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Standard Chartered Bank vs. Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union, GR No.

165550, October 8, 2008

FACTS:

On August 25, 1998, petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with respondent Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union
(SCBEU), which provided, among others, for medical benefits. Under Article XI, Section 1 of the
CBA, petitioner committed to "continue to cover all its employees with a group hospitalization
and major surgical insurance plan including maternity benefits.” At the time of the signing of
the said CBA, the insurance provider was Philippine American Life (Philamlife) Insurance
Company. After the signing of the CBA, SCB changed its insurance provider from Philamlife to
Maxicare.

Subsequently, SCBEU charged SCB with unfair labor practice before the DOLE for alleged gross
violation of the economic provisions of the CBA and diminution or removal of benefits. SCBEU
contested, among others, the exclusion of the outpatient medicine reimbursements of the
employees and the maternity benefits granted to the spouses of the male employees of SCB in
the new insurance policy provided by Maxicare.

SCB, in turn, argued that there was no diminution of benefits as the insurance policy issued by
Maxicare contained similar benefits to those contained in the previous Philamlife policy. SCB
alleged that outpatient medicine reimbursement was not expressly provided for in the Philamlife
insurance policy and that this was precisely the reason SCB’s employees were provided with a
medicine allowance under the CBA. It is also contended that the maternity benefits as provided
in the CBA were exclusive to its female employees and that the past practices cited by the
respondent SCBEU were "malpractices" which it seeks to curtail and correct.

DOLE gave credit to the claims of SCBEU. Separate Motion for Reconsideration (MR) were filed
by SCB and SCBEU. DOLE sustained its earlier findings but reversed its ruling that the maternity
benefits granted by SCB extend to the spouses of its male employees.

In the assailed Order dated March 11, 2002, the DOLE reverted to its original ruling. SCB
disagreed and filed a second motion for reconsideration to this ruling and a motion for
clarification regarding the grant of "outpatient benefits" to the employees. In a
subsequent Order dated April 29, 2002, the DOLE denied the said motion and clarified that the
grant of outpatient benefits includes medicine reimbursements.

Petitioner elevated this case before the appellate court through a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The said court dismissed the petition and
affirmed the assailed Orders dated March 11, 2002 and April 29, 2002 of the DOLE. The
appellate court likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereto for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. In its Comment, SCBEU contends that the
instant petition must fail as it raises questions of fact when it should be limited to questions of
law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant petition involves questions of law.


RULING:

No. We agree with SCBEU that the issues raised by the bank are essentially questions of fact
that cannot be the subject of this petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised on appeal by certiorari. Well-
settled in our jurisprudence is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts and that it is
neither the function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence of the parties all over again.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.

Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative


value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on
one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. 

SCB wants this Court to determine if (i) the maternity benefits provided to its female employees
extend to the spouses of its male employees and if (ii) its employees are entitled to "outpatient
medicine reimbursements" as a matter of company practice. Indeed, SCB, in phrasing the
issues in this Petition, urges this Court to scrutinize the "evidence based on record." Such
language militates against petitioner’s contention that the Petition involves purely questions of
law.

We see no reversible error in the CA’s adoption of said findings of the DOLE. It is elementary
that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters
within their jurisdiction, are accorded not only respect but finality. In a recent case, it was
similarly held that where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and
are affirmed by, the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding upon this
Court.

Petition DENIED.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Delijero, GR. No. 172635, October 20, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Pedro Delijero, Jr., was a public school teacher at the Burauen Comprehensive
National High School, Burauen, Leyte and was administratively charged for Grave Misconduct
for courting his student Myra Dela Cruz who was 12 years old at that time.

The Office of the Ombudsman rendered decision finding respondent guilty of grave abuse of
misconduct and meted him the penalty of dismissal. Respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals which ruled in favor of him. The CA ruled not by the issue raised by the respondent but
the issue of jurisdiction motu propio, contending that the Office of Ombudsman had no
jurisdiction to investigate the complaint because it was RA 4670 known as Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers shall govern.
Issue:
Is the decision to dismiss the respondent by the Ombudsman valid?

Ruling:
Yes. The court held that the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct and pursuant to Section 46
(b) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, he is, therefore, meted the penalty of dismissal
from public service, forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, the Court ruled that the administrative
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power
but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DECS.

The case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that "the Ombudsman’s
order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not
merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory." Implementation of the order
imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

Also, the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, the court held—

While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to "recommend x x
x removal, suspension, demotion of government officials and employees, the same Section
15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may "enforce its disciplinary authority
as provided in Section 21" of RA 6770.

Ruivivar vs. Office of the Ombudsman G.R. No. 165012, September 16, 2008

FACTS:

Dr. Connie Bernardo is the President of the Association of Drug Testing Centers (Association)
that conducts drug testing and medical examination of applicants for driver’s license. In this
capacity, Bernardo went to the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to meet with representatives
from the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and some other errands.
Before proceedings to the office of the LTO Commissioner, Bernardo passed by the office of
Rachel Beatriz Ruivivar to conduct a follow up on the status of her company’s application for
accreditation. While there, Ruivivar shouted at her in a very arrogant and insulting manner,
hurled invectives upon her person and prevented her from entering the office of the LTO
Commissioner. This prompted Bernardo to file an Affidavit-Complaint charging Ruivivar before
the Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a public official, abuse of
authority and violations of the RPC and of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding Ruivivar administratively liable for discourtesy in
the course of her official functions and imposed on her the penalty of reprimand. Ruivivar filed
a MR arguing that she was deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies of
the affidavits of Bernardo’s witnesses. The Ombudsman responded to the motion by order that
Bernardo furnish Ruivivar with copies and directed the latter to file, within 10 days from receipt
of the Order, such pleading which she may deem fit under the circumstances. Ruivivar,
nonetheless, did not choose to controvert the affidavits and insisted on her previous stand that
she was deprived of due process. Thus, the Ombudsman issued a ruling maintaining its
findings. On petition for certiorari, the petition was dismissed on the ground that Ruivivar used
the wrong legal remedy and failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the Ombudsman.
The CA posits that the remedy should have been an appeal to the CA by way of petition for
review, citing the case of Fabian v. Desierto.

ISSUEs:
(1) Whether or not Ruivivar chose the wrong remedy and
(2) Whether or not Ruivivar was deprived of due process

RULING:

The Mode of Review Issue


Yes. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Fabian is not applicable to the Ombudsman rulings
under the express provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule
III of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 since the penalty of reprimand imposed is final and
unappealable. The appropriate remedy, under the circumstances, is not the appellate remedy
provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of these
Rules.

The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsmans Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to
assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules
implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the
decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A.
No. 6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its
advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for
review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of judgments or final orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts
authorized by law. We pointedly said: As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43.

We restated this doctrine in several cases and further elaborated on the recourses from
Ombudsman actions in other cases we have decided since then. In Lapid v. CA, we explained
that an appeal under Rule 43 to the CA only applies to administrative cases where the right to
appeal is granted under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770. In Lopez v. CA and Herrera v. Bohol, we
recognized that no appeal is allowed in administrative cases where the penalty of public
censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, is imposed. We pointed out that decisions of administrative agencies that are declared
by law to be final and unappealable are still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion; the complainants legal recourse is to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, applied as rules suppletory to
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The use of this recourse should take
into account the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court i.e., the petition shall
be filed in and be cognizable only by the CA if it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or by the Rules. In the present case, the
Ombudsmans decision and order imposing the penalty of reprimand on the petitioner are final
and unappealable. Thus, the petitioner availed of the correct remedy when she filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA to question the Ombudsmans decision to reprimand her.

The Due Process Issue  


No. The CA Decision dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the petitioner failed
to exhaust all the administrative remedies available to her before the Ombudsman. This ruling
is legally correct as exhaustion of administrative remedies is a requisite for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Other than this legal significance, however, the ruling necessarily carries
the direct and immediate implication that the petitioner has been granted the opportunity to be
heard and has refused to avail of this opportunity; hence, she cannot claim denial of due
process. In the words of the CA ruling itself: Petitioner was given the opportunity by public
respondent to rebut the affidavits submitted by private respondent. . . and had a speedy and
adequate administrative remedy but she failed to avail thereof for reasons only known to her.

The records show that the petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration on due process
grounds (i.e., for the private respondents failure to furnish her copies of the affidavits of
witnesses) and on questions relating to the appreciation of the evidence on record. The
Ombudsman acted on this motion by issuing its Order of January 17, 2003 belatedly furnishing
her with copies of the private respondents witnesses, together with the directive to file, within
ten (10) days from receipt of this Order, such pleading which she may deem fit under the
circumstances. Given this opportunity to act on the belatedly-furnished affidavits, the petitioner
simply chose to file a Manifestation where she took the position that The order of the
Ombudsman dated 17 January 2003 supplying her with the affidavits of the complainant does
not cure the 04 November 2002 order, and on this basis prayed that the Ombudsman’s decision
be reconsidered and the complaint dismissed for lack of merit.

Buston-Arendain vs. Gil, GR No. 172585, June 26, 2008

FACTS:

On 24 October 1995, herein respondent Antonia Gil (married to the late Miguel Gil) and her
children, the herein respondents Miguel Antonio, Marlyn, and Manolo, all surnamed Gil, filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16, for the declaration of
nullity of titles, quieting of title, recovery of possession, accounting, damages with notice of lis
pendens, with prayer for receivership, against spouses Domingo Arendain and Irene Taroy-
Arendain (spouses Domingo and Irene); spouses Bautista Arendain and herein petitioner Cristita
Buston-Arendain (spouses Bautista and Cristita); the Register of Deeds of Davao City; the
Community Environment Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Davao City; and the Director of
Lands.

Respondents alleged that they are co-owners of parcels of land with a total land area of 50,130
square meters located in Cabantian, Davao City. Likewise they accused the spouses Domingo
and Irene and spouses Bautista and Cristita of fraudulently and maliciously obtaining, a lot
already registered in the name of Miguel Gil, an another lot name of Antonia Gil.

Since 1976 up to the present, through threats of bodily harm utilized by the spouses Domingo
and Irene and Bautista and Cristita, respondents were illegally deprived of enjoyment and
possession over the aforementioned parcels of land. The former being adjacent owners of lands
having common boundaries with respondents’ land, have extended their boundaries and
enlarged their parcels of lands by usurping the real rights of ownership/possession of the latter
over the said lands.

CENRO, in its answer to the complaint said that the “office cannot categorically state at this
point in time whether or not any of the certificates of title above-mentioned has preference
over that of the other pending the termination of administrative proceedings;

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the instant complaint be
heard without need of separate administrative proceedings before the DENR-CENRO.xxx”

Spouses Domingo and Irene and spouses Bautista and Cristita essentially sought the outright
dismissal of the same on the grounds that respondents had no cause of action against them
and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case because respondents had not exhausted all
administrative remedies.

RTC ORDERING –

1) The Register of Deeds of Davao City to cancel totally OCT No. P-10522 and OCT No. P-
10541 but only in so far as it involves the 10,771 square meters in P-6079;

2) Defendants-spouses Domingo Arendain and Irene Taroy-Arendain and defendants-


spouses Bautista Arendain and Cristita Buston Arendain to vacate the parcels of land
covered by OCT No. P-6075, P-6079 and P-6080. 15

From the foregoing judgment rendered by the trial court, only the spouses Bautista and Cristita
filed with the Court of Appeals an appeal.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC’s decision in toto.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy should be seek
first.

Ruling:

No. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an administrative decision


must first be appealed to the administrative superiors at the highest level before it may be
elevated to a court of justice for review. This Court has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed
himself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any
finding of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.

However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as tested by a battery of


cases, is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one, and its flexibility is called upon by
the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
(5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7)
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land
in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 26

Based on the ninth exception stated in the preceding paragraph, the doctrine requiring the prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies before recourse to the courts can be had is confined to
land cases involving public lands; it is inapplicable to cases in which the subject matter is
private lands. Upon registration, the homestead granted to Antonia and Miguel Gil ceased to
have the character of public land and so was removed from the operation of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Since the free patent applications of Miguel and Antonia Gil over the disputed lots were granted
and the corresponding certificates of title were accordingly issued in their names in 1976, the
said properties then became private and ceased to be part of the public domain, over which the
Director of Lands no longer has control or jurisdiction. The pieces of land thus covered by OCTs
No. P-6079 and No. P-6080, in the names of Miguel and Antonia Gil, respectively, thereby
assume the character of registered properties in accordance with the provisions of Section
122 of the Land Registration Act, and the remedy of any party who has been injured by their
alleged fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance instituted before the proper trial
courts.

Moran vs. Office of the President, GR No. 192957, September 29, 2014

FACTS:

On February 2, 2004, the late Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. filed with the Consumer Arbitration
Office (CAO) a verified complaint against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc. pursuant to the
relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7394 (RA 7394), otherwise known as the Consumer Act
of the Philippines. The complaint alleged that the private respondent should be held liable for
the product imperfections of a BMW car which it sold to complainant.

On September 23, 2005, the CAO rendered a Decision in favor of complainant and ordered the
private respondent to refund the purchase price of the BMW car in addition to the payment of
costs of litigation and administrative fines.

On October 19, 2005, the private respondent sought reconsideration of the Decision but the
CAO denied the motion in an Order dated January 19, 2006. Thus, the private respondent
appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the quasi-judicial
agency designated by Article 165[8] of RA 7394 to entertain appeals from the adverse decisions
and orders of the CAO. However, in a Resolution dated April 28, 2006, the DTI Secretary
dismissed the appeal of the private respondent who then filed an appeal with the herein public
respondent OP.

On April 3, 2007, the OP granted the appeal, reversed the DTI Secretary's Resolution, and
dismissed the complaint. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration with the OP, but the OP
denied said motion in an Order dated October 22, 2008.

On January 23, 2009, complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and alleged lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the OP for ruling on cases involving a violation of RA 7394. On March
13, 2009, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was a wrong mode
of appeal and for the failure of the petitioner to state material dates. On June 25, 2010, the CA
denied the motion for reconsideration.

Since, Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. passed away on May 17, 2010, his widow, Concordia V. Moran
filed the present petition for review on certiorari on August 9, 2010. Petitioner argues that the
CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari which alleged error of jurisdiction on the part of
the OP. She contends that in cases alleging error of jurisdiction on the part of the OP, the
proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari with the CA because appeal is not available to
correct lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, even though appeal is available, it is not considered as
the plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy.

Respondent argues that the CA was correct in denying the petition for certiorari since this was
an improper remedy in view of the availability of an appeal from the OP. Furthermore, the
private respondent confirms the appellate jurisdiction of the OP over the DTI based on the
constitutional power of control of the OP over Executive Departments and the well-entrenched
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that
petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of appeal.

RULING:

No. We rule in the negative. Under the Consumer Act (RA 7394), the DTI has the authority and
the mandate to act upon complaints filed by consumers pursuant to the State policy of
protecting the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales, acts or practices.
[12] Said law provided for an arbitration procedure whereby consumer complaints are heard
and investigated by consumer arbitration officers whose decisions are appealable to the DTI
Secretary. Article 166 thereof provides:
ART. 166. Decision on Appeal. The Secretary shall decide the appeal within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof. The decision becomes final after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof
unless a petition for certiorari is filed with the proper court.

The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No. 18, Series of
1987. Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President
shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from…

In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of Investments,[15] we interpreted


the above provision and declared that "a decision or order issued by a department or agency
need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides
for a different mode of appeal."

The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down in Section
17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the "power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch
of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not
the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by
law, or by judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant
case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Court's rule-making
power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
the procedure in all courts.

Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the


remedy of appeal to the Office of the President from the decisions of executive departments
and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order issued by a department or agency
need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides
for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O.
No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI
involving petitioner's application for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should
prevail over A.O. No. 18.

In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief
from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the "proper court."
Hence, private respondent should have elevated the case directly to the CA through a petition
for certiorari.

In filing a petition for certiorari before the CA raising the issue of the OP's lack of jurisdiction,
complainant Moran, Jr. thus availed of the proper remedy. The CA thus erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari on the ground of being an improper remedy.
Further, we hold that the Resolution dated April 28, 2006 of the DTI Secretary had become
FINAL and EXECUTORY with private respondent's failure to appeal the same within the 15-day
reglementary period.

Tapispisan vs. Court of Appeals , 459 SCRA 695

FACTS:

Petitioner Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has been occupying the position of Teacher
III since September 1, 1992. She has been teaching for the last thirty (30) years and is
currently assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City.

On May 30, 1995, respondent Atty. Ricardo T. Sibug, the Division Superintendent issued
Division Memorandum No. 33 designating respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P.
Villanueva Elementary School and respondent Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary
School, both schools are in Pasay City. Feeling that she had been unduly by-passed, petitioner
Tapispisan filed with respondent Sibug a protest contesting such designation. The latter,
however, denied the protest. The petitioner then brought the matter to respondent Dr. Nilo L.
Rosas, Regional Director of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for
National Capital Region (NCR) who, likewise, denied the protest.

On December 11, 1995, the petitioner filed with the DECS a "Complaint/Protest Against the
Illegal and Indiscriminate Appointment and Promotion of Mesdames Aida Rumbaoa and Myrna
Teves.

In her complaint/protest, petitioner Tapispisan alleged that the designation of respondents


Rumbaoa and Teves was made with evident favoritism and in gross violation of Civil Service and
DECS rules and regulations on promotions. The petitioner claimed that she was more qualified
for promotion than respondents Rumbaoa and Teves.

After evaluating the arguments of the parties, then Secretary of the DECS Hon. Ricardo T.
Gloria issued the Order dismissing the complaint/protest for lack of merit as he found the
appointment of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master Teacher II,
respectively, as well as their subsequent designation as OIC-Head Teacher and OIC-Principal,
respectively, to be in order.

Forthwith, petitioner Tapispisan elevated the case to the CSC where, in addition to her
allegation that she was more qualified than respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as their names
did not appear in the Division List of Promotables, the petitioner, likewise, contended that their
designation as OIC-Head Teacher and OIC-Principal, respectively, was made in violation of the
ban on appointments and promotions during election period. The CSC dismissed the protest on
the ground that only appointments/promotions and not designation can be the subject of a
protest. Designation, being temporary in nature, does not amount to the issuance of an
appointment, but is a mere imposition of additional duties.
Petitioner Tapispisan sought reconsideration thereof but her motion was denied for lack of
merit.

Undaunted, petitioner Tapispisan filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and
set aside the foregoing resolutions of the CSC

The appellate court dismissed the petition. It found that respondents Rumbaoa and Teves were
merely designated in acting capacity to their respective positions. This designation thus could
not be subject of a protest because, under Civil Service laws, only appointments and
promotions can be subject of a protest. In the same vein, such designation could not have been
a prohibited act during the election period because the ban only covers transfer of civil service
officers or employees or new appointments, promotions or giving salary increases.

Petitioner Tapispisan filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but, in
the assailed Resolution, it was denied.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointment and designation of the Respondents were proper.

Ruling:

Yes. The appointing power is vested in the Department Head/Secretary. Such power, however,
may be delegated to the regional director subject to the approval, revision, modification and
reversal of the Department Secretary. It is not disputed that the appointments of respondents
Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master Teacher II, respectively, had been made
by the appropriate appointing authority. Further, such appointments were duly attested by the
CSC, which, under the Constitution, is the central personnel agency of the government charged
with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed
to the civil service.14 The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not
concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete. Accordingly, the appointments
of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master Teacher II, respectively,
are entitled to respect by the Court.

In the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only
their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings
and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing
authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment,
deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications
and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left
undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority. 16

This construction given by the CSC should be given great weight and respect. As this Court has
time and again ruled: "[a]lthough technically not binding and controlling on the courts, the
construction given by the agency or entity charged with the enforcement of a statute should be
given great weight and respect, particularly so if such construction … has been observed and
acted on for a long period of time."

Clearly, the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves was well within the prerogative of
the said respondents DECS officials. It behooves the Court to refrain from unduly interfering
with the exercise of such administrative prerogative. After all, it is well settled that
administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies
are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law. None of these vices has been shown as having attended
the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves.

Petition DENIED.

Malabaguio vs. COMELEC, 346 SCRA 699

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in
Barangay 172, Kalookan City, during the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. Private respondent
was proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay having garnered One Thousand Two
Hundred Sixty Three (1,263) votes as against One Thousand Ninety Five (1,095) votes obtained
by petitioner.

Dissatisfied with the results of the canvass, petitioner filed an election protest case with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Kalookan City, which was initially heard by Judge Armando De Asa of
Branch 51. Upon inhibition of Judge De Asa, the case was later re-raffled to Branch 49 of the
same court presided by Judge Belen Ortiz. Petitioner-protestant prayed for the revision of the
ballots and other election documents in all the fifteen (15) precincts of Barangay 172.

On April 3, 1998, Judge Ortiz rendered judgment 5 in the election protest case, declaring
petitioner Alfredo U. Malabaguio as the winner in the barangay elections held on May 12, 1997
in Barangay 172, Caloocan City.

Private respondent filed a notice of appeal upon receipt of the court’s Decision on April 16,
1998.

Meanwhile, petitioner-protestant filed a motion for immediate execution pending appeal, which
private respondent-protestee vigorously opposed. The MTC subsequently granted petitioner-
protestant’s motion in an Order dated May 4, 1998. The said order directed private respondent-
protestee to vacate the position of Punong Barangay and turn over the same peacefully to
petitioner-protestant who would thenceforth assume the duties of the office pending the final
determination of private respondent-protestee’s appeal.

The granting of the motion for execution pending appeal prompted private respondent to file a
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Mandatory/Prohibitory Injunction with the COMELEC. With regard to the
present case, private respondent filed with the Commission on Election her appellant’s brief on
November 12, 1998,7while petitioner-protestant filed his appellee’s brief on December 16, 1998.
Setting aside the decision and Declaring protestee-appellant MIRALI MENDOZA-DURR the
duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March, however denied for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in invalidating 57 ballots cast
in favour of Malabaguio which do not bear the signature of the Chairman of the Board of
Inspectors.

Ruling:

Yes.

It is conceded that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of an administrative


agency like the COMELEC over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon. Thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts. 14 It bears emphasis, however, that even
decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from
judicial review when so warranted. 15 Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible
and will be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness, 16 or upon proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law.

The settled doctrine is that factual findings of an administrative agency are accorded respect
and at times finality for they have acquired the expertise and inasmuch as their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters.19 Nonetheless, these doctrines do not apply when the board or
official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly
acted arbitrarily without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of
discretion.20 In Leongson vs. Court of Appeals, 21 we held: "once the actuation of the
administrative official or administrative board or agency is tainted by a failure to
abide by the command of the law, then it is incumbent on the courts of justice to set
matters right, with this Tribunal having the last say on the matter.

Under the rules prevailing during the 1997 Barangay Elections, the failure to authenticate the
ballots shall no longer be cause for the invalidation thereof. Rather, the Board of Election
Inspectors shall merely note such failure in the minutes and declare the failure to authenticate
the ballots as an election offense.

Consequently, the absence of the Chairmen’s signature at the back of the ballot should not be a
reason to invalidate these fifty-seven (57) ballots which are genuine. Hence, all votes indicated
in these ballots must be counted in favor of protestant-appellee ALFREDO U. MALABAGUIO
because the intent of the voters to vote for him is crystal

Petition granted, the Resolution of Comelec be set aside and Petitioner Malabaguio be declared
as Winner.

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