Hazard analysis

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Hazard analysis is a fact of life. Herbivores

perform a hazard analysis each time they
go in search for food and face the
prospect of being eaten by carnivores.
They balance their risks versus their
rewards. Parents weigh the risks faced by
their children, whenever a child asks to go
outside to play. The more complex the
situation, the greater is the opportunity for
analysis, and at this time, complex
engineered systems receive the most
detailed analysis. It might be argued that
greatest unmet hazard analysis need
exists in the realm of political choice, but
today’s universities carefully avoid
involving themselves in so controversial a
matter.

A hazard analysis is used as the first step

in a process used to assess risk. The
result of a hazard analysis is the
identification of different type of hazards.
A hazard is a potential condition and
exists or not (probability is 1 or 0). It may
in single existence or in combination with
other hazards (sometimes called events)
and conditions become an actual
Functional Failure or Accident (Mishap).
The way this exactly happens in one
particular sequence is called a scenario.
This scenario has a probability (between 1
and 0) of occurrence. Often a system has
many potential failure scenarios. It also is
assigned a classification, based on the
worst case severity of the end condition.
Risk is the combination of probability and
severity. Preliminary risk levels can be
provided in the hazard analysis. The
validation, more precise prediction
(verification) and acceptance of risk is
determined in the Risk assessment
(analysis). The main goal of both is to
provide the best selection of means of
controlling or eliminating the risk. The
term is used in several engineering
specialties, including avionics, chemical
process safety, safety engineering,
reliability engineering and food safety.[1]

Hazards and risk

A hazard is defined as a "Condition, event,
or circumstance that could lead to or
contribute to an unplanned or undesirable
event." Seldom does a single hazard cause
an accident or a functional failure. More
often an accident or operational failure
occurs as the result of a sequence of
causes. A hazard analysis will consider
system state, for example operating
environment, as well as failures or
malfunctions.

While in some cases, safety or reliability

risk can be eliminated, in most cases a
certain degree of risk must be accepted. In
order to quantify expected costs before
the fact, the potential consequences and
the probability of occurrence must be
considered. Assessment of risk is made
by combining the severity of consequence
with the likelihood of occurrence in a
matrix. Risks that fall into the
"unacceptable" category (e.g., high severity
and high probability) must be mitigated by
some means to reduce the level of safety
risk.

IEEE STD-1228-1994 Software Safety

Plans prescribes industry best practices
for conducting software safety hazard
analyses to help ensure safety
requirements and attributes are defined
and specified for inclusion in software that
commands, controls or monitors critical
functions. When software is involved in a
system, the development and design
assurance of that software is often
governed by DO-178B. The severity of
consequence identified by the hazard
analysis establishes the criticality level of
the software. Software criticality levels
range from A to E, corresponding to the
severity of Catastrophic to No Safety
Effect. Higher levels of rigor are required
for level A and B software and
corresponding functional tasks and work
products is the system safety domain are
used as objective evidence of meeting
safety criteria and requirements.

Recently a leading edge commercial

standard was promulgated based on
decades of proven system safety
processes in DoD and NASA. ANSI/GEIA-
STD-0010-2009 (Standard Best Practices
for System Safety Program Development
and Execution) is a demilitarized
commercial best practice that uses proven
holistic, comprehensive and tailored
approaches for hazard prevention,
elimination and control. It is centered
around the hazard analysis and functional
based safety process.

Severity definitions - Safety

Related
 Severity Definition

Catastrophic Results in multiple fatalities and/or loss of the system

Reduces the capability of the system or the operator ability to cope with adverse
conditions to the extent that there would be:
Large reduction in safety margin or functional capability

Crew physical distress/excessive workload such that operators cannot be

Hazardous relied upon to perform required tasks accurately or completely

Serious or fatal injury to small number of occupants of aircraft (except

operators)

Fatal injury to ground personnel and/or general public

Reduces the capability of the system or the operators to cope with adverse
operating conditions to the extent that there would be:
Significant reduction in safety margin or functional capability

Significant increase in operator workload

Major
Conditions impairing operator efficiency or creating significant discomfort

Physical distress to occupants of aircraft (except operator) including injuries

Major occupational illness and/or major environmental damage, and/or major

property damage

Does not significantly reduce system safety. Actions required by operators are
well within their capabilities. Include:
Slight reduction in safety margin or functional capabilities

Minor Slight increase in workload such as routine flight plan changes

Some physical discomfort to occupants or aircraft (except operators)

Minor occupational illness and/or minor environmental damage, and/or minor

property damage

No Safety
Has no effect on safety
Effect

Likelihood of occurrence
 Likelihood Definition

Qualitative: Anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire

system/operational life of an item.
Probable
Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is greater than

Qualitative: Unlikely to occur to each item during its total life. May occur
several times in the life of an entire system or fleet.
Remote
Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less than
, but greater than

Qualitative: Not anticipated to occur to each item during its total life. May
Extremely occur a few times in the life of an entire system or fleet.
Remote Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less than
but greater than

Qualitative: So unlikely that it is not anticipated to occur during the entire

Extremely operational life of an entire system or fleet.
Improbable Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less than

See also
Medical Device Risk Management - ISO
14971
Failure mode and effects analysis –
Systematic technique for identification
of potential failure modes in a system
and their causes and effects
Fault tree analysis
Hazard and operability study, also
known as HAZOP
Hazard Potential Case
SWIFT
Safety engineering – Engineering
discipline which assures that
engineered systems provide acceptable
levels of safety
Reliability engineering – Sub-discipline
of systems engineering that emphasizes
dependability in the lifecycle
management of a product or a system
Occupational safety and health – Field
concerned with the safety, health and
welfare of people at work
RTCA DO-178B (Software
Considerations in Airborne Systems and
Equipment Certification)
RTCA DO-178C
RTCA DO-254 (similar to DO-178B, but
for hardware)
SAE ARP4761 (System safety
assessment process)
SAE ARP4754 (System development
process)
MIL-STD-882 (Standard practice for
system safety)
 ANSI/GEIA-STD-0010-2009 (Standard
Best Practices for System Safety
Program Development and Execution)
IEEE STD 1228-1994 Software Safety
Plans
IEEE STD 1584-2002 IEEE Guide for
Performing Arc Flash Hazard
Calculations

Further reading
Center for Chemical Process Safety
(1992). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation
Procedures, with Worked Examples (2nd
ed.). Wiley-American Institute Of
 Chemical Engineers. ISBN 0-8169-0491-
X.
Bahr, Nicholas J. (1997). System Safety
Engineering and Risk Assessment: A
Practical Approach (Chemical
Engineering) (1st ed.). Taylor & Francis
Group. ISBN 1-56032-416-3.
Kletz, Trevor (1999). Hazop and Hazan
(4th ed.). Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0-
85295-421-2.

External links
CFR, Title 29-Labor, Part 1910--
Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, § 1910.119
U.S. OSHA regulations regarding
"Process safety management of highly
hazardous chemicals" (especially
Appendix C).
FAA Order 8040.4 establishes FAA
safety risk management policy.
The FAA publishes a System Safety
Handbook that provides a good
overview of the system safety process
used by the agency.
IEEE 1584-2002 Standard which
provides guidelines for doing arc flash
hazard assessment.
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