TURKISH WATER EXPORTS: A MODEL FOR REGIONAL

COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER

RESOURCES

George E. Gruen, Professor Emeritus of International Relations,

Columbia University Middle East Institute
100 La Salle Street, Suite 15-F, New York, NY 10027
E-mail address: geg2@columbia.edu

ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the status of Turkish plans to export water to Is-
rael, Palestine, Cyprus, and other countries in the Middle East. The
most ambitious of these was President Turgut Özal's 1986 "Peace
Water Pipeline," a $21 billion project to bring water from the Seyhan
and Ceyhan rivers via pipelines to cities in Syria, Jordan, and Arab
Gulf States. We examine why this was not implemented. A shorter
pipeline from the Seyhan or Ceyhan rivers to Syria and Jordan, esti-
mated to cost $5 billion, may become feasible following the recent
rapprochement between Turkey and Syria, but extension of the pipe-
line to Israel and Palestinian territories requires a breakthrough in
Syrian-Israeli relations, including resolution of disputes over Jordan
River headwaters and Syrian access to the Sea of Galilee (Kinneret).
We will assess the progress of a Turkish export scheme that has been
approved in principle: Manavgat water to Israel: Israel has agreed
to purchase 50 MCM annually for 20 years from the Manavgat River
near Antalya, but -- as of mid-September 2004 -- the parties had nei-
ther finalized the price nor selected the company to implement the
water transfer. Israeli advocates of desalination object to the price of
Turkish water and question the wisdom of relying on Ankara, whose
government has lately been critical of Israeli policies. Palestinian wa-
ter officials express interest in Turkish water if the cost is subsidized
by international aid agencies. Ankara views the Manavgat “Peace
Water Project” as its contribution to the Arab-Israel peace process.

KEYWORDS: Cyprus, Israel, Palestine, Turkey Water Exports.

TURKEY’S NATURAL ADVANTAGE AS WATER SUPPLIER

In contrast to the semi-arid climate and consequent scarcity of water
that afflicts many of the countries of the Middle East, Turkey has
been blessed with a relative abundance of water resources. The main
problem for Turkey is the domestic one of distribution: How to bring
this water to the rapidly growing cities and agricultural communities
located at considerable distance from the river sources? Moreover,
since such major rivers as the Euphrates originate in Turkey before
flowing down into Syria and Iraq, Turkey is by nature a significant
exporter of water. This fact has embroiled Turkey in decades of con-
troversy with its downstream Arab neighbors over the equitable dis-
tribution of this valuable natural resource. Even the terms of the de-
bate have been in dispute. Ankara contends that the issue is one of
Turkey’s gracious “allocation” of part of its national water patrimony,
based on the theory that the Euphrates is a “transnational river”, over
whose resources Turkey enjoys full sovereignty until it flows into
Syria. Damascus and Baghdad argue that the Euphrates is an “interna-
tional river” and therefore Syria and Iraq should enjoy equal riparian
rights with Turkey and that what is required is to devise a fair and eq-
uitable formula for “sharing” their common water resource.

The various water negotiations among Ankara, Damascus, and Bagh-

dad since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 are de-
scribed in earlier studies. (Gruen, 1993, 2000, 2002). Stripped down to
its essential core, the basic argument is over what constitutes a fair and
equitable allocation of the Euphrates’ annual flow. Statistics show that
before Turkey constructed dams and diverted considerable water into
pipelines to irrigate additional fields in Southeastern Anatolia, the nor-
mal natural flow of the Euphrates averaged around 1,000 cubic meters
per second (m3/sec) at the point the river crosses from Turkey into
Syria. The Arab states argue that since there are three states sharing the
river’s flow, each is entitled to one-third, giving the two Arab states a
total of around 667 m3/sec.

The Turkish counter argument is that since nearly 90 percent of the Eu-
phrates river’s flow originates in Turkey, Ankara has been generous to
agree to supply Syria with 500 m3/sec., which in a year totals some 15.7
billion m3 or roughly half the river’s flow. This figure was enshrined in
a protocol concluded between the Turkish and Syrian Prime ministers in
July 1987. However, this was to be only a temporary arrangement until
the reservoir created behind the giant Atatürk Dam was filled. At that
time a permanent arrangement would be negotiated. The Atatürk dam
began to generate electricity in July 1992 and the first of two large tun-
nels to divert water for irrigation was completed in November 1994.
However, Syria and Turkey have until now been unable to agree upon
the terms of a permanent apportionment of the Euphrates flows. Syria
and Iraq have enlisted the help of the Arab League to support their de-
mands that Turkey increase its allotment to them. (Gruen, 2002, pp.10-
24).

Özden Bilen, former head of the Turkish State Hydraulics Works (DSI),
reports that Turkey contributes 31.6 Billion Cubic Meters (BCM) or 90
percent of the average 35BCM annual flow of the Euphrates, as well as
21.3BCM or 40 percent of the flow of the Tigris.(Bilen, 2000.) Profes-
sor Peter Beaumont, an international water authority, supports Ankara’s
position on the Euphrates, noting that since approximately 90 percent of
the river’s flow originates in Turkey, in terms of both “international
precedent” and “natural justice, it does not seem unfair that Turkey
should be able to utilize up to one-half of the water which is generated
within its borders.” (Beaumont, 1991,) For an analysis of Turkish pro-
jects utilizing Euphrates water, see Kolars and Mitchell, (1991.)

ÖZAL’S “PEACE WATER PIPELINE”

The concept of exporting Turkish water to promote regional peace
and economic development in the Middle East has been a constant in
Turkish foreign policy since the late President Turgut Özal in 1986
proposed an extensive "Peace Water Pipeline" This was a $21 billion
project to bring vast quantities of water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan
Rivers via two pipelines to supply the major cities in Syria, Jordan,
and the Arab Gulf states. The pipelines could convey 10 million cubic
meters of water every day, which was estimated as sufficient to meet
the needs of 15 million persons. The original Turkish proposal also
envisioned making some of this water available to Israel. However,
when some Arab states objected, Ankara modified its proposal, say-
ing that Israeli participation would have to be deferred until after the
conclusion of peace treaties between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
Although Jordan and Israel concluded a Peace Treaty in 1994, follow-
ing the earlier Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1981, Syria and Leba-
non have not yet done so.

It should be noted that unlike the Tigris and Euphrates, the Ceyhan
and Seyhan rivers originate and flow entirely within the sovereign
territory of Turkey before emptying into the Mediterranean Sea. The
pipeline idea was rejected by the oil-rich Gulf states, which Turkey
hoped would finance the giant project. The Saudis contended that de-
salination was a cheaper solution, since they could fuel flash distilla-
tion desalination plants with surplus gas produced as a byproduct of
their oil production. In a conversation I had with President Özal dur-
ing his visit to Columbia University shortly before his death in 1993,
the Turkish leader told me the Saudis failed to calculate the true cost
of desalination since they did not assign any value to the natural gas
being flared off rather than being liquified and sold. He was confident
that eventually Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States would realize the
value of the Turkish water for them. Alev Kılıç, Deputy Undersecre-
tary in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently told me that
Ankara was still hopeful that the long pipeline extending to Saudi
Arabia would ultimately be built.(Kılıç, A.,2004.)

Beyond the relative costs of desalination versus the water imports from
Turkey, the Arab Gulf states were weighing the political risks. A major
reason for rejecting the Turkish proposal was political: the Saudis feared
disruption of the flow by one of the states through which the water pipe-
line passed before reaching them. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait
in August 1990 reinforced this fear. However, the Kuwaiti experience
also pointed out the vulnerability of desalination plants. When the re-
treating Iraqi forces set many Kuwaiti oilfields on fire, large quantities
of oil spilled into the Persian/Arabian Gulf. The U.S.-led allied forces
managed to cap the oil wells just before the oil spill reached the intake
points of the desalination plants in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The recur-
ring acts of sabotage against oil pipelines by terrorists in Iraq following
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in March 2003, have once again
highlighted the vulnerability of pipelines to disruption.

Some political commentators in the Arab world have questioned the

seriousness of the Turkish intentions with regard to the giant multi-
billion dollar water pipeline project to the Arab states in the mid-
1980’s. Some contended that Ankara had only raised the proposal to
deflect criticism in the Arab world over Turkey’s failure to yield to
Syrian and Iraqi demands for a greater share of the water resources of
the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In 1946 Turkey and Iraq signed a
Protocol for the Control of the Waters of the Tigris and Euphrates and
their Tributaries. They agreed that flood control dams and storage fa-
cilities would most effectively be built upstream on Turkish territory.
They also promised to exchange hydrological and meteorological data
daily during flood periods. The normal flow of the Tigris and Euphra-
tes was adequate to meet the needs of the relatively small populations
of Turkey, Syria and Iraq. However, in the mid-1960’s the three
countries began large-scale projects to build major dams to produce
hydro-electric power and expand the areas of irrigated agriculture.
The first of these was the Keban Dam and Power Plant on the Euphra-
tes in Turkish territory. Ankara shared technical information on this
project with Syria and Iraq. In a tripartite meeting in Baghdad, in Sep-
tember 1965, Turkey proposed creation of a Joint Technical Commit-
tee (JTC) to study the entire Tigris-Euphrates basin. Syria at first en-
dorsed this idea, but Iraq insisted that the flow of the Euphrates be
considered separately from that of the Tigris. Turkey argued that the
Iraqi position was not reasonable since there were already plans to
develop canals to link the two rivers in Iraq. (These have since been
completed.) Moreover, the Tigris and Euphrates in fact naturally flow
together into the Shatt-al-Arab in southern Iraq, before emptying into
the Persian/Arabian Gulf. After 1980 Syria adopted the Iraqi position.
The JTC met numerous times but was not empowered to make major
political decisions.

Meanwhile, the populations of the three countries have been increasing

rapidly and the demand for water has increased exponentially. It has
been estimated that the combined development plans of Turkey, Syria
and Iraq, if fully implemented, would require more than 150 percent of
the normal total flow of the Tigris and Euphrates! Thus one can make a
plausible case that Özal’s “Peace Water Pipeline” was not simply an
exercise in public relations. It was a serious proposal made in good faith
by Ankara to help Syria, Iraq and other Arab neighbors – as well as Is-
rael -- cope with the anticipated shortfall in available water resources to
meet the growing domestic demands of their burgeoning populations
and the expanding requirements for irrigated agriculture and industrial
production.

DENIAL OF THE NILE OPTION

In theory, another potential source of water for Palestinians in Gaza and
possibly also Israelis living along Israel’s coastal plain is the Nile River.
Some years back, Elisha Kally, an international water authority working
at Tahal, Israel’s water research institute, proposed an arrangement un-
der which Israeli scientists would provide technical expertise in drip
irrigation and other water saving technologies for application to agricul-
ture in the Nile Delta. As a contribution to Arab-Israel peace, Kally
suggested that 50 percent of the water Egypt saved be exported by pipe-
line to meet the needs of the water-stressed Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip and possibly also for resettlement of some Palestinians in new
communities either in Gaza or along the Sinai coast. Egyptian officials I
have spoken to about this, notably former United Nations Secretary-
General Butros Butros-Ghali, dismissed the idea as impractical. In his
previous post as Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs,
Boutros-Ghali had been in charge of Egypt’s negotiations with the Su-
dan and the other riparian countries. He also had chaired the UNDUGU
organization of Nile riparians. He pointed out that Egypt was not free to
export Nile water out of the basin without the approval of the other ri-
parians. Ethiopia, which “alone supplies 84 percent of those waters, as
well as the immense aluvium fertilizing the lower reaches of the Nile,”
had already on February 6, 1956 lodged a formal complaint with Egypt
and the Sudan over their proposed agreement on allocation of the Nile
waters. (Text cited by Bilen, pp.130-131.) Other upper riparian states
have also complained that the huge quantity of water being used by
Egypt and the Sudan was stifling their own development needs.

At a conference of the International Water History Association (IWHA)

in Alexandria, Egypt in December, 2003, I met with Dr. Hassan Wahby,
Head of the Institutional Reform Unit at the Egyptian Ministry of Water
Resources and Irrigation. He confirmed that in the newly established
agricultural settlements on lands reclaimed from the desert they were
instituting the water-saving technologies developed by Israeli scientists.
But he reiterated that Egypt would not be able to provide any Nile water
to Israelis or Palestinians. To do so would arouse fierce opposition and
would undermine the water sharing agreements that Egypt had so pains-
takingly negotiated with the nine upper riparian states. (Wahby, 2003.)

PALESTINIANS, ISRAELIS AND JORDANIANS FACE

“WATER STRESS”
Professor Malin Falkenmark of the University of Linkoping, Sweden,
developed the concept of Water Stress. According to her calculations,
countries having more than 2,000 cubic meters (m3) of fresh water
available for all uses per person, per year were in the Water Abun-
dance Zone, while those having less than 500 m3 per capita were in
the Water Stress Zone. Ranking eight Middle Eastern countries in
terms of per capita water availability in 1991, Falkenmark found only
three with adequate supplies: Turkey (4,600), Iraq (4,400), and Leba-
non (3,000). Syria (1,300) and Egypt (1,200) were in an intermediate
position. Already under severe water stress were the Palestinians
(165), Israel (300) and Jordan (300). (Falkenmark, 2000.)

As regional population increases, per capita water figures will decline

further. Deborah Sontag reported in The New York Times in February
2000: "The population explosion in the Palestinian-governed Gaza Strip
appears to be unrivaled in the world. Its population of 1.1 million -- half
under 15 -- is expected to double by 2014, which would “pose almost
unimaginable strains" on an area with "almost no natural resources."
She noted that the combined Palestinian population of over 3 million in
the West Bank and Gaza was expected to rise to 5.5 million by then.
And this is without return of any of the more than 800,000 Palestinian
refugees now in Lebanon and Syria. (Sontag, 2000) (Other sources
believe the number of refugees in Lebanon and Syria is considerably
less.) While the high fertility rate of more than 7 per woman in Gaza is
similar to that of Somalia, the crucial difference is that whereas infant
mortality is still high and life expectancy is still very low in Somalia,
infant mortality in Gaza is half the world average and life expectancy is
73 years, similar to that in the United States and Israel.

Professor Amnon Rubinstein notes that within the territory of the State
of Israel there has also been a dramatic decrease in infant mortality.
The infant mortality rate in Mandatory Palestine in 1943-44 was almost
10 percent for Muslims, 7 percent for Arab Christians, and 3.5 percent
for Jews. In 2001, the infant mortality rate among Jews was 0.41
percent, among Muslims, 0.82 percent, and among Christians, 0.2
percent. The overwhelming majority of Muslims were members of
Israel’s Palestinian Arab communities. According to recent figures of
the World Health Organization, the average life expectancy in Europe,
in 2000, was 69.6 years. “The Israeli Arab male, with a 74.4-year life
expectancy average, was very close to the figure for Germany, 74.9
years, and for the U.K., 75.6 years.” (Rubinstein, 2003, pp.5-6.)

Jordan also faces a worsening crisis. Its population growth rate was of-
ficially estimated at more than 3.6% per year. Natural increase in 1991
was swelled by more than 200,000 Jordanians, mainly of Palestinian
origin, who returned from the Gulf States, having been expelled from
Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the crisis following Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait. (Jordan, 1991.) According to the official Jordan
Diary 2000, "the gravest environmental challenge that faces [the
Hashemite Kingdom of] Jordan today is the scarcity of water." Current
use already exceeds renewable supply, with the deficit covered by "the
unsustainable practice of overdrawing highland aquifers, resulting in
lowered water tables and declining water quality."

In March 2000 King Abdullah II went to Ankara to discuss water im-

ports from Turkey. Joint Jordanian efforts under the 1994 Peace Treaty
with Israel to develop additional water resources are also continuing.
According to Jordan Diary 2000, with Jordan's population expected to
continue to rise, the gap between water supply and demand "threatens to
widen significantly. By the year 2025, if current trends continue, per
capita supply will fall to only 91 cubic meters, putting Jordan in the
category of having an absolute water crisis. The kingdom's capital,
Amman, where almost half the population lives, has had to bear a water
rationing program almost every summer since 1989." (Jordan, 2000.)

If Israel does not need all the 50 MCM of water it plans to import annu-
ally from Turkey, some of this amount could be used to fulfill Israel’s
pledge under its Peace Treaty with Jordan to help find additional water
resources to ease Jordan’s perennial water shortage. (The additional wa-
ter provided by Israel to Jordan need not be the actual water from
Manavgat, but could be water drawn directly from the Jordan River or
from storage in the Sea of Galilee. The Turkish water could be used to
replace some of the Jordan River flow that is now pumped into the Na-
tional Water Carrier to meet Israel’s domestic needs.)

THE SHORTER PIPELINE TO SYRIA AND JORDAN

Since the extensive and far-reaching original Özal Peace Water Pipe-
line had failed to win Saudi or other Gulf country support, senior
Turkish officials have suggested that in the context of facilitating
Arab-Israeli peace, consideration be given to a shorter pipeline from
the Seyhan or Ceyhan, estimated a decade ago to cost some $5 bil-
lion, passing through Syria. Özden Bilen has suggested that “the ter-
minal point could be Jordan where the problem of water shortage is
felt most seriously and thus reduce costs by having a shorter line. The
yearly water transfer capacity of this smaller pipeline project is 2.19
BCM, which is 1.6 times greater than the average annual water capac-
ity of the Jordan river." Bilen concluded that “it is certain that the pro-
ject could play an important role in closing the water gap of Jordan
and Palestine in particular.” (Bilen, 2000, pp. 115-116.)
Extension of the pipeline to Israel would require the agreement of
Syria, which in the past insisted on total Israeli withdrawal from the
Golan Heights and the granting to Syria of riparian rights on the Sea
of Galilee (Yam Kinneret). American efforts, including those of
President Bill Clinton in 2000, failed to bring about a Syrian-Israeli
agreement before the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.
(Gruen, 2000a, pp. 11-14 and earlier works cited in notes 40-51.)
Shortly before his death, Hafez Assad selected his young son, Bashar,
to succeed him, and the Syrian parliament quickly amended the con-
stitution to lower the qualifying age for president to allow Bashar to
be chosen. In an interview last year with a New York Times corre-
spondent (MacFarouhar, 2003) and more recently with Al Hayat in
September 2004, Assad offered to resume peace talks with Israel “if
Israeli Prime Minister Sharon is prepared to do so.” (As reported in a
JTA dispatch from Jerusalem, The Jewish Week, September 10,
2004). Most Israeli officials expressed skepticism as to whether this
marked a significant softening of the Syrian position, contending that
Bashar’s immediate objective was to duck U.S. sanctions over Syria’s
backing of Hezbollah and other anti-Israel militants whom the U.S.
has designated as terrorists. Sharon distanced himself from the posi-
tions taken by Prime Minister Ehud Barak regarding withdrawal from
the Golan Heights. In interviews published on the eve of the Jewish
New Year, Sharon called on Syria to withdraw all of its forces from
Lebanon and stop supporting anti-Israel groups. He also noted that
Israel and Syria had unresolved disputes over water issues.

MANAVGAT WATER EXPORTS TO ISRAEL

“Israeli ‘Water for Arms’ Deal with Turkey” was the headline on the
story published in The Guardian on January 6, 2004, describing the
agreement in principle signed in Jerusalem on January 5th by Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and visiting former Turkish Energy and
Water Resources Minister Zeki Çakan. Reporter John Vidal termed
the “water for arms” deal as “extraordinary.” He added that the series
of linked agreements were “expected to have long-term strategic im-
plications throughout the Middle East.” It was the Turkish govern-
ment that had insisted on linking the two agreements. After years of
negotiations, the two parties finally agreed that Israel would purchase
50 million cubic meters (MCM) of water annually for the next 20
years from the Manavgat River near Antalya on Turkey’s Mediterra-
nean Coast. Special tankers would be built to transport the drinking
water from Manavgat to Ashkelon on Israel’s coast, a distance of
some 325 nautical miles. From the Ashkelon port, special pipes
would convey the water into the existing National Water Carrier for
distribution where needed (Vidal, 2004.)Ankara had already invested
$147 million to construct the necessary storage and water treatment
facilities upstream on the Manavgat, and a pipeline and offshore fa-
cilities in the Mediterranean for tankers to load the water for export.

The 50 million cubic meters Israel will initially import from Turkey
represent only about 3 percent of Israel’s current annual consumption.
However, because of the unpredictability of rainfall each season and
Israel’s recent experience of periods of multi-year drought, Israel is in
dire need of additional dependable water sources, especially as it an-
ticipates further increases in the country's population through native
births and immigration. Even though Israel was blessed with above
normal rainfall during the past two years and the Sea of Galilee (Kin-
neret), Israel’s primary storage reservoir, was overflowing in the
Spring of 2004, this should not give Israelis a false sense of optimism.
Israelis consume some two billion cubic meters (2,000 MCM) of wa-
ter each year, while the country’s water supplies are replenished at an
average rate of only some 1.8 billion. This produces a yearly deficit
of 200 MCM or four times the anticipated imports from Turkey.

A further step toward implementation of the Turkish-Israeli water

agreement took place on March 4, 2004 at the Israel Foreign Ministry
in Jerusalem with the signing of a detailed agreement by Turkish For-
eign Ministry Undersecretary Uğur Ziyal, and Yoav Biran, Director-
General of Israel’s Foreign Ministry. Turkish Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Namik Tan told reporters in Ankara that this agreement
“would bring a new dimension to the cooperation between the two
countries,” adding that “it would contribute to bringing stability and
peace in the Middle East.” He pointed out that the agreement “would
be a good example for providing water to other regional countries
which had a shortage of water,” such as Cyprus, Malta, and the Greek
islands. He stressed that Turkey had many times announced that it
was ready to sell additional water also from other “national rivers
which pour into the Mediterranean.”(Anadalu Ajans, 2004.) Tan said
that details such as the cost of the water, transportation and the date
for the initial shipments would be set out in a management contract
that had yet to be concluded. This contract will also include provi-
sions for monitoring the quality of the water in the export facilities in
Turkey, in the transportation network, and in the unloading facilities
in Israel (Cohen, A, 2004.).

According to Ömer Önhon, Turkey’s Consul-General in New York,

as of mid-September 2004 the two countries were still “more than a
few cents apart” on the price per cubic meter, and no contract had yet
been awarded to a commercial firm to implement the government-to-
government agreement. Ambassador Önhon was familiar with re-
gional water issues since he had served in Damascus (1998-2000),
and headed Ankara’s Middle East Department (2000-2002), before
assuming his current post. He dismissed the arguments of proponents
of desalination, such as Professor Dan Zaslavsky, who had been Is-
rael's Water Commissioner and the Energy Ministry's chief scientist in
previous right-wing Likud governments. Zaslavsky warned that inade-
quate management in Syria would result in environmental damage to
vital water resources flowing down to Israel from the Golan Heights
(Siegel and Rudge, 2000.) More recently Zaslavsky has argued that “I
don’t think it’s in the state’s interest to be in any way dependent on
Turkey for a resource as sensitive as water.” Even now, despite the
growing number of major economic deals between Turkey and Israel
in recent years, he contended, Turkey remained an unreliable source
for such a vital commodity as water. He cited press reports that An-
kara threatened to cancel some deals unless Israel bought the Manav-
gat water.(Zaslavsky, 2004.) Moreover, relations have been strained
because of the conservative Islamic background of the leadership of
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and criticisms by
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Israeli military actions in
the Gaza Strip, and allegations -- denied by Jerusalem -- that Israel
was aiding Kurdish nationalists in northern Iraq.

Ambassador Önhon insisted to me that Turkey’s relations with Israel

were fundamentally sound and that the occasional disagreements on
specific issues were no different than those between Israel and the
United States or the U.S. and its European allies. He emphasized that
Turkey believes it can play an important and constructive role in the
Middle East. “We have very good relations with Israel and also with
the Palestinian side,” he told me. Moreover, Turkey was in the unique
position of serving as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East.
Amiram Cohen, in his article on the agreement for the Israeli daily
Haaretz, pointed out that it was categorized not as a commercial
agreement but as a “political agreement” [medini in Hebrew can be
translated either as “political” or “state to state”]. The agreement ob-
ligates Turkey to sell Israel 50 MCM of drinking quality water annu-
ally for 20 years, with an option to extend the contract for an addi-
tional five years. Implementation of the agreement was assigned to
the national water authorities of the two countries. The agreement
stipulates that a Turkish-Israeli binational commission will select the
method of shipping and award the shipping contract.

Cohen reported that officials in the Israeli Ministry of Finance esti-

mate the cost of the water at the loading point in Turkey at between
13 and 18 cents per cubic meter, to which needs to be added the
transportation costs, which they estimate at between 70 and 80 cents,
meaning that the total cost of the water at the unloading facility in
Ashkelon would be around $1.00 per cubic meter. Israel’s nationalist
Arutz Sheva News Service reported on March 4 that the cost would be
“at a minimum price of 70 cents per cubic meter. This is cheaper than
desalinated water, but much more expensive than local water.” But
the true economic cost of water in Israel has been distorted by the
subsidies provided to farmers and consumers. Finance Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu had opposed the Turkish water deal, saying “it
was too expensive. Prime Minister Sharon, however, said the impor-
tance of the deal surpasses merely the water issue, and affects the
strategic relationship with Turkey.” (Arutz Sheva, 2004.)

Some argue that the best long-term solution is to build a network of

large-scale desalination plants. However, even if additional desalina-
tion plants were approved quickly, these would take several years to
be constructed. Commenting on the deal with Turkey, Raanan Gissen,
a spokesman for Prime Minister Sharon, stressed: “Water, additional
water, will never hurt Israel because we are at a very grave shortage.”
He pointed out that even if the Turkish water were not needed imme-
diately, “Water is like money in the bank. You can use it in the fu-
ture.” (JINSA, 2004.) Joseph Paritsky, then Israel’s National Infra-
structure Minister, explained: “We are buying water from Turkey for
two reasons: one, we need water, and two, to strengthen our ties with
one of the most important countries in the world for us.”(JINSA,
2004) Ankara has also placed great value on the agreement with Is-
rael, seeing it as the first tangible result of Turkey’s regional “Peace
Water” policy.

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