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S U P P O R T

T E C H N O L O G Y
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Escape slides & slide rafts 2

U

A330/A340 Family
B

Scheduled maintenance operational test

R

Sébastien Asse
I

A380 - A solution for airports 7

A

Willy-Pierre Dupont P A G E
Thomas Burger 1

FAST 33
Approach and Landing Accident Reduction 17
A global programme for flight operations
safety enhancement
Michel Trémaud

Preventing ignition sources inside fuel tanks 23

Editor: Denis Dempster José-Luis Mauriz-Digon
Art Director: Agnès Massol-Lacombe Ross Walker
in association with
Chandler Gooding Anemometric leak detection 34
London • Leeds • Toulouse
using new helium pressure tool
Customer Services Marketing Xavier Barriola
Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 39 29 Alain Marsan
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 27 67
E-mail: fast.digest@airbus.com From the archives... 36
Printer Escourbiac
Approach & landing - Part 2
FAST may be read on Internet http://www.airbus.com
under Customer Services/Publications
Customer Services 37
ISSN 1293-5476 Around the clock… Around the world

Airbus Customer Services

© AIRBUS 2003. All rights reserved
The articles herein may be reprinted without permission except where
copyright source is indicated, but with acknowledgement to Airbus.
Articles which may be subject to ongoing review must have their accuracy verified
prior to reprint. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are
based on the assumptions shown and are expressed in good faith. Where the
supporting grounds for these statements are not shown,
This issue of FAST has been printed on paper
the Company will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.
produced without using chlorine, to reduce
Photo cover © Airbus - Computer graphic by I3M waste and help conserve natural resources.
Photographs by Hervé Bérenger, Hervé Goussé and Philippe Masclet Every little helps!
J U S T H A P P E N E D . . .

I
2ND AIRBUS FLIGHT OPERATIONS MONITORING & SAFETY DEVELOPMENT SEP 03
CONFERENCE
22-24 September, 2003 Rome, Italy

As part of its commitment to increase safety,

Airbus held its second conference in Rome.
70 representatives attended from 48 operators.

Airbus will continue to organise this proactive safety dialogue in the future
together with other safety initiatives.

18TH HUMAN FACTORS SYMPOSIUM

2
28-30 October, 2003 New York, USA OCT 03

In cooperation with JetBlue Airways, this event attracted 130 participants.

Topics of the programme have been, amongst others, the implementation of

a safety culture right from the beginning of an aircraft operation, the safe-
ty evaluation methods and tools, the ways and means to prepare the digital
future in the cockpit.

A300/A300-600/A310 TECHNICAL SYMPOSIUM

17-21 November, 2003 Seville, Spain
3
NOV 03

This year the A300 Family Symposium gath-

ered 250 representatives from 51 airlines and
16 vendor representatives. The programme
covered aspects of ageing aircraft, major
in-service issues, improved responsiveness,
aircraft upgrades and freighter versions.
Demonstrations on fuel leak detection and
repair as well as AOLS were performed daily
throughout the conference.

Awards for Excellence in Operation were given to Japan Air Systems and
Kuwait Airways. Exceptionally an award for Recognition of outstanding
performance were given to European Air Transport, Korean Airlines and
TAP Air Portugal. Pakistan International Airlines, Qatar Airways and TAP
received a recognition for the highest aircraft utilisation.

C O M I N G S O O N . . .

19TH HUMAN FACTORS SYMPOSIUM

I
MAY 04
May 2004 Location not yet decided

Airbus will continue the dialogue with its operators at a suitable forum, dis-
cussing human factors aspects with practical and operational perspectives.

The first, of two scheduled for 2004, will take place in May. A provisional
agenda will soon be sent to all operators.

A330/A340 FAMILY SYMPOSIUM

2
JUN 04
14-18 June, 2004 Athens, Greece

Airbus is pleased to announce the date and

location of the next A330/A340 Technical
Symposium. The working sessions will begin
on Monday morning and will continue through
to Friday midday. These sessions will as usual
comprise presentations based on actual service
issues affecting the A330/A340 programme as
well as subjects of more general interest.

A provisional agenda will soon be sent to all operators.

 ESCAPE SLIDE & SLIDE RAFTS - SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE OPERATIONAL TEST A330/A340 FAMILY
P A G E
2 3
Escape slides and
FAST 33
slide rafts A330/A340 Family
Scheduled maintenance operational test
Each door on a passenger aircraft is fitted with an
escape slide for emergency evacuation of passengers
and crew. Most of the slides may also be used as life
rafts in the event the aircraft lands on water. For
simplicity in this article, slides includes slide rafts.
Slides can be compared to parachutes: they are
packed to work once. Following use, it is necessary
to repack them to be ready for the next deployment.
And, before each deployment, there is no absolute
certainty that they will work. Since they are not used
often it is necessary to have a means of gathering
information on their reliability and particularly to
identify potential deployment failures: the only way
is to perform scheduled deployments of slides.
Sebastien Asse
Group Manager Cabin Interior
Customer Services Engineering
ESCAPE SLIDE & SLIDE RAFTS - SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE OPERATIONAL TEST A330/A340 FAMILY
WHEN AND WHERE SLIDES
ARE TESTED
Today, deployment tests are per-
formed at different stages in the
life of the slide.
AT THE MANUFACTURING
FACILITY
During the manufacturing process
by the supplier, Goodrich, all slides
are tested before delivery to
Airbus. This acceptance test con-
sists of deploying all units from a
mock-up of the aircraft door. After
inflation the slide is checked in
order to correct any anomalies
such as bonding and leaks between
pieces of material. In the event of
deployment failure, the slide is
reconditioned and tested again.
Each deployment is video recorded
and the tape is archived by
Goodrich.
SAMPLING ON NEW AIRCRAFT
DURING AIRBUS A330/A340
FINAL ASSEMBLY
Since 2002 a sampling programme
was organized during A330/A340
final assembly in order to test in
real conditions, from the aircraft,
the newly installed slide. Before
delivery of a new aircraft to the
customer, one door is selected at
random and the corresponding
slide is deployed. All the tests are
video recorded from three different
angles (inside the aircraft, outside
in front of the door and on the
side). This permits identity of
potential issues, which are not
linked to operational or in-service
conditions.
WHEN FITTED ON IN-SERVICE
AIRCRAFT (MAINTENANCE
REQUIREMENT)
The Airbus Maintenance Planning
Document (MPD) requires that
operators perform a scheduled
operational test on the slide fitted
on their A330/A340 Family. The
minimum requirement is to per-
form one deployment per fleet
(A330/A340), per door position
(1, 2, 3 and 4 left or right) every 36
months. However, depending on
national regulations, some authori-
ties request their local operators to
perform more deployment tests
than Airbus requires.
Airbus requests each operator to
report all deployment tests (suc-
cessful or unsuccessful) through
SIL 25-061. Also, every 36
months, each slide has to be over-
hauled in a qualified shop
approved by Goodrich, and listed
in their Component Maintenance
Manual(CMM)
TESTING THE SLIDE
The tests have to be done on the
aircraft by opening the relevant
door in armed mode to allow the
deployment of the slide. The
Aircraft Maintenance Manual
(AMM) operational test task and
SIL 25-124 describes the proce-
dure to follow and the correspond-
ing safety precautions.
It is important to follow the rules in P A G E
performing this test in order to
ensure that slide deployment will
FAST 33
occur in the best conditions (close
to an emergency situation).
Slide deployment sequence
• Door handle lever is lifted with door in armed mode.
• Door booster is activated.
• Gas under pressure goes into the door damper.
• Door starts to open quickly and move forward.
• Release-pin lanyard is under tension, and then the two release pins are pulled.
• The slide packboard drops on to the door sill and the rail adapters are extracted from the rails.
• The packboard is detached from the door.
• Door moves to the side and allows the packboard to drop outside the aircraft.
• The packboard starts to rotate and then the parachute pin is pulled.
• Soft cover lacing opens (packboard rotated about 90 degrees).
• Packboard continues to rotate to a total of 270 degrees so that the top outboard corner of
the packboard (rail adapters) is pointing towards the fuselage.
• The aspirators detach from the packboard and the cylinder is then extracted from
the pack.
• The firing lanyard being under tension, the firing pin is pulled out of the regulator valve
and the inflation is initiated.
• Pressurised gas (3290 psi of mixed nitrogen and CO2) passes from the cylinder through
the aspirators to the inflatable part of the slide and opens the aspirators’ flapper valve
with the help of a venturi.
• The aspirators’ flapper valve draws in external air.
• The mix of gas under pressure and external air starts to inflate the slide.
• Inflation is finished when the slide raft has reached the requested pressure controlled by
a pressure relief valve(PRV).
 ESCAPE SLIDE & SLIDE RAFTS - SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE OPERATIONAL TEST A330/A340 FAMILY
The complete deployment sequence,
from the door opening until the full
inflation of the slide, should not
exceed 16 seconds. Actual slide
inflation from the packboard being
released until deployment is com-
plete takes less than six seconds.
The Goodrich method is to extract
the complete packboard from the
aircraft, let it drop against the fuse-
lage and then commence inflation.
During the deployment and infla-
tion, the packboard, which is built
from hard composite material, may
come into contact with the fuselage
P A G E
4 ment of the slide raft:
FAST 33
Figure 1
Figure 2
skin. Dents on the fuselage (or
belly fairing for door 3) may result
from this contact. It is therefore
necessary to protect the aircraft
during test slide deployments.
Initially the only recommendation
was to use a “protective mat” for
the fuselage during slide deploy-
ment, without giving a material
specification. Most of the time just
before deployment test, mechanics
had to find something in the hangar
to tape to the aircraft skin. Usually
plastic sheet, a piece of carpet,
cardboard or bubble wrap were the
most easily available materials and
were quickly taped to the fuselage
below the doorsill.
IN SERVICE EXPERIENCE
Several reports have been received
from the field showing that the use
of such materials has allowed dam-
age to the fuselage and in some
cases prevented normal deploy-
• damage to the fuselage and par-
ticularly to the belly fairing was
due to a protection that was too
light (Figure 1)or not located
where contact would occur,
• deployment failures were mainly
due to the slide pack being
caught in protective material
(particularly bubble wrap),
which decreased the drop inertia
and stopped the deployment
before inflation (Figure 2).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Further to these reports, Airbus
reviewed in detail how to protect
the aircraft skin during a deploy-
ment test. The first step was to
determine the fuselage area to be
protected at each door position.
The second step was to define a
material able to protect the fuse-
lage structure without disturbing
the deployment sequence.
ESCAPE SLIDE & SLIDE RAFTS - SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE OPERATIONAL TEST A330/A340 FAMILY
Figure 3
WHICH AREA TO PROTECT PROTECTIVE MATERIAL
During the deployment sequence, Having determined the area to be
the packboard may hit the fuselage protected, the type of protection
and cause damage. This happens chosen is also important to ensure
when the packboard is rotated a total adequate protection without dis-
of 270 degrees, and its top outboard turbing the deployment sequence.
corners (rail adapters) point towards The protective material should
the fuselage (figure 3). The degree simulate the aircraft skin. After P A G E
of contact depends on the dropping review of existing materials and 5
inertia. At the door 3 position, due to some tests on the final assembly
FAST 33
the contour and composite material line during a sample deployment, it
of the belly fairing located below it, has been decided to use two differ-
a heavy dent may result. ent materials, bonded together, to
provide the required protection.
After review of the different condi-
tions it has been decided to have a
specific protection fitted during Type A door
the test, just below the doorsill and
covering the maximum area of Type 1 door
packboard movement:
• for passenger exit (Type A door
equipped with slide raft) the pro-
tection dimension should be 3m
deep x 4m wide (figure 4).
• for emergency exit (Type 1 door
equipped with slide) the protec- Tape
tion dimension should be 3m
deep x 2m wide (figure 5). Belly
fairing
3m (9.9ft)
3m (9.9ft)
Fillet
fairing
4m (13.12ft) 2m (6.56ft)
Figures 4 and 5
 ESCAPE SLIDE & SLIDE RAFTS - SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE OPERATIONAL TEST A330/A340 FAMILY

Protective material

Outer layer with hard and smooth face

Minimum thickness: 1.2mm (0.06in.)

Inner layer of foam to absorb the load

Minimum thickness: 10mm (0.39in.)

Figure 6

This protection is made of
two separate layers (Figure 6):
• The outer layer is fibreglass-
reinforced polyester laminate
Material No. 05-109 (Refer to
AMM 20.31.00), which has a
P A G E minimum thickness of 1.2mm
6 (0.06in). This layer has a hard
smooth surface, which cannot
FAST 33
HOW TO BUILD AND FIT
THE PROTECTION ON THE
AIRCRAFT SKIN
Refer to figures 4 and 5 for the
dimensions and position of the pro-
tection required for each type of
door. Three different sizes of pro-
tection can cover all A330/A340
door types: (one for all Type A
tective cover: Make sure the pro-
tection is correctly attached with
tape to the aircraft structure. This
prevents the suction of loose pro-
tection material into the aspirator
during the deployment test. Loose
protection material can cause dam-
age to the aspirator, with the risk
that the deployment test will not be
satisfactory.

catch parts of the packboard, as doors 1, 2 and 4; one for Type A

it falls during deployment. The
surface is also impact resistant
and spreads the load evenly.
• The inner layer is polyethylene
foam Material No. 05-082
(Refer to AMM 20.31.00),
which has a minimum thickness
of 10mm (0.39in). It absorbs the
load.
door 3; one for Type 1 door 3).
However the protection for door 3
Type A can also be used for Type 1
if both door types are present in the
fleet. Then cut both outer and inner
layers to the appropriate dimen-
sions. Attach the self-adhesive
foam sheets to the polyester lami-
nate sheets.
Use an adjustable access platform
to help position and attach the pro-
Use adhesive tape (Material No.
05-069) or ADETEC 5350 to
attach the protection sheets to the
fuselage below the doorsill. Make
sure that there are no gaps between
the edges of the sheets and that the
self-adhesive foam sheet goes
against the fuselage.
Follow all safety instruction pro-
vided in AMM 25-62-00-501.

Since the preparation of this article,

Sébastien Asse has moved on an other
Conclusion
group and therefore questions on slides
should be sent to:
CONTACT DETAILS
Philippe Le Bigot
Group Manager Cabin Interior
Customer Services Engineering
Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 44 59
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 44 38
philippe.le-bigot@airbus.com
Being a system designed to be
used in emergencies, slide
deployment is fast and quite
violent, as the slide has to be
ready to evacuate passengers
from the aircraft very quickly
after the door opens. Because
of this deploying a slide or slide
raft for test requires some pre-
caution in order to prevent any
fuselage damage or interference
in the sequence. Making a
video of the tests in order to be
able to investigate possible fail-
ures is recommended.
Airbus would be grateful for
feedback on all deployments,
successful or otherwise, as
described in SIL 25-061.
 A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS

Most major airports are facing significant

passenger growth, growing congestion,
and limited potential for expansion.

A380 P A G E
7

A solution for airports
Given the unique nature of the A380’s size with
greater span, height, seating capacity and weights, a
team dedicated to the A380 airport compatibility
aspects was set up in 1994, 12 years before the
planned entry into service. Dialogue with major world
airports is now well-established and many are using
the A380 as the reference aircraft for master planning.
The availability of the A380 Airplane Characteristics
for Airport Planning manual, on the Airbus web site
since February 2002 has significantly supported this
process. In parallel, work with regulatory authorities
and on environmental aspects is ongoing. Many
aspects of the A380 design have been driven by
airport compatibility considerations, thus minimising
FAST 33
the amount of adaptation and, hence investment,
required by airports to accommodate the aircraft.
Most major airports are planning for operations of
large aircraft, mainly because they are facing
significant passenger growth, growing congestion,
and limited potential for expansion. These airports,
therefore, see the A380 as a boost for business: it will
enable them to increase revenue for relatively little
expenditure within the limits of their existing
infrastructure. Dialogue and combined working
groups are key elements in defining the A380 and
airport master plans.

Willy-Pierre Dupont Thomas Burger

Director Infrastructure & Environment Senior Marketing Analyst A380
A380 Programme Airbus Marketing Division
 A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS

Figure 1 - Likely first A380 airports
Airbus is working closely with 60 airports (Figure 1) that are likely to see Figure 2 - Designed for airport integration
the A380 before 2010 as indicated by existing and potential customers. Of
these airports, many are A380 compatible today and those that do require
infrastructure changes have planned and in some cases started work on the
relevant upgrades. In addition surveys have been carried out and contacts
established with further airports based on carrier interest and Airbus
forecasts for future A380 routes.

P A G E P A G E
8 9
FAST 33

AIRPORT COMPATIBILITY
Many recommendations that
Airbus received during it’s
extensive consultations with
airports and regulatory authorities
have directly shaped the design of
the A380. The main characteristics
that have been optimised for better
airport integration are summarised
in Figure 2. The landing gear
width and 20-wheel design will
allow the aircraft to use 23m wide
taxiways and have a comparable
pavement loading to existing
aircraft. Furthermore the A380
will be certificated for unrestricted
operations on 45m wide runways.
In the context of terminal
operations, the door locations and
cabin layout allow comparable
turn around times to the 747-400
with 35% more passengers
boarded. Ground servicing points
are located in similar positions to
other widebody aircraft allowing
the use of existing ground
servicing equipment. As well as
the physical characteristics, the
field performance of the aircraft
has been optimised to allow the
A380 to operate from any airport
that the 747 does today.
There are a number of factors that
relate to the wingspan, weight and
capacity of the aircraft that airports
will have to take into consideration
however. With a wingspan of
79.8m(262ft) and fin height of
24m(79.6ft) the main area that
airports will need to address are
runway and taxiway separation
distances. These vary from one
airport to another with many newer
airports already being fully A380
compliant. Although the pavement
loading of the A380 is comparable
to existing aircraft, the weight-
bearing limit of tunnels and
bridges will need to be verified to
ensure they are capable of
FAST 33
supporting the 562t Maximum
Ramp Weight of the aircraft.
Parking stands will need to be
upgraded to cater for the greater
wingspan, alternatively the size of
aircraft on the stands either side of
an A380 could be limited. With a
seating capacity approximately
35% higher than the 747-400,
terminal facilities directly related
to aircraft capacity such as gate
holding rooms, may require
modification. The amount of
modification required at airports
will vary considerably dependant
on the compatibility of existing
infrastructure.
 A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS
THE SMART INVESTMENT
FOR AIRPORTS
Many airports are already
congested today, accommodating
future growth with the existing
aircraft mix would require
additional infrastructure to provide
the extra stands and slots. This
would require the construction of
new runways, taxiways, parking
areas, terminals and gates with
costs in the region of several
billion dollars. As aircraft capacity
has hardly changed for three
P A G E decades there is an urgent need to
10 prepare for the future. The A380
carries 35% more passengers than
FAST 33
a 747, thus allowing airports to
accommodate growth within their
current infrastructure, therefore
mitigating the need for such
massive infrastructure investment.
Adaptation of airports to
accommodate larger aircraft is
cheaper, simpler and more space
efficient than the duplication of
runways and gates. For those
airports that are land constrained
and/or movement limited by local
environmental legislation, large
aircraft are the only solution to
cater for growth. The costs related
to the integration of the A380 are
incremental and relate only to
airside, apron and terminal
upgrades ($100 million - Airports
Council International – North
America average). They are
dependent on a variety of factors
including the level and layout of
existing infrastructure, frequency
of A380 operation and adoption of
operational recommendations. This
level of investment is small in
comparison to total airport
expenditure and much less than
that required for new airports,
which are also subject to very long
planning and construction periods.
REGULATORY ASPECTS
The costs of adapting an airport to
handle the A380 can be minimized
by applying current accepted air-
port operational recommendations
rather than design recommenda-
tions (Figure 3), which are applica-
ble to new airports and new areas
of existing airports. The A380
Airport Compatibility Group
(AACG) was the first group dedi-
cated to airport operational recom-
mendations and they now work
jointly with the FAA and ICAO on
A380 operations. The AACG
Common Agreement Document
was completed at the end of 2002.
Four European civil aviation
authorities have signed a letter,
stating that the AACG document
constitutes a sound basis for any
adaptation of their respective regu-
lations, to facilitate the introduc-
tion of the A380 for safe and har-
monised operations into existing
airports. A CD-ROM containing
the complete AACG documenta-
tion was officially released to
ICAO on January 31st, 2003.
Dissemination of AACG work to
ICAO, FAA, A380’ airlines and
airports, international and working
groups dealing with new large
aircraft operations was conducted
through presentations at ICAO
Europe (October 2002), ICAO
Montreal (November 2003) and
FAA (November 2002).
Following the dissemination of the
AACG work Airbus is currently
A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS
assisting in the definition of opera-
tional recommendations in con-
junction with both ICAO (circular
on new large aircraft operations,
including A380 specifics discussed
at Airport Design Study Group
meetings in July and October 2003
- planned to be issued by year end)
and the FAA (modification of stan-
dards requested by major US
airports - expected FAA answers
by early 2004).
GROUND OPERATIONS
The main driver for ground opera-
tions of the A380 was to be as com-
patible as possible to existing wide-
body aircraft in all key areas, these
include manoeuvrability on ramp
and taxiway systems and terminal
operations. To facilitate this aim,
Airbus has and continues to work
closely with airlines, airports,
ground handling companies,
ground servicing equipment (GSE)
manufacturers to ensure the all
Compatible with existing taxiway systems P A G E
aspects of ground operations will 11
be ready for the A380 when it
FAST 33
enters service.
MANOEUVRABILITY
Recent modifications to corners of
taxiways to suit the greater turning
circles of the A340-600 and 777-
300 will allow the A380 to manoeu-
vre without restriction (Figure 4).
Although the track of the A380
landing gear is slightly wider than
those aircraft its wheelbase is short-
er. This means that the effective
clearance between the main wheels
of the A380 and the edge of the
taxiway is greater. Visibility from
the cockpit also directly influences
the accuracy of ground manoeu-
vring and in this respect the A380’s
mid-deck cockpit position offers a
better field of vision than the 747. Figure 4 - Turning Radii of the A380
It also makes the transition from compared to existing wide-body aircraft
other Airbus wide-body types to the
A380 easier for pilots.
 A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS

Figure 7 - Balanced boarding flows

Figure 5 - A380 conventional ground servicing points

1. Pressure refuel connectors

2. Hydraulic reservoir servicing panel
(reservoir filling and reservoir pressurisation)
3. Engine oil filling
4. VF generator oil filling
5. Toilet and waste service panel
6. Ground electrical power
7. Low pressure preconditioned air
8. Yellow hydraulic ground connector
9. Green hydraulic ground connector
10. Potable water service panel
11. APU oil filling
12. High pressure air engine start
P A G E
13. Refuel/Defuel control panel
12 14. Oxygen system
FAST 33
between Doors 1 left and right on
the main deck. This allows the
same two bridge arrangement to
be used as the 747 but results in
separate and simultaneous board-
ing flows onto the upper and main
decks (Figure 7). This consider-
ably improves passenger boarding
and de-boarding times, a critical
component in the turn around time
of a large aircraft.
In those cases where airlines or air-
ers have shown detailed design
solutions for such a vehicle whose
main requirement is to service the
8m high upper deck directly. As
part of its commitment to ensuring
the availability and safe operation
of such vehicles by A380 entry
into service, Airbus has recently
completed a full scale partial
mock-up of the A380 in Toulouse
(Figure 8) which will be used for P A G E
operational testing. These tests 13
will initially use existing 5m main

TERMINAL OPERATIONS
Essentially from the main deck to
Figure 6 - A380 ramp layout with main deck servicing
ground level the A380 offers the
same accessibility as existing
wide-body aircraft. Ground servic-
ing locations have been agreed
with airlines to ensure compatibil-
ity with existing ground servicing
vehicles (Figure 5 & 6). The size
of the A380 cabin will drive spe-
cific ground servicing require-
ments, in particular for the amount
of electrical power and precondi-
tioned air. Additional ports for
ground electrical power and a
higher flow rate for the precondi-
tioned air cater for the increased
demand, which existing servicing
equipment can provide.
The cabin architecture of the A380
allows turn-around times similar
to the 747-400. This has largely
been achieved by the optimal posi-
tioning of the A380’s wide dual
lane stairs in the cross aisle
FAST 33
ports wish to offer an increased deck capable catering vehicles to
level of passenger service or faster validate positioning concepts and
turn-around times, specialised the interaction with other GSE.
equipment such as upper deck When prototype upper deck cater-
boarding bridges and upper deck ing vehicles are available, the
catering vehicles are required. In mock-up will be offered for full
those applications which necessi- scale operational testing and pos-
tate new equipment with direct sibly familiarisation training.
upper deck access capability,
Figure 8 - Initial positioning tests
Airbus has taken a proactive conducted at the full scale A380 upper
approach in facilitating the com- deck catering vehicle mock-up
munication between the airlines,
airports and GSE manufacturers.
This primarily includes the organi-
sation of working groups and open
forums where manufacturers can
present their design concepts and
receive feedback from airlines and
ground handling companies. As
well as the organisation of these
meetings, Airbus provides A380
technical data and has set up e-
rooms which greatly aid the inter-
change of information between
working group members.
Instigated in February 2001, the
upper deck catering vehicle work-
ing group is the longest running of
these forums. Several manufactur-
 A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS
PAVEMENT LOADING
Full scale pavement testing to
optimize and validate A380
landing gear design was started in
1998 at Toulouse Blagnac airport
(Figure 9) with two phases
(flexible and rigid pavement tests).
New test-validated methodologies
are under development, using a
Figure 9 - Location of Pavement
Experimental Programme (PEP) sites
P A G E
14
FAST 33
Figure 10 - Pavement tests
software called ALIZE to
supplement and eventually replace
the current Aircraft/Pavement
Classification Number (ACN/PCN)
method which although widely
used has limited theoretical basis.
The development process will
see ALIZE calibrated against
results from full-scale static and
fatigue tests using real aircraft
on both flexible and rigid
pavements. A380 landing gear
configurations as well as those
for some competing aircraft were
reproduced using a landing gear
configuration test vehicle. The
results obtained from the test
vehicle were also validated
against production aircraft.
In both of the tests four 30m x 35m
segments of pavement were
prepared, each separated by 5m of
neutral pavement. (Figure 10).
Each segment represented a
pavement laid on a different
quality of natural foundation called
subgrade and measured on the
CBR (California Bearing Ratio)
A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS
scale. The three weaker subgrades
CBR10, 6 and 4 were covered first
with a layer of humidified
reconstituted crushed gravel then a
layer of asphalted gravel and
finally with a layer of either
asphalt for the flexible surface or
concrete for the rigid surface.
Dozens of strain gauges were
placed in the surface to measure Airbus can now simulate any
the effect of different weights of landing gear configuration with the
aircraft on the pavement. associated aircraft weight and load
transferred through each wheel.
The landing gear configuration test The strain gauges on the eight
vehicle was built to simulate pavement and subgrade samples
different full scale landing gear show the actual load on the • Modular assembly (2 to 5 bogies)
layouts and different weights of surface. Results obtained from the • Full-scale landing gear
aircraft (Figure 11). A340 wheels pavement tests have been in line • Variable track and tandem
• Wheel load up to 32 tons
and tyres were used with tyre with the outputs from the ALIZE • A340 tyres (pressure adjustment to
pressure being varied to simulate model and validate the comparable simulate other aircraft tyres)
the tyres of different aircraft types. pavement loading of the A380 to • Auto-powered (2 to 4km)
A load per wheel of up to 32 tonnes existing aircraft.
was made possible by the addition
of ballast to the vehicle. Both
Airbus and other aircraft were used
to validate the results obtained
from the vehicle tests. P A G E
15
FAST 33
Figure 11 - Modular landing
gear test vehicle
 A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS
Nominal noise level (EPNdB)
P A G E
16
FAST 33
Figure 12 - A380 noise levels in comparison
to international and local limits
CONTACT DETAILS
Conclusion
Willy-Pierre Dupont
Director Infrastructure & Environment
A380 Programme
Tel: +33 (0)5 62 11 03 12
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 35 86
willy-pierre.dupont@airbus.com
Thomas Burger
Senior Marketing Analyst A380
Airbus Marketing Division
Tel: +33 (0)5 62 11 84 73
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 31 01
thomas.burger@airbus.com
This web edition updates the paper
version reflecting the evolution of
the programme.
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECT
NOISE
Low noise characteristics have
been a major design driver and as a
result the A380 will be
significantly quieter than current
large aircraft and have substantial
margins in relation to today’s
(ICAO stage 3) and future (ICAO
stage 4) noise limits. As well as
international regulation, the A380
also has a significant advantage
over existing large aircraft based
on the very stringent local noise
regulation such as the Quota Count
(QC) system at the London
airports of Heathrow, Gatwick and
Stansted (Figure 12).
These noise levels have been
Cumulative vs stage 3 (EPNdB)
achieved through the optimisation
of the engines, nacelles and
airframe. In addition to the
physical optimisation, the A380
will be equipped with a novel
function that will see the Flight
Management System (FMS)
programmed with optimal noise
trajectories. These will allow the
aircraft to reliably and
continuously follow the Noise
Abatement Departure Procedure
(NAPD) while taking into account
actual aircraft parameters and
ambient conditions.
The A380 offers airports an and hence investment. Airbus
immediate solution to cope with continues to work with all par-
the forecast ongoing growth in ties concerned to ensure that
air traffic. With its larger capaci- airports will be ready for the
ty it offers the most efficient use A380 when it enters into service
of terminal stands and runway in 2006.
slots thereby mitigating the
requirement for complex and From an environmental per-
costly infrastructure develop- spective the application of
ment. Through a process of new technology and intensive
consultation from a very early research has enabled the
stage, many aspects of the A380 to combine the intrinsic
A380 have been optimised for advantages of its larger
airport compatibility resulting in capacity with much lower
an aircraft that can be integrat- noise compared to existing
ed into existing airports with a large aircraft.
minimum of change
 APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTION

Approach-and-Landing P A G E
17
Accident Reduction

FAST 33
A global programme for
flight operations safety enhancement
Aviation safety, measured in terms of number of hull losses
per departure, has reached a mature, but stable, level. Any further
enhancement of this achievement requires a systematic approach
where the aircraft, the operations and the operating environment
are considered globally.

The on-going industry effort to reduce approach-and-landing

accidents is an illustration of global teamwork involving the
aircraft manufacturers, the airlines, the state regulatory
authorities and all other actors of the aviation system
(e.g., flight academies, service providers).

Michel Trémaud
Senior Director Safety and Security
Airbus Customer Services
 APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTION APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTION

The Approach and Landing Accident
Reduction (ALAR) effort certainly is
the largest flight safety initiative ever
initiated by the aviation industry. The
ALAR project was launched by the
Flight Safety Foundation in 1996 as
a new phase of the Controlled Flight
Into Terrain (CFIT) accident
reduction programme started in
1992.
The Flight Safety Foundation is
an international membership
organization dedicated to the
continuous improvement of
aviation safety. Safety initiatives
launched by the Flight Safety
Foundation draw on the support
of the worldwide aviation
industry, thus ensuring the wide
acceptance and dissemination of
the resulting conclusions and
recommendations.
Airbus has been an active
contributor to the CFIT accident
P A G E reduction project and makes a
18 continuing major contribution to the
on-going ALAR effort.
FAST 33
DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH
TO CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Flight Safety Foundation
ALAR task force collected and
analyzed data related to a
significant set of approach-and-
landing accidents, including those
resulting in controlled-flight-into-
terrain (CFIT). The task force
developed conclusions and
recommendations for practices
that would improve safety in
approach-and-landing, in the
following domains:
• air traffic control - training
and procedures,
• airport facilities,
• aircraft equipment,
• aircraft operations and training.
All conclusions and recomm-
endations were data-driven and
supported by factual evidence of
their relevance to the reduction of
approach-and-landing incidents
and accidents.
Each conclusion is complemented
by a set of recommendations that has
been translated in a corresponding set
of Flight Operations Briefing Notes.
In addition to flight operations
and training recommendations,
the ALAR task force encourages
the operators to consider the
immediate benefit of:
• existing technology and
equipment such as Terrain
Awareness Warning Systems of
Global Positioning Systems,
• flight operations monitoring
systems,
• aviation information sharing
programmes.
IMPLEMENTATION
The conclusions and recomm-
endations of the ALAR task force
have been translated into industry
actions to ensure their effective
implementation. These actions have
been endorsed by the ICAO, the US
FAA, the European JAA and the
Upcoming workshops include two
in the Gulf region and one in
northern Asia. This continuing
regional communication effort is
paralleled by regional translation
initiatives that have further eased the
dissemination of the ALAR safety-
awareness information in the
following languages: Spanish,
Portuguese, Chinese, Russian and
French.
The cooperation and contribution
of all players in the global aviation
system are of paramount
importance to enhance partnership,
cooperation and communication
between:
• operators (commercial, cargo and
corporate),
• manufacturers,
• national and international
airlines and pilots associations,
• air traffic control/services,
• state regulatory authorities,
• state navigation agencies,
• services providers,
• training organizations.
TAWS
Terrain Awareness Warning System
(this is the ICAO terminology for EGPWS)
EGPWS
Enhanced Ground proximity Warning System
(this is, in fact, an Honeywell trademark)
GPS
Global Positioning System
FOQA
Flight Operations Quality Assurance (this is, initially, an FAA terminology
that refers primarily to the analysis of flight data)
FOM
Flight Operations Monitoring (this is an Airbus terminology)
FOM includes three components :
- Flight data analysis
(LOMS software = Line Operations Monitoring System)
- Line observations
(LOAS software = Line Observation Assessment System)
- Crew reporting
(AIRS software = Aircrew Incident Reporting System)
P A G E
19

SIZING ELEMENTS
Approach-and-landing accidents
(defined as accidents occurring
during the initial approach, final
approach and landing) represent
approximately 55% of total hull
losses and 50% of fatalities.
The flight segment from the outer
marker to the completion of the
landing roll represents only 4% of
the flight time but 45% of hull
losses.
This statistical data has not shown
any down trend over the past 40
years.
Five types of events account for
75% of approach-and-landing
incidents and accidents:
• CFIT (including landing short
of runway),
• loss of control in flight,
• runway overrun,
• runway excursion,
• unstabilized approach.
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND
TRAINING
The conclusions of the Flight
Safety Foundation ALAR task
force identify the following flight
operations and training issues as
frequent causal factors in
approach-and-landing accidents,
including those involving CFIT:
• standard operating procedures,
• decision-making in time-critical
situations,
• decision to initiate a go-around
when warranted,
• rushed and unstabilized
approaches,
• pilot/controller understanding
of each other’s operational
environment,
• pilot/controller communications,
• awareness of approach hazards
(visual illusions, adverse wind
conditions or operations on
contaminated runway),
• terrain awareness.
CAAC (Civil Aviation Authority of
China), to name the main regulatory
authorities supporting this effort.
In 2000 the Flight Safety Foundation
started a worldwide awareness
campaign that will ensure the
availability of this information to
everyone who participates in
approach-and-landing operations, so
that they can all play a part in
improving safety within their sphere
of influence.
This global effort, to which Airbus is
contributing, has raised the
awareness of the aviation community
in the following world regions:
• Central America and
Caribbean area,
• South America,
• Iceland,
• Africa,
• Southeast Asia,
• Australia,
• People’s Republic of China,
• Russia / CIS
• Europe.
FAST 33
This is essential to achieve a wide
dissemination of the ALAR
Education and Training Aid (ALAR
Tool Kit), including:
• CFIT and ALAR awareness
videos,
• Briefing Notes,
• Safety Alert Bulletins,
• Awareness Tool (checklist),
• Risk Reduction Guide.
They are also vital to facilitate an
easy and fast implementation of all
conclusions and recommendations.
ALAR BRIEFING NOTES
Airbus provided major leadership in
the development of the Flight Safety
Foundation ALAR Briefing Notes.
The ALAR Briefing Notes provide
an overview of the operational
standards, factors and prevention
strategies related to the various
aspects involved in approach-and-
landing accidents.
 APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTION
Airbus published the ALAR Briefing
Notes in the brochure "Getting to
grips with Approach and Landing
Accident Reduction" (Issue 1,
October 2000). Flight Safety
Foundation published the Briefing
Notes in "Flight Safety Digest" (Vol.
19, Nos 8 to 11, August to November
2000) and in "ALAR Tool Kit" (CD-
ROM).
Overall, approximately 35000
copies of the ALAR Briefing Notes
have been disseminated worldwide,
under paper or CD-ROM format.
The scope of the ALAR Briefing
Notes actually extends well beyond
approach-and-landing accidents, by
addressing:
• wind shear awareness in all
flight phases, including takeoff
and landing,
• terrain awareness in all flight
phases,
P A G E • descent-and-approach
20 preparation,
• initial descent management,
FAST 33
• go-around and missed-approach.
This extended scope addresses the
type of events and causal factors
involved in approximately 70% of
total hull losses.
ALAR Briefing Notes consist of 34
standalone documents grouped under
8 chapters, (see table right).
ACCIDENT-PREVENTION
STRATEGY
The ALAR Briefing Notes have been
designed to allow an eye-opening
and self-correcting accident-
prevention strategy. To support this
strategy, each Briefing Note:
• presents the subject in the CFIT
and/or ALAR context, using
statistical data,
• emphasises the applicable
standards and best practices
(e.g., standard operating
procedures [SOPs], supplementary
techniques, flying techniques and
training guidelines),
• lists and discusses the
operational and human factors
that may cause flight crews to
deviate from applicable standards
(for eye-opening purposes),
• provides or suggests company
accident-prevention strategies
and/or personal lines-of-
defense (for prevention
purposes or for correction
purposes),
• establishes a summary of
operational and training key
points,
• provides cross-reference to
other Briefing Notes, whenever
appropriate,
• refers to ICAO, US FAR and
European JAR regulatory
documents.
The proposed education and
training strategy is valid at both
company and personal level for:
• risk awareness (eye-opening
aspect),
• exposure assessment,
• identification of risk-related
prevention strategies (at
company level) and lines-of-
defense (at company and/or
personal levels),
• supporting the analysis of flight
data, line checks and line audits,
• implementing relevant
prevention strategies and/or
corrective actions.
APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTION
Figure 1
ALAR BRIEFING NOTES
1 STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES (SOPS)
1.1 Operating Philosophy
1.2 Optimum Use of Automation
1.3 Operations Golden Rules
1.4 Standard Calls
1.5 Normal Checklists
1.6 Approach and Go-around
Briefings
2 CREW CO-ORDINATION
2.1 Human Factors in Approach-
Figure 2
and-Landing Accidents
2.2 CRM Issues in Approach-and-
landing Accidents
2.3 Effective Pilot/Controller
Communications
2.4 Intra-Cockpit Communications –
Managing Interruptions and
Distractions
3 ALTIMETER AND ALTITUDE ISSUES
3.1 Altimeter Setting – Use of Radio
Altimeter (see figure 1)
3.2 Altitude deviations
P A G E
21
4 DESCENT AND APPROACH
FAST 33
MANAGEMENT
4.1 Descent and Approach Profile
Management Figure 3
4.2 Energy Management during
Approach (see figure 2)
5 APPROACH HAZARDS AWARENESS
5.1 Approach Hazards Awareness
General
5.2 Terrain Awareness
5.3 Visual Illusions Awareness
5.4 Windshear Awareness
6 READINESS AND COMMITMENT
TO GO-AROUND
6.1 Being Prepared to Go-around
6.2 Flying a Manual Go-around
6.3 Terrain Avoidance ( Pull-up) Note: Should any deviation appear
8 LANDING TECHNIQUES
Manoeuvre 8.1 Preventing Runway Excursions between the information provided in
6.4 Bounce Recovery – Rejected and Overruns the ALAR Briefing Notes and that
Landing 8.2 The Final Approach Speed published in the applicable Airplane
8.3 Factors Affecting Landing Flight Manual (AFM), Flight Crew
7 APPROACH TECHNIQUES Distance Operating Manual (FCOM), Quick
7.1 Flying Stabilised Approaches 8.4 Optimum Use of Braking Devices Reference Handbook (QRH) and
7.2 Flying Constant-Angle non- 8.5 Landing on Wet or Contaminated Flight Crew Training Manual
Precision Approaches Runway (FCTM), the latter shall prevail at
(figure 3) 8.6 About Wind Information all times.
7.3 Acquisition of Visual References What’s your Current Wind ?
7.4 Flying Visual Approaches 8.7 Crosswind Landing
 APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTION

HOW TO USE AND IMPLEMENT THE ALAR BRIEFING NOTES

The ALAR Briefing Notes should be used by airlines to enhance the awareness of approach-and-landing
accidents (including those resulting in CFIT) among flight crews and cabin crews.

MANAGEMENT PILOTS should review, customise (as required) and implement the ALAR recommendations,
guidelines and awareness information, in the following domains:

■ Operational Standards: standard operating procedures (e.g., to incorporate ALAR-critical items), procedures
and techniques/ supplementary techniques.

■ Training Standards: simulator training to develop new scenarios for line oriented flight training (LOFT) or
special purpose operational training (SPOT), crew resource management (CRM) training to develop new
topical subjects to support CRM discussions.

■ Safety Awareness Information: airline bulletins and airline safety magazine articles, classroom lectures
(using ALAR Briefing Notes and associated presentations and videos), stand-alone reading.

LINE PILOTS should review and compare the CFIT/ALAR recommendations, guidelines and awareness
information with their current practices and enhance their techniques and awareness level, as required.

OTHER ACTORS in the global aviation system such as: air traffic control services, navigation state agencies,
operational authorities, service providers, flight academies… should use the provision of the ALAR Briefing
Notes to evaluate their possible contribution to the reduction of CFIT and Approach-and-Landing accidents.

P A G E
22 BEYOND THE ALAR EFFORT This effort will span the years
2003-2006 and will cover the
FAST 33

The wide acceptance of the ALAR following domains:

Briefing Notes by the pilot
community and the positive
feedback received from customers
have prompted Airbus to initiate
the development of new sets of
Flight Operations Briefing Notes,
in order to cover the entire flight
profile and address the main
threats and hazards to flight
operations safety.
• takeoff and departure safety,
• climb and cruise safety,
• weather threats,
• environmental hazards,
• cabin safety and security,
• other operational hazards, as
suggested by the lessons learnt
from the operational and human
factors analysis of in-service
occurrences.

CONTACT DETAILS
Michel Trémaud
Senior Director
Safety and Security
Airbus Customer Services
Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 33 30 04
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 29 68
michel.tremaud@airbus.com
Conclusion
Jim Burin
Director, Technical Programs
Flight Safety Foundation
Burin@flightsafety.org
Jim_Burin@email.msn.com
http://www.flightsafety.org
Flight safety enhancement has been, and will
continue to be, the result of technological
developments. However, 85% of accidents
today are operational events that involve
human performance at every stage of the
safety chain.
Human performance can be, and must be,
enhanced by the wide dissemination of
safety-awareness information.

Safety awareness is a mindset, it is …

being mentally prepared.
 PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS

Preventing
ignition sources P A G E
23

inside fuel tanks

FAST 33
Following the B747 TWA centre
The FAA has identified 6 cases of large aircraft fuel tank explosions since 1963: wing tank explosion in 1996, the
National Transportation Safety
◗ 1963 - B707, Elkton in Maryland. Empty wing tank explosion
Board (NTSB) in the United
◗ 1970 - DC-8, Toronto. External fuel fire caused tank explosion
States made recommendations to
◗ 1976 - B747-100, Spain. Iranian Air Force, empty wing tank explosion,
lightning strike during descent enhance the already good safety
◗ 1990 - B737-300, Manila. Philippines, empty centre tank explosion during record of aircraft fuel systems
pushback from gate worldwide. Subsequently the FAA
◗ 1996 - B747, TWA 800, Long Island USA. Empty centre tank explosion during and JAA introduced new
climb requirements relative to the
◗ 2001- B737-400, Bangkok Thailand. Empty centre tank explosion a few prevention of fuel tank explosions.
minutes after refuelling This article describes the major
activities undertaken by Airbus, in
order to further improve safety
margins.

Ross Walker José-Luis Mauriz-Digon

Engineering Programme Manager Senior Engineer Fuel Systems
Fuel Tank Safety (SFAR88) Customer Services Engineering Services
 PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS
AIRBUS ACTIVITIES PRIOR
TO FAA/JAA REQUIREMENTS
An exhaustive design review of
the fuel systems installed on the
various aircraft types has been
launched in order to identify any
situation that may in certain con-
ditions lead to the presence of an
ignition source inside or adjacent
to a fuel tank, and initiate appro-
priate action.
An inspection programme known
as Aircraft Fuel System Safety
Programme (AFSSP) was devel-
oped. Many representatives of the
air transport industry, ATA (Air
Transport Association of
America), AEA (Association of
European Airlines), AAPA
(Association Asian Pacific
Airlines), AIA (Aerospace
Industries Association of
America), AECMA (European
Association of Aerospace
P A G E Industries) and other groups par-
24 ticipated.
FAST 33
The aim of this inspection pro-
gramme was to:
• gather data on the condition of
in-service fuel tanks,
• where necessary, identify fol-
low-up activities to ensure the
continued airworthiness of these
tanks. These follow-up activities
included updated maintenance
programmes and / or corrective
action Service Bulletins.
The conclusions of the design
review, inspection programme and
the subsequent engineering analysis,
showed that the design of the fuel
tank systems used on Airbus aircraft
remains in general valid and func-
tional throughout the aircraft life.
In addition to above activities
Airbus participated in the FAA
Aviation Rule Making Advisory
Committee’s (ARAC) Fuel Tank
Harmonisation Working Groups
(FTHWG) 1 & 2.
The aim of the first FTHWG was
to:
• review in-service history of
fuel tank explosions to identify
common contributory factors,
• assess various means of reducing
or eliminating exposure to opera-
tion of transport airplane fuel
tanks with explosive fuel air mix-
tures, or eliminating the resultant
hazard if ignition does occur,
• assess the level of fuel tank
exposure to flammable
vapours.
It concluded that:
• heated centre wing tanks had a
significantly higher incidence
of fuel tank explosions than
other types of fuel tank,
• heated centre wing tanks had a
significantly higher exposure to
flammable fuel vapours than
unheated fuel tanks.
The aim of the second FTHWG
was to provide a cost benefit
study of fuel tank Nitrogen
Inerting Systems. Nitrogen
Inerting is a process where inert
gas is introduced into the ullage
(volume within fuel tank not
occupied with liquid) of a fuel
tank so the oxygen content of the
ullage is reduced to a point where
ignition and subsequent combus-
tion is precluded It concluded that
Interting systems were not yet
economically viable with the
Inerting requirements stipulated
by the FAA (Oxygen concentra-
tion less than 9%) and the exist-
ing technology.
PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS
JAA AND FAA For Low flammability tanks
REQUIREMENTS known combinations of failures
should be assessed. “Known”
In April 2001 the FAA issued means those conditions that have
Special Federal Aviation occurred in-service and are likely
Regulation (SFAR) 88 applicable to re-occur on other products of
to aircraft registered in the USA. the same or similar type design.
The JAA developed a similar pol-
icy, the JAA INT/POL 25/12,
mandatory for all Airbus aircraft.
Both regulations relate to the pre-
vention of ignition sources within Tank flammability exposure
fuel tanks of current type certifi-
cated aircraft. Both regulations
require carrying out a one-time
fuel system safety and design
review. However, the assessment
methodology differs:
JAA INTERIM POLICY 25/12
Wing tanks <7%
JAA require current standards as Trim tank <7%
per JAR 25.1309 methodology i.e.
demonstrating that an ignition
Additional centre tanks
source could not result from each
(pressurized) <7%
single failure, and from all combi-
nations of failures not shown to be P A G E
extremely improbable. The effects 25
of manufacturing variability, age-
FAST 33
ing, wear, corrosion, and likely Heated centre tanks (pressurized) >7% ) High flammability tank
damage must be considered.
FAA SFAR88
FAA requires an additional
assessment demonstrating that an
ignition source could not result
from each single failure in combi- FAA assessment standard/methodology: AC 25.981-1B
nation with each latent failure
condition not shown to be
extremely remote. In-tank current limit
30mA (no previous limit)
The FAA also distinguishes
between High Flammability and Maintenance error
Low Flammability fuel tanks in considered to exist
the consideration of failure com- on every flight
In-tank energy
binations. A tank is considered to
limit 20µJ
be a High Flammability Tank if
instead of 200µJ
the fuel ullage remains flammable Existing latent failure
more than 7% of the fleet opera- considered to exist
tional time for the aircraft type on every flight
(the time from the start of prepar-
ing the aircraft until the disem-
barking of payload and passen-
gers). If it is flammable less than
7% of the time, it is considered to Adverse environmental
be a Low Flammability tank. conditions considered
to exist on every flight
 PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS
For High flammability tanks
P A G E “Foreseeable” combinations of
26 failures must be assessed. An
event or condition is considered
FAST 33
foreseeable if the physics of the
failure can be defined and the
occurrence of the failure during
the exposure period in question
cannot be acceptably ruled out.
The FAA also proposed Advisory
Circular (AC) 25.981-1B. This
AC sets a new and more stringent
design standard for the industry
and considerably reduces the
design limits for in-tank energy
and current. The previous energy
limit of 200 micro Joules is
reduced to 20 micro Joules for
normal operations (excluding
threats from environmental
effect, e.g. lightning for which
200 micro Joules existing limit
still applies). A new current limit
is also set to 30 milliAmps for
normal operations (no previous
existing limits).
FAA SFAR 88
SPOT AMENDMENT
FLAMMABILITY EXPOSURE
RISK
Following research by the FAA
Technical Centre, the FAA estab-
lished that the oxygen concentra-
tion required to prevent fuel tank
ignition on military aircraft in
combat zones (9%) was exces-
sively conservative when applied
to commercial aircraft. The FAA
identified that, at sea level, an
oxygen concentration of 12% is
an acceptable level of protection
against fuel tank ignition for com-
mercial aircraft.
The FAA also assessed that the
technology for nitrogen inerting
to reduce the oxygen concentra-
tion to less than 12% is practical
and cost effective.
The FAA issued a Spot
Amendment to the SFAR 88 in
August 2002. This amendment
introduced an alternative means
of compliance (AMOC) affecting
the assessment required for High
Flammability tanks. The AMOC
allows fuel tank inerting to be
used to lower the flammability of
High Flammability tanks such
that the assessment required is
equivalent to Low Flammability
fuel tanks.
AIRBUS COMPLIANCE
TO AIRWORTHINESS
AUTHORITIES
REQUIREMENTS
On 4th December, 2002,
Airbus issued a single set of
documents by aircraft family
(A300/A310, A320 and A330
/A340 Families) to satisfy both
the JAA INT/POL 25/12 and
FAA SFAR 88 requirements.
These reports provide the
results of the design, safety
and maintenance review car-
ried out on the fuel systems
and zones adjacent to the fuel
tanks of each Airbus aircraft
family.
Airbus assessment considers
only safety. The solutions con-
sidered cost and retrofit feasi-
bility. The results of the Airbus
assessment are based on
Authority, Industry and Airline
meetings and on the FAA state-
ment that “Non compliance
with SFAR 88 by itself is not
automatically an unsafe condi-
tion”.
The assessment identified the fol-
lowing subjects where corrective
action/modification is required to
correct non-compliance:
◗ 1. In-tank wiring
◗ 2. Pump wiring
◗ 3. Pump dry running
◗ 4. Bonding
◗ 5. Adjacent systems
◗ 6. Arc gaps
Many of the modifications were
developed by Airbus as part of
Continued Airworthiness Process
prior to the new JAA and FAA
regulations, but were not mandat-
ed for all aircraft by the
Airworthiness Authorities. The
complete list of modifications can
be found in the Airbus-On-Line-
Services FTP site “Aircraft Fuel
Tank Safety”
PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS
1. IN-TANK WIRING
Threat:
Electrical energy entering the
fuel tank due to normal oper-
ation, short circuits and
induced current/voltage on to
fuel systems wiring potentially P A G E
leading to ignition of flamma- 27
ble vapours.
FAST 33
The only wiring inside the Airbus
fuel tanks is intrinsically safe
wiring associated with the fuel
quantity indicating (FQI) and fuel
level sense systems (FLSS). There
are no high-power cables in the
fuel tanks including all fuel pump
wirings which are routed exter-
nally to the fuel tanks.
Typical external wiring to fuel pumps
Investigations prior to the SFAR
88 regulation showed on A319
and A320 aircraft that shorting
between 28V DC and FQI probe
wiring could cause the FQI
probes to be heated to a tempera-
ture in excess of 200°C (230°C is
the auto ignition temperature of
Jet A fuel). All FQI probes are co-
routed with 28V DC wires. In
1999 Airbus introduced fused
adapters for the FQI probe har-
nesses of the centre tanks and
fused plug connectors for the FQI
probe harnesses of the wing
tanks. The fuses prevent the FQI
probe temperature from exceed-
ing 200°C in the event of a short
 PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS
circuit between 28V DC wires and
the FQI probe wires. This modifi-
cation, applied in production since
2000, is identified as required for
compliance to the SFAR 88 and
JAA INT/POL 25/12.
Airbus identified a possible use of
non fuel resistant ‘P’clips in some
fuel tanks. This could facilitate the
potential for FQI and FLSS har-
nesses chafing against the metallic
part of the clip. Airbus will issue
an Inspection Service Bulletin to
check the clips and where neces-
sary replace them with fuel resis-
tant clips.
In investigations prior to the SFAR
88 regulation Airbus also identi-
fied, on A300/A310 and A320
Families aircraft, the lack of segre-
gation between FQI/FLSS wires
and 115V wiring, external to the
fuel tanks. Short circuits between
these wires could introduce energy
P A G E levels in excess of 200µJ into the
28 fuel tank. Modifications have been
developed to reduce that risk to
FAST 33
acceptable levels.
The FAA has re-defined in-tank
energy and current standards with
AC 25-981-1B, leading to non-
compliance with SFAR 88 within
Airbus fuel tanks. Airbus fuel
tanks were designed to the most
stringent intrinsic safety standards
at the time of certification. Airbus
has assessed that this non-compli-
ance is not an unsafe condition
(The FAA agrees that “Non com-
pliance with SFAR 88 by itself is
not automatically an unsafe con-
dition”) and therefore there is no
identified need for modifications
such as wiring segregation,
shielding, or barrier devices to
limit the amount of current and
energy into the tank such as
Transient Suppression Units
(TSU).
2. PUMP WIRING
Threat:
Spark erosion and hot spots
due to short circuits of pump
wiring.
The fuel pump wiring
is external to fuel
tanks in all
Airbus air-
craft.
The FAA acknowledges that rout-
ing of the cables outside fuel tanks
is a good practice.
Prior to SFAR 88, Airbus analysis
of in-service experience high-
lighted that some flight & mainte-
nance crews reset tripped circuit
breakers (C/B) without checking
the circuit for continuity and short
circuits to ground. This practice if
repeated could cause damage to
equipment and or structure that
could lead to energy in excess of
200µJ being released in an adja-
cent zone containing flammable
vapours or cause heating or spark
erosion of the structure. Airbus
updated the Aircraft Flight
Manual (AFM) and Aircraft
Maintenance Manual (AMM) to
include the statement not to reset
the C/B until the fault is isolated
in the event that any fuel tank
pump C/B is tripped.
In November 2002 the FAA made
a specific request to all manufac-
turers to assess Ground Fault
Interrupter (GFI) devices. A GFI
is a device that monitors the pump
supply and isolates it when a short
circuit to ground is detected. A
summation of the currents flow-
ing in the 3-phase supply is
detected by a hall effect sensor. If
a short circuit to ground is detect-
ed the supply to the pump is cut
by a relay. Arc occurrence to iso-
lation takes approximately
10msec. Airbus did not identify
any unsafe condition that would
require GFIs to be installed. So
GFIs were not included in the
Airbus compliance document.
3. PUMP DRY RUNNING
Threat:
Mechanical sparking due to
component wear or foreign
object damage (FOD) inside
the pumps.
The FAA requirement as identified
in AC 25.981-1B is that contacting
of the fuel pump impellers with
FOD should not cause an ignition
source.
PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS
To meet the requirements it must A320 fuel pump installation
be assumed that:
• FOD exists in the fuel pumps,
• the fuel tank ullage is always
flammable,
• latent failures in the tank/pump
exist,
• crew does switch off pumps
when required to do so by the
Low Pressure indication.
All engine feed pumps are
installed inside a collector cell that
is always maintained full limiting
the potential for fuel pump dry
running. All transfer pumps
(except for some early A300B2/B4
with a three man crew) have an
automatic shut-off feature that
operates when the affected fuel
tank is empty.
In addition, even though Airbus
design always keeps the pump
inlets covered with fuel, testing
was successfully performed to P A G E
positively demonstrate that the 29
pumps do not run dry for a period
FAST 33
in excess of the complete scavenge
cycle. Therefore no modifications
are needed to meet the require-
ments of AC 25.981-1B.
4. BONDING
Threat:
Electrical discharge in the fuel
tank due to lightning, High
Intensity Radiation Fields
(HIRF), static, and/or fault
currents.
The FAA requirement as identified
in AC 25.981-1B is that electrical
transients caused by environmental
conditions, such as lightning A320 fuel pipes bonding installation
strikes, with the potential to create
electrical sparks and arcs in the fuel
tank should be limited so that the
energy from any electrical spark or
arc from the electrical transient is
less than 200 micro Joules.
To meet the requirements it must
be assumed that:
• vapour in the tank is always
flammable,
 PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS
Bonding lead serviceable • latent failures exist, such as
failure of bonding jumpers,
since there is no annunciation
or indication of the bonding
failure,
• FOD exists in fuel tanks,
• the aircraft is struck by lightning
at the same time.
Due to the findings on the inspec-
tions carried out as part of the
AFSSP the FAA have expressed
concern that a bonding-lead fail-
ure is not an extremely remote
event.
As of September 2002, the FAA
has been promoting a one off
inspection of the ‘critical’ bond-
ing leads in each aircraft fleet to
ensure that the configuration of
Bonding lead corroded each aircraft is correct.
Based on the AFSSP survey find-
ings, the introduction of a sched-
uled maintenance inspection
P A G E every 12 years (8C check) on all
30 bonding leads is considered nec-
essary. In addition, an enhanced
FAST 33
closing procedure requires a veri-
fication of the bonding configura-
tion after each tank entry within
the work area to ensure the bonds
are maintained in good condition
for the life of the aircraft.
A bonding lead should be
replaced if the lead is found bro-
ken, frayed or corroded. A lead is
considered frayed if more than
five out of the 33 strands are bro-
ken. Airbus analysis identified
that less than five out of the 33
strands are all that are needed to
Bonding lead frayed/corroded provide an adequate bonding path.
Prior to SFAR 88 Airbus analysis
revealed that the electrical bond-
ing of some equipment in fuel
tanks is not in accordance with the
appropriate Design Directives and
therefore the adequacy of the
bonds cannot be assured for the
life of the aircraft. Airbus Service
Bulletins, for all Airbus aircraft,
require a revision of the electrical
bonding procedure for equipment
identified as not having a dedicat-
ed bonding path.
5. ADJACENT SYSTEMS
Threat:
Ignition sources adjacent to
fuel tanks due to:
• ignition of the fuel in the
tank due to electrical arcing
external to the fuel tank
penetrating the tank wall
and causing auto-ignition
of the fuel due to heating of
the tank wall. (During the
assessment normal system
operation, system failure and
an external fire were consid-
ered.)
• explosion of the adjacent
area itself. (The presence of
vapours is assumed, there-
fore no ignition source
should be present. Liquid
fuel falling on to hot sur-
faces is also considered).
In the A320 Family, the electri-
cal connections to the mainte-
nance light installed in the
hydraulics bay are not explosion
proof and could under certain
failure conditions cause ignition
of flammable vapours if present
in the zone. Airbus has intro-
duced a modification to discon-
nect and stow the wiring until
such time as a new fully explosion
proof maintenance light has
been developed.
On A330 and A340-200/300 air-
craft, in the event of a fuel leak
from the centre tank, fuel could
drip on equipment whose temper-
ature could be in excess of 200°C.
This could result in an undetected
fire in this zone. Airbus developed
a modification that installs drip
shields above unprotected equip-
ment to mitigate this risk.
On Airbus aircraft equipped with
a trim tank and a single APU
bleed leak detection loop (A340-
500/-600 have a dual loop), in the
event of an uncontrolled APU
bleed leak adjacent to the trim
tank, the tank wall temperature
could exceed 200°C. Under
MMEL, with the single bleed leak
PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS
A320 maintenance lights (pre mod situation)
Water drain valve
Unprotected
connections
Drip shields to be installed above hot surfaces
Centre fuel tank
Unprotected
connections
P A G E
31
FAST 33
detection loop failed, the aircraft
could be dispatched with no
restriction to APU bleed usage. As
an immediate solution the MMEL
has been revised to prohibit use of
the APU bleed if no APU bleed
leak detection loop is functioning,
in addition instructions for a sys-
tem test are being developed to
identify if the system has failed.
As a long-term solution on
A330/A340-200 and -300 aircraft
a modification to the flight warning
computer will remove the need to
perform a system test. In addition,
the introduction of a second bleed
leak detection loop is being devel-
oped for these aircraft so that they
can be dispatched under MMEL
with one loop failed.
A300/A310 aircraft have wires on
the wing leading and trailing edges
routed freely and directly fixed to
structure. Wires could potentially
chafe on screws or sharp structure,
in various locations. This could
lead to the ignition of flammable
vapours in the zone that could be
present on the ground.
 PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS

OBIGGS installed in the A320 cargo bay

Potential chafing
with rib
FQI wires
Conduit exit
Potential chafing point
A300/A310 potential chafing points
Due to the age of aircraft and the
variations between each aircraft,
an Inspection Service Bulletin
(ISB) is being developed in con-
junction with the Aging Transport
Systems Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ASTRAC). The ISB
will require a one-time inspection
of the leading and trailing edges
with a requirement to correct any
installations that could chafe or
are not to the correct installation
standard.
P A G E
32 6. ARC GAPS
FAST 33
quent modifications and actions.
The EASA states that they con-
sider ignition risk mitigation, and
flammability reduction as sepa-
rate issues that should not be
mixed.
A modification embodiment
schedule has been agreed with the
EASA:
• EASA require all modifica-
tions necessitating entry into
the tanks to be embodied by
the end of 2009,
• some modifications external to
fuel tanks have a more restric-
tive compliance date.
The FAA has not at the date of
writing of this article made a for-
mal response to the Airbus com-
pliance proposal.
Harmonization is needed to
achieve one solution for manufac-
tures and operators and to facili-
tate transfer of aeroplanes from
country to country. The FAA and
and descent rates and different
operational configurations of the
On-Board Inert Gas Generation
System (OBIGGS).
Flight tests have demonstrated the
functionality of the system. No
major abnormal system operation
was observed during different
phases of the ground and flight
test, and no significant impact can
be observed on the Engine Bleed
Air system when the FRS operated.
Variation in supply pressure and
temperature has a significant
effect on the overall system per-
formance. A reasonably uniform
oxygen concentration was observed
within the tank during the climb
and cruise. Normal servicing of
the aircraft was not hindered, but
the maintenance crew were
briefed on the operations associated
with the potential hazards of
Nitrogen rich atmosphere (e.g. and the FRS was not included in modifications already agreed with
asphyxiation). the Airbus compliance proposal. the EASA and listed in the Airbus P A G E
The installation of an FRS system On-line Services FTP site under 33
Airbus did not identify any unsafe would not remove the requirement Aircraft Fuel Tank Safety.

Threat:
Inadequate separation bet-
ween components and struc-
ture that could allow electrical
arcing due to lightning
To prevent electrical discharge
between un-bonded metallic com-
ponents and structure, a minimum
separation distance is required.
Prior to SFAR 88, Airbus issued
some inspection and modification
Service Bulletins to ensure that
the minimum clearances are met
between metallic components in
all fuel tanks.
EASA/FAA FEEDBACK
In October 2003 the EASA
(European Aviation Safety
Agency) replaced the JAA as the
prime certification Airworthiness
Authority for Airbus. The EASA
considers that Airbus has shown
compliance for all fuel tanks
(high and low flammability), for
all identified unsafe conditions,
by the existing design and subse-
JAA have previously stated that
harmonization is achieved except
for High Flammability Tanks. The
FAA and EASA are actively
working to establish a harmonised
position relating in the differences
in the rules explained previously.
AIRBUS INVESTIGATIONS ON
FLAMMABILITY REDUCTION
SYSTEMS
Airbus is investigating the
feasability and benefits of FRS as
an additional layer of protection
on top of existing ignition risk
mitigation. Airbus and the FAA
agreed to launch a joint test initia-
tive on A320 MSN1 flight test air-
craft using the FAA developed
Nitrogen Inerting System.
Ground testing of the system
included a period of 50 hours
mini endurance tests to gain con-
fidence in the system operation.
The flight-testing phase included
nine flights, exploring system
performance over a range of fuel
quantities in the tanks, climb
condition that would require FRS,
Conclusion
CONTACT DETAILS
José-Luis Mauriz-Digon
Senior Engineer Fuel Systems
Customer Services
Engineering Airbus
Tel: +33 (0)5 62 11 80 09
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 32 73
jose-luis.mauriz-digon@airbus.com
Ross Walker
Engineering Program Manager
Fuel Tank Safety (SFAR88)
Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 29 31
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 41 25
ross.walker@airbus.com
to apply the ignition risk mitigation
Airbus has undertaken major
activities related to fuel tank ignition
prevention. Most of Airbus
modifications addressing ignition
sources were developed as part of
Continued Airworthiness Process
prior to the new EASA and FAA
regulations.
Airbus issued in December 2002 a
single set of documents by aircraft
family to satisfy both the JAA
INT/POL 25/12 and FAA SFAR 88
requirements. Airbus assessment
considered safety first. The EASA
considers that Airbus has shown
compliance for all fuel tanks by the
existing design and the identified
modifications and actions.
As an additional layer of protection,
Airbus is investigating a
Flammability Reduction System.
FAST 33
Airbus and EASA consider ignition
risk mitigation and flammability
reduction as separate issues that
should not be mixed. Even with the
fitment of an FRS system, the
ignition risk mitigation modifications
agreed with the EASA will be
required.
The FAA has not made a formal
response to the Airbus compliance
proposal yet. Depending on the
outcome of the EASA/FAA
harmonisation activity, the
requirement for additional
modifications may be identified.
Airbus has set up an SFAR 88
Operational Team to ensure that all
Airbus resources are put in place
for a smooth introduction of all
ignition prevention related
modifications.
 ANEMOMETRIC LEAK DETECTION USING NEW HELIUM PRESSURE TOOL
Anemometric
leak detection
using new helium
pressure tool
Up to now, localising air data leaks has been a relatively difficult and
time-consuming operation for operators. This article describes the new
detector which has been tested and validated on A300, A300-600 and
A310 to find leaks in the air data systems.
BACKGROUND
Airbus experience shows that
airspeed and altitude issues are
P A G E often reported in service. One
34 cause of trouble could be pressure
leaks either on the total pressure
FAST 33
line or on the static pressure line.
Airbus A300, A300-600 and A310
are fitted with two main Air Data
Systems and one standby system.
Each of these main and standby
systems includes one pitot probe
(total pressure) and two static
probes (static pressure) connected
directly to the Air Data Computer
(ADC) for the two main systems
and to the standby instruments
(altitude & airspeed indicator) for
the standby system. These
connections are made through
several meters of pressure lines
whose length makes leak detection
difficult and time-consuming.
Alain Marsan Xavier Barriola
Technical Publication Navigation, Flight Guidance
Author Navigation System & Flight Management Systems
Airbus Customer Services Airbus Customer Services
CONTACT DETAILS
Xavier Barriola
Navigation, Flight Guidance &
Flight Management Systems
Airbus Customer Services
Tel: +33 (0)5 61 11 81 08
Fax: +33 (0)5 62 93 44 25
xavier.barriola@airbus.com
ANEMOMETRIC LEAK DETECTION USING NEW HELIUM PRESSURE TOOL
AN INNOVATIVE
APPROACH
Airbus has investigated
several devices and methods
to decrease leak detection
time and has selected a ground
pressure generator using helium,
manufactured by HELITECH. This
new device offers the required
sensitivity and reliability, and is a
great step forward compared to
previous methods. A procedure has
thus been created and implemented
in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual.
THE HELIUM TECHNIQUE
Helium is a non-toxic, inert gas,
which does not react chemically
with any other element, making it
intrinsically safe. In addition, due to
its low relative molecular mass, it
has a high penetration capability
allowing it to pass through the
smallest gaps. Helium is particularly
effective for leak detection because
of its low concentration in the
atmosphere, which allows easy
detection of any small increase.
Finally, it is an industrial gas
available anywhere in the world.
The procedure starts with a leak
check as described in the AMM
(34.10.00 Page Block 501) to
confirm the leak on the affected
system. Then, using the Helium
Detection Kit (referenced in the
Tool Equipment Manual 34.13.00
Conclusion
Alain Marsan
Technical Publication Author
Maintenance Support Navigation
Airbus Customer Services
Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 02 53
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 04 39
alain.marsan@airbus.com
as PN 102-01171) the air data
pressure line is filled with helium,
with pressure maintained at
20mb/30mb. The helium pumped
into the tube is then detected. When
the sniffer probe is moved along the
pressure pipes, there will be
different sound frequencies emitted
by the detection device depending
on how far the probe is from the P A G E
leak of helium. 35
FAST 33
Moreover, an optional telescopic
probe (1.5m long) can be adapted
to the equipment for use under
floor without having to remove the
floor panels to gain access to the
pipes to be tested. This process
permits significant timesaving for
aircraft maintenance and avai-
lability, and the flexibility of the
equipment means that it can be
used on all types of aircraft.
Up to now the method used
to locate leaks in the air data
pressure line was a difficult and
time-consuming operation. The
helium technique has been
tested on several aircraft and has
proved its efficiency; it can easily
save several hours of ground
time. This procedure has already
been implemented for the Airbus
A310 in the AMM 34-10-00
Page Block 501. A300 and
A300-600 AMM will be updated
at the next opportunity.
 APPROACH AND LANDING - PART 2 CUSTOMER SUPPORT ARTICLE
AROUND THE CLOCK... AROUND THE WORLD

Customer support
APPROACH AND LANDING PART 2

Accidents were a way of life in the very early days

of flying. They varied in form from slightly
embarrassing to fatal. In those days the light-
weight construction which gradually collapsed, and
slow speed, largely attenuated the effects of the
physical shock. WORLDWIDE
Jean-Daniel Leroy
VP Customer Support
Mr Brindejonc’s aeroplane, Tel: +33 5 61 93 35 04
having flown into a crane Fax: +33 5 61 93 41 01
in 1911. Probably a Bleriot.
USA/CANADA
Philippe Bordes
Mr Frey’s accident Senior Director Customer Support
in Cannes in 1910. Tel: +1 (703) 834 3506
Probably a Farman..
Fax: +1 (703) 834 3464
Customer Support Centres
CHINA Training centres
Ron Bollekamp Spares centres / Regional warehouses
Resident Customer Support Managers (RCSM)
Director Customer Support
Tel: +86 10 804 86161 RCSM location Country RCSM location Country
Fax: +86 10 804 86162 / 63
Abu Dhabi United Arab Emirates Macau S.A.R. China
Amman Jordan Madrid Spain P A G E
P A G E
RESIDENT CUSTOMER SUPPORT Amsterdam Netherlands Manchester United Kingdom
36 ADMINISTRATION Athens Greece Manila Philippines 37
Atlanta United States of America Mauritius Mauritius
Jean-Philippe Guillon Auckland New Zealand Memphis United States of America

FAST 33
FAST 33

Director Bandar Seri Begawan Brunei Mexico City Mexico

Bangkok Thailand Milan Italy
Resident Customer Support Administration Beirut Lebanon Minneapolis United States of America
Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 31 02 Brussels Belgium Monastir Tunisia
Buenos Aires Argentina Montreal Canada
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 49 64 Cairo Egypt Moscow Russia
Charlotte United States of America Mumbai India
Chengdu China Nanchang China
TECHNICAL, SPARES, TRAINING Colombo Sri Lanka Nanjing China
Airbus has its main Spares centre in Hamburg, Copenhagen Denmark New York United States of America
Geo Chavez was the first person to cross the Alps from Switzerland to Italy, and regional warehouses in Frankfurt, Dalian China Ningbo China
on 18 September 1910. Unfortunately, 10 metres above the ground on approach at Damascus Syria Noumea New Caledonia
Washington D.C., Beijing and Singapore. Delhi India Palma de Mallorca Spain
Domodossola near Milan, his Bleriot suffered structural failures an crashed. Denver United States of America Paris France
He was severely injured and died in Derby United Kingdom Philadelphia United States of America
Airbus operates 24 hours a day every day. Detroit United States of America Phoenix United States of America
hospital nine days later.
AOG Technical and Spares calls Dhaka Bangladesh Pittsburgh United States of America
Doha Qatar Port of Spain Trinidad and Tobago
in North America should be addressed to: Dubai United Arab Emirates Qingdao China
.
Tel: +1 (703) 729 9000 Dublin Ireland Quito Ecuador
Duluth United States of America Rabat Morocco
Fax: +1 (703) 729 4373 Dusseldorf Germany Rome Italy
Frankfurt Germany San Francisco United States of America
AOG Technical and Spares calls outside Guangzhou China San Salvador El Salvador
Hangzhou China Santiago Chile
North America should be addressed to: Hanoi Vietnam Sao Paulo Brazil
Tel: +49 (40) 50 76 3001/3002/3003 Helsinki Finland Seoul South Korea
Hong Kong S.A.R. China Shanghai China
Fax: +49 (40) 50 76 3011/3012/3013 Indianapolis United States of America Shenzhen China
Istanbul Turkey Shenyang China
Jakarta Indonesia Singapore Singapore
Airbus Training centre Toulouse, France Jinan China Sydney Australia
Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 33 33 Johannesburg South Africa Taipei Taiwan
Karachi Pakistan Tashkent Uzbekistan
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 20 94 Kingston Jamaica Tehran Iran
Kishinev Moldavia Tokyo Japan
Airbus Training subsidiaries Kiyev Ukraine Toronto Canada
Kuala Lumpur Malaysia Tulsa United States of America
Miami, USA - Florida Kuwait city Kuwait Tunis Tunisia
Tel: +1 (305) 871 36 55 Lanzhou China Valetta Malta
Larnaca Cyprus Vancouver Canada
Fax: +1 (305) 871 46 49 Lisbon Portugal Verona Italy
Beijing, China London United Kingdom Vienna Austria
Louisville United States of America Xi'an China
Tel: +86 10 80 48 63 40 Los Angeles United States of America Zurich Switzerland
Fax: +86 10 80 48 65 76 Luton United Kingdom
 CUSTOMER SUPPORT ARTICLE
AROUND THE CLOCK... AROUND THE WORLD

Customer support

WORLDWIDE
Jean-Daniel Leroy
VP Customer Support
Tel: +33 5 61 93 35 04
Fax: +33 5 61 93 41 01

USA/CANADA
Philippe Bordes
Senior Director Customer Support
Tel: +1 (703) 834 3506
Fax: +1 (703) 834 3464
Customer Support Centres
CHINA Training centres
Ron Bollekamp Spares centres / Regional warehouses
Resident Customer Support Managers (RCSM)
Director Customer Support
Tel: +86 10 804 86161 RCSM location Country RCSM location Country
Fax: +86 10 804 86162 / 63
Abu Dhabi United Arab Emirates Macau S.A.R. China
Amman Jordan Madrid Spain P A G E
RESIDENT CUSTOMER SUPPORT Amsterdam Netherlands Manchester United Kingdom
ADMINISTRATION Athens Greece Manila Philippines 37
Atlanta United States of America Mauritius Mauritius
Jean-Philippe Guillon Auckland New Zealand Memphis United States of America

FAST 33
Director Bandar Seri Begawan Brunei Mexico City Mexico
Bangkok Thailand Milan Italy
Resident Customer Support Administration Beirut Lebanon Minneapolis United States of America
Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 31 02 Brussels Belgium Monastir Tunisia
Buenos Aires Argentina Montreal Canada
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 49 64 Cairo Egypt Moscow Russia
Charlotte United States of America Mumbai India
Chengdu China Nanchang China
TECHNICAL, SPARES, TRAINING Colombo Sri Lanka Nanjing China
Airbus has its main Spares centre in Hamburg, Copenhagen Denmark New York United States of America
Dalian China Ningbo China
and regional warehouses in Frankfurt, Damascus Syria Noumea New Caledonia
Washington D.C., Beijing and Singapore. Delhi India Palma de Mallorca Spain
Denver United States of America Paris France
Derby United Kingdom Philadelphia United States of America
Airbus operates 24 hours a day every day. Detroit United States of America Phoenix United States of America
AOG Technical and Spares calls Dhaka Bangladesh Pittsburgh United States of America
Doha Qatar Port of Spain Trinidad and Tobago
in North America should be addressed to: Dubai United Arab Emirates Qingdao China
Tel: +1 (703) 729 9000 Dublin Ireland Quito Ecuador
Duluth United States of America Rabat Morocco
Fax: +1 (703) 729 4373 Dusseldorf Germany Rome Italy
Frankfurt Germany San Francisco United States of America
AOG Technical and Spares calls outside Guangzhou China San Salvador El Salvador
Hangzhou China Santiago Chile
North America should be addressed to: Hanoi Vietnam Sao Paulo Brazil
Tel: +49 (40) 50 76 3001/3002/3003 Helsinki Finland Seoul South Korea
Hong Kong S.A.R. China Shanghai China
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Tel: +86 10 80 48 63 40 Los Angeles United States of America Zurich Switzerland
Fax: +86 10 80 48 65 76 Luton United Kingdom
 www.airbus.com

Our service managers know every aircraft down to the

last nut and NSA5031-6-19.
Knowing every inch of our aircraft is just a small part of being an Airbus service manager.
And we apply the same principle to our customers. By understanding you as well as we
understand our planes we can cater to your needs. This takes co-operation, a lot of listening ,
and, above all, dedication, which is why our Customer Service is so well respected. It’s no
big thing, but it means a great deal to our customers. Airbus. Setting the standards.