ONSUELO V. PANGASINAN AND ANNABELLA V. BORROMEO, PETITIONERS, VS.

CRISTINA DISONGLO-ALMAZORA, RENILDA ALMAZORA-CASUBUAN,

RODOLFO CASUBUAN, SUSANA ALMAZORA-MENDIOLA, CARLOS MENDIOLA,
CECILIO ALMAZORA AND NEN1TA ALMAZORA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 200558 | 2015-08-01
 
DECISION
 
MENDOZA, J.:
 
The present case demonstrates the legal principle that the law aids the vigilant, not those who
slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientihus jura subverniunt.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the July 28, 2011
Decision[1] and the February 3, 2012 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV
84529, which affirmed the June 29, 2004 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259,
Paranaque City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 96-0206, a case for damages.
 
The Facts

The subject property is a parcel of land with an area of 572 square meters located in Brgy. Sto.
Domingo, Binan, Laguna. It was registered in the name of Aquilina Martinez (Aquilina) under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18729 by the Register of Deeds of Laguna on July 29,
1939.[4]

After the liberation of Manila from the Japanese military occupation in 1945, Aquilina and her
maternal grandmother, Leoncia Almendral (Leoncia), learned that their house on Zabala Street,
Tondo, Manila, was ruined by the war. To rebuild their house, they borrowed money from their
relative, Conrado Almazora (Conrado). Thus, their house was reconstructed. In return, Leoncia
entrusted to Contrado the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-18729 covering the subject
property in Binan, Laguna. Consequently, Conrado and his family remained in the said property.

Following the death of Aquilina on July 19, 1949, the title of the subject property was transferred
to Aurora Morales-Vivar (Aurora), as her sole heir. Accordingly, TCT No. T-35280 was issued
in the name of Aurora[5] after TCT No. T-18729 was cancelled. On February 7, 1972, Conrado
passed away.

Sometime in 1994, Aurora learned from Cristina Almazora (Cristina), the widowed spouse of
Conrado, that the title of the subject property had long been transferred in the name of Conrado
and that the subject property had been sold to Fullway Development Corporation (Fullway) by
the heirs of Conrado in consideration of P4,000,000.00.[6]

Aurora was shocked to learn that the subject property was already transferred to Conrado and
sold for a meager amount. On October 30, 1995, she sent a letter to the heirs of Conrado
demanding the delivery of the payment they received for the sale of the subject property; but it
was unheeded.

On May 9, 1996, Aurora together with her husband, Arturo, filed a complaint for
damages[7] against Cristina and the other heirs of Conrado (respondents) before the RTC. They
contended that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-18729 was only given to Conrado for
safekeeping. The complaint, however, admitted that the family of Conrado had been staying on,
and using, the subject property since 1912 with the permission and generosity of Aquilina and
Leoncia.[8]

Aurora asserted that, through the years, she repeatedly asked Conrado to return the owner's copy
of the title but the latter procrastinated, giving all kinds of excuses, until he died in 1972; that
thereafter, Aurora asked Cristina for the copy of the title but the latter also ignored her request;
that the subsequent sale of the subject property to Fullway was without Aurora's authorization,
and, thus, the payment received by respondents for the sale of the subject property should be
turned over to her; and that she prayed for moral and exemplary damages.[9]

On June 24, 1996, respondents filed their answer with compulsory counterclaim. They countered
that the subject property was properly transferred to Conrado under TCT No. 35282, and,
thereafter, in the names of the heirs of Conrado under TCT No. T-114352. Respondents averred
that the imputation of fraud on the part of Conrado in the registration of the subject property was
baseless and this assertion of fraud was not transmissible from Conrado to his heirs, who merely
acquired the property through succession.[10]

Respondents raised some special and affirmatives defenses, among others, that the complaint
stated no cause of action and was barred by prescription. A preliminary hearing for the said
defenses was set by the RTC.[11] In the Order,[12] dated May 27, 1999, the RTC ruled that the
complaint stated a cause of action.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari[13] to assail the said interlocutory order of the RTC
before the CA. In its Decision,[14] dated February 24, 1999, the CA denied the same and held that
the complaint stated a cause of action, which was an action for damages arising from fraud
committed by Conrado, as trustee, against Aurora, ascestui que trust. The CA further held that
the complaint, on its face, did not show that the action had prescribed.

Meanwhile, the RTC continued the proceedings and set the case for trial on the merits. After the
parties adduced their respective pieces of evidence, the RTC required them to submit their
memoranda. Only respondents filed a memorandum.[15]

The RTC Ruling

In its Decision, dated June 29, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The trial court held that,
after a thorough evaluation of the records, Aurora miserably failed to prove her right to the
subject property. It explained that even if Aurora had a claim on the subject property, she was
guilty of laches. For many years, Aurora slept on her right over the questioned property and
failed to exhaust all means, legal or administrative, to retrieve what was rightfully hers at the
earliest possible time.

The RTC determined that Conrado was able to transfer the title of the subject property in his
name on June 17, 1965 by virtue of a document denominated as "Adjudication and Absolute Sale
of a Parcel of Registered Land,"[16]dated January 9, 1949, signed by Aurora and her husband. The
signatures of Aurora and her husband, affixed on the deed of sale, were not properly
controverted by her. The trial court found that her allegations of repeated pleas to Conrado to
return the copy of the title deserved scant consideration. It concluded that Aurora was not
entitled to damages because there were no clear and cogent grounds to award the same. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs having failed to prove its case for damages, the
same is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[17]
 
Aggrieved, Aurora appealed to the CA. On June 4, 2009, the children of Aurora, namely,
Consuelo V. Pangasinan, Lucio M. Vivar and Annabella V. Borromeo (petitioners), filed a
motion for substitution of party[18] after her death on March 26, 2008. In its Resolution,[19] dated
July 15, 2010, the CA granted the motion.

The CA Ruling
In the assailed Decision, dated July 28, 2011, the CA denied the appeal of petitioners. It held that
it took Aurora more than 50 years to act on Conrado's withholding of the title covering the
subject property. As early as 1945, the title was already in the possession of Conrado. The CA
ruled that petitioners were barred by laches as Aurora should have been impervious in asserting
her ownership and made judicial demands to return the title and the property.

The appellate court added that even on the aspect of prescription of actions, the case would not
prosper either. It explained that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained through
fraud or mistake giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code was 10
years, pursuant to Article 1144. This 10-year prescriptive period began from the time the land
was registered on June 17, 1965. Accordingly, Aurora had only until June 17, 1975 within which
to file her action. Evidently, the suit was commenced only on May 12, 1996, beyond its
prescription period. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision dated
June 29, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch 259 in Civil Case No. 96-
0206 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[20]
 
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed
Resolution, dated February 3, 2012.

Hence, this petition, raising the following

 
ISSUES

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FILED BY
AURORA MORALES-VIVAR, WHICH DECISIONS ARE ALL CONTRARY TO LAW;
 
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE

ACQUISITION OF CONRADO ALMAZORA, RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSOR-IN-
INTEREST, OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, IS INVALID AND PRODUCED NO
EFFECT WHATSOEVER BECAUSE NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF LACHES, AS TO
DEPRIVE AURORA MORALES-VIVAR OF HER OWNERSHIP, ARE PRESENT IN
THE CASE AT BAR.[21]

Petitioners assert that they are not guilty of laches. When Aurora was told that the subject
property was already in the name of Conrado in April 1994, she immediately filed a complaint
for damages on May 2, 1996. Petitioners also claim that prescription is not a valid defense to
defeat the title of Aurora. Section 47 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 states that no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.

On September 24, 2012, respondents filed their Comment,[22] arguing that petitioners' assertions
were tenuous. Aurora slept on her rights for more than 50 years, impervious in asserting her
ownership of the subject property, thereby losing the same by laches.

On December 11, 2012, petitioners filed their Reply,[23] claiming that the CA observed that
respondents might have manipulated the said title to their benefit and advantage. Respondents'
hands were unclean because of their bad faith and misrepresentation.
 
The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The petition raises questions of fact

As a general rule, the Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure
questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not allow the review of questions of
fact. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.[24]

Petitioners challenge the findings of laches, prescription and lack of bad faith by the CA. To
answer these questions, the Court must review the records to determine whether the lower courts
properly appreciated the evidence in concluding its findings. Clearly, the questions raised are
factual. Qn this ground alone, the present petition under Rule 45 is dismissible. In the interest of
substantial justice, however, the Court deems it proper to re-evaluate the records.

Petitioners are barred by laches

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[25]

The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize
neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would
result in a clearly inequitable situation.[26] The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is
that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become "stale," or who has
acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who lias not been vigilant or who has slept on
his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for
peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an
impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become, under the
circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.[27]

The four (4) elements of laches, as first prescribed by this Court in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho[28] are
as follows:
 
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice,
of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the
suit is not held to be barred.[29]
 
In the case at bench, the CA correctly held that all the elements of laches were present. First,
Aurora and her family entrusted to Conrado the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of the
subject property in 1945. In their complaint, petitioners even admitted that Conrado's family had
been staying in the subject property since 1912.[30]Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to
1996, before Aurora and petitioners decided to enforce their right thereon. Third, respondents
who lived all their lives in the disputed property apparently were not aware that Aurora would
one day come out and claim ownership thereon. Fourth, there was no question that respondents
would be prejudiced in the event that the suit would be allowed to prosper.

The contention of petitioners that they were not in delay in claiming their rights over the subject
property is specious. For 50 years, Aurora and her heirs did not take any legal step to uphold
their claim over the subject property, despite being fully aware that Conrado and his family were
occupying the same for a very long time. Even petitioner Consuelo Vivar-Pangasinan testified
that Conrado had been using the property for 30 years[31]and that Aurora had never shown her
any evidence of ownership of the property.[32]

In their complaint, Aurora claimed that she repeatedly reminded Conrado to return the copy of
the title. This, however, is a self-serving allegation without any evidentiary substantiation. The
two belated demand letters, dated October 30, 1995 and March 5, 1996, sent by Aurora's lawyer
before the institution of the present action, are the only tangible assertions of their claim to the
property.[33] Indeed, not a scintilla of proof was presented by Aurora and her heirs to establish
that, for 50 years, they actively manifested to reclaim the title and possession of the subject
property.

A person, endowed with properties and entitlements, but chose to lie quietly as decades passed
by, watching his property wither away, allowing innocent bystanders to pick the fruits of his
unguarded trees, instead of safeguarding his rights through the accessibly and necessary legal
means, does not deserve the protection of equity. The law aids the vigilant, not those who
slumber on their rights.

The action has prescribed

On the basis of prescription of actions, the pending petition must also be denied. Petitioners
argue that prescription shall not lie against their action because a registered land under Section
47 of P.D. No. 1529 cannot be acquired through prescription.[34] The argument is patently
erroneous.

There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the
acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106.
[35]
 Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind
is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in
paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article 1139.[36] Another name for extinctive prescription is
litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.[37]

In a plethora of cases,[38] the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 529 covers acquisitive
prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the case
at bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred
the action of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because respondents
adversely occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the
prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the
case should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title was
given to Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith
when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land[39] on January
9, 1949, and transferred the title of the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No.
35282[40] on June 17, 1965; and because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado against
petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by operation of law, with Conrado as
trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.

Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of
justice and prevent unjust enrichment.[41] Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person
acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the real owner of the property.[42] It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period
to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article
1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144.[43] The prescriptive period to
enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the property.[44] The ten-year prescriptive period applies
only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession
of the property.[45]

In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his
family, not petitioners, were in possession of the property. The subject property was registered in
the name of Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the ten-year
period. Petitioners, thus, had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert their
claim over the land. As properly held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial
claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed, with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an
action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts.

Fraud was not proven

Granting, for the sake of argument, that the present case was not barred by laches and had not
prescribed, it must still fail on its merits. The basis of the action for damages of petitioners would
be the fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation allegedly committed by Conrado in transferring the
title of the subject property to his name. Petitioners, however, drastically failed to prove the fact
of fraud with clear and convincing evidence.

Fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and not merely by a preponderance
thereof.[46] Clear and convincing proof is more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of
such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases.[47] The imputation of
fraud in a civil case requires the presentation of clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegations
will not suffice to sustain the existence of fraud. The burden of evidence rests on the part of the
plaintiff or the party alleging fraud.[48]

Here, the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land, which was signed by
Aurora and her husband, transferred the ownership of the subject property from Aurora to
Conrado. Petitioners, however, failed to assail the validity of such deed. As written by the RTC,
petitioners could have questioned the authenticity of the document and submitted the same to the
National Bureau of Investigation for comparison of the signatures. This, they failed to do.[49]

In fine, the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land, being a notarized
document, enjoys the presumption of regularity. Even assuming that Conrado truly employed
fraud, no proof was presented that respondents, as heirs of Conrado, were in privy and had
knowledge of the misrepresentations. In the absence of evidence of fraud, the transfer to Conrado
of the title of the subject property, and the subsequent transfer to respondents by virtue of
succession,[50] must be upheld.

Even on the subject of ownership, petitioners failed to substantiate their claim. Petitioners had
nothing, other than their bare allegations, that they continuously owned the subject property. For
decades, petitioners lacked the possession and interest to recover the subject property. The trial
court even noted that petitioners could not present a single tax declaration receipt as an indicia of
their ownership. Based on the foregoing, petitioners are certainly not entitled to damages on the
basis of their misplaced claim of ownership over the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 28, 2011 Decision and the February 3, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84529 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), v Aguirre

DECISION
 
REYES, J.:
 
Facts
 
Dubbed as the Asia's Titanic,1 the M/V Dofia Paz was an inter-island passenger vessel owned
and operated by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio) traversing its Leyte to Manila route on the night
of December 20, 1987, when it collided with MIT Vector, a commercial tanker owned and
operated by Vector Shipping Corporation, Inc., (Vector Shipping). On that particular voyage,
MIT Vector was chartered by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. , et al.2 (petitioners) to transport
petroleum products. The collision brought forth an inferno at sea with an estimate of about 4,000
casualties, and was described as the "world's worst peace time maritime disaster."3 It precipitated
the filing of numerous lawsuits, the instant case included.
 
In December 1988, the heirs of the victims of the tragedy (respondents), instituted a class action
with the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, United States of
America (Louisiana Court), docketed as Civil Case No. 88-24481 entitled "Sivirino Carreon, et
al. v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., et al."4 On November 30, 2000, the Louisiana Court entered a
conditional judgment dismissing the said case on Louisiana Court entered a conditional judgment
dismissing the said case on the ground of forum non-conveniens.5 This led the respondents,
composed of 1,689 claimants, to file on March 6, 2001 a civil action for damages for breach of
contract of carriage and quasi-delict with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar,
Branch 28 (RTC of Catbalogan), against the herein petitioners, Sulpicio, Vector Shipping, and
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association, Bermuda Limited (Steamship). This was docketed
as Civil Case No. 7277 entitled “Ma. Flor Singzon-Aguirre, et al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et al.”6
 
In its Order7 dated March 28, 2001, the RTC of Catbalogan, motu proprio dismissed the
complaint pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the respondents’
cause of action had already prescribed. In an unusual turn of events however, the petitioners as
defendants therein, who were not served with summons, filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that they are waiving their defense of prescription, among others. The RTC of
Catbalogan, however, merely noted the petitioners’ motion.8
 
The dismissal of the complaint prompted the respondents to have the case reinstated with the
Louisiana Court. The petitioners, as defendants, however argued against it and contended that the
Philippines offered a more convenient forum for the parties, specifically the RTC of Manila,
Branch 39 (RTC of Manila), where three consolidated cases9 concerning the M/V Doña Paz
collision were pending.10
 
In its Judgment11 dated March 27, 2002, the Louisiana Court once again conditionally dismissed
the respondents’ action, ordering the latter to bring their claims to the RTC of Manila by
intervening in the consolidated cases filed before the latter court. It was also stated in the
judgment that the Louisiana Court will allow the reinstatement of the case if the Philippine court
“is unable to assume jurisdiction over the parties or does not recognize such cause of action or
any cause of action arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.”12
 
Following the Louisiana Court’s order, the respondents filed a motion for intervention on May 6,
2002, and a complaint in intervention on May 13, 2002 with the pending consolidated cases
before the RTC of Manila. Also, co-defendants in the consolidated cases, Sulpicio and Steamship
were furnished with a copy of the respondents’ motion to intervene.
 
In their Manifestation13 dated April 24, 2002, the petitioners unconditionally waived the defense
of prescription of the respondents’ cause of action. The petitioners also reiterated a similar
position in their Comment/Consent to Intervention14 dated May 16, 2002. Likewise, Sulpicio and
Steamship filed their Manifestation of No Objection dated May 30, 2002 and Manifestation
dated June 20, 2002 with the RTC of Manila, expressing concurrence with the petitioners.15
 
On July 2, 2002, the RTC of Manila issued its Order16 denying the respondents’ motion to
intervene for lack of merit. The RTC of Manila ruled that the RTC of Catbalogan had already
dismissed the case with finality; that a final and executory prior judgment is a bar to the filing of
the complaint in intervention of the respondents; and that the waivers of the defense of
prescription made by the petitioners, Sulpicio and Steamship are of no moment.17 The motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners, Sulpicio and Steamship was denied as well on August
30, 2002.18
 
On September 25, 2002, the petitioners instituted a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72994. On November 12, 2002, Sulpicio and
Steamship also filed a separate petition docketed as CA -G.R. SP No. 73793. These petitions
were consolidated in an order of the CA dated March 31, 2004.19
 
On April 27, 2005, the CA dismissed20 the consolidated petitions in this wise:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions under consideration are hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed orders of the [RTC of Manila] dated July 2, 2002 and
August 30, 2002 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
 
SO ORDERED.21
 
The CA concurred with the RTC of Manila that the finality of the Order dated March 28, 2001
issued by the RTC of Catbalogan has the effect of res judicata, which barred the respondents’
motion to intervene and complaint-in-intervention with the RTC of Manila.22 The CA also
considered the filing of motion for reconsideration by the petitioners before the RTC of
Catbalogan as tantamount to voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said court over their
person.23 The CA rationalized that “[i]t is basic that as long as the party is given the opportunity
to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this
opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process.”24
 
The motions for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Order25 dated December 8,
2005, only the petitioners elevated the matter before this Court by way of petition for review on
certiorari26 under Rule 45.
 
The Parties’ Arguments
 
The petitioners contended that not all the elements of res judicata are present in this case which
would warrant its application as the RTC of Catbalogan did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons and that the judgment therein is not one on the merits.27 It was also adduced that only the
respondents were heard in the RTC of Catbalogan because when the petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration, the order of dismissal was already final and executory.28 The
petitioners also bewailed that other complaints were accepted by the RTC of Manila in the
consolidated cases despite prescription of the cause of action29 and that the real issue of merit is
whether the defense of prescription that has matured can be waived.30 They explained that they
were not able to file for the annulment of judgment or order of the RTC of Catbalogan since the
respondents precluded them from seeking such remedy by filing a motion for intervention in the
consolidated cases before the RTC of Manila.31
 
On the other side, the respondents maintained that the waiver on prescription is not the issue but
bar by prior judgment is, because when they filed their motion for intervention, the dismissal
meted out by  the  RTC of Catbalogan  was  already  final.32 According to  the respondents, if the
petitioners intended to have the dismissal reversed, the latter should have appealed from the
order of the RTC of Catbalogan or filed a petition for certiorari against the said order or an
action to nullify the same.33 The respondents also elucidated that they could not have precluded
the petitioners from assailing the RTC of Catbalogan’s orders because it was not until May 6,
2002 when the respondents filed a motion for intervention with the consolidated cases before the
RTC of Manila34 and only in deference to the 2nd order of dismissal of the Louisiana
Court.35 Finally, for the respondents, the CA correctly held that the petitioners cannot collaterally
attack the final order of the RTC of Catbalogan, the reason being that a situation wherein there
could be two conflicting rulings between two co-equal courts must be avoided.36
 
Essentially, the issues can be summed up as follows:
 
I. WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORDERS OF THE RTC OF
CATBALOGAN BARRED THE FILING OF THE MOTION AND COMPLAINT FOR
INTERVENTION BEFORE THE RTC OF MANILA; and
 
II. WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC OF MANILA’S   DISREGARD  
OF   THE   PETITIONERS’ WAIVER OF PRESCRIPTION ON THE GROUND OF BAR BY
PRIOR JUDGMENT.37
 
Ruling of the Court
 
The petition lacks merit.
 
The petitioners cannot be permitted to assert their right to waive the defense of prescription when
they had foregone the same through their own omission, as will be discussed below.
 
The Court shall first discuss the prescription of the respondents’ cause of action against the
petitioners. Article 1106 of the Civil Code provides that “[b]y prescription, one acquires
ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions
laid down by law. In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by prescription.” The first
sentence refers to acquisitive prescription, which is a mode of “acquisition of ownership and
other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions provided by
law.” The second sentence pertains to extinctive prescription “whereby rights and actions are lost
by the lapse of time.”38 It is also called limitation of action.39
 
This case involves the latter type of prescription, the purpose of which is to protect the diligent
and vigilant, not the person who sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and taking no trouble of
exercising them one way or another to show that he truly has such rights.40 The rationale behind
the prescription of actions is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great
distances of time when all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost or the facts have become
obscure from the lapse of time or defective memory or death or removal of witnesses.41
 
There is no dispute that the respondents’ cause of action against the petitioners has prescribed
under the Civil Code.42 In fact; the same is evident on the complaint itself. The respondents
brought their claim before a Philippine court only on March 6, 2001, more than 13 years after the
collision occurred.43 Article 1139 of the Civil Code states that actions prescribe by the mere lapse
of time fixed by law. Accordingly, the RTC of Catbalogan cannot be faulted for the motu
proprio dismissal of the complaint filed before it. It is settled that prescription may be
considered by the courts motu proprio if the facts supporting the ground are apparent from the
pleadings or the evidence on record.44
 
The peculiarity in this case is that the petitioners, who were the defendants in the antecedent
cases before the RTCs of Catbalogan and Manila, are most adamant in invoking their waiver of
the defense of prescription while the respondents, to whom the cause of action belong, have
acceded to the dismissal of their complaint. The petitioners posit that there is a conflict between
a substantive law and procedural law in as much as waiver of prescription is allowed under
Article 1112 of the Civil Code, a substantive law even though the motu proprio dismissal of a
claim that has prescribed is mandated under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.45
 
The Court has previously held that the right to prescription may be waived or renounced
pursuant to Article 1112 of the Civil Code:46
 
Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already
obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future.
 
Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts
which imply the abandonment of the right acquired.
 
In the instant case, not only once did the petitioners expressly renounce their defense of
prescription. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider such waiver as basis in order to reverse the
rulings of the courts below as the dismissal of the complaint had become final and binding on
both the petitioners and the respondents.
 
It is not contested that the petitioners were not served with summons by the RTC of Catbalogan
prior to the motu proprio  dismissal of the respondents’ complaint. It is basic that courts acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of defendants or respondents, by a valid service of summons or
through their voluntary submission.47 Not having been served with summons, the petitioners were
not initially considered as under the jurisdiction of the court. However, the petitioners voluntarily
submitted themselves under the jurisdiction of the RTC of Catbalogan by filing their motion for
reconsideration.
 
Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
 
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
 
In  Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, et al.,48 the Court
explained the following:
 
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
 
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must
be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
 
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court
for resolution.49
 
Previous to the petitioners’ filing of their motion for reconsideration, the RTC of Catbalogan
issued an Entry of Final Judgment50 stating that its Order dated March 28, 2001 became final and
executory on April 13, 2001. The petitioners claimed that for this reason, they could not have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Catbalogan by filing such a belated
motion.51
 
But the petitioners cannot capitalize on the supposed finality of the Order dated March 28, 2001
to repudiate their submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Catbalogan. It must be emphasized
that before the filing of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners were not under the RTC
of Catbalogan’s jurisdiction. Thus, although the order was already final and executory with
regard to the respondents; it was not yet, on the part of the petitioners. As opposed to the
conclusion reached by the CA, the Order dated March 28, 2001 cannot be considered as final and
executory with respect to the petitioners. It was only on July 2, 2001, when the petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration seeking to overturn the aforementioned order, that they voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. On September 4, 2001, the RTC of
Catbalogan noted the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on the flawed impression that the
defense of prescription cannot be waived.52
 
Consequently, it was only after the petitioners’ failure to appeal or seek any other legal remedy
to challenge the subsequent Order dated September 4, 2001, that the dismissal became final on
their part. It was from the date of the petitioners’ receipt of this particular order that the
reglementary period under the Rules of Court to assail it commenced to run for the petitioners.
But neither the petitioners nor the respondents resorted to any action to overturn the orders of the
RTC of Catbalogan, which ultimately led to their finality. While the RTC of Catbalogan merely
noted the motion for reconsideration in its Order dated September 4, 2001, the effect is the same
as a denial thereof, for the intended purpose of the motion, which is to have the complaint
reinstated, was not realized. This should have prompted the petitioners to explore and pursue
other legal measures to have the dismissal reversed. Instead, nothing more was heard from the
parties until a motion for intervention was filed by the respondents before the RTC of Manila, in
conformity with the order of the Louisiana Court. As the CA espoused in its decision:
 
We concur with the observation of the [RTC of Manila] that the petitioners’ predicament was of
their own making. The petitioners should have exhausted the other available legal remedies
under the law after the [RTC of Catbalogan] denied their motion for reconsideration. Under
Section 9, Rule 37 of the [Rules of Court], the remedy against an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is not to appeal the said order of denial but to appeal from the judgment or final
order of the court. Moreover, the petitioners could have availed of an action for annulment of
judgment for the very purpose of having the final and executory judgment be set aside so that
there will be a renewal of litigation. An action for annulment of judgment is grounded only on
two justifications:
 
(1) extrinsic fraud; and
(2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. All that herein petitioners have to prove was that
the trial court had no jurisdiction; that they were prevented from having a trial or presenting their
case to the trial court by some act or conduct of the private respondents; or that they have been
denied due process of law. Seasonably, the petitioners could have also interposed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules [of Court] imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge in issuing the said order of dismissal. For reasons undisclosed in the records,
the petitioners did not bother to mull over and consider the said legal avenues, which they could
have readily availed of during that time.53
 
The RTC of Manila denied the respondents’ motion for intervention on the ground of the finality
of the order of the RTC of Catbalogan, there being no appeal or any other legal remedy perfected
in due time by either the petitioners or the respondents. Since the dismissal of the complaint was
already final and executory, the RTC of Manila can no longer entertain a similar action from the
same parties. The bone of contention is not regarding the petitioners’ execution of waivers of the
defense of prescription, but the effect of finality of an order or judgment on both parties.
 
“Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not
appealed from by him” because the “presumption [is] that a party who did not interject an appeal
is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court.”54 Whether the dismissal was based on
the merits or technicality is beside the point. “[A] dismissal on a technicality is no different in
effect and consequences from a dismissal on the merits.”55
 
The petitioners attempted to justify their failure to file an action to have the orders of the RTC of
Catbalogan annulled by ratiocinating that the respondents precluded them from doing so when
the latter filed their complaint anew with the RTC of Manila. This is untenable, as it is clear that
the respondents filed the said complaint- in-intervention with the RTC of Manila more than a
year after the case was ordered dismissed by the RTC of Catbalogan.56 Aside from this, the
petitioners offered no other acceptable excuse on why they did not raise their oppositions against
the orders of the RTC of Catbalogan when they had the opportunity to do so. Thus, the only
logical conclusion is that the petitioners abandoned their right to waive the defense of
prescription.
 
Lastly, the Court takes judicial notice of its ruling in Vector Shipping Corporation, et al. v.
Macasa, et al.57 and Caltex (Philippines) Inc., v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.58 wherein the petitioners, as
a mere voyage charterer, were exonerated from third party liability in the M/V Doña Paz
collision. Should this Court allow the reinstatement of the complaint against the petitioners, let
the trial proceedings take its course, and decide the same on the merits in favor of the
respondents, then it would have led to the promulgation of conflicting decisions. On the other
hand, if this Court were to decide this matter on the merits in favor of the petitioners, then the
same result would be obtained as with a dismissal now.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
 
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171514 | 2012-07-18
SECOND DIVISION

DECISION

REYES, J.:

          This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision1 dated November 11, 2004
and Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456.

          On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu an application3 for land registration covering a parcel
of land with an area of 5,525 square meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion,
Cebu. In support of his application, which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa
alleged that: (a) the property, which is more particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D
(New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from his mother, Isabel
Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the latter's other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and
(c) he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property in the concept of an
owner for more than thirty (30) years.

          Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-0008934 to prove the
identity of the land. As proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence
the annotation on the advance survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibanez, Chief of the Map
Projection Section, stating that "CONFORMED PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No.
2545 Project No. 28 certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable
Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabel's
name - Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 - to prove that she had been in possession of the
property since 1965. To support his claim that he had been religiously paying the taxes due on
the property, Espinosa presented a Certification6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by the Office of
the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and
1985 - Tax Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and 010717.8

          Petitioner opposed Espinosa's application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of

Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been
complied with as Espinosa's predecessor-in-interest possessed the property only after June 12,
1945; and (b) the tax declarations do not prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-
interest are in the character and for the length of time required by law.
          On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment9 granting Espinosa's petition for
registration, the dispositive portion of which states:

          WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering for
the registration and the confirmation of title of Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New),
situated at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of 5,525
square meters and that upon the finality of this decision, let a corresponding decree of
registration be issued in favor of the herein applicant in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.

          SO ORDERED.10

          According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is alienable and
disposable and that he complied with the requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:

          After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-entitled case, the
Court is convinced, and so holds, that Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and
possession over the subject lot which is within the area considered by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

          The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of predecessor-in-interest have
been in open, actual, public, continuous, adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time
prescribed by law (Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the Land
Registration Act.11

          Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosa's failure to prove that his possession
and that of his predecessor-in-interest were for the period required by law. As shown by Tax
Declaration No. 013516, Isabel's possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945
or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of the PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa came into
possession of the property only in 1970 following the sale that transpired between him and his
mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name was for the year 1978. According to
petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in possession for more
than thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent proof that such possession began on June 12,
1945 or earlier.12

          Petitioner also claimed that Espinosa's failure to present the original tracing cloth of the
survey plan or a sepia copy thereof is fatal to his application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of
the Philippines13 and Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the submission
of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing the identity of the land subject of the
application.15

          Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey plan is not the
evidence admissible to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable.16

          By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the
MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that possession for at least thirty (30) years,
despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to
private. Thus:

          The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following grounds:

          a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has successfully established valid title
over the subject land and that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous,
adverse, public and undisturbed possession of said land in the concept of an owner for more than
30 years before the filing of the application. Established jurisprudence has consistently
pronounced that "open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable
public land ipso jure converts the same into private property (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years by applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant so as to segregate
the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 218
SCRA 41); and

          b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is the latest amendment
of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict implementation of the law
would in certain cases result in inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:

          "Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for
registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty
(30) years or more."17

          The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary evidence, not
necessarily the original tracing cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can be
established by other competent evidence.

          Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit. While the best
evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes may be the original tracing cloth
plan from the Land Registration Commission, the court may sufficiently order the issuance of a
decree of registration on the basis of the blue print copies and other evidence (Republic of the
Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70594, October 10, 1986). The said
case provides further:

          "The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient to justify the
registration and confirmation of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the original
tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission for purposes of comparison, should
not militate against the rights of the applicant. Such is especially true in this case where no clear,
strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has been shown by the oppositor to overcome
the correctness of said plans which were found both by the lower court and the Court of Appeals
as conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the parcels of land contained therein."

          There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra� the Supreme
Court pronounced that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a
mandatory requirement, and that failure to comply with such requirement is fatal to one's
application for registration. However, such pronouncement need not be taken as an iron clad rule
nor to be applied strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale behind the submission of
the tracing cloth plan.x x x:

xxxx

          As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by other competent
evidence like a duly approved blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and
technical description of Lot 8499, containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area and
location of the lot, the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be excused.18

          Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property is alienable and
disposable:

          Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In the duly approved
Advance Survey Plan As-07-0000893 (sic) duly approved by the Land Management Services,
DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, it is certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and
disposable area of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain.19

          Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its Resolution20
dated February 13, 2006.

Petitioner's Case

          Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CA's assailed decision and
attributes the following errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove by competent evidence that the
subject property is alienable and disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan
identifies the property in preparation for a judicial proceeding but does not convert the property
into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission of the
original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property;
and (d) a blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and
location of the property only if it bears the approval of the Director of Lands.

Issues

          The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect
title over the subject property that is worthy of confirmation and registration is hinged on the
determination of the following issues:

          a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially complies with Section
17 of P.D. No. 1529; and

          b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the geodetic engineer
who conducted the survey sufficed to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling

          The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosa's application is anchored on
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is
warranted in view of evidence supposedly showing his compliance with the requirements
thereof.

          This Court is of a different view.

          Based on Espinosa's allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent that his claim of
an imperfect title over the property in question is based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his possession
and that of his predecessor-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed
under the two (2) latter provisions. On the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired
title thru his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for
thirty (30) years, or through prescription. Therefore, the rule that should have been applied is
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states:

          Sec. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

          x x x x

             (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.

          Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts' disposition of this case stemmed
from their failure to apprise themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent
over the years. Section 48(b) of the PLA originally states:

          Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

                              x x x x

          (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
          Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
was since July 26, 1894 or earlier.

          On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by
providing a thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Thus:

          (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

          On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession
and occupation for a period of thirty (30) years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945
or earlier. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 states:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act
are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

          On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement for possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier was adopted under Section 14(1) thereof.

          P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section
48(b) of the PLA filed after the promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove
possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights
may have been acquired under Section 48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073. That is,
should petitions for registration filed by those who had already been in possession of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years at the time P.D. No. 1073 was
promulgated be denied because their possession commenced after June 12, 1945? In Abejaron v.
Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal predicament as follows:

          However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation required

by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity
of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should
have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that
the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law, then upon Abejaron's
satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have already gained title over the disputed
land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated,
"Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for
judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land
Act.22 (Citations omitted)

          Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain on the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession
and occupation, it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on
January 24, 1947 and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D.
No. 1073.

          There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it provides for two (2) modes of
acquisition. It is not the case that there is an option between possession and occupation for thirty
(30) years and possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither
contemplated under Section 48(b) that if possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is still possible to acquire an imperfect title
if such possession and occupation spanned for thirty (30) years at the time of the filing of the
application.

          In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the requirements of
Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed
evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property for at
least thirty (30) years prior to the time he filed his application. However, there is nothing on
record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or
Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and occupation of the property for thirty
(30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in Isabel's name was for the year 1965
indicating that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years had lapsed from the time she first
came supposedly into possession.

          The CA's reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court23 is misplaced

considering that the application therein was filed on October 20, 1975 or before the effectivity of
P.D. No. 1073. The same can be said with respect to National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.24 The petition for registration therein was filed on August 21, 1968 and at that time,
the prevailing rule was that provided under Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942.

          In Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 the applicants therein entered into possession of the
property on June 17, 1978 and filed their application on February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there is
evidence that the individuals from whom the applicant purchased the property, or their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession since 1937. Thus, during the effectivity of
Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or while the prevailing rule was possession and
occupation for thirty (30) years, or prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073, the thirty (30)-year
prescriptive period was already completed.

          Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529 that should apply in this case, as the lower courts held, it was incumbent upon Espinosa to
prove, among other things, that Isabel's possession of the property dated back at least to June 12,
1945. That in view of the established fact that Isabel's alleged possession and occupation started
much later, the lower courts should have dismissed Espinosa's application outright.

          In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b)
of the PLA. That there were instances wherein applications were granted on the basis of
possession and occupation for thirty (30) years was for the sole reason discussed above.
Regrettably, such reason does not obtain in this case.

          Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it follows that the
subject property being supposedly alienable and disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2)
categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under
Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use,
public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are considered private. In
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,26 this Court held that there must be an official
declaration to that effect before the property may be rendered susceptible to prescription:

          Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when
no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article
420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are
public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth." (Emphasis
supplied)

          Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.27

          Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an
aggregate period of thirty (30) years, this does not operate to divest the State of its ownership.
The property, albeit allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is not
held by the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto necessitates observance of the
provisions of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. For prescription to run against the State, there
must be proof that there was an official declaration that the subject property is no longer
earmarked for public service or the development of national wealth. Moreover, such official
declaration should have been issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be, prior
to the filing of the application for registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to
the conversion of the property to private or patrimonial shall not be considered in determining
completion of the prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of land is still reserved for public
service or the development of national wealth, even if the same is alienable and disposable,
possession and occupation no matter how lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give rise to any
title that would defeat that of the State's if such did not commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

          At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the survey plan does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the presumption that the property
belongs to the inalienable public domain.

          All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right
to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified
or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain
part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.28

          In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the earlier ruling in Menguito v.
Republic30 that the notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed is
alienable and disposable is not the positive government act that would remove the property from
the inalienable domain. Neither it is the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the
presumption that the property is inalienable:

          To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-
geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B.
L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."

          Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the
lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.

          "To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside
Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by
the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-
000227).

          This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. . . ."
          For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent
such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

          In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer's notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not
constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question.Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently
proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."31 (Citations omitted and
underscoring supplied)

          Therefore, even if Espinosa's application may not be dismissed due to his failure to present
the original tracing cloth of the survey plan, there are numerous grounds for its denial. The
blueprint copy of the advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and
location of the subject property if: (a) it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic engineer; (b) it
proceeded officially from the Land Management Services (LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is
accompanied by a technical description of the property which is certified as correct by the
geodetic surveyor who conducted the survey and the LMS of the DENR. As ruled in Republic v.
Guinto-Aldana,32 the identity of the land, its boundaries and location can be established by other
competent evidence apart from the original tracing cloth such as a duly executed blueprint of the
survey plan and technical description:

          Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth
plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact
identity of the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with
the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application
must be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is
accompanied by pieces of evidence-such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a
duly executed technical description of the property-which may likewise substantially and with as
much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.33

          However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be offered as evidence of the
identity, location and the boundaries of the property applied for, the notation therein may not be
admitted as evidence of alienability and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,34 this
Court enumerated the documents that are deemed relevant and sufficient to prove that the
property is already outside the inalienable public domain as follows:

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared
by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR Secretary's
declaration or the President's proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of such official record. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.35 (Citation omitted)

          Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of either Section
14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O. No.
1529. Applying Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper,
Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945
or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and disposable. On the other hand, applying Section
14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As to whether
Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel were of the
character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the
foregoing considerations.

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE

COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution dated
February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's application for registration of title
over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New) located at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

          SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN AND SOLEDAD DELFIN, NAMELY EMELITA D.
FABRIGAR AND LEONILO C. DELFIN, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193618 | 2016-11-28
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 
SECOND DIVISION
 
 
DECISION
 
LEONEN, J.:
 
Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, a claimant may acquire alienable and disposable public land
upon evidence of exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945. The period
to acquire public land by acquisitive prescription under Presidential Decree No. 1529 begins to
run only after the promulgation of a law or a proclamation by the President stating that the land
is no longer intended for public use or the development of national wealth.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure praying that the assailed February 26, 2010 Decision2 and July 2, 2010 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80017 be reversed, and that the May 20, 2002
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. II-1801 be reinstated.

The Regional Trial Court's May 20, 2002 Decision awarded compensation to Leopoldo and
Soledad Delfin (Delfin Spouses) for an Iligan City property subsequently occupied by
respondent National Housing Authority.

The assailed Court of Appeals Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court's May 20, 2002
Decision and dismissed the Delfin Spouses' complaint seeking compensation. The assailed Court
of Appeals Resolution denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
In a Complaint for "Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and Improvements and Damages"5 the Delfin
Spouses claimed that they were the owners of a 28,800 square meter parcel of land in Townsite,
Suarez, Iligan City (the "Iligan Property").6 They allegedly bought the property in 1951 from
Felix Natingo and Carlos Carbonay, who, allegedly, had been in actual possession of the
property since time immemorial.7 The Delfin Spouses had been declaring the Iligan Property in
their names for tax purposes since 1952,8 and had been planting it with mangoes, coconuts, corn,
seasonal crops, and vegetables.9

They farther alleged that, sometime in 1982, respondent National Housing Authority forcibly
took possession of a 10,798 square meter portion of the property.10 Despite their repeated
demands for compensation, the National Housing Authority failed to pay the value of the
property.11 The Delfin Spouses thus, filed their Complaint.12

They asserted that the property's reasonable market value was not less than P40 per square
meter13 and that its improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees should be valued at
P13,360.00 at the time of taking.14 They similarly claimed that because the National Housing
Authority occupied the property, they were deprived of an average net yearly income of
P10,000.00.15

In its Answer,16 the National Housing Authority alleged that the Delfin Spouses' property was
part of a military reservation area.17 It cited Proclamation No. 2151 (actually, Proclamation No.
2143, the National Housing Authority made an erroneous citation) as having supposedly
reserved the area in which property is situated for Iligan City's slum improvement and
resettlement program, and the relocation of families who were dislocated by the National Steel
Corporation's five-year expansion program.18

According to the National Housing Authority, Proclamation No. 2151 also mandated it to
determine the improvements' valuation.19 Based on the study of the committee it created, the
value of the property was supposedly only P4.00 per square meter, regardless of the nature of the
improvements on it.20

It emphasized that among all claimants, only the Delfin Spouses and two others remained unpaid
because of their disagreement on the property's valuation.21

The National Housing Authority failed to appear during the pre-trial conference.22 Upon the
Delfin Spouses' motion, the Regional Trial Court declared the National Housing Authority in
default.23 The case was set for the ex-parte reception of the Delfin Spouses' evidence.24

On May 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of the Delfin
Spouses.25cralawred The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and by virtue of the existence of preponderance of
evidence, the Court hereby enters a judgment in favor of spouses-plaintiffs Leopoldo Delfin and
Soledad Delfin against defendant National Housing Authority, its agents or representative/s
ordering to pay the former the following, to wit:
 
 P400,000.00 representing the reasonable market value of a portion of the land taken by the
1
defendant containing an area of 10,000 square meters at the rate of P40.00 per square meters
)
plus legal interest per annum from the filing in Court of the complaint until fully paid;
   
P13,360.00 representing the value of the permanent improvements that were damaged and
2
destroyed plus legal interest per annum from the time of the filing of this case until fully
)
paid;
   
3
P10,000.00, representing attorney's fees;
)
   
4
The costs of this suit.26
)
 
The Regional Trial Court stated that it had no reason to doubt the evidence presented by the
Delfin Spouses:
 
On this regards (sic), the Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of the plaintiff['s evidence],
there being none to controvert the same. If said. evidence did not ring true, the defendant should
have and could have easily destroyed their probatory value. Such indifference can only mean that
defendant had not (sic) equitable rights to protect or assert over the disputed property together
with all the improvements existing thereon. This, the defendant did not do so and the Court finds
no cogent reasons to disbelieve or reject the plaintiffs categorical declarations on the witness
stand under a solemn oath, for the same are entitled to full faith and credence. Indeed, if the
defendant National Housing Authority have been blinded with the consequence of their neglect
and apathy, then defendant have no right to pass on to the spouses-plaintiffs of their negligence
and expect the Court to come to their rescue. For it is now much too late in the day to assail the
decision which has become final and executory.27
 
The National Housing Authority filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied in the
Regional trial Court's September 10, 2002 Resolution.28

On the National Housing Authority's appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed February
26, 2010 Decision reversing the Regional Trial Court:29
 
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, appellees' complaint for compensation is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The property taken by appellant NHA and for which compensation is sought by appellees is
hereby DECLARED land of the public domain.30
 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the characterization of the property is no longer an issue because
the National Housing Authority already conceded that the property is disposable public land by
citing Proclamation No. 2151, which characterized the property as "a certain disposable parcel of
public land."31However, the Delfin Spouses supposedly failed to establish their possession of the
property since June 12, 1945, as required in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.32

During the pendency of their petition before the Court of Appeals. Both Leopoldo and Soledad
Delfin both passed away. Lepoldo passed away on February 3, 2005 and Soledad on June 22,
2004. Their surviving heirs, Emelita D. Fabrigar and Leonilo C. Delfin filed a Motion for
Substitution before the Court of Appeals, which was not acted upon.33

In its assailed July 2, 2010 Resolution,34 the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the heirs of the Delfin Spouses.

Hence, this petition which was filed by the surviving heirs of the Delfin Spouses, Emelita D.
Fabrigar and Leonilo C. Delfin (petitioners).35

For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to just compensation for the Iligan
City property occupied by respondent National Housing Authority.
 
I

The right to be justly compensated whenever private property is taken for public use cannot be
disputed. Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution states that
 
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
 
The case now hinges on whether the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interests have been in
possession of the Iligan Property for such duration and under such circumstances as will enable
them to claim ownership.

Petitioners argue that they and their predecessors-in-interests' open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the Iligan Property for more than 30 years converted the property from
public to private.36 They then posit that they acquired ownership of the property through
acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.37

Petitioners also assert that the Court of Appeals disregarded certifications and letters from
government agencies, which support their claims, particularly, their and their predecessors-in-
interest's possession since June 12, 1945.38

Respondent counters, citing the Court of Appeals Decision, that petitioners cannot rely
on'Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 because the property was not yet declared
private land when they filed their Complaint.39
 
II

Petitioners are erroneously claiming title based on acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Section 14 reads in full:
 
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
 
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
(1 continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
) lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
   
(2 Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
) existing laws.
   
(3 Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
) accession or accretion under the existing laws.
   
(4
Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
)

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for
the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption
expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may
continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by
him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust. [Emphasis supplied]

For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
two (2) requirements must be satisifled: first, the property is established to be private in
character; and second the applicable prescriptive period under existing laws had passed.

Property - such as land - is either of public dominion or private ownership.40

"Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs
to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth."41 Land that belongs to the state but which is not or is no
longer intended for public use, for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth, is patrimonial property;42 it is property owned by the State in its private capacity.
Provinces, cities, and municipalities may also hold patrimonial lands.43
Private property "consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or
collectively,"44 as well as "the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and
municipalities."45

Accordingly, only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in character are susceptible to
prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Consistent with this, Article
1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties of the state, which are not patrimonial in character, as
being not susceptible to prescription:
 
Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription.
 
Contrary to petitioners' theory then, for prescription to be viable, the publicly-owned land must
be patrimonial or private in character at the onset. Possession for thirty (30) years does not
convert it into patrimonial property.

For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property, there must be an express
declaration - "in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law"46 - that "the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial."47

This Court's 2009 Decision in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic48 explains:

 
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State". It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial properly susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes
clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when * it is "intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth".

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.49
 
This was reiterated in this Court's 2013 Resolution in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic:50
 
[W]hen public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect.51
 
Attached to the present Petition was a copy of a May 18, 1988 supplemental letter to the Director
of the Land Management Bureau.52 This referred to an executive order, which stated that
petitioners' property was no longer needed for any public or quasi-public purposes:
 
That it is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive Secretary dated April 24, 1954 the
portion thereof that will not be needed for any public or quasi-public purposes, be disposed in
favor of the actual occupants under the administration of the Bureau of Lands (copy of the
Executive Order is herewith attached for ready reference)53
 
However, a mere indorsement of the executive secretary is not the law or presidential
proclamation required for converting land of the public domain into patrimonial property and
rendering it susceptible to prescription. There then was no viable declaration rendering the Iligan
property to have been patrimonial property at the onset. Accordingly, regardless of the length of
petitioners' possession, no title could vest on them by way of prescription.
 
III

While petitioners may not claim title by prescription, they may, nevertheless, claim title pursuant
to Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act).

Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and issuance of titles in favor of citizens
occupying or claiming to own lands of the public domain or an interest therein. Section 48 (b)
specifically pertained to those who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945":
 
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under
the Land Registration Act, to wit: 
 
(b Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
) continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
 under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by PD 1073.)
 
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore requires that two (2) requisites be satisfied before
claims of title to public domain lands may be confirmed: first, that the land subject of the claim
is agricultural land; and second, open, continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the
land since June 12, 1945.

The need for the land subject of the claim to have been classified as agricultural is in conformity
with the constitutional precept that "[a]lienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands."54As explained in this Court's 2013 Resolution in Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic:
 
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, lands of
the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. Section
10, Article XTV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven,
specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The
1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest
or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. Agricultural lands may be further classified by
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. The identification of lands according to
their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive
Department.

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands
of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,
without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.55
 
As the Court of Appeals emphasized, respondent has conceded that the Iligan property was
alienable and disposable land:
 
As to the first requirement: There was no need for appellees to establish that the property
involved was alienable and disposable public land. This characterization of the property is
conceded by [respondent] who cites Proclamation No. 2151 as declaring that the disputed
property was a certain disposable parcel of public land.56
 
That the Iligan property was alienable and disposable, agricultural land, has been admitted. What
is claimed instead is that petitioners' possession is debunked by how the Iligan Property was
supposedly part of a military reservation area57 which was subsequently reserved for Iligan City's
slum improvement and resettlement program, and the relocation of families who were dislocated
by the National Steel Corporation's five-year expansion program.58

Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2143 (erroneously referred to by respondent as

Proclamation No. 2151) certain parcels of land in Barrio Suarez, Iligan City were reserved for
slum-improvement and resettlement program purposes.59 The proclamation characterized the
covered area as "disposable parcel of public land":
 
WHEREAS, a certain disposable parcel of public land situated at Barrio Suarez, Iligan City
consisting of one million one hundred seventy-four thousand eight hundred fifty-three
(1,174,853) square meters, more or less, has been chosen by National Steel Corporation and the
City Government of Iligan with the conformity of the National Housing/Authority, as the most
suitable site for the relocation of the families to be affected/dislocated as a result of National
Steel Corporation's program and for the establishment of a slum improvement and resettlement
project in the City of Iligan;60
 
However, even if the Iligan Property was subsumed by Proclamation No. 2143, the same
proclamation recognized private rights, which may have already attached, and the rights of
qualified free patent applicants:
 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby reserve for relocation of the families to be
affected/dislocated by the 5-year expansion program of the National Steel Corporation and for
the slum improvement and resettlement project of the City of Iligan under the administration and
disposition of the National Housing Authority, subject to private rights, if any there be, Lot 5258
(portion) of the Iligan Cadastre, which parcel of land is of the public domain, situated in Barrio
Suarez, City of Iligan and more particularly described as follows:

....

This Proclamation is subject to the condition that the qualified free patent applicants occupying
portions of the aforedescribed parcel of land, if any, may be compensated for the value of their
respective portions and existing improvements thereon, as may be determined by the National
Housing Authority.61
 
Whatever rights petitioners (and their predecessors-in-interest) may have had over the Iligan
property was, thus, not obliterated by Proclamation No. 2143. On the contrary, the Proclamation
itself facilitated compensation.

More importantly, there is documentary evidence to the effect that the Iligan Property was not
even within the area claimed by respondent. In a letter62 to the Director of Lands, dated
December 22, 1987, Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr. noted that:
 
That this land known as Lot No. 5258, Cad. 292, Iligan Cadastre which portion was claimed also
by the Human Settlement and/or National Housing Authority; but the area applied for by
Leopoldo Delfin is outside the claim of the said agency as per certification issued dated June 10,
1988; copy of which is herewith attached for ready reference;63
 
The same letter likewise indicated that the Iligan Property was already occupied by June 1945
and that it had even been released for agricultural purposes in favor of its
occupants.64 Accordingly, the Deputy Public Land Inspector recommended the issuance of a
patent in favor of petitioner Leopoldo Delfin:65
 
Upon investigation conducted by the undersigned in the premises of the land, it was found and
ascertained that the land applied for by Leopoldo Delfrn was first entered, occupied, possessed
and cultivated by him since the year June, 1945 up to the present; he have already well improved
the land and introduced some considerable improvements such as coconut trees and different
kinds of fruit trees which are presently all fruit bearing trees; declared the same for taxation
purposes and taxes have been paid every year; and that there is no other person or persons who
bothered him in his peaceful occupation and cultivation thereof;chanrobleslaw

Records of this Office show that said land was surveyed and claimed by the Military
Reservation, but the portion of which has been released in favor of the actual occupants and the
area of Leopoldo Delfin is one of the portions released for agricultural purposes;chanrobleslaw

....

That the applicant caused the survey of the land under Sgs-12-000099, approved by the Regional
Land Director, Region XII, Bureau of Lands, Cotabato City on April 3, 1979 (see approved plan
attached hereof);chanrobleslaw

In view hereof, it is therefore respectfully recommended that the entry of the application be now
confirmed and that patent be yes issued in favor of Leopoldo Delfin.66
 
A May 18, 1988 supplemental letter to the Director of the Land Management Bureau further
stated:
 
That the land applied for by Leopoldo Delfin is a portion of Lot No. 5258, Cad. 292, Iligan
Cadastre which was entered, occupied and possessed by the said applicant since the year June
1945 up to the present; well improved the same and introduced some considerable improvements
such as different kinds of fruit trees, coconut trees and other permanent improvements
thereon;chanrobleslaw

....

That is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive Secretary dated April 24, 1954 the
portion thereof that will not be needed for any public or quasi-public purposes, be disposed in
favor of the actual occupants under the administration of the Bureau of Lands[.]67
 
Clearly then, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan Property pursuant to Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act.

First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already been declared to be alienable and
disposable land. Respondent has admitted this and Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero,
Jr.'s letters to the Director of Land attest to this.

Second, although the Delfin Spouses' testimonial evidence and tax declarations showed that their
possession went only as far back as 1952, Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters
to the Director of Land nevertheless attest to a previous finding that the property had already
been occupied as early as June 1945.

Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act have been satisfied and
having established their rights to the Iligan Property, it follows that petitioners must be
compensated for its taking.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated
February 26, 2010 and Resolution dated July 2, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80017
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court's Decision dated May 20, 2002 in
Civil Case No. II-1801 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 214367, April 04, 2018 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. LAUREANA MALIJAN-

JAVIER AND IDEN MALIJAN-JAVIER, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

To establish that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable,

applicants must "present a copy of the original classification approved by the
[Department of Environment and Natural Resources] Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records."[1]

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, praying that the September 15, 2014 Decision [3] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR. CV No. 98466 be reversed and set aside. [4] The Court of Appeals affirmed
the May 5, 2011 Decision[5] and December 9, 2011 Order[6] of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Talisay-Laurel, Batangas in Land Reg. Case No. 09-001 (LRA Record
No. N-79691), which adjudicated Lot No. 1591, Cad. 729, Talisay Cadastre in favor
of Laureana Malijan-Javier (Laureana) and Iden Malijan-Javier (Iden). [7]

This case involves Laureana and Iden's application for registration of land title over
a parcel situated in Barangay Tranca, Talisay, Batangas filed in June 2009 before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Talisay-Laurel, Batangas. The land, regarded as
Lot No. 1591, Cad. 729, Talisay Cadastre, had an area of 9,629 square meters. The
application of Laureana and Iden was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 09-
001 (LRA Record No. N-79691).[8]

On September 10, 2009, Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition

to the application based on the following grounds:

(1) Ne[i]ther the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier; (2) The tax
declarations relied upon by appellees do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide  acquisition of the land by the appellees; and (3) The parcel
of land applied for is a land of public domain and, as such, not subject to private
appropriation.[9]

An initial hearing was scheduled on January 19, 2010. During the hearing, several
documents were marked to show compliance with the necessary jurisdictional
requirements. Since nobody appeared to oppose Laureana and Iden's application,
the trial court issued an Order of General Default against the whole world except
the Republic.[10]

In the subsequent hearings, Laureana and Iden presented testimonial and

documentary evidence to establish their ownership claim. [11] Laureana testified
along with Juana Mendoza Banawa (Banawa), Ben Hur Hernandez (Hernandez),
Loida Maglinao (Maglinao), and Glicerio R. Canarias (Canarias). [12]

In her testimony, Laureana alleged that she was married to Cecilio Javier (Cecilio)
and that Iden was their son. She claimed that she and Cecilio (the Spouses Javier)
purchased the property from Spouses Antonio Lumbres and Leonisa Manaig (the
Spouses Lumbres) on October 10, 1985. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to
facilitate the transaction. They had the property fenced and planted with coconut,
antipolo, and duhat. She also claimed that they had paid its property taxes since
1986.[13]

Banawa, a resident of Barangay Tranca, Talisay, Batangas since her birth on March
8, 1929,[14] testified that Cito Paison (Cito) and Juan Paison (Juan) owned the
property as early as 1937. The half portion owned by Cito was later transferred to
his daughter, Luisa Paison (Luisa). Both portions owned by Luisa and Juan were
then transferred to the Spouses Lumbres, until half was finally sold to the Spouses
Javier and the other half to their son, Iden.[15] Banawa added that since every
person in their barangay knew that Laureana and Iden owned and possessed the
property, nobody interrupted or disturbed their possession or made an adverse
claim against them.[16] Thus, their possession was "open, continuous, exclusive, and
in the concept of an owner[.]"[17]

Hernandez, who was a Special Land Investigator I of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources-Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO), testified that he was the one who conducted an
ocular inspection on the land.[18] He found that the land "ha[d] not been forfeited in
favor of the government for non-payment of taxes [or] ... confiscated as bond in
connection with any civil or criminal case."[19] Moreover, the land was outside a
reservation or forest zone. Hernandez also found that no prior application was filed
or any patent, decree, or title was ever issued for it. [20] Finally, he stated that the
land "[did] not encroach upon an established watershed, river bed, river bank
protection, creek or right of way."[21]

Maglinao, Forester I of DENR-CENRO,[22] also testified that she inspected the

property before issuing a certification, which stated that the land "[was] within the
alienable and disposable zone under Project No. 39, Land Classification Map No.
3553 certified on September 10, 1997." [23]

Meanwhile, Canarias, the Municipal Assessor of Talisay, Batangas, attested that the
property was covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 014-01335 and 014-00397 under the
names of Laureana and Cecilio, and of Iden. Upon tracing back the tax declarations
on the property, Canarias also found that the previous owners who declared the
land for taxation purposes were the same as the previous owners according to
Laureana's and Iden's testimonies. The previous tax declarations of the property
now covered by Tax Declaration No. 014-01335 were under the names of Luisa and
the Spouses Lumbres while Tax Declaration No. 014-00397 were previously under
the names of Juan and the Spouses Lumbres.[24]

On May 5, 2011, the trial court rendered a Decision granting Laureana and Iden's
application for registration of title. It held that they were able to establish that the
property was alienable and disposable since September 10, 1997 and that "[they]
and their predecessors-in-interest ha[d] been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject property, in the concept of an owner, even prior
to 12 June 1945."[25] The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, upon confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby
adjudicates and decrees Lot No. 1591, Cad-729 Talisay Cadastre as shown on plan
As-04-003630 situated in Barangay Tranca, Municipality of Talisay, Province of
Batangas, with an area of NINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY[-]NINE (9,629)
SQUARE METERS in favor of and in the name of LAUREANA MALIJAN JAVIER (1/2
SHARE), widow, Filipino, with address at Barangay Tranca, Talisay, Batangas, and
IDEN MALIJAN JAVIER (1/2 SHARE), married to Jaena Buno, Filipino, with address
at 39-31 56th St Apt 3, Woodside, New York, USA in accordance with Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
Once this decision has become final, let an Order be issued directing the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree
of registration.

SO ORDERED.[26]

The Republic moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in its
December 9, 2011 Order.[27]

The Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assailing the May 5, 2011
Decision and December 9, 2011 Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. [28] It
averred that there should be "(1) [a] CENRO or [Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office] Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records" attached to the application for title registration. It added that
Laureana and Iden failed to attach the second requirement. [29] It also argued that
they failed to prove that "they and their predecessors-in-interest ha[d] been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation [of the
property] under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier." [30]

On September 15, 2014, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision [31] dismissing

the Republic's appeal and affirming the Decision and Order of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court. It ruled that although Laureana and Iden failed to present a copy of the
DENR Secretary-approved original classification stating that the property was
alienable and disposable, "there [was] substantial compliance to the
requirement[s]."[32] It gave credence to the testimony of Hernandez, Special Land
Investigator I of DENR-CENRO, who stated that the property was not patented,
decreed, or titled.[33] Hernandez also identified his written report on the property,
which stated that:

(1) [T]he entire area is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under
Project No. 39, L.C. Map No. 3553 released and certified as such on September 10,
1997; (2) the land has never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-
payment of taxes; (3) it is not inside the forest zone or forest reserve or
unclassified public forest; (4) the land does not form part of a bed or navigable
river, streams, or creek. [34]

The Court of Appeals also gave weight to the testimony of Maglinao, Forester I of
DENR-CENRO, who said that she inspected the property before issuing a certificate
classifying the property as alienable and disposable "under Project No. 39, Land
Classification Map No. 3553 certified on 10 September 1997." [35]

Furthermore, the property's Survey Plan contained an annotation by DENR Regional

Technical Director Romeo P. Verzosa, stating that the property was within an
alienable and disposable area. The Court of Appeals held that the annotation could
be regarded as substantial compliance with the requirement that the property
should be alienable and disposable, especially since it coincided with Hernandez's
report and Maglinao's testimony.[36]
Finally, the Court of Appeals found that Laureana and Iden were able to prove their
predecessors-in-interest's possession of property since 1937 and their possession
since 1985 as evidenced by the tax declarations. [37]

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby

ordered DISMISSED, and the appealed Decision rendered on 5 May 2011 and
Order dated 9 December 2011 by the Fourth Judicial Region of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court in Talisay-Laurel, Batangas in Land Reg. Case No. 09-001 (LRA Record
No. N-79691) are AFFIRMED. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.[38] (Emphasis in the original)

On November 25, 2014, the Republic filed a Petition for Review [39] before this Court
against Laureana and Iden. Petitioner argues that the application for land
registration should have been dismissed by the trial court considering that it was
not accompanied by "a copy of the original classification approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary and certified
as true copy by its legal custodian."[40] It avers that a CENRO Certification is not
sufficient to prove the land's classification as alienable and disposable. [41] Moreover,
the rule on substantial compliance is applied pro hac vice in the cases of Republic v.
Vega and Republic v. Serrano, upon which the Court of Appeals heavily relied.[42]

Petitioner contends that respondents' acts of fencing and planting transpired only
after they purchased the property in 1985. Banawa also failed to mention in her
testimony that respondents' predecessors-in-interest occupied, developed,
maintained, or cultivated the property, which could have shown that the former
owners possessed the property by virtue of a bona fide ownership claim. Lastly, the
tax declarations presented by respondents only date back to 1948 as the earliest
year of possession.[43]

On April 21, 2015, respondents filed their Comment. [44] They counter that they were
able to prove substantial compliance when they presented Maglinao's Certification
and Hernandez's report. The Survey Plan also stated that the land was in an
alienable and disposable zone. They also point out that the Land Registration
Authority did not question the classification of the property, despite notice of the
application.[45]

Respondents maintain that their and their predecessors-in-interest's possession had

been "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious ... under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier,"[46] as supported by Banawa's testimony.
Although they admit that the earliest tax declaration was dated 1948, they seek the
application of this Court's ruling in Sps. Llanes v. Republic, where this Court held
that "tax declarations and receipts . . . coupled with actual possession ... constitute
evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through
prescription."[47]
On April 18, 2016, petitioner filed its Reply.[48] It asserts that land registration
applicants should strictly comply with the requirements in proving that the land is
alienable and disposable. It maintains that for failing to submit the required
document, respondents' application should have been denied. [49] Petitioner also
insists that Banawa's testimony and the tax declarations are not sufficient to prove
that respondents' and their predecessors-in-interest's possession and occupation of
the property were "open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious ... under a bona
fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier." [50]

This Court resolves the sole issue of whether or not the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in granting Laureana Malijan-Javier and Iden Malijan-Javier's
application for registration of property.

Land registration is governed by Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the

Property Registration Decree, which states:

Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds
by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land m any other manner provided for
by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application
jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an
application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should
the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration
proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the
latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land
held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
[51]
 (Emphasis supplied)
Applicants whose circumstances fall under Section 14(1) need to establish only the
following:

[F]irst, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain;  second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
[land]; and  third, that it is under a bona fide claim ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.[52]

To satisfy the first requirement of Section 14(1), petitioner argues that both a
CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
certification and a certified true copy of a DENR Secretaryapproved certificate
should be obtained to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. [53]

Petitioner's contention has merit.

It is well-settled that a CENRO or PENRO certification is not enough to establish that

a land is alienable and disposable.[54] It should be "accompanied by an official
publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable."[55] In Republic v. TA.N Properties:[56]

[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.[57] (Emphasis
supplied)

In Republic v. Lualhati:[58]

[I]t has been repeatedly ruled that certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists
of the DENR, as well as Survey Plans prepared by the DENR containing annotations
that the subject lots are alienable, do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to
overcome the presumption that the property sought to be registered belongs to the
inalienable public domain. Rather, this Court stressed the importance of proving
alienability by presenting a copy of the original classification of the land approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.[59] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

The certification issued by the DENR Secretary is necessary since he or she is the
official authorized to approve land classification, including the release of land from
public domain.[60] As thoroughly explained in Republic v. Spouses Go:[61]
[A]n applicant has the burden of proving that the public land has been classified as
alienable and disposable. To do this, the applicant must show a positive act from
the government declassifying the land from the public domain and converting it into
an alienable and disposable land. "[T]he exclusive prerogative to classify public
lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department." In Victoria v.
Republic:

To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but  the certification must show that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
the pub[l]ic domain as alienable and disposable[.]

Section X(1) of the DENR Administrative Order No. 1998-24 and Section IX(1) of
DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-11 affirm that the DENR Secretary is the
approving authority for "[l]and classification and release of lands of the public
domain as alienable and disposable." Section 4.6 of DENR Administrative Order No.
2007-20 defines land classification as follows:

Land classification is the process of demarcating, segregating, delimiting and

establishing the best category, kind, and uses of public lands. Article XII, Section 3
of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines provides that lands of the public domain
are to be classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks.

These provisions, read with Victoria v. Republic, establish the rule that before an
inalienable land of the public domain becomes private land, the DENR Secretary
must first approve the land classification into an agricultural land and release it as
alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary's official acts "may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy."

The CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer will then
conduct a survey to verify that the land for original registration falls within the
DENR Secretary-approved alienable and disposable zone.

The CENRO certification is issued only to verify the DENR Secretary issuance
through a survey[.][62] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In this case, although respondents were able to present a CENRO certification, a

DENR-CENRO report with the testimony of the DENR officer who made the report,
and the survey plan showing that the property is already considered alienable and
disposable, these pieces of evidence are still not sufficient to prove that the land
sought to be registered is alienable and disposable. Absent the DENR Secretary's
issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable, the land remains part of the
public domain.

Thus, even if respondents have shown, through their testimonial evidence, that
they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945, they
still cannot register the land for failing to establish that the land is alienable and
disposable.

All things considered, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the May 5, 2011 Decision and December 9, 2011 Order
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Talisay Laurel, Batangas, which granted the
land registration application of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals September 15, 2014
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 98466, which affirmed the May 5, 2011 Decision and
December 9, 2011 Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Laureana Malijan-Javier and Iden Malijan-Javier's application for
registration of Lot No. 1591, Cad. 729, Talisay Cadastre is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF FELICIANO YAMBAO, NAMELY: CHONA YAMBAO, JOEL YAMBAO,

WILLY YAMBAO, LENNIE YAMBAO AND RICHARD YAMBAO, AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF
HERMOGENES YAMBAO, NAMELY: ELEANOR YAMBAO, ALBERTO YAMBAO,
DOMINIC YAMBAO, ASESCLO YAMBAO, GERALD DANTIC AND MARIA PILAR
YAMBAO, WHO ARE ALL REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
MARIA PILAR YAMBAO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 194260 | 2016-04-13
 View Summary
RESOLUTION
 
REYES, J.:
 
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision[2] dated October 22, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 92755, which reversed and set aside the Decision dated December 23, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in SP. Civil Case No. RTC-88-I.
 
Facts

The subject of this case is a parcel of land located in Barangay Bangan, Botolan, Zambales,
which was originally possessed by Macaria De Ocampo  (Macaria). Macaria's nephew,
Hermogenes Yambao (Hermogenes), acted as the administrator of the property and paid realty
taxes therefor. Hermogenes has eight children, namely: Ulpiano, Dominic, Teofilo, Feliciano,
Asesclo, Delia, Amelia, and Melinda, all surnamed Yambao.[3]

After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were free to pick and harvest from the
fruit-bearing trees planted on the subject property. Eleanor Yambao (Eleanor), Ulpiano's
daughter, even constructed a house on the subject property. However, sometime in 2005, the
communal and mutual use of the subject property by the heirs of Hermogenes ceased when the
heirs of Feliciano, herein petitioners, prohibited them from entering the property. The heirs of
Feliciano even ejected Eleanor from the subject property.[4]

This prompted the heirs of Hermogenes, herein respondents, to file with the RTC a complaint for
partition, declaration of nullity of title/documents, and damages against the heirs of Feliciano.
The heirs of Hermogenes alleged that they and the heirs of Feliciano are co-owners of the subject
property, having inherited the right thereto from Hermogenes.[5]

The heirs of Feliciano denied the allegations of the heirs of Hermogenes and claimed that their
father, Feliciano, was in possession of the subject property in the concept of owner since time
immemorial. Accordingly, Feliciano was awarded a free patent thereon for which Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-10737 was issued. They also averred that the cause of action in
the complaint filed by the heirs of Hermogenes, which questioned the validity of OCT No. P-
10737, prescribed after the lapse of one year from its issuance on November 29, 1989.[6]
 
Ruling of the RTC

On December 23, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the heirs
of Hermogenes. The RTC opined that the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that the subject
property is owned by Macaria, stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria's name are
not conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if Macaria owned the
subject property, the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that Hermogenes had the right to
succeed over the estate of Macaria.
 
Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision[7] dated October 22, 2010, reversed and set aside the RTC's
Decision dated December 23, 2008. The CA found that the RTC, in hastily dismissing the
complaint for partition, failed to determine first whether the subject property is indeed co-owned
by the heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs of Feliciano. The CA pointed out that:
 
[A] review of the records of the case shows that in Feliciano's application for free patent, he
acknowledged that the source of his claim of possession over the subject property was
Hermogenes's possession of the real property in peaceful, open, continuous, and adverse manner
and more importantly, in the concept of an owner, since 1944. Feliciano's claim of sole
possession in his application for free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact of co-ownership
as claimed by the children of Hermogenes.[8] (Citation omitted and emphasis deleted)
 
Accordingly, the CA, considering that the parties are co-owners of the subject property, ruled
that the RTC should have conducted the appropriate proceedings for partition.[9]

Aggrieved, the heirs of Feliciano filed with the Court this petition for review alleging that the
CA erred in ruling that there is co-ownership between them and the heirs of Hermogenes. The
heirs of Feliciano likewise averred that the CA also erred in ordering the partition of the subject
property since it amounts to a collateral attack on the validity of OCT No. P-10737.[10]
 
Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied.

As pointed out by the CA, the RTC overlooked the fact that the subject property is co-owned by
the parties herein, having inherited the same from Hermogenes. Feliciano's free patent
application indicated that he merely tacked his possession of the subject property from
Hermogenes, his father, who held the property in peaceful, open, continuous, and adverse
manner in the concept of an owner since 1944. This is an implicit recognition of the fact that
Feliciano merely co-owns the subject property with the other heirs of Hermogenes. Indeed, the
heirs of Feliciano have not presented any evidence that would show that Hermogenes bequeathed
the subject property solely to Feliciano.

A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual
possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a
co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not
run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is
imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common
property.[11]

Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s. In order that a co-owners
possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following
requisites must concur:
 
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust or other co-owners;
 
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners; and
 
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.[12]

The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear repudiation of any trust.
[13]
 In such a case, an action to demand partition among co-owners prescribes in 10 years, the
point of reference being the date of the issuance of certificate of title over the property. But this
rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming
to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to demand partition does
not prescribe.[14]

Although OCT No. P-10737 was registered in the name of Feliciano on November 29, 1989, the
prescriptive period within which to demand partition of the subject property, contrary to the
claim of the heirs of Feliciano, did not begin to run. At that time, the heirs of Hermogenes were
still in possession of the property. It was only in 2005 that the heirs of Feliciano expressly
prohibited the heirs of Hermogenes from entering the property. Thus, as aptly ruled by the CA,
the right of the heirs of Hermogenes to demand the partition of the property had not yet
prescribed. Accordingly, the RTC committed a reversible error when it dismissed the complaint
for partition that was filed by the heirs of Hermogenes.

There is likewise no merit to the claim that the action for partition filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of OCT No. P-10737. The complaint
for partition filed by the heirs of Hermogenes seeks first, a declaration that they are a co-owners
of the subject property, and second, the conveyance of their lawful shares. The heirs of
Hermogenes do not attack the title of Feliciano; they alleged no fraud, mistake, or any other
irregularity that would justify a review of the registration decree in their favor. Their theory is
that although the subject property was registered solely in Feliciano's name, they are co-owners
of the property and as such is entitled to the conveyance of their shares. On the premise that they
are co-owners, they can validly seek the partition of the property in co-ownership and the
conveyance to them of their respective shares.[15]

Moreover, when Feliciano registered the subject property in his name, to the exclusion of the
other heirs of Hermogenes, an implied trust was created by force of law and he was considered a
trustee of the undivided shares of the other heirs of Hermogenes in the property. As trustees, the
heirs of Feliciano cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.[16] "A
trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration."[17]

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision dated October 22, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92755
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
JAIME ABALOS and SPOUSES FELIX SALAZAR and CONSUELO SALAZAR,
GLICERIO ABALOS, HEIRS OF AQUILINO ABALOS, namely: SEGUNDA
BAUTISTA, ROGELIO ABALOS, DOLORES A. ROSARIO, FELICIDAD ABALOS,
ROBERTO ABALOS, JUANITO ABALOS, TITA ABALOS, LITA A. DELA CRUZ AND
HEIRS OF AQUILINA ABALOS, namely: ARTURO BRAVO, PURITA B. MENDOZA,
LOURDES B. AGANON, CONSUELO B. SALAZAR, PRIMA B. DELOS SANTOS,
THELMA APOSTOL and GLECERIO ABALOS, Petitioners,vs.HEIRS OF VICENTE
TORIO, namely: PUBLIO TORIO, LIBORIO TORIO, VICTORINA TORIO, ANGEL
TORIO, LADISLAO TORIO, PRIMO TORIO and NORBERTO TORIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175444 | 2011-12-14
 View Summary
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
 
PERALTA, J:
 
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated
June 30, 2006 and Resolution2 dated November 13, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91887. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated June 14,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69, while the
questioned Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
 
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
 
On July 24, 1996, herein respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binmaley, Pangasinan against Jaime Abalos (Jaime)
and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar. Respondents contended that: they are the children
and heirs of one Vicente Torio (Vicente) who died intestate on September 11, 1973; at the time
of the death of Vicente, he left behind a parcel of land measuring 2,950 square meters, more or
less, which is located at San Isidro Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan; during the lifetime of Vicente
and through his tolerance, Jaime and the Spouses Salazar were allowed to stay and build their
respective houses on the subject parcel of land; even after the death of Vicente, herein
respondents allowed Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to remain on the disputed lot; however, in
1985, respondents asked Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to vacate the subject lot, but they refused
to heed the demand of respondents forcing respondents to file the complaint.4
 
Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with Counterclaim, denying the material
allegations in the Complaint and asserting in their Special and Affirmative Defenses that:
respondents' cause of action is barred by acquisitive prescription; the court a quo has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action and the persons of the defendants; the absolute and
exclusive owners and possessors of the disputed lot are the deceased predecessors of defendants;
defendants and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous and peaceful
possession of the subject lot as owners since time immemorial; defendants are faithfully and
religiously paying real property taxes on the disputed lot as evidenced by Real Property Tax
Receipts; they have continuously introduced improvements on the said land, such as houses,
trees and other kinds of ornamental plants which are in existence up to the time of the filing of
their Answer.5
 
On the same date as the filing of defendants' Answer with Counterclaim, herein petitioners filed
their Answer in Intervention with Counterclaim. Like the defendants, herein petitioners claimed
that their predecessors-in-interest were the absolute and exclusive owners of the land in question;
that petitioners and their predecessors had been in possession of the subject lot since time
immemorial up to the present; they have paid real property taxes and introduced improvements
thereon.6
 
After the issues were joined, trial ensued.
 
On December 10, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration[s], the Court adjudged the case in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants and defendants-intervenors are ordered to turn over
the land in question to the plaintiffs (Lot Nos. 869 and 870, Cad. 467-D. Binmaley Cadastre
located in Brgy. San Isidro Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan with an area of 2,950 sq. m., more or
less, bounded and described in paragraph 3 of the Complaint[)]; ordering the defendants and
defendants-intervenors to remove their respective houses standing on the land in dispute; further
ordering the defendants and defendants-intervenors, either singly or jointly to pay the plaintiffs
land rent in the amount of P12,000.00 per year to be reckoned starting the year 1996 until
defendants and defendants-intervenors will finally vacate the premises; furthermore, defendants
and defendants-intervenors are also ordered to pay, either singly or jointly, the amount
of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees and costs of suit.
 
SO ORDERED.7
 
Jaime and the Spouses Salazar appealed the Decision of the MTC with the RTC of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.8 Herein petitioners, who were intervenors, did not file an appeal.
 
In its Decision dated June 14, 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of Jaime and the Spouses Salazar,
holding that they have acquired the subject property through prescription. Accordingly, the RTC
dismissed herein respondents' complaint.
 
Aggrieved, herein respondents filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the Decision of
the RTC.
 
On June 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its questioned Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads, thus:
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 14, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its
stead, a new one is entered reinstating the Decision dated December 10, 2003 of the Municipal
Trial Court of Binmaley, Pangasinan.
 
SO ORDERED.9
 
Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the CA in its Resolution dated November 13, 2006.
 
Hence, the instant petition based on a sole assignment of error, to wit:
 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN ARE NOW THE ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE OWNERS OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.10
 
The main issue raised by petitioners is whether they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed
the disputed lot in the concept of an owner, or whether their possession is by mere tolerance of
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Corollarily, petitioners claim that the due
execution and authenticity of the deed of sale upon which respondents' predecessors-in-interest
derived their ownership were not proven during trial.
 
The petition lacks merit.
 
Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the observation of respondents that some of the petitioners
in the instant petition were the intervenors11 when the case was filed with the MTC. Records
would show that they did not appeal the Decision of the MTC.12 The settled rule is that failure to
perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and executory.13 Hence, insofar as the intervenors in
the MTC are concerned, the judgment of the MTC had already become final and executory.
 
It also bears to point out that the main issue raised in the instant petition, which is the character
or nature of petitioners' possession of the subject parcel of land, is factual in nature.
 
Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.14 Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions for
review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."
 
Doubtless, the issue of whether petitioners possess the subject property as owners, or whether
they occupy the same by mere tolerance of respondents, is a question of fact. Thus, it is not
reviewable.
 
Nonetheless, the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the abovementioned restriction.
Among the recognized exceptions are the following:
 
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.15
 
In the present case, the findings of fact of the MTC and the CA are in conflict with those of the
RTC.
 
After a review of the records, however, the Court finds that the petition must fail as it finds no
error in the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA and the MTC.
 
Petitioners claim that they have acquired ownership over the disputed lot through ordinary
acquisitive prescription.
 
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.16 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just
title for ten (10) years.17 Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty (30) years.18
 
Possession "in good faith" consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing
is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.19 There is "just title"
when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right.20
 
In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners
acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This
is clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it
contains a statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents'
immediate predecessor-in-interest.21 Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus,
having knowledge that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed
lot, petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to
acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA
that petitioners' possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere
tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.22 Possession, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueño, or, to use the
common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory
acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.23
 
Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the character of petitioners' possession of the
subject property had become adverse, as evidenced by their declaration of the same for tax
purposes under the names of their predecessors-in-interest, their possession still falls short of the
required period of thirty (30) years in cases of extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records
show that the earliest Tax Declaration in the name of petitioners was in 1974. Reckoned from
such date, the thirty-year period was completed in 2004. However, herein respondents' complaint
was filed in 1996, effectively interrupting petitioners' possession upon service of summons on
them.24 Thus, petitioners' possession also did not ripen into ownership, because they failed to
meet the required statutory period of extraordinary prescription.
 
This Court has held that the evidence relative to the possession upon which the alleged
prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish the
prescription.25 In the present case, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in holding that
petitioners failed to present competent evidence to prove their alleged good faith in neither
possessing the subject lot nor their adverse claim thereon. Instead, the records would show that
petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest.
 
Finally, as to the issue of whether the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale upon
which respondents anchor their ownership were not proven, the Court notes that petitioners did
not raise this matter in their Answer as well as in their Pre-Trial Brief. It was only in their
Comment to respondents' Petition for Review filed with the CA that they raised this issue.
Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to
the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing
court.26 They cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To allow this would be offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.27
 
 
Even granting that the issue of due execution and authenticity was properly raised, the Court
finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA, to wit:
 
xxxx
 
Based on the foregoing, respondents [Jaime Abalos and the Spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar]
have not inherited the disputed land because the same was shown to have already been validly
sold to Marcos Torio, who, thereupon, assigned the same to his son Vicente, the father of
petitioners [herein respondents]. A valid sale was amply established and the said validity subsists
because the deed evidencing the same was duly notarized.
 
There is no doubt that the deed of sale was duly acknowledged before a notary public. As a
notarized document, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.28
 
Indeed, settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that a notarized document has in its favor the
presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the document should be upheld.29 In
the instant case, petitioners' bare denials will not suffice to overcome the presumption of
regularity of the assailed deed of sale.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91887 are AFFIRMED.
 
 
SO ORDERED.
 
ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, NAMELY:
ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE,
ALL SURNAMED SUPAPO, AND SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN,
PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO
BERNARDO, AND THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 198356 | 2015-04-20
SECOND DIVISION
 
DECISION

BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioners Esperanza Supapo and
Romeo Supapo[2] (Spouses Supapo) to assail the February 25, 2011 decision[3] and August 25,
2011 resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.

Factual Antecedents
 
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint[5] for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de
Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them
(collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
 
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches,
Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-28441[6] registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names.
The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as
shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the
City Assessor of Caloocan.[7]
 
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but
they made sure to visit at least twice a year.[8] During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2)
houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built without their knowledge and permission.
They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the
other one.[9]
 
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot
by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a
Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to
settle amicably.[10]
 
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case[11] against the respondents for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.[12] The trial court convicted the
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROBERTO DE JESUS,
SUSAN DE JESUS and MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused is hereby ordered to pay a fine of
ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises.
 
SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)
 
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.[14] While the appeal was pending, Congress
enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential
Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.[15]
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final.[16]
 
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents'
civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of
the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration.
 
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders
denying the quashal of the writ and the respondent's motion for reconsideration.[17] The CA
granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents'
criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.[18] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction
is GRANTED. The orders dated June 5, 2003 and July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-45610 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Said court is hereby permanently ENJOINED from further executing or implementing its
decision dated March 18, 1996.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that
people now have unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not
intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate landowners.[19] In cases of violation of
their property rights, the CA noted that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action
for recovery of possession.
 
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.[20]
 
After filing their Answer,[21] the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing[22] and argued that: (1) there is another action pending between the same
parties; (2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the
Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment.

The MeTC Ruling[23]

 
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. It ruled that
the arguments advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be
utilized in the course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration.
 
From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC.[24]

The RTC Ruling[25]

 
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed;
and (ii) accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
 
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand
to vacate was made. Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before
the RTC.
 
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are hereby declared NULL and
VOID.
The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 08-29245 for lack of
jurisdiction.
 
SO ORDERED.[26]
 
In their motion for reconsideration,[27] the Spouses Supapo emphasized that the court's
jurisdiction over an action involving title to or possession of land is determined by its assessed
value; that the RTC does not have an exclusive jurisdiction on all complaints for accion
publiciana; and that the assessed value of the subject lot falls within MeTC's jurisdiction.
 
The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
 
It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the subject lot, the
Spouses Supapos' cause of action had already prescribed, the action having been filed beyond the
ten (l0)-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code.[28] As it was not proven
when the actual demand to vacate was made, the RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which
the ejectment suit should have been filed is counted from the time the certificate to file action
was issued. The certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992, while the complaint
for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or more than ten (10) years thereafter.
 
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA.[29]

The CA Ruling[30]
 
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been
lodged before the RTC and that the period to file the action had prescribed.
 
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2009 and Order dated
October 19, 2009 are AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
The Spouses Supapo moved[31] but failed[32] to secure a reconsideration of the CA decision;
hence, they came to us through the present petition.
The Petition
 
In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue that:

(1)    the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is
located in Metro Manila; and that

(2)    prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is imprescriptible under the
Torrens system.
 
The Respondents' Case[33]
 
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court;
(2) barred by prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.

Issues
 
The issues for resolution are:

I.    Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;

II.    Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and 

III.    Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
 
Our Ruling
 
The petition is meritorious.
 
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has not
prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.
 
Accion Publiciana and
the Jurisdiction of the 
MeTC
 
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from
the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.[34]
 
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the
subject lot but they based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership.
 
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property.[35]
 
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose
of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the
issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to
an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is
not conclusive on the issue of ownership.[36]
 
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the subject property,
we will only do so to determine if they or the respondents should have the right of possession.
 
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we now
resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
 
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,[37] the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to
or possession of real property is plenary.[38]
 
RA No. 7691,[39] however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the property does
not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the
property is located in Metro Manila.
 
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
 
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
Section 3 of the same law provides:

Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
 
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
 
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real
property is now determined by its assessed value.[40] The assessed value of real property is its fair
market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.[41]
 
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,[42] we explained:

[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value
of the property involved?
 
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA — that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana
lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property — no longer holds true.
As tilings now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value
of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
[43]
 (Emphasis supplied.)
 
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the
complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This
is required because the nature of the action and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed
for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.[44]
 
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located
in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration[45] issued by the Office of
the City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of
this tax declaration.
 
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that
the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
 
The cause of action 
has not prescribed
 
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for being filed out
of time.
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A possessor may lose his
possession:

xxxx
 
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession
has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse
of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on
March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on
November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover
possession of the subject property, the complaint having been filed beyond the period provided
by law.
 
Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the subject
property, and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the
latter have lost their right to recover possession because of laches.
 
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion publiciana more
than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that
their cause of action is imprescriptible since the subject property is registered and titled under the
Torrens system.
 
We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
 
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The
Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979.[46] Interestingly, the respondents
do not challenge the existence, authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.[47]
 
In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have allegedly been in
actual, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of an
owner since 1992. The respondents contend that they built their houses on the subject lot in good
faith. Having possessed the subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no
longer be disturbed in their possession.[48]
 
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents' contentions have no legal
basis.
 
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive
prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126[49] of
the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529[50]].
[51]
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens
system. The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529
which states:

Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation
of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
 
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also
entitled to the possession thereof.[52] The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a
logical consequence of ownership.[53] Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the
Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is
imprescriptible.[54]
In Bishop v. CA,[55] we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were
aware of the other persons' occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.[56]
 
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer of the
property, we still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce,
in addition to the deed of sale, a duly-registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or
sale.
 
A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado[57] in which we gave greater probative weight to the
plaintiffs TCT vis-à-vis the contested unregistered deed of sale of the defendants. Unlike the
defendants in Umpoc, however, the respondents did not adduce a single evidence to refute the
Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more reason therefore that we uphold the indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's title.
 
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo's TCT, this Court
merely recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate
transactions and integrity of land registration.
 
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance
that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his
acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but
will also erode public confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be attended by
complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent.[58]
 
With respect to the respondents' defense[59] of laches, suffice it to say that the same is evidentiary
in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[60] In other words, the
party alleging laches must adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not
being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so since the lower courts did not pass
upon the same.
 
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses
Supapo's petition.[61]On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show the clear intent
of the Spouses Supapo to exercise their right over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.:
(1) they brought the dispute to the appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint
for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the action publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the
allegation of laches.
 
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right to recover possession
of the subject lot is not barred by prescription.
 
The action is not barred
by prior judgment
 
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. They contend that
the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of the action publiciana.
 
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to
challenge the RTC's issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to vacate the subject
property) arising from their conviction under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA granted the
petition and permanently enjoined the execution of the respondents' conviction because their
criminal liability had been extinguished by the repeal of the law under which they were tried and
convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising from the crime had also been erased.
 
The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.
 
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section
47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section
47(c).[62]
 
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the
merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.[63]
 
The requisites[64] for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:

(1) The former judgment or order must be final;

 
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
 
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and
 
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter,
and cause of action.
 
Res judicata is not present in this case.
 
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject
matter, parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-
Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject property.
 
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses
Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on
the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses Supapo.
 
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a
crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover
possession of the subject property.
 
And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the
criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated
the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests
over the subject property and recover its possession.
 
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata has
still no basis.
 
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of
action provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.[65]
 
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.[66]
 
As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the
Anti-Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone,
"collusiveness of judgment" does not apply.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of
judgment" still does not apply because there is no identity of issues. The issue in the criminal
case is whether the respondents (accused therein) committed the crime alleged in the
information, while the only issue in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a
better right than the respondents to possess and occupy the subject property.
 
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless. 
 
Final Note
 
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining
who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and
binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even
third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and consequently REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
 
SO ORDERED.
FILADELFA T. LAUSA, LORETA T. TORRES, PRIMITIVO TUGOT AND
ANACLETO T. CADUHAY, PETITIONERS, VS. MAURICIA QUILATON, RODRIGO
Q. TUGOT, PURIFICACION T. CODILLA, TEOFRA T. SADAYA, ESTRELLITA T.
GALEOS AND ROSITA T. LOPEZ, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 170671 | 2015-08-19
DECISION
 
BRION, J.:
 
Before us is a Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 63248. The CA reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. CEB - 17857, and upheld the validity of Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. 571.
Factual Antecedents

The main issue in the present case involves the title to Lot No. 557, a parcel of land situated in
V. Ranudo and D. Jakosalem Streets, Cogon Central, Cebu City.

The petitioners and the respondents are relatives residing in Lot No. 557.

Petitioners Filadelfa T. Lausa, Loreta T. Torres, Primitivo Tugot, and Anacleto T. Caduhay are
the cousins of respondents Rodrigo Tugot, Purificacion Codilla, Teofra Sadaya, and Estrellita
Galeos; while Mauricia Quilaton is the respondents' mother and the petitioners' aunt-in-law.

The respondent Rosita T. Lopez, on the other hand, acquired the rights of Rodrigo when he
mortgaged Lot No. 557-A, a portion of Lot No. 557, to her. Rodrigo subsequently defaulted on
his loan.

The petitioners and respondents, with the exception of Mauricia and Rosita, are all grandchildren
of Alejandro Tugot. Alejandro had possessed Lot No. 557 since September 13, 1915, after it was
assigned to him by Martin Antonio.

Lot No. 557 formed part of the Banilad Friar Estate Lands, which had been bought by the
government through Act No. 1120 for distribution to its occupants. Antonio had initially been
Lot No. 557's beneficiary, but subsequently assigned his rights over Lot No. 557 to Alejandro.

Since then, Alejandro possessed Lot No. 557 until his death; thereafter, his children and
grandchildren continued to reside in the lot. The present controversy arose when the respondents,
claiming to be its registered owners, attempted to eject the petitioners from Lot No. 557.

On January 1993, Mauricia filed before the RTC of Cebu City Branch 17 a petition for the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 571, which purportedly covers Lot No. 557.
Mauricia claimed to own TCT No. 571, but lost her owner's duplicate during a strong typhoon
sometime in 1946. The RTC, after due hearing, granted Quilaton's petition and directed the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 571.

On September 27, 1994, Mauricia donated Lot No. 557 to her children Rodrigo, Purificacion,
Teofra and Estrellita. Thus, TCT No. 571 was cancelled, and re-issued as TCT Nos. 130517,
130518, 130519, 130520 and 130521 in the names of Mauricia's children.[1]

Mauricia's children subsequently performed several acts of ownership over Lot 571:
 
first, Rodrigo, on March 23, 1995, mortgaged TCT No. 130517 to Lopez as security for a loan he
obtained from the latter. Rodrigo subsequently defaulted on his loan, prompting the foreclosure
of TCT No. 130517. The land covered by TCT No. 130517 was thereafter sold by public auction
to Lopez, for which she was issued TCT No. 143511 on March 31, 1997.

Second, Mauricia's children filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners, docketed as
Civil Case No. R-35137, on August 4, 1995.
In response, the petitioners filed Civil Case No. CEB-17857 for the annulment of TCT No. 571
and the subsequent titles that originate from TCT No. 571, as well as criminal complaints[2] for
falsification and perjury against the respondents.
 
The Regional Trial Court's ruling

The RTC found TCT No. 571 to be a forgery, and declared it and all titles originating from it to
be null and void ab initio. The RTC gave the following reasons as basis for this conclusion:
 
First, the RTC noted several discrepancies in TCT No. 571 indicating that it is a forgery, viz.:
 
The TCTs issued before and after TCT No. 571, that is, TCT No. 570 and TCT No. 572, both use a different
(i) TCT Nos. 570 and 572 use Judicial Form No. 109, which was issued in June 1945, while TCT No. 571 uses J
in April 1936.
   
TCT Nos. 570 and 572 was signed by Martina L. Arnoco as Register of Deeds, while TCT No. 571 was signe
(ii)
Deeds.
   
(iii
There are distinct differences in Lavilles' signature as it appears in TCT No. 571 from his signatures in other
)

Second, Mauricia's previous acts show that she acknowledged Alejandro's ownership over Lot
No. 557. Prior to instituting a petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate in 1993, Mauricia
had been paying Alejandro (and subsequently Aurea) contributions for the real estate taxes due
on Lot No. 557.

Third, Mauricia exercised acts of full ownership over Lot No. 557 only in 1994, after she had
filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate, even as she claimed to have owned
the lot since 1946.

Fourth, Mauricia failed to present evidence showing how she acquired title to Lot No. 557. If
indeed the land was purchased from Martin Antonio, she could have secured a copy of its
document of sale from the Archives Office, Manila.
 
Additionally, the RTC held that the petitioners had better title to Lot No. 557 than the
respondents. The RTC found that Lot No. 557 had been in the possession of Alejandro since
September 13, 1915, when the lot's owner, Martin Antonio, executed a Deed of Assignment in
favor of Alejandro. This conveyance, together with Alejandro and his heirs' continuous payment
of Lot No. 557's real estate taxes since 1928, amounts to more than thirty years of adverse
possession, so that ownership over the lot vested in him.

As Alejandro's heirs, both the petitioners and respondents are entitled to a share in Lot No. 557.
 
Lastly, the RTC declared Lopez's TCT No. 143511, which she acquired when she purchased
TCT No. 130517, to be null and void. TCT No. 130517 covers Lot No. 557-A, and had been
annotated with a Notice of Lis Pendens at the time Lopez purchased it. Thus, Lopez had
knowledge of the dispute over the ownership of the lot she bought, and could not claim the
defense of a purchaser in good faith. She acquired no greater title to the lot than Rodrigo, who
mortgaged TCT No. 130517.
 
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration contesting the RTC's decision. After the RTC
denial of the motion, the respondents appealed to the CA.
 
The Court of Appeals' ruling

The CA reversed the RTC's decision, and upheld the validity of TCT No. 571 and all the titles
originating from it.

In upholding the validity of TCT No. 571 (and all the titles originating from it), the CA
emphasized the existence of a copy of TCT No. 571 in the custody of the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Cebu City, and noted that it is presumed by law to have been issued in a regular
manner. The application of this presumption is called for by the purpose of the Torrens system,
which is to promote the stability and integrity of land titles.

According to the CA, the petitioners have failed to disprove this presumption of regularity. The
pieces of evidence that the petitioners presented (i.e., the tax receipts and Antonio's Deed of
Assignment of Lot No. 557 to Alejandro) do not prove with clear, positive, and convincing
evidence that TCT No. 571 had been fraudulently issued. The payment of real estate taxes over
Lot No. 557 does not prove ownership. The Deed of Assignment, on the other hand, had been
subsequently cancelled, as shown by the Friar Lands Sale Certificate Register on file with the
DENR. It proves that the lot had been earlier assigned to Alejandro, but because the assignment
was canceled, the ownership of Lot No. 557 remained with Antonio.

The CA also noted that the lot that Alejandro appears to have owned was not Lot No. 557 but
Lot No. 357. The description of Lot No. 557 - as set forth by the petitioners in their original
complaint - substantially varies from the actual and precise technical description of Lot No. 557.
Additionally, some of the documentary evidence in the case (such as tax declarations, tax
receipts and notices of tax delinquency) show that what Alejandro owned was Lot No. 357, not
Lot No. 557.

The CA also pointed out that Alejandro could not have acquired Lot 557 through acquisitive
prescription for two reasons:
 
first, Mauricia had been in possession of the property since 1946; and
 
second, a lot registered under the Torrens system cannot be acquired through acquisitive
prescription. Records show that the lands comprising the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, of which
Lot No. 557 was a part, had been brought under the operation of the Torrens system on
September 23, 1913.
 
The CA found Lopez to be an innocent purchaser for value. Applying the Court's ruling in Bank
of the Philippine Islands v. Noblejas, the CA held that Lopez's good faith as a mortgagee extends
to her eventual purchase of the lot during its foreclosure. Since TCT No. 130517 had no notice of
any adverse claim at the time it was mortgaged to Lopez, then the subsequent annotation of
Notice of Lis Pendens prior to TCT No. 130517's foreclosure should not affect her status as a
mortgagee-in-good-faith. The clean title presented to Lopez at the time TCT No. 130517 was
mortgaged to her maintains this status at the time of its foreclosure, and cannot be prejudiced by
the subsequent annotation of a claim to it before the lot is foreclosed.

Lastly, the CA found that the RTC erred when it did not immediately dismiss the petitioners'
complaint, as their cause of action had been barred by prescription and laches. An action for the
annulment of title to land prescribes in ten years. The petitioners filed their complaint only on
September 20, 1995, almost fifty years after Mauricia had been issued TCT No. 571 on July 16,
1946. Thus, the petitioners had slept on their claimed right over Lot 557; consequently, they are
now barred by laches from seeking redress before the courts.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the CA's decision, which motion the
CA denied. The denial opened the way for the present petition for review on certiorari before
this Court.

The present petition

In their present petition, the petitioners seek the reversal of the CA's decision through their
assertion that they have acquired ownership over Lot No. 557 by acquisitive prescription.

The petitioners claim that the CA committed the following errors:

 
First, the CA erred in upholding the validity of TCT No. 571, which is a fake and fabricated title.

Second, the CA erred in finding that Mauricia owned and possessed Lot No. 557, as it was
Alejandro who exercised acts of exclusive ownership and possession over the lot since it was
assigned to him in 1915. The lot Antonio assigned to Alejandro covered Lot No. 557, although
earlier tax declarations indicated the areas of the lot to be Lot No. 357. This error was corrected
in subsequent tax declarations by the City of Cebu Assessor's Office in 1997.

Third, the CA erred in holding that Lopez is an innocent purchaser in good faith, as she knew
that the portion of Lot No. 557 being mortgaged to her was in the possession of Filadelfa, and
not Rodrigo. She knew of this possession before she executed the real estate mortgage contract
over the property with Rodrigo.

Fourth, the CA erred in finding the petitioners' cause of action barred by prescription and laches,
as they discovered the existence of TCT No. 571 only in August 1995, when Mauricia and her
children instituted ejectment proceedings against them.
 
In response, the respondents argue that the petitioners have no cause of action against them
because Alejandro's tax declarations cover Lot No. 357, and not Lot No. 557, which is covered
by their TCTs. They also cited the CA's decision, and argued that the CA committed no error of
law in upholding the validity of their TCTs.

Lopez, on the other hand, asserted that her status as an innocent purchaser or mortgagor in good
faith had not been included in the petitioners' amended complaint including her as an
indispensible party, and should thus not have been considered as an issue in the case. In any case,
Lopez asserts that her title to Lot No. 557-A is valid because she is an innocent purchaser in
good faith.
 
Issues:

The issues, having been properly joined, present to us the following questions:
 
(1) Whether the CA erred in finding that the lot that the petitioners claim to own covers Lot No. 357, and not Lot
   
(2) Whether the CA erred in finding that the respondents, and not the petitioners, are the owners and possessors o
   
(3) Whether the CA erred in finding Lopez an innocent purchaser in good faith; and
   
(4) Whether the CA erred in finding the petitioners' cause of action to have been barred by prescription and lache
 
The Court's Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

We note at the outset that the Court is not a trier of facts, and our jurisdiction in cases brought
before us from the appellate court is limited to the review of errors of law.

We have, however, recognized several exceptional situations that call for a re-evaluation of the
CA's factual conclusions, among them, the situation when the CA's findings are contrary to that
of the trial court, and when the CA manifestly overlooks relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would lead to a different conclusion.[3]

We find these circumstances in the present case, prompting us to re-examine the records of the
case and to reverse the CA's decision after due consideration of the records.

The CA erred in finding that the lot that the petitioners claim to own is Lot No. 357, and not
Lot No. 557

The CA, in upholding the validity of Mauricia's title and ownership over Lot No. 557, pointed
out that the lot that Alejandro claimed to own was not Lot No. 557, but Lot No. 357.

The CA based this conclusion on several tax documents in the name of Alejandro Tugot, which
indicate that the lot covered is Lot No. 357, and not Lot No. 557.

In so doing, the CA overlooked several key pieces of evidence presented before the RTC, which
had led the latter to conclude that the designation of Lot No. 357 in Alejandro's tax declarations
actually pertained to Lot No. 557. These pieces of evidence are as follows:
 
First, the testimony of Mr. Antonio Abellana of the City of Cebu Assessor's Office established
that he issued a Certification of Correction to change Alejandro's tax declarations, which initially
covered Lot No. 357, to Lot No. 557.
 
According to Abellana, Lot No. 357 is located in a barangay different from the address found in
Alejandro's tax declaration. The base map of Cebu locates Lot No. 357 to be in Barangay Day-
as, almost five meters from Sikatuna Street, while the address in Alejandro's erroneous tax
declaration indicates that Lot No. 357 is located in Jakosalem Street.
 
Second, records of the Cebu City Assessor's Office show that Lot No. 357 is covered by another
tax declaration with an address corresponding to the city's base map. In this tax declaration, Lot
No. 357 is owned by a certain Antonio Yap.

Third, the deed of donation[4] of Lot No. 558, which adjoins Lot Nos. 557 and 559, recognized
Alejandro Tugot as the owner of Lot No. 557.
 
We find that these pieces of evidence sufficiently explain that the lot in Alejandro and Aurea's
tax declarations actually covered Lot No. 557, and its initial designation as Lot No. 357 was an
error. The Assessor's Office of Cebu City, which had the responsibility of classifying, appraising,
and assessing real property in Cebu, had acknowledged this designation to be erroneous, and
subsequently made rectification. This acknowledgment is not only entitled to the presumption of
regularity; it is also corroborated by the Deed of Donation of an adjoining lot.

Additionally, we also found other pieces of evidence supporting the conclusion of the Cebu City
Assessor's Office. The tax declarations in Alejandro and (subsequently) Aurea's names indicate
that they covered the same address as the Lot No. 557 described in the Deed of Assignment that
Antonio executed in Alejandro's favor in 1915. The identity of the addresses in these two
documents show that what the petitioners intended to pay real property tax for, was the lot
covered in the Deed of Assignment, which was Lot No. 557. Thus, the tax declarations that
placed Lot No. 357 under Alejandro's name actually pertained to the lot covered by Lot No. 557;
its designation as covered by Lot No. 357 was an error that the Cebu City Assessor's Office
eventually discovered and corrected.

In the same vein, the court-approved subdivision plan for Lot No. 557 indicated it to be found
along Jakosalem Street, the address of the lot covered by Alejandro and Aurea's tax declarations.
The plan was commissioned for Alejandro and his children, including Romualdo (Mauricia's
husband and the father of her children), in 1960. That the address of Lot No. 557 in the
subdivision plan is identical to the address in Alejandro and Aurea's tax declarations establishes
that what they actually claim to own is Lot No. 557, and not Lot No. 357.

With this foundation established, we now resolve the issue of who among them have the better
right over Lot No. 557.
The CA erred in finding that the petitioners failed to prove that TCT No. 571 is a fabricated
title

In upholding the validity of Mauricia's TCT No. 571, the CA held that the petitioners failed to
overcome the presumption of regularity that attended its issuance. The CA emphasized that a
copy of TCT No. 571 is currently with the Register of Deeds, and that the documents that the
petitioners presented do not prove their ownership over the lot.

The CA's conclusion, however, overlooked the evidence that the petitioners presented before the
RTC to prove that TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title. These pieces of evidence include the TCTs
issued immediately before and after TCT No. 571; TCT No. 16534 (the TCT from which TCT
No. 571 allegedly originated); and several TCTs that contain the signature of the Acting Register
of Deeds who signed TCT No. 571. Taken together, all these pieces of evidence sufficiently
prove, by preponderance of evidence, that TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title.

We cite with approval the RTC's factual observations and conclusions, viz:

 
First, the text of TCT No. 571 contains glaring discrepancies with TCT No. 16534, the title
indicated in TCT No. 571 as its precursor.

TCT No. 16534 covered a different area from TCT No. 571. TCT No. 16534 covered Lot 7005-
E-2, which has an area of 3,311 square meters, while TCT No. 571 covers Lot No. 557 with an
area of 525 square meters. Too, TCT No. 16534 was issued in September 1957, or almost ten
years after the title it supposedly gave rise to was issued in 1946.

Second, TCT No. 571 contains discrepancies when compared with TCT Nos. 570 and 572, the
TCTs that were supposedly issued before and after TCT No. 571. These discrepancies are as
follows:
 
TCT Nos. 570 and 572 had both been issued on February 26, 1947, almost a year after TCT No. 571 was issu
(i)
an intervening title between TCT No. 570 and 572, then it should have also been issued on February 26, 1947
   
TCT No. 571 used an old form, Judicial Form No. 140-D, which was revised in June 1945 by Judicial Form N
(ii) was issued in 1946, then it should have used Judicial Form No. 109. Notably, both TCT Nos. 570 and 572 us
they were issued in 1947.
   
(iv TCT Nos. 570 and 572 were signed by Martina L. Arnoco as Register of Deeds, while TCT No. 571 was sign
) of Deeds.
   
There are distinct differences in Lavilles' signature as it appears in TCT No. 571, compared with his signature
(v)
526.

Additionally, we note that Mauricia's claim that she bought Lot No. 557 from Antonio is
contradicted by the contents of TCT No. 16534.

For a new TCT to be issued, the owner's duplicate of the seller should have been surrendered to
the Registry of Deeds, along with a copy of the TCT's Deed of Sale. Thus, the seller's TCT
would be cancelled, and the new TCT of the buyer would indicate the seller's TCT as its TCT of
origin.

The text of TCT No. 571 shows that it originated from TCT No. 16534. If indeed TCT No. 571
was issued to Mauricia because the latter bought Lot No. 557 from Antonio, then TCT No.
16534 should have reflected this transaction.

However, instead of reflecting Antonio's title to Lot No. 557, TCT No. 16534 shows that it
pertained to a different lot, and had been issued ten years after the issuance of TCT No. 571 to
a certain Crispina Lopez.

The original certificate of title from which TCT No. 571 and TCT No. 16534 originated are also
different:
 
TCT No. 571 originated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 251-253, while TCT No.
16534 originated fromOCTNo. 11375.

These discrepancies, taken together with its variations from the other titles issued around the
same time and Mauricia's failure to present proof of how she acquired the lot from Antonio,
reasonably establish that TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title.

We now proceed to determine whether Alejandro was Lot No. 557's rightful owner.

The CA erred in relying on a fabricated title as basis to deny Alejandro's claim to acquisitive
prescription

The CA, in reversing the RTC's decision recognizing Alejandro's ownership over Lot No. 571,
held that Lot No. 557 could no longer be acquired through prescription because it had already
been brought under the Torrens system, in Registry Book No. A-3.

Registry Book No. A-3 refers to the registry book where OCT No. 251-253 is registered, as
indicated in TCT No. 571. Thus, the CA concluded that Lot No. 557 has been brought under the
Torrens system because TCT No. 571 is already covered by the system. But as TCT No. 571 is a
fabricated title, the CA erred in relying on its contents to conclude that Lot No. 557 has already
been brought under the Torrens system.

Alejandro Tugot did not acquire Lot No. 557 through acquisitive prescription

We agree with the CA's conclusion that Lot No. 557 cannot be acquired through prescription, but
for a different reason.

In the present case, the Deed of Assignment between Antonio and Alejandro was cancelled three
months after it was executed. The Deed, executed on September 13, 1915, was inscribed with the
phrase: "Cancelled December 21, 1915. See letter # 12332."
Both the trial court and the CA found this inscription to be sufficient proof that the Deed of
Assignment had been cancelled three months after its execution. As a consequence, the Deed of
Assignment could not have vested Antonio's rights over Lot No. 557 to Alejandro.

Thus, Lot No. 557 reverted to its original status after the Deed of Assignment was cancelled. It
remained subject to the conditional sale[5] between the government and Antonio; under the
Certificate of Sale between the Bureau of Lands and Antonio, the government should transfer
title to Lot No. 557 to Antonio upon full payment of the lot's purchase price.

The nature of the contract of sale between Antonio and the government is in line with Section 15
of Act No. 1120, which provides for the administration, temporary lease, and sale of friar lands
that the government bought through sections 63 to 65 of "An Act temporarily to provide for the
administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other
purposes." These friar lands included the Banilad Estate Friar Lands, from where Lot No. 557
originated.

Section 15 of Act No. 1120 that applied to Lot No. 557 provides:

Sec. 15. The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold under
the provisions of this Act until the full payment of all installments or purchase money and
interest by the purchaser has been made, and any sale or encumbrance made by him shall be
invalid as against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be in all respects
subordinate to its prior claim.
 
xxxx
 
According to jurisprudence, Section 15 of Act No. 1120 reserves to the government the naked
title to the friar lands, until its beneficiaries have fully paid their purchase price. Since the intent
of Act No. 1120 was to transfer ownership of the friar lands to its actual occupants, the equitable
and beneficial title to the land passes to them the moment the first installment is paid and a
certificate of sale is issued. This right is subject to the resolutory condition that the sale may be
rescinded if the agreed price shall not be paid in full.

When the Certificate of Sale was executed, Antonio obligated himself to pay P9.00 as the final
installment to purchase Lot No. 557. His previous lease payments to the lot were applied as
initial installments for the payment of the lot's purchase price of PI5.16. Upon full payment of
the installment and its annual 4% interest, the government was bound to transfer full ownership
of Lot No. 557 to Antonio under Section 122 of Act No. 496.

While the records of the case do not show any documents or paper trail showing the actions of
the parties to the Certificate of Sale after the Deed of Assignment was cancelled, we can, with
certainty, rule out the possibility that Alejandro acquired title to it through prescription.

Three scenarios could have happened after the Deed of Assignment was cancelled - all of which
forego the possibility of acquisitive prescription.
 
First, Antonio could have completed payment of the purchase price of Lot No. 557. Upon full
payment, the lot would have then been registered in Antonio's name.
 
The Certificate of Sale between Antonio and the government requires registration under Section
122 of Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1902, for the ownership over Lot No. 557 to
be transferred to Antonio. Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:
 
Section 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the
United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed
to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing
the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such
instrument, before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the
province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances,
whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner's
duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from
the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to
the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the lands, and in all cases under this Act registration shall
be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. The fees for
registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issue of the certificate and
owner's duplicate such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act.
 
Thus, the government could have registered the title to Lot No. 557 in Antonio's name only after
he had paid the purchase price in full. Had Antonio eventually completed the payment of Lot No.
557's purchase price, it would have been registered under the Torrens system, through Section
122 of Act No. 496.

Land registered under the Torrens system cannot be acquired through prescription. As early as
1902, Section 46 of Act No. 496 categorically declared that lands registered under the Torrens
system cannot be acquired by prescription, viz:
 
Section 46. No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
 
Second, Antonio could have failed to complete payment of Lot No. 557's purchase price; thus,
the naked title to Lot No. 557 remains with the government.
 
Under Act No. 1120, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands is required to register title to the
friar lands acquired by the government through Act No. 496. Section 6 of Act No. 1120, in
particular, provides:
 
SECTION 6. The title, deeds and instruments of conveyance pertaining to the lands in each
province, when executed and delivered by said grantors to the Government and placed in the
keeping of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, as above provided, shall be by him
transmitted to the register of deeds of each province in which any part of said lands lies, for
registration in accordance with law. But before transmitting the title, deeds, and instruments of
conveyance in this section mentioned to the register of deeds of each province for registration,
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall record all such deeds and instruments at length in
one or more books to be provided by him for that purpose and retained in the Bureau of Public
Lands, when duly certified by him shall be received in all courts of the Philippine Islands as
sufficient evidence of the contents of the instrument so recorded whenever it is not practicable to
produce the originals in court.
 
The law on land registration at that time was Act No. 496, which established the Torrens system
in the Philippines. As earlier pointed out, a piece of land, once registered under the Torrens
system, can no longer be the subject of acquisitive prescription.

No certificate of title pertaining to the government's transfer of ownership of Lot No. 557 was
ever presented in evidence. Assuming, however, that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
failed to register Lot No. 557, the lot could not have been acquired by Alejandro through
prescription, under the rule that prescription does not lie against the government.
 
Third, Antonio could have sold his rights to Lot No. 557 to another person. Assuming he did,
only that person could have stepped into his shoes, and could have either completed payment of
the purchase price of Lot No. 557 and had it registered in his name; or, he could have failed to
pay the purchase price in full, in which case the naked title to the lot remains government
property.
 
In all three scenarios, Alejandro could not have acquired ownership over Lot No. 557 through
prescription.

Republic Act No. 9443 and the friar lands

The Court is not unaware of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9443, which confirms the
validity of titles covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands with Certificates of Sale and
Assignment of Sale that do not contain the signature of the then Secretary of the Interior and/or
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands. It does not apply to TCTs that have been fraudulently
issued and registered.

Republic Act No. 9443, however, does not validate any of the parties' claims of ownership over
Lot No. 557.

Mauricia's title, as earlier established, is fabricated; thus, her situation falls within the exception
expressed under Section 1 of RA No. 9443, viz:
 
This confirmation and declaration of validity shall in all respects be entitled to like effect and
credit as a decree of registration, binding the land and quieting the title thereto and shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the national government and all branches
thereof; except when, in a given case involving a certificate of title or a reconstituted
certificate of title, there is a clear evidence that such certificate of title or reconstituted
certificate of title was obtained through fraud, in which case the solicitor general or his duly
designated representative shall institute the necessary judicial proceeding to cancel the certificate
of title or reconstituted certificate of title as the case may be, obtained through such fraud.
 
With respect to Alejandro, his claim to Lot No. 557 rests on the Deed of Assignment executed
between him and Antonio, which had been cancelled; hence, it cannot be confirmed through
Republic Act No. 9443.

Effects of the nullity of TCT No. 571

After establishing that neither Mauricia nor Alejandro has title over Lot No. 557, we now resolve
the validity of the TCTs that originated from TCTNo. 571.

As a general rule, a person transmits only the rights that he possesses. When innocent third
persons, however, purchase or acquire rights over the property relying on the correctness of its
certificate of title, courts cannot disregard the rights they acquired and order the cancellation of
the certificate. As the third paragraph of section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:

Section 53. xxx

 
xxxx

In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After the entry of the decree of registration on
the original petition or application, any subsequent registration procured by the presentation of a
forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and void.

Thus, innocent purchasers in good faith may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefor, and neither the law nor the courts can oblige them to go behind the
certificate and investigate again the true condition of the property. They are only charged with
notice of the liens and encumbrances on the property that are noted on the certificate.

Jurisprudence defines innocent purchaser for value as "one who buys the property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property
and  pays a full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the
claims or interest of some other person in the property."

PD 1529 has expanded the definition of an innocent purchaser for value to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Neither PD 1529 nor jurisprudence, however, has included an innocent donee to the definition,
and for good reason. An innocent purchaser for value pays for the full price of the property,
while a donee receives the property out of the donor's liberality. Additionally, what the law does
not include, it excludes, and a donee is not included in the expansion of the term innocent
purchaser for value.

Applying these principles of law in the case at hand, we hold that the Deed of Donation Mauricia
issued in favor of her children immediately after getting a copy of TCT No. 571 could not have
transferred ownership over Lot No. 557 to her children. Since TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title,
it does not indicate ownership over Lot No. 557; thus, the Deed of Donation involving TCT No.
571 could not have conveyed the ownership of Lot No. 557 to Mauricia's children.

Neither could her children claim the status of an innocent purchaser in good faith, as they
received the property through donation.

The TCTs issued to Mauricia's children pursuant to the donation should thus be cancelled, as
they do not signify ownership over Lot No. 557.

We also note several circumstances that cast doubt over the ignorance of Mauricia's children
regarding the fabricated nature of TCT No. 571, viz:
 
(1) the petitioners are their close relatives, who have been residing in Lot No. 557 as early as
1928;
 
(2) their father, Romualdo, signed and recognized a subdivision plan of Lot No. 557 that would
divide the lot among all of Alejandro's heirs, including the petitioners;
 
(3) their mother executed the deed of donation as soon as she acquired a copy of TCT No. 571;
 
(4) their mother's nonpayment of taxes due Lot No. 557 since 1946; and (5) the payment of real
property taxes only to facilitate the subdivision of Lot No. 557 among them.

Lopez is not an innocent purchaser for value of Lot 5 57-A

We now determine Lopez's claim that she is an innocent purchaser for value of Lot No. 557-A,
and should thus be allowed to keep her title over it.

The CA, in affirming Lopez's title over Lot No. 557-A, held that she was an innocent mortgagee
for value. According to the CA, TCT No. 130517 had no encumbrances and liens at the time it
was mortgaged to Lopez, and this status extended to the time that TCT No. 130517 was
foreclosed to answer for Rodrigo's loan.

We cannot agree with the CA's conclusion.

As a general rule, a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of further inquiring over the status of the lot.

Jurisprudence has established exceptions to the protection granted to an innocent purchaser for
value, such as when the purchaser has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
compel a reasonably cautious man to inquire into the status of the lot; or of a defect or the lack of
title in his vendor; or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation.

The presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the
certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated as innocent purchaser
for value nor a purchaser in good faith, and hence does not merit the protection of the law.

In particular, the Court has consistently held that that a buyer of a piece of land that is in the
actual possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights
of those in possession. Without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good
faith.

We find that Lopez knew of circumstances that should have prodded her to further investigate
the Lot No. 557-A's status before she executed a mortgage contract over it with Rodrigo.

In the pre-trial brief she submitted before the trial court, Lopez made the following admissions:
 
xxx Only after these checking did an actual inspection of the properties took (sic) place, but on
this occasion, unfortunately, none of the plaintiffs, especially plaintiff Filadelfa T. Lausa, who is
found lately to be residing nearby, furnished her the information of the present claims.
 
She likewise made the same admission in an affidavit, viz:
 
6. The properties which were mortgaged were checked and no one at that time, even plaintiff
Filadelfa T. Lausa who is just residing nearby, disputed that the absolute owners thereof were the
spouses Rodrigo and Ligaya Tugot.
 
While these admissions pertain to the petitioners' act of not telling Lopez of the status of Lot No.
557-A, it implies that she had inspected the property, and accordingly found that Rodrigo did not
reside in Lot No. 557-A.

Records of the case show that Filadelfa resided in Lot No. 557-A at the time Lopez executed the
real estate mortgage with Rodrigo. In August 1995, Rodrigo and his siblings filed an ejectment
case against the petitioners Filadelfa Lausa and Anacleto Caduhay - Filadelfa resides in Lot No.
557-A while Anacleto's in Lot 557-B. Notably, this ejectment case was filed five
months after Lopez had entered into the real estate mortgage contract. Thus, at the time Lopez
inspected Lot No. 557, she would have found Filadelfa residing in it, and not Rodrigo.

That Filadelfa - and not Rodrigo - resided in Lot No. 557-A should have prompted Lopez to
make further inquiries over its status. Further inquiries with the lot owners of surrounding
property could have informed her of its actual status. Instead, she contented herself with
checking the copy of the title to Lot No. 557-A against the copy in the Registry of Deeds of
Cebu, which she had done prior to the actual inspection of Lot No. 557-A. The law cannot
protect Lopez's rights to Lot 557-A given her complacency.
Further, the status of an innocent-purchaser for value or innocent mortgagor for value is
established by the person claiming it, an onus probandi that Lopez failed to meet.

In her memorandum, Lopez urged the Court to acknowledge her rights over Lot No. 557-A,
arguing that the declaration of her status as an innocent-purchaser and innocent mortgagor is a
non-issue because it was never pleaded in her co-respondents' amended complaint. She also
pointed out that a valid title can emerge from a fabricated title, and essentially invoked the
innocent purchaser for value doctrine.

The amended complaint alleges that Lopez's status as current owner of Lot 557-A prejudices the
rights of the petitioners, who are its true owners. The circumstances regarding how Lopez
acquired ownership over Lot No. 557-A had also been pleaded therein.

Verily, the amended complaint does not need to allege Lopez's status as an innocent purchaser or
mortgagor in good faith precisely because it was incumbent upon her to allege and prove this to
defend her title to Lot No. 557-A. It merely needed to allege a cause of action against Lopez,
(which it did by alleging the circumstances surrounding Lopez's ownership of Lot No. 557-A)
and that it prejudices the petitioners' rights as its true owners.

Further, Lopez chose to ignore in her Memorandum the petitioners' contention that she knew that
Filadelfa Lausa, and not Rodrigo, resided in Lot No. 557-A. To reiterate, Lopez has the burden
of proving her status as an innocent purchaser for value in order to invoke its application. Failing
in this, she cannot avail of the protection the law grants to innocent purchasers for value.

The CA erred in finding that the petitioners' claim of ownership over Lot No. 557 had been
barred by prescription and laches

The outcome of the present case dispenses with the need for a discussion regarding extinctive
prescription and laches.

We note, however, that the CA erred in applying the principle of prescription and laches to the
petitioners' cause of action involving Lot No. 557.

An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the
plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the fraudulent acts. One who is in actual
possession of a piece of land on a claim of ownership thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.

The records of the case show that the petitioners resided in the property at the time they learned
about TCT No. 571. Being in possession of Lot No. 557, their claim for annulment of title had
not expired. Their ownership of Lot No. 571, however, is a different matter.

Effects of the Court's decision

Our decision in the present case does not settle the ownership of Lot No. 557. To recapitulate,
our examination of the records and the evidence presented by the petitioners and the respondents
lead us to conclude that neither of them own Lot No. 557.

Despite the intent of Act No. 1120 and Republic Act No. 9443 to transfer ownership of the
Banilad Friar Estate Lands to its occupants, we cannot settle the ownership of Lot No. 557 in the
present case.

Indeed, the petitioners and the respondents are the actual occupants of Lot No. 557, and they and
their families (with the exception of Rosita Lopez) have resided in the lot since 1915.

However, as we have discussed above, neither party had been able to establish their right of
ownership, much less possession, of Lot No. 557. The petitioners anchor their claim on
acquisitive prescription, which does not lie against registered land or the government. The
respondents, on the other hand, presented spurious TCTs. Thus, no amount of liberal
interpretation of Act No. 1120 or Republic Act No. 9443 could give either party the right over
the lot.

Neither can we ignore the evidence showing that none of them could rightfully own Lot No. 557.
The petitioners' cancelled deed of assignment and tax declarations cannot establish their
ownership over Lot No. 557; especially since the operation of pertinent laws prevented the
possibility of acquisitive prescription. The respondents' TCT No. 571, on the other hand, had
several discrepancies indicating that it was a fake.

The exercise of the Court's judicial power settles actual controversies between parties, through
which the Court establishes their legally enforceable and demandable rights. We determine the
parties' rights based on the application of the law to the facts established through the pieces of
evidence submitted by the parties. The application of the law on the facts of the present case
establishes that neither party has a legally enforceable right over Lot No. 557.

Given this situation, we direct that the records of the case be transmitted to the Land
Management Bureau[6] for further investigation and appropriate action over Lot No. 557 of the
Banilad Friar Estate Lands.

Additionally, we direct that a copy of the records of the case be transmitted to the Ombudsman,
for further investigation regarding how the fake TCTs covering Lot No. 557 ended up in the
Registry of Deeds of Cebu City, and for the criminal and administrative investigation of
government officials liable for them.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review

on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
63248 is MODIFIED, and the following titles are declared null and void:
 
(1) TCT No. 571 issued to Mauricia Quilaton;
(2) TCT No. 130517 issued to Rodrigo Tugot;
(3) TCT No. 130518 issued to Purificacion Codilla;
(4) TCT No. 130519 issued to Teofra Sadaya;
(5) TCT No. 130520 issued to Estrellita Galeos;
(5) TCT No. 130521 issued to Rodrigo Tugot; and
(6) TCT No. 143511 issued to Rosita Lopez.
 
The claim of the petitioners Filadelfa T. Lausa, Loreta T. Torres, Primitivo Tugot and Anacleto
T. ]Caduhay for recognition of their ownership over Lot No. 557 is DENIED.

We DIRECT that a copy of the records of the case be transmitted to the Land Management
Bureau and the Ombudsman for further investigation and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 116111, January 21, 1999 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (REPRESENTED BY THE ACTING

COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION), PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, SPOUSES CATALINO SANTOS AND THELMA BARRERO SANTOS,
ST. JUDE’S ENTERPRISES, INC., SPOUSES DOMINGO CALAGUIAN AND
FELICIDAD CALAGUIAN, VIRGINIA DE LA FUENTE AND LUCY MADAYA,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is the immunity of the government from laches and estoppel absolute?  May it still
recover the ownership of lots sold in good faith by a private developer to innocent
purchasers for value. Notwithstanding its approval of the subdivision plan and its
issuance of separate individual certificates of title thereto?

The Case

These are the main questions raised in the Petition for Review before us, seeking to
set aside the November 29, 1993 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV
No. 34647.  The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling[3] of the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 125, in Civil Case No. C-111708, which dismissed
petitioner’s Complaint for the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) to
several lots in Caloocan City, issued in the name of private respondents.
In a Resolution[4] dated July 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the Republic’s
motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts of the case are not disputed.  The trial court’s summary, which was
adopted by the Court of Appeals, is reproduced below:

“Defendant St. Jude’s Enterprises, Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 865-B-1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-52368, being a portion of
Lot 865-B located in Caloocan City containing an area of 40,623 square meters. 
For Lot 865-B-1 defendant St. Jude’s Enterprises, Inc. was issued TCT No. 22660
on July 25, 1966.

“Sometime in March 1966 defendant St’ Jude’s Enterprises, Inc. subdivided Lot No.
865-B-1 under subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 and as a result thereof the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City cancelled TCT No. 22660 and in lieu thereof
issued Certificates of Title Nos. 23967 up to 24068 inclusive, all in the name of
defendants St. Jude’s Enterprises, Inc.  The subdivision of lot 865-B-1 [which was]
covered [by] TCT No. 22660 was later found to have expanded and enlarged from
its original area of 40,523 square meters to 42,044 square meters or an increase of
1,421 square meters.  This expansion or increase in area was confirmed by the land
Registration Commission [to have been made] on the northern portion of Lot 865-
B-1.

“Subsequently, defendant St. Jude’s Enterprises, Inc. sold the lots covered by TCT
Nos. 24013 and 24014 to defendant Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto
Santos[;] TCT No. 24019 to defendant Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad de
Jesus[;] TCT No. 24022 to defendant Virginia dela Fuente[;] and TCT No. 2402 [3] to
defendant Lucy Madaya.  Accordingly, these titles were cancelled and said
defendants were issued the following: TCT No. C-43319 issued in the name of Sps.
Santos containing an area of 344 square meters[;] TCT No. 55513 issued in the
name of defendants Sps. Calaguian containing an area of 344 square meters[;] TCT
No. 13309 issued in the name of Sps. Santos[;] TCT No. 24069 issued in the name
of Virginia dela Fuente containing an area of 350 square meters[;] and TCT No. C-
46648 issued in the name of defendant Lucy Mandaya with an area of 350 square
meters."[5]

"[On January 29, 1985, then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed] an action
seeking xxx the annulment and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 24015, 24017, 24018, 24020, 24021, 24024, 24025 and 24068 issued in the
name of defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc.[;] Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
13309 and C-43319 both registered in the name of Sps. Catalino Santos and
Thelma B. Santos[;] TCT No. 55513 registered in the name of Sps. Domingo
Calaguian and Felicidad de Jesus[;] TCT No. 24069 registered in the name of
Virginia dela Fuente[;] and TCT No. C-46648 registered in the name of Lucy
Mandaya, principally on the ground that said Certificates of Title were issued on the
strength of [a] null and void subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 which expanded the
original area of TCT No. 22660 in the name of St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. from
40,623 square meters to 42,044 square meters upon its subdivision

"Defendants Virginia dela Fuente  and Lucy Mandaya were declared in default for
failure to file their respective answer within the reglementary period.

"Defendants Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos, St. Jude's
Enterprises, Inc. and Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad Calaguian filed
separate answers to the complaint. Defendants Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Sps.
Catalino Santos interposed defenses, among others, that they acquired the lots in
question in good faith from their former owner, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises,
Inc. and for value and that the titles issued to the said defendants were rendered
incontrovetible, conclusive and indefeasible after one year from the date of the
issuance of the titles by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.

"On the other hand, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. Interposed defenses,
among others, that the cause of action of plaintiff is barred by prior judgment; that
the subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the LRC, the government
is now in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan; and the plaintiff's
allegation that the area of the subdivision increased by 1,421 square meters is 
without any basis in fact and in law."[6]

Ruling of the Trial Court

On April 30, 1991, the trial court dismissed the Complaint. [7] While the plaintiff
sufficiently proved the enlargement or expansion of the area of the disputed
property, it presented no proof that Respondent St. Jude Enterprises, Inc. (“St.
Jude”) had committed fraud when it submitted the subdivision plan to the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) for approval.  Because the plan was presumed to
have been subjected to investigation, study and verification by the LRC, there was
no one to blame for the increase in the area “but the plaintiff[,] for having allowed
and approved the  subdivision plan.”  Thus, the court concluded, the government
was already “in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan.”

The trial court also took into account the “absence of complaints from adjoining
owners whose supposed lots [were] encroached upon by the defendants,” as well
as the fact that an adjoining owner had categorically stated that there was no such
encroachment.  Finding that Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and
Madaya had brought their respective lots from St. Jude for value and in good faith,
the court held that their titles could no longer be questioned, because under the
Torrens system, such titles had become absolute and irrevocable.  As regards the
Republic’s allegation that it had filed the case to protect the integrity of the said
system, the court said:

“xxx [S]ustaining the position taken by the government would certainly lead to
disastrous consequences.  Buyers in good faith would lose their titles.  Adjoining
owners who were deprived of a portion of their lot would be forced to accept the
portion of the property allegedly encroached upon.  Actions for recovery will be filed
right and left[;] thus instead of preserving the integrity of the Torrens System it
would certainly cause chaos rather than stability.  Finally, if only to strengthen the
Torrens System and in the interest of justice, the boundaries of the affected
properties of the defendants should not be disturbed and the status quo should be
maintained.”[8]

The solicitor general appealed the trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

Citing several cases[9] upholding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens
system, the appellate court affirmed the trial court.  It berated petitioner for
bringing the suit only after nineteen (19) years had passed since the issuance of St.
Jude’s title and the approval of the subdivision plan.  The pertinent portion of the
assailed Decision reads:[10]

“xxx Rather than make the Torrens system reliable and stable, [its] act of filing the
instant suit rocks the system, as it gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like
appellees, that their titles to properties can be questioned by the same authority
who had approved the same even after a long period of time.  In that case, no
Torrens title holder shall be at peace with the ownership and possession of his land,
for the Commission of land Registration can question his title any time it makes a
finding unfavorable to said Torrens title holder.”

Undaunted, petitioner seeks a review by this Court.[11]

The Issues

In this petition, the Republic raises the following issues for our resolution: [12]
“1.  Whether or not the government is estopped from questioning the approved
subdivision plan which expanded the areas covered by the transfer certificates of
title in question;

“2.  Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider the Torrens
System as merely a means of registering title to land;

“3.  Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that
petitioner’s complaint before the lower court was filed to preserve the integrity of
the Torrens System.”

We shall discuss the second and third questions together.  Hence, the issues shall
be (1) the applicability of estoppel against the State and (2) the Torrens system.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue:
Estoppel Against the Government

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or error
of its officials or agents.[13] However, like all general rules, this is also subject to
exceptions, viz.:[14]

“Estoppels against the public are little favored.  They should not be invoked except
in rate and unusual  circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would
operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. 
They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those
special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.  Nevertheless, the
government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its
citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to
limitations x x x, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private individuals.”

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[15] the government, in its effort to recover ill-gotten

wealth, tried to skirt the application of estoppel against it by invoking a specific
constitutional provision.[16] The Court countered:[17]

“We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, but this
concept is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those
which are irregular (Sharp International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA
299; 306 [1991]; Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983]), which peculiar
circumstances are absent in the case at bar.  Although the State’s right of action to
recover ill-gotten wealth is not vulnerable to estoppel[;] it is non sequitur to
suggest that a contract, freely and in good faith executed between the parties
thereto is susceptible to disturbance ad infinitum.  A different interpretation will
lead to the absurd scenario of permitting a party to unilaterally jettison a
compromise agreement which is supposed to have the authority of res
judicata (Article 2037, New Civil Code), and like any other contract, has the force of
law between parties thereto (Article 1159, New Civil Code; Hernaez vs. Kao, 17
SCRA 296 [1966]; 6 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 7th ed., 1987, p. 711; 3 Aquino,
Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 463). xxx.”

The Court further declared that “(t)he real office of the equitable norm of estoppel
is limited to supply[ing] deficiency in the law, but it should not supplant positive
law.”[18]

In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St. Jude’s 
titles in 1966 up to the filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to correct
and recover the alleged increase in the land area of St. Jude.  Its prolonged inaction
strongly militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to laches, which means “the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.”[19]

The Court notes private respondents’ argument that, prior to the subdivision, the
surveyors erred in the original survey of the whole tract of land covered by TCT No.
22660.  So that less then the actual land area was indicated on the title. 
Otherwise, the adjoining owners would have complained upon the partition of the
land in accordance with the LRC-approved subdivision plan.  As it is, Florencio
Quintos, the owner of the 9,146 square-meter Quintos Village adjoining the
northern portion of St. Jude’s property (the portion allegedly “expanded”), even
attested on August 16, 1973 that “there [was] no overlapping of boundaries as per
my approved plan (LRC) PSD 147766 dated September 8, 1971.” [20] None of the
other neighboring owners ever complained against St. Jude or the purchasers of its
property.  It is clear, therefore, that there was no actual damage to third persons
caused by the resurvey and the subdivision.

Significantly, the other private respondents --  Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian,
Dela Fuente and Madaya -- bought  such “expanded” lots in good faith, relying on
the clean certificates of St. Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either.  It
is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches
against the government to avoid an injustice [21] to the innocent purchasers for
value.

Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on
the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts
cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate.  Such
cancellation would impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone
dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in
every instance whether the title has been regularly issued or not.  This would be
contrary to the very purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles.  Verily, all
persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and the law or the courts do not oblige them to
go behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the
property.  They are only charged with notice of the liens and encumbrances on the
property that are noted on the certificate.[22]

When private respondents-purchasers bought their lots from St. Jude, they did not
have to go behind the titles thereto to verify their contents or search for hidden
defects or inchoate rights that could defeat their rights to said lots.  Although they
were bound by liens and encumbrances annotated on the titles, private
respondents-purchasers could not have had notice of defects that only an inquiry
beyond the face of the titles could have satisfied.[23] The rationale for this
presumption has been stated thus:[24]

“The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title to
real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the
right to rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the
need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned had actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry (Pascua v. Capuyoc, 77 SCRA 78).  Thus, where innocent third
persons relying on the correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over
the property, the court cannot disregard such rights (Director of Land v. Abache, et
al., 73 Phil. 606).”

In another case,[25] this Court further said:

“The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.  If a
person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all.  This would not only be unfair to him.  What is worse is that if
this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership.  The further consequence would
be that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent.  The
Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens System, should be
the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid
down by the law are satisfied.”  [Italics supplied.]

Petitioner never presented proof that the private respondents who had bought their
lots from St. Jude were buyers in bad faith.  Consequently, their claim of good faith
prevails.  A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or an interest in such
property; and who pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase or before he or she has notice of the claims or interest of some other
person.[26] Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another.[27]

Furthermore, it should be stressed that the total area of forty thousand six hundred
twenty-three (40,623) square meters indicated on St. Jude’s original title (TCT No.
22660) was not an exact area.  Such figure was followed by the phrase “more or
less.”  This plainly  means that the land area indicated was not precise.  Atty.
Antonio H. Noblejas, who became the counsel of St. Jude subsequent to his tenure
as Land Registration Commissioner, offers a sensible explanation.  In his letter[28] to
the LRC dated November 8, 1982, he gave the following information:

“a.  Records show that our client owned a large tract of land situated in an area
cutting the boundary of Quezon City and Caloocan City, then known as Lot 865-B,
Psd-60608, and described in T.C.T. No. 100412, containing an area of 96,931 sq.
meters, more or less.

b.  It will be noted that on the northern portion of this Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, is xxx
Lot 865-A, Psd-60608, which means that at a previous point of time, these 2 lots
composed one whole tract of land.

c.  On December 23, 1965, Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, was subdivided into 2 lots,
denominated as Lot 865-B-1, with an area of 40,622 sq. meters, more or less, on
the Caloocan side, and Lot 865-B-2, with an area of 56,308 sq. meters, more or
less, on the Quezon City side, under Plan (LRC) Psd-52368.

d.  On March 1-10, 1966, Lot 865-B-1, Psd-52368, then covered by T.C.T. No. N-
22660, was subdivided into residential lots under Plan (LRC) Psd-55643, with a
total area of 42,044 sq. meters, more or less.

e.  It will be noted that Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, covered by T.C.T. No. 100412,
contained an area of 96,931 sq. meters, more or less, but when subdivided under
Plan (LRC) Psd-52368, into 2 lots, its total area shrank by 1 sq. meter, to wit:

Lot 865-B-1, Psd-52368 = 40,622 sq. meters

Lot 865-B-2, Psd-52368 = 56,308     “

96,930 sq. meters.
f.  There is no allegation whatever in the Perez report that there was error in laying
out the metes and bounds of Lot 865-B-1 in Plan (LRC) Psd-55643, as specified in
the Technical Description of the said lot set forth in T.C.T. No. N-22660 covering
the same.  There is likewise no allegation, on the contrary there is confirmation
from the boundary owner on the northern side, Mr. Florencio Quintos, that there is
no overlapping of boundaries on the northern side of Lot 865-B-1, Psd-55643.

g.  We respectfully submit that the area of 42, 044 sq. meters stated in Plan (LRC)
Psd-55643 as the size of Lot 865-B-a, is the more accurate area, confirmed by the
Perez report ‘as per surveyor[‘]s findings on the ground’, which rectifies previous
surveryor’s error in  computing  its area as 40,622 sq. meters in Plan (LRC) Psd-
52368, which is about 3.5% tolerable error (1,422 divided by 40,622 = .035).

[h.]  It is well settled that in the identification of a parcel of land covered by

certificate of title, what is controlling are the metes and bounds as set forth in its
Technical Description and not the area stated therein, which is merely an
approximation as indicated in the ‘more or less’ phrase placed after the number of
square meters.

i.  There is thus no unauthorized expansion of the survey occasioned by the

subdivision of Lot 865-B-1 under Plan (LRC) Psd-55643; consequently, LRC Circular
No. 167, Series of 1967, finds no application thereto, as to bar the processing and
registration in due course of transactions involving the subdivision lots of our client,
subject hereof.  This is apart from the fact that LRC Circular No. 167 has not been
implemented by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City or any proper government
authority since its issuance in 1967, and that, in the interest of justice and equity,
its restrictive and oppressive effect on transactions over certificates of titles of
subdivisions that allegedly expanded on re-surveys, cannot be allowed to continue
indefinitely.” (Italics supplied.)

The discrepancy in the figures could have been caused by the inadvertence or the
negligence of the surveyors.  There is no proof, though, that the land area indicated
was intentionally and fraudulently increased.  The property originally registered was
the same property that was subdivided.  It is well-settled that what defines a piece
of titled property is not the numerical date indicated as the area of the land, but the
boundaries or “metes and bounds” of the property specified in its technical
description as enclosing it and showing its limits. [29]

Petitioner miserably failed to prove any fraud, either on the part of Private
Respondent St. Jude or on the part of land registration officials who had approved
the subdivision plan and issued the questioned TCT’s.  Other than its peremptory
statement in the Complaint that the “expansion” of the area was “motivated by bad
faith with intent to defraud, to the damage and prejudice of the government and of
public interests,” petitioner did not allege specifically how fraud was perpetrated to
cause an increase in the actual land size indicated.  Nor was any evidence proffered
to substantiate the allegation.  That the land registration authorities supposedly
erred or committed an irregularity was merely a conclusion drawn from the “table
survey” showing that the aggregate area of the subdivision lots exceeded the area
indicated on the title of the property before its subdivision.  Fraud cannot be
presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.

Second Issue:
The Torrens System

True, the Torrens system is not a means of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands.[30] Consequently, land erroneously included
in a Torrens certificate of title is not necessarily acquired by the holder of such
certificate.[31]

But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the titleholder be made to
bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in
the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons.  First, the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quite title to land to put
a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were
noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto.[32] Second, as we discussed earlier, estoppel by laches now bars petitioner
from questioning private respondents’ titles to the subdivision lots.  Third, it was
never proven that Private Respondent St. Jude was a party to the fraud that led to
the increase in the area of the property after its subdivision.  Finally, because
petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error that might have been
committed by its agent who had surveyed the property, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their functions must be respected.  Otherwise, the
integrity of the Torrens system, which petitioner purportedly aims to protect by
filing this case, shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.[33]
We cannot, therefore, adhere to the petitioner’s submission that, in filing this suit,
it seeks to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system.  To the contrary, it is
rather evident from our foregoing discussion that petitioner’s action derogates the
very integrity of the system.  Time and again, we have said that a Torrens
certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person
whose name appears thereon.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision

is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 194516, June 17, 2015 ]

BALDOMERA FOCULAN-FUDALAN, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES DANILO

OCIAL AND DAVIDICA BONGCARAS-OCIAL, EVAGRIA F. BAGCAT, CRISTINA
G. DOLLISEN, EULALIA F. VILLACORA, TEOFREDO FUDERANAN, JAIME
FUDERANAN, MARIANO FUDERANAN, FILADELFO FUDERANAN, MUSTIOLA
F. MONTEJO, CORAZON LOGMAO, DIONESIO FUDERANAN, EUTIQUIA
FUDERANAN, ASTERIA FUDERANAN, ANTONIO FUDERANAN, ROMEO
FUDERANAN, FLORENTINO FUDERANAN, DOMECIANO FUDERANAN,
ERLINDA SOMONTAN, FELICIANA FUDERANAN, BONIFACIO FUDERANAN,
QUIRINO FUDERANAN, MA. ASUNCION FUDERANAN, MARCELINA
ARBUTANTE, SALOME GUTUAL, LEONARDO LUCILLA, IMELDA L. ESTOQUE,
CIRILA OLANDRIA, TITA G. BONGAY AND MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF
PANGLAO, BOHOL, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the November 5, 2009 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. CEB-CV No. 01733, which granted the respondents' "Urgent Motion to Dismiss
Appeal,"[2] dated September 23, 2009, on the ground that petitioner Baldomera
Foculan-Fudalan (Baldomera) failed to file her appellant's brief within the non-
extendible period of forty-five (45) days; and the October 26, 2010
Resolution[3] which denied her "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated November 5, 2009, with Leave of Court to Admit Appellant's Brief
for the Intervenor-Third Party Plaintiff."[4]

The Antecedents

The present controversy began when the spouses Danilo Ocial and Davidica
Bongcaras-Ocial (Spouses Ocial), represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Marcelino
Bongcaras, filed an action for the declaration of validity of partition and sale,
recovery of ownership and possession and damages against Flavio Fudalan (Flavio)
and Cristobal Fudalan (Cristobal) before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Tagbilaran City (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 6672.

Later, Baldomera, the wife of Flavio and mother of Cristobal, intervened as 3 rd party
plaintiff against third-party defendants, Heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano Fuderanan (the
Fuderanans), the predecessors-in-interest of Spouses Ocial.

The subject of the said action was a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 56-A
located at Tangnan, Panglao, Bohol, which was a portion of Lot No. 56, Cad 705-D,
Panglao Cadastre, in the name of Juana Fuderanan (Juana).

Spouses Ocial alleged in their complaint[5] that on March 13, 2001, the heirs of
Juana executed the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Simultaneous Deed
of Absolute Sale over Lot 56-A including two (2) fruit bearing mango trees in their
favor as lawful vendees; that as the new owners of the subject land, they caused
the planting of thirty (30) gemelina seedlings, twenty (20) mahogany seedlings,
and two (2) mango seedlings, and in October 2001, they claimed the landowner's
share of the mango produce from Maximo Bolongaita who had been taking care of
the two (2) fruit-bearing mango trees; that in October 2001, they caused the
placement of a "no-trespassing" sign on one of the mango trees; that they also
caused the processing of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with
Simultaneous Sale for the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 93-009-00247 and
the issuance of a new tax declaration in their favor; that in June 2001, the
Fudalans, without any lawful right or authorization, surreptitiously planted "ubi" on
a portion of Lot No. 56-A and they also claimed the landowner's share of the mango
produce from Maximo Bolongaita who refused to give the same and instead
deposited the amount in a bank in Tagbilaran City; that in November 2001, the
Fudalans illegally placed two "no-trespassing" signs inside the questioned property;
that for this reason, they complained to the barangay captain of Tangnan, Panglao,
Bohol, who conducted conciliation proceedings on November 14 and 29, 2001; that
no settlement was reached between the parties; that the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa later on issued the Certification to File Action; and that they learned
that on December 14 and 15, 2001, while the Lupong Tagapamayapa had not yet
issued the required Certification to File Action, the Fudalans unjustifiably caused the
installation of a fence consisting of barbed wires with cemented posts around Lot
No. 56-A, without the necessary permit from the barangay captain of Tangnan and
the municipal officials of Panglao, Bohol.[6]

The Fudalans, on the other hand, claimed that they were the rightful owners of the
subject land having purchased the same from the Fuderanans on November 4,
1983; that the sale was evidenced by a private document printed in a blue paper;
that as owners, they planted "ubi," posted two "no-trespassing" signs and installed
a barb wire fence around the land; that since their purchase, they had been in
possession of the land in the concept of owners and had been paying the real
property taxes religiously; and that it was for this reason that they insisted that if
there was any deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate and simultaneous sale of
the land by the Fuderanans, the same was null and void for being without legal
basis.[7]

On May 6, 2002, Baldomera filed, with leave of court, an Answer in Intervention

with Third-Party Complaint against the Fuderanans for specific performance,
quieting of title and nullification of the deed of extra-judicial settlement with
simultaneous sale in favor of Spouses Ocial. She alleged therein that, although still
declared in the name of the late Juana Fuderanan, the property was absolutely
owned by her parents, the late Spouses Eusebio Fucolan and Catalina Bolias, [8] who
acquired the property in 1935 and thereafter took actual possession of the land.
She averred that the possession was continuous, peaceful, open, public, adverse,
and in the concept of an owner which was never disturbed by any person until
Spouses Ocial, through their Attorney-in-Fact, informed the Fudalans and
Baldomera that they had already bought the land from the Fuderanans. [9]

Baldomera also claimed that sometime in 1983, two of the Fuderanans, Teofredo
and Eutiquia, approached her and her husband. They represented themselves as
the duly authorized representatives of their coheirs and agreed to settle their claims
over the subject lot in their favor for the amount of P1,000.00. This agreement was
evidenced by a memorandum, dated November 4, 1983. [10]

Baldomera further claimed that in the year 2000, a certain Salome Getual,
supposedly another heir of Juana, told her that all the heirs of Juana were claiming
their rights of inheritance over the land but were willing to enter into a settlement if
the price would be acceptable. Unfortunately, no agreement was reached which
prompted Spouses Ocial to file an action before the barangay chairman of the place
where the property was situated. A mediation proceeding was conducted between
the parties where an amicable settlement was reached. Baldomera agreed to pay
the Fuderanans the amount of P50,000.00 as purchase price of the lot. The latter,
however, did not comply with their obligation in the agreed settlement. Instead,
they sold the land to Spouses Ocial for P20,000.00. [11]

The RTC Decision

On August 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision, [12] confirming the validity of the
extrajudicial settlement with simultaneous sale, thus, recognizing the right of the
third-party defendants, the Fuderanans, to sell the land in question to the Spouses
Ocial. The trial court explained its conclusion in this wise:

After a perusal of the evidence, the Court acknowledges the right of third party
defendants Heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano Fuderanan to sell the land in question to
plaintiffs Ocial spouses and upholds the validity of the sale. The claim of intervenor
Baldomera Fucolan-Fudalan that the land was purchased by her parents from Juana
Fuderanan in 1935 is not only doubtful being oral but more than that, it is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as provided in Art. 1403 (e) of the Civil
Code, as follows:

"Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

xxxx

(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale
of real property or of an interest therein;

No efforts were exerted by the intervenor and her predecessor parents for the
ratification of the sale despite the lapse of considerable time so that their failure
and neglect to do it amounts to laches and equitable estoppel on their part to lay
claim of ownership of the land. Furthermore, upon a perusal of the tax declarations
of the land from 1940 to 1985 the administrators mentioned therein were Modesta
Bongcaras, Ulpiano Fuderanan and Leoncia Estoreras, who took turn in its
administration. There was no mention of the predecessor parents of Baldomera as
one of the administrators which would only fairly suggest that they were never in
possession of the land. It was only in 1994 when Flavio Fudalan came to be
named as its administrator per TD-93-009-00247 evidently after the
execution of the blue paper receipt of P1,000.00 by Teofredo and Teofista
Fuderanan in their favor. And it was also only then that the Fudalans
started paying taxes thereto, as shown by the numerous receipts
submitted. Thus, the parents of Baldomera could not have paid taxes to the
land before that period for being not in actual possession of the land
contrary to their claim. It could be for this reason that defendants and
intervenor agreed to buy the land from the heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano
Fuderanan to whom the land was adjudicated which act was tantamount to
an abandonment of their claim.

xxx Besides, it is to be noted from the testimony of Baldomera Fucolan-Fudalan in

her direct examination on July 13, 2005 when she acknowledged that the amount
of P1,000.00 as mentioned in the blue paper receipt was not actually a payment of
the land but was given to Toribio and Juana Fuderanan as a consideration for them
to prepare the deed of sale for the land in their favor but to which the latter did not
comply. Instead, they filed a complaint along with the other heirs before the
barangay captain of Tangnan, Panglao, Bohol for the repossession and partition of
the property among the heirs. This admission of Baldomera Fucolan-Fudalan is
credible for the amount of P1,000.00 is grossly inadequate to be a consideration for
the sale of the whole lot of 7,334 sq. m. or even for the combined shares of
Teofredo and Teofista of their common property of 1,018 sq. m. Furthermore, the
alleged agreement was not signed by the parties as required by the Local
Government Code for its validity and no time or period was set for its compliance,
thus, leaving it to the Fudalans the choice as to when they would pay the purchase
price of the land which is against the provision of Art. 1308 of the Civil Code on the
qualifications of a valid contract.

On the alleged promise of the heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano Fuderanan to sell the
property to defendants Fudalan for P50,000.00 as shown in the minutes of the
mediation proceedings before the barangay captain of Tangnan, Panglao, Bohol of
which they did not comply, there is no evidence of tender of payment made by the
defendants. In fact, in the testimony of Maria Salome Gutual in the witness stand
during her cross-examination on March 10, 2003 which was not refuted by
defendants, the Fudalans did not allegedly comply with their promise to buy the
land, and instead, they even signified refusal to pay it claiming that they had
already bought it from Teofredo and Teofista Fuderanan so that the heirs of Pedro
and Ulpiano Fuderanan were forced to sell the land to herein plaintiffs Ocial
spouses. Their act of selling the land to the plaintiffs was therefore justified as it
was the defendants who first reneged from their agreement. Moreover, as there
was no tender of payment or earnest money given by defendants as a consideration
therefor, no contract to sell was perfected that would bind the parties to it (Art.
1479, par. 2, Civil Code) nor is there any basis for an action of specific performance
which defendants only initiated lately upon the filing of the third-party complaint. [13]

[Emphasis Supplied]
Consequently, the Fudalans and Baldomera were ordered to vacate the subject
land. Thus, the decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby confirms the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale executed by the Heirs of Pedro
Fuderanan and Ulpiano Fuderanan of Lot 56-A to herein plaintiffs Danilo Ocial and
Davidica Bongcaras-Ocial as one valid and enforceable. Consequently, herein
defendants Flavio Fudalan, Cristobal Fudalan and Intervenor Baldomera Fucolan-
Fudalan are hereby ordered to vacate from the premises of Lot 56-A CAD 705-D of
Panglao Cadastre which is located at barangay Tangnan, Panglao, Bohol having an
area of 6,316 sq. m. Furthermore, defendants and intervenor are hereby ordered to
pay jointly and severally reasonable attorney's fee in the amount of P30,000.00 and
the costs of the proceedings which shall earn legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until the same shall have been fully paid. The landowner shares of the
fruits of the two mango trees which are deposited in the bank are hereby
adjudicated to plaintiffs if the same are found to be within Lot 56-A.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Not in conformity, the Fudalans and Baldomera filed their respective notices of
appeal with the trial court.

The CA Decision

On March 18, 2009, upon receipt of the records, the CA issued a Resolution,
[15]
 requiring the Fudalans and Baldomera, as well as Spouses Ocial; and Evagra F.
Bagcat, as third-party defendants, to file their respective briefs within the non-
extendible period of forty-five (45) days.

In their Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal, dated September 23, 2009, Spouses Ocial
prayed for the dismissal of the appeal for failure of the appellants to file the
required appellants' brief within the prescribed non-extendible period of 45 days.

Acting thereon, the CA granted the motion and dismissed the appeal in its
November 5, 2009 Resolution, which in its entirety reads:

Finding merit in appellee's Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated September 23,
2009, citing as ground therein appellants' failure to file their respective appeal
briefs within the non-extendible period required under Resolution, dated March 18,
2009, the court resolves to grant the same. Accordingly, the case is considered
closed and terminated.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Baldomera filed her Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated

November 5, 2009 with Leave of Court to Admit Appellant's Brief for the
Intervenor-Third Party Plaintiff. On October 26, 2010, however, the CA issued
another resolution denying her motion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
November 5, 2009 with Leave of Court to Admit Appellant's Brief for the
Intervenor-Third Party Plaintiff is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[17]

According to the CA, "[b]laming the failure to file the required brief on counsel's
heavy workload, on the mistake or ignorance of his client, and excusable neglect on
his part is not acceptable."[18] What happened was simply the negligence of the
counsel in the monitoring of notices and resolutions from the courts. The attendant
circumstances did not make a case of gross negligence that would fall under the
exception to the rule that the inadvertence of counsel could be considered as an
adequate excuse to call for the court's leniency. The CA further stated that "the
delay in the filing of the brief, 206 days after the last day to file the same which is
May 22, 2009, is unreasonably long."[19]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner Baldomera states, among others, that the main reason for the late filing
of the appellant's brief was both her mistake and simple negligence and that of her
counsel; and that the CA should have been lenient in the application of technical
rules in resolving the appeal considering their peculiar situation.

Spouses Ocial, on the other hand, counter that the CA was correct in denying the
omnibus motion for reconsideration because the records were bereft of any factual
justification for Baldomera's failure to file the required appellant's brief.
Furthermore, even granting arguendo, that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
promulgating the November 5, 2009 and October 26, 2010 Resolutions, still the
subject petition must be dismissed because abuse of discretion is not among the
allowable grounds for a petition for review under Rule 45 to prosper.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petitioner's contention wanting in merit.

There was inexcusable negligence where a brief was filed 206 days late

It appears from the record that the counsel for Baldomera received a copy of the
March 18, 2009 CA Resolution on April 7, 2009, thus, giving him until May 22, 2009
to file the appellant's brief; that he did not file any motion for extension of the
period to file the brief; that he did not file either a comment or opposition to the
Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal, filed by Spouses Ocial on September 24, 2009, a
copy of which he was furnished by mail; and that he filed the brief for his client only
at the time he filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration on December 14, 2009,
or 206 days late.[20]

In this regard, Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court succinctly provides that:

Section l. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed by the

Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:

xxxx

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his
brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules; x x x

Baldomera posits that it was erroneous for the CA to dismiss her appeal on the
ground that she failed to file her appellant's brief on time. She cited the case
of Sebastian v. Morales[21] where it was written that liberal construction of the rules
is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.

Nevertheless, the Court in the same case made qualifications with respect to the
application of the said principle. It was held therein,

Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in

accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented
and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except
only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant
of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
explain his failure to abide by the rules.[22]

[Emphases and Underscoring Supplied]

In other words, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.
Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.[23] Besides, as the oft quoted quip would put it, the bare
invocation of "in the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. [24]

Although the authority of the CA to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the
appellant's brief is a matter of judicial discretion, a dismissal based on this ground
is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must
be observed, bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances
surrounding the case.[25]

Petitioner's assertion that her counsel is partly to be blamed for her legal
predicament is not persuasive. Indeed, there have been myriad of instances when
the Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsel's negligence and
allowed a litigant another chance to present his case, to wit: (1) where the reckless
or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when
application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or
property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. Unfortunately, none of
these exceptions obtain here.[26]

For a claim of counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear

abandonment of the client's cause must be shown. Here, petitioner's counsel failed
to file the appellant's brief. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple
negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the
proceeding.[27]

Baldomera herself should have exerted some efforts to inquire as to the status of
her appeal. She should not have been complacent. "While this Court has recognized
that a non-lawyer litigant is not expected to be familiar with the intricacies of the
legal procedures, a layman nonetheless must not be allowed to conveniently profit
from his improvident mistakes. Thus, it has been equally stressed that litigants
represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax
and await the outcome of the case; instead, they should give the necessary
assistance to their counsel for what is at stake is ultimately their interest." [28]

Even on the merits, the petition must fail

Even on the merits, the petitioner's quest must fail.

In essence, Baldomera claims that because they have been in adverse possession
for the requisite period, their possession has now ripened into ownership through
acquisitive prescription.

Baldomera's argument fails to convince the Court.

Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over

immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under
conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept
of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription
of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. [29] When the Court
speaks of possession in "good faith," it consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and can
transmit his ownership. There is "just title," on the other hand, when the adverse
claimant comes into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor is not the owner or cannot transmit any right. [30]

In the present controversy, aside from Baldomera's bare allegation that her family
had been in possession of the subject property since it was sold to her parents, no
other evidence, documentary or otherwise, showing that the title to the subject
property was indeed transferred from Juana to her parents was presented. In fact,
she never denied that the tax declaration of the property was still in the name of
Juana Fuderanan. As such, for lack of "just title," she could not have acquired the
disputed property by ordinary prescription through possession often (10) years.
Occupation or use alone, no matter how long, cannot confer title by prescription or
adverse possession unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true
owner, that is, possession under the claim of title. [31]

Even the allegation that sometime on November 4, 1983, a blue paper was
executed wherein Teofredo and Eutiquia, allegedly the duly authorized
representatives of the heirs of Juana to settle their claims over the land,
acknowledged to have received the sum of P1,000.00, [32] cannot be considered a
valid basis for a possession in good faith and just title. The alleged agreement
which is, at best, a compromise agreement cannot be made as the foundation of a
conclusion that Baldomera is a possessor in good faith and with just title who
acquired the property through ordinary acquisitive prescription. By the nature of a
compromise agreement, which brings the parties to agree to something that neither
of them may actually want, but for the peace it will bring them without a protracted
litigation, no right can arise therefrom because the parties executed the same only
to buy peace and to write finis to the controversy. It did not create or transmit
ownership rights over the subject property.[33]

That being settled, the next question now is: Can Baldomera acquire the property
through extraordinary acquisitive prescription?

The Court is still constrained to rule in the negative.

In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable

property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years even
without need of title or of good faith.[34]

As observed by the trial court,

There was no mention of the predecessor parents of Baldomera as one of the

administrators which would only fairly suggest that they were never in possession
of the land. It was only in 1994 when Flavio Fudalan came to be named as
its administrator per TD-93-009-00247 evidently after the execution of the
blue paper receipt of P1,000.00 by Teofredo and Teofista Fuderanan in
their favor. And it was only then that the Fudalans started paying taxes
thereto, as shown by the numerous receipts submitted. Thus, the parents
of Baldomera could not have paid taxes to the land before that period for
being not in actual possession of the land contrary to their claim. It could be
for this reason that defendants and intervenor agreed to buy the land from the
heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano Fuderanan to whom the land was adjudicated which act
was tantamount to an abandonment of their claim. [35]

Taking cue from the foregoing, Baldomera's alleged possession could not have
amounted to an ownership by way of extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
According to the factual findings of the trial court, it was only in 1994 that her
husband, Flavio was named administrator; that it was also then that they started
paying taxes; and that it was also then that they started occupying the subject
property. This observation of the trial court was contrary to her assertion that they
had been paying taxes and had been in possession of the land even before the said
period. On this note, the thirty-year period would only be completed in the year
2024. Also, the records would reveal that as early as November 2001, her
possession was effectively interrupted when Spouses Ocial filed a complaint before
the barangay captain of Tangnan, Panglao, Bohol, where conciliation proceedings
were held although no settlement was reached.[36]

Finally, Baldomera also assails the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case. According
to her, since the action involves ownership and possession of real property,
jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property in contention.
Considering that the assessed value of Lot 56-A was only P1,930.00 as indicated in
Tax Declaration No. 93-009-00247, it should have been the first level court, and
not the RTC, which should have exercised jurisdiction to hear actions involving title
to, or possession of real property or any interest in it, as provided in Sections 19
and 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) 129, as amended.[37]

This argument cannot be sustained.

Even if the Court would treat the complaint filed by Spouses Ocial as falling under
the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of B.P. 129, as the assessed
value was way below the P20,000.00 threshold, still Baldomera's postulation that it
is the first level court, and not the RTC, which has jurisdiction, would not hold
water. As observed, Baldomera had voluntarily participated in the proceedings
before the RTC and aggressively defended her position. Although she questioned
the jurisdiction of the trial court as early as in the trial level, she actively
participated in the proceeding when she filed an ANSWER IN INTERVENTION WITH
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT[38] where she interposed counterclaims, and asked for
affirmative reliefs. Simply put, considering the extent of her participation in the
case, she is estopped from invoking lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the
dismissal of the action.[39]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed November 5, 2009 and

October 26, 2010 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01733
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015 ]

LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE ANDRES, AND PABLO B. FRANCISCO,

PETITIONERS, VS. STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Not all may demand for an easement of right-of-way. Under the law, an easement
of right-of-way may only be demanded by the owner of an immovable property or
by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the November 17, 2011 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87715, which reversed and set aside the
May 22, 2006 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Binangonan, Rizal,
Branch 68 granting petitioners Pablo B. Francisco (Pablo), Liwayway Andres
(Liwayway), Ronnie Andres (Ronnie) and their co-plaintiff Liza Andres (Liza) a 50-
square meter right-of-way within the subdivision of respondent Sta. Lucia Realty
and Development, Incorporated (respondent).

Likewise assailed is the March 27, 2012 CA Resolution[3] which denied petitioners

and Liza's Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint[4] for Easement of Right-of-Way against

respondent before the RTC on November 28,2000. They alleged that they are co-
owners and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered
agricultural land in Pag-asa, Binangonan, Rizal with a total area of more or less
10,500 square meters (subject property). A few years back, however, respondent
acquired the lands surrounding the subject property, developed the same into a
residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis East, and built a
concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were denied
access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice versa. They thus
prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan Metropolis East in order for them to
have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road.

In its Answer,[5] respondent denied knowledge of any property adjoining its

subdivision owned by petitioners and Liza. At any rate, it pointed out that
petitioners and Liza failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the existence of
the requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-way.

During trial, Pablo testified that he bought a 4,000-square meter-portion of the

subject property from Carlos Andres (Carlos), the husband of Liwayway and father
of Ronnie and Liza.[6] According to Pablo, he and his co-plaintiffs are still in
possession of the subject property as evidenced by an April 13, 1998
Certification[7] issued by the Barangay Chairman of Pag-asa.[8] Further, Pablo
clarified that the easement of right-of-way that they are asking from respondent
would traverse the latter's subdivision for about 50 meters from the subject
property all the way to another subdivision that he co-owns, Victoria Village, which
in turn, leads to Col. Guido Street.[9] He claimed that the prevailing market value of
lands in the area is about P600.00 per square meter. Pablo also explained that the
subject property is still not registered under the Land Registration Act since no tax
declaration over the same has been issued to them despite application with the
Municipal Assessor of Binangonan.[10] When required by the court to submit
documents regarding the said application, [11] Pablo attached in his Compliance,
[12]
 among others, Carlos' letter[13] of Maty 18, 1998 to the Municipal Assessor of
Binangonan requesting for the issuance of a tax declaration and the reply thereto
dated August 5, 1998[14] of the Provincial Assessor of Rizal. In the aforesaid reply,
the Provincial Assessor denied the request on the ground that the subject property
was already declared for taxation purposes under the name of Juan Diaz and later,
in the name of Juanito[15] Blanco, et al. (the Blancos).

Liwayway testified next. According to her, she and her children Ronnie and Liza are
the surviving heirs of the late Carlos who owned the subject property. [16] Carlos
acquired ownership over the same after he had been in continuous, public and
peaceful possession thereof for 50 years,[17] the circumstances of which he narrated
in a Sinumpaang Salaysay[18] that he executed while he was still alive. Carlos stated
therein that even before he was born in 1939, his father was already in possession
and working on the subject property; that in 1948, he started to help his father in
tilling the land; that when his father became weak and eventually died, he took
over the land; and, that he already sought to register his ownership of the property
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and to declare
the same for taxation purposes.

For its part, respondent presented as a lone witness the then Municipal Assessor of
Binangonan, Virgilio Flordeliza (Flordeliza). Flordeliza confirmed that Carlos wrote
him a letter-request for the issuance of a tax declaration. [19] He, however, referred
the matter to the Provincial Assessor of Rizal since the property for which the tax
declaration was being applied for was already declared for taxation purposes in the
name of one Juan Diaz.[20] Later, the tax declaration of Juan Diaz was cancelled and
in lieu thereof, a tax declaration in the name of the Blancos was issued. [21] For this
reason, the Provincial Assessor of Rizal denied Carlos' application for issuance of tax
declaration.[22]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC rendered its Decision[23] on May 22, 2006. It observed that petitioners and
Liza's allegation in their Complaint that they were in possession of the subject
property for more than 50 years was not denied by respondent in its Answer. Thus,
the same is deemed to have been impliedly admitted by the latter. It then
ratiocinated that based on Article 1137[24] of the Civil Code, petitioners and Liza are
considered owners of the subject property through extraordinary prescription.
Having real right over the same, therefore, they are entitled to demand an
easement of right-of-way under Article 649[25] of the Civil Code.

The RTC further held that Pablo's testimony sufficiently established: (1) that the
subject property was surrounded by respondent's property; (2) the area and
location of the right-of-way sought; (3) the value of the land on which the right-of-
way is to be constituted which was P600.00 per square meter; and (4) petitioners
and Liza's possession of the subject property up to the present time.

In the ultimate, said court concluded that petitioners and Liza are entitled to an
easement of right-of-way, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered giving the plaintiffs a right of way of 50

square meters to reach Victoria Village towards Col. Guido Street. Defendant Sta.
Lucia is hereby ordered to grant the right of way to the plaintiffs as previously
described upon payment of an indemnity equivalent to the market value of the [50-
square meter right of way].

SO ORDERED.[26]

Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal[27] which was given due course by the RTC in an
Order[28] dated June 27, 2006.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, respondent argued mat petitioners and Liza were neither able to prove
that they were owners nor that they have any real right over the subject property
intended to be the dominant estate. Hence, they are not entitled to demand an
easement of right-of-way. At any rate, they likewise failed to establish that the only
route available from their property to Col. Guido Street is through respondent's
subdivision.

In a Decision[29] dated November 17, 2011, the CA held that the evidence adduced
by petitioners and Liza failed to sufficiently establish their asserted ownership and
possession of the subject property. Moreover, it held that contrary to the RTC's
observation, respondent in fact denied in its Answer the allegation of petitioners
and Liza that they have been in possession of subject property for more than 50
years. In view of these, the CA concluded that petitioners and Liza have no right to
demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,

the May 22, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch
68 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 00-037-B is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[30]

Petitioners and Liza's Motion for Reconsideration[31] was denied in the CA

Resolution[32] dated March 27, 2012.
Hence, petitioners seek recourse to this Court through this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.

Issue

Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from

respondent.

Our Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be demanded
by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use the same.

Here, petitioners argue that they are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-
way from respondent because they are the owners of the subject property intended
to be the dominant estate. They contend that they have already acquired ownership
of the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription. [33] This is
considering that their possession became adverse as against the Blancos (under
whose names the subject property is declared for taxation) when Carlos formally
registered his claim of ownership with the DENR and sought to declare the subject
property for taxation purposes in 1998. And since more than 10 years [34] had lapsed
from that time without the Blancos doing anything to contest their continued
possession of the subject property, petitioners aver that ordinary acquisitive
prescription had already set in their favor and against the Blancos.

In the alternative, petitioners assert that they have already become owners of the
subject property through extraordinary acquisitive prescription since (1) they have
been in open, continuous and peaceful possession thereof for more than 50 years;
(2) the subject property, as depicted in the Survey Plan they caused to be prepared
is alienable and disposable; (3) Carlos filed a claim of ownership over the property
with the DENR, the agency charged with the administration of alienable public land;
and (4) Carlos' manifestation of willingness to declare the property for taxation
purposes not only had the effect of giving notice of his adverse claim on the
property but also strengthened his bona fide claim of ownership over the same.

It must be stressed at the outset that contrary to petitioners' allegations, there is

no showing that Carlos filed a claim of ownership over the subject property with the
DENR. His April 13, 1998 letter[35] to the said office which petitioners assert to be an
application for the registration of such claim is actually just a request for the
issuance of certain documents and nothing more. Moreover, while Carlos indeed
attempted to declare the subject property for taxation purposes, his application, as
previously mentioned, was denied because a tax declaration was already issued to
the Blancos.

Anent petitioners' invocation of ordinary acquisitive prescription, the Court notes

that the same was raised for the first time on appeal. Before the RTC, petitioners
based their claim of ownership on extraordinary acquisitive prescription under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code[36] such that the said court declared them owners of
the subject property by virtue thereof in its May 22, 2006 Decision. [37] Also with the
CA, petitioners initially asserted ownership through extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.[38] It was only later in their Motion for Reconsideration[39] therein that
they averred that their ownership could also be based on ordinary acquisitive
prescription.[40] "Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered
by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.
Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule." [41]

Even if timely raised, such argument of petitioners, as well as with respect to

extraordinary acquisitive prescription, fails. "Prescription is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code."[42] There are two modes of prescription
through which immovables may be acquired - ordinary acquisitive prescription
which requires possession in good faith and just title for 10 years and,
extraordinary prescription wherein ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years
without need of title or of good faith.[43] However, it was clarified in the Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,[44] that only lands of the public
domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private
ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code.[45] And if the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must first be shown that the land has already
been converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive
period. Otherwise, Article 1113 of the Civil Code, which provides that property of
the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of prescription,
applies.[46]

Sifting through petitioners' allegations, it appears that the subject property is an

unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public domain,
petitioners, in order to validly claim acquisition thereof through prescription, must
first be able to show that the State has -
expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation
issued by the President that the subject [property] is no longer retained for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the
State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and hence, not
susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription.[47]

In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case, petitioners' claim of

ownership over the subject property based on prescription necessarily crumbles.
Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent for
lack of personality.

All told, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in reversing and setting aside
the May 22, 2006 Decision of the RTC and in ordering the dismissal of petitioners'
Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 17, 2011 Decision and March
27, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87715
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.