RAMANUSA, PANTHEIST OR PANENTHEIST ?
By
RICHARD DESMET
In a book entitled Religious Hinduism and published for the first time
some 18 years ago, I devoted 6 pages to a very succinct exposition of
RamAnuja’s teaching and ended it with a short evaluation apportioning
both praise and blame. I expressly said that his doctrine cannot satisfy
fully the religious heart which craves for a God altogether transcendent and
absolute even in his most intimate immanence to us, Though highly
personal, the God of Raminuja is not supposed to be complete without his
modes, whether qualities or bodies, and thus falls short of that radical
transcendence which is the mark of divine personality, What, therefore,
vitiates his doctrine is its definite pantheism, consciously opposed to Saikara’s
transcendentalism. The root of this pantheism is found in Ramanuja’s
conception of the intellectual act as inevitably relational, and in his concep-
tion of reality as exactly corresponding to the relational character of human
judgment.
My insufficiently explained statement that pantheism vitiates Rama-
nuja’s doctrine did not remain unchallenged, The first one to take up the
cudgel in favour of Ramanuja was Fr. Antony Manalapuzhavila, 0. C.D.
In his careful article of 1966, ‘Is RamAnujas a Pantheist?’ he opines that I
have too strict an understanding of the characteristically Ramanujian
terms: part, mode, body and attribute. They are, he thinks, simply
comparisons which “ should be taken only in a general sense as illustrating
‘one and the same truth, namely, the total dependence of all things on God.”
Then, quite recently, my friend Rev. Eric J. Lott published a quite extensive
study of Ramanuja’s use of the self-body analogy in which he also finds
fault with my labelling of Ramanuja as a pantheist.* And Professor Ninian
Smart in his foreword to this book writes : “ It is an analogy which has led
relatively ignorant Western writers to think of Ramdnuja as a pantheist.
1. R, Desmet and J. Neuner (Editors ), Religious Hinduism, Allahabad: St. Paul
Publications, 3rd edition, 1968, pp. 68-69.
2. Fr. Antony, “Is Raminuja a Pantheist?” Indian Ecclesiastical Studies, 5 14 (Oct.
1966 ), pp. 283-313.
3. Eric J. Lott, God and the Universe in the Vedantic Theology of Raminuja, Madras :
Riminuja Research Society, 1976.
71 Annals [D. Jy]562 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume
This is nonsense as the present book shows; and it is nonsense because
Raménuja is very strong on the dependence of the cosmos on the Lord. It
is not that the cosmos and God are identical, as pantheism would imply.”
From these last words it is obvious that Prof. Smart uses rather brutally the
‘etymological meaning of the term ‘ pantheism’ and this is an indication that
this term is perhaps not sufficiently defined and refined to be used incauti-
ously. Let me then begin with an elucidation of pantheism.
Pantheism
When in 1705 Toland coined the term ‘pantheism’ to describe his
own position he meant it to denote a Spinozian conception of the whole of
reality as one Substance, God, consisting in infinite attributes two of which,
thought and extension, have modes or modifications which comprise all the
ways of being of our diversified universe. Here already we notice that the
oneness of God and world is not a simple identity but a differenced unity.
Once coined, the term was found convenient to describe much older
systems as well as newly arising doctrines, especially those of Fichte,
Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Bradley, to cite only the most important
‘ones. Due to this broad historical application, the term ‘pantheism’ got
relatively detached from any clearly definable doctrine such as Spinozism
and rather denotes today the implication of diverse views which tend to
emphasize the immanence of God in the world and to deemphasize, or even
to ignore, his transcendence over the world. In this regard, it is like our
term advaitavada which also cannot be reduced to the particularity of one
doctrine. But while there exists one kevalddvaita doctrine, we cannot
point to a single Western doctrine which could represent pure pantheism in
the etymological sense of simple identity of world and God. As E.R,
Naughton remarks, “since no one has as yet failed to make some distinc
tion between transcendent and immanent aspects of infinite being, there
never has been a complete and utter pantheism.”*
From the many divergent definitions of pantheism it is difficult to
extract a cluster of characteristics which would really represent a common
core of all so-called pantheisms. We do not find that all pantheisms deny
completely the ontological contingency of mundane beings, or the ultimate
distinctness of personality either in God or man, or the necessary distinction
between cause and effect, or the moral distinction between good and evil.
Most of them have, at root, seen that there is no really divine immanence in
4, E.R. Naughton, “Pantheism", New Catholic Bneyclopaedia, Vol. X, New York +
McGraw Hill, 1967, p. 947,DESMET : Réménuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 563
the universe unless God transcends this universe. But, as R. Jolivet remarks,
“the difficulty in which pantheists are involved is that they do in fact
compromise this divine transcendence which they yet regard as necessary.
The pantheistic God, by being self-differenced into infinite attributes,
by having or projecting cosmic modes or by dialectically realizing himself
through an inner process. of self-reflection and self-expression, includes or
reflects in his very essence the diversity and mutability which ought to
remain characteristic of imperfect reality. He is no longer simple fullness
of perfection, ineffable and indescribable,
Leaving this point aside for the present let me now turn my attention
to another but kindred term, ‘ panentheism’, to which some contemporary
thinkers, prominent among whom is Charles Hartshorne, have given a new
lease of philosophical favour.
Panentheism
Introduced in the early nineteenth century by Karl C. F. Krause
(1781-1832) to distinguish his doctrine from contemporary forms of
pantheism and emanationism, the term panentheism describes today the
views of those who introduce a polarity in the notion of God as both eternal
and temporal and as including yet transcending the world. Panentheism
views all things as being in God (pan en Thed) without exhausting his infinity.
It utilizes a real distinction between the essence of God and his existence, or
considers God as having accidents really distinct from his substance. It is a
kind of surrelativism holding for a convertible relation of dependence
between God and the world, the latter being an actual fulfilment of God’s
creative possibility. Panentheism is rooted in a conviction that the world as
possible in the mind of God becomes actualized and thereby adds to God's
actuality. Thus it opposes the Thomistic view of God as Pure Actuality.
Panentheists give special importance to what they call a logic of polarity,
which has a close affinity to Hegelian dialectics, as the only means of esca-
ping ultimate dilemmas arising from the use of categories.
Among the forerunners of modern panentheism can be mentioned
John Scotus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Schelling, Hegel
and Soloviev. And among its twentieth century representatives, Whitehead,
Tillich and Hartshorne. Interestingly, E. R. Naughton in his historical
survey mentions also Raminuja, Iqbal and Radhakrishnan.’ E. J. Lott
would also qualify Ramaouja as a panentheist.?
5. R. Jolivet, The God of Reason, London : Burns and Oates, 1958, p. 92.
6. Naughton, op. cit. “ Panentheism ”, p. 944.
7. Lott, op. cits p. 85.564 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume
Panentheism rests upon a principle of polarity that holds that contra-
ries may both be true without one excluding the other. In applying the notion
of polarity to causality, panentheists place a real reciprocal relation between
cause and effect. This would seem to do away with the meaning of causa-
lity as such, It is true that lower orders of causes are somewhat involved
with their effects through the principle of reaction, but such involvements
exist by reason of the limitations of these causes—causality as such does not
demand such reciprocity. To import it into God as the first cause is to
affect him with a mode of action proper to secondary causes.
A further inadequacy evidenced in panentheism involves the role of
intrinsic analogy in thinking about God. Panentheists seem convinced that
the only way to escape the limiting univocity of the categories is to introduce
apparent contradictions and to explain their copredication in terms of chang-
ing meaning of the terms; this results, however, in equivocity. Only
through analogy can one predicate perfections of being that are simply
different, yet somewhat the same.
Both pantheism and panentheism appear to be rooted in forms of
epistemology which are inadequate to the task of thinking about God. Such
epistemologies remain naive to the extent that they view our ways of
thinking as coinciding with the ways of being, Instead of critically realizing
that our concepts are only signs and pointers, they still view them as
representative rather than presentative, i. e., as really corresponding to, and
mirroring even though obscurely, the objects of Knowledge. In a similar
way they project upon these objects the structures of our concepts and the
network of their interrelationships, When the reality considered is God, who
more than any object escapes the grasp if not the reach of our knowledge,
theories are produced which bring him down to the univocal level of concepts.
They superimpose on the simplicity of his fullness structures of substance and
attributes or type and modes, or structures of polarity and inner evolution.
Whereas it is possible to understand that if the concepts we feel justified to
predicate of God can be no more than analogical pointers they can coincide
in his simple essence and be asserted formally without imparting to it their
plurality, distinctions and oppositions, such a possibility is lacking in these
epistemologies. They can only compromise the divine transcendence and
view it through the deforming glass of mundane complexity.
It is now time to pass on to Ramanuja and to examine if his teaching
has any considerable affinity with either pantheism or panentheism, And,
first of all, let us consider his epistemology.DESMET : Ramanuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 565
The Ramanujian epistemology
For Raminuja the structure of the judgment (essentially the judgment
of perception ) reveals immediately the structure of reality. This axiomatic
assumption characterises his epistemological realism which he holds in
common with Nyaya-Vaigesika.
«Every nascent awareness,” he observes, “is produced by some
distinctive aspect ( visesa ) so that it may be expressed in this way, ‘this is
such’ ( idam ittham); for it is not possible to apprehend any real entity
(padartha) without a particular configuration, such as triangular head,
dewlap, etc,” (SBh 1. 1. 1.) The ‘this’ (idam) element is the visesya, the
subject to be distinguished, and the ‘such’ (ittham) element is the visesana,
the distinguishing or differencing predicate or attribute, Both together
denote the actually differenced subject as manifested in its separation ( bheda)
from other objects of knowledge.
The viSesya-visesana structure is called by the Grammarians sémdnd-
dhikaranya, functional coordination or appositional construction. It means
“the fact that a plurality of terms whose use is motivated by a plurality of
objective grounds denotes one and the same thing... It aims at making one
and the same thing known as differenced ( visista) by a plurality of differen-
cing terms (visesaya)” (ibid.), Let us notice that for Ramanuja the
plurality of the terms is motivated by a plurality of objective grounds.
Between the two pluralities there is, in his opinion, an exact or one-one
correspondence.
This appears clearly when he applies his understanding of sémanadhi-
karanya to the interpretation of Tattvamasi. He is aware that for Sankara
the plurality of the terms was not motivated by a plurality of objective
grounds, namely, a differenced structure of the Brahman-Atman, but by a
plurality of subjective grounds, namely, the human knower’s liability to err
in diverse directions concerning the Absolute. For Sankara, indeed, each
term having a limited direct meaning (mukhydrtha) carried the risk of
bringing about a perverse understanding of the Unlimited as something
limited. Tat, for instance, denoted primarily reality as external and tvam
the inward but particular reality of the knowing subject. But in tattvamasi
each one controlled and was controlled by the other so that a secondary
meaning, a laksydrtha could arise which, stripping them of their mutual
incompatibilities, would elevate their essential meaning, their sv@rtha, to the
simplicity of the pure unlimited Sac-cit or nirguya Brahmatman. This
recourse to laksané, actually jahadajahallaksana, through anvaya and
vyatireki (retention of the compatible and exclusion of the incompatible)566 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume
had been explained fully in Saikara’s bhdsya on the definition Satyam
‘janam-anantam brahma (Brahman is reality-knowledge-infinite. ).
Now, according to Raminuja, “« whether we take the several terms of
this definition in their primary sense, i. e., as denoting qualities ( his position ),
or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary to those
qualities (Sankara’s position, ) in either case we must needs admit a plurality
of causes for the application of those several terms to one thing [i.e., for
their sémanadhikaranya. }. There is, however, that difference between the two
alternatives that in the former case the terms preserve their primary meaning,
while in the latter case their denotative power depends on the so-called
Jaksana... This view would moreover be in conflict with the sdmdnddhi-
karanya notion, as it would not allow of difference of objective grounds for
several terms applied to one thing.” (Ibid. )
This text demonstrates two things: first Ramanuja adheres conserva-
tively to the Mimamsé rule that the primary meaning be generally privileged
and laksand be permitted only in rare cases when absurdity could not be
avoided otherwise; and second, he can do it here only because his under-
standing of sémdnadhikaranya is grounded in what I have called an episte-
mology of naive realism.
Indeed, this understanding is logico-ontological. For “the element
that is referred to as such [ by the visesaya] when a thing (vastu) is appre-
hended as ‘ this is such’ is a mode (prakdra).” (1.1.13)
Prakara and Prakarin (mode and entity-with-modes )
“ What determines statements of co-ordination is only the relation of
mode ( prakdra) in which one thing [ denoted by a viéesaya, be it a genus, a
quality, or even a substance] stands to another, [ the visesya vastu or
prakarin).”” ($Bh 1.1.1.) This relation is a relation of inherence and
subservience : “class characteristics and qualities inhere in the substance as
in their substrate and their final cause (prayojana ), and they are its modes”
(ibid. ).
The distinction between prakdra and prakarin is not merely logical
and does not, therefore, cover an ontological non-difference. For they are
different padarthas between which there is an aprthak-siddhi sambandhana, i.
a bond of inseparability.- But this bond is not necessarily reciprocal, espe-
cially if the prakarin is God.
Now “since a mode depends on its prakdrin, the cognition of the
mode depends on and includes the prakarin [for cognition is always of a
substance ]. From this it follows that a word denoting a mode includes inDESMET : Ramdnuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 567
its denotation the substance having that mode.” ($Bh 1. 1. 13). This being
80, sémanddhikaranya is justified since its appositional structure is grounded
in the unity-in-complexity of the prakdrin with its prakaras. In other terms,
the structure of the perceptional judgment is paralleled by the ontological
structure of its referent, and the two structures are homomorphic. Such a
homomorphy is precisely characteristic of the epistemologies of naive realism
which ontologise the ways of our thinking.
Sarira and Saririn ( body and the embodied )
‘The modal structure is first discovered in material things. A material
entity (pina) is accepted to be as it is known, namely, as specified by generic
configurations, qualities, etc. : this is a brown broken-horned cow. Then itis
discovered as binding together body and atman in one differenced reality.
« For just like genus and quality, so substances (dravya) also may occupy
the position of specifying attributes ( viSesana), insofar namely as they consti=
tute the body of something else. Enunciations such as ‘the atman is,
according to its works, born either a god, or a man, or a bull’ show that in
ordinary speech as well as in the Veda functional co-ordination has to be
taken ina real primary [ not implied ] sense... As material bodies bearing
the generic marks of humanity are definite things insofar only as they are
modes of the dtman, enunciations of co-ordination such as ‘the atman has
been born as aman, or a cunuch, or a woman,’ are in every way appro-
priate... The relation of bodies to the 4tman is strictly analogous to that of
class characteristics and qualities to the substance in which they inhere; for
it is the atman only which is their substrate and their final cause, and they
are modes of the atman. .. That they are its modes appears from the fact that
they are mere attributes of the atman manifesting itself as god, man, or the
like. .. That they thus stand to it in the relation of distinguishing attributes is
not perceived visually because the eye has no capacity to perceive the atman.
But this does not imply that the body does not possess that essential nature ;
it rather is just the possession of that essential nature on which the judgment
of co-ordination [ such as ‘ the dtman is a man’] is based. And as words
have the power of denoting the relation of something being a mode of the
tman, they denote things together with this relation.” ($Bh 1. 1.1)
Ramfnuja is aware that this is an unusual and even novel conception
for he puts in the mouth ofa fictitious opponent the following objection : “But
in ordinary speech the word ‘ body’ is understood to mean the mere body;
it does not therefore extend in its denotation up to the atman ! —Not so, we
reply. The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode of the atman; but, for
the purpose of showing the distinction of things, the word ‘ body’ is used in
a limited sense [ just as we speak of ‘whiteness’ as if it were a separate568 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume
thing although it is never found apart from a white thing of which it is a
prakara,|” (ibid. )
He, then, unfolds the full theological scope of this theory: “ As the
individual atmans with their body-modes constitute a body of the highest
Atman, and hence are modes of it, the words denoting them extend in their
connotation up to the very highest Atman. And as all intelligent and non-
intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman, and have
reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in samdnadhikaranya
with the terms denoting Brahman [ directly. ]” (ibid. )
Ramanuja’s well-known definition of body’ stands as follows : “ Any
substance that an intelligent [ entity ] is able completely to control ( niyantum )
and to support (dhdrayitum ) for his own purposes, and the essential nature
of which is entirely subservient ( sesatd) to that intelligent [ entity ] is its
body ” (yasya cetanasya yad-dravyam sarva émand svarthe niyantum dharayi«
tum-ca Sakyam, tat-Sesata-eka-svariipam-ca, tat-tasya Sariram-iti) (SBh
2.1.9). Or, more briefly, “ The body of a being is constituted by that, the
nature, subsistence and activity of which depend on the will of that being”
(yad-icchd-adhina-svariipa-sthiti-pravrtti-yat-tat-tasya Sariram-iti). (ibid. 2.
1.8). Having adopted this definition, Ramanuja pursues : “In this sense,
then, all conscious and non-conscious beings together constitute the body of
the Supreme Person, for they are completely controlled and supported by
him for his own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him ” (ibid. 2. 1.9).
First of all then, these beings depend on the Lord for their nature of
which he is the support. This must be considered on two levels: the level of
the actual living bodies and the level of their two constituents, the eternal
prakrti and the eternal dtmans. Of the living bodies and their universe, the
Lord is the total cause, i. e., both their reality-giving upddana and their struc
ture-giving nimitta-kdrana. The process of their origination is a parindma, a
self-modification, not however of the very essence ( svariipa ) of the Lord but
of his co-essential mode and body, prakyti, which is eternally comprised
within his larger substance or svabhdva.® Brahma-parindma is not svariipa-
parindma (which would imply bhedabheda), and not even Sakti-parindma (as
suggested by the Bh. Gité but rejected by Ramanuja because sakti cannot
be extrinsic to the divine svariipa) but only Sarira-parinama (VS [VB],
p. 226). One perceives here how Ramanuja preserves to a large extent the
Lord’s transcendence thanks to his notion of body and his conception of two
a
8. On the distinction between scaripa and svathaea, cf. J. B, Carman, The Theology
of Raminyja : An Essay in Interreligious Understanding, New Haven : Yale University Press, 1974,
pp 88-07,DESMET : Rémdnuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 569
eternal bodies of the Lord, prakrti and the plurality of equally eternal
atomic dimans.
Further, the assertion that the Lord also controls the subsistence and
activity of all living beings and their universe for his own ends (namely, for
his merciful /i/a, the sport of his love for them ), also contributes to preserving
his trancendence. For he is thus their inner ruler ( antaryamin ) and their
absolute principal (sesin) or master (svdmin) while they are totally his
subordinates ( sesa) so that even in their free decisions they act only through
his permission (anumati). As their sesin, the Lord pervades them but,
RamAnuja says, “ he does not contain them like a jug contains water.- How
then does God pervade them?—In virtue of his will. Behold his yoga,
miraculous and peculiar to him alone : God supports all beings, but no being
is of use to him... All beings depend on God because they constitute his
body; but God does not depend on them for they serve no purpose in
maintaining his being (Gita Bh@sya, 9.4-5). Divine pervasion may be
compared to the pervasion of a whole body by its atomic atman. “As the
light of the sun abiding in one place is seen to extend to many places, so the
Stman dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body by means of knowledge
which is its quality * ($Bh. 2. 3. 26). God, however, does not only pervade
all beings through his knowledge but through his ruling will.
To say, then, that God and subordinate beings stand in the relation of
&tman and body seems to be unobjectionable, at least insofar as it expresses
the instrumentality of those beings in regard of God’s omnipotence. But we
must not forget that these are parinamic products of his prakrti invested by
eternal dimans whose karman is to be enjoyed in them. And prakrti and
Gtmans are two eternal bodies of God. Besides, the Lord possesses even an
eternal body of glory which is uniquely appropriate to him :
« Just as his essential nature consists of indefinable knowledge, bliss
and purity; just as he has countless auspicious qualities of matchless excel-
lence, the first six of which are knowledge, power, untiring strength,
sovereignty, immutability and splendor; and just as he causes all other
entities, both spiritual and material, to function by an act of his will; so also
he has one permanent celestial form which is agreeable and appropriate to
him; he has an infinite variety of superlatively auspicious ornaments that
suit his form, and immeasurable, infinite, and amazing weapons of various
kinds which are appropriate to his might; he has a consort of matchless
beauty...; he has an infinite retinue of attendants...; he has an infinitely great
realm... which includes all objects and instruments of enjoyment; and he
has a celestial abode (divya-sthana), the essential and inherent nature of
72 Annals [D. J.)3570 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume
which is beyond the grasp of speech and thought. All this is eternal and
flawless.” (Ved. S., para 127)
Not only does Ramanuja assert that there is as much scriptural autho-
rity for God’s form, abode, and so on, as for the defining attributes of his
essential nature and his other auspicious qualities but he is also willing to
expand the concept of God’s essential nature (svariipa) to include God’s
form and abode : “ Even as such attributes as knowledge have been stated to
constitute the svariipa of the supreme Brahman, likewise his bodily form
(ripa) belongs to his svaripa, for the Scriptures declare that his essential
nature is such” (ibid., para 135). And in $Bh 1, 1. 21 he says; “even his
celestial form...is natural to him (svabhdvika)*” and the conclusion of his
comment is ; “this form is nothing else than his own attribute (tasya
svadharmah ).” As such it is, of course, different from all material bodies :
it is aprakrta (ibid. ).
The need felt by Ramanuja for providing God with this eternal form
and abode may be found, apart from his fidelity to the Vaisnava tradition, in
his explanation of the terms satyakdma and satyasamkalpa of Chand. Up.,
8.1.5. The term satyakdma, he says, means ‘he who possesses objects of
his desire (kama) which are eternally real (satya).’ These permanent
(sthira ) objects are instruments of his enjoyment ( bhoga-upakarana), As to
satyasamkalpa it means ‘he who possesses objects accomplished by his
eternally real will’, These objects comprise not only the permanent instru-
ments of his enjoyment but also the impermanent instruments of his cosmic
sport (/ild-upakarana) whose nature, subsistence, functioning and differentia-
tions depend (dyatta), as we know, on his will (ibid., para 132). The
important notion here is that God appears to need for the very reality of his
essential bliss permanent instruments of enjoyment or, more generally, a
divine body with a celestial abode, retinue, etc. His self-sufficiency needs
that complexity. He is not only vis/sra as having a.plurality of defining
attributes and auspicious qualities but even as having a body and a perfect
abode co-essential to him. As such he may appear utterly superior to the
phenomenal universe but this superiority is only fullness in complexity. In
the eyes of those who have ascended to the notion that the divine Absolute
can only be fullness in simplicity Ram@nuja’s doctrine cannot but appear to
compromise the perfection of divine transcendence.
It also appears to compromise God’s absolute ineffability. Ramanuja
does not fail to remark that the Supreme Person in his celestial form and
abode is inconceivable ( acintya) and beyond the grasp of speech or thought,
even to the lower gods and to accomplished ascetics. But the whole of his
doctrine of modes or bodies and his conception of sdmanadhikaranya importDESMET : Raménuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 571
into that apophatism an undeniable element of cataphatism. Indeed, all our
words by denoting objects which are all said to be modes or bodies of God
denote simultaneously God himself. Their mukhyarthas extend to him, and
even to him primarily. Since Ramanuja rejects the theological recourse to
laksand, they are not simply apophatic pointers of God’s absolute essence.
They are not simply presentative but representative.*
Conclusion
The very thrust of my exposition has prevented me from doing justice
to the highly religious quality and attractiveness of Ramanuja’s teaching
which I feel and value deeply. I regret it but I wanted to focus philosophi-
cal attention critically on the epistemological postulates of Ram&nuja and on
their consequences for his elaboration of the notion of God. As high as it
reaches, as religious as are the attitudes it commands in the devotees, it still
seems to me to compromise to some extent the perfect transcendence of God.
This is why I had found it pantheistic,
Labels do not matter much, It is enough to repeat that Ramanuja
teaches visistadvaita which does not mean ‘differentiated non-dualism’ but
*non-dualism of the differenced Brahman’. But it is important to under-
stand what this really means and how closely it measures up to the standard
of perfect transcendence. Instead of speaking of an implication of panthe-
ism, I am ready to speak, probably with more correctness, of am affinity of
Raminuja’s theology with panentheism. At least for Hartshorne’s panen-
theism, God “ must be logically independent (and at the same time) cannot
in his full actuality be less or other than literally all-inclusive.” Hartshorne’s
method, and roughly Raminuja’s method too, is to follow a via eminentiae
attributing to God in a “categorically superior” form the qualities and
values found in our analysis of human experience." The question is whether
this form is “ categorically uppermost. ”
ABBREVIATIONS
SBh = Sri Bhagya as translated by G. Thibaut.
‘VS [VB] = Vedértha Sarhgraha as translated by Van Buitenen,
Ved. 8. = idem as translated by J. B. Carman, op. cit.
9, For these paras concerning the divine Form and Abode, cf. ibid., pp. 167-175,
10. Cf. Lott, op. cit., pp. 226-227.