Pre-proclamation cases
G.R. No. 179285 February 11, 2008
IMELDA Q. DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE BELMONTE, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
UNDER consideration is a petition for certiorari via Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division dated July 10, 2007 and (2) Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc promulgated on
September 5, 2007.
The antecedent facts:
Petitioner Imelda Dimaporo and private respondent Vicente Belmonte were both candidates
for Representative of the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Norte during the May 14,
2007 elections.
The said legislative district is composed of seven (7) towns and one (1) city, namely: the
Municipalities of Linamon, Kauswagan, Bacolod, Maigo, Kolambugan, Tubod, Baroy and the
City of Iligan.
On May 22, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers3 (PBOC) completed the canvass of the
Certificates of Canvass (COCs) for the City of Iligan and four (4) of the municipalities, namely,
Linamon, Kolambugan, Tubod and Baroy. Upon adjournment on May 22, 2007, the said
PBOC issued a Certification showing respondent Belmonte in the lead, with 52,783 votes,
followed by candidate Badelles with 39,315 votes, and petitioner Dimaporo in third place
with only 35,150 votes, viz.:
Sometime in the evening of May 19, 2007, the ballot boxes containing the COCs of
Kauswagan, Bacolod and Maigo were allegedly forcibly opened, their padlocks destroyed
and the envelopes containing the COCs and the Statement of Votes (SOV) opened and
violated. When the PBOC was about to resume the canvassing at around 9:00 a.m. the
succeeding day, the forced opening of the ballot boxes was discovered prompting the PBOC
to suspend the canvass.
On May 22, 2007, the Commissioner-in-Charge of CARAGA Region, Nicodemo Ferrer, issued
a Resolution ordering that the canvassing of the ballots contained in the tampered ballot
boxes of Kauswagan, Maigo and Bacolod be suspended until after the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) submits its findings to the Commission.
On May 24, 2007, the NBI submitted its report. It found as follows:
In our assessment and observation, the culprit(s) managed to enter the room of the Vice-
Governor [Irma Umpa Ali] which he/she used as a staging and hiding place while persons are
still allowed to enter the building during the canvassing. On the night of May 19, 2007 the
culprit(s) hide (sic) in the said room and waited until there were no persons allowed inside
the building except the provincial guard on duty who was manning the ground floor at the
area near the entrance door. The culprit(s) then entered the Session Hall by using some hard
ID Card or any similar object which was inserted in between the door and door-lock, and
once inside specifically destroyed the padlocks of the ballot boxes for the Municipalities of
Bacolod, Maigo and Kauswagan. x x x.
On May 24, 2007, Atty. Dennis L. Ausan, Regional Director, Region X, issued a Very Urgent
Memorandum addressed to the COMELEC En Banc, enclosing the NBI report, with the
following recommendation:
[T]hat the Commission En Banc comes out with an order directing the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Lanao del Norte to immediately reconvene solely for the purpose of retrieving
the three envelopes supposedly containing the COCs from the said three (3) municipalities,
to open the same in the presence of all watchers, counsels and representatives of all
contending parties and the accredited Citizens’ Arm of the Commission and right there and
then to turn over the same to the representative of the NBI for technical examination by
their questioned documents expert.
Further, it is requested that it must also be incorporated in the En Banc’s order the directive
for the PBOC to turnover to the NBI the copies of the COC of the three (3) municipalities
intended for the Commission and the Election Officer for purposes of comparison with that
retrieved from the questioned ballot box.
Thereafter, on May 25, 2007, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8073 adopting in part the
recommendation of Atty. Ausan directing the PBOC of Lanao del Norte to "immediately
reconvene solely for the purpose of retrieving the three envelopes supposedly containing
the COCs from the municipalities of Kauswagan, Bacolod and Maigo" and to "open the same
in the presence of all watchers, counsels, and representatives of all contending parties and
the accredited Citizens’ Arm of the Commission and right there and then to direct the
representatives of the dominant majority and minority parties to present their respective
copies of the COCs for comparison with the COCs intended for the COMELEC and with the
COCs inside the envelope just opened."
The COMELEC further resolved that when discrepancies show signs of tampering and
falsifying, the PBOC is to "immediately turnover to the NBI the copies of the COCs of said
three (3) municipalities intended for the Commission and the Election Officer for purposes
of comparison with those retrieved from the questioned ballot boxes."
On May 30, 2007, Commissioner Nicodemo Ferrer issued his Memorandum relieving the
PBOC of its functions and constituting a special provincial board of canvassers (SPBOC).4 He
further ordered as follows:
The previous En Banc Resolution No. 8073 promulgated on May 25, 2007 is hereby
amended to state that upon the opening of the envelopes containing the COCs found inside
the tampered ballot boxes for the towns of Kauswagan, Maigo and Bacolod, the same shall
at once be canvassed in the presence of the candidates and/or their representatives, taking
note of whatever objections that they may interpose on any of the entries in said COCs.
However, no canvassing took place on May 30, 2007 in view of the human barricade of
some 100 persons who effectively blocked the entrance to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
building.
Considering the heightened controversies occasioned by the admitted tampering of the
three (3) ballot boxes containing the COCs of said towns to be canvassed, you are directed
to refrain from proclaiming any candidate until ordered by the Commission through the
undersigned Commissioner-in-Charge of Region X. Appeal, if any, should be immediately
elevated to the Commission for evaluation.
This amends the urgent memorandum addressed to Atty. Joseph Hamilton Cuevas dated
May 30, 2007.
The chairman and members of the new SPBOC arrived at the venue of the canvassing at
Tubod, Lanao del Norte at 10:15 p.m. on May 31, 2007. However, the human barricade
which blocked the entrance to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan building had now swelled into
a horde of some 300 persons. As a consequence, the canvassing still did not take place.
On June 1, 2007, the new SPBOC convened and opened the ballot boxes for the towns of
Kauswagan, Maigo and Bacolod. As the SPBOC proceeded with the canvass, private
respondent Belmonte objected to the inclusion of the COCs of the concerned municipalities
on the following grounds:
1.) There were manifest errors in the COCs;
2.) The numbers of votes in words and in figures opposite the names of appellant and
appellees Badelles and Dimaporo contain intercalations done through the application of a
white correction fluid ("SnoPake"), which intercalations are visible to the naked eye;
3.) The COCs were obviously manufactured;
4.) The COCs were tampered or falsified;
5.) The intercalations in the COCs were not made or prepared by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBOC) concerned; and
6.) The SOVs likewise contain intercalations done through "SnoPake" resulting in an altered
number of votes for appellant and respondents.
The SPBOC denied Belmonte’s objections due to lack of jurisdiction.
On that same day, June 1, 2007, Belmonte filed his verified notice of appeal before the
SPBOC. On June 5, 2007, Belmonte filed his appeal with appeal memorandum. On June 7,
2007, Belmonte filed with the COMELEC his alternative petition to correct manifest errors.
In the assailed Resolution of July 10, 2007, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted
Belmonte’s petition. While conceding that it has no jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-
proclamation cases against members of the house, it took cognizance of the petition as one
for the correction of manifest errors, hence, within its jurisdiction as per the last sentence of
Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166. The law provides:
Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and
Member of the House of Representatives. – For purpose of the elections for president, vice-
president, senator, and member of the house of representatives, no pre-proclamation cases
shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as
provided for in Sec. 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested
person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
(Underscoring supplied)
The dispositive portion of the challenged Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) resolves to GRANT the
Petition and the questioned Rulings of the respondent MBC is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The questioned COCs are hereby ordered excluded and should not be canvassed.
The Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to RECONVENE here in Manila (for security
purposes) and issue a new certificate of canvass of votes excluding the election returns
subject of this appeal and substituting the proper entries as are evident in the authentic
copies of the election returns related to the subject COCs. The winning candidate who
garners the most number of votes in accordance with our observation shall after proper
canvass be proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers.
SO ORDERED.
On July 13, 2007, Dimaporo moved for a reconsideration. This was denied in the COMELEC’s
equally assailed En Banc Resolution of September 5, 2007. The second Resolution prompted
Dimaporo to file, on September 7, 2007, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
questioning the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the case.
In her petition, Dimaporo claims that the subject matter involved does not pertain to
manifest errors but to the "preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation" of
certificates of canvass, a matter outside the realm of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction when a
congressional seat is involved. She cites Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166.
Dimaporo prays as follows:
1. upon filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order be issued by the Honorable
Court enjoining the implementation of the questioned Resolution of July 10, 2007 of the
COMELEC (Second Division) and the COMELEC En Banc Resolution promulgated on
September 5, 2007 affirming the Second Division upon such bond as may be required by the
Honorable Court;
2. after due hearing, the questioned Resolution of July 10, 2007 of the COMELEC (Second
Resolution) and the COMELEC En Banc Resolution promulgated on September 5, 2007 be
both reversed and set aside;
3. petitioner be ordered proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First
Congressional District of the Province of Lanao del Norte in the May 14, 2007 elections;
4. for such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises.5
On September 13, 2007, Dimaporo filed an urgent motion reiterating the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. This was followed by the filing of a manifestation
and motion for the issuance of a status quo ante order and/or temporary restraining order
on September 25, 2007. On October 1, 2007, Dimaporo, again, filed a motion to maintain
the status quo at the time of the filing of the petition.
On October 2, 2007, the Court En Banc, acting upon Dimaporo’s motion for the issuance of a
status quo ante order and/or temporary restraining order, issued the following Resolution:
Acting on the Manifestation and Motion for the Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order and/or
Temporary Restraining Order dated September 12, 2007 filed by counsel for petitioner, the
Court Resolved to require public respondent Commission on Elections to observe the
STATUS QUO prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition and refrain from
implementing the resolutions of July 10, 2007 and September 5, 2007 of the COMELEC
Second Division and En Banc, respectively.
The Court further Resolved to NOTE the Motion to Maintain the Status Quo at the Time of
the Filing of the Petition, dated October 1, 2007, filed by counsel for petitioner.
The succeeding day, October 3, 2007, a status quo ante order was issued to the COMELEC
stating:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Court, You, Respondent COMELEC, your agents, representatives, or persons acting in your
place and stead, are hereby required to observe the STATUS QUO that is prevailing at the
time of the filing of the petition.
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he brought to
Our attention that on September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status quo ante
order of the Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected
Member of the House of Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del
Norte. On that very same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de
Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly.
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). When there has been a proclamation
and a defeated candidate claims to be the winner, it is the Electoral Tribunal already that
has jurisdiction over the case.6
In Lazatin v. Commission on Elections,7 the Court had this to say:
The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the
Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such,
and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral
protest against him would be to usurp the function of the House Electoral Tribunal. The
alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC
itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of
protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises,
to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. (Emphasis supplied)
This was reiterated in Aggabao v. Commission on Elections:8
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction overall contests relative to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
The COMELEC was not amiss in quickly deciding Belmonte’s petition to correct manifest
errors then proclaiming him the winner. Election cases are imbued with public interest.9
They involve not only the adjudication of the private interest of rival candidates but also the
paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the
electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their
gift.10 It has always been the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies
should be summarily decided, consistent with the law’s desire that the canvass and
proclamation be delayed as little as possible.11
Considering that at the time of proclamation, there had yet been no status quo ante order
or temporary restraining order from the court, such proclamation is valid and, as such, it has
vested the HRET with jurisdiction over the case as Belmonte has, with the taking of his oath,
already become one of their own.
Hence, should Dimaporo wish to pursue further her claim to the congressional seat, the
filing of an election protest before the HRET would be the appropriate course of action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Effect of filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 180443
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C.
GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and
mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing
rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list
nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements.
Common Antecedents
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly
registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to
participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its
manifestation of intent to participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen
should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order
that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1)
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-
Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of
acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of
nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star
News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6
whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane
R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1)
Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than
81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin,
Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC
averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by
CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to
focus on his family life.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc
sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its
second nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus
proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed
CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the
motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a
proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members,
the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm
the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC
on June 28, 2007.9
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the
matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was
docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially
proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List
System as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong,
Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon
Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns
and Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.
The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18,
2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan
Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
to an additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of
said parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of
their respective cases.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los
Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72
and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him
to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be
granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency
of E.M. 07-054.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise:
WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the
withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as
second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty.
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee
for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
SO ORDERED.
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the
president of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the
president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct
the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of
intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that
from all indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the
leeway to act as the party's representative and that his actions had always been considered
as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval, was
accomplished with the Board’s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent
of the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee
of CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office
as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15
Precís of the Consolidated Cases
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel
respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January
12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054
(approving CIBAC’s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s
second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and
Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section
8 of R.A. No. 7941.18 the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate
recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her
assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no
jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.
For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for
mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to
have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Issues
The issues are the following:
(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act; and
(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing
the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after
the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.
Ruling
The petitions are granted.
A the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final
The Court has jurisdiction over the case
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has
been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the
jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special
civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this
Court.
We do not agree.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds
and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of
the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who
has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate
the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy
because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo
warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as
the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to
one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine
which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-
list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list
organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not
involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or
some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to
seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption
of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of
orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the
mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the
Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the
COMELEC.
B
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping
Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse
decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari)
in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files another
petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope
that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case
(offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another
court.19
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is
the vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts
and administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.20
The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes
forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts
and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the
administration of justice.21
Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not
necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must
also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.23 Elsewise stated, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.24
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the
second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing
CIBAC’s entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike
down the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in
abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of
their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to
proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no
authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-
list organizations with pending disputes.
On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September
14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin,
Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje
as the third nominee); and to challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the
COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and
the action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions
involved the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the
reliefs they sought were different.
C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in
accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature
cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional.
Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other
authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.25
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and
administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such
delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal
principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary
standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid
down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the
duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred
upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a
distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an
authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to
make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect
the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character,
but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated
must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating
IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a
law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it
into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling
and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.27
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to
be valid:28
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum,
and a recall.29 In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.30
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the
first requisite.
The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804
underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with
the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis
of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge
of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds.
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that
the resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority
conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32 for
administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law.
The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions
of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory
requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.33
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or
coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election
a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in
case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent
in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective
office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding
election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after
the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name
of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives
in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.
The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization
of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is
submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws
in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be
read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single,
definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning
that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced
that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal
interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of
the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.34 When the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application.35 Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to
implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are
clear and unambiguous.36
The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the
nominees or to alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations
of the Congress, viz:
MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do
not see any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to
change the nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the
implication correct that at any time after submission the names could still be changed or the
listing altered?
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman
from Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The
sponsoring committee will gladly consider the same.
MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to
the COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of
listing.
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular
nominee has been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the
nominee changed his political party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified
to be included in the party list and the political party has a perfect right to change the name
of that nominee who changed his political party affiliation.
MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be
the exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies,
then there has to be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last
part of the list so that the prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected.37

The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated,
in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" – renders
Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute
mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but
one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain from doing
the forbidden act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.
Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its
nominees, but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in
the list of its nominees’ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of
lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list
reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with
whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list organization,
but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the
law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of
general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-
list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who
the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the
party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people,
enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the
party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or
to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees
circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’ exclusion of such
arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.
D
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list
organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been
submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee
withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling
under any of the three exceptions.
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule,
the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as
their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with
exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may
add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others,
although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether,
in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.391avvphi1
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope
of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such
general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent
that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of
strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and
against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in
many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or
abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
E
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only when
he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to
continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the
fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three
statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election,40 has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to
the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should
always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify
the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry
out.41
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress.42
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section
8 of R.A. No. 7941,43 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory
provision’s phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to
phrase anew or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or
phrase is not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision.
The new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its
nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not
allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters
of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record
of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus
conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the
party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the
electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations.
We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of
developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of
the system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list
organizations, by seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the
electorate would be afforded the chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their
party-list representatives.
The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their
IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in
view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they
were authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.45
F
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and
the IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not
adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of
law.47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right,
obligation, or power.
Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-
list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was
invalid, CIBAC’s withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of
them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any
substitution of Lokin and the others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of
withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of CIBAC’s substitution, both through its
assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.
We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it
authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has
submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens’
Battle Against Corruption’s withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N.
Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering
their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje
as third nominee; and
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a
Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a
Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Effect of filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
G.R. No. 135468 May 31, 2000
DIOSCORO O. ANGELIA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENTINO R. TAN, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the
resolution, dated August 18, 1998, of the Commission on Elections en banc annulling the
proclamation of petitioner as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Abuyog, Leyte and
ordering the Municipal Board of Canvassers of said municipality to make the necessary
corrections in the election returns of Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 and Precinct No. 23-A and,
thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate or candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan.
The facts of the instant case are as follows:
Petitioner Dioscoro O. Angelia and private respondent Florentino R. Tan were candidates for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Abuyog, Leyte in the elections held on
May 11, 1998. After the canvass of votes on May 13, 1998, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the following as the duly elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan:1
Winning Candidates Votes Obtained
1. Placido A. Deloy 9,681
2. Emmanuel L. Gacis 9,164
3. Edmundo P. Sano 8,720
4. Clementino Rudas 8,277
5. Francis Raymundo Realino 8,173
6. Carmelita P. Piscos 7,898
7. Marcelo G. Ganoza 7,835
8. Dioscoro O. Angelia 7,765
Private respondent, who received a total of 7,761 votes — four votes less than those
obtained by petitioner — ranked ninth among the candidates.
On May 25, 1998, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional
Trial Court, Abuyog, Leyte against petitioner, alleging that in Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1, he
was credited with only 82 votes, when he actually obtained 92, while in Precinct No. 23-A,
petitioner was credited with 18 votes, when he actually garnered only 13 votes. According
to private respondent, he actually received a total of 7,771 votes, while petitioner actually
garnered 7,760 votes.
On June 12, 1998 petitioner took his oath and assumed office as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On June 23, 1998, private respondent filed a motion to withdraw his petition. Subsequently,
he filed a petition for annulment of proclamation of petitioner with the COMELEC. He
attached to the petition a copy of Election Return No. 3700088 from Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-
A-1, which he claims showed a tally of 92 votes for him but indicated a corresponding total
in words and figures of only 82 votes.2 He also submitted a copy of Election Return No.
3700023, which allegedly showed a tally of only 13 votes for petitioner but indicated a
corresponding total in words and figures of 18 votes.3 He presented the affidavit4 of Alma
Duavis, the poll clerk of Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1, stating that she inadvertently entered in
Election Return No. 3700088 only 82 instead of 92 as the total number of votes received by
private respondent, and the affidavit5 of Chona Fernando, the poll clerk of Precinct No. 23-
A, stating that through oversight, in Election Return No. 3700023, she indicated 18 instead
of 13 as the total votes obtained by petitioner. In addition, private respondent submitted to
the COMELEC the affidavit6 of Susan Matugas, the chairperson of the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1, corroborating the affidavit of Duavis.
In the resolution, dated August 18, 1998, the COMELEC annulled the proclamation of
petitioner as member of the Sangguniang Bayan and ordered the Municipal Board of
Canvassers to make the necessary corrections in the election returns from Precinct Nos. 84-
A/ 84-A-1 and Precinct No. 23-A and, thereafter, to proclaim the winning candidate or
candidates on the basis of the amended results. The resolution of the COMELEC reads:
On the basis of the documents thus presented and taking into consideration the admission
of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct Nos. 84-A and 84-A-1, Barangay Dingle, as
well as the Chairman of the BEI of Precinct No. 23, the Commission En Banc hereby RULES to
GRANT the Petition. Petitioner had correctly availed of the procedure provided for under
Section 5 Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules which prescribes:
Pre-proclamation controversies which may be filed directly with the Commission — (a) The
following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of
the results during the canvassing as . . . . (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of the
figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass . . . and such errors
could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence
and proclamation of the winning candidates had already been made.
Indeed, the error committed is manifest in that in Resolution No. 2962 (General Instructions
for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of Canvassers in Connection with the May
11, 1998 Elections) it was clearly directed:
In case there exist discrepancies in the votes of any candidate in taras/tally as against the
votes obtained in words/figures in the same returns/certificate, the votes in taras/tally shall
prevail.
Clearly, rectification of the error is called for, if We are to give life to the will of the
electorate. Moreover, it is purely administrative and "It does not involve any opening of the
ballot box, examination and appreciation of ballots and/or election returns. As said error
was discovered after proclamation, all that is required is to convene the board of canvassers
to rectify the error it inadvertently committed in order that the true will of the voters will be
effected." (Tatlonghari vs. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 849)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc hereby ANNULS the
proclamation of Dioscoro Angelia, the same being based on an erroneous tally and DIRECTS
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Abuyog, Leyte, to RECONVENE within five (5) days
from receipt hereof and effect the corrections in the total number of votes received by the
candidates in Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 (clustered) and Precinct No. 23-A and thereafter
PROCLAIM the winning candidate/s for Municipal Kagawad based on the corrected results.
Accordingly, the Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened on September 1, 1998 and,
after making the necessary corrections in the election returns, proclaimed private
respondent a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that he was not given due notice and
hearing. Then, without waiting for the resolution of his motion, he filed the instant petition
for certiorari, alleging, as the sole assignment of error, the following:
WITH DUE RESPECT, PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ERRED AND VIOLATED
PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT PASSED THE AUGUST 18,
1998 RESOLUTION ANNULLING HIS PROCLAMATION AND RECONVENING THE MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING.
The petition has no merit and should be dismissed, but before we do so, certain preliminary
questions raised by the parties must first be disposed of.
First. Respondents contend that the instant petition should be dismissed for being
premature, because petitioner has a pending motion for reconsideration of the resolution,
dated August 18, 1998, of the COMELEC.
We hold that petitioner acted correctly in filing the present petition because the resolution
of the COMELEC in question is not subject to reconsideration and, therefore, any party who
disagreed with it had only one recourse, and that was to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.7 Rule 13, §1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides:
What Pleadings are Not Allowed. — The following pleadings are not allowed:
xxx xxx xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases;
xxx xxx xxx
As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense, reconsideration of the
COMELEC resolution was not possible and petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For him to wait until the COMELEC
denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing a petition for
certiorari with this Court to run and expire.
The COMELEC contends that petitioner should not be allowed to speculate on the outcome
of his motion for reconsideration, which he has not formally withdrawn. Indeed, it would
have been more appropriate for petitioner to first withdraw his motion for reconsideration
in the COMELEC before filing the present petition. Nevertheless, the filing by petitioner of
the instant petition and his reply to the comments of respondents — where he admitted
that, except in cases involving election offenses, a motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the COMELEC en banc is a prohibited pleading8 — sufficiently indicated his intention to
abandon his motion for reconsideration.
Second. Petitioner alleges that private respondent failed to serve him a copy of the petition
for annulment of proclamation filed with the COMELEC. In reply, private respondent
submitted the registry receipt and the return card9 to prove that a copy of the said petition
was received on June 26, 1998 by a certain Tudila M. Angelia on behalf of petitioner.
Petitioner admits the receipt of said mail, but avers that it did not contain a copy of the
petition for annulment of proclamation in the COMELEC but of the petition for quo warranto
filed by private respondent in the Regional Trial Court, Abuyog, Leyte. 10 As private
respondent points out, however, the petition for quo warranto was filed by his former
counsel, the Martinez & Martinez Law Office, and a copy of said petition was already sent to
petitioner. On the other hand, the petition for annulment of proclamation was filed by his
new counsel, the Astorga & Macamay Law Office. Since a copy of the petition for quo
warranto had previously been served on petitioner, there could be no reason for private
respondent's new counsel to serve it again on petitioner.
Petitioner likewise claims that private respondent engaged in forum-shopping because, after
filing a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Abuyog, Leyte, private
respondent filed the present petition for annulment of proclamation with the COMELEC.
This contention is bereft of merit. First, private respondent withdrew the quo warranto case
before filing the petition for annulment of proclamation. Second, while the filing of a
petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation
controversy, this principle admits of several exceptions, such as when such petition is not
the proper remedy. 11 Under §253 of the Omnibus Election Code, the grounds for a petition
for quo warranto are ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines of the
respondent. Since in the present case, private respondent alleged the existence of manifest
errors in the preparation of election returns, clearly, the proper remedy is not a petition for
quo warranto but a petition for annulment of proclamation.
Third. Petitioner further contends that he was denied procedural due process because the
COMELEC issued its resolution without notice and hearing. Indeed, it appears that the
Municipal Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC did not comply with the procedure that
should have been followed in the instant case.
In Castromayor v. COMELEC, 12 the returns from a precinct were overlooked by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers in computing the total number of votes obtained by the
candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan, for which reason the
COMELEC directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers to make the necessary corrections.
We held that, as the case involved a manifest error, although the COMELEC erred in
annulling the proclamation of petitioner without notice and hearing, the expedient course
of action was for the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and
hearing in accordance with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the
necessary corrections on the certificate of canvass and proclaim the winning candidate or
candidates on the basis thereof.
Said Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states:
Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of Canvassers. — (a)
Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the
tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as
where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a
certificate of canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns
or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or
copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by
precinct, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the
canvass, the board may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political
party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the
errors committed.
(b) The order for correction must be made in writing and must be promulgated.
(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by
said order may appeal therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the
promulgation.
(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning
candidates, unless their votes are not affected by the appeal.
(e) The appeal must implead as respondents the Board of Canvassers concerned and all
parties who may be adversely affected thereby.
(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons,
together with a copy of the appeal, to the respondents.
(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.
(h) The appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.
This case likewise involves manifest errors. Election Return No. 3700088 from Precinct Nos.
84-A/84-A-1 is claimed to show 92 votes in favor of private respondent but indicate a total
in words and figures of only 82 votes. On the other hand, Election Return No. 3700023
allegedly shows 13 votes for petitioner but indicates in words and figures 18 votes. These
discrepancies can be easily resolved without opening the ballot boxes and recounting the
ballots. COMELEC Resolution No. 2962 provides that "in case there exist discrepancies in the
votes of any candidate in taras/tally as against the votes obtained in words/figures in the
same returns/certificates, the votes in taras/tally shall prevail."
In the present case, although the COMELEC annulled the proclamation of petitioner, it
merely directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers to "RECONVENE within five (5) days from
receipt hereof and effect the corrections in the total number of votes received by the
candidates in Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 (clustered) and Precinct No. 23-A and thereafter
PROCLAIM the winning candidate/s for Municipal Kagawad based on the corrected results."
It was the Municipal Board of Canvassers which the COMELEC ordered to actually effect the
necessary corrections, if any, in the said election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim
the winning candidate or candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan. In
accordance with our ruling in Castromayor, the expedient action to take is to direct the
Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance
with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the necessary corrections, if
any, in the election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim the winning candidate or
candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
WHEREFORE, the en banc resolution, dated August 18, 1998 of the Commission on Elections
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Abuyog,
Leyte is ordered to reconvene and, after notice to the parties and hearing in accordance
with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the necessary corrections, if
any, in Election Return No. 3700088 from Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 and Election Return No.
3700023 from Precinct No. 23-A and, based on the amended results, proclaim the winning
candidate or candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan of said
municipality.
SO ORDERED.
Effect of filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
G.R. No. 141952-53 April 20, 2001
RODOLFO DUMAYAS, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF THE
MUNICIPALITY OF CARLES, PROVINCE OF ILOILO and FELIPE BERNAL, JR., respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this special civil action, petitioner Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr., seeks to nullify the Resolution
promulgated March 2, 2000 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc, reversing
that of the Second Division dated August 4, 1998, which annulled the petitioner’s
proclamation as Municipal Mayor of Carles, Iloilo.
The antecedent facts of the case, as found by the COMELEC en banc, are as follows:
Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates for the position of
mayor in Carles, Iloilo last 11 May 1998 synchronized elections.1âwphi1.nêt
During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for precinct nos. 61A, 62A, and
63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan was protested for inclusion in the canvass before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity) by petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr. The
grounds relied upon for their exclusion are all the same- that is, "violation of Secs. 234, 235,
236 of the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism, intimidation,
coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law." Appellant Dumayas, Jr. submitted his evidence
to the Board of Canvassers on 14 May 1998 which consist of (a) the joint affidavits executed
by LAMMP watchers for precinct 61A: Teresita Oblido, Reyland de la Rosa, and Armando
Flores [signed by Oblido and Flores only]; (b) affidavit of petitioner’s supporter Virgilisa
Capao; (c) joint affidavit of precinct 63A – watcher Nona Dichosa and precinct 62A – watcher
Daniel Carmona; (d) blotter report dated 12 May 1998 of Carles PNP, Iloilo; and (d)
corroborating affidavit of LAMMP supporter Honorato Gallardo.
All the affidavits submitted by petitioner contain similar attestations such as: certain local
barangay (sic) officials were inside the polling place during the casting and counting of votes,
or acted as watcher of respondent; SPO3 Gilbert Sorongon who was in shorts and t-shirt
armed with an armalite roamed around and inside the polling places; a CVO in uniform was
roaming precinct 63A; the presence of the public officials posed threat and intimidation
driving most of the watchers of other political parties away; the BEIs were so intimidated
and coerced that no election return was prepared simultaneous with the tallying; the
election returns were prepared under duress; the voters were coerced to vote for certain
favored candidates especially herein respondent; petitioner’s watchers were made to sign
or affix their thumbmarks on the already prepared election returns; in precinct 63A/64A, the
voting ended at almost 9:00 P.M. without the BEI members writing the names of such
voters.
Petitioner also submitted a certification issued by PO3 Tito Billones, Desk Officer of PNP
Carles representing the blotter report (extracted from the police log book) which states that
on 12 May 1998, Virgilisa Capao reported to the Police Station of Carles, Iloilo that PO3
Sorongon and Brgy. Capt. Mahilum entered Precinct 63A with (sic) the company of other
CVO and Brgy. Kagawad during election. And that these people gravely intimidated the
voters by telling them the names of the candidates they should vote for. It also states that
PO3 Sorongon was not in his prescribed uniform when seen with hand grenades hanging on
his neck and carrying an armalite roaming inside and outside the polling place.
On the other hand, respondent Bernal, Jr. in vehemently denying the allegations of
petitioner, submitted joint affidavits of the members of the different Boards of Election
Inspectors for precinct nos. 61A, 62A and 63A/64A.
xxx
All the supplemental affidavits of the different BEIs categorically declared that the elections
in their respective precincts "starting from the start of the voting to its closing, to the
counting of votes and to the preparation and submission of election returns" were peaceful,
clean, orderly and no acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion and similar acts prohibited by
law was (sic) exerted on anybody including the voters and members of the BEIs. They all
attested that the incidents alleged by petitioner’s watchers did not happen. The alleged
terrorism, coercion, or violation of election laws like the opening of ballots and reading the
votes allegedly done by certain public officials like SPO3 Sorongon, Nody Mahilum, Anonia
Barrios, Telesforo Gallardo and others are not true, the truth being that these people were
only inside the polling place to exercise their right of suffrage. They also vehemently denied
that the election returns were not simultaneously prepared with the tallying and counting of
votes. They stressed that as public school teachers, they cannot risk their future and career
and will not allow or tolerate anybody to make a mockery of the electoral process to (sic)
which they were duly sworn to uphold.
Nody Mahilum and PO3 Gilbert Sorongon also executed a joint affidavit denying the
accusations of Dumayas, Jr. and his watchers stating therein that they only entered their
respective precinct-polling place in order to exercise their right of suffrage and that the
election in the three precincts of Barangay Pantalan was orderly, peaceful, and honest which
(sic) truly reflects the will of the electorate.
x x x1
In the afternoon of May 14, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers denied petitioner’s
objection to the inclusion of the contested returns and proceeded with the canvass. The
results of the voting were as follows:

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the MBC on May 15, 1998. The appeal was given
due course by the COMELEC Second Division3 which rendered a resolution dated August 4,
1998, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the preparation of the contested election returns to be tainted with
irregularities, this Commission (SECOND DIVISION) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
EXCLUDE Election Return No. 3000976 from Precinct No. 61-A; Election Return No. 3000977
from Precinct No. 62-A; and Election return No. 3000978 from Precinct Nos. 63-A/64-A
(clustered).
Respondent Mun(i)cipal Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to RECONVENE and FINISH
the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning
mayoralty candidate of Carles, Iloilo.
SO ORDERED.4
On August 10, 1998, private respondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed a motion for reconsideration
of the above-cited resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
On August 12, 1998, an order certifying that the motion for reconsideration and records of
the case were elevated to the COMELEC en banc was signed by Commissioner Julio F.
Desamito and issued by the Clerk of the Commission.
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration and pursuant to the resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division, Election Officer Rolando Dalen set the reconvening of the MBC
on August 13, 1998, for the continuation of canvass proceedings and proclamation of
winning candidates for Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors of Carles, Iloilo. No winner for
the position of Mayor was proclaimed since private respondent was able to present a copy
of his motion for reconsideration before the MBC. The MBC then reset the date for
reconvening of the board on August 17, 1998, after confirming by phone with COMELEC-
Manila that a motion for reconsideration was indeed filed by private respondent.
Thereafter, the MBC ruled that proclamation of the winning candidate for Mayor would
proceed on August 17, 1998 unless private respondent could present a certification from the
COMELEC that the motion for reconsideration was elevated to the COMELEC en banc.
On August 17, 1998, despite presentation of the August 12, 1998 order, petitioner was
proclaimed winner of the election after excluding from the canvass the election returns
from the three contested precincts in accordance with the COMELEC Second Division
Resolution. The MBC, with its Vice-Chairman dissenting, justified its act by reasoning that it
did not receive an official copy of the order directing the elevation of the case to the banc.
The following day, private respondent immediately filed an urgent motion to declare void ab
initio the proclamation of petitioner on the ground that the resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division was not yet final and executory. For his part, petitioner opposed both the
motion for reconsideration and motion to declare void ab initio his proclamation as Mayor
of Carles, asserting that private respondent failed to show palpable errors to warrant
reconsideration of said resolution and maintaining, at the same time, that his proclamation
was legal since respondent failed to produce the certification required by the MBC.
Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor Arnold Betita filed an
action for quo warranto5 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
66. Docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141, said petition included respondent Bernal as one
of the petitioners together with Vice-Mayor Betita.
On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed before the COMELEC en banc a motion to expunge
respondent Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and motion to declare petitioner’s
proclamation void ab initio, on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to
have abandoned said motions by the filing of Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141 which, according to
petitioner, is a formal election protest via quo warranto brought before the regular courts.
In a resolution dated August 24, 1999 but promulgated on March 2, 2000, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner’s motion to expunge, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Second Division is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the proclamation of Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. is hereby
ANNULLED. A new Municipal Board of Canvassers of Carles, Iloilo is hereby constituted with
the following members: Atty. Nelia Aureus, Chairman; Atty. Rosel Abad, Vice-Chairman; and
Atty. Manuel Lucero, Third Member – all of Election Contests and Adjudication Department
of the Commission. They are directed to convene at Session Hall of the COMELEC – Main
Office, Manila on the tenth (10th) day from the date of promulgation of this Resolution with
notice to the parties. The new board of canvassers shall complete the canvassing of all the
returns and proceed with the proclamation of the true winner for the position of mayor of
Carles, Iloilo. Petitioner Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. is hereby directed to cease and desist from
performing the functions of the office of mayor of Carles, Iloilo. Election Officer Rolando
Dalen is hereby directed to bring to the Commission’s Main Office the election returns of
Carles, Iloilo which need to be canvassed and the other election documents necessary for
the canvassing and proclamation and turn them over to the new board of
canvassers.1âwphi1.nêt
The Law Department is directed to investigate the election offense allegedly committed by
PO3 Gilbert Sorongon on election day.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations of the Commission implement this
Resolution with dispatch giving a copy thereof to the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government.
SO ORDERED.6
On March 13, 2000, respondent Bernal, Jr. was proclaimed by the newly-constituted
Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality of Carles,
thereby unseating petitioner Dumayas.
Hence, this instant special civil action where he alleges that:
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, PRIVATE RESPONDENT FELIPE
BERNAL JR. IS DEEMED TO HAVE ABANDONED HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION EN BANC CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT,
TOGETHER WITH ARNOLD BETITA FILED AN ELECTION CASE THRU A QUO WARRANTO,
BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO BRANCH 66, DOCKETED AS CASE NO. 98-
141.
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE INCLUSION FOR CANVASS THE
THREE ELECTION RETURNS FOR PRECINCT NOS. 61-A, 62-A, and 63-A/64-A (CLUSTERED) BY
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CARLES, ILOILO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT THERE IS CLEAR AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE ELECTION RETURNS
FOR THESE THREE PRECINCT(S) WERE PREPARED UNDER DURESS AND NOT PREPARED
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE COUNTING OF VOTES.
THE RESOLUTION PROMULGATED ON MARCH 2, 2000 IS ILLEGAL AS IT WAS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE IX (A) SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION CONSIDERING THAT ONLY FOUR
COMMISSIONERS VOTED TO REVERSE THE RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 4, 1998 OF THE
SECOND DIVISION COMMISSION ON ELECTION AND THAT, TWO COMMISSIONER(S) HAVE
ALREADY RETIRED, AT THE TIME OF THE PROMULGATION.7
The following are the issues to be resolved: (1) Should respondent Bernal, who was named
as petitioner in the quo warranto proceedings commenced before the regular court, be
deemed to have abandoned the motions he had filed with respondent Commission? (2) Did
the COMELEC err in ordering the inclusion of the contested election returns in the
canvassing of ballots? (3) In view of the retirement of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani
before the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on March 2, 2000, should said
resolution be deemed null and void for being violative of Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution?
We shall first discuss the third issue. Petitioner claims that March 2, 2000 Resolution of the
COMELEC is void because Commissioners Manolo Gorospe and Japal Guiani have already
retired on the date of its promulgation, even if they had participated earlier in the
deliberations of the case and signed the resolution dated August 24, 1999. Petitioner
submits that this defect invalidated the entire decision of the Commission and that
accordingly, a new vote should be taken to settle the matter.
In Jamil vs. Commission on Elections,8 we held that a decision becomes binding only after its
promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or member of the collegiate court
who had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision
must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners
Gorospe and Guiani should merely be considered as withdrawn for the reason that their
retirement preceded the resolution’s promulgation. The effect of the withdrawal of their
votes would be as if they had not signed the resolution at all and only the votes of the
remaining commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose of deciding the
controversy.
However, unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as
votes for or against a party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the decision a
nullity. In the present case, with the cancellation of the votes of retired Commissioners
Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners at the
time of the resolution’s promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of respondent.
Noteworthy, these remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum. In our view, the
defect cited by petitioner does not affect the substance or validity of respondent
Commission’s disposition of the controversy. The nullification of the challenged resolution,
in our view, would merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily.

Now, regarding the first issue raised by petitioner. Did respondent Bernal effectively
abandon his pending motions before the COMELEC en banc by the filing of Spl. Civil Action
No. 98-141? Petitioner’s contention that Bernal did appears to us untenable.
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes
the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of
one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon
the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for this rule is that
once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not
in another proceeding, so as to prevent confusion and conflict of authority.9
Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions, as where: (a)
the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper
remedy; (c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest
but a petition to annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an
election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy
or was made ad cautelam; and (e) the proclamation was null and void.10
An examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor Betita with the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City reveals that it is neither a quo warranto petition under the Omnibus
Election Code nor an election protest. In Samad vs. COMELEC11 , we explained that a
petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or
ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office
but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest
between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in
the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns. It raises the
question of who actually obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to
hold the office.
The allegations contained in Betita’s petition before the regular court do not present any
proper issue for either an election protest or a quo warranto case under the Omnibus
Election Code. Spl. Civil Action NO. 98-141 appears to be in the nature of an action for
usurpation of public office brought by Betita to assert his right to the position of Mayor
pursuant to the rules on succession of local government officials contained in the Local
Government Code.12 Although said petition is also denominated as a quo warranto petition
under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, it is different in nature from the quo warranto provided
for in the Omnibus Election Code where the only issue proper for determination is either
disloyalty or ineligibility of respondent therein. Neither can it be considered as an election
protest since what was put forth as an issue in said petition was petitioner’s alleged
unlawful assumption of the office of Mayor by virtue of his alleged illegal proclamation as
the winning candidate in the election.
A closer look at the specific allegations in the petition disclose that Spl. Civil Action No. 98-
141 is actually an action for the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation on the ground of
illegality and prematurity. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that the nature of the
action is determined by the averments in the complaint or petition13 and not the title or
caption thereof. The material stipulations of the petition substantially state:
13. That when the Board of Canvassers convened in the afternoon and despite the
submission of the copy of the order certifying the Motion for Reconsideration to the
COMELEC En Banc and in violation of the Comelec Rules and Procedure and due to the
threat received by the Board, Mr. Dalen, the Chairman of the Board and Mr. Serafin Provido,
Jr. signed the Certificate of Proclamation proclaiming respondent as winner of the elections
for Mayor. Mr. Deony Cabaobao did not signed (sic) the said Certificate of Proclamation as
he dissented to (sic) the decision to proclaim respondent;
14. The proclamation, therefore, of respondent is illegal and null and void from the very
beginning for it was done in violation of law and under duress. The affidavit of Mr. Serafin
Provido, Jr. a member of the Board of Canvassers showing duress is hereto attached as
Annex "C";
15. On account of the illegal proclamation of the respondent said proclamation does not
vest any right or authority for him to sit as Mayor of the town of Carles thus when he sits as
such Mayor he usurps, intrudes into, and unlawfully holds and exercise(s) a public office
without authority;
16. The authority to act as mayor for and in the absence of the duly proclaimed mayor is
vested on petitioner Betita pursuant to law;
17. That the continued unlawful exercise by the respondent of the position of mayor of the
town of Carles will cause great and irreparable damage to the petitioners, particularly
petitioner Betita, who pursuant to law is entitled to act as Mayor of the town of Carles and
the people of Carles who pays his salaries unless he be restrained or enjoined from siting
(sic) as such Mayor;
x x x 14
Thus, respondent Commission did not err, much less abuse its discretion, when it refused to
consider as abandoned Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and urgent motion to declare
petitioner’s proclamation as void ab initio. Note that under the allegations cited above, the
determination of Betita’s right would ultimately hinge on the validity of petitioner’s
proclamation in the first place. To repeat, the "quo warranto" petition brought by Vice-
Mayor Betita is a petition to annul petitioner’s proclamation over which COMELEC exercises
original exclusive jurisdiction. Consequently, it could not be deemed as a proper remedy in
favor of respondent Bernal, Jr. even if his name was included in the title of said petition.
We now consider whether the MBC’s proclamation of petitioner Dumayas as the winning
candidate in the 1998 mayoralty election is null and void. For where a proclamation is null
and void, it is no proclamation at all such that the proclaimed candidate’s assumption of
office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the
proclamation.15
Although petitioner’s proclamation was undertaken pursuant to the resolution of the
COMELEC’s Second Division, it appears plain to us that the latter grievously erred in ordering
the exclusion of the contested returns from Precincts 61A, 62A and 63A/64A (clustered). On
this score, the Comelec en banc correctly reversed the Second Division by holding that
petitioner Dumayas failed to justify the exclusion of said returns on the ground of duress,
intimidation, threat or coercion. We note that the only evidence submitted by petitioner to
prove said irregularities were self-serving affidavits executed by his watchers and
supporters. Aside from the fact that these allegations were countered by opposing affidavits
made by the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors who are presumed to have
regularly performed their duties16 and who categorically denied the allegations, the
election returns were also observed to be genuine, clean, signed and/or thumbmarked by
the proper officials and watchers.17
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact by the COMELEC, or any other
administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on
this Court.18 In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC
are not required to look beyond or behind the election returns which are on their face
regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to raise issues the resolution of which would
necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie regular,
the proper remedy is a regular election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.19
In the present case, petitioner barely alleged that the preparation of said returns was
attended by threats, duress, intimidation or coercion without offering any proof, other than
the affidavits mentioned above, that these had affected the regularity or genuineness of the
contested returns. Absent any evidence appearing on the face of the returns that they are
indeed spurious, manufactured or tampered with, the election irregularities cited by
petitioner would require the reception of evidence aliunde which cannot be done in a pre-
proclamation controversy such as the one initiated by petitioner. Returns can not be
excluded on mere allegation that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the
returns, on their face, appear regular and without any physical signs of tampering, alteration
or other similar vice. If there had been sham voting or minimal voting which was made to
appear as normal through falsification of the election returns, such grounds are properly
cognizable in an election protest and not in a pre-proclamation controversy.20
In sum, we hold that the COMELEC en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the ruling of its Second Division. The appeal brought by petitioner from the order
of inclusion issued by the MBC should have been dismissed by that Division right away, since
the grounds for exclusion relied upon by petitioner are not proper in a pre-proclamation
case, which is summary in nature.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, public respondent having
committed no grave abuse of discretion. Its challenged resolution dated August 24, 1999 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Institution of election contest
G.R. No. 195191 March 20, 2012
CONGRESSWOMAN LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, petitioner,
vs.
EUFROCINO C. CODILLA, JR. AND HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction. The Petition
seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 10-482 of the Mouse of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-009 (EP) entitled "Eufrocino C. Codilla, Jr. v.
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (Fourth District, Leyte)," which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Statement of the Facts and the Case
On 30 November 2009, Richard I. Gomez (Gomez) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the Liberal Party of the
Philippines. On even date, private respondent Codilla Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the same position under Lakas Kampi CMD.
On 6 December 2009, Buenaventura O. Juntilla (Juntilla), a registered voter of Leyte, filed a
Verified Petition for Gomez's disqualification with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
First Division on the ground that Gomez lacked the residency requirement for a Member of
the Fiouse of Representatives.
In a Resolution dated 17 February 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Juntilla's
Petition and disqualified Gomez. On 20 February 2010, the latter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which dismissed it on 4 May 2010, six days
before the May 2010 national, and local elections. The dispositive portion of the COMELEC's
Resolution1 is worded as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration filed by the Respondent
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission (First Division) is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2
On the same date, Gomez filed a Manifestation with the COMELEC En Bane, alleging that,
without necessarily admitting the allegations raised by Juntilla, he was accepting the
aforementioned Resolution with finality, in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the
filing of the necessary documents for substitution.
On 5 May 2010, petitioner Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez filed her Certificate of Candidacy as
substitute for the position of representative of the Fourth Congressional District for the
Province of Leyte vice Gomez, her husband.
On 6 May 2010, Juntilla filed a Counter-Manifestation with the COMELEC En Banc. At the
same time, he wrote a letter to Atty. Ferdinand T. Rafanan, Director of the Law Department
of the COMELEC, alleging the invalidity of the proposed substitution of Gomez by petitioner.
On 8 May 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8890, which approved and
adopted the recommendation of its Law Department to allow petitioner as a substitute
candidate for Gomez for representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte.
On 9 May 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the above
COMELEC Resolution No. 8890. Pending resolution of his motion, the national and local
elections were conducted as scheduled.
After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, petitioner emerged
as the winner with 101,250 votes or a margin of 24,701 votes over private respondent
Codilla, who obtained 76,549 votes.
On 11 May 2010, Codilla filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Suspend the Proclamation of
Substitute Candidate Lucy Marie T. Gomez (vice Richard I. Gomez) as the Winning Candidate
of the May 10, 2010 Elections for the Fourth Congressional District of Leyte.
On the same date, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending Motion
for Reconsideration filed on 9 May 2010 relative to Resolution No. 8890 and to immediately
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of the Province of Leyte to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner as a Member of the House of Representatives, Fourth District,
Province of Leyte.
On 12 May 2010, petitioner was proclaimed the winning candidate for the congressional
seat of the Fourth District of Leyte.
Accordingly, on 21 May 2010, private respondent Codilla filed a Petition with public
respondent HRET against petitioner docketed as HRET Case No. 10-009 (Election Protest).
On 2 July 2010, petitioner filed her Verified Answer to Codilla's Election Protest questioning
the alleged lack of the required Verification and praying for its dismissal.
On 8 July 2010, Codilla filed a Reply to petitioner's Verified Answer.
In an Order issued by public respondent HRET, the instant case was set for preliminary
conference on 2 September 2010.
On 1 September 2010, unsatisfied with the Order of the HRET, petitioner filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion, persistent in her position that Codilla's Election Protest should
be dismissed based on the grounds raised in her Verified Answer. She also prayed for the
deferment of the preliminary conference until after the resolution of the said
motion.1âwphi1
On 9 September 2010, the HRET issued the assailed Resolution No. 10-2823 resolving the
Urgent Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
The Tribunal NOTES the Urgent Manifestation and Motion filed on September 1, 2010 by the
protestee; REITERATES its ruling in Resolution No. 10-160 dated July 29, 2010 that the
protest cannot be considered insufficient in form, considering that the examination of the
original copy of the protest filed before the Tribunal had revealed the existence of the
required verification; and DENIES the respondent's motion for deferment of the preliminary
conference scheduled on September 2, 2010.4
Accordingly, on 30 September 2010, petitioner filed with public respondent HRET a Motion
for Reconsideration of the above Resolution No. 10-282.
On 22 November 2010, public respondent HRET issued Resolution No. 10-4825 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, ruling as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DENIES the instant motion for reconsideration as regards the
issues pertaining to absence/defect of the verification and propriety of the election protest;
and DIRECTS the protestant to have his verification properly notarized.6
Thereafter, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari7 dated 7 February 2011. The
Petition raises the following grounds:
A.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DISMISS THE ELECTION PROTEST
DESPITE AN ADMITTEDLY DEFECTIVE VERIFICATION.
B.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN Y ALLOWED THE PROTESTANT TO RAISE
ISSUES ON QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES IN AN ELECTION PROTEST.8
Petitioner claims that there was a material defect in the Verification of the Election Protest,
a requirement explicitly provided for in Rule 16 of the 2004 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HREF Rules).9 The verification being a mandatory
requirement, the failure to comply therewith is a fatal defect that affects the very
jurisdiction of the HRET.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that what is in question in the Election Protest is her
qualification as a Member of the House of Representatives, and not the number of votes
cast. Her qualification is allegedly not a proper ground for an election protest, in which the
issues should be the appreciation of ballots and the correctness and number of votes of
each candidate.
On 15 February 2011 this Court required respondents to file their comment on the Petition.
Thereafter, Codilla filed his Comment/Opposition dated 28 April 2011. In his Comment, he
argues that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HREF in issuing the
assailed Resolutions. He clarifies that the Ejection Protest that he filed contained a validly
executed Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping (Verification).10 However,
the defect that petitioner points to is the portion of the jurat of the Verification, which
states:
Subscribed and sworn to before me this__ day of May 2010 at _____. Affiant personally and
exhibited to me his (1) License ID Card with Card No. 1103-80-002135 issued by LTO on
January 16, 2009 (2) Philippine Passport No. XX4793730 issued on "October 20, 2009 valid
until October 19, 2014, he, being the same person herein who executed the foregoing
document thereof.11
The date "May 21 2009" was stamped on the first blank in "__ day of May 2010." "May 21
2010" was written with a pen over the stamped date "May 21 2009" and countersigned by
the notary public. Codilla claims that the date of the Verification was a mere innocuous
mistake or oversight, which did not warrant a finding that the Verification was defective;
much less, fatally defective. He claims he should not be faulted for any alleged oversight
that may have been committed by the notary public. Further, the same argument holds true
with respect to the absence of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Compliance Number of the notary public, as well as the overdue Professional Tax Receipt
(PTR) indicated in the notarial stamp. In any case, the insufficiency of the Verification was
not fatal to the jurisdiction of the HRET.
With respect to the second issue, Codilla argues that the issues in the Election Protest do
not pertain to petitioner's qualification, but to the casting and counting of votes. He claims
that his Election Protest contests the declaration by the Board of Canvassers that the
101,250 votes should be counted in favor of petitioner and be credited to him as these
should have instead been declared as stray votes.
Thereafter, public respondent HRET filed its Comment12 on the Petition dated 5 May 2011.
In its Comment, the HRET claims that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
took cognizance of Codilla's Election Protest despite an alleged absence/defect in the
verification. After all, an unverified petition differs from one which contains a defective
verification, such as in this case. A defective verification is merely a formal defect which
does not affect the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In any case, the summary dismissal of an
Election Protest, as well as the allowance of its amendments in matters of form, is
sanctioned by the HRET Rules.
The HRET further argues that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it took
cognizance of the Election Protest. The issue raised in the Election Protest was the validity of
petitioner's proclamation, in view of her alleged invalid substitution. This is a matter that is
addressed to the sound judgment of the HRET.
On 7 June 2011, this Court, among others, required petitioner to file a reply to Codilla's
Comment. Petitioner later filed her Reply dated 15 August 2011, citing an additional ground
for considering the Verification as defective. She claimed that Codilla, a resident of Ormoc
City, could not have possibly appeared before a notary public in Quezon City; and that he
failed to prove that he was indeed in Quezon City when he supposedly verified the Election
Protest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
HRET.
On the Allegedly Defective Verification
While the existence of the Verification is not disputed, petitioner notes three alleged
defects. First, the Election Protest was filed on 21 May 2010, but the Verification was
allegedly subscribed and sworn to on 21 May 2009.13 Second, Codilla, a resident of Ormoc
City, could not have possibly appeared personally before the notary public in Quezon City.14
Third, in the notarial stamp, the date of expiration of the notarial commission was
handwritten while all other details were stamped; the PTR indicated was issued in 2005;
there was no MCLE Compliance Number as required by Bar Matter No. 1922.15 Petitioner
claims that due to the lack of a proper verification, the Election Protest should have been
treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed.
The alleged defects of the Verification are more apparent than real.
With respect to the date of the notarization, it is clear that the stamped date "2009" was a
mere mechanical error. In fact, the notary public had superimposed in writing the numbers
"10" and countersigned the alteration. Thus, this error need not be overly magnified as to
constitute a defect in the Verification.
With respect to the second alleged defect, there is a presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed with respect to the jurat of the Verification, wherein the notary public
attests that it was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned
thereon.16 Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. Thus,
contrary to petitioner's allegation, there was no need for Codilla to "attach his plane ticket
to prove he flew from Ormoc City to Manila."17
Further, to overcome the presumption of regularity, clear and convincing evidence must be
presented.18 Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. The burden of proof
to overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarized document lies on the party
contesting the execution.19 Thus, petitioner's contention that she "had reliable information
that [Codilla] was in Ormoc City on the date indicated in the Verification" cannot be
considered as clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the document
was duly executed and notarized.
With respect to the third alleged defect, the fact that some portions of the stamp of the
notary public were handwritten and some were stamped does not, in itself, indicate any
defect. Further, Bar Matter No. 1922 merely requires lawyers to indicate in all pleadings
filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, whichever is applicable - for the
immediately preceding compliance period. Clearly, the regulation does not apply to notarial
acts. With respect to the PTR number which was dated 5 years prior to the date of
notarization, the deficiency merely entails the potential administrative liability of the notary
public.20
In any case, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET in denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Election Protest and directing Codilla to have his
Verification properly notarized.
It has been consistently held that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a
jurisdictional, requirement. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely speculative. This
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance
therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.21
This Court has emphasized that in this species of controversy involving the determination of
the true will of the electorate, time is indeed of paramount importance. An election
controversy, by its very nature, touches upon the ascertainment of the people's choice as
gleaned from the medium of the ballot. For this reason, an election protest should be
resolved with utmost dispatch, precedence and regard for due process. Obstacles and
technicalities that fetter the people's will should not stand in the way of a prompt
termination of election contests.22 Thus, rules on the verification of protests should be
liberally construed.
At this point, it is pertinent to note that such liberalization of the rules was also extended to
petitioner.1âwphi1 A perusal of the Verification and Certification attached to this Petition
shows she attests that the contents of the Petition "are true and correct of [her] own
personal knowledge, belief and based on the records in [her] possession.23 Section 4, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on "information and belief or "knowledge, information and belief," shall
be treated as an unsigned pleading. A pleading, therefore, wherein the verification is based
merely on the party's knowledge and belief— such as in the instant Petition — produces no
legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied.24
On the Propriety of the Election Protest
Codilla's Election Protest contests the counting of 101,250 votes in favor of petitioner. He
claims that the denial of the Certificate of Candidacy of Gomez rendered the latter a non-
candidate, who therefore could not have been validly substituted, as there was no
candidacy to speak of.
Further, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the HRET on this score. An
election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds
and irregularities. Its purpose is to determine who between them has actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office.27 The foregoing
considered, the issues raised hi Codilla's Election Protest are proper for such a petition, and
is within the jurisdiction of the HRET.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
The Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction is likewise DENIED. Resolution Nos. 10-282 and 10-482 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Institution of election contest
G.R. No. 222236
HARLIN C. ABAYON, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTOLRAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and RAUL A. DAZA,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 223032

It bears stressing that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, HARLIN C. ABAYON, Petitoner,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This exclusive vs.
jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and RAUL A. DAZA,
determine the controversy presented; and the right to decide whether there exists that Respondent.
state of facts that confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters arising from the case
legitimately before it.25 Accordingly, the HRET has the power to hear and determine, or DECISION
inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction - both as to parties and as to subject matter;
and to decide all questions, whether of law or of fact, the decision of which is necessary to MENDOZA, J.:
determine the question of jurisdiction.26 Thus, the HRET had the exclusive jurisdiction to
determine its authority and to take cognizance of the Election Protest filed before it. These consolidated petitions for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seek to
reverse and set aside the December 14, 20151 and January 21, 20162 Resolutions of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 13-023, dismissing the
counter-protest fpr petitioner Harlin C. Abayon (Abayon); and the February 3, 2016
Decision3 and the March 7, 2016 Resolution4 of the HRET in the same case, which found the
private respondent Raul A. Daza. (Daza) as the duly elected Representative of the First
Legislative District of Northern Samar in the May 13, 2016 Elections.
The Antecedents
Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Representative in the First Legislative
District of Northern Samar during the May 13, 2013 Elections. Out of the votes cast in the
332 clustered precincts in the First District of Northern Samar, Abayon emerged as the
winner after obtaining the majority vote of 72,857. Daza placed second with a total of
72,805 votes. The difference was 52 votes. On May 17, 2013, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Northern Samar proclaimed Abayon as the duly elected member of the House
of Representatives for the said legislative district. 5
On May 31, 2013, Daza filed his Election Protest6 challenging the elections results in 25
clustered precincts in the Municipalities of Biri, Capul, Catarman, Lavezares, San Isidro, and
Victoria. In his protest, he bewailed that there was massive fraud, vote-buying, intimidation,
employment of illegal and fraudulent devices and schemes before, during and after the
elections benefitting Abayon and that terrorism was committed by the latter and his
unidentified cohorts, agents and supporters. 7
On August 1, 2013, Abayon filed his Verified Answer raising special and affirmative defenses
as well as his Counter-Protest. 8 He challenged the results in all 332 precincts alleging that
the 72,805 votes obtained by Daza were questionable in view of the frauds and anomalies
committed by the
latter and his supporters during the elections.9
In its Resolution No. 14-055,10 dated February 27, 2014, the HRET found both Daza's
protest and Abayon's counter-protest to be sufficient in form and substance. From October
14, 2014, until October 15, 2014, revision proceedings were conducted on the 25 clustered
precincts protested by Daza. 11 After the revision of ballots in the said precincts, the votes
for Abayon increased by 28 and the votes for Daza increased by 14.12
In his Urgent Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, 13 dated September 3, 2015, Daza moved
for the withdrawal of his cause of action for the recount, revision and re-appreciation· of the
ballots in the clustered precincts in the municipalities of Biri, Capul and San Isidro. He
likewise prayed that the validity and legitimacy of his separate and distinct cause of action
for the annulment of election results in certain identified precincts on the ground of
terrorism be upheld. 14 In its Resolution No. 15-052, dated September 24, 2015, the HRET
granted Daza's motion and directed the Hearing Commissioner to continue with the
reception of Abayon 's defense on the issue of terrorism and to hold in abeyance the
proceedings relative to his counter-protest. 15
G.R. No. 222236
Thereafter, Daza filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion, 16 dated November 4, 2015,
praying that Abayon's counter-protest be dismissed as a consequence of the withdrawal of
his (Daza's) cause of action for the recount, revision and re-appreciation in the concerned
clustered precincts.
In its Resolution No. 15-058, dated December 14, 2015, the HRET granted Daza's motion and
dismissed Abayon's counter-protest.1âwphi1 Abayon moved for reconsideration but his
motion was denied by the HRET in its
January 21, 2016 Resolution. Aggrieved, Abayon filed a Petition for Certiorari17 with prayer
for the urgent issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a status quo ante
order and/or Preliminary injunction before the Court, which was docketed as G.R. No.
222236.
Meanwhile, the HRET proceeded with the reception of evidence with regard to the issue of
terrorism on the remaining clustered precincts in the municipalities of Lavezares and
Victoria. After the parties had submitted their memoranda, the HRET decided the election
protest in Daza' s favor and declared him as the winning candidate.
G.R. No. 223032
In its February 3, 2016 Decision, the HRET annulled the election results in five ( 5) clustered
precincts in the municipalities of Lavezares and Victoria because of the commission of
massive terrorism. As a result of nullifying the election results in the said clustered precincts,
the HRET deducted the votes received by the parties in the concerned clustered precincts
and concluded that Daza obtained 72,436 votes and Abayon had 72,002 votes.
The HRET highlighted that Daza presented testimonial and documentary evidence showing
that: (1) prior to the May 13, 2013 elections, the National Democratic Front-Eastern Visayas
(NDF-EV) had already shown its animosity and hostility towards him and his then incumbent
governor son through the posting on the NDF-EV website and in conspicuous places
statements declaring them as enemies of the people of
Northern Samar; (2) comic magazines vilifying them were distributed; (3) "pulong-pulongs"
were held in the concerned barangays where the NDF-EV exhorted the resident-attendees
to vote against him and in favor of Abayon, threatening to comeback if the result were
otherwise; (4) his supporters and/or fellow Liberal Party candidates were prohibited from
campaigning for him, and also from mounting tarpaulins/posters and distributing sample
ballots; (5) Abayon had meetings with NDF-EV officials, during which times, he gave them
money and guns; and (6) NDF-EV armed partisans were deployed around the school
premises in the concerned precincts on election day.
The HRET found that Daza had adduced convincing evidence to establish that fear was
instilled in the minds of hundreds of resident-voters in the protested clustered precincts
from the time they had attended the "pulong-pulongs" up until the election day itself when
armed partisans were deployed to the schools to ensure that the voters would not vote for
him but for Abayon.
The HRET disregarded the certifications issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor Atty.
Antonio G. Gulay Jr. that there was no failure of election in Northern Samar and by P/SSupt.
Mario Abraham Gonzalez Lenaming, Officer-in-Charge of the Northern Samar Police
Provincial Office, that the conduct of the elections was generally peaceful despite the
occurrence of two election-related incidents in the First District of Northern Samar. The
HRET noted that the said government officials were not presented to testify and, even if the
said certifications were admissible, it had no probative value in disputing the terroristic acts
committed upon the voters in the assailed precincts.
The HRET ratiocinated that there was clear and convincing evidence to warrant the
annulment of the elections in the concerned precincts because the terrorism affected more
than 50% of the votes cast in the said precincts and it was impossible to distinguish the good
votes from the bad.
Abayon moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the HRET in its March 7,
2016 Resolution.
On March 9, 2016, Abayon filed before the Court this petition for certiorari18 and
prohibition with prayer for the urgent issuance of TRO and/or a status quo ante order
and/or preliminary injunction before the Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 223032.
These present consolidated petitions raise the following:
ISSUES
1] Whether the HRET had jurisdiction to annul the elections in the contested precincts in the
municipalities of Lavezares and Victoria;
2] Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the elections on the
ground of terrorism; and
2] Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the counter-protest
filed by Abayon.
G.R. No. 222236
Petitioner Abayon insists that the HRET erred when it dismissed his counter-protest as it was
in violation of his right to due process. He states that the resolutions issued by the HRET
dismissing his counter-protest did not state clearly and distinctly the facts and legal bases
thereof. Abayon even asserts that the HRET admitted in its resolution that it merely adopted
the facts and the law invoked by Daza in his urgent manifestation and motion.
He argues that the counter-protest could not be simply dismissed on the basis of Daza's
withdrawal of his cause of action for the recount, revision and re-appreciation of the ballots
in the clustered precincts in Biri,
Capul and San Isidro; that a counter-protest is an independent, distinct, separate and
alternative legal remedy which is exclusively available to a protestee in an election protest
case; and that his counter-protest may be summarily dismissed only if the grounds under
Rule 21 19 of the 2011 HRET Rules of Procedure are present.
G.R. No. 223032
Abayon asserts that the nullification of the election results in the concerned clustered
precincts was not within the jurisdiction of the HRET.1avvphi1
He explains that the annulment of election results on the ground of terrorism is akin to a
declaration of failure of elections, which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7166.20
Further, Abayon argues that even if the HRET had jurisdiction to annul election results, it still
committed grave abuse of discretion in this particular case for lack of legal and factual bases.
He avers that there was no clear and convincing evidence to establish that terrorism
affected more than 50% of the votes cast and that it was impossible to distinguish the good
votes from the bad. Abayon heavily relies on the respective certifications issued by the
COMELEC and the Philippine National Police (PNP) that the elections in Northern Samar
were orderly and peaceful.
Also, Abayon laments that his right to due process was violated because the HRET did not
exhibit the cold neutrality of an impartial judge in handling the present election protest. He
points out that the HRET granted Daza's motion to present additional witnesses without him
being granted the opportunity to be heard. Abayon also reiterates that his counter-protest
was unceremoniously dismissed.
Position of Respondent Daza
In his Consolidated Comment,21 dated March 28, 2016, Daza countered that the petition
(G.R. No. 222236) should be dismissed because it contained fatal violations of the Rules of
Court. He cited the following infractions: (1) forum shopping; (2) the resolution dismissing
Abayon's protest had become final and executory for his failure to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof; and (3) the petition did not indicate in its caption the original case
number before the HRET. Moreover, Daza contended that the
petition was without merit because the HRET could continue or discontinue the revision
proceedings motu propio. In addition, he stated that the case had been mooted by the
promulgation of the HRET decision declaring him as the winner in the last electoral process.
Further, Daza posited that the HRET had jurisdiction to annul the election results on the
ground of terrorism. He questioned the present petition (G.R. No. 223032) as it raised
factual issues, which was outside the province of a Rule 65 petition. He stressed that the
Court could only exercise its certiorari jurisdiction in cases of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the HRET. Daza further stated that even if the Court were to review the factual
findings of the HRET, it would still find clear and convincing evidence to justify the
annulment of election results in the contested precincts. He asserted that the testimonies of
the voters and residents of the concerned precincts were corroborated by P/SSupt. Isaias B.
Tonog (PISSupt. Tonog), then Provincial Director of Northern Samar; and Col. Roberto S.
Capulong (Col. Capulong), Operations Officer of the 8th Division, Philippine Army in
Catbalogan, Samar. Daza explained that the totality of his evidence clearly and convincingly
showed that the NDF-EV, through violence, intimidation and threats conducted before and
during elections, harassed voters in the contested precincts to vote for Abayon and
threatened them should they not do so.
In its Consolidated Comment,22 dated March 28, 2016, the HRET, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, averred that it had jurisdiction to annul election results. It highlighted Rule
16 of the 2011 HRET Rules stating that the election or returns of a proclaimed House
Representative may be assailed in an election protest if the election or returns were
attended by specific acts or omission constituting electoral frauds, anomalies or
irregularities, which necessarily included acts of terrorism to dissuade voters from casting
their vote or to alter the results of the election.
The HRET faulted Abayon in claiming that the case was similar to a declaration of failure of
elections which was under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc, pursuant to R.A. No.
7166. It reasoned that mere allegation of terrorism would not immediately convert the case
to a nullification case because terrorism was an act resulting in either failure of elections or
electoral fraud, anomaly, or irregularity, which can only be protested through an election
protest. Moreover, the HRET claimed that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion as its
decision in favor of Daza was supported by clear and convincing evidence. As such, it
concluded that its decision should be sustained.
The HRET further stated that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Abayon's counter-protest because it had the prerogative to discontinue the revision
proceedings. It likewise elucidated that Abayon was not deprived of due process when his
counter-protest was dismissed because he was given his day in court.
The HRET underscored that Abayon did not move for reconsideration when his counter-
protest was denied, hence, the resolution became final and executory.
Finally, the HRET posited that it did not violate Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution23
because the assailed resolutions were merely interlocutory orders and, even if they were
considered decisions or final orders, they sufficiently stated the facts and law upon which
they were based as there was no proscription against the court's adoption of the narration
of facts made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties.
The Court's Ruling
The petitions are impressed with merit.
The HRET Jurisdiction
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution clearly spells out HRET's jurisdiction, to wit:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Abayon argues that the annulment of the election results in the contested precincts was
beyond the jurisdiction of the HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. He claims that
under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166,24 only the COMELEC En Banc has jurisdiction to annul
elections or declare a failure of elections. Daza, on the other hand, counters that the power
of the HRET to annul election results, where terrorism, fraud or other irregularities are
existent, differs from the power of the COMELEC to declare failure of elections or annul
elections pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7166.
Both Abayon and Daza do not contest the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET to decide
election protests filed against members of the House of Representatives. They, however,
diverge as to the extent of its jurisdiction.
An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds
or irregularities. 25 It aims to determine who between them has actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes cast and, therefore, entitled to hold the office. 26
The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power
granted to the COMELEC to declare failure of elections. The Constitution no less, grants the
HRET with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the members of the
House of Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud,
terrorism or other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections. To deprive
the HRET the prerogative to annul elections would undermine its constitutional fiat to
decide election contests. The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be
interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee' s
title. 27
Consequently, the annulment of election results is but a power concomitant to the HRET' s
constitutional mandate to determine the validity of the contestee' s title.
The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.28 Thus, the HRET, as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism
or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is
merely exercising its constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates received
the majority of the valid votes cast.
To the Court's mind, the HRET had jurisdiction to determine whether there was terrorism in
the contested precincts. In the event that the HRET would conclude that terrorism indeed
existed in the said precincts, then it could annul the election results in the said precincts to
the extent of deducting the votes received by Daza and Abayon in order to remain faithful to
its constitutional mandate to determine who among the candidates received the majority of
the valid votes cast.
Moreover, the passage of R.A. No. 7166 cannot deprive the HRET of its incidental power to
annul elections in the exercise of its sole and exclusive authority conferred by no less than
the Constitution. It must be remembered that the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial, quasi-
legislative and administrative functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC,29 the Court expounded, to
wit:
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and
the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-judicial.
The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies
arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-
proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be
delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative Junction refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. in the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6,
Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue
rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. 30
[Emphases Supplied]
Thus, the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial function when it decides election contests not
otherwise reserved to other electoral tribunals by the Constitution. The COMELEC, however,
does not exercise its quasijudicial functions when it declares a failure of elections pursuant
to R.A. No. 7166. Rather, the COMELEC performs its administrative function when it
exercises such power.
R.A. No. 7166 was enacted to empower the COMELEC to be most effective in the
performance of its sacred duty of ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections. 31
Further, a closer perusal of Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code readily reveals that it is
more in line with the COMELEC's administrative function of ensuring that elections are free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible, and not its quasi-judicial function to adjudicate
election contests. The said provision reads:
Sec. 6. Failure of elections - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed,
or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after
the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended
orwhich resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In Sambarani v. COMELEC;32 the Court clarified the nature of the COMELEC's power to
declare failure of elections, to wit:
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Indisputably, the text and intent of this
constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve its primordial objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and
administrative in nature. It is elementary in administrative law that "courts will not interfere
in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training
of such agencies." The authority given to COMELEC to declare a failure of elections and to
call for special elections falls under its administrative function.33
[Emphasis Supplied]
Consequently, the difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and
the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First, the former
is an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise
of the COMELEC's administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the
election results connected with the election contest before it whereas the declaration of
failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned precinct
or political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who
among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the
other hand, declares a failure of elections with the objective of holding or continuing the
elections, which were not held or were suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure
to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of elections, special elections will have to be
conducted. 34
Hence, there is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the COMELEC declares a failure of
elections on the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so
in its administrative capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the
same grounds, they do so in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions.
Annulment of elections only
warranted in exceptional
circumstances
Abayon asserts that even if the HRET had jurisdiction to annul the elections in the concerned
precincts, the latter nonetheless acted with grave abuse of discretion because the
circumstances did not warrant the nullification of the results in the contested precincts. He
explains that Daza failed to sufficiently establish that terrorism was so prevalent in the said
clustered precincts that it had adversely affected the right of the majority of residents to
vote and that made it impossible to differentiate the valid votes from the invalid ones.
It must be remembered that "[t]he power to declare a failure of elections should be
exercised with utmost care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt
that the disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that
it is impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at
any certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by
violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise." 35 Consequently, a
protestant alleging terrorism in an election protest must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the will of the majority has been muted by"violence, intimidation or threats.
The Court agrees with the observation of HRET Member and esteemed colleague, Associate
Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (Justice Peralta), that the circumstances in the case at bench did
not warrant the nullification of the election in the concerned clustered precincts. The Court
quotes the pertinent portions of his dissent in the HRET decision, to wit:
Protestant's evidence is utterly weak, unclear and unconvincing. The Tribunal, in Balindong
v. Macarambon, Jr., declared that "[t]here should be clear and convincing evidence to nullify
an election. It is the duty of the courts to sustain an election authorized by law if it has so
conducted as to give substantially a free and fair expression of the popular will, and actual
result thereof is clearly ascertained. When a person elected obtained a considerable
plurality of votes over his adversary, and the evidence offered to rebut such a result is
neither solid nor decisive, it would be imprudent to quash the election, as that would be to
oppose without reason the popular will solemnly expressed in suffrage."
xxx
There are two (2) indispensable requisites that must concur in order to justify the drastic
action of nullifying the election:
(1) The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fiftypercent (50%) of the votes cast on
the specific precinct or precincts sought to be annulled, or in case of the entire municipality,
more than fifty percent (50%) of its total precincts and the votes cast therein; and
(2) It is impossible to distinguish with reasonablecertainty between the lawful and unlawful
ballots. xxx
While protestant's witnesses, Messrs. Crisanto G. Camposano, Alex B. Rimbao and
Melquiades T. Bornillo, contended that they are residents and voters of Barangay Salvacion,
Barangay Toog and Barangay Datag, respectively, and merely voted for protestee out of fear
of the said armed partisans, not a single ballot or vote cast by said witnesses and/ or other
voters allegedly subjected to terroristic acts had been identified and the effect thereof,
proven extensive or massive. Failing in this regard, the Tribunal cannot order the annulment
of votes for protestee, as prayed for by protestant. The validity of the results of the elections
in the protested clustered precincts must be upheld.
It is worthy to note that no evidence was presented which will directly point to protestee as
the one responsible for the incidents which allegedly happened before and during the
elections. Absent anything that would concretely and directly establish protestee as the one
who had induced or actually perpetrated the commission of terroristic acts and
demonstrate that those incidents were part of a scheme to frustrate the free expression of
the will of the electorate, the alluded handing of material considerations, including guns, to
the NDF-EV officials, and the garnering of votes higher than those of the protestant in the
protested clustered precincts, do not per se make him, responsible for the charges of
terrorism.
Moreover, at the time of the alleged submission to the offices of the Provincial and Regional
Directors, Philippine National Police (PNP), of intelligence reports regarding the commission
of massive terroristic acts, Comelec Resolution No. 9583 xxx was already effective. Upon
validation of intelligence reports, the logical step that should have been undertaken by the
PNP, which is in accord with human experience, was to report also such terroristic acts to
the Comelec in order to place under its immediate and direct control and supervision the
political divisions, subdivision, unit or area affected by "serious armed threats" to ensure the
holding of free, peaceful, honest, orderly and credible elections. However, no evidence on
reporting to the Comelec for said purpose was made to concretize protestant's postulation
of massive terrorism. The protestant himself did not even bother to report to the COMELEC
the alleged terroristic acts in order to control or prevent such serious armed threats and to
ensure the holding of free, peaceful, honest, orderly and credible elections. Protestant also
did not report the matter to the police so that the alleged persons committing such
terroristic acts would be arrested and the proper cases filed against them in court. It is thus
highly doubtful that such terroristic acts, as protestant claimed, existed. Such actuation by
protestant is simply not in accord with human experience.
Since public officers like those in the PNP are presumed to have regularly performed their
official duties, given the foregoing intelligence reports, and the effectivity as well during the
election period xxx of Comelec Resolution No. 9561-Axxx it is expected that they would have
assigned their forces therein to protect not only the life and limb of the voters, but also their
right to vote. In fact, in his post-election memorandum addressed to the Regional Director
dated May 27, 2013, P /SSupt. Tonog, then Provincial Director, mentioned about the strict
implementation of "PRO8 LOI 20/2012 "SAFE 2013 WARAY" through the Provincial Special
Operations Task Group, Secure and Fair Elections 2013 (PSOTG-SAFE 2013)." Hence, it is
incredible that there were as many as five (5) NPA armed partisan at the school premises for
the purpose of overseeing that the voters in involved barangays would not be supporting
protestant on the day of the elections. Such circumstance was not even reflected in the
memorandum of P /SSupt. Tonog.36
[Emphases Supplied]
It is on record that Daza presented several residents of the concerned precincts to illustrate
how NDF-EV members terrorized the residents of the said precincts before and during the
elections to ensure Daza's defeat to Abayon. The Court, nevertheless, observes that only
three (3) witnesses testified that they voted for Abayon out of fear from the NDF-EV. The
other witnesses merely described the alleged violence committed by the NFD-EV but did not
expound whether the same had ultimately made other voters vote for Abayon.
Neither did the testimonies of P/SSupt. Tonog and Col. Capulong corroborate the fact that
the alleged terrorism by the NDF-EV caused voters to vote for Abayon. These testimonies do
not prove that voters in the concerned precincts indeed voted for Abayon out of fear of the
NDF-EV. For one, Col. Capulong simply stated that the NDF-EV would want to see that
politicians and candidates whom they call "enemies of the people" be defeated in the
elections. Further, as noted by Justice Peralta, P/SSupt. Tonog's Post-Election Memorandum
did not state that NDF-EV armed partisans were present in the course of the elections.
Daza presented three (3) voters as witnesses to establish that they were coerced by NDF-EV
armed partisan to vote for Abayon during the 2013 Elections. Their collective testimonies,
however, fail to impress. First, their testimonies made no reference to Abayon's alleged
participation in the purported terroristic acts committed by the NDF-EV. Second, Daza's
witnesses alone are insufficient to prove that indeed terrorism occurred in the contested
precincts and the same affected at least 50% of the votes cast therein. The testimonies of
three (3) voters can hardly represent the majority that indeed their right to vote was stifled
by violence. With the allegation of widespread terrorism, it would have been more prudent
for Daza to present more voters who were coerced to vote for Abayon as a result of the
NDFEV's purported violence and intimidation.
Indubitably, the numbers mattered considering that both the COMELEC and the PNP issued
certifications stating that no failure of elections occurred in Northern .Saf11ar and that the
elections was generally peaceful and orderly. The unsubstantiated testimonies of Daza's
witnesses falter when faced with official pronouncements of government agencies, which
are presumed to be issued in the regular performance of their duties.
In Tan v. COMELEC,37 the Court found wanting the testimony of a sole witness to
substantiate the claim of terrorism which disenfranchised a majority of voters and gave
more credence to official statements of government agencies, to wit:
We agree with the finding of the COMELEC en bane that the evidence relied upon by
petitioners to support their charges of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of elections in
the questioned municipalities consisted of affidavits prepared and executed by their own
representatives; and that the other pieces of evidence submitted by petitioners were not
credible and inadequate to substantiate petitioners' charges of fraud and irregularities in the
conduct of elections. Mere affidavits are insufficient, more so, when they were executed by
petitioners' poll watchers. The conclusion of respondent COMELEC is correct that although
petitioners specifically alleged violence, terrorism, fraud, and other irregularities in the
conduct of elections, they failed to substantiate or prove said allegations. Had there been
massive disenfranchisement, petitioners should have presented the affidavits of these
disenfranchised voters, instead of only a single affidavit of one allegedly disenfranchised
voter.
We go along with the COMELEC en bane in giving more weight to the affidavits and
certifications executed by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors and the PNP and
military authorities that the elections held were peaceful and orderly, under the
presumption that their official duties had been regularly performed. 38
[Emphasis Supplied]
The testimonies of a minute portion of the registered voters in the said precincts should not
be used as a tool to silence the voice of the majority expressed through their votes during
elections. To do so would disenfranchise the will of the majority and reward a candidate not
chosen by the people to be their representative. With such dire consequences, it is but
expected that annulment of elections be judiciously exercised with utmost caution and
resorted only in exceptional circumstances.
It is true that in Vilando v. HRET,39 the Court recognized that the power granted to the HRET
by the Constitution is full, clear and complete, which excludes the exercise of any authority
by the Court that may restrict or curtail, or affect the same.40 The Court, nevertheless,
clarified in Tagolino v. HRET41 that the HRET's independence is not without limits as the
Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over it if only to check whether it had gravely abused its
discretion.42 As such, the Court will not hesitate to set aside the HRET's decision favoring
Daza if it was tainted with grave abuse of discretion on its part.
In Leus v. St. Scholastica 's College Westgrove,43 the Court has ruled that a decision be a redundancy considering that the Court has upheld his election as the duly elected
unsupported by sufficient evidence amount to grave abuse of discretion, to wit: Representative of his constituents.

Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not strictly include an inquiry as to the WHEREFORE, the February 3, 2016 Decision and the March 7, 2016 Resolution of the House
correctness of the evaluation of evidence (that was the basis of the labor tribunals in of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Harlin C.
determining their conclusion), the incorrectness of its evidentiary evaluation should not Abayon is
result in negating the requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when there is a showing
that the findings or conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were arrived at DECLARED to be the law.fully elected Representative of the First Legislative District
arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be reviewed by the courts. In ofNorthem Samar in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
particular, the CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed
decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. A This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
decision that is not supported by substantial evidence is definitely a decision tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. SO ORDERED.

[Emphasis Supplied]

As discussed above, the decision of the HRET was clearly unsupported by clear and
convincing evidence. Thus, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the
elections in the contested precincts and disregarding the respective number of votes
received by Abayon and Daza from the precincts, which led to its conclusion that Daza was
the one elected by the majority of voters in the First Legislative District of Northern Samar
to be their Representative in Congress. Hence, Abayon should be reinstated as the duly
elected Representative of the said legislative district.

Moreover, Daza cannot claim that the issue had been mooted by his assumption to office
because the same is premised on the fact that the HRET had correctly ruled Daza to be the
duly elected representative. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value.44 In the present case, there is still a justiciable controversy-
who between Daza and Abayon was truly chosen by the majority of voters of the First
Legislative District of Northern Samar to be their representative.

Propriety of the dismissal

of Abayon's counter-protest is now
moot

With the Court's ruling that Abayon is the duly elected Representative of the First Legislative
District of Northern Samar, the issue of dismissal of his counter-protest in G.R. No. 222236 is
now moot and academic. A declaration on the propriety of the dismissal of Abayon's
counter-protest has no practical value because to continue with his counter-protest would
 of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born
Institution of election contest Filipino or is he not?

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots
and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) Antecedent Case Settings
and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
x-----------------------------x (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004 forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent. Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
x-----------------------------x Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003
before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004 or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
vs. Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents. Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
DECISION birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
VITUG, J.: marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of
the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,"1 that cannot In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in
be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it. support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of
birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3)
qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of
are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management
and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives
that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to
the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a
certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be
found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247
of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e)
copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by
the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the
said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days
later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No.
161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction
or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission
on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and Victorino X. Fornier,"
and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due
course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material
fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier
invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false" –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers
and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.
A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which
power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to,
and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial
to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice,
on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-
presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,4 as "not
(being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the
Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing
for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution
might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless,
would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario.
Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on
18 April 1992, would support this premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest
or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest
shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include
an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President
of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest
the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified
petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines,
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5 In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would
have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, d efined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on
Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the
concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.6 Aristotle saw its significance if only
to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.7 The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen
to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on
the other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to
submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century,
the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights
necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.9 Its
meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which
encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.10 The 20th century
saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right
of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.11 The idea of citizenship has
gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An
ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village,
might well be the internationalization of citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of
Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13 In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting
a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became
highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to
one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to
apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in
Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained
to be the subject of differing views among experts;15 however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of
14 August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political
status of children born in the Philippine Islands,17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de
Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the
Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of
the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar
among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889,
which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town
of the Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline
as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming
world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a
change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force,
would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its
Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to
sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry
on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws
as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the
date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve
such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and
to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus –
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded
to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on
the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects.
Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens"
under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill
of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight."23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was
taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular
Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to
01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight
was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common
law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in
the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within
that period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens
of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for
the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones
Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act
of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and
except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen
of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2)
residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common
law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as
fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of
the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect
such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship,
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her
citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime
of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28 – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e.,
jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not
been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11
September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he
was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother,
Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of
the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old,
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried,
and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20
August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an
American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would
be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-
born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in
the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as
Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for
respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan
F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized
those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies
of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a
public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of
their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made,
2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes
more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at
the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou
was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain.
Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period
of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the
Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that
Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the
place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.
It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have
had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the
child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the
child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner,
the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889
up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was
either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document.32 Complementary to the
new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by
the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it
shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who
refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father
could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment
of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father.
The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative
document of recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really
is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the
registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the
names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it
was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public
document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to
the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in
the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed,
or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of
voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,35
this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly
made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the
lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed
parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as
to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine
or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175
provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
"x x x xxx x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided
under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that
'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if
the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950.
Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of
keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of
the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern
the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or,
in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be
found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the
domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the
family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts
which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection
of private interests."37
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards
although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil
nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the
domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their
properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the
classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the
persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the
national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in
different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family relations.40 In
adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive
parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law41 and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude
may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary
and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of
legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to
keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the
primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain
only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political
law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should
thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil
law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family
relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code
or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or
unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a
relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before
the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley
Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of
Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with
Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena
Street, Manila.
"x x x xxx xxx
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe,
Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan
and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota
St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some
months between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x xxx xxx
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is
a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of
the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.
A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,42 this
Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the
fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According
to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate
of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born
on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an
illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of
this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision
but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to
look closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It
was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a
Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the
naturalized stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to
public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father.
Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was
whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship
of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father,
Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin
therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court
said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The
Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither
was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not
even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The
Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be
Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary
to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure
and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once
but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People
vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate
children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What
possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a
public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive
the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate
child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause
and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was
to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the
petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President
in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No.
161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter’s
capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest
under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou),
if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in
his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his
case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only
be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe,
Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for
want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing
the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Institution of election contest
G.R. No. 158371 December 11, 2003
SONIA R. LORENZO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., in his capacity as Chairman,
Commission on Elections, and NESTOR B. MAGNO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner Sonia R. Lorenzo and respondent Nestor B. Magno were rival candidates for
Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the local elections of May 14, 2001. A certain Carlos
Montes, resident of San Isidro, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition, docketed
as SPA 01-153, for the disqualification of respondent Magno as a candidate on the ground of
his conviction by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of Direct Bribery. On May 7, 2001, the
COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution disqualifying respondent Magno. This was
affirmed on appeal by the COMELEC En Banc on May 12, 2001.
The aforesaid Resolution was disseminated for implementation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Isidro. Hence, on May 18, 2001, petitioner Lorenzo was proclaimed as the
Mayor-elect of San Isidro.
Meanwhile, respondent Magno brought a petition for certiorari before this Court, assailing
his disqualification by the COMELEC, which petition was docketed as G.R. No. 147904. On
October 4, 2002, this Court rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the two
challenged Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 7 and 12, 2001, and declaring that
Magno was under no disqualification to run for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2001 elections. The relevant portion of the Decision reads:
[A]lthough [Magno’s] crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner
nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA
7160). [Magno]’s disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no
such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2001 elections.
Unfortunately, however, neither this Court nor this case is the proper forum to rule on (1)
the validity of Sonia Lorenzo’s proclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner as the
rightful winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the winning
candidate, the legal remedy of petitioner would have been a timely election protest.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The challenged resolutions
of the Commission on Elections dated May 7, 2001 and May 12, 2001 are hereby reversed
and set aside. The petitioner’s prayer in his supplemental petition for his proclamation as
the winner in the May 14, 2001 mayoralty elections in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, not being
within our jurisdiction, is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.1
On October 21, 2002, respondent Magno filed an Omnibus Motion with the COMELEC in
SPA 01-153, seeking: (a) that his name be reinstated in the certified list of candidates for
municipal mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 local election; (b) the
nullification of the proclamation of Lorenzo as mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija; (c) that a
special board of canvassers be formed to continue the canvas of votes cast in favor of
respondent Magno; and (d) after completion of the canvas, that Magno be proclaimed the
winner.
The COMELEC En Banc thereafter issued a Resolution dated May 13, 2003, wherein it (a)
ordered the creation of new Boards of Election Inspectors for all precincts in the
municipality of San Isidro, for the purpose of counting the votes cast for Magno and
preparing new election returns for submission to the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Isidro; and (b) constituted a new Municipal Board of Canvassers for the purpose of
canvassing said election returns and submitting the results to the COMELEC.
Subsequently, on May 22, 2003, the COMELEC partially modified the above Resolution to
order the immediate constitution of a new Municipal Board of Canvassers, it appearing that
the old Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija had already canvassed all
the election returns for all precincts except the votes for Magno. The COMELEC reiterated
the directive in an Order dated June 10, 2003, and ordered the immediate implementation
and execution thereof.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the validity of the
Resolution dated May 13, 2003 and the Orders dated May 22, 2003 and June 10, 2003.
On June 17, 2003, this Court directed public respondents to observe the status quo
prevailing before the filing of the petition.
Petitioner argues that the COMELEC’s order for the canvass of votes defies this Court’s
ruling in G.R. No. 147904 that Magno should have filed an election protest.
We find in favor of the respondent.
Well settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities
and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials.2 Also
settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.3 In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by
all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate.4
As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for
the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo
warranto.5 This rule, however, admits of exceptions, to wit: (1) where the board of
canvassers was improperly constituted; (2) where quo warranto was not the proper remedy;
(3) where what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest
but a petition to annul the proclamation; (4) where the filing of a quo warranto petition or
an election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation
controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (5) where the proclamation was null and void.6
This case falls squarely within the fifth exception to the general rule, i.e. the proclamation of
Lorenzo as Mayor of San Isidro was null and void. As of May 18, 2001, the date on which
Lorenzo was proclaimed Mayor-elect of San Isidro, the question as regards Magno’s
qualifications for said post was still pending, and was raised as an issue before this Court in
certiorari proceedings in G.R. No. 147904. The question of Magno’s qualifications for the
office of Mayor was not resolved until October 4, 2002, when we expressly ruled that
Magno was qualified for said post.7
Since the question of Magno’s eligibility for the position of Mayor was still pending, the
canvass which excluded Magno from the list of qualified candidates was an incomplete
canvass, and Lorenzo’s proclamation, on the basis thereof, was illegal. An incomplete
canvass is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation.8
In a long line of cases, we have affirmed the power of the COMELEC to annul an illegal
canvass and an illegal proclamation,9 which respondent COMELEC has implicitly done in its
Resolution of May 13, 2003 and Orders of May 22, 2003 and June 10, 2003.
Moreover, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, respondent Magno cannot be
faulted for his failure to file an election protest.10 The question of his qualification or
disqualification for the position of Mayor had not yet been settled as of the expiration of the
ten-day reglementary period. As such, Magno was not yet eligible to file an election protest
and, therefore, the fact that no such protest was filed should not be an impediment to his
proclamation as mayor if the results of the canvass of the new Municipal Board of
Canvassers would show that he garnered the highest number of votes.
Petitioner’s other contentions – that she was denied due process,11 and that the COMELEC
Chairman modified an en banc resolution without notice and hearing12 – deserve scant
consideration.
First, the records of the case clearly show that petitioner was given full opportunity to
participate in SPA 01-153, both via due notice of and attendance at hearings and the
opportunity to submit memoranda and pleadings.

Second, there was no substantial modification of the COMELEC’s En Banc Resolution dated
May 13, 2003. The Orders issued by respondent COMELEC Chairman dated May 22, 2003
and June 10, 2003 were merely to implement the COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution, with the
end goal of canvassing the votes cast in the most expeditious way possible.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May
13, 2003, and the Orders dated May 22, 2003 and June 10, 2003 of the Commission on
Elections, which (a) ordered the creation of a new Board of Election Inspectors for all
precincts in the municipality of San Isidro in Nueva Ecija; and (b) ordered the immediate
constitution of a new Municipal Board of Canvassers in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Institution of election contest
G.R. No. 179413 November 28, 2008
PRISCILA R. JUSTIMBASTE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RUSTICO B. BALDERIAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On challenge via Certiorari and Prohibition is the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
banc Resolution of August 21, 20071 affirming the May 28, 20072 Resolution of its Second
Division dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by Priscila R. Justimbaste (petitioner)
against Rustico B. Balderian (private respondent).
Gathered from the records of the case are the following antecedent facts:
On April 3, 2007, petitioner filed with the Office of the Leyte Provincial Election Supervisor a
petition to disqualify private respondent as a candidate for mayor of Tabontabon, Leyte
during the May 14, 2007 elections. In the main, petitioner alleged:
2.3. That the Respondent committed falsification and misinterpretation in his application for
candidacy for mayor as follows;
a. That while Respondent stated in the application [that] his name is Rustico Besa Balderian,
his real name is CHU TECK SIAO as shown in the Certificate of Birth issued by the National
Statistic Office, copy of which is hereto attached as "Annex B". (sic)
b. That the Respondent had been using as his middle name BESA, while his brother
Bienvenido is using the middle name SIAO, as shown by "Annexes C and D", a copy of which
[is] hereto attached, thereby confusing the public as to his identity.
c. That the Respondent is reportedly a U.S. citizen or Permanent resident of the United
States and has not reportedly relinquished his allegiance or residence to that foreign
country, thus disqualified from filing his application for Candidacy for mayor. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)3
Private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations, he asserting that he is a Filipino citizen.
In her Position Paper filed before the COMELEC, petitioner attached a record of private
respondent’s travels from 1998 to 2006, as certified by the Bureau of Immigration;4 a
photocopy of private respondent’s Philippine Passport5 issued on November 6, 2002 by the
Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles which shows his nationality as a Filipino; a Certification
from the National Statistics Office dated April 4, 2007 for one Rustico S. Balderian6 and
another for one Rustico B. Balderian;7 a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Tabontabon dated March 30, 2007 as to the fact of birth of one Chu Teck Siao to Peter Siao
and Zosima Balderian;8 and a Certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Tacloban City that the records of the Petition for Change of Name of
private respondent "is (sic) not available in the records of this office."9
In the meantime, private respondent won and was proclaimed as mayor of Tabontabon.
By Resolution of May 28, 2007, the Second Division of the COMELEC denied the petition for
disqualification, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant petition for disqualification is denied and the
respondent Rustico B. Balderian is considered a Filipino, having elected to be and is thus
qualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As reflected early on, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC Second
Division Resolution was denied by the banc, hence, the present petition.
The issue in the main is whether private respondent committed material misrepresentation
and falsification in his certificate of candidacy.
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides that the contents of the certificate
of candidacy must be true to the best of the candidate’s knowledge, thus:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the
political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy
are true to the best of his knowledge. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
If the certificate contains a material representation which is false, Section 78 provides the
procedure to challenge the same, thus:
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Material misrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy refers to the falsity of a statement required to be entered therein, as enumerated
in above-quoted Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Concurrent with materiality is a
deliberate intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications. Thus Salcedo II v.
Commission on Elections10 reiterates:
As stated in law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under
Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertained to a
material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive
rights of a candidate – the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate
of candidacy.11
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by
Section 78 of the Code refers to the qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having
made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave – to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of
election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a
basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake.12
xxxx
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive
the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. x x x13 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC)
governing qualifications for elective municipal officials14 reads:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any local language
or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty three (23) years of age on election day."
x x x x (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Petitioner asserts that private respondent committed material misrepresentation when he
stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen and that his name is Rustico
Besa Balderian, instead of Chu Teck Siao. Further, petitioner asserts that the immigration
records of private respondent who frequently went to the United States from 1998 up to
2006 reflected the acronyms "BB" and "RP" which petitioner takes to STAND FOR
"Balikbayan" and "Re-entry Permit," thus showing that private respondent either harbors
dual citizenship or is a permanent resident of a foreign country in contravention of Section
40 of the LGC:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted of final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis in the original and supplied)
Upon the other hand, private respondent insists on his Filipino citizenship.
Republic Act 676815 provides that a balikbayan is
1. A Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the Philippines for a period of at least
one year;
2. A Filipino overseas worker; or
3. A former Filipino citizen and his or her family, who had been naturalized in a foreign
country and comes or returns to the Philippines.
Re-entry permits are, under the Philippine Immigration Act, issued to lawful resident aliens
who depart temporarily from the Philippines. 16
The record of the case yields no concrete proof to show that private respondent, who holds
a Philippine passport, falls under the third category of a balikbayan (former Filipino citizen).
As noted by public respondent:
[T]he Commission (Second Division) dismissed the instant petition since the same was based
on mere conjectures and surmises. Petitioner never presented clear and convincing
evidence that respondent is indeed an American citizen and a permanent resident of the
United States of America. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As in petitioner’s petition before the COMELEC, as alleged above, she, in her present
Petition, is uncertain of private respondent’s citizenship or resident status, viz:
c. That the Respondent is reportedly a US citizen or Permanent resident of the United States
and has not reportedly relinquished his allegiance or residence to that foreign country, thus
disqualified from filing his application for Candidacy for mayor. (Emphasis, italics, and
underscoring supplied)17
Private respondent’s notarized photocopy of his Philippine Passport18 issued in 2002, the
genuineness and authenticity of which is not disputed by petitioner, shows that he is a
Filipino.
Petitioner insists, however, that private respondent is a Chinese national, following the
nationality of his father, Peter Siao. There are, however, conflicting documentary records
bearing on the citizenship of private respondent’s father. Thus, in the Certificate of Live
Birth of private respondent on file at the Local Civil Registrar of Tabontabon,19 the father is
registered as a Filipino. But in the Certificate of Live Birth of private respondent’s older
brother Bienvenido Balderian,20 the father is registered as a Chinese.
In private respondent’s Certificate of Live Birth, the entry on the date, as well as the place of
marriage of private respondents’ parents, reads "no data available." In his brother’s
Certificate of Live Birth, the entry on the same desired information is left blank. In light of
these, absent any proof that private respondent’s parents Peter Siao and Zosima
Balderian21 contracted marriage, private respondent is presumed to be illegitimate, hence,
he follows the citizenship of his mother who is a Filipino.22 As will be reflected shortly,
private respondent was, in a certified true copy of a decision dated August 26, 1976
rendered by then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Leyte and Southern Leyte,
therein noted, as gathered by the said court from the evidence presented, to be an
illegitimate child.
Petitioner goes on to bring attention to private respondent’s filing of a petition for change of
name from Chu Teck Siao to Rustico B. Balderian, which petition, petitioner alleges, is not
reflected in the records of the National Statistics Office as shown by two Certifications from
the said agency.
Responding, private respondent confirms that he indeed filed a verified petition for change
of name in 1976, docketed as SP Proc. JP-0121, with the then JDRC of Leyte and Southern
Leyte which rendered a decision in his favor in the same year. He adds that his previous
counsel, Atty. Rufino Reyes, sought in 1986 to secure a certified true copy of the decision
but no court records thereof could be found, hence, Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Palo, Leyte, "reconstituted the records" from the file copies of his counsel by Order
of November 7, 1986.23
The Court notes that by Order of November 21, 1986, Branch 7 of the Palo RTC, after
conducting a hearing, directed the issuance of a certified true copy of the judgment24
rendered by the JDRC on August 26, 1976. The Order states:
"When this case came on [sic] hearing this morning, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Teresita S.
Lopez of Leyte who was then Clerk of Court of the JDRC of Leyte confirmed the genuineness
of the file copy of the aforesaid judgment of Judge Zoila M. Redoña of the JDRC of Leyte in
SP Proc. JP-0121.
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the clerk of this court issue a certified true copy of the
aforesaid judgment in SP Proc. JP-0121 dated August 26, 1986 (sic) the dispositive parts of
which reads –
"Premises considered, the court hereby allows the petitioner (sic) for Change of Name. The
petitioner henceforth shall carry the name of Rustico Balderian as prayed for."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Civil Registrar of McArthur, Leyte, for him to
make of record this judgment in his Civil Registry." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)25
In the certified true copy of the judgment of the JDRC, the following were noted:
At the hearing petitioner presented the following exhibits: "B" – the order of the court
setting the case for hearing and ordering its publication; ordering also that a copy be served
upon the Office of the Sol. Gen. which was acknowledged having been received by said
office on Nov. 11, 1975 as per return Registry Receipt of the court attached to page 7 of the
record; "C" – the Affidavit of Publication of the Asst. Publisher of the "The Reporter" the
newspaper of general circulation which the order was published, "D" – the issue of "The
Reporter" dated November 12, 1975 and "D-1" – the page carried the order; "E" – issue of
same newspaper dated November 19, 1975 and "E-1" – the column carrying the order; "F" –
the issue of said newspaper dated November 26, 1975, and the "F-1", the column carrying
the order; "G" – the certification of the Local Civil Registrar; G-1, the place of birth of
petitioner; G-2, his date of birth,; G-3, the name of petitioner’s father Peter Siao; G-4, and
his mother’s name Zosima Balderian and G-5, the entry that petitioner is an illegitimate
child; which certification was issued on May 5, 1975 by said public official; "H" – petitioner’s
Baptismal Certificate; "H-1" – his date of birth; "H-2" – his place of birth; "H-3" – that his
parents are Peter Siao and Zosima Balderian. Exhibit "I" –petitioner’s diploma from the
Manila Central University where he earned his degree of Optometry on April 6, 1975 and
the name of Rustico Balderian; "J" – petitioner’s official rating issued by the Commissioner
of Professional Regulation Commission under the Board of Optometry issued January 13,
1976 under the name of Rustico B. Balderian; "K" – petitioner’s registration License No. 3374
with the Professional Regulation Commission for the practice of Optometry; "L" –
petitioner’s Registration Card with the Manila Central University being enrolled in Pre-
Medicine Course as of June 1976; Exhibit "M" – his registration card in the University of the
East when he cross-enrolled in the College of Law for the second year 1976-1977; Exhibit
"N" – Student Pilot’s License No. 758109 issued by the CAA to fly fixed wings; Exhibit "O" –
his Student Pilot’s License No. 75SH224 issued by Civil Aeronautics Administration allowing
him to fly a helicopter.
To the above school records which he earned under the name of Rustico Balderian, the
name under which he was baptized and hereon known to all since he can remember, he
never used the alien name of Chua Teck Siao by which he was registered. He has not been
charged with any offense either criminally, civilly or administratively.
His intention in filing the petition is to avoid undergoing the same difficulty and ordeal when
he takes the BAR examination and the Board examination in Medicine as he did when he
took the Board Examination in Optometry. After the latter Board allowed him to take the
examination upon the submission of an affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting to
the fact that Chu Teck Siao and Rustico Balderian is one and the same person, he was
advised to petition for Change of Name to avoid confusion.26 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
That the records of the Tabontabon Civil Registry still show, by petitioner’s allegation, that
private respondent’s name is Chu Teck Siao does not necessarily mean that there was no
such petition for change of name and that the certified true copy of judgment thereon is
spurious, especially given that, as highlighted in the above-quoted dispositive portion of the
JDRC decision, it was the Civil Registrar of McArthur, not Tabontabon, which was ordered to
be copy-furnished the decision and "to make of record [its] judgment in his Civil Registry."
AT ALL EVENTS, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a
material misrepresentation,27 as "material misrepresentation" under the earlier-quoted
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to "qualifications for elective office." It need
not be emphasized that there is no showing that there was an intent to deceive the
electorate as to private respondent’s identity, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting
public was thereby deceived.
Petitioner’s compilation of online articles/data on private respondent puts on view his
profile as Rustico B. Balderian. Petitioner in fact has not claimed that the electorate did not
know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of private respondent
or that they were deceived into voting for someone else other than him. Given that private
respondent and his family are members of the Colegio de Sta. Lourdes of Leyte Foundation,
Inc. which operates a nursing school in Tabontabon, it may safely be assumed that the
electorate had been fully acquainted with him.
Petitioner finally assails the failure of public respondent to conduct hearings on her petition,
citing Dayo v. Commission on Elections28 which held that "an election protest may not be
disposed of by summary judgment."29
Section 5 vis-á-vis Section 7 of Republic Act 664630 provides that the procedure in cases
involving nuisance candidates shall apply to petitions for cancellation of certificate of
candidacy.
SECTION 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. ─
(a) A Verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under
Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized
representative with the Commission by any registered candidate for the same office within
five (5) days from the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail not be
allowed.
(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue summons
to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any.
(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within which
to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy thereof
upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised as a affirmative
defenses.
(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the case and
receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of oral testimonies, the
parties may be required to submit position papers together with affidavits or counter-
affidavits and other documentary evidence. The hearing officer shall immediately submit to
the Commission his findings, reports, and recommendations within five (5) days from the
completion of such submission of evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within
five (5) days from receipt thereof.
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.
(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available means,
disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city or municipal
election registrars, boards of election inspectors and the general public in the political
subdivision concerned. (Underscoring supplied)
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. – The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. (Emphasis in
the original, underscoring supplied)
Petitioner is reminded that a petition for disqualification based on material
misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy is different from an election protest. The
purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by
the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate.31
In fine, petitioner has not shown that public respondent, in issuing the assailed Resolution,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Election contest imbued with public interest
G.R. No. 199433 November 13, 2012
ISABELITA P. GRAVIDES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PEDRO C. BORJAL, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
This Rule 65 petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the following issuances by
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC): (1) Resolution1 dated August 25,
2011 of the First Division granting the appeal of private respondent Pedro C. Borjal (Borjal)
from the December 7, 2010 Order2 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Quezon City,
Branch 33 in EPC No. 10-1313; (2) Order3 dated November 23, 2011 of the Commission En
Banc denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Isabelita P. Gravides
(Gravides); and (3) Entry of Judgment4 dated November 24, 2011 declaring that the
Resolution dated August 25, 2011 had become final and executory as of September 17,
2011.
Borjal and Gravides both ran for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay U.P. Campus
in Diliman, Quezon City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) Elections. Results of the elections showed that Gravides garnered a total of 2,322 votes
as against Borjal’s 2,320 votes. On October 26, 2010, the Barangay Board of Canvassers
(BBOC) officially proclaimed Gravides as the winning candidate for the said post.
On November 5, 2010, Borjal filed an Election Protest5 alleging the following irregularities
and violation of election laws:
7.1 Harassment, corruption, and anomalous activities committed by the BET and the
Barangay Board of Canvassers.
7.2 Valid votes cast in favor of protestant were misread and misappreciated by the Board of
Election Tellers (BET). For instance, several ballots containing wrong spelling (but with the
same sound when read) of protestant’s surname were not counted, there being no
candidate with the surname when read.
7.3 Valid votes for protestant were erroneously counted/tallied in the election returns
and/or erroneously tallied as votes of protestee and other candidates. Such that protestee
and other candidates seemed to have received more votes than those actually cast in their
favor.
7.4 Falsification, alteration, and manipulation of the votes and related data in the election
returns.
7.5 Valid votes in favor of protestant were not counted or were considered stray and
rejected. For instance, several ballots containing protestant’s registered nickname "Doc"
were not counted for protestant, there being no candidate with the same nickname. On the
other hand, invalid ballots such as spurious and those containing markings to identify the
ballots/voters, or with irrelevant, derogatory writings or drawings were counted in favor of
protestee and other winning candidates.
7.6 The use of either fake, spurious ballots or genuine but manufactured ballots to increase
protestee’s votes.
7.7 Invalid ballots (prepared by persons other than the voters themselves) such as written-
by-one person (WBO) and/or individual ballots written-by-two persons (WBT) containing
protestee’s name were counted as valid votes for protestee and other winning candidates.6
Borjal thus asserted that there is a need for revision, re-appreciation of ballots, judicial
recount and thorough scrutiny of the election returns and minutes of voting in the protested
precincts, the results of which will change the election sufficient to overcome the
presumptive lead of the declared winner.
Gravides filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim7 denying the allegations of fraud,
vote manipulation, misreading/misappreciation of ballots and other irregularities in the
counting and tallying of votes, committed either by her or by the Board of Election Tellers
(BET)/BBOC.
She pointed out that the protest failed to provide a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of, which would show the alleged fraud or irregularities in the
protested precincts. Such general and sweeping allegations violate the provisions of A.M.
No. 07-4-15-SC8 or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving
Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials, including non-compliance with the requirement of
cash deposit. Neither Borjal nor his watchers filed a challenge or raised any issue with the
BET or BBOC on the integrity of the ballots during the voting and counting of votes in
accordance with Sections 202 and 203 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as evidenced by the
Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes.
On November 15, 2010, the MeTC issued a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference stating:
This Court sets the case for preliminary conference on the 18th day of November 2010 at
2:00 o’clock in the morning in the Session Hall of this Branch, Room 312, Third Floor, Hall of
Justice, Quezon City.
In order to assist the Court in conducting the Preliminary Conference, parties are enjoined
to be ready on that date regarding the following:
1. A statement whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the
terms thereof;
2. Intention to refer the case for mediation;
3. A Summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
4. The issues to be resolved or a clear specification of material facts which remain
controverted;
5. Such other matter intended to expedite the disposition of the case.
The counsel served with this Notice is duty bound to notify the party represented by him of
the schedule of Preliminary Conference. Failure of the plaintiff or the defendant to appear in
the preliminary conference shall respectively be cause for dismissal of his/her case or a
summary judgment based solely on the complaint in accordance with Rule 70, Sec. 8, par. 2
& 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.9
During the preliminary conference, Gravides moved for the dismissal of the election protest
for non-compliance with Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC as to the contents of the
preliminary conference brief. After considering the movant’s arguments and the counter-
arguments of the opposing counsel, the MeTC resolved to grant the motion. The Order10
dated December 7, 2010 thus ordered the dismissal of the election protest in accordance
with the aforesaid provisions in relation to Sections 5 and 6 of the same Rule.
Borjal appealed the order of dismissal to the COMELEC arguing that the MeTC erred (1) in
applying the Rules of Civil Procedure on the preliminary conference in the election protest
and in misinforming him of the contents of a preliminary conference brief in its Notice of
Pre-Trial Conference; (2) assuming said notice is not defective, it was issued prematurely,
contrary to the mandate of Section 1, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC; (3) in applying the
ruling in Cabrera v. COMELEC11 considering that the factual circumstances are not
foursquare with the present case; and (4) in dismissing the election protest by holding that
his Preliminary Conference Brief failed to comply with the required contents under Section
4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.12
In its Resolution dated August 25, 2011, the COMELEC’s First Division granted the appeal,
annulled the December 7, 2010 Order of the MeTC and remanded the case for further
proceedings. In finding for Borjal, the First Division held:
First, the assailed Order of the court a quo declared the Preliminary Conference Brief of
Borjal non-compliant with Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. 07-4-15-SC in the following manner:
xxxx
The court a quo, after stating the antecedent facts of the case, the contentions of each
party, and the pertinent provisions of the rules, simply dismissed the election protest
without specifying which of the required contents were lacking in Borjal’s Preliminary
Conference Brief. It would appear, based on the court’s Order, that the said brief did not at
all contain the contents required in Section 4 of Rule 9.
Examination thereof reveals, however that the same has substantially complied with Section
4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.
In his Preliminary Conference Brief, Borjal stated a summary of admitted facts and proposed
stipulation of facts; the issues to be tried or resolved; documents to be presented; witnesses
to be presented; proposed number of revision committees; and a statement of his
conformity to discovery procedures or referral to the commissioners to facilitate the speedy
disposition of the case.
Apparently, what Borjal failed to include are statements of (1) a manifestation of withdrawal
of certain protested precincts, if such is the case; and (2) in case the election protest or
counter-protest seeks the examination, verification, or re-tabulation of election returns, the
procedure to be followed.
Nonetheless, these omissions do not warrant the outright dismissal of the election protest.
As explained by Borjal’s counsel during the preliminary conference, withdrawal of certain
protested precincts will be made either after or during the revision.
Moreover, Borjal’s failure to provide for the procedure to be followed in case the election
protest seeks the examination, verification or re-tabulation of election returns is not fatal. A
reading of the election protest shows that Borjal’s allegations consist mainly of election
irregularities and frauds that resulted to an incorrect number of votes pertaining to each
candidate. Hence, Borjal’s prayer is for the recount/revision of the ballots to determine the
correct number of votes cast in his favor.
Undoubtedly, Borjal does not seek the examination, verification or re-tabulation of the
election returns; therefore, a statement for its procedure is not necessary in the instant
case.
Second, it must be emphasized that Gravidez won by a lead of merely two (2) votes. Thus,
should the allegation of Borjal that some votes cast in his favor were misread and
misappreciated during the counting of votes appears to be true in at least two (2) ballots,
the election result will be different, as the same will result in a tie. This fact should have
been taken into consideration by the court a quo.
It bears stressing that blind adherence to a technicality, with the inevitable result of
frustrating and nullifying the constitutionally guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be
countenanced. Likewise, it has been held that "on more than one occasion, this Court has
recognized the emerging trend towards a liberal construction of procedural rules to serve
substantial justice. Courts have the prerogative to relax rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily end litigation and the
parties’ right to due process." While procedural rules are intended for the expeditious
disposition of election cases, this should not impede this Commission from compliance with
the established principles of fairness and justice and adjudication of cases not on
technicality but on their substantive merits.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the court a quo, in its "Notice of Pre-Trial Conference,"
required the parties to state in their respective preliminary conference briefs the following:
xxxx
Noticeably, the court a quo overlooked the rule applicable in the instant case, i.e., Section 4,
Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, as it failed to include all the matters required under the said
rule. On the contrary the foregoing notice is more akin to the provision on pre-trial brief
under the Rules on Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding this, the court a quo hastily dismissed
the election protest for non-compliance with Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. 07-4-15-SC.13
(Underscoring in the original; additional emphasis supplied)
Gravides filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Commission En Banc in
its Order dated November 23, 2011. The denial of the motion was based on the failure to
pay the required motion fees prescribed under Section 7(f), Rule 40, COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 02-130 dated September 18,
2002, in relation to Section 18 of the same Rule, to wit:
It Motion for Reconsideration should be accompanied by the payment of the correct
amount of motion fee and should be paid within the five (5)-day period for the filing of said
motion.
There being no valid motion for reconsideration to speak of, the provision of Section 13,
paragraph (c) Rule 18, Comelec Rules of Procedure applies, to wit:
Rule 18 – Decisions
xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 13.Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. –
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a
Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special actions
and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its
promulgation."
Hence, the Resolution of the Commission (First Division) promulgated on August 25, 2011,
copy of which was received by protestee-appellee’s counsel on September 1, 2011, per
admission in her Motion for Reconsideration filed on September 6, 2011, had become final
and executoryas of September 17, 2011.14
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION
DATED AUGUST 25, 2011 IN CLEAR CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 4 IN RELATION TO
SECTIONS 5 AND 6, RULE 9 OF A.M. NO. 07-4-15-SC OR THE RULES OF PROCEDURE IN
ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE THE COURTS INVOLVING ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL AND
BARANGAY OFFICIALS AND THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC RULING IN CABRERA VS.
COMELEC (G.R. NO. 182084, OCTOBER 6, 2008).
II. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION
DATED AUGUST 25, 2011 REVERSING THE DECISION OF BRANCH 33, METC QUEZON CITY
JUDGE ALFREDO AMPUAN, WHICH WAS ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
III. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONSIDERING THE NARROW LEAD OF
PETITIONER OVER PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN REVERSING THE ORDER OF JUDGE AMPUAN
DATED DECEMBER 7, 2010, DISMISSING THE ELECTION PROTEST OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
IV. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING THE MANDATORY RULES
GOVERNING THE FILING OF PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE BRIEFS AND ITS REQUIRED
CONTENTS UNDER SECTION 4, RULE 9 OF A.M. NO.07-4-15-SC A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION.
V. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT BLAMED THE COURT A QUO
FOR THE ABJECT FAILURE OF COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO BE COGNIZANT OF
THE MANDATORY REQUISITES UNDER SECTION 4, RULE 9 OF A.M. NO. 07-4-15-SC ON THE
REQUIRED CONTENTS OF HIS PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE BRIEF.
VI. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS ORDER DATED
NOVEMBER 23, 2011 DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF PETITIONER
DESPITE THE PLEA OF THE LATTER FOR A REVERSAL OF ITS RESOLUTION BECAUSE OF THE
OPPORTUNITY OF COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT, ATTY. MICHAEL D. VILLARET, WHO
IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS A MEMBER OF THE STAFF OF THE HON. COMELEC
COMMISSIONER AUGUSTO LAGMAN, TO EXERCISE UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE PREPARATION
OF THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION, WHICH RENDERS ITS INTEGRITY, VALIDITY AND PROPRIETY
DUBIOUS, SUSPECT AND QUESTIONABLE.15
The petition has no merit.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC state:
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference brief.—The parties shall file with the court and serve on the
adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt at least one day before the date
of the preliminary conference, their respective briefs which shall contain the following:
(1) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
(2) The issues to be tried or resolved;
(3) The pre-marked documents or exhibits to be presented, stating their purpose;
(4) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery
procedures or referral to commissioners;
(5) The number and names of the witnesses, their addresses, and the substance of their
respective testimonies. The testimonies of the witnesses shall beby affidavits in question
and answer form as their direct testimonies, subject to oral cross examination;
(6) A manifestation of withdrawal of certain protested or counter-protested precincts, if
such is the case;
(7) The proposed number of revision committees and names of their revisors and alternate
revisors; and
(8) In case the election protest or counter-protest seeks the examination, verification or re-
tabulation of election returns, the procedure to be followed.
SEC. 5. Failure to file brief.—Failure to file the brief or to comply with its required contents
shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the preliminary conference.
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to appear.—The failure of the protestantor counsel to appear at the
preliminary conference shall be cause for dismissal, motu proprio, of the protest or counter-
protest. The failure of the protestee or counsel to appear at the preliminary conference shall
have the same effect as provided in Section 4(c), Rule 4 of these Rules, that is, the court may
allow the protestant to present evidence ex parte and render judgment based on the
evidence presented. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cabrera v. COMELEC,16 this Court upheld the nullification by COMELEC of the RTC orders
denying the motion to dismiss election protest on the ground that protestant’s preliminary
conference brief did not contain the following: (1) a manifestation of his having availed or
intention to avail of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners; (2) a manifestation
of withdrawal of certain protested or counter-protested precincts, if such is the case; and,
(3) in the event the protest or counter-protest seeks the examination, verification or re-
tabulation of election returns, the procedure to be followed.
Rejecting petitioner’s proffered excuse for the foregoing omissions, we held that –
The petitioner’s commitment that he does not seek the examination, verification or re-
tabulation of election returns is belied by the preliminary conference brief’s statement that
the protestant shall present the election returns as documentary evidence, and that he will
present witnesses who will testify that the entries thereon are erroneous. Clearly, the
testimonies of these witnesses will entail the examination or verification of the election
returns. Likewise, the petitioner’s undertaking that he does not intend to withdraw any of
the protested precincts appears inconsistent with the allegation in the preliminary
conference brief that protestant will present 22 witnesses (who served as watchers) to give
evidence on alleged irregularities in the voting and counting in 22 precincts. Considering
that there is a total of 142 precincts in the locality, and in fact, the ballots in 88 precincts
had already been revised by the trial court, the probability is great that petitioner may have
to withdraw some precincts from his protest.
The Rules should not be taken lightly. The Court has painstakingly crafted A.M. No. 07-4-15-
SC precisely to curb the pernicious practice of prolonging election protests, a sizable number
of which, in the past, were finally resolved only when the term of office was about to expire,
or worse, had already expired. These Rules were purposely adopted to provide an
expeditious and inexpensive procedure for the just determination of election cases before
the courts. Thus, we emphasize that the preliminary conference and its governing rules are
not mere technicalities which the parties may blithely ignore or trifle with. They are tools
meant to expedite the disposition of election cases and must, perforce, be obeyed.17
(Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to petitioner’s submissions, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the proper
consideration by COMELEC of the attendant circumstances warranting a more reasonable
and liberal application of the rules. Foremost of these is the fact that Borjal was misled by
the Notice of Preliminary Conference issued by the MeTC which erroneously applied the
provision on pre-trial brief under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The mistake committed by
Borjal’s counsel in complying with the court’s directive should not prejudice his cause, as no
intent to unduly prolong the resolution of the election protest can be gleaned from his
failure to include such manifestation of withdrawal of certain protested precincts and of the
procedure to be followed in case the election protest seeks the examination, verification, or
re-tabulation of election returns.1âwphi1
Another important consideration for the COMELEC was that, unlike in Cabrera where
petitioner lost by 420 votes to the winning candidate, only two (2) votes separated the
winning candidate Gravides from Borjal who placed second in the 2010 elections for Punong
Barangay in Barangay U.P. Campus. There were also only 25 precincts subject of the protest
out of the total 36 precincts, in the barangay, as against the 142 precincts protested in
Cabrera. As COMELEC duly noted, the finding of just more than 2 misread or miscounted
ballots during the revision or recount would be sufficient to overcome the lead of Gravides.
The paramount interest of determining the true will of the electorate thus justified a
relaxation of procedural rules.Indeed, an election protest is imbued with public interest so
much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is
imperative.18
We likewise fail to discern whimsicality or arbitrariness in the denial of petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration. Rule 40, Section 1819 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives
discretion to the COMELEC En Banc either to refuse or to take action until the motion fee is
paid, or to dismiss the action or proceeding.20
We stress that in a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of
proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public respondent for his issuance of the impugned
order.21 Grave abuse of discretion is present "when there is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."22 In other
words, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or
resolution in a capricious or despotic manner.23 Petitioner failed to discharge that burden
and perforce the petition must fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution
dated August 25, 2011 of the COMELEC's First Division and Order dated November 23, 2011
of the COMELEC En Bane (EAC [BRGY-SK] NO. 32-2010), as well as the Entry of Judgment
dated November 24, 2011 declaring that the Resolution dated August 25, 2011 had become
final and executory as of September 17, 2011, are all
AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Election contest imbued with public interest
G.R. No. 166046 March 23, 2006
MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, and ECELSON C. SUMAGUE, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse
the Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPC No. 04-209 dated
November 18, 2004 which denied petitioner Margarito Suliguin’s motion for reconsideration
of the July 21, 2004 Resolution2 of the Comelec’s First Division. The Comelec nullified his
proclamation as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Margarito Suliguin was one of the candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 elections. At around 6:00 p.m. on said date,
respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) convened to canvass the votes for all the
candidates. Petitioner received 6,605 votes while respondent Ecelson Sumague received
6,647 votes. However, in the Statement of Votes (SOV) covering Precincts 1A to 19A,
Sumague appears to have received only 644 votes when, in fact, he received 844 votes. The
MBOC failed to notice the discrepancy and proclaimed the winning candidates at around
7:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004. Petitioner was proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan
member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, garnering a total of 6,605 votes.3
Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation of the votes received by him and
Suliguin in a Letter4 dated May 15, 2004, it appearing that there was a mistake in adding the
figures in the Certificate of Canvass of votes. He pointed out that he officially garnered 6,647
votes, as against petitioner’s 6,605 votes.
The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent Sumague to a conference. Upon review,
the MBOC discovered that it had, indeed, failed to credit respondent Sumague his 200 votes
from Precincts 1A to 19A, and that with his 6,647 votes, he should have been proclaimed as
the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead of petitioner Suliguin.
On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec a "Petition to Correct Entries Made in
the Statement of Votes" for Councilor. The error was attributed to extreme physical and
mental fatigue which the members of the board experienced during the election and the
canvassing of votes.
In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, petitioner took his oath of office before Judge Renato B.
Bercades.5
On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued a Resolution6 granting the petition of
the MBOC. The Commission nullified the proclamation of petitioner Suliguin as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 National and
Local Elections "for being based on an erroneous computation of votes." It then ordered the
MBOC of Nagcarlan, Laguna to reconvene and effect the necessary corrections in the SOV,
and forthwith proclaim Sumague as the 8th duly elected Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna.7
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but the Comelec En Banc denied
the motion on November 18, 2004; hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that respondent
Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in ruling against him. In support of his petition, he alleges that:
4.1 THE "PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR
COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS UNDISPUTEDLY FILED OUT OF TIME, and
4.2 "THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR
COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS FILED BY THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
IN DEFIANCE OF EXISTING COMELEC RULES AND REGULATIONS AND WAS OBVIOUSLY BIAS
IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANDICATE ECELSON C. SUMAGUE.8
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35,9 36(c) and (f)10 of Comelec Resolution No.
6669 (General Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of Canvassers in
Connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections), the MBOC should not have entertained the
letter-request of respondent Sumague as it was filed only on May 17, 2004, or four (4) days
after the canvassing of votes was terminated and after he (petitioner) was proclaimed
winner as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Furthermore,
respondent Sumague never entered any objection during the proceedings of the canvassing
of votes. The MBOC itself filed the "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of
Votes" before the Comelec only on May 26, 2004, 13 days after the canvassing of votes was
terminated. Petitioner maintains that the Comelec should have denied the petition, since
according to the Revised Comelec Rules, it should have been filed not later than five (5) days
following the date of the proclamation.
Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the MBOC itself to file the petition before
the Comelec. He further argues that upon the proclamation of the winning candidates in the
election, the MBOC adjourns sine die and becomes functus officio.
The issue is whether or not respondent Comelec erred in granting the petition of the MBOC
to nullify petitioner’s proclamation as the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan in
Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within its command
who the real candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the
results.11 In the case at bar, the simple mathematical procedure of adding the total number
of votes garnered by respondent Sumague as appearing in the Statement of Votes
submitted to the Comelec would readily reveal the result that he has forty-two (42) votes
more than petitioner. Such result would, in effect, dislodge petitioner from said post, and
entitle respondent Sumague to occupy the eighth and last seat of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. Petitioner himself never disputed the discrepancy in the total number of
votes garnered by respondent Sumague, and instead questioned the personality of the
MBOC to file the petition and insisted that such petition was not filed on time.
Sections 312 and 413 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that
such rules may be "liberally construed" in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec has
the discretion to liberally construe its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any
portion thereof in the interest of justice.14 Disputes in the outcome of elections involve
public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to
stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in
the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.15
What is involved in the present petition is the correction of a manifest error in reflecting the
actual total number of votes for a particular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5 of
Comelec Resolution No. 6669 includes mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate
as a manifest error.16 As correctly cited by the Comelec,17 a manifest clerical error is "one
that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is apparent from the papers to
the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may, by
evidence dehors the record be shown to have been committed."
The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect the true winner elected by the voting
public, to occupy the eighth position as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna. In Carlos v. Angeles,18 the Court had the occasion to declare:
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are
determined through the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people." "Specifically, the term
‘election,’ in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including
the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of
votes." The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes
cast in the election. "Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican
forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can de declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast
in the election."19
We quote, with approval, the ruling of the Comelec (First Division) granting the petition of
the MBOC:
A careful perusal of the records show that there was, indeed, an honest error committed by
petitioner MBOC in the computation of votes for candidate Ecelson Sumague which resulted
in the erroneous proclamation of respondent as one of the winners for the said office.
"A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding
and is apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not
include an error which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been
committed."
The contention of respondent that the instant petition should be dismissed for being filed
out of time cannot be given merit because his proclamation was flawed. It must be stressed
that "a proclamation based on faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a petition to correct
errors in tabulation under Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, even if
filed out of time, may be considered, so as not to thwart the proper determination and
resolution of the case on substantial grounds and to prevent a stamp of validity on a
palpably void proclamation based on an erroneous tabulation of votes."
Furthermore, "where the proclamation is flawed because it was based on a clerical error or
mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not through the legitimate will of the
electorate, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of and the same can be challenged
even after the candidate has assumed office."
There is no showing that petitioner MBOC acted with manifest bias and committed a grave
abuse of discretion. "Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." Petitioner MBOC is
merely doing its function that is mandated by law – to canvass votes in the election returns
submitted to it in due form, adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown
in the face of such returns and eventually proclaim the winning candidates. Respondent
miserably failed to prove that petitioner exhibited manifest bias thereby thwarting his
chances of winning the last slot for Sangguniang Bayan Member. "Absent a strong showing
to the contrary, the court must accept the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption."
Likewise, it cannot be said that petitioner MBOC violated the sanctity of the ballots. Unlike
the Board of Election Inspectors which counts the votes from the precinct levels, the MBOC
computes the votes as appeared in the election returns.
Finally, a subsequent annulment of the proclamation of the respondent does not constitute
a clear violation of his right. In the first place, there is no valid proclamation to speak of. He
was not elected by a majority or plurality of voters. His alleged right was based on an
erroneous proclamation. By any mathematical formulation, the respondent cannot be
construed to have obtained such plurality of votes; otherwise, it would be sheer absurdity to
proclaim a repudiated candidate as the choice of the voters. "Where a proclamation is null
and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate’s
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration a
nullity." Respondent also cannot claim that he was denied of his right to due process of law
since he was given the opportunity to be heard. He was duly notified by petitioner MBOC of
the erroneous computation which resulted in his proclamation and was afforded the
opportunity to be heard by this Commission.
"The COMELEC exercises immediate supervision and control over the members of the
Boards of Election Inspectors and Canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and control
includes the power to revise, reverse or set aside the action of the boards, as well as to do
what boards should have done, even if questions relative thereto have not been elevated to
it by an aggrieved party, for such power includes the authority to initiate motu proprio or by
itself steps or actions that may be required pursuant to law."20
Petitioner posits that the Comelec’s reliance in the ruling of this Court in Bince, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections21 is misplaced since, unlike the present petition, petitioner therein
was an affected candidate who filed his petition on time.
The argument of petitioner does not persuade. The Court, in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,22 declared that:
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident
alone will not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on
substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a
palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people’s will cannot
be countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, we categorically declared that:
x x x Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been
consistently observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808)
cited in Duremdes v. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion
to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities
and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And
also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269;
Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalañang, G.R.
No. L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27,
1967). In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within
its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-
17512, December 29, 1960). x x x (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Italics
ours)
In the later case of Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was
reiterated and the Court went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only
the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment
of the results. This bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).
The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the
election laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the
correction of what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the
votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither
does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by
private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest
mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of
reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs involved. In
this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and diligent addition
of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.23
The Court made a similar pronouncement in Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections,24 to
wit:
The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicate that respondent’s
assumption of office was effected by a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the
addition of votes and not through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus, respondent’s
proclamation was flawed right from the very beginning. Having been based on a faulty
tabulation, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of insofar as respondent Castillo is
concerned. As this Court once said:
"x x x Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that Comelec is
with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact
that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of
such power. It, of course, may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation.
Since private respondent’s petition before the Comelec is precisely directed at the
annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is
within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to Comelec.
xxx
"We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be
challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office.
xxx
"It is, indeed, true that, after proclamation, the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an
election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that
there has been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself is
illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues." (Aguam v.
Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 883 [1968]; cited in Agbayani v. Commission on Elections,
186 SCRA 484 [1990]).25
Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of petitioner for being based
on an erroneous computation of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on
Elections,26 where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidate’s
assumption of office cannot deprive the Commission the power to declare such
proclamation a nullity. We emphasized that a defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office.27
In fine, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation
of petitioner. In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to
prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse
of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be so grave as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.28
To the credit of the MBOC, when it realized that it made a mistake in computing the total
number of votes for respondent Sumague, it took swift action and called the attention of the
Comelec by filing the Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes for
Councilor.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPC
No. 04-209 dated July 21, 2004 and November 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo
Order issued by the Court dated January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Election contest imbued with public interest
[ GR No. 178456, Jan 30, 2008 ]
RANDY C. CAMBE v. COMELEC +
567 Phil. 152
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails Resolution No.
8212[1] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) sitting en banc, dated June 28, 2007,
insofar as SPC Case No. 07-212 is concerned. Petitioner Randy C. Cambe contends that the
COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal from the
May 22, 2007 Ruling[2] of public respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Lasam,
Cagayan, which granted herein private respondent Dominador M. Go's petition to exclude
from the canvass Election Return No. 9601666 (for clustered precinct numbers 66A and 68,
Barangay Nabannagan East), resulting in the proclamation on even date of Go as the duly
elected eighth (8th) Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Lasam, Cagayan.
Petitioner and Go were candidates during the May 14, 2007 elections for Sangguniang
Bayan members of the municipality of Lasam, Cagayan, where eight seats were at stake. On
May 15, 2007, when Election Return No. 9601666 for clustered precinct numbers of 66A and
68 was presented for canvassing, Go orally moved for its exclusion on the ground that said
return was allegedly manufactured. He alleged that the integrity of said return is
questionable as the total number of votes cast for the vice-mayoralty candidates exceeded
the number of registered voters.[3] This was followed by the written petition/opposition[4]
filed by Go on May 17, 2007, stating that the canvass of the contested return will affect the
8th position in the Municipal Councilor race.
Should the alleged manufactured election return be included in the canvassing, petitioner
would land on the 8th seat in the Sangguniang Bayan leading by 21 votes over Go who
would occupy the 9th slot. On the other hand, if the said return will be excluded, Go would
advance to the 8th place with a six-vote lead over petitioner.[5]
In the meantime, the MBC proclaimed the winners for the position of mayor, vice-mayor,
and 7 Sangguniang Bayan Members, leaving the canvassing of the questioned return for the
8th slot, pending.[6]
On May 21, 2007, the MBC issued a notice directing petitioner to file his
comment/opposition to the petition within 24 hours from receipt of said notice.[7]
At 9:00 in the morning of May 22, 2007, the MBC issued a ruling excluding Election Return
No. 9601666 on the ground of "fraud, material defect, tamper[ing], and statistical
improbability."[8] On the same day, the MBC proclaimed Go as the 8th duly elected member
of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Lasam, Cagayan.[9]
At 1:35 in the afternoon of May 22, 2007, petitioner filed his written opposition to the
petition for exclusion.[10] At 4:30 p.m. of May 25, 2007, a Friday, petitioner received a copy
of the ruling of the MBC.[11] On May 28, 2007, a Monday, he filed a notice of appeal with
the MBC,[12] and thereafter an appeal memorandum[13] with the COMELEC on May 30,
2007.
On June 28, 2007, the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Resolution with an annex of the
list of cases that shall continue to be heard by the Commission. SPC Case No. 07-212 was not
included in the list hence, it was deemed dismissed and terminated. The full text of the
Resolution, reads:
WHEREAS, in connection with the May 14, 2007 National and Local Election various petitions
docketed as Special Action, Special Cases and Special Proceeding Cases and other
contentious cases were filed with the Office of the Clerk of the Commission;
WHEREAS, the second paragraph of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 7166 provides:
"All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at
the beginning of the term of office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers
concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election
protest by the aggrieved party. However, proceeding may continue when on the basis of the
evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears
meritorious and accordingly issue an order for the proceeding to continue or when
appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari."
WHEREAS, the Commission has disposed of the pre-proclamation and other cases brought
before it for adjudication, except those whose disposition requires proceeding extending
beyond 30 June 2007;
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of its powers under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act. Nos. 6646 and 7166, and other election laws,
the Commission RESOLVES:
All cases which were filed by private parties without timely payment of the proper filing fee
are hereby dismissed;
All cases which were filed beyond the reglementary period or not in the form prescribed
under appropriate provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Act Nos. 6646 and
7166 are hereby likewise dismissed;
All other pre-proclamation cases which do not fall within the class of cases specified under
paragraphs (1) and (2) immediately preceding shall be deemed terminated pursuant to
Section 16, R.A. 7166 except those mentioned in paragraph (4). Hence, all the ruling of the
boards of canvassers concerned are deemed affirmed. Such boards of canvassers are
directed to reconvene forthwith, continue their respective canvass and proclaim the
winning candidates accordingly, if the proceedings were suspended by virtue of pending
pre-proclamation case;
All remaining pre-proclamation cases, which on the basis of the evidence thus far presented,
appear meritorious and/or are subject of orders by the Supreme Court or this Commission in
petitions for certiorari brought respectively to them shall likewise remain active cases,
thereby requiring the proceedings therein to continue beyond 30 June 2007, until they are
finally resolved; and
All petitions for disqualification, failure of elections or analogous cases, not being pre-
proclamation controversies and, therefore, not governed by Section 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and
particularly, by the second paragraph of Sec. 6, Republic Act No. 7166, shall remain active
cases, the proceedings to continue beyond June 30, 2007, until the issues therein are finally
resolved by the Commission;
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ordered that the proceedings in this cases appearing on the list
annexed and made an integral part thereof, be continued to be heard and disposed of by
the Commission.
This resolution shall take effect immediately.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this resolution by appropriate notices to the
parties concerned and the Department of Interior and Local Government. The Education
and Information Department shall cause the immediate publication of this resolution in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in excluding Election
Return No. 9601666 in the canvas of votes which led to the proclamation of Go as the 8th
elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He prays for the annulment of Go's
proclamation as well as Resolution No. 8212 of the COMELEC insofar as it upheld the ruling
of the MBC. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the MBC
correctly excluded the subject election return because the same was tampered and
statistically improbable. It further claims that the Court, not being a trier of facts, is without
jurisdiction to review the factual findings of the MBC as affirmed by the COMELEC.
The issues for resolution are the following:
1) Whether the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies in
the first instance;
2) Whether the proclamation of Go is valid.
3) Whether the COMELEC acted properly in sustaining the ruling of the MBC which
outrightly excluded the questioned election return.
Although not raised as an issue, the Court is empowered to address the first issue which is
both constitutional and jurisdictional.[15] The consistent ruling of the Court is that, the
Commission en banc does not have jurisdiction in the first instance, whether original or
appellate, over election cases, pre-proclamation controversies, and incidents thereof. When
such disputes are filed before or elevated to the Commission, they should be heard and
adjudicated first at the division level.[16] This doctrine is anchored on Section 3, Article IX-C
of the Constitution which established the two-tiered organizational and functional structure
of the COMELEC. The provision requires that election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, should be heard and decided first at the division level. It reads, thus:
SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided
in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
It is important to clarify, however, that not all cases relating to election laws filed before the
COMELEC are required to be first heard by a division. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC
exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of
quasi-judicial powers is involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in
division, and then, upon motion for reconsideration, en banc.[17]
In the instant controversy, the case filed by petitioner involving Election Return No. 9601666
which the MBC found to be fraudulent, tampered, and statistically improbable, is a pre-
proclamation case[18] requiring the COMELEC's exercise of quasi-judicial powers.[19] The
same should have been decided at the first instance by a division of the COMELEC, especially
so that petitioner filed his appeal not with the en banc but with a division of the COMELEC.
[20] Failing to comply with the constitutional and jurisprudential requirements, Resolution
No. 8212 must therefore be declared void insofar as the instant case is concerned.
Anent the second issue, we rule that Go's proclamation is invalid for non-compliance with
the mandatory requirements of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166,[21] which provides:
(f) After all the uncontested returns have been canvassed and the contested returns ruled
upon by it, the board shall suspend the canvass. Within forty-eight (48) hours therefrom,
any party adversely affected by the ruling may file with the board a written and verified
notice of appeal; and within an unextendible period of five (5) days thereafter, an appeal
may be taken to the Commission.
(g) Immediately upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board shall make an appropriate
report to the Commission, elevating therewith the complete records and evidence
submitted in the canvass, and furnishing the parties with copies of the report.
(h) On the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board, the Commission
shall decide summarily the appeal within seven (7) days from receipt of the said records and
evidence. Any appeal brought before the Commission on the ruling of the board, without
the accomplished forms and the evidence appended thereto, shall be summarily dismissed.
The decision of the Commission shall be executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from
receipt thereof by the losing party.
(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by
the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the
losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the
contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the foregoing that after the board has ruled on the petition for exclusion, it is
duty bound to suspend the proclamation to give the other party an opportunity to question
the ruling by filing a notice of appeal with the board within 48 hours from the suspension of
the proceedings, and of an appeal with the COMELEC, within five days from the same
suspension. Failure to comply with these requirements renders the proclamation void ab
initio.
In Jainal v. Commission on Elections,[22] a pre-proclamation case filed by mayoralty
candidate Julhatab Talib, the Court affirmed the order of the COMELEC annulling the
proclamation of his rival, Salip Aloy Jainal, for having been made immediately after the
board ruled on the objection of Talib. Thus:
[I]t was the MBC who did not comply with its duties under Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166. When
Talib made his objections to the inclusion of the contested election returns, there was no
other recourse for the MBC except to rule on the objections, suspend the canvass of the
contested election returns, and suspend the proclamation of petitioner, in that sequence.
Instead of doing so, the MBC, after ruling on the objections, included the contested returns
in the canvass and immediately proclaimed petitioner. (Emphasis supplied)
These actions of the MBC rendered it impossible for Talib to comply with Sec. 20 of R.A. No.
7166 any further. It should be noted that the forty-eight (48)-hour period for filing a verified
notice of appeal with the MBC is reckoned from suspension of the canvass. The appeal to
the COMELEC is also reckoned five (5) days from suspension of the canvass. Understandably,
Talib had no other recourse but to go directly to the COMELEC.
It is worthy of note that what was filed with and resolved by the poll body is a pre-
proclamation case. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining to or affecting
the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns.
The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is, logically, no longer
viable after a proclamation has been made. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as
when the proclamation is null and void. The proclamation of petitioner in this case is void
for three (3) reasons: (1) it was based on a canvass that should have been suspended with
respect to the contested election returns; (2) it was done without prior COMELEC
authorization which is required in view of the unresolved objections of Talib to the inclusion
of certain returns in the canvass; and (3) it was predicated on a canvass that included
unsigned election returns involving such number of votes as will affect the outcome of the
election. In this regard, it has long been recognized that among the reliefs that the COMELEC
may grant is to nullify a proclamation or suspend the effects of one.
In this case, the proclamation of Go is void because it was based on a canvass that outrightly
excluded an election return, which as admitted by both petitioner[23] and Go,[24] would
determine who between them would advance to the 8th position as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. Moreover, said proclamation was done immediately after the MBC
issued its ruling on the petition for exclusion. As held in Espidol v. Commission on Elections,
[25] the action of the MBC constituted a deprivation of the right to appeal the ruling to the
COMELEC, violating Section 20 (i) of R.A. No. 7166.
The rationale for declaring void such hasty proclamation is elucidated thus:
A pattern of conduct observed in past elections has been the "pernicious grab-the-
proclamation-prolong-the-protest-slogan" of some candidates or parties." Really, were a
victim of a proclamation be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that
proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily
supervene. It may not be out of place to state that in the long history of election contests in
this country, as served in Lagumbay v. Climaco, successful contestant in an election protest
often wins but "a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to
expire or has expired." Protests, counter-protests, revisions of ballots, appeals, dilatory
tactics, may well frustrate the will of the electorate. And what if the protestant may not
have the resources and an unwavering determination with which to sustain a long drawn-
out election contest? In this context therefore all efforts should be strained - as far as is
humanly possible - to take election returns out of the reach of the unscrupulous; and to
prevent illegal or fraudulent proclamation from ripening into illegal assumption of office.[26]
The last issue relates to the proper treatment which should have been accorded to the
questioned return at the COMELEC division level and the appropriate course of action which
should have been taken at the canvassing board level.
As a rule, as long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face,
the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to verify the allegations of
irregularities in the casting or the counting of the votes. Corollarily, technical examination of
voting paraphernalia involving analysis and comparison of voters; signatures and
thumbprints thereon is prohibited in pre-proclamation cases which are mandated by law to
be expeditiously resolved without involving evidence aliunde and examination of
voluminous documents which take up much time and cause delay, defeating the public
policy underlying the summary nature of pre-proclamation controversies.
However, in Lee v. Commission on Elections,[27] involving a petition of a candidate for
mayor seeking the exclusion of an election return on the ground that the same bears no
entries for the position of congressman, the Court explained that the aforestated restrictive
doctrine on the examination of election returns presupposes that said returns appear to be
authentic and duly accomplished on their face. But when there is a prima facie showing that
the return is not genuine, as where several entries were omitted in the questioned election
return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if
there is basis for the exclusion of the controverted election return.
In the instant case, Election Return No. 9601666 cannot be considered as regular or
authentic on its face inasmuch as the total votes cast for the vice-mayoralty position, which
is 288, exceeded the total number of the voters who actually voted (230)[28] and the total
number of registered voters (285).[29] The COMELEC therefore is clothed with ample
authority to ascertain under the procedure outlined in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) the
merits of the petition to exclude Election Return No. 9601666.
Sections 235 and 236 of the OEC read:
Sec. 235. When election returns appear to be tampered with or falsified.-If the election
returns submitted to the board of canvassers appear to be tampered with, altered or
falsified after they have left the hands of the board of election inspectors, or otherwise not
authentic, or were prepared by the board of election inspectors under duress, force,
intimidation, or prepared by persons other than the member of the board of election
inspectors, the board of canvassers shall use the other copies of said election returns and, if
necessary, the copy inside the ballot box which upon previous authority given by the
Commission may be retrieved in accordance with Section 220 hereof. If the other copies of
the returns are likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, not authentic, prepared under
duress, force, intimidation, or prepared by persons other than the members of the board of
election inspectors, the board of canvassers or any candidate affected shall bring the matter
to the attention of the Commission. The Commission shall then, after giving notice to all
candidates concerned and after satisfying itself that nothing in the ballot box indicate that
its identity and integrity have been violated, order the opening of the ballot box and,
likewise after satisfying itself that the integrity of the ballots therein has been duly
preserved shall order the board of election inspectors to recount the votes of the candidates
affected and prepare a new return which shall then be used by the board of canvassers as
basis of the canvass.
SEC. 236. Discrepancies in election returns. - In case it appears to the board of canvassers
that there exists discrepancies in the other authentic copies of the election returns from a
polling place or discrepancies in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the same
return, and in either case the difference affects the results of the election, the Commission,
upon motion of the board of canvassers or any candidate affected and after due notice to all
candidates concerned, shall proceed summarily to determine whether the integrity of the
ballot box had been preserved, and once satisfied thereof shall order the opening of the
ballot box to recount the votes cast in the polling place solely for the purpose of
determining the true result of the count of votes of the candidates concerned.
In Balindong v. Commission on Elections,[30] the Court interpreted the foregoing provisions
to mean that "in cases where the election returns appear to have been tampered with,
altered or falsified, the prescribed modality is for the COMELEC to examine the other copies
of the questioned returns and if the other copies are likewise tampered with, altered,
falsified, or otherwise spurious, after having given notice to all candidates and satisfied itself
that the integrity of the ballot box and of the ballots therein have been duly preserved, to
order a recount of the votes cast, prepare a new return which shall be used by the board of
canvassers as basis for the canvass, and direct the proclamation of the winner accordingly."
If the integrity of the ballot box had been violated, there would be no need to open it. If not,
and upon opening there is evidence that the integrity of the ballots had been violated, there
would be no recounting thereof, and the COMELEC would then seal the box and order its
safekeeping.[31] Thus, Section 237 of the OEC provides:
Sec. 237. When integrity of ballots is violated. - If upon the opening of the ballot box as
ordered by the Commission under Sections 234, 235 and 236, hereof, it should appear that
there are evidence or signs of replacement, tampering or violation of the integrity of the
ballots, the Commission shall not recount the ballots but shall forthwith seal the ballot box
and order its safekeeping.
The same procedure was emphasized by the Court in Jainal v. Commission on Elections[32]
in upholding the course of action taken by the COMELEC. Pertinent portion thereof
explained that -
Indeed, the COMELEC did not instantaneously nullify the questioned election returns as
claimed by petitioner. Utilizing the first procedure contained in the first sentence of Sec.
235, the COMELEC used other copies of said suspect election returns, namely the election
returns submitted by Talib. When this was not enough, it even resorted to an examination
of the COMELEC copies. And when it was evident that the election returns for the nine (9)
precincts were manufactured or fabricated because the printed names and signatures of the
members of the BEI were absent, it was only then that the COMELEC annulled the said
election returns and petitioner's proclamation.
With the finding that the election returns were manufactured, the COMELEC further
ordered the Election Officer in Jainal to:
[C]onvene the Board of Election Inspectors in the abovementioned precincts, after notifying
the parties concerned and after ensuring that the integrity of the ballot boxes and the
ballots are not compromised, in order to recount the ballots cast in the abovementioned
precincts. After the recount, the new results will be canvassed and the mayoralty winner
proclaimed. If a recount is deemed not possible, he is to make a report to the Commission
so that a special election may be immediately scheduled in the affected precincts.[33]
In the instant case, the MBC, without complying with Section 235 of the OEC, outrightly
excluded Election Return No. 9601666. Worse, the COMELEC found nothing irregular in the
procedure taken by the MBC. The precipitate exclusion from the canvass of the return for
Precincts 66A and 68 resulted in the unjustified disenfranchisement of the voters thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 8212 of the Commission on Elections
en banc dated June 28, 2007 is SET ASIDE insofar as SPC Case No. 07-212 is concerned. The
Commission is ordered to raffle said case to one of its divisions, which is hereby directed to
resolve the same with deliberate dispatch. In the meantime, the position for the eighth (8th)
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Lasam, Cagayan is DECLARED VACANT.
SO ORDERED.
Election contest imbued with public interest
P.E.T. CASE No. 002 March 29, 2005
RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., Protestant,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Protestee.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The moving finger writes, says Omar Khayyam in the Rubayyat, and having writ, moves on.
Nor all your piety nor wit, adds the poet, could lure it back to cancel half a line; nor all your
tears wash out a word of it.
Such is my view on the providential case for our consideration.
Before this Electoral Tribunal, composed pursuant to the Constitution, by all the fifteen
members of the Supreme Court, is a matter of first impression. We are tasked not only to
determine, as originally prayed for, who between the Protestant and the Protestee was the
true winner in the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections, but also to decide now whether the
Protestant’s widow (Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, popularly known as the cinema star Susan
Roces) could intervene and/or substitute for the deceased party, assuming arguendo that
the protest could survive his death.
If one were guided by folk wisdom expressed in the adage that in a democracy, the voice of
the people is the voice of God, then it would appear our task had been made easy by fateful
events. Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the
representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a
near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly
elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232
votes for the second-placer, the movie actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ).1 She took her Oath of
Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an
election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel,
filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As counsels for the parties
exchanged lively motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the
controversy, an act of God intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the
course of his medical treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital. The medical certificate, filed by
counsel as part of the Notice of Death of the Protestant, showed that he died of cardio-
pulmonary arrest, secondary to cerebral infarction.
However, neither the Protestee’s proclamation by Congress nor the death of her main rival
as a fortuitous intervening event, appears to abate the present controversy in the public
arena. Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies
raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs.
GMA once and for all. The oracular function of this Tribunal, it would appear, needs to be
fully exercised to make manifest here and abroad who is the duly elected leader of the
Filipino nation. All these, despite the fact that the submissions by the parties on their
respective sides in the protest and the counter-protest are thus far, far from completed.
Needless to stress, this Tribunal cannot shirk its constitutional duty. Yet, neither could it go
beyond its mandate under the Constitution and the law. Further, this Tribunal is guided by
its Rules, as well as the Rules of Court in a suppletory manner. Considering the
transcendental importance of the electoral contest involving the Presidency, a rush to
judgment is simply out of the question. Yet decide the matter we must, without further
delay, to prevent popular unrest and avoid further destabilization of government at the
highest level.
Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the
Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a "MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to
INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa
Sonora Poe, who signed the verification and certification therein.
As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband
and in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the
paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and
substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true
and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections. In support of her assertion, she
cites De Castro v. Commission on Elections,2 and Lomugdang v. Javier,3 to the effect that
the death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor
oust the trial court of the jurisdiction to decide the election contest. She stresses
nevertheless that even if the instant protest case succeeds, she is cognizant that as a mere
substitute she cannot succeed, assume or be entitled to said elective office, and her utmost
concern is not personal but one that involves the public’s interest. She prays, however, that
if subsequently determined that the protestee Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo did not get the
highest number of votes for president, for protestee to be disallowed from remaining in
office, and thus prevented from exercising the powers, duties, responsibilities and
prerogatives reserved only to the duly-elected president or her legitimate successor.
In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias4 and
subsequent cases including analogous cases decided by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper
party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property
that passes on to the heirs. She points out that the widow has no legal right to substitute for
her husband in an election protest, since no such right survives the husband, considering
that the right to file an election protest is personal and non-transmissible.
Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased husband because
under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who
obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the
president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not receive the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for she was
not even a candidate for the presidency in the election that is being contested.
Citing pertinent PET Rules, protestee also stresses that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over
actions of surviving spouses to ascertain the vote of the electorate as the Tribunal has
jurisdiction only over election protests and quo warranto cases.
According to protestee, movant/intervenor Mrs. FPJ cannot use "the public interest" to
justify her request to be substituted for her husband. "Public interest", i.e. the need to
dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate, is applicable only in election
contests, not in an action to merely "ascertain the true and genuine will of the people." She
asserts that the only case herein cognizable by this Tribunal is an election protest involving a
protestant and a protestee, not between the electorate and the protestee. Citing analogous
HRET cases, protestee avers that in a case where the protestant, the primary adversary in an
election protest case dies, the public interest in said protest dies with him.
Protestee also contends that in the adversarial nature of a protest case where one of the
parties dies, a correct ruling cannot be had because the dead protestant could no longer
refute his adversary’s allegations because death has rendered him hors de combat.
Further citing Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,5 protestee points out that this Tribunal,
nonetheless, confirmed its power to dismiss an electoral case on technical grounds. She
adds that if the Tribunal can do so on a technicality, all the more it could for a stronger
reason, that of protestant’s death.
In her Reply, movant/intervenor argues that reference of protestee to the HRET case of
Abadilla v. Ablan,6 was erroneous inasmuch as said case was a congressional protest and
the controlling case is De Castro. She likewise contends that protestant failed to distinguish
between a right to an office which protestant concedes is personal and non-transmissible
vis-à-vis the right to pursue the process which is not personal but imbued with public
interest. She likewise stresses that the death of the protestant abolished the
personal/private character of the protest, as protestant’s right to assume if he prevails,
necessarily disappears, and the same cannot be transferred to anyone else, protestant’s
widow included. She insists, however, that the public interest remains. Further,
movant/intervenor posits that the protest having been commenced cannot be abated by
the death of the protestant and the only real issue is the determination of the proper
substitute. She avers that the Tribunal’s rule is clear on who can commence and initiate a
protest compared to the persons who can initiate a quo warranto. She admits that in the
former, only the second and third placers in the presidential election are authorized to
commence the contest, while in the latter, any voter may initiate the petition. She contends
that with no personal interest involved, any registered voter can continue the duly-
commenced protest as the real-party-in-interest which is analogous to a quo warranto. She
contradicts protestee and insists that allowing "any voter" to substitute just like in a quo
warranto will not open the floodgate to whimsical protests, and the imagined political
instability feared by protestee will even more be pronounced if the protest is dismissed.
Movant/intervenor reiterates that the issue at hand involves just the continuation of
proceedings by allowing substitution and the taking over by the substitute of the
prosecution of the protest already "duly commenced."
Plainly, the issue here is: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died
during the pendency of the latter’s protest case?
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET
Rules. It provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest.–Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President
of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest
the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified
petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election.
By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in
interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the
declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who
received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in
a successful election contest.
This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does
allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the
Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals.7
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court.8 This rule allows
substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that
movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in
our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public
office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon
death.9 Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election
contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. In Vda. de De Mesa
v. Mencias,10 we recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee but denied
substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly, in
the later case of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections,11 we struck down the claim of
the surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office for the same
reason. Even in analogous cases before other electoral tribunals,12 involving substitution by
the widow of a deceased protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest,
we denied substitution by the wife or heirs.
This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. We
have held as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public office is
personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and
exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the
court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings.13 Hence, we have allowed
substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled
to the avails of the suit.14 In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias15 and Lomugdang v. Javier,16 we
permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest
considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor
succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot
assume office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to
the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude
that protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
We are not unaware that a contest before election tribunals has two aspects. First, it is in
pursuit of one’s right to a public office, and second, it is imbued with public interest.
Indeed the personal aspect of the case is inextricably linked with the public interest. For an
election protest involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with public
interest which raises it into a plane over and above ordinary civil actions.17 But herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the "paramount public
interest" in mind that she desires "to pursue the process" commenced by her late husband.
She avers that she is "pursuing the process" to determine who truly won the election, as a
service to the Filipino people. We laud her noble intention and her interest to find out the
true will of the electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in
determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court18 is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in
the PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit
must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will
not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the
declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes. We fully appreciate
counsel’s manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no interest in
assuming the position as she is aware that she cannot succeed to the presidency, having no
legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential
aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the
deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the action could be allowed
to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable –
and this is not the policy of the law.19 It is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict
limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules.
Conformably then with the law, the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal finds no
justifiable reason to grant the petition/motion for intervention and substitution.
WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a. SUSAN ROCES to
intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED for lack of merit.
Acting on the protest and considering the Notice of the Death, submitted by counsel of
protestant RONALD ALLAN POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., we also resolve that Presidential
Electoral Tribunal Case No. 002, entitled Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, should be as it is hereby DISMISSED on the ground that no real party in
interest has come forward within the period allowed by law, to intervene in this case or be
substituted for the deceased protestant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Election contest imbued with public interest
G.R. No. 160130 April 14, 2004
ISIDRO IDULZA and GODOFREDO CABANA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TERESITA A. BOLLOZOS, REY L. MORTIZ, MIGUEL P.
PADERANGA, JOJAC Q. ASUNCION and CIFERINO L. GARCIA, JR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
An election protest was filed by three unsuccessful candidates for seats in the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Gingoog City, directed at three proclaimed candidates. The COMELEC found
merit in the protest and ordered the protestees to vacate their posts. In reviewing the
COMELEC’s actions, the Court is guided by two principles particular to election cases: the
recognition of the COMELEC’s specialized role in the supervision of elections, and the liberal
construction of election laws to the end that the will of the people may not be defeated by
mere technical objections.
On 17 May 2001, petitioners Isidro Idulza ("Idulza") and Godofredo Cabana ("Cabana") were
proclaimed as the seventh (7th) and eighth (8th) winning candidates for the office of
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog City. Private respondents Miguel
Paderanga ("Paderanga"), Jojac Asuncion ("Asuncion"), and Ciferino L. Garcia, Jr. ("Garcia"),
all losing candidates for the same office, filed an election protest with the COMELEC on 25
May 2001, against the two petitioners therein and Besben Maquiso ("Maquiso"), who had
placed ninth (9th) in the canvass results. The election protest was docketed as COMELEC
Case No. EPC 2001-3. After conducting the revision of ballots, the COMELEC Second Division
("Second Division") on 16 January 2003 promulgated a Resolution that settled the election
protest at that point. It determined that the parties garnered the following number of votes:
PROTESTANTS:
Paderanga - 17,260
Asuncion - 16,567
Garcia - 16,502
PROTESTEES:
Idulsa - 16,013
Maquiso - 16,266
Cabana - 16,2661
At the same time, the Second Division determined that one Rey Y. Mortiz ("Mortiz"), who
was not a party to the election protest, had garnered more votes than the three protestants.
Apparently, per the Certificate of Canvass, Mortiz had placed tenth (10th) in the city council
election, though he had not been impleaded in the protest as he was a party-mate of the
protestants.2
Consequently, the Second Division disposed of the election protest in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant protest is hereby GRANTED.
Protestants Paderanga, Asuncion and Garcia are hereby declared winners and councilors-
elect of Gingoog City, in the following order:
1. 8th place – Miguel P. Paderanga
2. 9th place – Jojac Q. Asuncion
3. 10th place – Ceferino (sic) L. Garcia, Jr.
As a consequence of the final numerical results of the votes obtained by the winning
candidates vis-à-vis the number of those authorized to be elected, Rey Y. Mortiz, who
garnered more votes than the three Protestants herein, wins the seventh (7th) rank in the
City Council.
Protestees Isidro Idulsa, Besben Maquiso, and Godofredo Cabana are hereby ordered to
vacate their positions as Councilors No. 7, 8 and 9 in the City Council, Gingoog City.
SO ORDERED.3
Obviously aggrieved, the protestees, filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc on 21 January 2003. Aside from contesting the Second Division’s
appreciation of the contested ballots, the petitioners also specifically questioned the
proclamation of Mortiz, who was not a party to the election protest. Petitioners also noted
therein that Asuncion and Garcia had filed certificates of candidacy for Punong Barangay
and Barangay Kagawad respectively in the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, and Asuncion
was elected. As a result, it was argued, Asuncion and Garcia should be deemed to have
abandoned their election protest.4
On 17 February 2003, before the COMELEC En Banc had resolved the Motion for
Reconsideration, private respondent Teresita A. Bollozos ("Bollozos"), who was not a party
to the election protest, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in `COMELEC Case No. EPC
2001-3, with her Motion for Intervention appended thereto. She alleged therein that she
too was a losing candidate for the Gingoog City Sanggunian, yet her vote total according to
the records had surpassed the number of votes ascribed to Asuncion and Garcia.5 She
therefore asserted that she should have been proclaimed as the ninth (9th) winning
candidate in lieu of Asuncion, who should have placed tenth (10th) instead.
On 18 September 2003, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution partially affirming the
Second Division’s Resolution. It held that the Second Division committed no reversible error
as to the appreciation of the contested ballots, and in declaring Mortiz as the seventh (7th)
place councilor. However, the COMELEC also considered Bollozos’ claim as meritorious, as
according to it, "[r]ecords reveal that Bollozos garnered a total of seventeen thousand
twenty-three (17,023) votes…, clearly outnumbering [Asuncion’s] 16,567 votes and
[Garcia’s] 16,502 votes."6 Bollozos’ Motion for Intervention was thus granted, and Bollozos
was proclaimed as the ninth (9th) place candidate. At the same time, the COMELEC En Banc
also ruled that Asuncion should not be proclaimed, as he has been deemed to have
abandoned his protest due to his successful candidacy for Punong Barangay in the 15 July
2002 elections. Accordingly, the tenth (10th) place was declared vacant.
Petitioners now come before this Court on a Petition for Certiorari, assailing the Resolutions
of the COMELEC. They assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
proclaiming Mortiz and Bollozos, the former having no participation in the election protest,
while the latter having filed her motion for intervention beyond the period provided by
law.7 They also question the manner of appreciation by the COMELEC of the contested
ballots.8 Finally, they applied for a Temporary Restraining Order, which the Court has not
granted.
The appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact
best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the
supervision of elections all over the country.9 The findings of fact of the COMELEC when
supported by substantial evidence are final and non-reviewable.10 Petitioners want this
Court to review the specific appreciation by the Second Division of ballots cast in forty-eight
(48) precincts in Gingoog City. The bar for this manner of review is quite high, considering
that the Court is not a trier of facts. Yet before this Court, petitioners merely direct us to
examine the contrary conclusions made by Commissioner Florentino Tuason in his
dissenting opinion, without particularly explaining why we should substitute the findings of
one commissioner in lieu of those of the COMELEC speaking as a collegial body.
An examination of the Tuason dissent reveals that it is predicated not on any broad question
of law, but on the specific application of principles of election law vis-à-vis particular ballots.
His disagreement with the majority is purely factual in basis, too detailed to the point of
being pernickety. On the other hand, the thirty (30)-page majority opinion is just as detailed
in providing for the general principles applicable in appreciating the ballots, and in
explaining why each particular contested ballot was interpreted in the particular way that it
was. Petitioners are unable to point out why the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of the contested ballots. Notwithstanding the dissenting
opinion, the Second Division’s factual findings, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, are
supported by substantial evidence and thus beyond the ken of review by the Court.
Thus, the Court is bound by the findings of the COMELEC as to how many votes the parties
had obtained in the city council election. The COMELEC had also noted that Mortiz, who had
originally placed tenth (10th), has become the seventh (7th) placer, considering that his
original vote total still surpassed that of the protestants. We are unable
to see how such declaration by the COMELEC could constitute grave abuse of discretion,
even if Mortiz had not been a party to the election protest. He was not a losing candidate
elevated into victory, as he apparently was already proclaimed a duly elected city councilor
in May of 2001.11 The petitioners were dislodged from their respective seats because the
private respondents garnered more votes than them. Mortiz’s vote total remained
unchanged despite the protest. His elevation to seventh (7th) place is but a necessary
consequence of the finding of the COMELEC that the petitioners had actually obtained less
number of votes than as reflected in the first canvass results. It would be patently ridiculous
for the Court or the COMELEC to hold that he should still be deemed as the tenth (10th)
placer when the amended vote totals reveal that he had garnered more votes than the new
eighth (8th) placer. Presumptively, the vote totals as amended after the revision more
accurately reflect the true will of the voters of Gingoog City, and the elevation of councilor
Mortiz from tenth (10th) to seventh (7th) place is in consonance with the electoral mandate.
Election protests are guided by an extra-ordinary rule of interpretation that statutes
providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.12
For that reason, the Court sustains the allowance by the COMELEC of Bollozos Intervention.
It would have been explicitly anomalous had Bollozos not been seated in the City Council,
considering that her uncontested vote total had exceeded that of Asuncion, the ninth (9th)
placer according to the Second Division. The people of Gingoog City had chosen Bollozos to
serve as their councilor, and it was but proper for the COMELEC to recognize that electoral
will and accordingly amend the Second Division’s Resolution.
Besides, in allowing the Bollozos Intervention, the COMELEC did not stretch itself by
applying an overarching equitable principle that would have disturbed the judicially sedate.
Statutory prescription on the right to intervene in an election protest is provided only by the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule 8, Section 1. The aforementioned rule does
state that the motion for intervention be filed before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding.13 At the same time, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are to be construed
liberally "in order to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding" before the COMELEC.14 The allowance of the motion for intervention was
clearly geared towards fostering honest, credible elections and a just outcome centered
around the proper proclamation of a candidate whom the voters have chosen to serve as
their councilor.
Admittedly, the Rules of Court provides that a motion to intervene be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment of the trial court.15 However, the suppletory role of the Rules
of Court in this case must be dispensed with if its application would frustrate the electoral
will. Further, as the Solicitor General points out in his Comment filed in behalf of the
COMELEC, the Court has, in exceptional cases, allowed intervention notwithstanding the
rendition of judgment by the trial court16, or even after the case had become final and
executory.17 The Court is not ordinarily predisposed, on account of broad claims of equity,
to disregard infractions of procedural rules. Yet election cases are of such an exceptional
character that the supervening State interest is to ensure that the true results of its
elections are given efficacy. We find that the COMELEC’s grant of the Bollozos Intervention
is in accord with this superior principle which is grounded on the imperative to seek and
make the sovereign will of the people prevail.
Finally, none of the parties question the COMELEC En Banc’s declaration of vacancy of the
tenth (10th) seat in the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog City on the premise that the
tenth (10th) placer Asuncion’s subsequent active candidacy and election as Punong
Barangay should be deemed an abandonment of his protest. In so holding, the COMELEC En
Banc cited the Court’s majority opinion in the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos.18 The
parties adduced no compelling reason for the Court to disturb this conclusion of the
COMELEC. At the same time, the eleventh (11th) placer Garcia cannot be elevated to the
tenth (10th) spot, for the simple reason that the electorate of Gingoog City did not elect him
as one of the ten (10) city councilors.19
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Election contest imbued with public interest
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be
declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast
in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to
have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number
of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to
the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the
said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested
office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds
the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19, 19952 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995,
petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as
SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public
office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec
promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition6:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a
citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May
8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections
held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned
Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained
by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June
29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-
317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was
no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-
Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having
garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of
Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the
Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having
garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board
of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed
canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon
having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26,
1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order,
this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions"15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant
the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition
and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of
petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of
which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo
from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he
is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the
proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However,
Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered
"within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755
since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the
ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of
Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not,
may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-
317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a
quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of
existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue
in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses
the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during
the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him,
to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was
rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by
the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in
1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially
declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular
mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon
and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now
boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring
citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General
himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as
counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able
private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the
provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists
that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon
when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that
time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her
memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino
directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your
functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated
April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no
express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on
the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was
being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even
mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be
allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are
clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special
Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other
words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once
created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully
couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the
present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter
of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential
Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated
violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . .
(and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious
review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application
for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994.
This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated
only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his
application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee
required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in
the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor
General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply
baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list
of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3,
1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the
proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings
were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are
not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not
unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine
political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely
seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a
natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to
his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only
to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience
embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic
space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and
services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism
vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless
it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship
qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his
election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R.
10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require
that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office." Obviously, however,
this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization
was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization
to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was
NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to
be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist
of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least
twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,31
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien,
i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country
or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions
only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day32 the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to
be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities
thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our
law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too,
even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of
election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally,
such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and
residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to
govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June
30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if
the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not
end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim
or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of
his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34 to
the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate
(or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from
requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be
a "registered voter". And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he
was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the
law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with
the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the
law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a
voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was
included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for
nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR
TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized
that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does
not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of
this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to
ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern --
and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained
as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he
voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed
(sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the
previous elections including on May 8, 1995."3 7
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the
date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate
of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably
including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on
how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet
the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of
Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning
candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation
(8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having
taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have
been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes
in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous
"judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions40 to this general
rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW
RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public
officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some
technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily
retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . .
(and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain
evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past
events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts
which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate
in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within
the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the
retrospective operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a
new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725
expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as
amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of
their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new
provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine
citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino
women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted
a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their
marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute
also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who
(had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship",
because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D.
725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of
repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they
are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata,
14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon
the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of
C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations
and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable
that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A)
retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should
so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms
thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those
persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and
jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right
equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the
fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to
make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so
applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some
vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725,
which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation
granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his
Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later,
on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given
retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17,
1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally
guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect
and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of
such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be
made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in
the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative
authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust
or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown
that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any
vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should
now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of
time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already
renounced his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their
control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.4 7
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were
filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of
prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the
mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's
repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in
connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the
interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant
case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should
now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating
Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on
August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election
(May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become
moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would
also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his
Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40
of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At
best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988,
in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections
of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings
of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or
abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No.
95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became
final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been
issued by this Honorable Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected
governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying"
Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally
"correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the
1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American
citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public
office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered
in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with
the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be
changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution:55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections.
However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21,
1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that
Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order
dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme
Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC
No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the
Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again,
Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-
317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day
reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an
election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to
"exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the
various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may
entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's
authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No.
95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-
proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the
winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463;
Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule,
however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and
the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power
to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs.
COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed
only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly
acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following
reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was
not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second
placer, . . . just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this
Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and
none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate,
much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was
even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be
voted for the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course
to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final
outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this
case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the
Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as
there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec
issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others
can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate
of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to
"bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters
intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was
ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should
be pro- claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously
not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship
and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not
Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should
now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered
beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code
which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded
by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,
affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension
(not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is
a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or
abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz.,
"(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship
maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register
and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a
"mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such
abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured
whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the
1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992,
which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false
material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no
quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the
Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because
they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section
78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and
decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this
point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the
dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the
25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during
which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after
the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated
by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond
the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the
second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring
citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for
purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled.
But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but
only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who
are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its
own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec
made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by
Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and
final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all
three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for
being an American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for
such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto
only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court
were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections.
How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates,
not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it
differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f)
refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to
"candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of
differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that
the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would
have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other
qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on
the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the
oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship.
We do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should
be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all
purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up
rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold
the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue
here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be
followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how
to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the
naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or
in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious
choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty
than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected
candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny
and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full
force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly
granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature
of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent
behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and
political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be
given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of
which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of
law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of
office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course,
are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a
continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we
emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction
to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt,
political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot
stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections
(citations omitted).67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge,
in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance
of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must
exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the
majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those
who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court
could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before
the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he
was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the
spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development
of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic,
technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice
in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating
venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to
escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any
doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned
to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon
overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic
every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And
let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume
his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and
in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-
embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and
love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and
equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life
of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay,
single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved
land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be
applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the
indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their
overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.