vineyards in Algeria, in Palestine he simply enlarged
his sphere of activity, exploiting other Arabs in his vineyards there.

A turning point occurred with the arrival from Russia of a new wave of immigrants
following the failure of the Revolution of 1905. Instead of carrying on the fight there, side
by side with other Russian revolutionaries, the deserters of the defeated revolution imported
a strange Zionist socialism into Palestine. They created production and service cooperatives
and agricultural kibbutzes, excluding the Palestinian fellahin in order to create an economy
based on a Jewish working and agricultural class. From a classical colonialism (of the
English or French type), Palestine passed to a settlement colony in the logic of political

19
Zionism, involving an influx of immigrants "for" whom, and "against" no one (accordingly
to Professor Klein), land and work had to be provided. From this point on, it was a matter
of replacing the Palestinian people with another, and, naturally, of taking their the land.

The starting point of this great operation was the creation, in 1901, of the Jewish National
Fund, which had a feature novel even to settler colonialism: the land which the JNF
acquired could not be resold, or even rented, to non-Jews.

Two other laws concern the Keren Kayemet (Jewish National Fund; law passed on
November 23, 1953) and the Keren Hayesod (Foundation Fund; law passed on January 10,
1956). "These two laws," writes Professor Klein, "permitted the transformation of these
societies, which found themselves benefitting from certain privileges" (Klein, Caractère
juif, pp. 20-21). Without enumerating these privileges, he introduces, as a simple
"observation," the fact that lands obtained by the National Jewish Fund were then declared
"Lands of Israel," and a law was enacted to decree the inalienability of these lands. This
law is one of Israel's four "fundamental laws" passed in 1960 (elements of a future
constitution, which still does not exist, fifty years after the creation of Israel). It is
unfortunate that the learned lawyer, usually attentive to detail, made no comment on this
"inalienability." He does not even define it: a piece of land "reclaimed" by the Jewish
National Fund ("land redemption") is a land which has become "Jewish"; it can never be
sold to a "non-Jew," nor rented to a "non-Jew," nor worked by a "non-Jew."

Can it be denied that this fundamental law is discriminatory?

Israel's agrarian policy is one of systematic plundering of the Arab peasantry.

The property law of 1943, on expropriation in the public interest, is a relic from the time of
the British mandate. This law is perverted from its original intent when it is applied in a
discriminatory way, as, for example, in 1962, when 500 hectares were expropriated at Deir
El-Arad, Nabel and Be'neh, where the "public interest" consisted of creating the town of
Carmel, which was reserved exclusively for Jews.

Another procedure involved the use of "emergency laws," decreed in 1945 by the British
against both Jews and Arabs. Law 124 gives the military governor the authority, this time
under the pretext of "security," to suspend all civil rights, including freedom of movement.
The army has only to declare an area off limits, "for reasons of state security," in order to
prevent an Arab from entering his land without authorization from the military governor. If
authorization is refused, the land is then declared "uncultivated" and the ministry of
agriculture can "take possession of uncultivated land in order to ensure its cultivation."

When the British enacted this savagely colonialist legislation to fight Jewish terrorism in
1945, the lawyer Bernard (Dov) Joseph, protesting against this system of "arbitrary
warrants," declared:

Are we all to be subjected to official terror?... No citizen can be safe from imprisonment for
life without trial ... the power of the administration to exile anyone is unlimited ... it is not
necessary to commit any type of infraction, a decision made in some office is sufficient ...

20
The same Bernard (Dov) Joseph, after he became Israeli minister of justice, applied these
laws against Arabs.

J. Shapira criticized the British emergency laws at the same protest meeting at which
Joseph spoke out, on February 7, 1946, in Tel Aviv (Hapraklit, February 1946, pp. 58-64),
declaring even more forcefully: "The order established by this legislation is without
precedent in civilized countries. There were no such laws even in Nazi Germany." The self-
same Shapira became the State of Israel's chief prosecutor, then its minister of justice, and
enforced the same laws he had denounced, against the Arabs.

To justify the permanence of these repressive laws, "the state of emergency" has not been
lifted in the State of Israel since 1948.

Shimon Peres wrote in the newspaper Davar (January 25, 1972):

The use of Law 125, on which military government is founded, follows directly from the
struggle for Jewish settlement and immigration.

The 1948 law on the cultivation of fallow lands, amended in 1949, is even more repressive:
without so much as the pretext of "public utility" or "military security," the minister of
agriculture can requisition any abandoned land. The massive exodus of Arabs fleeing
Israeli terror tactics, such as at Deir Yassin in 1948, Kafr Kassem on October 29, 1956, or
the "pogroms" of "Unit 101," created by Moshe Dayan and long commanded by Ariel
Sharon, "liberated" vast areas. Cleared of their Arab owners or cultivators, they were
handed to Jews.

The mechanisms for the dispossession of the fellahin were completed by the law of June
30, 1948; the emergency decree of November 15, 1948 on property of "absentees"; the law
relating to lands of "absentees" (March 14, 1950); the law on the acquisition of land (March
13, 1953); and a whole arsenal of measures tending to legalize theft by pressuring the Arabs
to leave their land in order to establish Jewish colonies, as Nathan Weinstock makes clear
in Le sionisme contre Israël.

To obliterate even the memory of the Palestinian agricultural population and to give
credence to the myth of the "desert," the Arab villages were destroyed: their homes, their
fences and even their graveyards and tombs. In 1975, Professor Israel Shahak gave, district
by district, a listing of 385 Arab villages destroyed, bulldozed, out of the 475 that had
existed in 1948.

To convince us that before Israel, Palestine was a "desert," hundreds of villages were razed
by bulldozer with their houses, their fences, their graveyards and tombs.

Shahak, Racisme, pp. 152ff.

21
The Israeli settlements have continued to multiply, with a new lease on life since 1979 on
the West Bank, and, in accordance with the most classic colonialist traditions, the settlers
are always armed.

The overall result is that after having expelled a million and a half Palestinians, "Jewish
land," -- as the people of the Jewish National Fund call it -- no more than 6.5 percent in
1947, today represents more than 93 percent of Palestine (of which 75 percent belongs to
the state and 14 percent to the National Fund).

The outcome of this operation was remarkably (and significantly) summarized in the
Afrikaner newspaper, Die Transvaler, well versed in matters of racial discrimination
(apartheid):

What is the difference between the way in which the Jewish people struggle to remain who
they are in the midst of non-Jewish populations, and the way Afrikaners are trying to
remain what they are?

Henry Katzew, South Africa: A Country Without Friends, quoted in R. Stevens, Zionism,
South Africa and Apartheid

The system of apartheid manifests itself in the regulation of individuals no less than it does
in the appropriation of land. The "autonomy" which the Israelis want to grant the
Palestinians is the equivalent of the "homelands" for the blacks in South Africa.

Analyzing the consequences of the Law of "Return," Klein raises a question:

If the Jewish people are a large majority in the State of Israel, inversely, one can say that
the entire population of the State of Israel is not Jewish, since the country has a sizeable
non-Jewish minority, mainly Arab and Druze. The question which arises is to what extent
the existence of a Law of Return, which favors the immigration of one part of the
population (defined by its religious and ethnic affiliation), can not be regarded as
discriminatory.

Klein, Caractère juif, p. 33

The author wonders in particular whether the International Convention on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (adopted December 21, 1965, by the General Assembly of the
United Nations) applies to the Law of Return.

By a dialectic of which we shall let the reader be the judge, the eminent lawyer concludes
with this subtle distinction: in matters of non-discrimination,

22
a measure must not be directed against one particular group. The Law of Return was
created for Jews who want to settle in Israel; it is not directed against any group or
nationality. One cannot see how this law would discriminate.

Klein, Caractère juif, p. 35

For the reader who might risk being led astray by this, to say the least, audacious logic --
which calls to mind the famous witticism that all citizens are equal but some are more equal
than others -- let us make the situation created by this Law of Return very clear. The Law
of Nationality (5712/1952) specifies those who are not to benefit from the "right of return"
in Article 3: "any individual who, immediately before the founding of the State, was a
Palestinian subject, and who didn't become an Israeli by virtue of Article 2" (which
concerns the Jews). Those referred to by this circumlocution (and who are considered to
have "never had any previous nationality," in other words, were stateless persons) must
prove they were living in Palestine over a given period (documentary proof is often
impossible because the papers disappeared during the war and the terror which
accompanied the establishment of the Zionist state). Failing this, in order to become a
citizen, the "naturalization" route requires, for example, "a certain knowledge of the
Hebrew language." After which, "if he judges it useful," the minister of the interior grants
(or refuses) Israeli nationality. In short, in Israeli law, a Jew from Patagonia becomes an
Israeli citizen the moment he sets foot in Tel Aviv airport; a Palestinian, born in Palestine,
of Palestinian parents, can be considered a man or woman without a country. No racial
discrimination "against" the Palestinians here -- simply a measure "for" Jews!

It therefore seems difficult to contest the UN General Assembly's resolution of November

10, 1975 (Resolution 3379-XXX) classifying Zionism as "... a form of racism and racial
discrimination."

In actuality, only a tiny minority of those who settled in Israel have come to fulfill "the
promise." The Law of Return has had very little effect. This is fortunate, because in every
country of the world Jews have played an eminent role in every area of culture, science, and
the arts, and it would be deplorable for Zionism to attain the objective the anti-Semites have
longed for: to remove the Jews from their respective homelands in order to insulate them in
a world ghetto. The example of the French Jews is significant: after the Évian agreements
of 1962 leading to the independence of Algeria, of 130,000 the Jews who left Algeria, only
20,000 went to Israel, while 110,000 went to France. This emigration was not the result of
anti-Semitic persecution, for the proportion of non-Jewish French colonists who left
Algeria was the same. The reason for their departure was not anti-Semitism but the end of
French colonialism. The Algerian French Jews experienced the same fate as the other
French people in Algeria.

To summarize: Nearly all Jewish immigrants to Israel came to escape anti-Semitic

persecution.

In 1880, there were 25,000 Jews in Palestine, out of a population of 500,000.

23
Starting in 1882, massive immigration began in response to the great pogroms of Tsarist
Russia.

From 1882 to 1917, 50,000 Jews arrived in Palestine. Then, between the two wars, came
the Polish immigrants and those from the Maghreb (the Mediterranean coast of Africa),
who were escaping persecution.

The greatest number, however, came from Germany as a result of Hitler's vile anti-
Semitism. Altogether, almost 400,000 Jews arrived in Palestine before 1945.

In 1947, on the eve of the creation of the State of Israel, there were 600,000 Jews in
Palestine, out of a total population of 1,250,000.

And so began the systematic uprooting of the Palestinians. Before the 1948 war, about
650,000 Arabs lived in the territory which was to become the State of Israel. In 1949, only
160,000 remained. Yet, due to a high birth rate, their descendants numbered 450,000 at the
end of 1970. The Israeli Human Rights League revealed that between June 11, 1967 and
November 15, 1969, more than 20,000 Arab houses were dynamited in Israel and on the
West Bank.

At the time of the British census of December 31, 1922, there were 757,000 people living
in Palestine, of whom 663,000 were Arabs (590,000 Muslim Arabs and 73,000 Christian
Arabs) and 83,000 Jews (which is to say: 88 percent Arabs and 11 percent Jews). It is to be
remembered that this so-called "desert" was an exporter of cereals and citrus fruits.

As early as 1891, one of the first Zionists, Asher Ginsberg (writing under the pseudonym
Ahad Haam, "One of the People"), visiting Palestine, gave this account:

Abroad, we are accustomed to believing that Eretz-Israel is currently almost all desert,
without cultivation, and that whoever wants to acquire land can come here and get as much
as his heart desires. But the truth is nothing like this. Throughout the length and breadth of
the country, it is difficult to find any fields which are not cultivated. The only non-
cultivated areas are fields of sand and rocky mountains where only fruit trees can grow, and
this, only after hard work and a lot of effort in clearing and reclamation.

Ahad Haam, Complete Works (in Hebrew),

Tel Aviv: Devir, 8th edition, p. 23

In reality, before the Zionists, the "bedouins" (who were in fact settled farmers) were
exporting 30,000 tons of wheat per year. The area of Arab orchards tripled between 1921
and 1942, that of orange and other citrus fruit groves multiplied seven-fold between 1922
and 1947, and production rose ten-fold between 1922 and 1938.

So rapid was the growth of Palestine's orange industry that in 1937 the Peel Report,
presented to the British Parliament by the secretary of state for the colonies, estimated that

24
over the next decade Palestine would grow half the world's winter oranges, as shown in the
following table (the figures refer to crates of oranges):

Palestine 15 million

United States 7 million

Spain 5 million

Other Countries (Cyprus, Egypt, Algeria, etc.) 3 million

Great Britain, Colonial Office,

Palestine Royal Commission Report ("Peel Report"),
(Cmd. 5479), 1937, chapter 8, § 19, p. 214

According to a US State Department study submitted to a congressional committee on

March 20, 1993:

... more than 200,000 Israelis are now settled in the occupied territories (including the
Golan Heights and East Jerusalem). They constitute "approximately" 13% of the total
population of these territories.

Some 90,000 of them reside in 150 settlements on the West Bank, "... where the Israeli
authorities control about half of the territory."

"In East Jerusalem and in the outlying Arab suburbs of the city," continues the State
Department study,

... approximately 120,000 Israelis are settled in some twelve districts. In the Gaza Strip,
where the Jewish State has confiscated 30 percent of an already over-populated territory,
3,000 Israelis reside in about 15 settlements. On the Golan Heights, there are 12,000,
scattered among approximately 30 locations.

Le Monde, April 18, 1993

Le Monde cited the following report which originally appeared in the daily newspaper
Yediot Aharonot, which has the largest circulation in Israel:

Since the 70's, there has never been such an acceleration in construction within the
territories. Ariel Sharon (Minister of Housing and Construction), is feverishly busy
establishing new settlements, developing those which already exist, building roads and
preparing new sites for construction.

Le Monde, April 18, 1993

25
(Recall that Ariel Sharon was the general in command of the invasion of Lebanon, who
armed the Phalangist militias that carried out the massacres in the Palestinian refugee
camps of Sabra and Shatila. Sharon turned a blind eye to these cowardly slaughters and was
complicit in them, as even the Israeli commission appointed to investigate the killings
determined).

The maintenance of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, their protection by
the Israeli army and by armed settlers (like the frontiersmen of the American "Wild West" a
century ago), makes any real Palestinian "autonomy" -- and thus any hope for a genuine
peace -- impossible. They will remain impossible as long as the occupation continues.

The main thrust of colonialist settlement has been directed at Jerusalem and its environs,
with the declared goal of making the decision to annex the whole of Jerusalem irrevocable
-- although that has been condemned unanimously by the United Nations (including the
United States!).

The colonialist settlements in the occupied territories are a flagrant violation of

international law, specifically the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Article 49 of
which stipulates:

The occupying power cannot undertake a transfer of a part of its own civil population into
the territory which it occupies.

The pretext of "security," such as from the "terrorism" of the intifada, is illusory: the
statistics in this regard are eloquent:

1,116 Palestinians have been killed since the beginning of the intifada ... on December 9,
1987, by shootings by soldiers, policemen or settlers. There were 626 deaths in 1988 and
1989, 134 in 1990, 93 in 1991, 108 in 1992 and 155 from January 1 to September 11, 1993.
Among the victims have been 233 children under the age of 17, according to a study carried
out by Betselem, the Israeli association for human rights.

Military sources give a figure of nearly 20,000 for the number of Palestinians wounded by
bullets, and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) gives a
figure of 90,000.

Thirty-three Israeli soldiers have been killed since December 9, 1987: four in 1988, four in
1989, one in 1990, two in 1991, eleven in 1992 and eleven in 1993.

Forty civilians, mostly settlers, have been killed in the occupied territories, according to
figures provided by the Army.

According to the humanitarian organizations, in 1993, 15,000 Palestinians were being held
in civil and military prisons detention centers.

26
Twelve Palestinians have died in Israeli prisons since the beginning of the intifada, some
under circumstances which, according to Betselem, have not yet been clarified. This
humanitarian organization also indicates that at least 20,000 detainees are tortured every
year during interrogation in the military detention centers.

Le Monde, September 12, 1993

So many violations of international law, treated like a "worthless scrap of paper" -- all the
more so, as Professor Israel Shahak writes:

... because these settlements, by their very nature, partake of a system of plunder,
discrimination and apartheid.

Shahak, Racisme, p. 263

Here is Professor Israel Shahak's testimony on the idolatry which consists of replacing the
God of Israel with the State of Israel:

I am Jew who lives in Israel. I consider myself a law-abiding citizen. I do my time in the
army every year even though I am over forty years old. But I am not "devoted" to the State
of Israel or any other state or organization! I am attached to my ideals. I believe that one
must tell the truth and do what is necessary to preserve justice and equality for all. I am
attached to the Hebrew language and poetry, and I like to think that I modestly respect
some of the values of our ancient prophets.

But make a cult of the State? I can well imagine Amos or Isaiah if they had been asked to
make a cult of the kingdom of Israel or Judea!

Jews believe, and repeat three times a day, that a Jew must be devoted to God and to God
alone: "You will love Yahweh, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul and with
all your might" (Deuteronomy 6:5). A small minority still believes in this. But it seems to
me that most people have lost their God and replaced Him with an idol, as when they
worshipped the golden calf in the desert so much that they gave up all their gold to make a
statue of it. The name of their modern idol is the State of Israel.

Shahak, Racisme, p. 93

US-Israel-Palestine by Noam Chomsky

Red Pepper, May 2002
April 11, 2002

A year ago, Hebrew University sociologist Baruch Kimmerling observed that "What we
feared hascome true." Jews and Palestinians are "regressing to superstitious tribalism... War
appears an unavoidable fate," an "evil colonial" war. After Israel's invasion of the refugee
camps this year his colleague Ze'ev Sternhell wrote that "In colonial Israel...human life is
cheap." The leadership is "no longer ashamed to speak of war when what they are really

27
engaged in is colonial policing, which recalls the takeover by the white police of the poor
neighborhoods of the blacks in South Africa during the apartheid era." Both stress the
obvious: there is no symmetry between the "ethno-national groups" regressing to tribalism.
The conflict is centered in territories that have been under harsh military occupation for 35
years. The conqueror is a major military power, acting with massive military, economic and
diplomatic support from the global superpower. Its subjects are alone and defenseless,
many barely surviving in miserable camps, currently suffering even more brutal terror of a
kind familiar in "evil colonial wars" and now carrying out terrible atrocities of their own in
revenge.

The Oslo "peace process" changed the modalities of the occupation, but not the basic
concept. Shortly before joining the Ehud Barak government, historian Shlomo Ben-Ami
wrote that "the Oslo agreements were founded on a neo-colonialist basis, on a life of
dependence of one on the other forever." He soon became an architect of the US-Israel
proposals at Camp David in Summer 2000, which kept to this condition. These were highly
praised in US commentary. The Palestinians and their evil leader were blamed for their
failure and the subsequent violence. But that is outright "fraud," as Kimmerling reported,
along with all other serious commentators.

True, Clinton-Barak advanced a few steps towards a Bantustan-style settlement. Just prior
to Camp David, West Bank Palestinians were confined to over 200 scattered areas, and
Clinton-Barak did propose an improvement: consolidation to three cantons, under Israeli
control, virtually separated from one another and from the fourth enclave, a small area of
East Jerusalem, the center of Palestinian life and of communications in the region. In the
fifth canton, Gaza, the outcome was left unclear except that the population were also to
remain virtually imprisoned. It is understandable that maps are not to be found in the US
mainstream, or any of the details of the proposals.

No one can seriously doubt that the US role will continue to be decisive. It is therefore of
crucial importance to understand what that role has been, and how it is internally perceived.
The version of the doves is presented by the editors of the NY Times (7 April), praising the
President's "path-breaking speech" and the "emerging vision" he articulated. Its first
element is "ending Palestinian terrorism," immediately. Some time later comes "freezing,
then rolling back, Jewish settlements and negotiating new borders" to end the occupation
and allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. If Palestinian terror ends, Israelis will be
encouraged to "take the Arab League's historic offer of full peace and recognition in
exchange for an Israeli withdrawal more seriously." But first Palestinian leaders must
demonstrate that they are "legitimate diplomatic partners."

The real world has little resemblance to this self-serving portrayal -- virtually copied from
the 1980s, when the US and Israel were desperately seeking to evade PLO offers of
negotiation and political settlement while keeping to the demand that there will be no
negotiations with the PLO, no "additional Palestinian state..." (Jordan already being a
Palestinian state), and "no change in the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than in
accordance with the basic guidelines of the [Israeli] Government" (the May 1989 Peres-
Shamir coalition plan, endorsed by Bush I in the Baker plan of Dec. 1989). All of this
remained unpublished in the US mainstream, as regularly before, while commentary

28
denounced the Palestinians for their single-minded commitment to terror, undermining the
humanistic endeavors of the US and its allies.

In the real world, the primary barrier to the "emerging vision" has been, and remains,
unilateral US rejectionism. There is little new in the "Arab League's historic offer." It
repeats the basic terms of a Security Council Resolution of January 1976 backed by
virtually the entire world, including the leading Arab states, the PLO, Europe, the Soviet
bloc -- in fact, everyone who mattered. It was opposed by Israel and vetoed by the US,
thereby vetoing it from history. The Resolution called for a political settlement on the
internationally-recognized borders "with appropriate arrangements...to guarantee...the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all states in the area and their
right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders" -- in effect, a modification of
UN 242 (as officially interpreted by the US as well), amplified to include a Palestinian
state. Similar initiatives from the Arab states, the PLO, and Europe have since been blocked
by the US and mostly suppressed or denied in public commentary.

US rejectionism goes back 5 years earlier, to February 1971, when President Sadat of Egypt
offered Israel a full peace treaty in return for Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory,
with no mention of Palestinian national rights or the fate of the other occupied territories.
Israel's Labor government recognized this to be a genuine peace offer, but rejected it,
intending to extend its settlements to northeastern Sinai; that it soon did, with extreme
brutality, the immediate cause for the 1973 war. Israel and the US understood that peace
was possible in accord with official US policy. But as Labor Party leader Ezer Weizmann
(later President) explained, that outcome would not allow Israel to "exist according to the
scale, spirit, and quality she now embodies." Israeli commentator Amos Elon wrote that
Sadat caused "panic" among the Israeli political leadership when he announced his
willingness "to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and to respect its independence
and sovereignty in `secure and recognized borders'."

Kissinger succeeded in blocking peace, instituting his preference for what he called
"stalemate": no negotiations, only force. Jordanian peace offers were also dismissed. Since
that time, official US policy has kept to the international consensus on withdrawal -- until
Clinton, who effectively rescinded UN resolutions and considerations of international law.
But in practice, policy has followed the Kissinger guidelines, accepting negotiations only
when compelled to do so, as Kissinger was after the near-debacle of the 1973 war for which
he shares major responsibility, and under the conditions that Ben-Ami articulated.

Plans for Palestinians followed the guidelines formulated by Moshe Dayan, one of the
Labor leaders more sympathetic to the Palestinian plight. He advised the Cabinet that Israel
should make it clear to refugees that "we have no solution, you shall continue to live like
dogs, and whoever wishes may leave, and we will see where this process leads." When
challenged, he responded by citing Ben-Gurion, who "said that whoever approaches the
Zionist problem from a moral aspect is not a Zionist." He could have also cited Chaim
Weizmann, who held that the fate of the "several hundred thousand negroes" in the Jewish
homeland "is a matter of no consequence."

29
Not surprisingly, the guiding principle of the occupation has been incessant and degrading
humiliation, along with torture, terror, destruction of property, displacement and settlement,
and takeover of basic resources, crucially water. That has, of course, required decisive US
support, extending through the Clinton-Barak years. "The Barak government is leaving
Sharon's government a surprising legacy," the Israeli press reported as the transition took
place: "the highest number of housing starts in the territories since the time when Ariel
Sharon was Minister of Construction and Settlement in 1992 before the Oslo agreements" --
funding provided by the American taxpayer, deceived by fanciful tales of the "visions" and
"magnanimity" of US leaders, foiled by terrorists like Arafat who have forfeited "our trust,"
perhaps also by some Israeli extremists who are overreacting to their crimes.

How Arafat must act to regain our trust is explained succinctly by Edward Walker, the
State Department official responsible for the region under Clinton. The devious Arafat must
announce without ambiguity that "We put our future and fate in the hands of the US,"
which has led the campaign to undermine Palestinian rights for 30 years.

More serious commentary recognized that the "historic offer" largely reiterated the Saudi
Fahd Plan of 1981 -- undermined, it was regularly claimed, by Arab refusal to accept the
existence of Israel. The facts are again quite different. The 1981 plan was undermined by
an Israeli reaction that even its mainstream press condemned as "hysterical." Shimon Peres
warned that the Fahd plan "threatened Israel's very existence." President Haim Herzog
charged that the "real author" of the Fahd plan was the PLO, and that it was even more
extreme than the January 1976 Security Council resolution that was "prepared by" the PLO
when he was Israel's UN Ambassador. These claims can hardly be true (though the PLO
publicly backed both plans), but they are an indication of the desperate fear of a political
settlement on the part of Israeli doves, with the unremitting and decisive support of the US.

The basic problem then, as now, traces back to Washington, which has persistently backed
Israel's rejection of a political settlement in terms of the broad international consensus,
reiterated in essentials in "the Arab League's historic offer."

Current modifications of US rejectionism are tactical and so far minor. With plans for an
attack on Iraq endangered, the US permitted a UN resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal
from the newly-invaded territories "without delay" -- meaning "as soon as possible,"
Secretary of State Colin Powell explained at once. Palestinian terror is to end
"immediately," but far more extreme Israeli terror, going back 35 years, can take its time.
Israel at once escalated its attack, leading Powell to say "I'm pleased to hear that the prime
minister says he is expediting his operations." There is much suspicion that Powell's arrival
in Israel is being delayed so that they can be "expedited" further. That US stance may well
change, again for tactical reasons.

The US also allowed a UN Resolution calling for a "vision" of a Palestinian state. This
forthcoming gesture, which received much acclaim, does not rise to the level of South
Africa 40 years ago when the Apartheid regime actually implemented its "vision" of Black-
run states that were at least as viable and legitimate as the neo-colonial dependency that the
US and Israel have been planning for the occupied territories.

30
Meanwhile the US continues to "enhance terror," to borrow the President's words, by
providing Israel with the means for terror and destruction, including a new shipment of the
most advanced helicopters in the US arsenal (Robert Fisk, Independent, 7 April). These are
standard reactions to atrocities by a client regime. To cite one instructive example, in the
first days of the current Intifada, Israel used US helicopters to attack civilian targets, killing
10 Palestinians and wounding 35, hardly in "self-defense." Clinton responded with an
agreement for "the largest purchase of military helicopters by the Israeli Air Force in a
decade" (Ha'aretz, 3 October, '01), along with spare parts for Apache attack helicopters.
The press helped out by refusing to report the facts. A few weeks later, Israel began to use
US helicopters for assassinations as well. One of the first acts of the Bush administration
was to send Apache Longbow helicopters, the most murderous available. That received
some marginal notice under business news.

Washington's commitment to "enhancing terror" was illustrated again in December, when it

vetoed a Security Council Resolution calling for implementation of the Mitchell Plan and
dispatch of international monitors to oversee reduction of violence, the most effective
means as generally recognized, opposed by Israel and regularly blocked by Washington.
The veto took place during a 21-day period of calm -- meaning that only one Israeli soldier
was killed, along with 21 Palestinians including 11 children, and 16 Israeli incursions into
areas under Palestinian control (Graham Usher, Middle East International, 25 January '02).
Ten days before the veto, the US boycotted -- thus undermined -- an international
conference in Geneva that once again concluded that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies
to the occupied terrorities, so that virtually everything the US and Israel do there is a "grave
breach"; a "war crime" in simple terms. The conference specifically declared the US-
funded Israeli settlements to be illegal, and condemned the practice of "wilful killing,
torture, unlawful deportation, wilful depriving of the rights of fair and regular trial,
extensive destruction and appropriation of property...carried out unlawfully and wantonly."
As a High Contracting Party, the US is obligated by solemn treaty to prosecute those
responsible for such crimes, including its own leadership. Accordingly, all of this passes in
silence.

The US has not officially withdrawn its recognition of the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions to the occupied territories, or its censure of Israeli violations as the "occupying
power" (affirmed, for example, by George Bush I when he was UN Ambassador). In
October 2000 the Security Council reaffirmed the consensus on this matter, "call[ing] on
Israel, the occupying power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations under the Fourth
Geneva Convention." The vote was 14-0. Clinton abstained, presumably not wanting to
veto one of the core principles of international humanitarian law, particularly in light of the
circumstances in which it was enacted: to criminalize formally the atrocities of the Nazis.
All of this too was consigned quickly to the memory hole, another contribution to
"enhancing terror."

Until such matters are permitted to enter discussion, and their implications understood, it is
meaningless to call for "US engagement in the peace process," and prospects for
constructive action will remain grim.

31
Palestine--The Suppression of an Idea
by: Muhammad Hallaj
January - March  1982
The Link - Volume 15, Issue 1
Page 1

When Zionism first emerged as an organized political movement in 1897 to solve the
“Jewish problem” by “ingathering” the Jews of the world in a Jewish state in Palestine, it
inevitably put itself on a collision course with an already existing society in Palestine. As
Nehru once put it, the Zionist scheme neglected “one not unimportant fact...Palestine was
not a wilderness or an empty, uninhabited place. It was already somebody else’s home.”1
This is indisputably the central fact about Palestinian-Israeli relations, and is indispensable
to interpreting Palestinian attitudes toward Israel or Israeli behavior toward the Palestinian
people.

To the Palestinians, the Zionists were European settlers who, through a process of invasion
by immigration, dispossessed them of their country and turned them into a nation of
refugees. On the other hand, “the fact of an overwhelming indigenous Arab majority
confronted the Zionists with an imposing ethical problem.”2 It was primary witness to the
fact that Zionist colonization of Palestine was of necessity an act of invasion. Menachem
Begin once explained the consequences of this fact. When asked during a 1969 conference
in the Israeli kibbutz of Ein Hahoresh about Israel’s refusal to recognize the existence of
the Palestinians, Begin replied:

My friend, take care. When you recognize the concept of “Palestine,” you demolish your
right to live in Ein Hahoresh. If this is Palestine and not the land of Israel, then you are
conquerors and not tillers of the land. You are invaders. If this is Palestine, then it belongs
to a people who lived here before you came. 3

Zionist success in the colonization of Palestine and the Judaization of the country hinged,
among other things, on the propagation of the belief that no one would be victimized by the
Zionist scheme. This, in turn, required that awareness of the Palestinian people be
suppressed.

The Zionist movement disseminated several versions of the myth of Palestinian non-
existence. The first was that Palestine was a country without people. From the beginning
the Zionists adopted the slogan: “A land without people for a people without land.” There
are indications that the Zionist movement intended that this slogan be accepted in its literal
meaning. Even Max Nordau, the British Zionist leader, seemed to have been temporarily
deceived by it. The famous Jewish philosopher Martin Buber related in his memoirs:
“When Max Nordau, Herzl’s second in command, first received details on the existence of
an Arab population in Palestine, he came shocked to Herzl exclaiming: ‘I never realized
this--we are committing an injustice.’”

The Zionists’ need to convince the world that their scheme victimized no one required them
to maintain the delusion that Palestine was a land without people. When they sought
Gandhi’s endorsement of Zionism, their emissary brazenly asserted to him that “Palestine

32
itself was a waste space when we went there... No one else wanted it.” 5 Even after the
Zionists created their Jewish state they continued to insist that the Palestinians did not exist.
“It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as
Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from
them,” Golda Meir, Israel’s prime minister, said after the 1967 war. “They did not exist.” 6

The second variation of this Zionist myth about Palestinian non-existence downgraded the
fact that the country was populated, when that fact could not be hidden altogether. When
asked by an American journalist if he did not think that the Palestinians, like the Israelis,
were entitled to a homeland, Israel’s former prime minister, Levi Eshkol, responded: “What
are Palestinians? When I came here there were 250,000 non-Jews--mainly Arabs and
Bedouins. It was desert-- more than underdeveloped. Nothing.” 7 Ben-Gurion confirmed the
Zionist view that the indigenous Arab population in Palestine did not merit the status of a
“people.” In 1969, the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz quoted him as saying:

I have always been careful to refer to “Arabs” when speaking of Palestine; I have always
distinguished between rights of the Jewish people in Palestine and the rights of the Arabs
who live in it; never the rights of Arab people in Palestine.

Menachem Begin’s mentor Jabotinsky described the Arabs as “a yelling rabble dressed up
in gaudy, savage rags.” 8 Borochov, one of the foremost theoreticians of early Zionism,
believed that the natives “lacked any culture of their own and did not have any outstanding
national characteristics.” 9 As one interpreter of the Zionist mind put it:

The dehumanized image of the Palestinians which the Zionists developed and propagated
was instrumental in displacing the moral issue and establishing an aura of legal justification
around Zionist goals and activity. 10

The assertions that Palestine was a land without a people, a wasteland, and a cultural
vacuum were ironic because Palestine is the home of one of the oldest human civilizations.
Centuries before the first Hebrews settled in the country “Palestine gave birth to a unique
culture...which seems to have been the earliest culture to produce on a large scale. In this
period in Palestine, as far as we now know, the earliest permanent villages in the world
were built.” 11 Palestine is “the only place in the world where a town is known to date back
nine thousand years,” for Jericho is the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world, and
it is “four thousand years older than any other urban settlement known at present.” 12

Yet the Zionists wanted the world community to perceive the Palestinians as they did: a
non-people. The Anglo-American Committee of 1946, though highly supportive of Zionist
aspirations, commented that “it is not unfair to say that the Jewish community in Palestine
has never, as a community, faced the problem of cooperation with the Arabs. It is, for
instance, significant that, in the Jewish Agency’s proposal for a Jewish State, the problem
of handling a million and a quarter Arabs is dealt with in the vaguest of generalities.” 13 The
first major breakthrough in this Zionist campaign against what Begin called “the concept of
Palestine” came when the Balfour Declaration in 1917 called the Palestinian people, “the
non-Jewish communities,” and by so doing relegated them to a peripheral status in
Palestine, even at a time when they constituted more than 90 percent of the population.

33
Maxine Rodinson suggested that this Zionist tendency to downgrade Arab presence in
Palestine and to adhere to such a “dehumanized image” of the Palestinian people was a
product of the prevailing philosophy of the European world of the late 19th century which
held that “every territory situated outside that world was considered empty--not of
inhabitants of course, but constituting a kind of cultural vacuum, and therefore suitable for
colonization.” 14

The Zionists knew (what later events were to prove) that the third world, where the Zionists
intended to create their state, would refuse to condone the denial of self-determination to
the people of Palestine. To counteract this, they tried to present Zionism as the national
liberation movement of the Jewish people. Gandhi, who was aware of the Palestinian
people and therefore saw the Zionist movement as a European colonial endeavor
detrimental to the anti-colonial struggle of an Asian people, steadfastly resisted Zionist
attempts to secure his endorsement by saying “you want to convert the Arab majority into a
minority.” 15 Similarly, Nehru perceived Zionism to be on the wrong side of the anti-
imperialist struggle, precisely because it was detrimental to the liberation struggle of the
Palestinian people. The Zionists, Nehru wrote in 1942, “preferred to take sides with the
foreign ruling power [Britain], and have thus helped it to keep back freedom from the
majority of the people.” 16 Today, the universal support the Palestinians enjoy in the Third
World is due to increasing awareness of the existence of an indigenous community
struggling for self-determination. The inability of the Zionist movement to masquerade as a
national liberation movement and, therefore, as an ally of oppressed peoples, proved to be
the most resounding failure of Zionist-Israeli foreign policy.

One of the Zionists’ greatest fears has always been that the Jews themselves would refuse
to be party to the oppression of the Palestinian people. Some Jews soon discovered that
Zionism would make them an instrument for the dispossession and displacement of the
Palestinian people. Ahad Ha-Am (Asher Ginsberg), one of the best-known Jewish literary
figures in this century, was so disillusioned with Zionism that he said: “If this is the
‘Messiah,’ then I do not wish to see his coming.” 17 Ahad Ha-Am, who visited Palestine in
the early 1920’s, discovered the existence of the Palestinians, and witnessed the beginnings
of Zionist behavior toward the indigenous population. The early Jewish settlers, he said,
“treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, deprive them of their rights, offend them without
cause, and even boast of these deeds.” 18 He warned that political Zionism was perverting
the ideals of Judaism and asked: “Is this the dream of a return to Zion which our people
have dreamt for centuries: That we now come to Zion to stain its soil with innocent blood?”
19

Dr. Arthur Rupin, described by an Israeli writer as the “godfather” of Zionist colonization
in Palestine, wrote in 1928: “it became clear to me how hard it is to realize Zionism in a
way compatible with the demands of universal ethics. I was quite depressed.” 20

It took the 1967 war, however, to show a large number of Jews in and out of Palestine that
Zionism did bring oppression and dispossession to a native population. Israelis were being
called upon daily to quell riots, encircle schools, man checkpoints, fence confiscated land,
demolish homes, arrest students, deport mayors, shoot down Palestinian flags, and
otherwise control a population of more than a million and a half Palestinians under Israeli

34
rule. Israelis began to see and to protest oppression against a captive civilian population.
Some Israeli youths risked prison sentences for refusal to serve as soldiers of occupation. 21
In a meeting in the Israeli kibbutz of Ein Shemer on the first anniversary of the 1967 war,
many participants expressed the ethical dilemma with which Zionism burdened the Jewish
people. One participant indicated:

We live with the feeling that our historical revival, and the beautiful and just life that we
might be able to establish here, will be built upon an injustice done to another people. Will
it be in this way that we shall educate our children to ideals and justice? Will this be the
basis of our existence? To know that we, and maybe our sons as well, are going to fight,
and perhaps die for something which is built upon causing injustice? 22

The ability of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state in a country populated with
Palestinian Arabs required that it not only ignore, but also destroy a native society. Unlike
other forms of settler colonialism, the Zionist goal of “ingathering” the “scattered Jewish
nation” required the displacement, rather than just the exploitation, of the native population.
Zionist settlers, therefore,

successfully blocked the development of a Palestinian comprador capitalism that might

have offered some employment to the expropriated Palestinian peasants. The result was the
development of a practically hermetically sealed Jewish society in the middle of a
disintegrating Palestinian society. While the nature of “classical” colonialism is primarily to
exploit, Zionist colonialism displaces and expels. 23

The expansion of the state of Israel in 1967 into new territory heavily populated by
Palestinian Arabs required Israeli attitudes and behavior similar to those of the Zionist
movement in the pre-state era. Again, Israel found itself “redeeming” for the Jewish people
a land already inhabited by a native population. And now it seeks to overcome this obstacle
by denying that this native population constitutes a national entity.

At the same time, the Israeli occupation authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
pursue policies designed to make these regions less and less suitable as potential sites for a
Palestinian homeland. Increasing international opinion in favor of a Palestinian state in a
part of Palestine is met with increasing Israeli determination to foreclose this option by re-
doubled efforts to Judaize the occupied territories. Israel annexed Arab Jerusalem: it
confiscated about 40 percent of the total area of the West Bank; it implanted more than 100
Jewish settlements; it siphoned off water resources; it expelled a large number of
community leaders and potential leaders; it is forcing Arab cities and villages to connect
into Israel’s electric grid and water network; it is subordinating Arab hospitals and health
services to those in Israel--all in a race to abort the idea of Palestinian nationhood and to
foreclose the possibility of Palestinian independence. In short, to undermine the concept of
Palestine. 24 An integral part of this strategy is the paralysis of Palestinian cultural life and
the suppression of Palestinian expression in occupied Palestine.

Occupied Territories Experience Cultural Strangulation

35
In the whole sphere of cultural life, the Israeli occupation authorities are actively pursuing a
policy to stifle the concept of Palestine as a part of its general war against Palestinian self-
determination. Suleiman Mansour, a Palestinian artist living in the West Bank, wrote:

This occupation is not like other occupations. The Israelis say that there is no Palestinian
people, that they came into a land without a people. Fine arts, literature and culture as a
whole shows them that these are lies, that there is a people and that this people has a
productive culture. 25

Another Palestinian from the occupied West Bank recently wrote:

Since the establishment of the Jewish state, Israel has carried out not only confiscation of
Palestinian land, the source of our physical existence, but also confiscation of our culture,
constituting the spiritual source of our life. Culture is our roots, a vital and essential side of
the integrity of every people. Without it, we are deprived of our common identity as a
national community. 26

Israel’s attack on the development and expression of Palestinian culture has covered the
whole spectrum of cultural activity: education, journalism, literature, art, folklore, and even
the symbolic representations of the Palestinian national personality.

Educational institutions in the occupied territories have been the main targets of Israeli
repression. 27

Israel had acquired experience in this matter through the “de-Palestinization” of the Arabs
who found themselves Israeli citizens in 1948. As Sabri Jiryis put it, Israel imposed a
curriculum on its Arab citizens designed to isolate and estrange them from their culture and
nation.28 Another Israeli Arab explained that although in Jewish literature classes the
students read the fervently Zionist poetry of Bialik, in Arabic literature classes they were
made to reach such works as A Description of the Earthquake which hit the Italian village
of Messina in 1908.29 Arab students are taught Arab history in a way intended to “diminish
national consciousness among the Arabs, to make them uncertain about their national
affiliation” and in fact to make them ashamed of their heritage. “The history of the Arab
peoples is falsified and represented as a series of revolutions, killings, feuds, plunderings
and robberies.” 30

In the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967, similar manipulation of the educational
process in Arab schools has been effected. In the Syrian Golan Heights [recently annexed
by Israel], the Israeli Section of the War Resisters International reported that “the school
curricula have been modified by the Israeli occupation authorities with the aim of tearing
the minds and the hearts of the people away from their country, Syria. 31 The occupation
authorities even decreed that Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, will replace Friday, the Moslem
Sabbath, in the schools “in an attempt to alienate school children from the Syrian school
heritage.” 32

In the West Bank and Gaza, comprehensive control of the school system is exercised by an
Israeli military officer attached to the Military Governor. He controls budgets,

36
appointments, curriculum, textbooks, and every aspect of the educational process. The main
instrument of this control is censorship.

A member of a UNESCO team that visited the occupied territories late in 1977 reported
that the Israeli censors of school textbooks concentrate on books dealing with literature,
history, geography, and religious matters. The report indicated that in books dealing with
history and geography one finds an almost systematic replacement of the term “Palestine”
by “Israel.” 33

Israeli censorship of textbooks is so severe that often books approved by United Nations
officials for use in UNESCO/UNRWA schools for refugee children are not allowed by the
Israeli censors, even after they are purged of offensive references to Israel. According to a
1980 report by the Director-General of UNESCO, during the 1978-79 school year the
Israeli censor confiscated 8 texts intended for use in West Bank elementary schools and 4
books for the preparatory stage in UNRWA schools. In the Gaza Strip, 9 books (out of a
total of 27) for use in elementary schools were forbidden. For the preparatory cycle the
score was 8 out of 21. 34

By 1971, or within four years of the start of the occupation, Israel was cited in six United
Nations resolutions for preventing the importation of textbooks already cleared by the
Director-General of UNESCO for use in UNRWA/UNESCO schools.

The UNESCO report also documented another type of miseducation. The team cited a
geography textbook, printed by the education department in the military government of the
West Bank in 1977, which contained a chapter on “The Kingdom of Libya,” years after
Libya ceased to be a monarchy. The team concluded that “the censorship at present restricts
the prospects of young Palestinians in the occupied territories by giving them a distorted
image of their cultural heritage and making it impossible for them to have any access to the
Arab world of today or the contemporary world in general.” 35 One member of the
UNESCO team pointed out that:

the censorship manages to reject works of fundamental importance to the Arab cultural
heritage (poets and prose writers of the second and third centuries of the Hegira, for
example), to ban the works of Arab poets of the early twentieth century (I am thinking of
the great poet Chawqi among others) on the grounds that they consti- tute incitations to
violence, and to reject books concerned with world culture (I am thinking of a book on Paul
Ce’zanne) on the pretext that they come from Syria or that they contain brief comments on
events which took place in Palestine or the Middle East. One sentence is sometimes enough
to condemn out of hand a book of obvious importance. 36

The most repellant manipulation of Palestinian education is the banning of a large number
of books. An article in the Israeli newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, reported that 3,000 books
have been banned by the Israeli censors. The spokesman for the Israeli army claimed that
only 600 books have been banned, but he refused to present his list or explain the criteria
used for determining whether or not a book is to be banned. It is more likely that the 3,000
figure is the correct one, since the list seen by the reporter was on Israeli army stationery
and carried the seal of the military governor. 37

37
Often the banned books do not deal with politics or do so only in a peripheral manner.
Among recent additions to the list is a group of 60 books which included such titles as The
History of Jerusalem, Palestine Poetry and the Tragedy of Palestine, The Use of Sports,
Training in War, The Islamic Dictionary, Changes in the Israeli Economy, Brief Look at
Islamic Studies, and The Myth of Death and Resurrection in Modern Arabic Poetry.38

In December 1980, 40 professors from Hebrew University, concerned about cultural

suppression of Palestinians under Israeli occupation and the restrictions on academic
freedom in their educational institutions, established a committee to investigate Israeli
practices. The Jerusalem Post reported that, according to observers, the eventual
conclusions of the committee, “are likely to cause embarrassment to the Israeli military
government.” 39 The committee is particularly concerned about the banning of 3,000 books
which include such titles as Alan Moorhead’s The White Nile and The Blue Nile;
biographies of Abraham Lincoln and Alexander the Great, plays by Sophocles, Emotions
and The Gods of Previous Lands, by Khalil Gibran. The list also includes Shakespeare’s
The Merchant of Venice and Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta in Arabic translation.
40

Total Israeli control over the entry of books and other forms of publications gives the
occupation authority complete power over what the Palestinians under occupation can read.
“All books entering the area, for sale or distribution, must first receive permits from the
I.D.F. [Israeli Defense Forces] censor. Formally, any book in the West Bank without such a
permit is ‘illegal.’” 41 Books brought into the West Bank by an individual for his own
personal use are also subject to censorship through the tightly controlled “open bridges”
across the River Jordan.

The ban on books and other reading materials is strictly enforced. The Jerusalem weekly,
Al-Fajr, reported in September 1981 that its Nablus correspondent, who is also a book
seller, was awaiting trial in a military court on a charge of dealing in banned books and
publications. The same court, the paper reported, had sentenced another dealer to a one-
month suspended prison sentence and a fine of 1,000 Israeli shekels for the same “offense.”
42
A week later, the paper reported the arrest of a third dealer for “possession of banned
books” and the closure of his shop. 43 Birzeit University, where I served as vice-president
for academic affairs, repeatedly attempted to secure permission to import Arabic journals
for its library. The university was willing to limit its acquisitions to scientific and scholarly
journals (all of which are regularly received by Israeli universities), but the military
government has persistently refused to grant the necessary permit.

Institutions of higher education in the occupied territories are also severely restricted as
cultural centers for the community. Extra-curricular cultural activities are suppressed under
the pretext of security and public order. Birzeit University was closed for a week in the fall
of 1980 by order of the military governor to prevent it from holding Palestine Week, an
annual student-run cultural fair displaying books, paintings, handicrafts, etc. The military
governor of the Ramallah District required the university to seek permission and present a
detailed program for his approval. The students considered it both a cultural affair and a
campus function held for several years with no permit required; they refused to subject the
program to the scrutiny and will of the military government. The governor responded by

38
closing the entire university for one week. 44 Palestine Week, as a faculty member of Birzeit
University described it in a press conference held in Jerusalem, is “a purely cultural event,
and it is political, if at all, only in the inevitable but harmless sense that it is Palestinian
rather than voodoo or Buddhist or Jewish.” 45

The closure of the university turned the event into a political confrontation, because it
provoked widespread protest demonstrations which resulted in the shooting of many
students throughout the West Bank by Israeli soldiers. 46 The New York Times reported on
November 19, 1980, that 11 youths were shot and wounded by Israeli soldiers, and Al-Fajr
reported that from Najah University alone 67 students and faculty members were arrested
and that 52 of them, including one faculty member were still under detention a month later.
47
The General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution which stated in part that
the Assembly was “deeply shocked by the most recent atrocities committed by Israel, the
occupying power, against educational institutions in the occupied Palestinian territories.” 48
The Israeli editor of the journal New Outlook sent a letter of protest to members of the
Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Israeli Knesset on November 23, 1980, in
which he said that the shooting of school children by Israeli soldiers “shows the depths to
which we have sunk.” 49 The editor rejected the military government’s contention that the
soldiers shot in self-defense against students armed with stones. The scenes shown on
Israeli television, he wrote, “in which soldiers were seen firing from rooftops at the
demonstrators made it plain that they were in no actual danger. 50 A member of the Israeli
Knesset remarked that “the military government had itself provoked unrest on the West
Bank by making an issue of an internal affair at Birzeit University which had been
completely orderly.” 51

Israeli manipulation and repression of education in the occupied territories have intensified
in the last few years. This fact supports the thesis presented in this paper that Israeli
repression is politically motivated and is designed to undermine the concept of Palestine
and its implications regarding Palestinian nationhood and independence; for the intensified
repression, as well as land confiscation and settlement, coincide with the increasing
international inclination after the Camp David agreements to think of the various prospects
and meanings of a Palestinian “entity.”

The most tangible and serious manifestation of increased Israeli repression of educational
institutions is Military Order 854, issued in July 1980. 52 This order was described by a
group of American professors as imposing “crippling restrictions” on Palestinian higher
education. 53 A group of 116 Italian professors, in a letter to Israeli academicians, said of
the measures contemplated by the Order 854, “These measures cancel all trace and
appearance of the values of academic liberty...” and they present young Palestinians with
“the unacceptable choice between emigrating from their own country or renouncing an
education based on the values of their own national culture, in favor of self-enslavement to
the occupying power and its needs in terms of unqualified low cost labor. 54 The boards of
trustees of Birzeit University, Najah National University, Bethlehem University and the
Polytechnic Institute (Hebron) in the West Bank, in a joint letter of protest to Major
General Raphael Eitan, the Israeli Chief of Staff, wrote:

39
To subject the universities in the occupied territories to the supervision of a military officer,
and confer upon him arbitrary power in regard to organizational, academic, and
professional activities would render precarious the very existence of these institutions. 55

Military Order 854 places the previously autonomous institutions of higher education under
the total control of the education officer in the Israeli military government. It requires the
universities to seek annual permits to operate; it gives him authority over the recruitment of
professors and other staff, over the curriculum, and over the admission of students.

A statement by Najah National University in Nablus regarding academic harassment in

1980-81 indicates the scope and variety of Israeli repression. Najah endured six cases of
Israeli soldiers storming the campus, the arrest of 9 professors, the dismissal of one
professor and his expulsion from the country, the arrest of 198 students, placement of 7
students under house arrest, the wounding of 2 students, the closure of the university three
times, and the banning of a sports festival. 56

Even before Order 854 provoked a new wave of protests and suppression, six Palestinian
institutions of higher education found it necessary to suspend instruction (on May 5 and 6,
1980), “to protect the students of these institutions from armed attack” and as a protest
against such attacks. 57

It is not possible to explain this repression on the basis of need to protect the security of the
state of Israel. An Israeli soldier, baffled by the behavior of the military establishment
which he serves, said he once expressed his doubts to the deputy governor about the
justification of shooting school children or arresting them because they sang about Palestine
in their school yards. “Let them sing till they’re dry in the throat,” the soldier suggested to
his superior. The officer advised him to mind his own business: “That’s the order and that’s
that.” The soldier concluded his story by asking: “Why do we have to fight these children
because of songs which we hardly even understand?” 58

Literature

Palestinian literature and art have been primary avenues of expression of the tragedy and
the aspirations of the Palestinian people. Peoples everywhere have always used novels,
poems, paintings, music, and sculpture to convey their personal and communal fears and
hopes. The unique individual and collective experiences of the Palestinian people during
the past few decades were bound to be recorded in the intellectual and cultural output of the
Palestinian people. The fact that Palestinian writers and artists were not an elite group,
privileged with a rare kind of education baring their souls through their art to each other in
writer or artist colonies, intensified their tendency to become, as a Palestinian intellectual
put it, “the spokesmen of a nation.” 59 Palestinian writers and artists were, and still are, for
the most part, ordinary people sharing the typical experiences of their community. As one
Palestinian artist put it:

Among the Palestinian painters, one finds the stone cutter and laborer, the gardener, the
carpenter, the blacksmith, and the school teacher. Few have had the opportunity to obtain
professional training, travel, or live in a European capital exposed to the Masters. 60

40
Palestinian writers and artists, therefore, were and are deeply involved in the affairs of their
nation and their art is heavily colored with social concern.

Palestine became the predominant theme of Palestinian literature and art. This commitment
often was a deliberate and conscious resolve, evident in the charter of the Association of
Palestinian Cinema, founded in 1972. The charter noted that it was important “to develop a
Palestinian cinema capable of supporting with dignity the struggle of our people, revealing
the actual facts of our situation and describing the stages of our Arab and Palestinian
struggle to liberate our homeland.” 61

The Palestinian has never felt a need to be defensive about the social mission of his art and
literature. His strong urge to shout to the world his tragic experience drove him to seek
every conceivable mode of expression, as the mayor of Nazareth who is himself a poet put
it, to engrave the “wide range of experiences in national oppression even on the bark of an
olive tree in the courtyard.” 62

This strong desire to reach the people often led to the impairment of the quality of
Palestinian literature and art. “The young talented Palestinian was overwhelmed by the
destitution of his own people. The necessity of self-expression not the impulse for aesthetic
creation encouraged his art.” 63 This need “to record and immortalize the Palestinian case
and to speak on behalf of the people’s refusal to be defeated or broken” became both the
strength and the weakness of Palestinian cultural output. 64

The themes which permeate Palestinian literature and art portray the profoundest aspects of
the Palestinian experience: the assertion of a suppressed and denied identity, and the strong
yearning for a usurped native soil. Sometimes such themes are expressed explicitly. In one
of the most popular poems, “Identity card,” Mahmoud Darweesh expresses defiance of
Israeli categorization of the Arab as a non-Jew:

Write down, I am an Arab!

Fifth thousand is my number.
Eight children, the ninth will come next summer.
Angry? Write down, I am an Arab! 65

Harun Hashim Rashid tells the world that he is not merely a non-Jew, not even just an Arab
refugee but a Palestinian:

Palestinian is my name.
In a clear script,
On all battlefields,
I have inscribed my name,
Eclipsing all other titles. 66

The Palestinian writer, Jabra I. Jabra, likened the dispersion of the Palestinian people to
being catapulted in space, and their wanderings in the life of exile as a journey through the
cosmic absurd. But they continued stubbornly to cling to their reason and identity. They

41
refused to forget. He demonstrated this Palestinian rejection of de-Palestinization by
describing his own experience as a wandering exile:

If anyone used the word “refugee” with me, I was furious. I was not seeking refuge. None
of my Palestinian co-wanderers were seek- ing refuge. We were offering what- ever talent
or knowledge we had, in return for a living, for survival. We were knowledge peddlers
pausing at one more stop of our seemingly end- less way. When in the autumn of 1948 the
customs men asked me upon arrival in Baghdad to open my baggage for inspection I
offered them a battered suitcase full of books and papers, a small box full of paints and
brushes, and half a dozen paintings on plywood. I was not a refugee, and I was proud as
hell. 67

The Palestinian felt his experience deeply, and his experience was profoundly political, and
his art naturally reflected this existential fact.

Another well known Palestinian poet, Samih Qasim, vowed never to succumb to injustice:

As long as I own a foot of land,

As long as I own an olive tree,
A lemon tree, a well, and a memory,
As long as Arabic is still spoken
In folklore and poetry,
I’ll wage in the face of my enemies,
On behalf of the free: workers, students, and poets,
A scourging war against the enemies of the sun. 68

Most Palestinian poetry, however, did not go so far in its defiance, but stressed the sense of
tragedy, and affirmed loyalty to the native soil, often using symbolic language to evade the
censorship and probable persecution. “The poet, and sometimes the Palestinian people, are
Christ, with all the consequent imagery of the side wound, the crucifixion, and
resurrection.” 69 But however the poet chose or had to express himself, it was Palestine and
his yearning for it which continued to haunt him. In a poem entitled “Love Palestinian
Style,” ‘Agl wrote:

And when I am led all alone

To be whipped and humiliated
And lashed at every police station
I feel we’re lovers, who died from ecstasy, dark-skinned man and his woman.
And when soldiers smash my head
and force me to sip the cold of prison
To forget you--I love you even more. 70

The Palestinian poet sought to cover the spectrum of his people’s grievances and hopes.
Samih Qasim condensed many features of the Arab-Israeli conflict in this imaginary
dialogue between an Israeli Arab, perhaps himself, and an Israeli Jew:

42
My grandparents were burnt in Auschwitz.
My heart is with them, but remove the chains from my body.
What’s in your hand?
A handful of seeds.
Anger colors your face.
That’s the color of the earth.
Mold your sword into a ploughshare.
You’ve left no land.
You are a criminal!
I killed not, I murdered not, I oppressed not!
You are an Arab, you are a dog!
May God save you--try the taste of love
And make way for the sun! 71

As in his politics, so in his poetry, the Palestinian sought conciliation. In this poem, “to
Jerusalem,” Yusuf Hamdan proposed a life of peace for all:

I want you to be a Kaaba, for the people of the earth,

A spacious house, Without guards;
I love you...a voice from a minaret,
The sound of horns Mingled with church bells.
I love you, a jasmine in the open air. 72

ut above all, the Palestinian poet expressed his people’s simple yearning to go home. In his
poem “A Palestinian Psalm” Samih Qasim wrote:

From this wounded land,

Purgatory of sorrows,
The orphaned birds call you, O World!
From Gaza, Jenin, Old Jerusalem: Alleluia.
Under the sun, in the wind in exile, Hearts and eyes once sang:
“Lord of Glory.” We’ve been tired too long
Send us back!
Alleluia, Alleluia. 73

The Palestinian poet, just like the Palestinian mayor, teacher, journalist, and student paid
dearly for his Palestinianism. As an Israeli-Arab intellectual put it:

Some of the measures are an insult to men and spiritually crushing. For example: When an
Arab poet decides to publish a book of poems, he must deliver the poems for censor- ship--
unlike a Jewish poet, of course. The censor does not have to be an expert on poetry; he may
strike out whole lines and paragraphs. Some- times a collection of poems appears --like that
of Samih al-Khassem [Qasim]--“Ways of Freedom”--with whole pages erased. 74

He continues to say that sometimes “censorship reaches the absurd: Poems which were
published with the permission of the censor, may be changed in the press.” 75 He summed

43
up the experience of Arab poets and writers by saying “I can write whatever I like. Then
they will do--whatever they like.” 76

Mahmoud Darweesh, the foremost Arab-Israeli poet “became the target of Israeli
harassment and was subjected to frequent interrogations, travel restrictions, house arrest
and numerous imprisonments.” Finally, he could take it no longer and, in 1971, he chose to
go into exile. 77

Press censorship is the main method of restricting literary expression. Most literary
production in the occupied territories is published in literary pages or supplements to daily
and weekly newspapers and magazines. In a later section, I discuss censorship of the Arab
press.

Palestinian Art

The Palestinian artist, like the Palestinian writer and poet, was deeply influenced by
the tragedy of his people and expressed it in his art. In the words of Kamal Boullata,
one of the best known Palestinian artists,

The landscape, the painter’s natural inspiration, was not the Palestinian painter’s
concern. The Palestinian landscape with all its lyricism and its visual dynamics...all
were visual experiences the Palestinian artist could not afford to concern himself with.
These are qualities of luxury for a man who lives in misery and oppression and who
must constantly concern himself with mere survival. 78

It took the Palestinian artist 20 years, after the catastrophe of 1948, to overcome the shock.

The thunder made the Palestinian artist close his eyes; he failed to see the lightning in the
darkness; he was lucky to find shelter from the heavy rains. For 20 long years life was cry-
ing inside; there were no windows, and only when his dwelling was en- tirely blown up, did
he find himself face to face with the rainbow. 79

When he opened his eyes, he painted what he saw. Shammout painted commandos, Ibrahim
Hazima painted his nostalgia (“A Fisherman from Acre;” “The Keeper of the Vineyard”),
and Jumana Husseini Bayazid painted her childhood memories in Palestine (“The
Wedding;” embroidered dresses of Palestinian village women, and themes of old wives
tales). 80

Just as the Palestinian poet tried to depict his people’s story in a poem, the artist tried to do
so in a painting. Suleiman Mansour, a West Bank artist, told it in a painting “Hope,” a view
from the inside of a prison, as the prisoner would see it. One critic saw in it “A band of four
colors, representing the Palestinian flag (green, white, red and black) leaves his cell,
transforming into the colors of the rainbow.” 81 Another critic saw it as “a painting
portraying the iron bars across a cell window with barbed wire outside. A rainbow enters
the cell and as it passes through the bars is transformed into the colors of the Palestinian
flag.” 82 Whether the Palestinian prisoner watched his flag become a rainbow, or the

44
rainbow becomes his flag, the artist depicted the tragedy and hope of the Palestinian people.
Consequently, he too fell victim to the Israeli censors. Mansour said: “They say that every
painting shown in public is like a leaflet, and that a leaflet needs the permission of the
military government.” 83

The censorship is exercised by military officers with no discernible competence in art, and
who construe their power in the most sweeping manner. Furthermore, there is no appeal
against a decision of the censor. To illustrate the type of “political art” confiscated by the
Israeli censors, it is necessary to give a few examples.

In 1974, a work of sculpture, by Fawzi Anastas, depicting a woman in traditional

Palestinian dress, carrying a child, and surrounded by a ring of people holding hands, was
confiscated from the Birch municipal building. 84 To the censor, it apparently symbolized
pride in the Palestinian identity and solidarity of the Palestinian people. Reproductions of a
painting of a Palestinian peasant carrying a model of Jerusalem on his back were
confiscated; presumably they represented the blasphemous belief that love of Jerusalem
was not a Jewish-Israeli monopoly. 85 A painting by Suleiman Mansour which includes two
buildings side by side representing a church and a synagogue, with a crescent in the sky
background, was perhaps seen by the censor to represent the Palestinian proposal for the
establishment of a non-sectarian state in Palestine. 86

For exhibiting such “political” paintings, the occupation authorities, in September 1980,
closed Gallery ’79, the only permanent art gallery in the West Bank. 87 Three weeks earlier,
“Israeli occupation troops forcibly entered Gallery ’79 in Ramallah and confiscated five of
the paintings by Muhammad Hammoudeh.” The owner of the gallery “was warned not to
allow the display of any paintings with ‘political’ themes, including those that could be
interpreted by the authorities as having political significance.” 88 On September 21,
Suleiman Mansour was exhibiting his work “which--in compliance with the order
mentioned--was devoid of any political content or coloring.” 89 Israeli soldiers once more
stormed Gallery ’79 and summoned the owner as well as the exhibiting artist for
interrogation. The owner, Isam Bader, was informed that charges against him were being
prepared, and that he would be formally charged in due time. The two artists were informed
of the military authorities’ decision to close down the gallery on the ground that it lacked an
operating permit. In fact, Gallery ’79 “did have a trade license from the municipality and
the Chamber of commerce,” the authorities with jurisdiction over such matters in West
Bank cities. 90

Palestinian artists complain that they have no way of knowing what the military censor
considers a political painting. One artist said: “An abstract painting can be called politically
inspired. Where is the line between political, social and folkloric themes?” 91 Mansour said
he and other artists tried hard to avoid giving the occupation authorities an excuse to
suppress the art movement.

We have tried to work cautiously for the last several years, to be cautious in our movement,
in our exhibitions and even in our paintings. Not to put anything which is too overtly
political--against the occupation, directly. It seems that the authorities did not even accept
that and they tried during the last year to suppress the art movement completely. 92

45
In reference to the exhibit which resulted in the closure of Gallery ’79, Mansour said:

For this exhibit, I tried to put myself in the mind of the military governor. So as not to
enrage the authorities, I did not exhibit anything I thought he would think political. We
wanted the work of the gallery to continue. 93

What the Israeli occupation authorities object to, in fact, is the very concept of Palestine
and, therefore, any form of expression of such a concept is forbidden. This is shown by the
fact that even the use of the colors of the Palestinian flag in a painting, regardless of its
content, is forbidden. Suleiman Mansour was told so by the military governor: “If you paint
a flower with colors of white, green, black or red (Palestinian flag colors) on the petals
we’ll confiscate it.” 94 This degree of suppression led Professor Israel Shahak to title his
article on Israeli censor “The Four ‘Terrible’ Colors.” 95

The artists themselves are frequently subjected to various types of pressure and harassment.
Suleiman Mansour related that, every now and then “they call one of us to the military
governor’s office, to interrogate us, to frighten us, to create an atmosphere in which we
cannot work effectively.” 96 He said that every letter he receives from abroad is opened by
the censor. Once, while on a trip abroad, he said, he mailed himself books and art materials.
He never received any of the books; the pencils and charcoals were cut in half before
delivery. 97 “We are also not allowed to send things abroad,” he said. “The authorities told
us that every picture they catch on the bridge will be confiscated.” 98 On July 27, 1981,
Mansour was arrested and detained for nine days because he was taking pictures of
Palestinian villages “to guide his future drawings for a special exhibit on the Palestinian
village.” 99

Many artists are intimidated and driven to inactivity. An art exhibit in Gaza was described
by a critic as superficial. “Gazan artists,” he explained “were threatened so only
three...showed their work. The majority of Gazan artists, who are teachers, were afraid to
exhibit.” 100 The military government was not content to warn against the display of
paintings with “Palestinian themes,” but “the chief supervisor in the Gaza Education
Department and military officials visited the exhibit before the opening to weed-out
‘poisonous works’” 101 Palestinian artists protested that “We are not inciting against Israel,
nor the Israeli people. We are merely expressing our feelings as Palestinians in paint.” 102
But it is precisely that which the occupation authorities seek to suppress. As Professor
Shahak put it, it is actually simple to know why the military governor considers all types of
expression of Palestinian feelings as sinful. “In the opinion of the military governor and his
‘experts on Arab affairs,’ everything which can symbolize Palestine, or the Palestinian
people, can be and is prohibited.” 103

Israeli repression of Palestinian artistic expression has been so severe that

one can only conclude, therefore, that in implementing such harsh and repressive policy of
harassment and persecution against Palestinian artists, the Israeli authorities are completing
the enforcement of a campaign against the Palestinian national culture and heritage as a
whole. 104

46
Israel usually justifies its repression on the grounds that Palestinians use the language of
violence to communicate with Israelis. In fact, it is what they are trying to communicate
rather than how they do it that is anathema to the Zionist mind. Tawfiq Zayyad, the poet
mayor of Nazareth once said, “we want to communicate with the Jewish people through the
language of flowers, paintings, music and other artistic means.” 105 But experience
demonstrates that, even so, it is still a risky proposition.

The Press

In the West Bank, where the military governors are absolute rulers and where the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945 still apply, censorship is total. Article 87 (paragraph 1) of
the Regulations gives the censor the power to prohibit publishing anything he deems
prejudicial to security, public order, or is “likely to be so.” Publishing is defined to include
circulating, dispensing, handing over, communicating, or making available. The proprietor,
the editor, and the writer are all held accountable. Furthermore, the expression “publishing”
is defined to include lithography, typewriting, photography and all forms and modes of
representing or reproducing words, figures, signs, pictures, maps, designs, illustrations and
other like matter. Article 96 (paragraph 1) says that “No notice, illustration, placard,
advertisement, proclamation, pamphlet or other like document” is permitted without prior
permission from the military government. 106

The importation of newspapers and magazines is also forbidden without prior permit from
the military government. The Importation and Distribution of Newspapers Order of July 11,
1967, imposes a penalty of five years in prison on violators.107 Arabic newspapers and
magazines published in Israel itself by Israeli-Arabs, like Al-Ittihad, Al-Jadid, and Al-Ghad
are prohibited to circulate in the West Bank.108 Even Arabic newspapers published by
people from the West Bank in Jerusalem are frequently prohibited from circulating in the
West Bank and Gaza. 109

Although it is claimed that Israeli laws are applied in Jerusalem equally to Arabs and Jews,
the Arab press is in fact censored more severely than the Hebrew press. A senior Israeli
official admitted to The New York Times that the censors have unlimited authority, and they
may delete anything which appears to them to endanger security, public order, or public
well-being; in the case of the Israeli press only the “state security” criterion is applied and
he “acknowledged that this was not the case with the East Jerusalem Palestinian
newspapers.” 110

Knowing the severity of Israeli censorship, and desiring to continue to function, the Arab
press exercises self-censorship. A Palestinian journalist wrote:

The censor has become the constant shadow of the writer in the occupied territories,
holding him accountable for every word he writes. Therefore, the writer censors himself
before he sends anything to the newspaper. Is it or is it not permitted to publish this? 111

Very often, the only way Arabic newspapers can publish a story of interest to their
Palestinian readers is to wait until it appears in the Hebrew Israeli press and then take it
verbatim from them. 112 I learned from the editors of the Arabic newspapers that, to be able

47
to print a story, they sometimes have to give it to an Israeli journalist, wait for it to appear
in an Israeli paper, then publish a translation of it in their papers. Sometimes even that does
not work. The editor of Al-Sha’b told The New York Times that sometimes the censor bans
articles and news taken from the Israeli press. 113 He said that he ordinarily prepares 25
percent extra material “because I know Israeli military censors routinely ban about a
quarter of all articles and news I submit.” 114 On bad nights,” he added “they take out much
more...but there is nobody to whom I can appeal their orders.” 115 An editorial by Al-Fajr in
June 1990 said that 30 percent of its editorials were crossed out by the censor in the month
of May. 116 Another Arabic newspaper, Al-Tali’a (weekly) announced in 1978 its intention
to suspend publication because most of its articles were being banned by the censor. 117

Newspapers are the main instruments of literary expression in the occupied territories. They
all include literary pages or issue literary supplements where most of the literary production
of the Palestinian community living under occupation appears. So, the censorship of the
press is to a large measure suppression of literary expression. Alluding to this fact, the
literary editor of Al-Tali’a wrote symbolically: “In every issue we march in the funerals of
little babies born to pens which spent sleepless nights to give birth to them.” 118

Newspapers and their editors are continually threatened and harassed. The editors of three
of the four Palestinian newspapers are and have been for many months under “town arrest.”
Ma’moun el-Sayed, editor of Al-Fajr, Akram Haniyeh, editor of Al-Sha’b, and Basheer
Barghouti, editor of Al-Tali’a, all of whom reside in Ramallah, are forbidden indefinitely to
travel anywhere in the West Bank, including Jerusalem where their offices are located.
They appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court for permission to modify the order restricting
their movement if only to the extent of enabling them to spend eight hours a day in their
Jerusalem offices, but the court refused the petition under the pretext that the matter was
within the jurisdiction of the military governor. 119

Palestinian newspapers are also undermined by orders periodically banning their

distribution in the West Bank and Gaza. According to the editor of one of these papers,
such restriction deprives the newspapers of 70 percent of their readers and 90 percent of
their advertising revenues. 120 The English-language edition of Al-Fajr, the only newspaper
which gives foreign visitors and interested Israeli readers access to Palestinian opinion, is
subjected to continuous pressures. Raphael Levy, District commissioner for Jerusalem,
wrote to the newspaper demanding the deletion of “Palestinian Weekly” which appears
under its name, 121 making it clear why the paper was being punished. The newspaper told
the story of the pressure against it this way:

Al-Fajr Palestinian Weekly suffered a three-pronged attack this week. On the streets of
West Jerusalem a 10-year-old Palestinian paper seller was assaulted by paratroopers; while
at the post office, a Mr. Allon refused Al-Fajr the bulk postal rate given to newspapers and
magazines for mailing abroad. The final blow came when Shilo distributors, who get the
paper to Israeli readers, announced that they were discontinuing their contract with Al-
Fajr.122

The newspaper elaborated on the assault story. On July 6, 1981, it wrote, a newsboy was
selling Al-Fajr outside of Cinema Orion in West Jerusalem.

48
Two men in paratroop uniforms, described by witnesses as heavily- built, armed and
wearing knitted skull-caps, grabbed the boy’s papers. In the course of a scuffle, as he tried
to get them back, the papers were destroyed.

The paper added that “Over the past years dozens of young boys have been attacked by
Israelis in West Jerusalem for selling Al-Fajr. 123

Many Palestinian journalists have been imprisoned, deported, or placed under house or
town arrest. The editor of Al-Sha’b said “we are constantly receiving threatening letters, but
we don’t bother reporting them to the police because we know they won’t do anything.” 124
In July 1980, Al-Fajr received a letter in Hebrew signed by “Youth of Israel” telling the
editor “to appear on Israeli television by July 22 to announce the closure of the paper.” Al-
Sha’b received a similar letter. At 2:40 a.m. on August 3 a bomb exploded outside the
offices of Al-Fajr in Jerusalem. 125

Instead of finding the culprits, “several days after the bombing, the military government
placed the editors of Al-Fajr and Al-Sha’b under town arrest for the maintenance of
security, public order and safety in the area.” 126

This is a great deal of harassment for newspapers which cannot publish anything, not even
an advertisement or a love poem, without prior approval of the censors. 127 The only way it
can be explained is that their very existence is objectionable. As Lt. Col. Ami Gulska, the
Israeli military spokesman in Jerusalem once put it: “I wonder sometimes why Arabs
should have a press in the first place.” 128

Symbolic Expression

The curtailment of Palestinian expression, whatever form it takes, has been recently
broadened to cover any and all expressions of Palestinianism among the Arabs of
Israel itself. Although the new restrictions came in the form of a law (The Tamir Law)
passed in the summer of 1980 by the Israeli Knesset as an amendment to the so-called
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 129 it is obvious from the wording of the law, from
explanations given by Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir who proposed it, and from the
arrests and trials of violators that it is the freedom of expression which is being
restricted.130 The law, forbids “any kind of expression of support for or sympathy
with the Palestine Liberation Organization,” whether “by means of placards, slogans,
flags or anthems.” The mayor of Nazareth said that “according to this law, any
Palestinian child who raises a branch of olives will be charged and sued because
Arafat himself held the olive branch at the United Nations in 1974.” 131

The primary symbols of Palestinian nationhood are, of course, the word “Palestine” and the
Palestinian flag. The objection is not only to the context within which the word “Palestine”
is used, but also to its symbolism. For that reason, the word itself, even when it stands
alone, is considered offensive by the Israeli authorities. Professor Shahak pointed out that
“the very word ‘Palestine’ (whether written in English, Arabic, or Hebrew) can be a
criminal offense. Boys are frequently arrested and sentenced for the ‘crime’ of writing on
their T-shirts the forbidden word ‘Palestine.’” 132

49
The Israeli authorities have also clamped down on the use in the names of business
establishments. The Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, in its report for 1980, said
it was particularly shocked by “the prohibition on the use of the word ‘Palestine,’”
especially in apolitical contexts as this. The Palestine Bank in Gaza which, like all Arab
banks, was closed down after the occupation, has been negotiating for many years with the
Israeli authorities to re-open. The Israelis finally agreed to allow the bank to re-open, but
only if it removed the word “Palestine” from its name. The Israeli authorities contend that
“Israelis are sensitive to the name of Palestine and that the word is ‘offensive to the Israeli
public.’” 133 Another Palestinian establishment which ran afoul of the authorities on account
of its name is the Palestine Press Service in Jerusalem. The Israeli Register of Companies
refused to license the Press Service, again on the grounds that the name is “offensive to the
Israeli public.” The establishment’s lawyer argued in the district court in Jerusalem that the
word Palestine is acceptable and was used in the Camp David accords. The Israeli judge
upheld the Register of Companies’ refusal to issue the license because of the “offensive
nature of the proposed title.” 134

An Israeli postal official said that mail coming from abroad addressed to Palestine would be
returned to the sender. A woman from the West Bank spent a year before she could get a
birth certificate issued to her baby girl, because the baby was named “Filastin”--Arabic for
Palestine! 135

The Palestinian flag, of course, is not taken less seriously by the Israeli authorities.
Professor Shahak wrote: “To have the Palestinian flag in one’s possession, even hidden in a
chest, is, of course, a serious crime. To exhibit it in public is even a greater one.” 136

Palestinians understand that such repression is politically motivated, and its purpose is to
repress and deny their very existence and identity. Anwar Nusseibeh, former minister in the
Jordanian cabinet now residing in Jerusalem, said that Palestine “represents a people, a
history and a cause which the Israelis want to smother.” 137 A co-owner of the Palestine
Press Service, commenting on Israel’s motive in harassing his company, said:

Israel’s policy today, and the philosophy behind the establishment of the state of Israel is
based on the elimination of the Palestinian na- tional identity. By recognizing Pales- tine
they would be forced to unmask their own well-propagated assertion that Israel was
established in an uninhabited land, one of history’s most blatant falsehoods. 138

When one surveys the political motivation, and the totalitarian scope of the Israeli
repression of “the concept of Palestine,” one is driven to the conclusion that it is indeed an
essential ingredient of Israel’s resolve to perpetuate the denial of self-determination to the
Palestinian people, and to secure its monopoly over the whole of Palestine.

NOTES

1. Quoted in G.H. Jansen, Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism. Beirut: Institute for
Palestine Studies, 1971, p. 182.
2. Alan R. Taylor. The Zionist Mind, Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1974, p. 48.
3. Yediot Aharonot, October 17, 1969; also quoted in Arie Bober, ed., The Other Israel,

50
New York: Doubleday, 1972, p. 27.
4. Ibid., p. 37.
5. Jansen, p. 177.
6. The Sunday Times (London), June 15, 1969.
7. Newsweek magazine, February 17, 1969.
8. Quoted in Taylor, p. 96.
9. Bober, p. 155.
10. Taylor, p. 48.
11. Emmanuel Anati, Palestine Before the Hebrews. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963,
p.7.
12. Ibid., pp. 241-242.
13. Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report in the United States Government and
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1946, p. 40.
14. Maxime Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs. New York: Random House, 1968, p. 14.
15. Jansen, p. 178.
16. Quoted from Nehru’s Glimpses of World History in Jansen, p. 183.
17. Quoted in Taylor, p. 103.
18. From his article “The Truth from the Land of Israel,” quoted in Taylor, p. 103.
19. Ibid.
20. Quoted in Bober, p. 159.
21. For an interview with Gadi Elgazi, an Israeli soldier who was imprisoned for refusing to
serve in the occupied territories, see Al-Fajr (Jerusalem), May 17-23, 1981. All references
to Al-Fajr in this article are to the English edition.
22. “Know Thy People,” Israc, no. 1 (May 1969), p. 17.
23. Bober, pp. 10-11.
24. Muhammad Hallaj, “As We See It, “The Middle East International, No. 144 (February
27, 1981), pp. 6-8.

25. Wilhelm Geist, “The Growing Pains of an Art Movement Under Occupation,”
(interview with Suleiman Mansour), Al-Fajr, September 6-12, 1981, p. 13.
26. Awad Abdel Fattah, “Firing of Palestinian Teachers,” Al-Fajr, November 23-29, 1980,
p.5.
27. For recent reports on Israeli repression of Palestinian educational institutions see
Michael C. Griffin, “A Human Rights Odyssey: In Search of Academic Freedom,” The
Link, vol. 14, no. 2 (April/May 1981). “Cutting the Cultural Spinal Cord,” Al-Fajr, March
15-21, 1981, and Naseer Aruri, “Repression in Academia: Palestinian Universities vs.
Israeli Military,” Al-Fajr, June 7-13, 1981.
28. Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, pp. 146-155.

29. Fauzi El-Asmar, To Be An Arab in Israel. Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies,
1978, pp. 46-47.
30. Jiryis, p. 153.
31. Report by Yeshaayahu Toma Schick, in the Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 8, no. 3
(Spring 1979), pp. 127-130.
32. Ibid.
33. See UNESCO Team Report: Document 104 Ex/52 in UNESCO, General Conference,

51
Twen- tieth Session (Paris, 1978), Report of the Director- General, 20 C/113 (September
28, 1978), pp. 4-11. Direct quotation from p. 9. For other references on curriculum changes
see “Cutting the Cultural Spinal Cord,” cited in note 27, and Najla Bashur, “Change of
Curricula in the West Bank After 1967,” Shu-un Filastiniya (Beirut, in Arabic), July 1971,
pp. 229-241.
34. UNESCO, Director-General, Report to the General Conference, Twenty-First Session
(Belgrade, 1980), Document 21 C/18 (September 5, 1980), p. 33
35. UNESCO document 104 EX/52, cited earlier.
36. Ibid., 0. 10.
37. Benny Morris, “Controversy over books banned in Territories,” Jerusalem Post, March
8, 1981. I have been able to obtain a partial list which contains more than a thousand titles.
My list includes “Islamic Ruins in Jordan and Pales- tine,” “The History of Arabic Drama,”
“Arab Philosophers in the Middle Ages,” “The Science of Psychology and its Application,”
“Khalil Gibran: Analytical Study,” “Gandhi,” “DeGaulle,” “Immigration and Social
Change in Kuwait,” “Marriage and Related Issues,” etc.
38. Jerusalem Post, July 13, 1980 and Al-Fajr, December 7-13, 1980. Another list of 72
titles added to the list in Al-Fajr, May 24-30, 1981. Other references to the question of
banned books: ‘Al-Tali’a (Arabic Weekly, Jerusalem), April 14, and July 23, 1981: and
Palestine & Israel (Supplement), January 1981, p. 18.
39. Morris, Jerusalem Post, March 8, 1981.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Al-Fajr, September 6-12, 1981.
43. Al-Fajr, September 20-26, 1981.
44. For accounts of these events, including Birzeit University’s statement, see Al-Fajr,
November 16-22 and 23-29, 1980. Also see the Jerusalem Post, November 16 and 19,
1980, and the New York Times, November 20, 1980.
45. New York Times, November 20, 1980.

46. For some of the press reports on protests and clashes following the closure of the
university, see the Jerusalem Post, November 19, 1980: Israel & Palestine (Supplement to
October 1980 issue); and Filastin al-Thawra, November 24, and December 1, 1980.
47. Al-Fajr, December 21-27, 1980. Also see Fahed Abdullah, “Injured Students Describe
Nablus Events,” Al-Fajr, December 7-13, 1980.
48. Text of resolution in Special Unit on Palestine, Bulletin no. 1 (January-February 1981),
pp. 35-36. Emphasis in the original.
49. Text of the letter in Al-Fajr, November 30- December 5, 1980.
50. Ibid.
51. Jerusalem Post, November 19, 1980.
52. For a study of Order 854, including its text, legality, and impact on Palestinian
education, see Jonathan Kuttab, Analysis of Military Order No. 854 and Related Orders
Concerning Educa- tional Institutions in the Occupied West Bank, Geneva: Law in the
Service of Man, May 1981.
53. Press statement made during a visit to the West Bank in November 1980 is found in Al-
Fajr, November 30-December 5, 1980.
54. Text on letter in Al-Fajr, November 23-29, 1980.
55. Text of letter in Al-Fajr, December 7-13, 1980.

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56. See text of university statement in Al-Tali’a, June 25, 1981. For additional accounts on
order 854 and clashes stemming from it see the Jeru- salem Post, August 1, 1980; The
Washington Post of the same date; various issues of Al-Fajr in- cluding November 23-29,
1980 and November 30-December 5, 1980; and Penny Johnson, “The Next Day in Nablus,”
A.A.U.G. Newsletter, vol. 14, no. 1, (January-February 1981).
57. Text of joint statement announcing closure in Al-Fajr, May 11-17, 1980.
58. This story was related by the Israeli columnist Amnon Danker in Ha’aretz of December
26, 1980; English translation in the Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (Spring
1981), pp. 133-134.
59. Hanan Michael Ashrawi, “The Contemporary Palestinian Poetry of Occupation,”
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 7, no. 3 (Spring 1978), p. 86.
60. Kamal Boullata, “Towards a Revolutionary Arab Art,” The Arab World, vol. 16, no. 2
(February 1970), p. 6.
61. Guy Hennebelle, “Arab Cinema,” MERIP Reports, no. 52 (November 1976), p. 8
62. Quoted from Tawfiq Zayyad’s “On a Bark of an Olive Tree,” in Ashrawi, p. 90.
63. Boullata, p. 5.
64. Ashrawi, p. 90.
65. Translation in Emile Nakhleh, “Wells of Bit- terness: A Survey of Israeli-Arab Poetry,”
The Arab World, vol. 16, no. 2 (February 1970), p. 33.
66. Translation in Mounah A. Khouri and Hamid Algar, An Anthology of Modern Arabic
Poetry, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, p. 231.
67. Jabra I. Jabra, “The Palestinian Exile as Writer,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 8,
no. 2 (Winter 1979), p. 77.
68. Translation in Nakhleh, p. 36.
69. Ashrawi, p. 92.
70. In Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri, “The Palestinian Wedding,” Journal of Palestine Studies,
vol. 10,no. 3 (Spring 1981), p. 90.
71. Translation in Nakhleh, p. 36.
72. In Elmessiri, p. 89.
73. Translation in Nakhleh, p. 36.
74. Fauzi El-Asmar, “From the Diary of an Israeli Arab,” Israc, no. 1 (May 1969), p. 8.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. “Poetry of Resistance: Mahmoud Darweesh,” Arab Perspectives, vol. 2 (May 1981), p.
37.
78. Ibid., p. 5.
79. Ibid.
80. For themes and illustrations see Ibid.
81. Neil Catford, “Palestinian Paintings Exhibition,” Al-Fajr, May 11-17, 1980.
82. David Adams, “Gaza Red Crescent Hosts Palestinian Art Show,” Al-Fajr, June 29-July
5, 1980.
83. Geist, interview with Mansour, cited in note 25.
84. Nidal Samed, “The Politics of Art: Military Close Sole West Bank Gallery,” Al-Fajr,
September 28-October 4, 1980.
85. Danny Rubenstein in Davar of May 23, 1978. Translation in the Journal of Palestine
Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1978), p. 134.
86. Painting confiscated from exhibit in Gallery ’79, Ramallah, which was also closed. Al-

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Fajr, September 28-October 4, 1980.
87. On the closure of the gallery, see the Jerusalem Post, September 22, 1980; Al-Fajr,
September 28-October 4 and December 14-20, 1980.
88. “But No Windows for West Bank Artists,” Al-Fajr, December 14-20, 1980.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Samed, Al-Fajr, March 29-April 4, 1981.
92. Geist, interview with Mansour.
93. Samed, Al-Fajr, March 29-April 4, 1981.
94. Ibid. Also see Geist.
95. Israel Shahak, “The Four ‘Terrible’ Colors,” Palestine/Israel Bulletin, March 1981, p.
4.
96. Geist.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Al-Fajr, August 9-15, 1981.
100. Al-Fajr, June 29-July 5, 1980.
101. Ibid.
102. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 8, 1980.
103. Shahak.
104. “But No Windows...”
105. Zuhair Sabagh, “Some Art and Politics Mix in Nazareth,” Al-Fajr, December 14-20,
1980.

106. National Lawyers Guild (U.S.), Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli Occupied West
Bank and Gaza. New York: National Lawyers Guild, 1978, p. 53. On how the Emergency
Regulations were used against Israeli Arabs in the 1950’s and 1960’s see Chapter 8 in
Bober, The Other Israel, and Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel.
107. National Lawyers Guild, p. 53.
108. Danny Rubenstein, cited in note 101 above and Al-Fajr, July 12-18, 1981.
109. Al-Fajr, June 8-14, 1980.
110. New York Times, August 31, 1980.
111. Adel Al-Ustah, “Palestinian Literature in the Occupied Territories After 14 Years of
Occupa- tion,” (Symposium), Al-Jadid, nos. 6-7, June-July, 1981), p. 57. In Arabic.
112. “Common Ordeal,” (editorial) Al-Fajr, June 8-14, 1980.
113. New York Times, August 31, 1980.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. “Common Ordeal.”
117. Jerusalem Post, October 26, 1978.
118. Muhammad Batrawi, “Palestinian Literature...,” (symposium cited in note 111 above).
119. Al-Tali’a, April 16, 1981. On the placement of the editors under “town arrest” see also
the Jerusalem Post, July 15, 1980, and Al-Bayadir Al-Siyasi, September 1,1981.
120. Al-Fajr, June 8-14, 1980: the Jerusalem Post, June 2, 1980; and the New York Times,
June 2, 1980.
121. Al-Fajr, July 12-18, 1981. Text of the letter appeared in Al-Fajr, January 11-17, 1981.
122. Ibid.

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123. Ibid.
124. New York Times, August 31, 1980.
125. Al-Fajr, August 10-16, 1980. 126. Robert Friedman, “Political Censorship of the Arab
Press.” Al-Fajr, January 11-17, 1981.”
127. Amnon Kapeliouk, an Israeli journalist who studied the censorship of the Arab press,
said “I found simple love poems that were censored although they contained no reference to
the na- tional question. Perhaps our censors are anti-love. Probably the censor didn’t
understand the poem, so he cancelled it.” Cited in Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. For information on this law see New York Times, July 30, 1980, and Jerusalem Post,
July 19, 1980.
130. For Tamir’s statement to Israeli television see Al-Fajr, July 20-26, 1980. For cases of
arrest see Benny Morris, “Trouble on Campus,” Jerusalem Post, May 30, 1980, and
September 24, 1980. Also see Al-Fajr of September 27-October 3, 1981.
131. Quoted in Al-Fajr, August 3-9, 1980.
132. Shahak.
133. The report of the Israeli League in Al-Fajr, March 29-April 4, 1981; and the story of
Palestine Bank in Al-Fajr, March 15-21, 1981.
134. Jane Story, “Filastin-Everything in a Name,” Al-Fajr, January 18-24, 1981.
135. Ibid.
136. Shahak.
137. Story.
138. Ibid.

Muhammad Hallaj is a Fellow, Institute of Arab Studies, Belmont, Massachusetts, and a

Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs

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