Special Proceedings Rule 88 Rule 90

[1] G.R. No.
L-27526 September 12, 1974
ANGELITA G. VDA. DE VALERA, AMANDA G. VALERA, OSCAR G.

VALERA, DIONISIO G. VALERA, FELIXBERTO G. VALERA, BENITO G.
VALERA, EVA G. VALERA, LITA G. VALERA, TONIETTE VALERA,
ANGEL V. COLET, NORMAN PE BENITO and ROMEO PE BENITO,
petitioners, vs.HON. MACARIO M. OFILADA, as Probate Judge, Court of
First Instance of Abra; ADORACION VALERA-BRINGAS, as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Francisco Valera; PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF of Abra; DOMINGO V. BANEZ as Deputy Provincial Sheriff of
Abra, and CELSO VALERA, respondents.
Courts; Probate court; Determination by probate court on question regarding

title to property for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory not conclusive;
Probate court with special and limited jurisdiction.—The inclusion of the property in
the inventory is not conclusive as to the ownership. “Questions on title to real property
cannot be determined in testate or intestate proceedings. It has, however, been held
that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to be instituted between the parties.” The probate court is a court of special and
limited jurisdiction.
Same; Same; As a general rule, probate court cannot issue writ of execution.—
The probate court generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to
issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims
against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the
necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not
render any judgment enforceable by execution.
Same; Same; Instances when probate court can issue a writ of execution.—The
Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue execution (a) to
satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the
decedent’s assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88); (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition
(Sec. 3, Rule 90); and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in
probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142). This may mean, under the rule of inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius, that these are the only instances when it can issue a writ of
execution.
Settlement of estate; Actions only against executors or administrators; Heirs of
decedent not liable personally for debts of the said decedent—The heir legally
succeeds to deceased from whom he derives his right and title but only after the
liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of the same, and the adjudication of
the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime, the only person in
charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is the
executor or administrator appointed by a competent court.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

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Same; Person entrusted with estate or embezzler before letters testamentary or
of administration issued refers to a living person.—Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court both refer to a living person, meaning a person entrusted with a part of
the decedent’s estate “by an executor or administrator,” and to a person who
committed “embezzlement before letters (were) issued.” Section 8 explicitly provides
that the embezzler’s liability shall be determined in “an action,” and not in the
intestate proceeding.
Execution; Execution in case of death of a party.—Section 7 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court allows execution in case of the death of a party only “where a party
dies after the entry of the judgment or order.” The implication is that if a person,
before his death, or the legal representative of his estate was never a party to a case, no
execution can be issued against his properties after his death.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
Had the Court of First Instance of Abra been more cognizant of the limitations
on its prerogative as a probate court, it would not have committed the
jurisdictional and procedural errors pointed out in this certiorari case by the
petitioners, the heirs of the late Virgilio Valera.
The record discloses that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing its
orders of July 10, 1964, April 15, 1966 and January 4, 1967 as well as the writ
of execution against the assets of the deceased Virgilio Valera. The
jurisdictional and procedural errors committed by the lower court justify the writ
of certiorari. Hence, We find the petition to be meritorious. We have to set
aside the said orders and writ of execution insofar as the heirs or estate of
Virgilio Valera are concerned.
Civil Case No. 64, R-1 of the Court of First Instance of Abra is a special
proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Valera.
Virgilio Valera was the administrator of the estate, He died on March 21, 1961.
He was survived by his widow, Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera and their
ten (10) children, named Amanda, Oscar, Dionisio, Benito, Felixberto, Eva,
Lita, Toniette, Vicenta and Teresita, all petitioners herein, except Vicenta and
Teresita, who were abroad.
Later (the exact date is not shown in the record), Adoracion Valera Bringas,
who claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Francisco Valera, was
appointed administratrix. She filed on April 16, 1964 in the intestate
proceeding a petition to require "Celso Valera and family and Angelita de
Valera and family to pay P100.00" as monthly rental for the one-third pro-
indiviso portion of the Valera residence located in Bangued, Abra. 1

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That residence is item 3 of the original inventory dated April 10, 1964
submitted by Mrs. Bringas. It is described as follows:
Residential land & Improvements. — Covered by Tax Declaration No.

16922, declared in 1948 in the names of Virgilio & Celso Valera; cancelled
by Tax Declaration No. 21571 in the name of Virgilio Valera; cancelled by
Tax Declaration No. 29338, in 1962, in the name of Virgilio Valera, located
in Partelo Street, Bangued, Abra, bounded as follows: N. Alejandro
Lizards; E. Partelo Street (now Virgilio Valera Street); S. Taft Street;
W'Consiliman Brook, with an area of 1,775 square meters, and assessed
at P1,420.00 for the residential lot, and P9,500.00 for the improvements.
Appraised value — P45,600.00, 1/3 of which is P15,200.00. (p. 5 of

Respondents' Memorandum)
The petition was not served on the widow and ten children of Virgilio Valera.
Celso Valera interposed an opposition to it on the ground that Francisco
Valera had no interest in the Valera residence, that the property was never
leased and that the remedy of Mrs. Bringas was "in a appropriate remedy
and/or procedure" and not in the intestate proceeding. 2
The lower court granted the petition in an order dated July 10, 1964 which
reads:3
ORDER
The administratrix, through counsel, has petitioned for an order to pay

rental on the property (Item 1-B, 23 of the Inventory submitted i)v the
administratrix, pp. 415-416, rec.) owned in common by the estate of the
deceased Francisco Valera y Versoza and the late Virgilio Valera and
Celso Valera, corresponding to one-third (1/3) interest pertaining to the
estate of the deceased Francisco Valera to be paid by the family of Virgilio
Valera and Celso Valera and family who have been occupying the property
since April, 1945 in the amount of P100.00 a month, plus legal interest, the
same to be paid to the Administratrix.
WHEREFORE, finding the said motion to be well-founded and meritorious,

the same is hereby granted. It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court
shall furnish Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera with a copy of this order by
registered mail.
SO ORDERED.

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Done at Bangued, Abra, this 10th day of July, 1964.
(Sgd.) ALFONSO P. DONESA J u d g e
The directive of Judge Donesa to the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of the
order by registered mail on Mrs. Valera implies that the heirs of Virgilio Valera
were not served with a copy of the petition. The said heirs, through Atty. Angel
V. Colet, a son-in-law of Mrs. Valera, filed a motion for the reconsideration of
that order. They contended that the Valera residence "should be excluded
from the inventory," because that was their "absolute property of which they
have been in complete possession and occupation". 4 Mrs. Bringas replied that
Francisco Valera's estate had "already consolidated" its ownership over that
one-third partition "through the submission of the inventory and its approval"
by the probate court.5
It was only nearly two years later that respondent Judge Macario Ofilada in his
order of April 15, 1966 denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs
of Virgilio Valera.6
On February 17, 1965 (before the motion for reconsideration was resolved)
Mrs. Bringas filed in the intestate proceeding a pleading known as "Motion for
Execution and for an Order Directing Delivery of the Fruits of the Properties or
Value and Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix." 7
She prayed in that motion that Judge Donesa's order for the payment of
rentals be executed against the heirs of Virgilio Valera; that the heirs be
ordered to deliver to her the fruits of the properties of the estate of Francisco
Valera, which, according to her calculation, amounted to P100,000 for twenty
years, plus legal interest supposedly amounting to P5,000; that the heirs be
ordered to deliver the sum of P4,684.98 representing the insurance and war
damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera; and that the Sheriff be ordered to
"to seize such properties of Virgilio Valera and his heirs" "to be sold according
to law for the payment of double the value of the fruits and the amount of
monies alienated and embezzled".
As already stated, in an order dated April 15, 1966, respondent Judge Macario
M. Ofilada denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio
Valera and granted the motion of Mrs. Bringas for execution and for the
delivery of certain funds and properties. (Note that the execution was granted
although the order was not yet final). That order, which is being assailed in this
case, is quoted as follows (pp. 7-9 of the Petition):
Pending resolution before the court are the following motions:

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1. Unsigned 'Motion for leave of Court to Intervene and Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated July 10, 1964', filed by counsel for the
heirs of Virgilio Valera;
2. 'Motion' without any notice of hearing filed by counsel for the heirs of
Virgilio Valera;
3. 'Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 10, 1965,' filed by
counsel for petitioner Celso Valera; and
4. 'Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing Delivery of the Fruits of
the Properties or Value thereof and Monies of the Estate to the
Administratrix', filed by counsel for the administratrix.
Also pending is the examination of persons regarding the properties of the

estate as ordered by the court also on July 10, 1964.
On January 27, 1966, the court directed the movants seeking a

reconsideration of the order directing the payment of rentals to the estate
to submit their respective memoranda within 15 days from receipt of the
order and the administratrix 5 days from receipt of adverse parties
memoranda to submit her reply if she so desires. Despite the fact that the
parties had received copies of the order of January 27, 1966, none
complied. Considering that this case is already more than 20 years old, the
Court can not, in the interest of justice, further hold or suspend the
resolutions on these incidents. They must as they should now, be resolved.
The motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the heirs of Virgilio
Valera and his subsequent 'Motion'. appearing to be unfounded, is hereby
denied.
The motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for Celso Valera is a mere
repetition of the 'Opposition to Petition for an Order to Pay Rental dated
May 8, 1964. This motion is merely intended to delay the proceedings and
it is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Finding the 'Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing the Delivery of
Fruits of the Properties or Value thereof and Monies of the Estate to the
Administratrix' well-founded and meritorious, it is hereby directed:
1. That a writ of execution issue against the heirs of Virgilio Valera and
Celso Valera insofar as the collectible rents pertaining t the estate are
concerned;

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2. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera deliver to the
administratrix properties still in their possession which are among those
listed in the 'Incomplete Inventory and Appraisal of the Real and Personal
Estate of the Deceased, Francisco Valera y Versoza' filed by the
administratrix on September 17, 1965;
3. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera and family account to
the Administratrix the fruits of the properties of the estate listed in the said
amended inventory;
4. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera deliver to the administratrix the sum of
P4,784.98 representing the insurance and war damage monies collected
by Virgilio Valera;
5. That Celso Valera account to the administratrix the war damage monies
received by him for the destroyed Valera family residence and deliver 1/3
of the same to the administratrix; and
6. That failure to render a satisfactory account as hereby required within 15

days from receipt of this order shall, conformably with See. 8 of Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court, make the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera liable
to double the value of the fruits and monies unaccounted for.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court immediately set 2 days for the
examination of the persons required to appear in the order dated July 10,
1964.
SO ORDERED.
Bangued, Abra, this 15th day of April, 1966.
(Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA
Judge
On January 5. 1967 Judge Ofilada directed the execution of his aforequoted

order of April 15, 1966. That directive reads as follows: 8
ORDER

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Pending resolution before this Court are: (1) Omnibus Motion filed by the
Administratrix dated September 15, 1966; and, (2) Omnibus Motion filed by
the heirs of Virgilio Valera dated October 13, 1966.
The parties, by the order of this Court dated December 12, 1966 after the
hearing on said date at which counsel discussed their respective motions,
were given three days time within which to submit their written memoranda.
No such memoranda have been filed by any of the parties, and the Court
took time and efforts in considering the said motions, oppositions, affidavit
and counter-affidavits.
The Omnibus Motion of the heirs of Virgilio Valera dated October 13, 1966
seeks to stay the writ of execution issued by this Court pursuant to the
order dated April 15, 1966 and relies upon an alleged compromise
agreement entered into between said heirs and the administratrix on May
21, 1966.
The Court is aware of attempts to a compromise agreement between the

aforementioned parties. There is nothing however in the record of any
amicable settlement such as that required by the Court in its order dated
June 26, 1965, which required the parties 'to inform the court as soon as
possible what arrangement or settlement have been taken and arrived at
by them.' The Court has given the parties long time to agree and settle
their differences, even taking time on Sundays to meet with them for this
purpose and, until the present time, no such agreement by all the parties
has been presented for the approval of the Court. Certainly the alleged
compromise agreement is not such agreement especially when the
administratrix takes vigorous exception citing facts of record and valid
points of law which have not been sufficiently answered and explained. To
allow the alleged oral compromise agreement in violation of fundamental
principles of law such as the time limit within which to file a petition for relief
and unsupported by the facts on record as cited by counsel for and
administratrix would be to trifle with the administration of justice especially
in this case which is the oldest in this court and which has been pending for
more than twenty years now. For these basic reasons, the Omnibus Motion
of the heirs of Virgilio Valera dated October 13, 1966 must be, as it is
hereby, DENIED.
And considering the motion of the administratrix dated September 15, 1966
to be meritorious, the same, as prayed for, is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby directed that:

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(1) The orders of November 14 and 25, 1966 staying the execution of the
order of April 15, 1966 are hereby lifted and let another writ of execution
immediately issue to effect the order of April 15, 1966.
(2) A writ of execution issue against said heirs of Virgilio Valera for the
satisfaction of the amounts due the estate;
(3) A writ of execution issue against the properties of Celso Valera for the
satisfaction of the amount due to estate; and,
(4) The heirs of Virgilio Valera deliver to the administratrix the possession
of the properties listed in paragraph 6 and 7 of her Omnibus Motion dated
September 15, 1966 and the fruits or value thereof from April, 1945 until
time of delivery, and, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 87, of the New Rules of
Court, to pay double the value of said fruits upon failure to account and
deliver same within thirty days from receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Bangued, Abra, January 4, 1967.
(Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA Judge
The heirs of Virgilio Valera filed a motion dated February 6, 1967 for the
reconsideration of Judge Ofilada's order of January 4, 1967. 9 The motion was
denied in the order dated February 13, 1967. 10 judge Ofilada in his order
dated February 27, 1967 ordered another execution. 11
The Deputy Provincial Sheriff levied upon the properties of the deceased
Virgilio Valera and caused to be published a notice of auction sale also dated
February 27, 1967 which reads in part as follows: 12
1. Of the goods and chattels of Celso Valera and the heirs of Virgilio Valera
— the sum of Forty Thousand Three Hundred Twenty (P40,320.00) Pesos
for rent due the estate together with interest thereon from April, 1945
(P25,200.00) for the principal at P1,200.00 per annum from April, 1945 to
March, 1966, and P15,120.00 for interest due at six (6) per centum per
annum), plus P100.00 a month from April, 1966 with interest at six (6) per
centum until date of payment and delivery of the interest, of the estate in
the property to the administratrix;
2. Of the goods and chattels of the heirs of Virgilio Valera — the sum of
Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos representing double the value of
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undelivered fruits of the properties of the estate for 20 years from April,
1945 to October, 1965 or One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos
per year, and the sum of Nine Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos
and Ninety Six Centavos (P9,569.96), respresenting double the value of
the undelivered insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio
Valera.
The petitioners filed a motion dated March 15, 1967 to quash the writ of
execution and for the suspension of the auction sale. 13 Judge Ofilada denied
it in his order of April 1967. 14 The petitioners filed a motion dated March 31,
1967 to set aside the lower court's orders of April 15, 1966 and February 27,
1967 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process. 15
On April 3, 1967, the dated when Judge Ofilada denied petitioners' motion to
quash the writ of execution, respondent Deputy Sheriff proceeded with the
auction sale and sold to the estate of Francisco Valera eighteen (18) parcels
of land supposedly belonging to the deceased Virgilio Valera. The price was
P92,337.00. 16
The petitioners filed a motion dated April 11, 1967 for the reconsideration of
the order of April 3, 1967. 17 Judge Ofilada denied it in his order of April 21,
1967. 18
On May 8, 1967 the petitioners, the heirs of Virgilio Valera (except two
children who were abroad) filed the instant petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against Judge Ofilada, Mrs. Bringas, the Provincial
Sheriff and the Deputy Provincial Sheriff. Celso Valera was joined as a
nominal party. The respondents were required to answer the petition. The
Court directed that a writ of preliminary injunction should issue upon
petitioners' posting a bond of P5,000.00.
The petitioners assail the brief, three-sentence order of July 10, 1964 on the
following grounds: (a) that it decided the issue of ownership as to the one-third
pro-indiviso share of Francisco Valera in the Valera residence, an issue, which
according to them, is beyond the court's probate jurisdiction; (b) that it was
issued without the benefit of a trial on the merits and without hearing all the
parties involved; (c) that it does not contain findings of fact and law; (d) that it
is a judgment for a money claim which should have been filed in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor, Virgilio
Valera, and (e) that the order has no basis in substantive law.
The petitioners attack Judge Ofilada's order of April 15, 1966 on the following
grounds: (a) that, as a probate judge, he had no jurisdiction to require the
heirs of Virgilio Valera to account for the fruits of the six parcels of land
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administered by him and that a separate action should be filed or the proper
claim should be made against his estate; (b) that he had no jurisdiction to
order the heirs of Virgilio Valera to deliver to Mrs. Bringas the sum of
P4,784.98 as "insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera";
(c) that Section 8, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court contemplates that "double the
value of the fruits and monies" should be recovered in an "action" and not in
an intestate proceeding, and (d) that the order was issued without any trial on
the merits and it does not contain findings of fact and law.
The petitioners further contend that the orders of July 10, 1964 and April 15,
1966 are not enforceable by execution because they are incomplete and not
precise as to the amounts supposedly due from the judgment debtors.
As to the execution sale, the petitioners contend: (a) that the orders sought to
be executed are void; (b) that the probate court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to
issue a writ of execution and that the instant case is not among the
exceptional cases wherein the probate court can authorize an execution, and
(c) that execution for a money claim cannot be had against a decedent's
estate.
After a careful study of the arguments of the parties in their memoranda, reply,
rejoinder and surrejoinder, We find that, for the resolution of the case, it is not
necessary to pass upon all those issues. The crucial issue in the last analysis
is whether the lower court, sitting as a probate court in the intestate
proceeding for the estate of Francisco Valera, could hold the heirs of Virgilio
Valera answerable for certain supposed monetary liabilities of the latter to the
estate and enforce said liabilities against the properties of the deceased
Virgilio Valera.
We hold that the trial court, as a probate court, erred in adjudging in the said
intestate proceeding the monetary liabilities of the late Virgilio Valera to the
estate of Francisco Valera and in issuing a writ of execution against his
properties to enforce the supposed liabilities.
The controlling principle, which should govern this case, was announced by
Justice Torres in 1907 in Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70, a case which is on
all fours with the instant case. This Court ruled in that case:
Administrators or executors; Code of Civil Procedure; Heirs. — The heir

legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title but
only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same,
and the adjudication of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in
the meantime the only person in charge by law to attend to all claims

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against the estate of the deceased debtor is the executor or administrator
appointed by a competent court.
In the Pavia case, an action for damages was brought by Rafaela Pavia
against Bibiana de la Rosa and Salud de la Rosa, as the only heirs of the
deceased Jose de la Rosa. Rafaela Pavia claimed that she empowered Jose
de la Rosa to administer the estate of Pablo Linart and that, as administrator,
De la Rosa caused damages to the estate through his negligence. The De la
Rosa sisters contended that they could not be held liable for the negligent acts
of their brother, Jose de la Rosa.
This Court held that the action was not maintainable against the De la Rosa
sisters and that it should be prosecuted against the executor or administrator
of the estate of Jose de la Rosa. Hence, the action was dismissed, reserving
to Rafaela Pavia "the right to institute proper action against the executor or
administrator of the properties of the estate of the deceased Jose de la Rosa".
In the instant case, Mrs. Bringas sought to hold the heirs of the deceased
Virgilio Valera liable for his obligations to pay rentals and to account for the
fruits of the properties forming part of the estate of Francisco Valera and the
war damage and insurance monies collected by Virgilio Valera. The heirs of
Virgilio Valera were dragged into the intestate proceeding for the purpose of
holding them liable for the amounts supposedly due from the deceased. As
already noted, Mrs. Bringas prayed for "an order directing the Sheriff to seize
such properties of Virgilio Valera and his heirs ... as may be sufficient, to be
sold according to law for the payment of double the value of the fruits and the
amount of monies alienated and embezzled" (Annex "E" of Petition). Judge
Ofilada specifically directed that the execution be issued "against the heirs of
Virgilio Valera". The Deputy Sheriff literally followed that directive by levying
upon "the goods and chattels of the heirs of Virgilio Valera".
The procedure followed by the Sheriff was erroneous. The decedent's heirs
are not liable personally for the debts of his debts. Thus, it was held:
It happens, however, that the plaintiffs are not under obligation to pay the
debts of their late father, such as items (a), (f) and (h) of the counterclaim.
It does not appear that they personally bound themselves to pay them, and
the mere fact that they are the deceased's heirs does not make them
answerable for such credits against their predecessor in interest, inasmuch
as article 1003 of the Civil Code is no longer in force, having been
abrogated by certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Pavia vs.
De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70, cited in Calma vs. Calma, 56 Phil. 102, 105).

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The error becomes more glaring in the light of Section 7, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which allows execution in case of the death of a party only "where a
party dies after the entry of the judgment or order". The implication is that if a
person, before his death, or the legal representative of his estate was never a
party to a case, no execution can be issued against his properties after his
death. In this case, the Sheriff seems to have proceeded on the assumption
that the properties levied upon belonged to the deceased Virgilio Valera and
that the said properties were in the possession of his heirs.
Furthermore, there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court
generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of
execution because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against
the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the
necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does
not render any judgment enforceable by execution.
The circumstance that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate
court may issue execution (a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees,
legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88),
(b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (e)
to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate
proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius
est exclusion alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a
writ of execution.
With particular reference to the sum of P4,784.96, which represents the

insurance and war damage monies allegedly embezzled by Virgilio Valera, the
lower court, sitting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to enforce, by
execution, the payment of double the value of that amount. The alleged
embezzler was dead. Execution was not warranted under Sections 7 and 8,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, which both refer, to a living person, meaning a
person entrusted with a part of the decedent's estate "by an executor or
administrator", and to a person who committed "embezzlement before letters
(were) issued". Section 8 explicitly provides that the embezzler's liability shall
be determined in "an action", and not in the intestate proceeding. 19
The record reveals that there is a dispute between Mrs. Bringas and the heirs
of Virgilio Valera as to whether one-third of the Valera residence and the six
parcels of land listed in the "Amended Incomplete Inventory, etc." dated
August 31, 1965 20 belong to the estate of Francisco Valera. The tax
declarations for those properties are in the name of the deceased Virgilio
Valera.

Page 12 of 206
Their inclusion in the inventory is not conclusive as to the ownership.
"Questions on title to real property cannot be determined in testate or intestate
proceedings. It has, however, been held that for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory,
the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to he
instituted between the parties." 21 As stressed by Mr. Justice Zaldivar in
Mangaliman vs. Gonzales, L-21033, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462, the
probate court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction.
We have studied carefully respondents' memorandum and rejoinder. We have

not found therein any citation of a rule or precedent which would justify the
arbitrary and irregular procedure followed by the lower court in determining the
liability of a dead person without hearing the legal representative of his estate
and in holding his heirs answerable for his supposed liabilities and then
enforcing those liabilities against his estate. Section 6(b), Rule 78 and Section
2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court assume that a creditor, as an interested
person, may cause a debtor's estate to be placed under administration.
The cases of Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 and Bernardo vs. Court of
Appeals, 62 O.G. 2621 cited by the respondents in page 19 of their rejoinder,
refer to a living party, not to a decedent.
Without going into a more extensive and detailed discussion of the other
irregularities committed by the lower court, We believe that the jurisdictional
errors already pointed out suffice to show that it acted in excess of jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the issuance of the writ of certiorari
is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the writ of execution and the Sheriff's execution sale on April
3, 1967 and all proceedings relative thereto as well as the orders of July 10,
1964, April 15, 1966, January 4, April 3 and May 2, 1967 of the lower court,
are declared void and are set aside, insofar as the heirs of Virgilio Valera or
his estate are concerned, without prejudice to the right of Adoracion Valera
Bringas to institute the proper action against the administrator of the estate of
the estate of the late Virgilio Valera and to file the appropriate claims in the
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Page 13 of 206
[2] G.R. No. L-50526 December 4, 1991
CASIMIRO V. ARKONCEL, JR., in his capacity as the Administrator of the

ESTATE OF CASIMIRO F. ARKONCEL, petitioners,
vs.HON. ALFREDO J. LAGAMON, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Davao
City, Branch I and INVESTORS' FINANCE CORPORATION (FNCB),
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Compromise Agreement; Execution; A judgment

rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory
unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the ground of fraud, mistake or
duress in which case an appeal may be taken against the order denying the motion.—
The rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is
immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress in which case an appeal may be taken against the
order denying the motion (De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 730 [1985];
Zagala v, Jimenez, 152 SCRA 148 [1987]). It then becomes ministerial for the lower
court to order the execution of its final executory judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The compromise agreement is part and parcel of the
judgment and may therefore be enforced as such by a writ of execution.—Even more
than a contract which may be enforced by ordinary action for specific performance,
the compromise agreement is part and parcel of the judgment, and may therefore be
enforced as such by a writ of execution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the terms of an amicable settlement are
violated, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to move for its execution.—Finally,
when the terms of an amicable settlement are violated, as in the case at bar, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is to move for its execution.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking that the
orders of respondent judge dated December 13, 1978 and January 12, 1979
in Special Case No. 2079, Court of First Instance of Davao City, be declared
null and void and set aside, with costs against the respondent Investors'
Finance Corporation (FNCB Finance).
The order dated December 13, 1978 reads:
The Compromise Agreement forged between the Intestate of Casimiro

F. Arkoncel, Sr., represented by its administrator, Casimiro V.
Arkoncel, Jr., and the FNCB Finance Corporation, having become

Page 14 of 206
final and executory, the motion for execution filed by the plaintiff thru
counsel should be, as it is hereby, granted.
WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution issue forthwith.
The order of January 12, 1979 denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner for lack of merit.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
The late Casimiro F. Arkoncel died intestate on July 20, 1976 at Davao City
(his residence at the time of his death), leaving behind an estate with a
probable value of about P241,020.00. On November 24, 1976, a petition for
letters of administration seeking, among others, for the appointment of the
widow Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel as administrator over the intestate estate of
the deceased, was filed by one of the heirs, Nenita C. Valdez, and docketed
as Special Case No. 2079 in the Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch
I. All the other heirs manifested their conformity to the appointment of the
surviving spouse, Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel.
In the order dated April 1, 1977, the intestate Court * identified the heirs of the
deceased Casimiro F. Arkoncel as Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, widow;
Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., son; Florencio V. Arkoncel, son; Maria V. Arkoncel,
daughter; and Nenita Carpio Valdez, daughter, but appointed Casimiro V.
Arkoncel, Jr., the eldest son, as the judicial administrator without bond instead
of Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, the widow and ordered the issuance to him of
letters of administration. In the same order, the Court of First Instance allowed
him one year within which to dispose of the estate and to pay the debts of the
deceased. The letters of administration issued on April 11, 1977 gives
Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., petitioner herein, full authority as Administrator of
the estate of Casimiro F. Arkoncel, to take possession of all the property of
said deceased and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of
said property.
On July 5, 1977, the intestate court issued an order giving notice to all persons
having money claims against the decedent Casimiro F. Arkoncel, "arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent,
all claims for funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the said
decedent, and judgment for money against him to file them in the Office of the
Clerk of Court within six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the
notice" in the Mindanao Mail, a newspaper of general circulation in the City
and Province of Davao, wherein the notice wis to be published once a week
for three consecutive weeks.

Page 15 of 206
In compliance with the order of the intestate court, FNCB Finance, respondent
herein, filed on October 7, 1977 with the court a quo its claim against the
estate for the payment of certain debts incurred by the decedent during his
lifetime, in the following amounts:
Principal sum ..........................P44,438.00
Interests .....................................(to be
computed later at 14% p.a.)
Attorney's fees ..........................11,109.50
Liquidated damages ...................4,443.38
On January 9, 1978, petitioner herein, in his capacity as administrator of the

estate of Casimiro F. Arkoncel and the claimant FNCB Finance, assisted by
their respective counsels, entered into an amicable settlement, under the
following terms and conditions:
1. That the Judicial Administrator admits the claim of herein claimant

against the estate, as follows:
a) P44,438.00 — representing the outstanding principal balance of the

Torana car purchased for the use and benefit of the decedent
Casimiro F. Arkoncel and financed by herein claimant;
b) Interest on the outstanding principal balance from the date of

default in the payment of the latter on April 12, 1977 until fully paid at
the rate of 14% per annum;
c) Pll,109.50 or 25% of the outstanding principal balance as and for

attomey's fees;
d) Costs of and expenses in this suit in the amount of P200.00;
2 That the claimant, with the conformity of its counsel, is willing to

reduce, as it hereby reduces, its claims for attorney's fees to 15% of
the principal balance or to P6,665.70. (Rollo, p. 35)

Page 16 of 206
The intestate Court approved the amicable settlement in an order dated May
17, 1978, directing the parties to strictly comply with the terms thereof and the
Judicial Administrator, "to pay the amounts agreed upon out of the estate finds
and/or properties within 30 days from receipt" of the said order (Rollo, p. 37).
It appears that the Judicial Administrator, petitioner herein, was served thru
counsel a copy of the aforementioned order on September 17, 1978 but the
claim of private respondent had remained unpaid thirty (30) days after. Thus,
on November 26, 1978 private respondent filed with the intestate court a
motion for execution praying for the issuance of a writ of execution to satisfy
its claims (Rollo, p. 39) which was opposed by petitioner (Rollo, p. 42).
Acting on the motion, respondent judge issued the questioned order of

December 13, 1978 granting the motion for execution and the issuance of a
writ of execution. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on
December 28, 1978 was denied by respondent judge for lack of merit in an
order dated January 12, 1979 holding that "the order of this Court dated May
17, 1979 approving the amicable settlement voluntarily entered into by the
parties ... is a perfectly valid order which was a decision in itself based on the
compromise agreement" (Rollo, p. 57). Hence, this petition filed with the Court
by petitioner on May 15, 1979.
On July 9, 1979, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.
After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the Court
declared the case submitted for decision on September 28, 1979.
On March 7, 1988, the Court resolved to require the parties to move in the
premises within 30 days from notice; otherwise the case shall be considered
terminated and closed. In compliance with the same Resolution, petitioner, on
May 13, 1988, manifested that there exists no supervening events (that have
taken place in the interim) that may have rendered the case moot and
academic (Rollo, p. 96). Private respondent manifested that as matters stand,
as between the petitioner and the private respondent, the instant case is now
ripe for disposition. It also brought to the attention of the Court the fact that the
issue in the instant case is one of the errors assigned by the petitioner in his
appeal from the decision in Civil Case No. 2079 to the Court of Appeals, which
was docketed and considered by the latter Court under AC-G.R. CV No.
04426, the two other issues being (a) that the trial court erred in not finding
that the Officer-inCharge of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Court a quo
(formerly Davao Court of First Instance, Branch I) is not authorized by law to
cause to be issued the controversial ahas writ of execution; and (b) that the
trial court erred in not finding that when a subject matter is pending before the
Supreme Court, such as the present petition for certiorari, the court a quo

Page 17 of 206
should refrain from issuing implementing orders on the questioned subject-
matter (Rollo, p. 99).
The Third Division of the Court to which the case was transferred on May 30,
1988 (Rollo, p. 109) resolved to note the manifestations of both parties in its
Resolution of June 22, 1988.
The sole issue of the case is:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR

IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE
OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION FOR THE PAYMENT OF A DEBT IN
AN ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. (Rollo, p. 76).
What transpired after the case was elevated to the Court in this instant
certiorari case is described by the appellate Court in its decision in AC-G.R.
No, 04426, as follows:
... Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, the administrator

elevated the issue as G.R. No. 50526, Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr. etc. v.
Hon. Judge Alfredo G. Lagamon, etc. et al., on certiorari with
preliminary injunction to the Supreme Court which initially required
comments. Prior to the elevation, appellee filed motion for alias writ of
execution. The Supreme Court required comments, thereafter, the
intestate court granted the motion for alias writ which was issued over
the signature of the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Davao of
First Instance Clerk of Court.
Pursuant to the alias writ, the Davao Provincial Sheriff caused levy to
be made on a piece of property with an area of 1,136 square meters
under TCT No. 2436 (T-1 339) which forms part of the estate.
The Supreme Court gave due course but did not issue an injunction.
The Provincial Sheriff thereafter sold the property at public auction at

which the appellee was the highest bidder.
Before expiry of the redemption, the administrator filed this case for
the declaration of nullity of certain proceedings, damages and
preliminary injunction ...
The aforementioned supervening events form the bases of the appeal made to
the appellate court but the third assigned error which is "that the trial court
Page 18 of 206
erred in not finding that a writ of execution is not the property
remedy/procedure to satisfy money claims or for the payment of debts before
an intestate court in an administration proceedings" (Rollo, p. 104), is the
same issue brought before the Court in this instant case. The appellate court,
however, aware of the pending issue before the Court, made no ruling on this
issue. It simply declared:
The issue in this error (sic) is squarely raised in G.R. No. 50526,
supra, where decision still pends. Carefully mindful of the fact that the
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of dispute, we refrain from passing
judgment upon the issue brought up by this assigrunent. As a matter
of practice, it is more advisable in a situation like this one to defer to
the Supreme Court. It is not inconceivable that our appreciation may
run counter to the Supreme Court decision in which event it will be for
naught anyway. And, in any case, whatever may be the ruling from
this Court on the issue will provide no comfort to either the appellant
or the appellees both of whom must await the Supreme Court decision
on the matter. (Rollo, p. 106).
There is indeed a need for the Court to rule squarely on the issue.
The Judicial Administrator voluntarily entered into an amicable settlement with

the claimant FNCB Finance. He was not only assisted by counsel but the
agreement itself was confirmed by the other heirs, the widow Maria V. Vda. de
Arkoncel, Florencio V. Arkoncel and Maria V. Arkoncel (Mesias). The other
heir, Nenita C. Valdez, was represented by her Attorneyin-Fact David O.
Montano who is at the same time counsel for the other heirs and the judicial
administrator. The agreement was submitted to the intestate court for approval
and it was duly approved by the court a quo in an order dated May l7, 1978
which incorporated the conditions therein. The court approves a compromise
agreement when not contrary to law, morals or public policy and renders
judgment in accordance therewith (Jose v. Cham Samco and Sons, Inc., 125
SCRA 142 [1983]; Alejandro v. Philippine Airlines, 127 SCRA 660 [1984]). In
the instant case, judgment was rendered in consonance with the compromise
agreement and the parties were enjoined to comply with and abide by its
terms and conditions (Gravador v. Elbiuias, 126 SCRA 205 [1983]; G & S
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 212 [1983]; National Housing
Authority v. Abaya, 129 SCRA 412 [19841).
There is no merit to the petition.
The rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise

agreement is immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the
agreement on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress in which case an appeal

Page 19 of 206
may be taken against the order denying the motion (De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals, 137 SCRA 730 [1985]; Zagata v. Jimenez, 152 SCRA 148 [1987]). It
then becomes ministerial for the lower court to order the execution of its final
executory judgment. (Service Specialists Incorporated v. Sheriff of Manila, 145
SCRA 139 [1986]; Landicho v. Tensuan, 151 SCRA 410 [1987])
Even more than a contract which may be enforced by ordinary action for
specific performance, the compromise agreement is part and parcel of the
judgment, and may therefore be enforced as such by a writ of execution (Tria
v, Lirag, 1 SC 1207 [1961]; Osmena v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 17 SC 828
[1966]; Paredes v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 501 [1984])
Finally, when the terms of an amicable settlement are violated, as in the case
at bar, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to move for its execution (Valdez
v. Octaviano, 1 SCRA 74 [961]; Parede s v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 501
[1984]).
Petitioners claim that properties in custodia legis may not be the proper
subject of a writ of execution to satisfy a claim; that what private respondent
could have done was to ask the Court a quo for an order requiring the
administrator to pay the debt and only if there are no sufficient funds on hand
to pay the debt may the court order the sale of the properties and out of the
proceeds, to pay the debt. This argument is untenable inasmuch as the
dispositive portion of the very order approving the amicable settlement directs
the judicial administrator to pay the claim of FNCB Finance out of the funds
and/or properties of the estate, to wit:
Conformably, the Judicial Administrator is hereby directed to pay out

of the estate funds and/or properties the amounts agreed upon within
30 days from receipt hereof.
Nevertheless, petitioner Judicial Administrator chose not to comply with said

order. Inasmuch as the compromise agreement is part and parcel of the
judgment and may, therefore, be enforced as such by a writ of execution, the
respondent judge committed no reversible error in issuing the questioned writ
of execution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Page 20 of 206
[3] G.R. No. L-8235 March 19, 1914
ISIDRO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEANDRA MANARANG,

administratrix, defendant-appellee.
1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF

CLAIMS; TIME FOR PRESENTATION.—If the property of the estate has been
properly inventoried, the committee on claims regularly appointed, the publication of
the notice required by law duly made, and there has been no fraud in the proceedings,
claims or debts which the law requires shall be presented to the committee on claims
must be presented to it within the limitation of time provided in section 689 (Code
Civ. Proc.) or they will be barred.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE WILL.—Directions in the

testator's will that such claims and debts, or any of them, shall be settled in some other
manner are void as opposed to public policy, at least where there are heirs by force of
law.
3. ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR.—No action can be instituted

directly against the administrator of the estate for the collection of claims and debts
which the committee on claims is directed to pass upon.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DIRECTION IN WILL TO PAY DEBTS.—An itemized list of debts
in the will of the testator which he directs shall be paid does not obviate the necessity
of presenting them to the committee for allowance. Nor do such directions in a will
indicate that it was the testator's desire to have them paid without being probated in
accordance with the probate procedure provided in Act No. 190.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISTAKE OF LAW.—If, because of such provisions in the will,
a creditor fails to present such claims to the committee in the belief that it is
unnecessary, he is laboring under a mistake of law for which no relief can be afforded
by the courts.
TRENT, J.:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real
and personal property which, by his last will and testament dated July 26,
1906, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this will reads as
follows:

Page 21 of 206
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is
my desire that they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors
in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.
Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the
plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various
other described as falling due at different dates (the dates are not given)
amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee
was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate
as might be presented. This committee submitted its report to the court on
June 27, 1908. On July 14, 1908, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a
petition to the court asking that the committee be required to reconvene and
pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of
testator. This petition was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the
plaintiff instituted the present proceedings against the administratrix of the
estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied
in the court below, and now appeals to this court.
In his first assignment of error, the appellant takes exception to the action of
the court in denying his petition asking that the committee be reconvened to
consider his claim. In support of this alleged error counsel say that it does not
appear in the committee's report that the publications required by section 687
of the Code of Civil Procedure had been duly made. With reference to this
point the record affirmatively shows that the committee did make the
publications required by law. It is further alleged that at the time the appellant
presented his petition the court had not approved the report of the committee.
If this were necessary we might say that, although the record does not contain
a formal approval of the committee's report, such approval must undoubtedly
have been made, as will appear from an inspection of the various orders of the
court approving the annual accounts of the administratrix, in which claims
allowed against the estate by the committee were written off in accordance
with its report. This is shown very clearly from the court's order of August 1,
1912, in which the account of the administratrix was approved after reducing
final payments of some of the claims against the estate to agree with the
amounts allowed by the committee. It is further alleged that at the time this
petition was presented the administration proceedings had not been
terminated. This is correct.
In his petition of July 14, 1909, asking that the committee be reconvened to
consider his claims, plaintiff states that his failure to present the said claims to
the committee was due to his belief that it was unnecessary to do so because
of the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and directed
that they should be paid. The inference is that had plaintiff's claims not been
mentioned in the will he would have presented to the committee as a matter of

Page 22 of 206
course; that plaintiff was held to believe by this express mention of his claims
in the will that it would be unnecessary to present them to the committee; and
that he did not become aware of the necessity of presenting them to the
committee until after the committee had made its final report.
Under these facts and circumstances, did the court err in refusing to
reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's claim? The
first step towards the solution of this question is to determine whether plaintiff's
claims were such as a committee appointed to hear claims against an estate
is, by law, authorized to pass upon. Unless it was such a claim plaintiff's
argument has no foundation. Section 686 empowers the committee to try and
decide claims which survive against the executors and administrators, even
though they be demandable at a future day "except claims for the possession
of or title to real estate." Section 700 provides that all actions commenced
against the deceased person for the recovery of money, debt, or damages,
pending at the time the committee is appointed, shall be discontinued, and the
claims embraced within such actions presented to the committee. Section 703
provides that actions to recover title or possession of real property, actions to
recover damages for injury to person or property, real and personal, and
actions to recover the possession of specified articles of personal property,
shall survive, and may be commenced and prosecuted against the executor or
administrator; "but all other actions commenced against the deceased before
his death shall be discontinued and the claims therein involved presented
before the committee as herein provided." Section 708 provides that a claim
secured by a mortgage or other collateral security may be abandoned and the
claim prosecuted before the committee, or the mortgage may be foreclosed or
the security be relied upon, and in the event of a deficiency judgment, the
creditor may, after the sale of mortgage or upon the insufficiency of the
security, prove such deficiency before the committee on claims. There are
also certain provisions in section 746 et seq., with reference to the
presentation of contingent claims to the committee after the expiration of the
time allowed for the presentation of claims not contingent. Do plaintiff's claims
fall within any of these sections? They are described in the will as debts.
There is nothing in the will to indicate that any or all of them are contingent
claims, claims for the possession of or title to real property, damages for injury
to person or property, real or personal, or for the possession of specified
articles of personal property. Nor is it asserted by the plaintiff that they do. The
conclusion is that they were claims proper to be considered by the committee.
This being true, the next point to determine is, when and under what
circumstances may the committee be recalled to consider belated claims?
Section 689 provides:

Page 23 of 206
That court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case
require for the creditors to present their claims the committee for
examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more than
twelve months, or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be
stated in the commission. The court may extend the time as
circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed
eighteen months.
It cannot be questioned that thus section supersedes the ordinary limitation of

actions provided for in chapter 3 of the Code. It is strictly confined, in its
application, to claims against the estate of deceased persons, and has been
almost universally adopted as part of the probate law of the United States. It is
commonly termed the statute of nonclaims, and its purpose is to settle the
affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that residue may be delivered to the
persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond
in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not
yet prescribed.
The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims
must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a
deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate in
the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. (Estate of De Dios, 24
Phil. Rep., 573.)
Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation applying

to such claims as compared with the ordinary statute of limitations, the statute
of nonclaims has not the finality of the ordinary statute of limitations. It may be
safely said that a saving provision, more or less liberal, is annexed to the
statute of nonclaims in every jurisdiction where is found. In this country its
saving clause is found in section 690, which reads as follows:
On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if

made within six months after the time previously limited, or, if a
committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such
application is made before the final settlement of the estate, the court
may, for cause shown, and on such terms as are equitable, renew the
commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month, for the
committee to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally
notify the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as soon as may
be make the return of their doings to the court.
If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for
reconvening it for further consideration of claims which may not have been
presented before its final report was submitted to the court. But, as stated

Page 24 of 206
above, this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee did give the
notice required by law. Where the proper notice has been given the right to
have the committee recalled for the consideration of a belated claim appears
to rest first upon the condition that it is presented within six months after the
time previously limited for the presentation of claims. In the present case the
time previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed the
plaintiff until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An
extension of this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the court.
(Estate of De Dios, supra.) In other words, the court could extend this time and
recall the committee for a consideration of the plaintiff's claims against the
estate of justice required it, at any time within the six months after January 23,
1908, or until July 23, 1908. Plaintiff's petition was not presented until July 14,
1909. The bar of the statute of nonclaims is an conclusive under these
circumstances as the bar of the ordinary statute of limitations would be. It is
generally held that claims are not barred as to property not included in the
inventory. (Waughop vs. Bartlett, 165 III., 124; Estate of Reyes, 17 Phil. Rep.,
188.) So also, as indicated by this court in the case last cited, fraud would
undoubtedly have the same effect. These exceptions to the operation of the
statute are, of course, founded upon the highest principles of equity. But what
is the plea of the plaintiff in this case? Simply this: That he was laboring under
a mistake of law — a mistake which could easily have been corrected had he
sought to inform himself; a lack of information as to the law governing the
allowance of claims against estate of the deceased persons which, by proper
diligence, could have been remedied in ample to present the claims to the
committee. Plaintiff finally discovered his mistake and now seeks to assert his
right when they have been lost through his own negligence. Ignorantia legis
neminem excusat. We conclude that the learned trial court made no error in
refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's
claims against the estate.
In his second assignment of error the appellant insists that the court erred in
dismissing his petition filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the
administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the
will as debts due him. We concede all that is implied in the maxim, dicat testor
et erit lex. But the law imposes certain restrictions upon the testator, not only
as to the disposition of his estate, but also as to the manner in which he may
make such disposition. As stated in Rood on Wills, sec. 412: "Some general
rules have been irrevocably established by the policy of the law, which cannot
be exceeded or transgressed by any intention of the testator, be it ever so
clearly expressed."
It may be safely asserted that no respectable authority can be found which

holds that the will of the testator may override positive provisions of law and
imperative requirements of public policy. (Page on Wills, sec. 461.)

Page 25 of 206
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law and good morals shall
be considered as not imposed, . . . (Art. 792, Civil Code.)
Conceding for the moment that it was the testator's desire in the present case
that the debts listed by him in his will should be paid without referring them to
a committee appointed by the court, can such a provision be enforced? May
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the settlement of
claims against an estate by a committee appointed by the court be
superseded by the contents of a will?
It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the
Code of Civil Procedure has established a system for the allowance of claims
against the estates of decedents. Those are at least two restrictions imposed
by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and which pro
tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable
for all legal obligations incurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or
encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of law. The former take
precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.) In case his estate is
sufficient they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they
must be paid in the order named in section 735. It is hardly necessary to say
that a provision in an insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid would not
entitle it to preference over other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in
the will requires the administrator to pay it without reference to the committee,
what assurance is there, in the case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take
precedence over preferred debts?
If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of

nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred until from four to ten years,
according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
establishing questions upon actions. Under such circumstances, when then
the legal portion is determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been
distributed, what security have the differences against the interruption of their
possession? Is the administrator required to pay the amount stipulated in the
will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what authority has he to vise the
claim? Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an executor
may, with the approval of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a
debt due the estate, But he is nowhere permitted or directed to deal with a
creditor of the estate. On the contrary, he is the advocate of the estate before
an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power to determine the amount of
the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust the
amounts due. The administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the
creditor appear before this body as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied
with its decision, an appeal to the court is their remedy. To allow the
administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would put

Page 26 of 206
him in the dual role of a claimant and a judge. The law in this jurisdiction has
been so framed that this may not occur. The most important restriction, in this
jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by will are those provisions of the
Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal portions due to heirs by
force of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force by sections 614,
684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a debt is expressly
recognized in the will must be paid without its being verified, there is nothing to
prevent a partial or total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest
under a guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the amount
of the legal portion can be determined.
We are aware that in some jurisdictions executors and administrators are, by

law, obligated to perform the duties which, in this jurisdiction, are assign to the
committee on claims; that in some other jurisdictions it is the probate court
itself that performs these duties; that in some jurisdictions the limitation upon
the presentment of claims for allowance is longer and, possibly, in some
shorter; and that there is a great divergence in the classification of actions
which survive and actions which do not survive the death of the testator. It
must be further remembered that there are but few of the United States which
provide for heirs by force of law. These differences render useless as
authorities in this jurisdiction many of the cases coming from the United
States. The restriction imposed upon the testator's power to dispose of his
property when they are heirs by force of law is especially important. The rights
of these heirs by force law pass immediately upon the death of the testator.
(Art. 657, Civil Code.) The state intervenes and guarantees their rights by
many stringent provisions of law to the extent mentioned in article 818 of the
Civil Code. Having undertaken the responsibility to deliver the legal portion of
the net assets of the estate to the heirs by force of law, it is idle to talk of
substituting for the procedure provided by law for determining the legal
portion, some other procedure provided in the will of the testator. The state
cannot afford to allow the performance of its obligations to be directed by the
will of an individual. There is but one instance in which the settlement of the
estate according to the probate procedure provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure may be dispense with, and it applies only to intestate estates. (Sec.
596, Code Civ. Proc.) A partial exemption from the lawful procedure is also
contained in section 644, when the executor or administrator is the sole
residuary legatee. Even in such case, and although the testator directs that no
bond be given, the executor is required to give a bond for the payment of the
debts of the testator. The facts of the present case do not bring it within either
of this sections. We conclude that the claims against the estate in the case at
bar were enforceable only when the prescribed legal procedure was followed.
But we are not disposed to rest our conclusion upon this phase of the case
entirely upon legal grounds. On the contrary we are strongly of the opinion that

Page 27 of 206
the application of the maxim, "The will of the testator is the law of the case,"
but strengthens our position so far as the present case is concerned.
It will ordinarily be presumed in construing a will that the testator is

acquainted with the rules of law, and that he intended to comply with
them accordingly. If two constructions of a will or a part thereof are
possible, and one of these constructions is consistent with the law,
and the other is inconsistent, the presumption that the testator
intended to comply with the law will compel that construction which is
consistent with the law to be adopted. (Page on Wills, sec. 465.)
Aside from this legal presumption, which we believe should apply in the
present case as against any construction of the will tending to show an
intention of the testator that the ordinary legal method of probating claims
should be dispensed with, it must be remembered that the testator knows that
the execution of his will in no way affects his control over his property. The
dates of his will and of his death may be separated by a period of time more or
less appreciable. In the meantime, as the testator well knows, he may acquire
or dispose of property, pay or assume additional debts, etc. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, it is only proper to presume that the testator, in his
will, is treating of his estate at the time and in the condition it is in at his death.
Especially is this true of his debts. Debts may accrue and be paid in whole or
in part between the time the will is made and the death of the testator. To
allow a debt mentioned in the will in the amount expressed therein on the
ground that such was the desire of the testator, when, in fact, the debt had
been wholly or partly paid, would be not only unjust to the residuary heirs, but
a reflection upon the good sense of the testator himself. Take the present
case for example. It would be absurd to say that the testator knew what the
amount of his just debt would be at a future and uncertain date. A mere
comparison of the list of the creditors of the testator and the amounts due
them as described in his will, with the same list and amounts allowed by the
committee on claims, shows that the testator had creditors at the time of his
death not mention in the will at all. In other instances the amounts due this
creditors were either greater or less than the amounts mentioned as due them
in the will. In fact, of those debts listed in the will, not a single one was allowed
by the committee in the amount named in the will. This show that the testator
either failed to list in his will all his creditors and that, as to those he did
include, he set down an erroneous amount opposite their names; or else,
which is the only reasonable view of the matter, he overlooked some debts or
contracted new ones after the will was made and that as to others he did
include he made a partial payments on some and incurred additional
indebtedness as to others.

Page 28 of 206
While the testator expresses the desire that his debts be paid, he also
expressly leaves the residue of his estate, in equal parts, to his children. Is it
to be presumed that he desired to overpay some of his creditors
notwithstanding his express instructions that his own children should enjoy the
net assets of his estate after the debts were paid? Again, is the net statement
of the amount due some of his creditors and the omission all together of some
of his creditors compatible with his honorable and commendable desire, so
clearly expressed in his will, that all his debts be punctually paid? We cannot
conceive that such conflicting ideas were present in the testator's mind when
he made his will.
Again, suppose the testator erroneously charged himself with a debt which he
was under no legal or even moral obligation to pay. The present case
suggests, if it does not actually present, such a state of affairs. Among the
assets of the estate mentioned in the will is a parcel of land valued at P6,500;
while in the inventory of the administratrix the right to repurchase this land
from one Isidro Santos is listed as an asset. Counsel for the administratrix
alleges that he is prepared to prove that this is the identical plaintiff in the case
at bar; that the testator erroneously claimed the fee of this land in his last will
and stated Santos' rights in the same as a mere debt due him of P5,000; that
in reality, the only asset of the testator regard to this land was the value of the
right to repurchase, while the ownership of the land, subject only to that right
of redemption, belonged to Santos; that the right to repurchase this land
expired in 1907, after the testator's death. Assuming, without in the least
asserting, that such are the underlying facts of this case, the unjust
consequences of holding that a debt expressly mentioned in the will may be
recovered without being presented to the committee on claims, is at once
apparent. In this supposed case, plaintiff needed only wait until the time for
redemption of the land had expired, when he would acquired an absolute title
to the land, and could also have exacted the redemption price. Upon such a
state of facts, the one item of P5,000 would be a mere fictitious debt, and as
the total net value of the estate was less than P15,000, the legal portion of the
testator's children would be consumed in part in the payment of this item.
Such a case cannot occur if the prescribed procedure is followed of requiring
of such claims be viseed by the committee on claims.
The direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does not
mean that he shall pay them without probate. There is nothing in the
will to indicate that the testator in tended that his estate should be
administered in any other than the regular way under the statute,
which requires "all demands against the estates of the deceased
persons," "all such demands as may be exhibited," etc. The statute
provides the very means for ascertaining whether the claims against
the estate or just debts. (Kaufman vs. Redwine, 97 Ark., 546.)

Page 29 of 206
See also Collamore vs. Wilder (19 Kan., 67); O'Neil vs. Freeman (45 N. J. L.,
208).
The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that
the administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in
the will as debts due him appears to be nothing more nor less than a
complaint instituting an action against the administratrix for the recovery of the
sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to
real property or specific articles of personal property.
When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit

shall be commenced or prosecute against the executor or
administrator upon a claim against the estate to recover a debt due
from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of
real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be
commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)
The sum of money prayed for in the complaint must be due the plaintiff either
as a debt of a legacy. If it is a debt, the action was erroneously instituted
against the administratrix. Is it a legacy?
Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his

first assignment of error he alleges that the committee on claims should have
been reconvened to pass upon his claim against the estate. It is clear that this
committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as
a legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release),
or to a third person. But this case can only arise when the debt is an asset of
the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a testator's leaving a bare legacy of
his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy depends
upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding
force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with
whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation
recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be
extinguished in a lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and
must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific
articles of personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to
collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must
show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to
show that this sum represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a
legacy.
Was it the intention of the testator to leave the plaintiff a legacy of P7,454? We
have already touched upon this question. Plaintiff's claim is described by the
testator as a debt. It must be presumed that he used this expression in its

Page 30 of 206
ordinary and common acceptation; that is, a legal liability existing in favor of
the plaintiff at the time the will was made, and demandable and payable in
legal tender. Had the testator desired to leave a legacy to the plaintiff, he
would have done so in appropriate language instead of including it in a
statement of what he owed the plaintiff. The decedent's purpose in listing his
debts in his will is set forth in the fourth clause of the will, quoted above. There
is nothing contained in that clause which indicates, even remotely, a desire to
pay his creditors more than was legally due them.
A construction leading to a legal, just and sensible result is presumed

to be correct, as against one leading to an illegal, unnatural, or absurd
effect. (Rood on Wills, sec. 426.)
The testator, in so many words, left the total net assets of his estate, without
reservation of any kind, to his children per capita. There is no indication that
he desired to leave anything by way of legacy to any other person. These
considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the testator intended to leave
plaintiff any thing by way of legacy. His claim against the estate having been a
simple debt, the present action was improperly instituted against the
administratrix. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)
But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the
nature of a legacy and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the
plaintiff would receive nothing until after all debts had been paid and the heirs
by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable
result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to
determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased
persons. This hearing, in the first instance, can not be had before the court
because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must present their claims
to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.
For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs
against the appellant.

Page 31 of 206
[4] G.R. No. L-18936 May 23, 1967
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ENCARNACION ELCHICO Vda. de FERNANDO,

deceased. NATIVIDAD E. IGNACIO and LEONOR E. ALMAZAN,
administratrices-appellants, vs. PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC., claimant
appellee.
Settlement of decedent's estate; Hearing on contributive share of heir.—The

probate court acted correctly in holding a hearing to determine the amount and the
manner in which an heir, in possession of a portion of the decedent's estate, should
contribute for the payment of the creditor's claims and taxes. The motion for the return
of the said portion to the decedent's estate is premature.
Same; Courts; One probate court should not interfere with the assets under
administration in another probate court.—Where property belonging to the estate of a
decedent, under administration in the Manila Court of First Instance, was delivered to
an heir who died and whose estate is under administration in the Rizal Court of First
Instance, the Manila court, out of respect for the prerogatives of the Rizal court,
should not intermeddle with the latter's authority.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The present case has its roots in the proceedings hereinafter to be recited:
August 29, 1951. Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (referred to herein as

Pambusco) lodged its complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against two (2) defendants Valentin Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico Vda.
de Fernando. The suit was to collect P105,000.00 upon a contractual
obligation.1
January 23, 1955. Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando died. By this time,
Pambusco in the foregoing civil case had already presented its evidence and
submitted its case.
March 23, 1955. Intestate proceedings were filed. 2 Notice to the estate's
creditors was given for them to file their claims within six (6) months from this
date, the first publication of the notice.
April 16, 1955. On Pambusco's motion, the court in the civil case ordered Jose
Nicolas, then administrator, to substitute for the deceased Encarnacion
Elchico Vda. de Fernando as one of the defendants. No objection to this order
was registered.

Page 32 of 206
July 15, 1955. Pambusco amended its complaint in the civil case naming
therein administrator Jose Nicolas and original defendant Valentin Fernando,
as defendants. The court, without objection, admitted this amended complaint
on August 27, 1955.
Jose Nicolas, as such administrator, filed an amended answer with

counterclaim against Pambusco. The date of filing said answer is not of
record. In due course, Nicolas presented his evidence.
December 11, 1958. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered judgment in the civil case (Civil Case 14578), as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former the sum
of NINETY-THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P93,000.00) together with
the costs of these proceedings. Defendants' counterclaim is hereby
dismissed.
The two defendants appealed.
May 28, 1960. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, thus —
As plaintiff's complaint is well founded and meritorious and the

evidence of record justify the award of P93,000.00 in its favor, it
stands to reason that defendants' counterclaims were correctly
dismissed.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed without

pronouncement as to costs.3
Both defendants appealed by certiorari to this Court. Valentin Fernando's

appeal4 was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The appeal of the
estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando, 5 raising issues of fact,
likewise dismissed.
February 25, 1959. We go back to Special Proceeding 25256, Intestate Estate

of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. Fernando. On this day, while defendants in Civil
Case 14576 were perfecting their appeal from the judgment the Court of First
Instance, Pambusco registered its contingent claim in these special
proceedings — for whatever money judgment may be rendered in his favor in
the civil suit.

Page 33 of 206
January 25, 1961. The judgment in the civil case having reached finality,
Pambusco moved in the intestate proceedings that the heirs and/or the
present joint administratrices, Natividad E. Ignacio and Leonor E. Almazan, be
ordered to pay P46,500.00, the share of the deceased in the judgment debt.
The administratrices opposed. Ground: Pambusco's claim is time-barred.
March 13, 1961. Resolving Pambusco's motion, the probate court (in Sp. Proc.
25256) issued an order, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
Wherefore, the Court hereby allows said amount of P46,500.00 to be

paid by the heirs and/or the joint administratrices; but no payment
thereof shall be made until after the administratrices shall have
informed the Court in writing as to the existence of other unsettled
money claims against the estate and of the sufficiency of the assets
available for payment of all the debts.
In harmony with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders said

administratrices to inform the Court, within ten (10) days from the
notice of this order, of the other unsettled money together with the
amount of each, and of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the assets
available for payment of all the debts.
By order of May 24, 1961, the probate court denied the motion to reconsider
the foregoing order.
The administratrices came to this Court on appeal.
Given the facts just recited, was Pambusco's claim properly admitted by the
probate court?
It will be remembered that at the time Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando

died, the civil case against her and the other defendant Valentin Fernando had
not yet been decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila. That case,
however, was prosecuted — with the assent of the administrator of her estate
— to final conclusion.
1. This situation brings to the fore a consideration of Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court,6 which reads:
SEC. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
Page 34 of 206
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these
rules.
The Philosophy behind the rule which provides for the dismissal of the civil
case is that, upon the death of defendant, all money claims should be filed in
the testate or interstate proceedings "to avoid useless duplicity of procedure."7
Obviously, the legal precept just quoted is procedural in nature. It outlines the
method by which an action for recovery of money, debt or interest may
continue, upon the terms therein prescribed. Whether the original suit for the
recovery of money — as here — proceeds to its conclusion, or is dismissed
and the claim covered thereby filed with the probate court, one thing is certain:
no substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced.
But is there justification for the civil case to go on in spite of the death of
Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando "before final judgment in the Court of
First Instance?"
2. At the time of the death of defendant Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de

Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco had already closed its evidence and submitted
its case. Her administrator substituted. By this substitution, the estate had
notice of the claim. The estate was thus represented. The administrator did
not complain of the substitution. At no time did the estate of the deceased
impugn the authority of the regular courts to determine the civil case. Much
less did it seek abatement of the civil suit. On the contrary, its administrator
took active steps to protect the interests of the estate. He joined issue with
plaintiff. He filed an amended answer. He counterclaimed. He went to trial.
Defeated in the Court of First Instance, he appealed to the Court of Appeals.
He even elevated that civil case to this Court. Now that the judgment has
become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said judgment — reached
after a full dress trial on the merits — will now go for naught. The estate has
thus waived its right to have Pambusco's claim re-litigated in the estate
proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is
generally understood that it may be waived by the estate's representative.8
And, waiver is to be determined from the administrator's "acts and conduct." 9
Certainly, the administrator's failure to plead the statute of nonclaims, his
active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount
to such waiver. 10
3. Courts are loathe to overturn a final judgment. Judicial proceedings are

entitled to respect. Non quieta movere. 11 Plaintiff's claim has passed the test
in three courts of justice: the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals and
this Court. The judgment in plaintiff's favor should be enforced. Appellants'
technical objection — after judgment had become final in the civil case — that
plaintiff's claim should have been litigated in the probate court does not impair

Page 35 of 206
the validity of said judgment. For, such objection does not go into the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In Laserna vs. Altavas, 68 Phil. 703, suit was started by Jose Altavas against
Jose Laserna Paro to recover P4,500.00 as attorney's fees. The Court of First
Instance decided in plaintiff's favor. During the pendency of Laserna's appeal
in this Court, he died. Aristona Laserna, the administratrix of Laserna's estate,
substituted. This Court affirmed the judgment. Altavas subsequently filed in
the estate proceedings a motion to direct the administratrix to pay the
judgment for P4,500.00 in his favor. The court granted this motion. On appeal,
the administratrix urged that Altavas' claim "was definitely barred by the
statute of nonclaim," because of his failure "to present it before the committee
on claims and appraisal."12 This Court there stated.13 —
x x x we are of the opinion and so hold that, upon the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the claim of Jose Altavas,
although it did not survive the deceased, need not have to be
presented before the committee on claims and appraisal principally
because that claim is already an adjudicated claim by final
pronouncement by this Court in G.R. No. 40038. To countenance
appellant's theory would be to convert a claim duly passed upon, and
determined not only by the Court of First Instance but by this Court
into a contested claim, once again, . . . and "obliging a creditor whose
claim had already been passed upon by the Court to submit himself to
the committee on claims and to pass over again through the endless
process of presenting his evidence which he had already done." ... It
also appears that the substitution of the defendant in civil case No.
2961, for the recovery of attorney's fees, was effected at the instance
of the defendant and appellant therein, Aristona Laserna. She had an
opportunity to contest that claim, and when her contention was
overruled she did not impugn the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Neither does it appear that during the pendency of the appeal in the
Supreme Court she moved for the abatement or suspension of the
proceedings because of the provisions of sections 119, 700 and 703
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the circumstances it is unjust to
defeat the claim of the appellee and to hold that it had been barred by
the statute of nonclaim.14
4. Of course, it is correct to say that upon the demise a defendant in a civil

action planted on a claim which does not survive, such claim should be
presented to the probate court for allowance, if death occurs before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance. But, procedural niceties aside, the
revival of the civil action against the administrator, the decedent's
representative, "is generally considered equivalent to presentation" of such

Page 36 of 206
claim in probate court, 15 "dispenses with the actual presentation of the claim."
16
The soundness of this proposition commands assent. Because, the
administrator represent the deceased's estate itself, is an alter ego of the
heirs. More than this, he is an officer of the probate court. 17 In the
circumstances, presentment of Pambusco's 1950 claim ad abundantiorem
cautelam was at best reduced to a mere formality.
5. It matters not that Pambusco's said claim was filed with the probate court
without the six-month period from March 25, 1955, set forth in the notice to
creditors. For, Section 2, Rule 86, permits acceptance of such belated claims.
Says Section 2: 18
SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice

provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the
filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve
(12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication
of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim
within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and
on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a
tune not exceeding one (1) month.
Here, the claim was filed in the probate court on February 25, 1959, while the
defendants in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The
record does not show that the administrator objected thereto upon the ground
that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case, we are persuaded to
say, is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim. 19 And, the order
of final distribution is still to be given.
Besides, the order of the lower court of March 18, 1961 allowing payment of
appellee's claim "impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within
which to file said claim." 20 The probate court's discretion has not been
abused. It should not be disturbed. 21
For the reasons given, we vote to affirm the order of the lower court of March
13, 1961 and May 24, 1961, under review. Costs against appellants. So
ordered.

Page 37 of 206
[5] G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and

REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO, petitioners,
vs.HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and
AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the late
EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; Partition; In testate succession, there can be no valid

partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated.—In testate
succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because
unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity
of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the
law prescribes for the validity of a will.
Same; Same; Same; The probate court has the jurisdiction to settle the claims of
an heir and the consequent adjudication of the properties.—Some decisions of the
Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the jurisdiction to settle the
claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication of the properties, are worth
mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo v. Gerona, and Benedicto v. Javellana, this Court
said: “x x x any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication
thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in a
testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the
same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having
jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question
raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution
and adjudication of the property to the interested parties
Same; Same; Same; The probate court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
distribute the estate has the power to determine the proportion or parts to which each
distributee is entitled.—The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
distribute the estate, has the power to determine the proportion or parts to which each
distributee is entitled x x x. A project of partition is merely a proposal for the
distribution of the hereditary estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the court
that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution
and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition
becomes irrelevant.—A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person
vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it
should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect
is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or

Page 38 of 206
fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has
become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
Same; Same; Same; The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence.—It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a
principle of public policy, that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis
sit litum. “The very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies.” The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Remedial Law; Res judicata; The fundamental principle upon which the
doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the
same issue more than once.—The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of
res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
Same; Lis pendens; A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.— The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be
ordered by the court having jurisdiction over it at any given time. Under Sec. 24, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled “after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.” In this
case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the principal reason
that the administrators of the properties involved are subject to the supervision of the
court and the said properties are under custodia legis.
ROMERO, J.:
These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders 1 dated September 20,
1976, January 7, 1977 and January 31, 1977 of the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch, IV respectively, cancelling the notice
of lis pendens filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. with the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental, denying the motion for reconsideration of the
order dated September 20, 1976 filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., and
holding in abeyance the resolution of defendants' motion to dismiss.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Page 39 of 206
On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a
"Testamento" 2 which contains among its provisions, the following:
DECIMA — Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi

participacion consistente en una tercera parte (1/3) de una
catorce (1/14) avas partes proindivisas de la Hda. Minuluan,
que he adquirido mediante permuta de mi hermano Dr.
Antonio A. Lizares, se adjudique, como por el presente se
adjudica, a mi sobrina Eustaquia Lizares; ENTENDIENDOSE,
sin embargo, que en el caso de que mi citada sobrina
Eustaquia Lizares muera soltera o sin descendientes
legitimos, mi referida participacion en la Hda. Minuluan se
adjudicara a mi hermano Antonio A. Lizares que me
sobrevivan.
UNDECIMA — Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de

todas mis propiendades, incluyendo mis participaciones,
derechos e intereses (no dispuestos mas arriba) an las
Haciendas "Minuluan" (Lotes Nos. 439, 403, 1273, 1274,
1278, 1279 y 1280 del Catastro de Talisay, Negros
Occidental), y "Matab-ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550, 552, 553 y
1287-C del Catastrado de Talisay, Negros Occidental),
situadas en el Municipio de Talisay, Provincia de Negros
Occidental, I.F., el resto de mis acciones en la Central
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. (unas 2,860 acciones) y de la
Financing Corporation of the Philippines (unas 53,636
acciones), registradas a mi nombre y no heredadas de mi
difunta madre Dña. Enrica A. Vda. de Lizares, mis acciones
en la Central Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., Negros
Navigation Co. y otras Compañas Mineras, y todos los demas
bienes no mencionados en este testamento y que me
pertenezcan en la fecha de mi muerte, se adjudiquen, como
por el presente adjudico, a mi sobrina Srta. Eusaquia Lizares,
hija de mi difunto hermano Don Simplicio Lizares cuidados
que mi citada sobrina me ha prestado y signe prestandome
hasta ahora. Ordeno, sin embargo, a mi referida sobrina,
Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se haga cargo de pagar
todas las obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre las
propriedades adjudicadas a la misma. Asimismo ordeno a mi
citada sobrina que ella mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana
cada año en sufragio de mi alma, y misas ordinarias en
sufragio de las almas de mi difunto Padre y de mi difunta
Madre, el 6 de Marzo y 17 de Deciembre de cada año,
respectivamente, y mande celebrar todos los años la fiesta de
San Jose en Talisay como lo hago hasta ahora. En el caso de
Page 40 of 206
que mi citada sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, falleciere sin
dejar descendientes legitimos, ordeno y dispongo que mi
participacion consistente en una sexta parte (1/6) de la Hda.
Matab-ang, con su correspondiente cuota de azucar y otros
mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas y hermano antes
mencionados y que me sobrevivan (Emphasis supplied)
On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving
said "testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia
Lizares.3 On February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement of
the testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452.
4
The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been
made, in due course, the probate court issued an order declaring the will
probated and appointing Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria
Lizares. 5
On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition 6 which was granted by
the probate court in an order dated January 8, 1971. Simultaneously, said
court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in
the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries
of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned to each
and every one of them, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental and Bacolod City to effect the corresponding transfer of the real
properties to said heirs as well as the transfer of shares, stocks, and dividends
in different corporations, companies and partnerships in the name of Maria
Lizares to the heirs and legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of
Maria Lizares. 7
Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings

in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the
partition be adjudicated to her. 8 The Court granted the motion and
correspondingly reopened the testate proceedings. It adjudicated to Eustaquia
certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and
sugar quota allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which
were not given by her to any other person in her last will and testament. 9
On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L.

Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez,
Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an agreement of
partition and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over Lots
Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of plan SWO-7446, and 552, all of the Cadastral

Page 41 of 206
Survey of Talisay covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-
65005; T-65006, T-65007, and T-65008. 10
A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without
any descendant. 11 In due time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were
appointed joint administrators of Eustquia's intestate estate.
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10

and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a
simple substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and
Remedios Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda.
de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen
once again the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed
among others that a substitute administrator be appointed; that the order
dated January 8, 1971 be reconsidered and amended by declaring them as
heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang, both of
which form an aggregate area of 33 hectares; that the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental, after such amendment, be ordered to register at the back
of their respective certificates of title, the order of probate and a "declaration"
that movants are the heirs of said properties, and correspondingly issue new
certificates of title in their names. 12
Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely:
Socorro L. Vda. de Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo,
and Aurora Lizares Wagner opposed the aforesaid motion. They alleged that
the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of
Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the
testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and void. 13
On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the
testate proceedings and holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate
is a proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is binding against the whole
world. It observed that inspite of the fact that the movants knew that the court
had jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the proceedings nor did
they appeal the order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the court concluded, even if
the said order was erroneous, and since the error was not jurisdictional, the
same could have been corrected only by a regular appeal. The period for filing
a motion for reconsideration having expired, the court opined that the movants
could have sought relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
but unfortunately for the movants, the period for filing such remedy had also
elapsed. 14
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of said
order. It was denied on June 17, 1974. 15 Hence, on October 14, 1974, the

Page 42 of 206
said movants filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of
real property against the joining administrators of the estate of Eustaquia
Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 11639
with the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV. 16 On
the same date, they availed of their rights under Rule 14, Section 24 of Rules
of Court
by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental. 17
As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late

Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint administrators
for brevity), filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the case; the cause of action was barred
by prior judgment, and the complaint stated no cause of action. 18 This motion
was opposed by the plaintiffs.
On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the contentions that there existed
exceptional circumstances which justified the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens and that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiffs. 19 The latter
opposed said motion. The defendants having filed a reply thereto, the plaintiffs
filed a rejoinder reiterating their arguments in their opposition to the motion for
cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 20
On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the

motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 21 The court simultaneously
held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint.
The joint administrators filed the answer to the complaint in Civil Case No.
11639. 22 Thereafter, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative
defenses. 23 Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. vigorously opposed said motion. 24
On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion praying

for the reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976. 25 The joint
administrators having filed an opposition thereto, 26 on January 7, 1977 the
lower court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. 27 It held that
while a notice of lis pendens would serve as notice to strangers that a
particular property was under litigation, its annotation upon the certificates of
title to the properties involved was not necessary because such properties,
being in custodia legis, could not just be alienated without the approval of the
court. Moreover, the court added, a notice of lis pendens would prejudice any
effort of the estate to secure crop loans which were necessary for the viable
cultivation and production of sugar to which the properties were planted.

Page 43 of 206
Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed in
this Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on
certiorari. Docketed as G.R No. L-45425, the petition contends that the
grounds of lis pendens, namely, that the properties are in custodia legis and
the lending institutions would not grant crop loans to the estate, are not the
legal grounds provided for under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court for the
cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating that
since on September 21, 1976 it had held in abeyance the resolution of the
motion to dismiss, it was also proper to suspend the resolution of the
affirmative defenses interposed by the defendants until after trial on the merits
of the case. Accordingly, the court set the date of pre-trial for March 24, 1977.
28
On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-45965. Petitioners contend that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639 as it involves the
interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its implementation and/or the
adjudication of her properties. They assert that the matter had been settled in
Special Proceedings No. become final and unappealable long before the
complaint in Civil Case No. 8452 which had become final and unappealable
long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 was filed, and therefore, the
cause of action in the latter case was barred by the principle of res judicata.
They aver that the claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of
Maria Lizares, over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the
latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because
paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.
base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs.
Petitioners contend that said provisions of the will are not valid because under
Article 863 of the Civil code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary
substitution of heirs.
On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the lower court from further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. 11639.
29
After both G.R. Nos. L-45425 and L-45965 had been given due course and
submitted for decision, on January 20, 1986, the two cases were consolidated.
The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. 30 The law enjoins the probate of a will and
the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof

Page 44 of 206
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will
may be rendered nugatory. 31 The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes
for the validity of a will. 32
Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When

the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration,
the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on application of the executor or administrator,
or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon
notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the

obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum
to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
33
Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza, and Torres v.
Encarnacion, 34 the Court said:
. . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the

entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this
provision, within the estate proceeding, said proceeding being
the most convenient one in which this power and function of
the court can be exercised and performed without the
necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the incovenience
and litigate an entirely different action.

Page 45 of 206
Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has
the jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication
of the properties, are worth mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo v. Gerona, 35
and Benedicto v. Javellana, 36 this Court said:
. . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the

authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any
heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate
succession may make, must be acted upon and decided
within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action,
and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of
the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised,
inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to
make distribution and adjudication of the property to the
interested parties. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has
the power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is
entitled . . .. 37 A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of
the heredity estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the court that
makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled
thereto. 38
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate
estate of Maria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January
8, 1971, a project of partition in which the parcels of land, subject matters of
the complaint for reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and
assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In
accordance with said project of partition which was approved by the probate
court, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios Lizares Vda. de
Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia
Lizares executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on November 28,
1972, whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos.
550, 514, 553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552 covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These facts
taken altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of
partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or
any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in
law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition,
agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. 39 Thus, where
a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that
the inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner's

Page 46 of 206
knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated
to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its
proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. 40 The question of
private respondents title over the lots in question has been concluded by the
partition and became a closed matter.
The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint,

Civil Case No. 11639, that Eustaquia had been in possession of the
questioned lots since March 2, 1971 up to the time of her death indicates that
the distribution pursuant to the decree of partition has already been carried
out. Moreover, it cannot be denied that when Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.
moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares,
the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was
already final and executory, then reglementary period of thirty (30) days
having elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having
been filed by them. Therefore, they cannot now be permitted to question the
adjudication of the properties left by will of Maria Lizares, by filing an
independent action for the reconveyance of the very same properties subject
of such partition.
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title
to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should
be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect
is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution
and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of
partition becomes irrelevant. 41
It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of

public policy, that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit
litum. "The very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end
to controversies." 42 The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to
secure relief is the opening of the same by proper motion within the
reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which if
successful, would be for another court or judge to throw out a decision or
order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed
and disposed of. 43
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once,

Page 47 of 206
that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 44
All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the order
approving the distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted
in said will has become final and unappealable; the probate court that
rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties; the judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Maria Lizares was a proceeding
in rem that was directed against the whole world including Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al., so that it can be said that there is a similarity of parties in
Special Proceedings No. 8452 and Civil Case No. 11639, the judicial
administrators of Eustaquia being privy to Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.;
there is identity of subject matter involved in both actions, namely, the
properties left by Maria Lizares; there is identity of causes of action because in
the first action there was a declaration of the probate court in its order dated
April 6, 1974 that although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary
substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will, the substitution can have no
effect because the requisites for it to be valid, had not been satisfied. 45
Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No.
11639, the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are
conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares
46
is not meritorious. While the allegation of the joint administrators that
paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a
fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also
baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation
to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may
said paragraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.
It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and

provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall
succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should
then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil
Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. 47 In
this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares.
Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the
properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the
circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of
Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy.

Page 48 of 206
With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties
involved, there is no merit in the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.,
that the lower court acted contrary to law and/or gravely abused its discretion
in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be ordered by
the court having jurisdiction over it at any given time. 48 Under Sec. 24, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse
party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it
to be recorded." 49 In this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said
notice on the principal reason that the administrators of the properties involved
are subject to the supervision of the court and the said properties are under
custodia legis. Therefore, such notice was not necessary to protect the rights
of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More so in this case where it turned out that
their claim to the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in L-45425 is hereby

DENIED but the petition for certiorari and prohibition and/or mandamus in L-
45965 is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order of April 26, 1977 which
was issued by the Court in L-45965 is made PERMANENT. Costs against the
petitioners in L-45425.
SO ORDERED.

Page 49 of 206
[6] G.R. No. 43351 February 26, 1937
Intestate estate of the deceased Baldomero Cosme.

ROSARIO COSME DE MENDOZA, administratrix-appellee, vs. JANUARIO
PACHECO and RAYMUNDO CORDERO, sureties-appellants.
1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; ACCOUNTABILITY ON BOND OF

ADMINISTRATOR AND SURETIES.—It lies within the discretion of the court to
select an administrator of the estate of a deceased person (Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 46
Phil., 726, 727). Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of
the trust, and letters testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to whom
they are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as the court directs,
with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his
trust (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 643, 662). The administrator is accountable on
his bond along with the sureties for the performance of certain legal obligations. (Tan
vs. Go Chiong Lee, 46 Phil., 200, 205. See also, Stovall vs. Banks, 10 Wall., 583, 588;
19 Law. ed., 1036; Long vs. O'Fallon, 19 How., 116; 15 Law. ed., 550.)
2. ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF ADMINISTRATOR'S BOND.—It is clear that a Court

of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of
the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any
breach of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an allembracing power over
the administrator's bond and over administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance
in a probate proceeding can not be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that
bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.—It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so many words that
such court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and
logical implication, the power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in
unequivocal terms. When the accountability of an administrator's bond is spoken of in
the very provisions dealing with and bearing directly on administration proceedings, it
would involve a strained construction to hold, as appellants would have us do. that
where an administrator is held liable for a devastavit for having squandered and
misapplied property which he was in duty bound to marshal and conserve, the estate is
without a remedy to go against the administrator's bond in the same probate
proceedings, but in an action outside of and separate from it.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.—Section 683 of the Code of Civil Procedure affords a person who
may be held liable as surety in respect to an administrator's account the right, upon
application, to be admitted as a party to the accounting, from which we may not
unreasonably infer that a surety, like the appellants in the case before us, may be
charged with liability upon the bond during the process of accounting, that is, within

Page 50 of 206
the recognized confines of probate proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct
from such proceedings.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.—The execution of an administrator's bond, unlike the questions

involved in other cases, clearly stands upon a different footing, and is as necessary a
part and incident of the administration proceedings as the filing of such bond or the
fixing of its amount, Particularly is this true in. the present case where S's
indebtedness to the estate in the amount of P23,603.21, subsequently reduced to
P5,000, is conceded on all sides, and all that the trial court had to do was to see that
said amount was turned over to the estate.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF COURTS OF PROBATE JURISDICTION.—It is the duty

of courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estates of the deceased persons
by intervening in the administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury
that may be done thereto (Dariano vs. Fernandez Fidalgo, 14 Phil., 62, 67; Sison vs.
Azarraga, 30 Phil., 129, 134).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION.—The appellants could have raised the question of
jurisdiction now pressed upon us in civil case No. 5494 of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna and on appeal of that case to this court once before (G. R. No. 40998,
Cosme de Mendoza vs. Pacheco and Cordero [60 Phil., 1057]). They not only failed to
avail of that right but failed to appeal from the order complained of (Vide, Decision of
this court in G. R. No. 409,98). The questions raised in the appeal at bar, appellants'
second attempt to go about and frustrate the order in question, could have been passed
upon once for all in the case referred to.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICY AND PURPOSE OF ADMINISTRATION

PROCEEDINGS.—We cannot encourage a practice that trenches violently upon the
settled jurisprudence of this court that the policy and purpose of administration
proceedings is "* * * to close up, and not to continue an estate * * *" (Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil., 124, 133), and that "* * * the State fails wretchedly in
its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by it for the division and distribution
of the property of a decedent is so cumbersome, unwieldy and expensive that a
considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division. Where
administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished quickly and at very small
expense; and a system which consumes any considerable portion of the property
which it was designed to distribute is a failure. * * *" (McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng,
21 Phil., 211, 220.)
LAUREL, J.:
The facts in this case are not disputed. Manuel Soriano was former
administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme in civil case No. 5494, Court
of First Instance of Laguna. To assure faithful performance of his duties as
Page 51 of 206
such administrator, he filed a bond for P5,000, with the herein appellants,
Januario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero, as sureties. Soriano's account,
upon approval, showed him indebted to the estate in the sum of P23,603.21.
Unable to turn this amount over to the estate upon demand of Rosario Cosme,
the new administratrix, the lower court ordered the execution of his bond on
November 4, 1932, after notice duly served upon the sureties. Sometime later,
the court approved a settlement had between the adminstratrix and the ex-
administrator, whereby the latter ceded certain real properties to the estate
reducing on that account his indebtedness to the estate from P23,603.21 to
P5,000. As to this last amount, "La administradora se atiene a la orden de
ejecucion de la fianza suscrita por los fiadores Januario Pacheco y Raymundo
Cordero" (Record on Appeal, p. 2). Subsequently, the administratrix had the
public sale thereof to collect this amount of P5,000. Separate motions to he
discharged from the bond were filed by sureties Pacheco and Cordero. Both
motions were denied. A motion by Cordero to reconsider the order of denial
met a like fate. Brought on appeal to this court, the appeal was dismissed. The
dispositive part of the decision of this court (G. R. No. 40998, Cosme de
Mendoza vs. Pacheco and Cordero [60 Phil., 1057]) reads as follows:
The motion of October 1, 1933, was filed only on behalf of Raymundo

Cordero who filed no motion for reconsideration of the order of
execution of November 4, 1932, and took no appeal therefrom. Being
of the opinion that the trial court correctly held that said order had
become final, the motion of October 31, 1933, for reconsideration (if
such it may be called) came too late. The judgment is therefore
affirmed with costs against the appellants.
When the case was remanded to the lower court, the sureties filed a motion
challenging, for the first time, the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order
of November 4, 1932, executing the bond. The trial court denied the motion in
view of the decision of this court. The case is elevated here for the second
time on appeal.
Appellants assign the following error:
The lower court erred in refusing: (a) To declare null and void its order
of execution of the ex-administrator's bond of November 4, 1932, as
well as the writs of execution issued in virtue thereof; (b) to
accordingly vacate said order of November 4, 1932, and order the
release of the properties of the herein sureties-appellants attached in
pursuance of the writs of execution issued against them by virtue of
said order; and (c) to order the suspension of the execution of the said
order of November 4, 1932, until this case is finally decide.

Page 52 of 206
In the discussion of the foregoing assignment of error in their brief (pp. 9-23),
the appellants take in six propositions. One question, however, — that of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Laguna to order the execution of
the administrator's bond — is decisive of this appeal. Appellants, sureties
upon the bond, press the point that the order in suit is an absolute nullity for
lack of power in the issuing court. "In vain," they tell us, "have we searched
our statute books, especially the part of our Code of Civil Procedure regarding
probate jurisdiction, to find whether our Courts of First Instance, acting as
probate courts, have the power to order the execution of an administrator's
bond." Neither their failure to assail that jurisdiction when they ought nor the
subsequent affirmance of the order by this court, they say, could revive an
order dead from its inception.
To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to select an administrator of

the estate of a deceased person (Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 46 Phil., 726, 727).
Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of his trust,
and letters testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to whom
they are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as the court
directs, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful
performance of his trust (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 643, 662). The
administrator is accountable on his bond along with the sureties for the
performance of certain legal obligations. (Tan vs. Go Chiong Lee, 46 Phil.,
200, 205. See also, Stovall vs. Banks, 10 Wall., 583, 588; 19 Law. ed., 1036;
Long vs. O'Fallon, 19 How., 116; 15 Law. ed., 550.)
It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is

empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount
thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty.
Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond
and over administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate
proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond
answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed. It is true that the law
does not say expressly or in so many words that such court has power to
execute the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and logical implication,
the power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal term.
When the accountability of an administrator's bond is spoken of in the very
provisions dealing with and bearing directly on administration proceedings, it
would involve a strained construction to hold, as appellants would have us do,
that where an administrator is held liable for a devastravit for having
squandered and misapplied property which he was in duty bound to marshal
and conserve, the estate is without a remedy to go against the administrator's
bond in the same probate proceedings, but in an action outside of and
separate from it. In this connection, it should be observed that section 683 of
the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of the account
of an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person liable as surety
Page 53 of 206
in respect to such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a party to
such accounting, and may have the right to appeal as hereinafter provided."
There is here afforded to a person who may be held liable as surety in respect
to an administrator's account the right, upon application, to be admitted as a
party to their accounting, from which we may not unreasonably infer that a
surety, like the appellants in the case before us, may be charged with liability
upon the bond during the process of accounting, that is, within the recognized
confines of probate proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct from
such proceedings.
Appellants in their brief direct our attention to several cases decided by this
court holding that Courts of First Instance, as probate courts, have no power
to adjudicate on claims of other persons on property forming part of the estate,
by title adverse to the deceased (Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, 37 Phil., 61,
62); on the legal usufruct of the widow (Sahagun vs. De Gorosita, 7 Phil., 347,
351), and on the validity of testamentary dispositions (Castañeda vs. Alemany,
3 Phil., 426, 428). We have carefully examined these cases in relation to the
facts and circumstances of the case at bar. We take the view, however, that
the execution of an administrator's bond, unlike the questions involved in the
cited cases, clearly stands upon a different footing, and is as necessary a part
and incident of the administration proceeding as the filing of such bond or the
fixing of its amount. Particularly is this true in the present case where
Soriano's indebtedness to the sate in the amount of P23,603.21, subsequently
reduced to P5,000, is conceded on all sides, and all that the trial court had to
do was to see that said amount was turned over to the estate.
It is the duty of courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estates of

the deceased person by intervening in the administration thereof in order to
remedy or repair any injury that may be done thereto (Dariano vs. Fernandez
Fidalgo, 14 Phil., 62, 67; Sison vs. Azarraga, 30 Phil., 129, 134). "Probate and
like courts have a special jurisdiction only, and their powers as to ancillary or
incidental questions must of necessity to exercise within certain limitations; but
such powers include the right to try questions which arise incidentally in a
cause over which such courts have jurisdiction and the determination of which
are necessary to a lawful exercise of the powers expressly conferred in
arriving at a decision. . . . There seems, however, to be a general tendency, in
the absence of express and specific restrictions to the contrary, to uphold the
exercise by these court of such incidental powers as are, within the purview of
their grant of authority, reasonably necessary to enable them to accomplish
the objects for which they were invested with jurisdiction and to perfect the
same. And it has been held that statutes conferring jurisdiction on such courts,
being remedial and for the advancement of justice, should receive a favorable
construction, such as will give them the force and efficiency intended by the
legislature." (15 C. J., 813, 814.) The tendency in the United States indeed
has been towards the enlargement of the powers of probate courts. In the
Page 54 of 206
beginning these courts were possessed but limited powers. Having originated
from the ecclesiastical courts of England, their jurisdiction, following their
English patterns was practically limited to the probate of wills, the granting of
administrators, and the suing for legacies (Plant vs. Harrion, 74 N. Y. Sup.,
411, 441; 36 Misc. Rep., 649; Chadwick vs. Chadwick, 13 Pac., 385, 388; 6
Mont., 566; 3 Bl. Comm., pp. 95-98). But, though they still are often
unadvisedly described, particularly in Connecticut (Griffin vs. Pratt, 3 Conn.,
513), as courts of limited, inferior or special jurisdiction, they have outgrown
their limitations and have become courts with considerably increased powers
(Woerner, The American Law of Administration [2d], sec. 145; Plant vs.
Harrison, supra).
What has been said sufficiently determinative of the appeal before us. We
wish, however, to say a word on a salutary consideration of policy which has
been invariably followed by this court in cases of this nature. We refer to the
dispatch and economy with which administration of the estates of deceased
persons should be terminated and settled. It will be recalled that the appellants
could have raised the question of jurisdiction now pressed upon us in civil
case No. 5494 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and on appeal of that
case to this court once before (G. R. No. 40998 [60 Phil., 1057]). They not
failed to avail of that right but failed to appeal from the order complained of
(Vide, Decision of this court in G. R. No. 40998, Cosme de Mendoza vs.
Pacheco and Cordero). The questions raised in the appeal at bar, appellant's
second attempt to go about and frustrate the order in question, could have
been passed upon once for all in the case referred to. We cannot encourage a
practice that trenches violently upon the settled jurisprudence of this court that
the policy and purpose of administration proceedings is ". . . to close up, and
not to continue an estate . . ." (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil., 124,
133), and that ". . . the State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the
machinery furnished by it for the division and distribution of the property of a
decedent is so cumbersome, unwidely and expensive that a considerable
portion of the sate is absorbed in the process of such division. Where
administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished consumes any
considerable portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is a
failure. . . ." (McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211, 220.)
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
So ordered.

Page 55 of 206
[7] G.R. No. L-15445 April 29, 1961
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED

MERCEDES CANO. FLORANTE C. TIMBOL, administrator-appellee,
vs. JOSE CANO, oppositor-appellant.
Wills; Court of First Instance; Probate jurisdiction; Probate -proceeding.—In

probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants
letters of administration to the party best entitled to any qualified applicant, supervises
and controls all acts of administration, hears and approves claims against the estate of
the deceased, orders payment of lawful debts, authorizes the sale, mortgage or any
encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2) and directs the delivery of the estate to
those entitled thereto. The court acts as a trustee, and, as such trustee, should jealously
guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered, not
dissipated.
Same; Lease; Judicial revocation or modification of lease contract.—If the
probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the
reduction of the subject of the lease. The act of giving the property to a lessee is an act
of administration, also subject to the approval of the court. If the court abuses its
discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its order may be
subject to appeal and may be reversed; but not because the court may make an error
may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control the acts of administration of the
administrator.
Same; When probate court loses jurisdiction over estate under administration.
—The probate court loses jurisdiction over an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Hon.

Arsenio Santos, presiding, dated August 25, 1958, approving petitions of the
administrator Florante C. Timbol dated January 6 and 8, 1958. The order
appealed from authorizes the administrator to increase the area of a
subdivision to be formed out of the lands under administration from 30
hectares to 41.9233 hectares and approves the plan of such increased area.
The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir
her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946,
Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April 13,
1951 Jose Cano, filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also
an uncle of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the agricultural lands
Page 56 of 206
of the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental
of P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the
payment of land taxes and dues to the government. Judge Edilberto Barot,
then presiding the court, approved the motion in an order dated April 27, 1951,
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion of the administrator and his lawyer dated

April 13,1951, is hereby granted under the conditions therein set forth
and the further condition that all previous obligations of the
administration including the previous deficits are assumed by said
administrator, and that the arrangement will continue only as long as,
in the judgment of contageous to the heir, the Court, the same
continues to be advantageous to the heir, Florante C. Timbol. (p. 27,
Rec. on Appeal)
On January 14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the administrator and the
conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the
annual rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the
administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the
agricultural lands into a subdivision.
On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was

approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the
properties of the intestate.
On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of

Jose Cano and on January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modified
ina subsequent one of January 8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that
the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares
to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions
were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give
opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his
objections to the motions. Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of
the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his
tenants of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express
authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his
leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.
The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objections of
Jose Cano, in the order now subject of appeal, which reads:
The said contract of lease is on all forms illegal. Under article 1646 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, — a new provision, — "the persons
disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491, are also
Page 57 of 206
disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned therein," and
under article 1491 (3) o the same Code, executors and administrators
cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate under
administration.
If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only pointed

administrator on June 6, 1957 and the said contract of lease having
been executed on July 9, 1956, the same fall within the prohibition
provided by law. However, Jose C. Cano avers that this Court, in the
instant proceedings, cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid
lease contract, but in its general jurisdiction. There is no need for the
court to declare such contract illegal and, therefore, null and void as
the law so expressly provides.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations the court

hereby grants Florante C. Timbol's petitions date January 6 and 8,
1958, approving the amended plan for sub division, attached thereto,
and overrules Jose C. Cano's motion for reconsideration dated May 9,
same year. (pp. 151-152 Record on Appeal) The above is the subject
of the present appeal.
The above is the subject of the present appeal.
In the first assignment of error appellant claims that the consideration of the
motions of the administrator July 6 and 8, 1958, without due notice to him,
who is lessee is a violation of the Rules of Court. This objection lost its force
when the court, motu proprio set aside it first order of approval and furnished
copy of the motion to appellant and gave him all the opportunity to present his
objections thereto.
In the second and third assignments of error appellant argues that the court
below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his
rights under the lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified only
by a court of general jurisdiction. The above arguments are without merit. In
probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent
(Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled
thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all
acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the
deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec.
14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90,
Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91,
See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee,
should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically
administered, not dissipated. (Tambunting vs. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8152.) .

Page 58 of 206
Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural
lands of the intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with
the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so
may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The
matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also
subject to the approval of the court. Of course, if the court abuses its
discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its
orders may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not
because the court may make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to
control acts of administration of the administrator.
In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the effect of the
reduction of the area under lease would be to deprive the tenants of appellant
of their landholdings. In the first place, the tenants know ought to know that
the lands leased are lands under administration, subject to be sold, divided or
finally delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the administration of
the lands of the intestate. The order appealed from does not have the effect of
immediately depriving them of their landholdings; the order does not state so,
it only states that the lands leased shall be reduced and subdivided. If they
refuse to leave their landholdings, the administrator will certainly proceed as
the law provides. But in the meanwhile, the lessee cannot allege the rights of
his tenants as an excuse for refusing the reduction ordered by the court.
In the fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that his rights as lessee would
be prejudiced because the land leased would be reduced without a
corresponding reduction in the rentals. This would be a matter to be litigate
between the administrator and himself before the probate court. But the fact of
the prejudice alone cannot bar reduction of the land leased, because such
reduction is necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the debts
of the estate under administration.
The sixth assignment of error merits no attention on our part; it is appellant

himself who, as administrator since 1945, has delayed the settlement of the
estate.
In the seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project of
partition had already been approved and had become final, the lower court
has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the
enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision. This assignment of
error needs but a passing mention. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an
estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the
case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been
delivered to the heirs as such heir.

Page 59 of 206
We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on
this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the
declaration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to
the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was
granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the
lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.(See Arts. 1646 and
1491, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the court
below that the lease is null and void, which declaration we hereby affirm, it
would seem proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to
take steps to get back the lands leased from the appellant herein, or so much
thereof as is needed in the course of administration.
The court order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.

Page 60 of 206
[8] G.R. No. L-16584 November 17, 1921
EUSEBIO A. GODOY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GUILLERMO ORELLANO, ET

AL., defendants. FELISA PAÑGILINAN, PAZ ORELLANO assisted by her
husband FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, JOSE ORELLANO, and DEMETRIO
ORELLANO, defendants-appellants.
SALE OF PROPERTY OF AN INTESTATE ESTATE; NULLITY.—A sale and conveyance by

executors without an order of the probate court, under a will devising property to them
in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise than by a direction to pay
the debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to the purchasers. A sale by an
administrator of the personal property of the estate, without the authority of an order
of court, or of a will, or under an order of court which is void for want of jurisdiction,
does not confer on the purchaser a title which is available against a succeeding
administrator. (Sees. 717, 718, and 722, Code of Civil Procedure.)
VILLAMOR, J.:
On January 13, 1919, in consideration of the amount of P1,000 received by

the appellant, Felisa Pañgilinan, a document was executed by her giving the
appellee, Eusebio A. Godoy, an option to buy a dredge for the sum of
P10,000. It appears from that document that the dredge is the common
property of the vendor and of the brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo,
and Paz, all surnamed Orellano; that the condition was that Godoy was to pay
the whole price of the dredge within twenty days; and that said option was
granted in accordance with the power of attorney executed by her coowners
who reserved the right to ratify whatever sale might be made, or option
granted by Pañgilinan, their attorney-in-fact. The latter's coowners did not
ratify the option contract. Before the expiration of twenty days, the appelle was
ready to make complete payment of the price, but the appellant failed to
deliver the dredge. Then the appellee brought suit in the Court of First
Instance against Feliza Pañgilinan, Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano, Demetrio
Orellano, Guillermo Orellano, and Alfredo Orellano, praying that they be
ordered to deliver the dredge, upon payment by him of the sum of P9,000; to
pay him the sum of P10,000 as damages, and to return to the plaintiff the sum
of P1,000 should the carrying out of the sale become impossible.
The defendants Orellano set up in their answer a general denial of the facts
alleged in the complaint and, as a special defense, alleged that the dredge in
question was the property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, and under the administration of Felisa
Pangilinan; that the plaintiff perfectly knows that said dredge is under judicial
Page 61 of 206
control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority, and that the
court has never authorized the sale mentioned in the complaint filed herein;
and that the defendants Jose, Guillermo, and Alfredo surnamed Orellano are
at present under age, and the defendant Paz Orellano is a married woman
who had not obtained the consent of her husband before executing the power
of attorney in favor of the administratrix.
The defendant Felisa Pañgilinan filed a separate answer, and a defense

alleges: (a) That the dredge which was the subject-matter of the option is
property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, of which she is the
administratrix; (b) that the plaintiff, as well as the defendants, and the notary
who prepared the aforesaid option sale, were all aware of these facts, and
they led her to believe that she had the authority to dispose of the dredge in
her name and by themselves; (c) that believing herself to be under obligation
to comply with the aforesaid option deed, she applied to the court of probate
for permission to sell the dredge in the sum of P10,000; (d) that on the day of
the hearing of the motion, her codefendants who had themselves authorized
her by means of a power of attorney, opposed the motion through their
attorneys, Francisco and Lualhati, on the ground that there were higher
bidders and the best thing to do was to sell it at public auction; (e) that in view
of this opposition, the administratrix asked the court that it be sold at public
auction, and the court authorized said defendant to sell it at public auction,
advertising the sale in newspapers of general circulation, and the aforesaid
dredge was sold for P10,000, accordingly; ( f ) that the defendant did not at
any time refuse to make delivery of the dredge to the plaintiff, but that it was
the court that would not give her the authority to do so; and (g) that she is all
times ready to return the P1,000 received from the plaintiff and that she has
tendered it several times, but that the plaintiff refused to accept it.
The judge a quo rendered judgment, ordering the defendants to pay Eusebio
A. Godoy the sum of P2,000 with legal interest thereon from February 13,
1919, and the cost and dismissing the complaint as against the defendants
Guillermo Orellano and Alfredo Orellano.
From this judgment the defendants have appealed to this court by bill of
exceptions.
By a resolution of this court of September 14, 1920, the appeal of the

defendants Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano and Demetrio Orellano was declared
abandoned for failure to file their brief within the period prescribed by the rules
of the court. Wherefore, this decision concerns only the appeal taken by Felisa
Pañgilinan.lawphil.net

Page 62 of 206
It appears from the evidence that the dredge in question belongs to the
intestate estate of Julio Orellano, father of the defendants, which was pending
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, of which the judicial administratrix is
the defendant herein, Felisa Pañgilinan; that when this defendant contracted
with the plaintiff Godoy the sale of the aforesaid dredge, she had no authority
of the court; and that the plaintiff knew that the dredge, which was the subject-
matter of that contract, belonged to the intestate estate of Julio Orellano,
under the control of the court.
In the sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, it is
necessary to comply with the provisions of sections 717, 718, and 722 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The said sections prescribed the proceedings to be
had before an administrator of an intestate or testate estate may sell personal
or real property and also the conditions under which the personal or real
property pertaining to an estate may be sold or disposed of by the
administrator. Unless compliance is had with the provisions of these sections,
the sale of the aforesaid dredge by the administratrix, or her promise to sell it
is null and void.
A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate

court, under a will devising property to them in trust, but not
authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise than by a direction to pay
the debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to the purchase.
(Huse vs. Den, 85 Cal., 390.)
A sale by an administrator of the personal property of the estate,

without the authority of an order of court, or of a will, or under an order
of court which is void for want of jurisdiction, does not confer on the
purchaser a title which is available against a succeeding
administrator. (Wyatt's Adm'r vs. Rambo, 29 Ala., 510.)
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of
properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney
executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without
authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the
said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as
provided in the aforesaid power of attorney.
It is not necessary to dwell longer upon this point, as the appellee himself
admits in his brief "that the dredge in question being a part of the intestate
estate of Julio Orellano, it cannot be disposed of by any person without the
proper authority of the court, in accordance with the existing laws."lawphil.net

Page 63 of 206
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the appellant
was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Julio
Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging
to said estate without the authority of the court, and the contract entered into
by her with the plaintiff, without this authority, is null and void.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint against the
appellant Felisa Pañgilinan is hereby dismissed, without special finding as to
costs. So ordered.

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[9] G.R. No. L-27876 April 22, 1992
ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as Administrator of the

Intestate Estate of the late Margarita Suri Santos, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL., defendants. CITY OF
DAGUPAN, defendant-appellant.
Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estates; For purposes of complying with the

requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, it does not follow that
notice to the father is notice to the children.—Article 320 of the present Civil Code,
taken from the aforesaid Article 159, incorporates the amendment that if the property
under administration is worth more than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), the father or
the mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
This provision then restores the old rule which made the father or mother, as such, the
administrator of the child’s property. Be that as it may, it does not follow that for
purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court, notice to the father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said Rule
state explicitly that the notice, which must be in writing, must be given to the heirs,
devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time and place for hearing such
petition and cause notice to be given to the interested parties.
Same; Same; Requirement of notice under Sections 2, 4 and 7 of Rule 89,
mandatory and essential.—There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly
represented by counsel or by a guardian ad litem in the case of the minors, the notice
may be given to such counsel or guardian ad litem. In this case, however, only the
surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the
heirs, Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not
represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still minors with no
guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then, the
requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisites set forth in the aforesaid
sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the authority to sell,
the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.
Same; Same; For want of notice to the children, the order of 9 September 1949
granting the application, the sale in question of 4 October 1952 and the Order of 15
March 1954 approving the sale are all void ab initio as against the children.—
Consequently, for want of notice to the children, the Order of 9 September 1949
granting the application, the sale in question of 4 October 1952 and the Order of 15
March 1954 approving the sale are all void ab initio as against said children.
Same; Same; Civil Law; Estoppel; A decedent’s representative is not estopped
to question the validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land and if this be
true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor cannot be
estopped to question the acts of his predecessor are not conformable to law.—As to
the former, this Court, in Boñaga vs. Soler, supra, reiterated the rule “that a decedent’s
representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void deed purporting

Page 65 of 206
to convey land; and if this be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his
successor can not be estopped to question the acts of his predecessor are not
conformable to law.” Not being the party who petitioned the court for authority to sell
and who executed the sale, she cannot be held liable for any act or omission which
could give rise to estoppel. Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, through estoppel an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for estoppel by pais and estoppel by
conduct.—In estoppel by pais, as related to the party sought to be estopped, it is
necessary that there be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) conduct
amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least
calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent
with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least
expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the other
party; and (c) knowledge, actual or constructive of the actual facts. In estoppel by
conduct, on the other hand, (a) there must have been a representation or concealment
of material facts; (b) the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts;
(c) the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter;
and (d) it must have been made with the intention that the other party would act upon
it.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Actions to declare the inexistence of
contracts do not prescribe, a principle applied even before the effectivity of the new
Civil Code.—As to prescription, this Court ruled in the Boñaga case that “[a]ctions to
declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe [Art. 1410, N.C.C.), a principle
applied even before the effectivity of the new Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Laches; The defense of laches applies independently of
prescription.—Laches is different from prescription. As this Court held in Nielson &
Co., Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., the defense of laches applies
independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay,
laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity
being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the
parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas
prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Essential elements of laches.—The essential
elements of laches are the following: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of
one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made
and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct
and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief
is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
Same; Same; Same; Property; Possession; Since good faith is always presumed
and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of
Page 66 of 206
proof.—We find no circumstance in this case to have alerted the vendee, the City of
Dagupan, to a possible flaw or defect in the authority of the judicial administrator to
sell the property. Since good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad
faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof, it was incumbent upon the
administrator to establish such proof, which We find to be wanting. However, Article
528 of the Civil Code provides that: “Possession acquired in good faith does not lose
this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.” The
filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of
good faith.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If there are no other facts from which
the interruption of good faith may be determined, and an action is filed to recover
possession, good faith ceases from the date of receipt of the summons to appear at the
trial and if such date does not appear in the record, that of the filing of the answer
would control.—In Tacas vs. Tobon, this Court held that if there are no other facts
from which the interruption of good faith may be determined, and an action is filed to
recover possession, good faith ceases from the date of receipt of the summons to
appear at the trial and if such date does not appear in the record, that of the filing of
the answer would control.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a possessor in good faith, the City
of Dagupan was entitled to all the fruits of the property and was under no obligation
to pay any rental to the intestate estate of Margarita for the use thereof. —The date of
service of summons to the City of Dagupan in Civil Case No. D-1785 is not clear from
the record. Its Answer, however, was filed on 5 November 1965. Accordingly, its
possession in good faith must be considered to have lasted up to that date. As a
possessor in good faith, it was entitled to all the fruits of the property and was under
no obligation to pay any rental to the intestate estate of Margarita for the use thereof.
Under Article 544 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
received before the possession is legally interrupted.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The issue presented in this case is the validity of a sale of a parcel of land by
the administrator of an intestate estate made pursuant to a petition for
authority to sell and an order granting it which were filed and entered,
respectively, without notice to the heirs of the decedents.
The records disclose that on 12 June 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died
intestate. She was survived by her husband Severo Maneclang and nine (9)
children. On 30 July 1947, a petition for the settlement of her estate was filed
by Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate children, with the Court of First
Instance at Dagupan City, Pangasinan; the case was docketed as Special
Proc. No. 3028. At the time of the filing of the petition, the ages of her children
were as follows:

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Hector Maneclang –– 21 years old
Cesar Maneclang –– 19
Oscar Maneclang –– 17
Amanda Maneclang –– 16
Adelaida Meneclang –– 13
Linda Maneclang –– 7
Priscila Maneclang –– 6
Natividad Maneclang –– 3
Teresita Maneclang –– 2
No guardian ad litem was appointed by the court for the minor children.
Margarita left several parcels of land, among which is Lot No. 203 of the
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan City containing an area of 7, 401 square meters,
more or less , and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1393.
On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate

estate of Margarita, filed a petition in SP Proc. No. 3028 asking the court to
give him "the authority to dispose of so much of the estate that is necessary to
meet the debts enumerated" in the petition. While notice thereof was given to
the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo
Guadiz, no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.
On 9 September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate
court issued an Order "authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so
much of the properties of the estate for the purposes (sic) of paying off the
obligations" referred to in the petition.
Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator of the

intestate estate, executed on 4 October 1952 a deed of sale 1 in favor of the
City of Dagupan, represented by its mayor, Angel B. Fernandez, of a portion
consisting of 4,415 square meters of the aforementioned Lot No. 203 for and
in consideration of P11,687.50. This sale was approved by the intestate court
on 15 March 1954.
The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and constructed
thereon a public market, known as the Perez Boulevard Public Market, at a
cost of P100,00.00, more or less. It has been in continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the property since the construction of the market. 2
Some other parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate were sold by the
administrator pursuant of the same authority granted by the 9 September 1949
Order. 3

Page 68 of 206
On 28 September 1965, the new judicial administratrix of the intestate estate,
Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter of the late Margarita Suri Santos, filed with
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the
sales made by the previous administrator pursuant to the order of 9
September 1949, cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and damages
against the vendees Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun, Marcelo Operaña and
Aurora Pagurayan, Crispino Tandoc and Brigida Tandoc, Jose Infante and
Mercedes Uy Santos, Roberto Cabugao, Basilisa Callanta and Fe Callanta,
Ricardo Bravo and Francisca Estrada, the City of Dagupan, and Constantino
Daroya and Marciana Caramat. 4 The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. D-1785. The cause of action against the City of Dagupan centers around
the deed of sale executed in its favor on 4 October 1952 by former judicial
administrator Oscar S. Maneclang. In its Answer filed on 5 November 1965, 5
the City of Dagupan interposed the following affirmative defenses: (a) the sale
in its favor is valid, legal and above board; (b) plaintiff has no cause of action
against it, or that the same, if any, had prescribed since the complaint was
filed thirteen (13) years after the execution of the sale; (c) plaintiff is barred by
estoppel and laches; (d) it is a buyer in good faith; and (e) it has introduced
necessary and useful improvements and contructed a supermarket worth
P200,000.00; hence, assuming arguendo that the sale was illegal, it has the
right to retain the land and the improvements until it is reimbursed for the said
improvements.
On 30 March 1966, plaintiff and the City of Dagupan entered into a Stipulation
of Facts wherein they agreed on the facts earlier adverted to. They, however,
agreed: (a) to adduce evidence concerning the reasonable rental of the
property in question and other facts not embodied therein but which are
material and vital to the final determination of the case, and (b) to request the
court to take judicial notice of SP Proc. No. 3028.
The evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang was

induced by its then incumbent Mayor, Atty. Angel B. Fernandez, to sell the
property to the City of Dagupan and that the said City has been leasing the
premises out to numerous tenants at the rate of P0.83 per square meter per
month, or a total monthly rental of P3,747.45, since 4 October 1952. 6
On 9 November 1966, the trial court rendered a partial decision in Civil Case
No. D-1785 against the City of Dagupan, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby

renders judgment:

Page 69 of 206
(a) Annulling (sic) the Deed of Sale executed by the Administrator on
October 4, 1952 (Exh. F) being null and void ab initio;
(b) Ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Title issued in favor of the
defendant City of Dagupan by virtue of said Deed of Sale, and directing the
Register of Deeds of said City to issue a new Certificate of Title in favor of
the plaintiff as Administratrix covering the property in question;
(c) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to restore the possession to

the plaintiff in her capacity as Judicial Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of Margarita Suri Santos of the parcel of land in question, together with all
the improvements thereon existing;
(d) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan City to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P584,602.20 as accumulated rentals or reasonable value of the use of
the property in question from October 4, 1952 up to the filing of the
complaint in 1985, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from
the later date;
(e) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay a monthly rental or

reasonable value of its occupation of the premises in the amount of
P3,747.45 from October 9, 1985 up to the date the possession of the
premises is delivered (sic) the plaintiff by said defendant, and
(f) Ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant City of Dagupan the
sums of P100,000.00 and P11,687.50 both amounts to be deducted from
the amount due the plaintiff from said defendant.
Defendant shall also pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 7
In arriving at the said disposition, the trial court held that:
(a) Under Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, 8 which is similar to the provisions
of Section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is essential and mandatory
that the interested parties be given notices of the application for authority to
sell the estate or any portion thereof which is pending settlement in a
probate court. As held in the early case of Estate of Gamboa vs. Floranza,
9
an order issued by a probate court for the sale of real property belonging
to the estate of a deceased person would be void if no notice for the
hearing of the petition for such sale is given as required by said Section
722. Under this section, when such a petition is made, the court shall

Page 70 of 206
designate a time and place for the hearing and shall require notice of such
hearing to be given in a newspaper of general circulation; moreover, the
court may require the giving of such further notice as it deems proper.
In the instant case, no notice of the application was given to the heirs;
hence, both the order granting authority to sell and the deed of sale
executed in favor of the City of Dagupan pursuant thereto, are null and
void.
(b) Estoppel does not lie against plaintiff as no estoppel can be predicated
on an illegal act and estoppel is founded on ignorance. In the instant case,
the nullity is by reason of the non-observance of the requirements of law
regarding notice; this legal defect or deficiency deprived the probate court
of its jurisdiction to dispose of the property of the estate. Besides, the City
of Dagupan was represented in the transaction by lawyers who are
presumed to know the law. This being the case, they should not be allowed
to plead estoppel; finally, estoppel cannot give validity to an act which is
prohibited by law or is against public policy. 10
(c) Laches and prescription do not apply. The deed of sale being void ab
initio, it is in contemplation of law inexistent and therefore the right of the
plaintiff to bring the action for the declaration of inexistence of such
contract does not prescribe. 11
(d) The City of Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith and for value as
the former judicial administrator, Oscar Maneclang, testified that he was
induced by then incumbent Mayor of the City Councilor Atty. Teofilo
Guadiz, Sr. to sell the property; moreover, the City Fiscal signed as witness
to the deed of sale. These lawyers are presumed to know the law.
Not satisfied with the decision, the City of Dagupan appealed to this Court 12
alleging that said decision is contrary to law, the facts and the evidence on
record, and that the amount involved exceeds P500,000.00.
In its Brief, the City of Dagupan submits the following assigned errors:
FIRST ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE

EXECUTED BY THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR TO THE CITY OF
DAGUPAN IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
SECOND ERROR

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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN
ESTOPPEL FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF THE SALE.
THIRD ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT

ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.
FOURTH ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT DEFENDANT CITY

OF DAGUPAN IS NOT A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR
VALUE.
FIFTH ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT CITY OF

DAGUPAN TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF P584,602.20 AS
ACCUMULATED RENTALS OR REASONABLE VALUE OF (sic) THE USE
OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION FROM OCTOBER 4, 1952 UP TO
THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN 1965, PLUS INTEREST THEREON
AT THE RATE OF 6% PER ANNUM FROM THE LATER DATE.
SIXTH ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT CITY

OF DAGUPAN TO PAY A MONTHLY RENTAL OR REASONABLE VALUE
OF (sic) ITS OCCUPATION OF THE PREMISES IN THE AMOUNT OF
P3,747,45 FROM OCTOBER 9, 1965 UP TO THE DATE THE
POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES IS DELIVERED TO THE PLAINTIFF
BY SAID DEFENDANT.
We shall consider these assigned errors sequentially.
1. In support of the first, appellant maintains that notice of the application for
authority to sell was given to Severo Maneclang, surviving spouse of
Margarita. As the designated legal representative of the minor children in
accordance with Article 320 of the Civil Code, notice to him is deemed
sufficient notice to the latter; moreover, after Oscar Maneclang signed the
deed of sale 13 in his capacity as judicial administrator, he "sent copies of his
annual report and the deed of sale to Severo Maneclang, and his brothers
Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang and sister Amanda Maneclang, all of
legal ages (sic), while the other minor heirs received theirs through his
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lawyer." 14 Besides, per Flores vs. Ang Bansing, 15 the sale of property by the
judicial administrator cannot be set aside on the sole ground of lack of notice.
These contentions are without merit.
Article 320 of the Civil Code does not apply. While the petition for authority to
sell was filed on 2 September 1949, the Civil Code took effect only on 30
August 1950. 16 Thus, the governing law at the time of the filing of the petition
was Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain which provides as follows:
The father, or in his default, the mother, shall be the legal administrator of
the property of the children who are subject to parental authority.
However, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on guardianship

impliedly repealed those of the Civil Code relating to that portion of the patria
potestad (parental authority) which gave to the parents the administration and
usufruct of their minor children's property; said parents were however entitled,
under normal conditions, to the custody and care of the persons of their minor
children. 17
Article 320 of the present Civil Code, taken from the aforesaid Article 159,
incorporates the amendment that if the property under administration is worth
more than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), the father or the mother shall give
a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. This provision
then restores the old rule 18 which made the father or mother, as such, the
administrator of the child's property. Be that as it may, it does not follow that
for purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the
Rules of the Court, notice to the father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4
and 7 of said Rule state explicitly that the notice, which must be in be writing,
must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a
time and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be given to the
interested parties.
There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or
by a guardian ad litem in the case of the minors, the notice may be given to
such counsel or guardian ad litem. In this case, however, only the surviving
spouse, Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the
heirs, Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age,
were not represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still
minors with no guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them.
Obviously then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set
forth in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without
them, the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be
null and void ab initio. 19 The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs,
Page 73 of 206
as the presumptive owners 20 since they succeed to all the rights and
obligations of the deceased from the moment of the latter's death, 21 are the
persons directly affected by the sale or mortage and therefore cannot be
deprived of the property except in the manner provided by law.
Consequently, for want of notice to the children, the Order of 9 September

1949 granting the application, the sale in question of 4 October 1952 and the
Order of 15 March 1954 approving the sale are all void ab initio as against
said children. Severo Maneclang, however, stands on different ground
altogether. Having been duly notified of the application, he was bound by the
said order, sale and approval of the latter. However, the only interest which
Severino Maneclang would have over the property is his right of usufruct
which is equal to that corresponding by way of legitime pertaining to each of
the surviving children pursuant to Article 834 of the Civil Code of Spain, the
governing law at that time since Margarita Suri Santos died before the
effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
2 Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the administratrix of the

estate and against the children.
As to the former, this Court, in Boñaga vs. Soler, supra, reiterated the rule
"that a decedent's representative is not estopped to question the validity of his
own void deed purporting to convey land; 22 and if this be true of the
administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not be estopped
to question the acts of his predecessor are not conformable to law." 23 Not
being the party who petitioned the court for authority to sell and who executed
the sale, she cannot be held liable for any act or omission which could give
rise to estoppel. Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, through estoppel an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. In
estoppel by pais, as related to the party sought to be estopped, it is necessary
that there be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) conduct amounting
to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated
to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent
with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at
least expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced
by the other party; and (c) knowledge, actual or constructive of the actual
facts. 24 In estoppel by conduct, on the other hand, (a) there must have been a
representation or concealment of material facts; (c) the party to whom it was
made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and (d) it must have
been made with the intention that the other party would act upon it. 25
As to the latter, considering that, except as to Oscar Maneclang who executed

the deed of sale in his capacity as judicial administrator, the rest of the heirs

Page 74 of 206
did not participate in such sale, and considering further that the action was
filed solely by the administratrix without the children being impleaded as
parties plaintiffs or intervenors, there is neither rhyme nor reason to hold these
heirs in estoppel. For having executed the deed of sale, Oscar Maneclang is
deemed to have assented to both the motion for and the actual order granting
the authority to sell. Estoppel operates solely against him.
3 As to prescription, this Court ruled in the Boñaga case that "[a]ctions to

declare the inexsistence of contracts do not prescribe (Art. 1410, N.C.C.), a
principle applied even before the effectivity of the new Civil Code
4. Laches is different from prescription. As the court held in Nielsen & Co. Inc .
vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.,26 the defense of laches applies
independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of
delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of
time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be
enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the
property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not.
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is
based on fixed time, laches is not.
The essential elements of laches are the following: (1) conduct on the part of
the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which
he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief
is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. 27
In the instant case, from time the deed of sale in favor of the City of Dagupan
was executed on 4 October 1952, up to the time of the filing of the complaint
for annulment on 28 September 1965, twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-four (24) days had elapsed.
The respective ages of the children of Margarita Suri Santos on these two
dates were, more or less, as follows:
Upon execution At the filing of the deed of sale of the complaint
Hector Maneclang 26 39
Cesar Maneclang 24 37
Oscar Maneclang 22 35

Page 75 of 206
Amanda Maneclang 21 34
Adelaida Maneclang 18 31
Linda Maneclang 12 25
Priscila Maneclang 11 24
Natividad Maneclang 8 20
Teresita Maneclang 7 20
It is an undisputed fact that the City of Dagupan immediately took possession

of the property and constructed thereon a public market; such possession was
open, uninterrupted and continuous. Obviously, Hector, Cesar, Oscar and
Amanda were already of legal age when the deed of sale was executed. As it
was Oscar who executed the deed of sale, he cannot be expected to
renounce his own act. With respect to Hector, Cesar and Amanda, they should
have taken immediate steps to protect their rights. Their failure to do so for
thirteen (13) years amounted to such inaction and delay as to constitute
laches. This conclusion, however, cannot apply to the rest of the children —
who were then minors and not represented by any legal representative. They
could not have filed an action to protect their interests; hence, neither delay
nor negligence could be attributed to them as a basis for laches. Accordingly,
the estate is entitled to recover 5/9 of the questioned property.
5. In ruling out good faith, the trial court took into account the testimony of
Oscar Maneclang to the effect that it was Mayor Fernandez of Dagupan City
and Councilor Teofilo Guadiz, Sr., both lawyers, who induced him to sell the
property and that the execution of the sale was witnessed by the City Fiscal.
We are unable to agree.
While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was actually issued on
9 September 1949, the same was secured during the incumbency of the then
judicial administrator Pedro Feliciano. Even if it is to be assumed that Mayor
Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz induced Oscar Maneclang to sell the
property, the fact remains that there was already the order authorizing the
sale. Having been issued by a Judge who was lawfully appointed to his
position, he was disputably presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction and that his official duty was regularly performed. 28 It was not
incumbent upon them to go beyond the order to find out if indeed there was a
valid motion for authority to sell. Otherwise, no order of any court can be relied
upon by the parties. Under Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good
faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw which invalidates it; furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good faith. It implies freedom from
knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. 29 We
find no circumstance in this case to have alerted the vendee, the City of

Page 76 of 206
Dagupan, to a possible flaw or defect in the authority of the judicial
administrator to sell the property. Since good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden
of proof, 30 it was incumbent upon the administrator to established such proof,
which We find to be wanting. However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides
that: "Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in
the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is
not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully." The filing
of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation
of good faith.
In Tacas vs. Tobon, 31 this Court held that if there are no other facts from
which the interruption of good faith may be determined, and an action is filed
to recover possession, good faith ceases from the date of receipt of the
summons to appear at the trial and if such date does not appear in the record,
that of the filing of the answer would control. 32
The date of service of summons to the City of Dagupan in Civil Case No. D-
1785 is not clear from the record. Its Answer, however, was filed on 5
November 1965. Accordingly, its possession in good faith must be considered
to have lasted up to that date. As a possessor in good faith, it was entitled to
all the fruits of the property and was under no obligation to pay rental to the
intestate of Margarita for the use thereof. Under Article 544 of the Civil Code,
a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the
possession is legally interrupted. Thus, the trial court committed an error when
it ordered the City of Dagupan to pay accumulated rentals in the amount of
P584,602.20 from 4 October 1952 up to the filing of the complaint.
6. However, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan already
became a possessor in bad faith. This brings Us to the issue of reasonable
rentals, which the trial court fixed at P3,747.45 a month. The basis thereof is
the monthly earnings of the city from the lessees of the market stalls inside the
Perez Boulevard Supermarket. The lesses were paying rental at the rate of
P0.83 per square meter. Appellant maintains that this is both unfair and unjust.
The property in question is located near the Chinese cemetery and at the time
of the questioned sale, it had no access to the national road, was located "in
the hinterland" and, as admitted by the former judicial administrator, Oscar
Maneclang, the persons who built houses thereon prior to the sale paid only
P6.00 to P8.00 as monthly rentals and the total income from them amounted
only to P40.00 a month. Appellant contends that it is this income which should
be made the basis for determining the reasonable rental for the use of the
property.

Page 77 of 206
There is merit in this contention since indeed, if the rental value of the property
had increased, it would be because of the construction by the City of Dagupan
of the public market and not as a consequence of any act imputable to the
intestate estate. It cannot, however, be denied that considering that the
property is located within the city, its value would never decrease; neither can
it be asserted that its price remained constant. On the contrary, the land
appreciated in value at least annually, if not monthly. It is the opinion of this
Court that the reasonable compensation for the use of the property should be
fixed at P1,000.00 a month. Taking into account the fact that Severo
Maneclang, insofar as his usufructuary right is concerned, but only until his
death, is precluded from assailing the sale, having been properly notified of
the motion for authority to sell and considering further that the heirs, Hector,
Cesar, Oscar and Amanda, all surnamed Maneclang, are, as discussed
above, barred by laches, only those portions of the monthly rentals which
correspond to the presumptive shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad
and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang, to the extent untouched by the
usufructuary right of Severo Maneclang, should be paid by the City of
Dagupan. There is no showing as to when Severo Maneclang died; this date
of death is necessary to be able to determine the cessation of his usufructuary
right and the commencement of the full enjoyment of the fruits of the property
by the unaffected heirs. Under the circumstances, and for facility of
computation, We hereby fix the presumptive shares in the rentals of the
aforenamed unaffected heirs at P500.00 a month, or at P100.00 each,
effective 5 November 1965 until the City of Dagupan shall have effectively
delivered to the intestate estate 5/9 of the property in question. The latter,
however, shall reimburse the City of Dagupan of that portion of the real estate
taxes it had paid on the land corresponding to 5/9 of the lot commencing from
taxable year 1965 until said 5/9 part is effectively delivered to the intestate
estate.
Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the City of Dagupan may retain
possession of the property until it shall have been fully reimbursed the value of
the building in the amount of P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price
amounting to P6,493.05
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision in all

respects, except to the extent as above modified. As modified, (a) the sale in
favor of the City of Dagupan, executed on 4 October 1952 (Exhibit "F"), is
hereby declared null and void; however, by reason of estoppel and laches as
abovestated, only 5/9 of the subject property representing the presumptive
shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all surnamed
Maneclang, may be recovered; (b) subject, however, to its right to retain the
property until it shall have been refunded the amounts of P100,000.00 and
P6,493.05, the City of Dagupan is hereby ordered to reconvey to the intestate
estate of Margarita Suri Santos 5/9 of the property in question, for which
Page 78 of 206
purpose said parties shall cause the appropriate partition thereof, expenses
for which shall be borne by them proportionately; and (c) the City of Dagupan
is further ordered to pay reasonable compensation for the use of 5/9 of the
property in question at the rate of P500.00 a month from 5 November 1965
until it shall have effectively delivered the possession of the property to the
intestate estate of Margarita Suri Santos. Upon the other hand, said intestate
estate is hereby ordered to refund to the City of Dagupan that portion of the
real estate taxes the latter had paid for the lot corresponding to 5/9 thereof
effective taxable year 1965 and until the latter shall have delivered to said
intestate estate. SO ORDERED.

Page 79 of 206
[10] G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993
HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO and DEMOSTHENES P. ACEBEDO,

petitioners, vs. HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL ACEBEDO,
ALEXANDER ACEBEDO, NAPOLEON ACEBEDO, RIZALINO ACEBEDO,
REPUBLICA ACEBEDO, FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and YU HWA PING,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Probate; Jurisdiction; It is within the

jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased
person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication.—In the case of Dillena vs.
Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of
the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter
should be threshed out in a separate action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state
that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a
special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is
necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.—The Court further elaborated
that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable
property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made
with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a
probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted
within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that court approval is necessary for the
validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate.—Petitioners herein anchor their
claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. It is settled that court approval is
necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. However,
reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of the
heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the
heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever
right, interest or participation he may have in the property under administration.—
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever
right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration. This
is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s
property even if the same is under administration is based on the Civil Code.—The
right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property, even if the same is under
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the
Page 80 of 206
moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there
are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling,
alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common.—The Civil
Code, under the provisions on co-owner-ship, further qualifies this right. Although it
is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. In other
words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his
ideal share in the property held in common.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale

executed by respondents-heirs and ordering herein administrator-petitioner
Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of said properties, despite
the absence of its prior approval as a probate court, is being challenged in the
case at bar.
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate
properties located in Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative
estimated value of about P30 million. Said estate allegedly has only the
following unsettled claims:
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due

Quezon City;
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City;
c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator

Miguel Acebedo, and the incumbent Administrator Herodotus
Acebedo; and
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners
herein, and the others are the private respondents.

Page 81 of 206
Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for
sixteen years, respondents-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on
October 4, 1989. The said sale involved the properties covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are
registered in Quezon City, and form part of the estate. The consideration for
said lots was twelve (12) million pesos and by that time, they already had a
buyer. It was further stated in said Motion that respondents-heirs have already
received their proportionate share of the six (6) million pesos paid by the
buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of P6,000,000.00 is
more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they
prayed for the Court to direct the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo (referred
to as petitioner-administrator hereafter):
1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;
2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against

the Estate; and
3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement

of the Estate.
To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an

"Opposition to Approval of Sale", to wit:
1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold
some real estate property of the Estate located at Balintawak,
Quezon City, without the knowledge of the herein
administrator, without the approval of this Honorable Court
and of some heirs, and at a shockingly low price;
2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement

objection to the approval of the sale, perpetrated in a manner
which can even render the proponents of the sale liable for
punishment for contempt of this Honorable Court;
3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this

Honorable Court to authorize the sale of the above mentioned
property of the Estate to generate funds to pay certain
liabilities of the Estate and with the approval of this Honorable
Court if warranted, to give the heirs some advances
chargeable against theirs (sic) respective shares, and, for the
purpose to authorize the herein Administrator, and the other
heirs to help the Administrator personally or through a broker,

Page 82 of 206
to look for a buyer for the highest obtainable price, subject
always to the approval of this Honorable Court.1
On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-

five (45) days within which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the
properties at a price higher than P12,000,000.00.
The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date,
petitioners have not found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they asked
the Court, on February 8, 1990, for an in extendible period of thirty days to
look for a buyer.
Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a

public document against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on
February 26, 1990. He initiated this complaint upon learning that it was Yu
Hwa Ping who caused the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale
wherein allegedly petitioner-administrator's signature was made to appear. He
also learned that after he confronted the notary public of the questioned
document, the latter revoked his notarial act on the same.
On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the

declaration by the Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the
Deed of Absolute Sale.
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a
buyer, petitioner Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting
them several periods within which to look for a better buyer. Respondents filed
a comment thereon.
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months,
petitioner-administrator filed another "Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated
May 10, 1990, maintaining that the sale should wait for the country to recover
from the effects of the coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the properties should
be divided among the heirs.
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage
and Lease some of the Properties of the Estate". To this Motion, respondents
filed an Opposition on the following grounds : that the motion is not proper
because of the pending motion to approve the sale of the same properties;
that said conditional sale was initiated by petitioner-administrator who had
earlier signed a receipt for P500,000.00 as earnest money; that the approval
of the sale would mean Yu Hwa Ping's assumption of payment of the realty

Page 83 of 206
taxes; that the estate has no further debts and thus, the intestate administrator
may be terminated.
On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive

portion of which, stated, among others, to wit: 2
b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4,

1989, praying that the new administrator be directed to sell
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145
and 18709, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied; and
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage

some properties of the estate at a just and reasonable
amount, subject to the approval of the Court.
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call

the parties to a conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held,
but still the parties were unable to arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4,
1991, it was continued, wherein the parties actually agreed that the heirs be
allowed to sell their shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price
already agreed upon, while herein petitioners negotiate for a higher price with
Yu Hwa Ping.
Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of

the Deed of Conditional Sale.
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the
dispositive portion of which states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby

lifted, reconsidered and set aside, and another one is hereby
issued as follows:
1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989,

executed by the heirs-movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping,
pertaining to their respective shares in the properties covered
by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City;
2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the

remaining portions of the said properties also in favor of Yu
Hwa Ping at the same price as the sale executed by the
herein heirs-movants;

Page 84 of 206
3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total
remaining balance of the purchase price for the said lots
within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice hereof;
4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in

contempt of court, resulting from his failure to submit the
owner's copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and 120145 is hereby
denied.3
Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the

purchase price for the properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the
amount of P6,500,000.00.
Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty
one (21) days thereafter, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that
the Court reinstate its Order of August 17, 1990. To this, private respondents
filed their Opposition.4
Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration. The motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were
denied by the respondent Court on August 23, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial

Reconsideration, hoping for the last time that they would be able to convince
the Court that its Order dated March 29, 1991 in effect approving the
conditional sale is erroneous and beyond its jurisdiction.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration for "lack of merit".
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the

Order dated March 29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners
filed this Petition for Certiorari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within
the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs
without prior court approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the
remaining portion of said properties?
We answer in the positive?

Page 85 of 206
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court made a pronouncement
that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of
properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in
a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not
specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate
of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of
the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate
court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted
within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional
Sale.
We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said

conditional sale is null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale
precisely was made conditional, the condition being that the same should first
be approved by the probate court.
Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of

Court.6 It is settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent's estate. However, reference to judicial approval
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their
ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs. 7
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell
whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under
administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the
probate court.8
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is
under administration, is based on the Civil Code provision 9 stating that the
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs. 10
The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this
right.11 Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus
may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
Page 86 of 206
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.12 In other words, the law
does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal
share in the property held in common.13
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of
property under administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols,
et al.,14 it was said that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance,
subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise, stands in the
way of such administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the Old
Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 339 which are still in force as Article 533
and Article 493, respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the
words of a noted civilist, Manresa: "Upon the death of a person, each of his
heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the
part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership
being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains
undivided'."
Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a

matter which is unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established
private respondents' right to alienate the decedent's property subject of
administration, this Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.
SO ORDERED.

Page 87 of 206
[11] G.R. No. L-44664 July 31, 1991
BERNARDO MENDOZA I, BERNARDO MENDOZA II, GUADALUPE M.

MANGALE, JULIANA M. SAMONTE, PACITA M. SAMONTE, RICARDO
MENDOZA, FRANCISCO MENDOZA, PATRICIA MENDOZA, OLYMPIA M.
DIZON, ROMEO MENDOZA, REYNALDO MENDOZA, REMEDIOS M.
BERNABE and TRINIDAD MANUEL MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, RENATO SAMONTE and LUCIA DELA CRUZ
SAMONTE, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Co-Ownership; Where there are two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs.—
In this case, the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession.
Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs (Article 1078 of the Civil Code).
Petitioners’ co-ownership over Lot 3 was extinguished when it was subdivided into
Lot 3-A and Lot 3-B, which portions were concretely determined and technically
described (see de la Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-27759, April 17, 1970, 32 SCRA 307).
Against the impetuous denial of petitioners that Lot 3 has been partitioned (pp. 19, 96,
121, Rollo) is Exhibit A which is the Subdivision Plan of Lot 3, (LRC) PSD-17370,
dated September 7, 1961, duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration.
Same; Same; Same; Redemption; If the property has been partitioned or an

identified share has been sold, then there is no longer any right of legal redemption.—
We resolve the second issue based on the previous discussion that the co-ownership
has been extinguished. Article 1620 of the Civil Code applies only if the co-ownership
still exists. If the property has been partitioned or an identified share has been sold,
there is no longer any right of legal redemption.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to nullify the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 23, 1976, in C.A G.R. No. 56049-R entitled
"Bernardo Mendoza I, et al. v. Renato Samonte, et al.," which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan; and its resolution dated
September 15, 1976, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are, as follows:
On February 18, 1969, petitioners Bernardo Mendoza I, Bernardo Mendoza II,

Guadalupe M. Mangale, Juliana M. Samonte, Pacita M. Samonte, Ricardo
Mendoza, Francisco Mendoza, Patricia Mendoza, Olympia M. Dizon, Romeo
Mendoza, Reynaldo Mendoza, Remedios M. Bernabe and Trinidad Manuel
Page 88 of 206
Mendoza instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an action for
reconveyance of real property against private respondents spouses Renato
Samonte and Lucia de la Cruz Samonte. On October 27, 1970, petitioners
filed a First Amended Complaint wherein they alleged that in the event that the
sale of the real property by petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza to private
respondents is declared valid, they are nonetheless entitled to legal
redemption.
During the pre-trial on June 28, 1971, the parties, through their respective
counsel, submitted the following partial stipulation of facts
1. Plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the late Arcadio Mendoza of Barrio Taliptip,
Bulacan, Bulacan; plaintiff Trinidad Manuel being the surviving spouse of
said Arcadio Mendoza and the rest of the plaintiffs being the legitimate
children of spouses Arcadio Mendoza (deceased) and Trinidad Manuel;
2. Arcadio Mendoza and Trinidad Manuel were married on April 22, 1923, in
the Catholic Church, Parish of Bulacan, Bulacan;
3. Areadio Mendoza died in the Barrio of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, on

November 4, 1944;
4. The late Arcadio Mendoza left properties, real and personal, among which
is the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 12192 of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, situated at Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan,
consisting of nine (9) parcels of land, with an aggregate area of 33,398
square meters; . . .;
5. The property in question is Lot 3-A, which is a portion of Lot 3, which Lot
3-A is more particularly described as follows:
(A parcel of land (Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd17370,

being a portion of Lot 3, described on plan Psu-51078, LRC (GLRO)
Record No. 32994), situated in the Barrio of Taliptip, Municipality of
Bulacan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., points 1 to 2 by
(Lot 8, Psu-51078, Road Widening) Bulacan-Obando Provincial Road
(15-00 m. wide); on the SE., points 2 to 3 by property of Faustino
Samonte; on the SW., points 3 to 4 by property of Faustino Samonte;
and on the NW., points 4 to 1 by Lot 3-B of the Subdivision plan.
Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S, 30 deg. 52'E.,
3794.82 m. from BLLM 1, Mp. of Bulacan,
thence S. 49 deg. 38'E., 46.93 m. to point 2;

Page 89 of 206
thence S. 42 deg. 21 'W 49.94 m. to point 3;
thence N. 43 deg. 47'W., 47.33 m. to point 4;
thence N. 42 deg. 46'E., 45.14 m. to the point
of beginning containing an area of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED

AND THIRTY EIGHT (2,238) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All
points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground as follows: points 1 and 4 by PS. Cyl. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.,
and the rest of Old PLS. Stone Mons. 20x20x60 cm., bearings true;
declination O deg. 48'E date of the original survey, April 27, 1926 and
that of the subdivision survey, July 21, 1961.
6. Arcadio Mendoza acquired ownership over the above-mentioned nine (9)

parcels of land, including Lot 3, through donation from the late Jose
Samonte, which mode of acquisition was recognized and adjudicated by the
Court of Appeals in its decision dated September 23, 1964, in the case
entitled "Victor Samonte, et al. v. Maria Samonte, et al."; GR No. 22891-R; .
7. In the case decided by the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. No. 22891-R the
plaintiffs were:
VICTOR SAMONTE, AGATONA SAMONTE, ARTEMIO VILLANUEVA,

CELESTINO VILLANUEVA, RAMON VILLANUEVA, MERCEDES
VILLANUEVA, SANTOS VILLANUEVA, MAXIMO VILLANUEVA,
ALIPIO VILLANUEVA, SIXTO DE LOS REYES, JOSE DE LOS REYES,
LIGAYA DE LOS REYES, ELINO VILLANUEVA, CRISANTA
VILLANUEVA, PEDRO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS VILLANUEVA,
ARSENIO VILLANUEVA, BALTAZAR VILLANUEVA, OTILLA
VILLANUEVA, ENRIQUE VILLANUEVA, JOSE VILLANUEVA,
ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, MARTA MENDOZA, MARIA MENDOZA,
FELIPA VILLENA, ADELA ANDAYA, and MATIAS VILLANUEVA. (sic)
while the defendants were:
FAUSTINO SAMONTE, MARIA SAMONTE, BERNARDO MENDOZA,

GUADALUPE M. VDA. DE MANGALI, JULIANA MENDOZA, RAUL
SAMONTE, BERNARDO MENDOZA II, RICARDO MENDOZA,
FRANCISCO MENDOZA, PACITA MENDOZA, CAYETANO SAMONTE
and TRINIDAD MANUEL, in her own right and as guardian-ad-litem for
the minors, OLIMPIA, PATRICIA, REYNALDO, REMEDIOS and
ROMEO all surnamed MENDOZA;

Page 90 of 206
8. The aforementioned Lot 3 was subsequently subdivided into two (2)
lots, namely: Lot 3-A with an area of 2238 square meters and Lot 3-B
with an area of 2115 square meters, as shown in the Subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-17370, dated September 7, 1961, duly approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas;
9. One June 26,1962, plaintiff Trinidad Manuel Mendoza sold to

defendants, Renato Samonte and Lucia de la Cruz Samonte, Lot 3-A
10. The said "Dokumento ng Bilihan:" is written in Tagalog, signed by

plaintiff Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, as vendor, witnessed by plaintiffs
Juliana Mendoza and Pacita Mendoza Samonte, and notarized by
Atty. Pedro Magsalin;
11. In said "Dokumento ng Bilihan," plaintiff Trinidad Manuel Mendoza

declared the following:
Na sa aming kasunduan ng aking mga anak at ako, ang nasabing Lot 3-A
ay siyang aking kalahati sa nasabing Lot 3, na may kaunting lamang, at
ang Lot 3-B ay siyang nauukol sa aking mga anak na tunay nilang pag-
aari. (See first paragraph, page 3, Dokumento ng Bilihan, (Annex "C");
Na sa aking pakikpagkasundo (sic) sa aking mga anak at sa kanilang

kapasiyahan at kapahintulutan ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay siyang aking
ipinagbili sa magasawang (sic) Renato Samonte at Lucia de la Cruz,
alang-alang sa aming pangako na ipagbili sa nasabing magasawa ang
kalahati ng naturang Lot 3, na ang halaga ay matagal ng tinanggap namin
sa mga nakabiling magasawa. (see second paragraph, page 3, Dokumento
ng Bilihan, supra);
Na alang-alang (sic) sa halagang TATLONG LIBO AT LIMANG DAANG

PISO (P3,500.00), Salaping Pilipino (sic), na aking ng (sic) tinanggap na
may mga dalawang taon na sa magasawang (sic) RENATO SAMONTE at
LUCIA DE LA CRUZ, mga Pilipino (sic), may sapat na gulang at
naninirahan sa Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, ay aking ipinagbibili, isinasalin
at inililipat sa nasabing magasawang Renato Samonte at Lucia de la Cruz,
sa kanilang mga anak at tagapagmana ang Lot 3-A ng Lote 3, na
binabanggit sa itaas nito, pati ng pagkamayari at possesion (sic) ng
nasabing Lote 3-A, na walang pinanagutan (sic) kahit ano hanggang sa
petsang ito, at aking ipagtatangol sa ano mang habol sa Lote 3-A ang mga
bumiling magasawang (sic) Renato Samonte at Lucia de la Cruz sa sarili
kong pananagot.

Page 91 of 206
12. All the improvements in said Lot 3-A were placed therein by defendant
spouses Renato Samonte and Lucia de la Cruz Samonte.
WHEREFORE, parties herein respectfully pray that the foregoing

partial stipulation of facts be admitted, and that the above-entitled
case be set for hearing for purposes of receiving evidence insofar as
the contorverted (sic) facts are concerned.
Malolos, Bulacan, June 18, 1971.
(SGD.) ERNESTO M. TOMANENG
Counsel for the plaintiffs
Suite 507 Marvel Bldg. I
258 Juan Luna, Manila
(SGD.) FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR.
Counsel for the defendants
54 Dona (sic) Juana Rodriguez, St.
Quezon City
On October 15, 1973, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with
costs against petitioners, based on the following grounds (pp. 51-53,
Record on Appeal):
There are several issues raised by the plaintiffs in their pre-trial brief as
well as memorandum and foremost among them is the question
regarding the validity of the sale. According to the plaintiffs, the sale of
the disputed property in favor of the defendants was null and void
because as a mere co-owner of an undivided estate, Trinidad Mendoza
had no right to divided (sic) the estate into parts and then convey a part
thereof by metes and bounds to a third person. Such was the case,
according to the plaintiffs, since there had never been any partition,
judicial or extrajudicial, of the estate among the heirs of the late Arcadio
Mendoza.

Page 92 of 206
It is apparent that the resolution of this issue will depend on whether or
not the heirs of Arcadio Mendoza had already partitioned his estate and
in pursuance thereto, adjudicated the lot in question to the plaintiff
Trinidad Mendoza.
After examining the "Dokumento ng Bilihan," evidencing the sale of the lot in
question to the defendants, the Court is convinced that there was such an
agreement to partition the properties, including the one involved in this case,
left by the deceased Arcadio Mendoza. From paragraphs 4 and 5 of said
document it can readily be seen that the partition had been accomplished by
the heirs of Arcadio Mendoza. Said paragraphs, which read as follows,
clearly stated that it was the agreement among the surviving children and
wife of Arcadio Mendoza that Lot 3-A, which was the other half of Lot 3, was
to be the share of plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza while Lot 3-B would belong to
the children:
Na sa aming kasunduan ng aking mga anak at ako, ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay
siyang aking kalahati sa nasabing Lot 3, na may kaunting lamang, at ang Lot
3-B ay siyang nauukol sa aking mga anak na tunay nilang pagaari.
Na sa aking pakikipagkasundo sa aking mga anak at sa kanilang

kapasiyahan at kapahintulutan ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay siyang aking
ipinagbili sa magasawang (sic) Renato Samonte at Lucia dela Cruz, alang-
alang sa aming pangako na ipagbili sa nasabing magasawa (sic) ang
kalahati ng naturang Lot 3, na ang halaga ay matagal ng (sic) tinanggap (sic)
namin sa mga nakabiling magasawa (sic).
Indeed, it must habe (sic) been because of this agreement to partition the
estate, that Lot 3, from which the land in question came, was subdivided on
September 7, 1961 by a surveyor as stated in the second paragraph of said
deed of sale.
Na upang mahati humigit kumulang sa dalawang bahagi ang nasabing

Lote No. 3, ang isa ay para sa mga anak ng namatay na aking asawang
Arcadio Mendoza, at ang pangalawa ay para sa akin na tunay kong
pagaari (sic), ay ipinagawa namin ang ang (sic) plano de subdivision (LRC)
PSD-17370 petsa Sept. 7, 1961, aprobado ni G. Antonio H. Noblejas,
Comisionado ng Land Registration, at ang kinalabasan ay ang mga
sumusunod:
Lote 3-AArea 2238 sq. m.:

Page 93 of 206
It bears emphasis that according to the fourth paragraph of the "Dokumento
ng Bilihan" quoted above, the sale made by plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza of Lot
3-A to the defendants had the prior consent and approval of her children, the
other plaintiffs herein.
In the opinion of the Court, the paragraphs cited above constitute clear
admissions on the part of plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza, who executed said deed
of sale, and on the part of plaintiffs Pacita Samonte and Juliana Samonte, who
signed the same as witnesses, regarding the existence of the partition
agreement adjudicating to plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza the land in question
before it was sold to the defendants.
Of course, plaintiffs Trinidad Manuel, Pacita Samonte and Juliana

Samonte, who all took the stand, vehemently denied having read and
understood the contents of the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" which they
admittedly signed. According to plaintiff Trinidad Manuel, she affixed her
thumbmark on the document when her sister Lourdes Manuel, the mother
of defendant Renato Samonte, asked her to do so and promised to take
care of the "interests" of her children. On her part, Pacita Samonte claimed
that although she was able to read the title of the document, she did not
read the contents thereof, however, since she signed the same only upon
the assurance of her aunt that her mother Trinidad Mendoza, had already
given her conformity. Juliana Samonte also denied having read the
document but alleged that her failure to do so was due to her illness then.
But in the opinion of the Court, all these deals cannot prevail over the
presumption that the said plaintiffs understood the contents of the deed of
sale whtn (sic) they signed the same. For following the ordinary course of
human nature, one does not affix his signature on a legal document if he
does not understand the same. Besides, it appears that the "document
(sic) ng Bilihan" was written in a dialect spoken by and known to the said
plaintiffs who while on the stand all testified in the Tagalog dialect.
Moreover, according to plaintiff Romeo Mendoza, the son of plaintiff

Trinidad Mendoza, the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" was prepared by their
lawyer, Atty. Pedro Magsalin who according to the defendant Renato
Samonte read the same to the plaintiffs Trinidad Mendoza, Juliana and
Pacita Samonte before the latter affixed their respective signatures, a fact
which is not improbable.
Indeed, there is another circumstance showing why the denials of plaintiffs

Trinidad Mendoza, Juliana and Pacita Samonte cannot be given much
credit. These three plaintiffs testified that they did not know the contents of
the deed of sale not only at the time they signed it but also after they had

Page 94 of 206
executed the same. Yet, the undeniable fact remains that after the
execution of said deed of sale in 1962, the defendants started building their
house on the lot in question in barrio Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. The failure
of said plaintiffs and of the other plaintiffs to stop or even question the
defendants regarding the construction of their house on the lot in question,
which was being built openly in the vicinity where they all resided, can only
mean that the plaintiffs knew that the defendants had a right to build on the
disputed property.
Considering the finding of the Court that Lot 3-A, the property in question,
was the subject of a partition agreement and was adjudicated to plaintiff
Trinidad Mendoza, it follows that said property was no longer held in co-
ownership by the plaintiffs at the time that it was sold to the defendants.
Such being the case, the provisions of Article 1620 of the Civil Code,
allowing a co-owner to exercise the right of redemption, cannot be applied.
To summarize, the trial court took into account the following in

dismissing petitioners' complaint: (1) the pertinent provisions of the
"Dokumento ng Bilihan" to prove that Lot 3 has been subdivided and
that Lot 3-A has been adjudicated to petitioner Trinidad Manuel
Mendoza; (2) the presumption that petitioners Trinidad Manuel
Mendoza, Pacita Samonte and Juliana Mendoza understood the
contents of the document when they signed it; (3) estoppel on the part
of petitioners; and (4) non-applicability of Article 1620 of the Civil
Code.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court (p. 40, Rollo).1âwphi1 The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 70,
Rollo) Hence, the present petition.
The issues are whether or not: (1) the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" is valid; and (2)
petitioners can still exercise the right of legal redemption.
According to petitioners, on June 26, 1962, when the alleged "Dokumento ng

Bilihan" was executed by Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, Lot 3-A was still under
litigation for it was only on September 23, 1964, that C.A.-G.R. No. 22891-R
was decided by the respondent court. This being the case, petitioners have
not executed any agreement of partition, judicial or extrajudicial. As held by
the respondent court in C.A.-G.R. No. 22891-R, Lot 3-A (and other lots) was
donated by Jose Samonte to Arcadio Mendoza for which reason, petitioner
Trinidad Manuel Mendoza is not entitled to one-half (1/2) of Lot 3 but only to
the share of one (1) legitimate child or 1/13 rights and interests, citing Article
996 of the Civil Code.1 The "Dokumento ng Bilihan" is null and void insofar as
it affects the rights and interests of the other petitioners because petitioner

Page 95 of 206
Trinidad Manuel Mendoza can only sell her 1/13 rights and interests over Lot
3-A and not more than that. Corollarily, the remaining petitioners can still
exercise the right of legal redemption, conformably with Article 1620 of the
Civil Code.2
Disputing these allegations of petitioners, private respondents contend that

petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza declared under oath in the "Dokumento
ng Bilihan" that Lot 3-A was given to her by virtue of an agreement of partition
between her and her children. She declared further that the land in question
was sold by her to private respondents with the knowledge and consent of her
children. The amount paid therefor was known to her and her children. The
document was written in Tagalog, the dialect in Bulacan. It was signed by
petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, as vendor, witnessed by petitioners
Pacita Samonte and Juliana Mendoza and prepared and notarized by Atty.
Pedro Magsalin, the family lawyer of petitioners. Having participated in,
consented to and/or benefited from the sale, petitioners are estopped from
impugning the validity and enforcesbility thereof.
Likewise, We affirm.
In resolving the first issue, We have to settle two (2) sub-issues: (1) has Lot 3
been partitioned; and (2) if so, has the subject lot been adjudicated to
petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza? In this case, the source of co-ownership
among the heirs was intestate succession. Where there are two or more heirs,
the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by
such heirs (Article 1078 of the Civil Code). Petitioners' co-ownership over Lot
3 was extinguished when it was subdivided into Lot 3-A and Lot 3-B, which
portions were concretely determined and technically described (see de la Cruz
v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-27759, April 17, 1970, 32 SCRA 307). Against the
impetuous denial of petitioners that Lot 3 has been partitioned (pp. 19, 96,
121, Rollo) is Exhibit A which is the Subdivision Plan of Lot 3, (LRC) PSD-
17370, dated September 7, 1961, duly approved by the Commissioner of Land
Registration. It is also Our finding that Lot 3-A has been adjudicated to
petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza. We take into account the pertinent
provisions of the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" and estoppel on the part of
petitioners (pp. 6-8, supra). Therefore, the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" is a valid
document.
We resolve the second issue based on the previous discussion that the co-
ownership has been extinguished. Article 1620 of the Civil Code applies only if
the co-ownership still exists. If the property has been partitioned or an
identified share has been sold, there is no longer any right of legal redemption
(see Umengan v. Butucan, et al., 117 Phil. 325; Caro v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. L-46001, March 25, 1982, 113 SCRA 10).

Page 96 of 206
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision dated June 23,
1976 and the resolution dated September 15, 1976 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Page 97 of 206
[12] G.R. No. 56550 October 1, 1990
MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and SOCORRO Z.

FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B.
CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite, Tagaytay, Br. IV,
SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA,
LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO, and ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO,
respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Co-ownership; Legal Redemption; A co-owner has no pre-

emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his coowners. A co-owner's right
to redeem may be invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a
third party or a stranger to the co-ownership.—In this jurisdiction, the legal
provisions on coownership do not grant to any of the owners of a property held in
common a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners.
Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. x x x Article
1620 contemplates of a situation where a coowner has alienated his pro-indiviso
shares to a stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal redemption", a co-owner's
right to redeem is invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a
third party or stranger to the co-ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)].
But in the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and
damages against private respondents, no sale of the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a
third party had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds no
application to the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A co-owner may sell, alienate or mortgage his ideal
share in the property held in common, but the alienation or mortgage is limited to that
portion that may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership.—The law
does not prohibit a coowner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in
the property held in common. The law merely provides that the alienation or mortgage
shall be limited only to the portion of the property which may be allotted to him upon
termination of the co-ownership [See Mercado v. Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June
30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472; PNB v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34404,
June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
75884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270], and, as earlier discussed, that the
remaining co-owners have the right to redeem, within a specified period, the shares
which may have been sold to the third party. [Articles 1620 and 1623 of the New Civil
Code.]
Same; Same; Same; Partition; Respondent trial judge's order directing the
holding of a public sale of the subject properties and the distribution of the proceeds
thereof among the co-owners, was in accordance with law.—The sale of the property
held in common referred to in the above article is resorted to when (1) the right to
partition the property among the co-owners is invoked by any one of them but because
of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article

Page 98 of 206
495 of the New Civil Code] would prejudice the interests of the co-owners [See
Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court] and (2) the co-owners are not in
agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon
reimbursement of the shares of the other co-owners. Petitioners herein did not have
justifiable grounds to ignore the queries posed by respondent trial judge and to insist
that hearings be conducted in order to ascertain the reasonable price at which they
could purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and
Motion" dated February 27, 1981, Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60]. Since
at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to respondent trial judge that the
parties could not agree on who among them would be allotted the subject properties,
the Court finds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the holding of a public sale for the subject properties (with the opening bid
pegged at P12.50 per square meter), and the distribution of the proceeds thereof
amongst the co-owners, as provided under Article 498 of the New Civil Code.
CORTÉS, J.:
On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for injunction and
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-572, seeking to enjoin private
respondents Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna and
Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third party their pro-indiviso shares as
co-owners in eight parcels of registered land (covered by TCT Nos. A-1316 to
A-1322) located in the province of Cavite, with an aggregate area of about 96
hectares. Petitioner claimed that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code,
they, as co-owners, had a preferential right to purchase these shares from
private respondents for a reasonable price.
On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex parte application for
a writ of preliminary injunction, on the ground that petitioners' registered notice
of lis pendens was ample protection of their rights.
On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the summons and copies of
the complaint. Private respondents then filed their answer with counterclaim,
praying for the partition of the subject properties. Private respondent Elena
Fronda Zaballero filed a motion for intervention dated April 29, 1980, adopting
therein her co-respondents answer with counterclaim.
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
1. That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor are the pro-indiviso co-
owners of the properties cited and described in the complaint;

Page 99 of 206
2. That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land covered by TCT No. T-
1319; approximately twelve (12) hectares of that covered by TCT No. T-1320;
and the entire parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are subject of
expropriation proceedings instituted by the National Housing Authority (NHA)
now pending before this Court in Civil Case Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-
417;
3. That based on the evidence presented by the herein parties in the

aforecited expropriation cases, the current valuation of the land and the
improvements thereon is at P95,132.00 per hectare;
4. That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written notice from the
defendants and the intervenor that the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS
AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION had offered to buy the latter's share
in the properties listed in the complaint subject to the following terms:
1. The selling price shall be net at TWELVE & 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per
square meter, or a total price of NINE MILLION (P9,000,000.00) PESOS
for a total area of SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES ONLY;
2. A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY (30%) PERCENT of the selling

price, or a minimum downpayment of TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,700,000.00) PESOS;
3. The balance of the purchase price to be payable within THREE (3)

YEARS from the date of downpayment in THREE (3) EQUAL, ANNUAL
PAYMENTS with interest at the legal rate prevailing at the time of payment;
4. The balance shall be covered by a BANK GUARANTEE of payments

and shall not be governed by Art. 1250 of the Civil Code.
5. That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the plaintiffs were

requested:
a) To exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase defendants'

and intervenor's shares under the above-quoted terms; or
b) To agree to a physical partition of the properties; or
c) To sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and the

intervenor, to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION at the price and under the
terms aforequoted.
Page 100 of 206
6. That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION is ready, willing and able to purchase not only the aliquot
shares of the defendants and the intervenor, but also that of the plaintiffs,
in and to all the properties subject of this case, for and in consideration of
the net amount of TWELVE and 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square meter
and under the afore-quoted terms;
The parties laid down their respective positions, as follows:
PLAINTIFFS
1. That the subject properties are incapable of physical partition;
2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive;
3. That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive right for an amount
of not more that P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the fair and
reasonable value of said properties;
4. That the statutory period for exercising their pre-emptive right was
suspended upon the filing of the complaint;
DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR
1. That the reasonable price of the subject properties is P12.50 per

square meter;
2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed upon their failure
to exercise the same within the period prescribed in Art. 1623 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines;
3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that the price of

P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive, it would be to the best
interest of the plaintiffs to sell their shares to the VOLCANO
SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION,
whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond question, as the
same was admitted by the parties herein;
4. That the subject properties consisting approximately 95 hectares may

be physically partitioned without difficulty in the manner suggested by
them to plaintiffs, and as graphically represented in the subdivision plan,
which will be furnished in due course to plaintiffs' counsel.

Page 101 of 206
Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered a pre-trial order dated
July 9, 1980 granting petitioners a period of ten days from receipt of the
subdivision plan to be prepared by a competent geodetic engineer within
which to express their approval or disapproval of the said plan, or to submit
within the same period, if they so desire, an alternative subdivision plan.
On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent to the counsel for
petitioners a letter enclosed with a subdivision plan.
On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their comment to the pre-trial order,

contending that the question of reasonable value of the subject properties
remains a contentious issue of fact ascertainable only after a full trial.
Petitioners likewise insisted on their pre- emptive right to purchase private
respondents' shares in the co-ownership after due determination of the
reasonable price thereof.
Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the counsel for petitioners
another subdivision plan prepared by a geodetic engineer. Still, no definite
communication was sent by petitioners signifying their approval or disapproval
to the subdivision plans.
In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the parties, private
respondents filed a motion dated December 16, 1980 requesting that
petitioners be required to formally specify which of the two options under
Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to avail of: that petitioners'
shares in the subject properties be sold to private respondents, at the rate of
P12.50 per square meter; or that the subject properties be sold to a third party,
VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. (claimed to have been erroneously
referred to in the pre-trial as VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION) and its proceeds thereof distributed among the
parties.
Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for the purpose of
determining the applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code, respondent
trial judge issued an order dated February 4, 1981 which directed the parties
to signify whether or not they agree to the scheme of allotting the subject
properties to one of the co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, or
whether or not they know of a third party who is able and willing to buy the
subject properties at terms and conditions more favorable than that offered by
VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The order contained a series of
questions addressed to all the parties, who were thereupon required to submit
their answers thereto.

Page 102 of 206
Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they were willing to
allot their shares in the subject properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de
Zaballero, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, and that they did not know
of any other party who was willing and able to purchase the subject properties
under more favorable conditions than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW
RESORTS, INC.
However, instead of submitting their answers to the queries posed by

respondent trial judge, petitioners filed a motion for clarification as to the true
identity of the third party allegedly willing to purchase the subject properties.
On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected petitioners' motion on

the ground that it was irrelevant.
Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a pleading captioned

"Compliance and Motion", (1) reiterating the relevance of ascertaining the true
identity of the third party buyer, VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION or VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS,
INC., (2) expressing their view that there is actually no bona fide and
financially able third party willing to purchase the subject properties at the rate
of P12.50 per square meter, and, (3) once again insisting on their pre-emptive
right to purchase the shares of private respondents in the co-ownership at a
"reasonable price", which is less than that computed excessively by the latter
at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Petitioners therein prayed that further
proceedings be conducted in order to settle the factual issue regarding the
reasonable value of the subject properties.
On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an order denying petitioners'
motion. The judge ruled that petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right to
purchase private respondents' shares in the co-ownership. Thus, finding that
the subject properties were essentially indivisible, respondent trial judge
ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to
Article 498 of the New Civil Code. A notice of sale was issued setting the date
of public bidding for the subject properties on April 13, 1981.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the above order.
Respondent trial judge reset the hearing on petitioners' motion for
reconsideration to April 6, 1981, and moved the scheduled public sale to April
14, 1981.
Without awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed

the present petition for certiorari, alleging that the respondent trial judge acted
without jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in issuing his order dated March 16, 1981 which denied
Page 103 of 206
petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-
indiviso shares and which, peremptorily ordered the public sale of the subject
properties. On April 8, 1981, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the sale of the subject properties at public auction.
With the comment and reply, the Court considered the issues joined and the
case submitted for decision.
The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's order dated March 16,
1981 is ultimately premised on petitioners' claim that they had a pre-emptive
right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of their co-owners, private
respondents herein, at a "reasonable price". It is this same claim which forms
the basis of their complaint for injunction and damages filed against private
respondents in the court a quo.
This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on
co-ownership do not grant to any of the owners of a property held in common
a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners.
Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. Article
1620 provides:
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the

shares of all the co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If
the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay
only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption,

they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have
in the thing owned in common [Emphasis supplied].
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his

pro-indiviso shares to a stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal
redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is invoked only after the shares of
the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the co-ownership
[See Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the time
petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and damages against private
respondents, no sale of the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet
been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds no application to
the case at bar.

Page 104 of 206
There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that private respondents
had acknowledged the pre-emptive right of petitioners to purchase their
shares at a "reasonable price". Although it appears that private respondents
had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares to petitioners, the offer was made
at a fixed rate of P12.50 per square meter [See Pre-trial Order dated July 9,
1980, Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It cannot be said that private
respondents had agreed, without qualification, to sell their shares to
petitioners. Hence, petitioners cannot insist on a right to purchase the shares
at a price lower than the selling price of private respondents.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents from
alienating their pro-indiviso shares to a third party. The rights of a co-owner of
a property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the New Civil Code, thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his
ideal share in the property held in common. The law merely provides that the
alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the portion of the property which
may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership [See Mercado v.
Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472; PNB v. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207;
Go Ong v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75884, September 24,
1987, 154 SCRA 270,] and, as earlier discussed, that the remaining co-
owners have the right to redeem, within a specified period, the shares which
may have been sold to the third party. [Articles 1620 and 1623 of the New Civil
Code.]
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent trial judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he denied petitioners' claim of a
pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares.
Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent trial judge's order for
the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to the provisions
of Article 498 of the New Civil Code. After a careful examination of the
proceedings before respondent trial judge, the Court finds that respondent trial
judge's order was issued in accordance with the laws pertaining to the legal or
juridical dissolution of co-ownerships.

Page 105 of 206
It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim
prayed for, inter alia, the partition of the subject properties in the event that the
petitioners refused to purchase their pro-indiviso shares at the rate of P12.50
per square meter. Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase
the other co-owners' pro-indiviso shares, private respondents' counterclaim for
the partition of the subject properties is recognized by law, specifically Article
494 of the New Civil Code which lays down the general rule that no co-owner
is obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494 reads as follows:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-

owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain

period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be
extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not
exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-

owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at bar.
Private respondents' counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties
was therefore entirely proper. However, during the pre-trial proceedings,
petitioners adopted the position that the subject properties were incapable of
physical partition. Initially, private respondents disputed this position. But after
petitioners inexplicably refused to abide by the pretrial order issued by
respondent trial judge, and stubbornly insisted on exercising an alleged pre-
emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares at a "reasonable price",
private respondents relented and adopted petitioner's position that the partition
of the subject properties was not economically feasible, and, consequently,
invoked the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil Code [Private
respondents' "Motion To Allot Properties To Defendants Or To Sell the Same
Pursuant To Article 498 Of The Civil Code", Annex "D" of the Petition; Rollo,
pp. 46-49].
Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the
subject properties should not be partitioned, and private respondents

Page 106 of 206
continued to manifest their desire to terminate the co-ownership arrangement
between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge acted within his
jurisdiction when he issued his order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the
parties to answer certain questions for the purpose of determining whether or
not the legal conditions for the applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil
Code were present in the case.
Art. 498 provides that:
Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-

owners cannot agree that it be alloted to one of them who
shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
distributed.
The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article is
resorted to when (1) the right to partition the property among the co-owners is
invoked by any of them but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be
subdivided or its subdivision [See Article 495 of the New Civil Code] would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners (See Section 5 of Rule 69 of the
Revised Rules of Court) and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon
reimbursement of the shares of the other co-owners.
Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to ignore the queries posed
by respondent trial judge and to insist that hearings be conducted in order to
ascertain the reasonable price at which they could purchase private
respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and Motion" dated
February 27, 1981, Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60].
Since at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to respondent trial
judge that the parties could not agree on who among them would be allotted
the subject properties, the Court finds that respondent trial judge committed no
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the holding of a public sale for the
subject properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per square meter),
and the distribution of the proceeds thereof amongst the co-owners, as
provided under Article 498 of the New Civil Code.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need for further hearings in

the case because it is apparent from the various allegations and admissions of
the parties made during the pre-trial proceedings, and in their respective
pleadings, that the legal requisites for the application of Article 498 of the New
Civil Code were present in the case. No factual issues remained to be litigated
upon.

Page 107 of 206
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

Page 108 of 206
[13] G.R. No. 75579 September 30, 1991
TOMAS TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Subdivision lots and condominiums, Sale of; Violation of P.D. No. 957; Non-
delivery of title.—Any person who violates Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957
by non-delivery of the title upon full payment of the lot or in case of a corporation,
partnership, cooperative, or association, the president, manager or administrator or the
person who has charge of the administration of the business shall be criminally
responsible.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Pres. Decree 957 is not ex post facto
law.—Under the fourth assigned error, herein petitioner maintains that PD 957 impairs
the obligations of the vendee (Ms. Dimabuyu) in the contract to sell and that it is an ex
post facto law as the provision thereof provides retroactive effect. The contention is
likewise without merit. Quoting the Solicitor General, the respondent appellate court
aptly rebutted this argument, thus: "x x x P.D. 957 cannot be assailed as an ex post
facto law. The act made punishable thereunder is the failure of the owner-developer or
administrator to deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment, not
the execution of a deed of sale or contract to sell over such lot or unit before the
passage of the law. In the instant case, although the contract to sell was executed long
before the enactment of P.D. 957, the failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to deliver
the title over the lot upon full payment transpired when the decree was already in
effect. Such law is not ex post facto for the simple reason that what is being punished
is the failure to deliver such title after the enactment of the Decree on July 12, 1976."
Special Proceedings; Settlement of estates; Claims against the estate.—We
however find that the fifth or last issue to be meritorious and the same deserves Our
careful consideration. In said issue, herein petitioner maintains that to proceed to
execute the deed of absolute sale without the go-signal of the Probate Court is to be
recreant to his sworn duty as administrator, as well as to render void his actuations
done without the permission of the Probate Court. This contention is correct and is
impressed with merit. Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the property was already
deceased and there were proceedings in the Probate Court, it was incumbent for the
Probate Court to first give authorization to the administrator of the estate to deliver
titles of lots which had previously been sold. The decedent after all, might be
considered the alter ego of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation. The
private complainant had been duly instructed by the accused herein to file the proper
petition or motion with the Probate Court for delivery of said title but said
complainant for one reason or another, disregarded said instructions. If at all anybody
should be blamed, it should be private complainant herself for her failure to obtain the
needed authorization from the court. Indeed, questions of title to any property
apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed upon in the Probate
Court, with consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons such as the
herein private complainant.

Page 109 of 206
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of 1) the decision
*
dated February 14, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
of Appeals) in AC-G.R. N 01483 entitled: "People of the Philippines vs. Atty.
Tom Trinidad," affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court Manila dated
January 5, 1984, which convicted herein petitioner of violation of Section 25 in
relation to Section 39 of P 957 sentencing him to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and
to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs, and the
resolution of said appellate court dated May 9, 1986, denying the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioner.
In an information that was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Manila
(now Regional Trial Court), herein petitioner, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, was
charged with violation of P.D. 957 for non-delivery of title allegedly committed
in this manner:
That on or about February 20, 1978 and continuously up to the

present, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being the administrator of the
estate of the late NICOLAI DREPIN, President and General Manager
of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, owner-
developer of the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision, located at
Antipolo, Rizal, and having knowledge of the sale of Lot No. 19, Block
No. 51 of the said Subdivision to FRANCISCA T. DIMABUYO for the
purchase price of P14,000,00, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously fail to deliver the title of said subdivision lot to the said
lot buyer upon full payment thereof in violation of the aforementioned
P.D. No. 957. (Rollo, p. 25)
After the accused had been arraigned, pleading not guilty, the prosecution
presented only one witness namely Francisca T. Dimabuyu, who is 49 years
old, married, public school teacher, residing at 311 Poblacion, Mabalacat,
Pampanga. In her direct and cross examination she testified to the following:
that she filed a case against the accused Tomas Trinidad with the Task Force
of the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for Violation of P.D. No. 957 for
non-delivery of title and she executed an affidavit in support of her complaint
before the Task Force of the Ministry (now Department) of Justice. She
identified the Affidavit, Exhibit A in her complaint. She filed this complaint
against Tomas Trinidad for the non-issuance of title wherein there was a
contract executed by her with the Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation, and that the accused Tomas Trinidad was the administrator of
the estate of the late Nicolai Drepin. She identified the contract executed by
her presented and marked as Exhibit B and the total price of the lot bought by

Page 110 of 206
her was FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00). She was paying Thirty Eight
Pesos and Sixty Bight Centavos (P38.68) monthly until she made the full
payment. She was given receipts and entered in her booklet presented and
marked as Exhibit C. She was able to pay SEVEN THOUSAND (P7,000.00)
PESOS including amortization, and this lot which she bought is located at
Antipolo, Rizal. She had visited the place before she bought the same. She
identified Exhibit D, which is the certification of the secretary of the accused.
She has also receipts to prove her payments to the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation, of which the accused is the President and General
Manager and owner developer of the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision
located at Antipolo, Rizal. She identified these receipts of payment paid by
her. Exhibits E, E-1 to E-3 inclusive. She also identified a passbook wherein
the payment made by her were posted by the employee of the said
corporation, Exhibits F to F-1. She further stated that she never me the
accused in his office. She called him by phone and he promised her to deliver
the title after she had made the full payment. She waited for several months
but no title was issue to her. She dropped in the office of the accused and she
never saw him there, only a clerk told her that he is busy. Two month after she
paid the last payment she made inquiries of her title. She was able to talk with
the accused in 1978, and the accused told her that she should be patient for
her title would arrive. She went to the office of the accused for so many, many
times and inquired about her title and the office of the accused in situated at
Escolta, Regina Building, Manila. She was able to talk with the accused two
times using the telephone in his office and the accused told her that she must
not worry for her title would be forthcoming. Her son was able to talk with the
accused but the accused told her son that her title was coming. She wen to
the National Housing Authority and inquired if the corporation of the accused
is fake. Atty. Lagunsag of the National Housing Authority set a hearing
between her and the accused but the accused did not appear. She received
the notification ("marked as Exhibit G) from the National Housing Authority
about the hearing. The hearing was about the title she was claiming from the
accused. A hearing. was also held at the Ministry (now Department) of Justice
on March 7, 1981 but the accused did not appear. The Ministry (now
Department) of Justice handled the case to help her and it was Fiscal Rodrigo
Cosico, state Prosecutor of the Ministry (now Department) of Justice who
handled the case. There was a resolution of the Ministry (now Department) of
Justice in her favor, marked an presented as Exhibit H and H-1. She did not
approach an lawyer for she could not afford to pay a lawyer. Whenever she
comes to Manila to claim her title and confront Tomas Trinidad she used to
spend FIFTY PESOS (P50.00) per day. She felt frustrated and was mad with
the accused.
In the cross-examination of this witness she said she had been teaching
Grade IV at Pampanga for 20 years then. She admitted that she is a signatory

Page 111 of 206
to the contract, Exhibit B. admitted that she did not pay the real estate taxes of
this land. She admitted that she did not go to the Probate Court.
In the re-direct, she said that she has not paid the taxes because she was not
notified about the demand of payment. She paid the installment as evidenced
by receipts Exhibits E, E-I E-30 of Lots Nos. 19 and 51 of said subdivision
managed by the accused. She said that the accused was the administrator of
land wherein the portion was bought by her.
After the testimony of the complainant Francesca Dimabuyu, the prosecution

rested its case and offered Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, E-I to E-30, inclusive, F, F-I
to F-5, inclusive, and H, and H-1, which were all admitted by the court. (Ibid.,
pp. 27-29).
On the other hand, herein petitioner, in his direct testimony and cross, testified
to the fact that in the Intestate Proceedings of the estate of the late Nicolai
Drepin, he became the Judicial Administrator appointed in the year 1976, and
he presented his appointment and marked as Exhibit 3. He testified that he
took hold of the property of the deceased including the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation, and also the unregistered property situated at
Antipolo, Rizal. The whole lot is titled in the name of testator. He admitted that
he is the administrator of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation,
and that said corporation has lots for sale. He continued to receive payments
of lots for sale in installment. In 1978 the National Housing Authority stopped
the sale of lots, and his corporation was told to stop operating the property
now the place being under control of the Ministry of Human Settlements.
According to him the complainant (Ms. Francesca T. Dimabuyu) had not
complied with all the requirements for the complainant had not paid the taxes.
He asked the Probate Court as administrator to allow him to execute a Deed
of Sale to his lot buyers and he was allowed in November 1982, the authority
was presented and marked as Exhibit 5. The Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation, according to him, is not in business now, and he is
not the administrator. He was appointed by the Court as administrator in place
of Atty. Guico, and he has letters of administration presented and marked as
Exhibit 3. His duties as administrator are with the full authority to take
possession of all properties of the deceased.
In the cross examination of this witness he admitted that he was not able to
deliver any title to the complainant for according to him the complainant had
not actually paid all her obligations because there is no adjustment
considering the value of the peso which has declined these days. The
complainant has not even paid the taxes of the land so that the contract has
not been duly complied with.

Page 112 of 206
On January 5, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION,

the guilt of the accused having been proven beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Sec. 25 in relation to Section 39 of P.D. 957 hereby
sentences him to pay a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.) and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law and
to pay the costs. (Ibid., P. 62)
Not satisfied with the foregoing decision, herein petitioner elevated the case to
the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto with

costs against accused-appellant. (Ibid., p. 34)
The motion for reconsideration having been denied (Ibid., p. 39), herein
petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:
I. IT IS AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF

JURISDICTION TO EXPAND THE TERM IN A PENAL PROVISION OF
PD 957 TO INCLUDE THAT WHICH IS NOT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED
FOR THEREIN. (Ibid., p. 10)
II. THE CONCLUSION OF THE I.A.C. THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
MOTHER REALTY DEV. CORP. (sic) FINDS NO SANCTION IN REASON
AND LOGIC AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION. (Ibid., 13)
III. IT IS A SERIOUS ERROR OF THE IAC. NOT TO COUNTENANCE THE
SPECIFIC PROVISION OF LAW ON THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
OF THE PROBATE COURT IN REFERENCE TO THE SETTLEMENT OF
THE ESTATE OF A DECEDENT OF WHICH A DELIVERY OF TITLE TO A
LOT IS ONE SUCH. (Ibid., p. 15)
IV. ENFORCING PD 957 TO RETROACT TO A CONTRACT LONG BEFORE
ESTABLISHED VALID AND LEGAL THEN, VIOLATES THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, HENCE IT IS REVERSIBLE
ERROR. (Ibid., p. 17)
V. YOUR PETITIONER, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
NICOLAI DREPIN IS CAUGHT IN THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA AND A
NO WIN POSITION AT THAT. (Ibid., p. 18)
Under the first two assigned errors, herein petitioner assails the judgment of
the respondent appellate court for having expanded the term in a penal
provision of PD 957, i.e., Section 39, to include that which is not specifically
Page 113 of 206
provided for therein. Moreover, he assails respondent appellate court's finding
that he is also the administrator of Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation as non sequitur.
The contentions are without merit.
Sections 25 and 39 of Presidential Decree 957 provide, thus:
Sec. 25. Issuance of Title. — The owner or developer shall deliver the
title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit.
No fee, except those required for the registration of the deed of sale in
the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such title.
In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time
of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall
redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six
months from such issuance in order that the title over fully paid lo or
unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance
herewith.
Sec. 39. Penalties. — Any person who shall violate any of th provision
of this decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued
pursuant to this Decree shall upon conviction, be punished by fine of
not more than twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or
imprisonment of not more than ten years: Provided, that in the case of
corporations, partnerships, cooperatives, or associations, the
President, Manager or Administrator or the person who has charge
with the administration of the business shall be criminally responsible
for any violation of this Decree and/or the rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto.
From the foregoing, it is clear that any person who violate Section 25 thereof
by non-delivery of the title upon full payment of the lot or in case of a
corporation, partnership, cooperative, or association, the president, manager
or administrator or the person who has charge of the administration of the
business shall be criminally responsible.
In the case at bar, Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation is the

developer of the property in question which belongs to the deceased, Nicolai
Drepin. As administrator of the estate of the said decedent, herein petitioner
took over the administration of all the properties of said deceased including
the property in question. Thus undeniably he is also the administrator of the
Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation which is handling the
development and disposition of said property. This is demonstrated by the fact
that when said corporation was sued by Ms. Dimabuyu before the Nation
Page 114 of 206
Housing Authority (NHA) for non-issuance of title, herein petitioner appeared
as the administrator of said corporation an appealed to the Minister (now
Secretary) of Justice from resolution of the Task Force Division of said
Ministry (no Department) in the same capacity. In his appeal he did not deny
that he is the administrator of the said corporation and property in behalf of the
deceased. What he claims is that the title was not issued due to the failure of
the proper government agency to approve the technical description of the lot
preparatory to the issuance of the corresponding torrens title and that PD 957
cannot be given retroactive effect to apply to contracts entered into ten years
before its passage. Again, in his letter of December 7, 1982 to Ms. Dimabuyu
delineating the procedure to secure the title of ownership of the property in
question, herein petitioner signed as administrator not only of the testate
estate of Nicolai Drepin but also of the Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation. (Ibid., pp. 31-32).
Under the third assigned error, herein petitioner contends that the trial court
and the respondent appellate court had exceeded their jurisdiction by totally
disregarding the law and penalizing an act when the law shows the manner of
performing the same.
The contention is without merit.
Section 41 of Presidential Decree 957 provides, thus:
Section 41. Other Remedies. — The rights and remedies provided in

this Decree shall be in addition to any and all other rights and
remedies that may be available under existing laws.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that whatever rights or remedies accruing to

a lot buyer, Ms. Dimabuyu in this case, under other laws do not foreclose the
application of PD 957.
In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that Ms. Dimabuyu has fully paid in
monthly installments the agreed purchase price for the lot. Notwithstanding full
payment, herein petitioner has failed and refused to deliver to Ms. Dimabuyu
the certificate of title corresponding to the lot despite numerous demands.
Under the fourth assigned error, herein petitioner maintains that PD 957
impairs the obligations of the vendee (Ms. Dimabuyu) in the contract to sell
and that it is an ex post facto law as the provision thereof provides retroactive
effect.
The contention is likewise without merit.

Page 115 of 206
Quoting the Solicitor General, the respondent appellate court aptly rebutted
this argument, thus:
Under P.D. 957, after the complainant had fully paid for the lo in
question, appellant (herein petitioner) as administrator of t Mother
Earth Realty Development Corporation, was legally bound cause the
issuance of the corresponding transfer certificate of title in the name of
the buyer. The failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to do so is
punishable under the penal provisions of Section 39 of said decree.
Likewise, under P.D. 957, it is not required that the buyer should pay
the taxes. The buyer is only required to pay for the registration of the
Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds for the issuance of the title
but it does not mention the payment of taxes. With respect to th
alleged devaluation of the peso, suffice it to state that at the time thde
contract was executed, the full price of the lot was already agreed
upon by the complainant and the corporation.
Lastly, appellant (herein petitioner) asserts that P.D. 957 is an ex post

facto law as the penal provision thereof provides retroactive effect.
P.D. 957 cannot be assailed as an ex post facto law. The act made
punishable thereunder is the failure of the owner-developer or
administrator to deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full
payment, not the execution of a deed of sale or contract to sell over
such lot or unit before the passage of the law. In the instant case
although the contract to sell was executed long before the enactment
of P.D. 957, the failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to deliver the
title over the lot upon full payment transpired when the decree was
already in effect. Such law is not ex post facto for the simple reason
that what is being punished is the failure to deliver such title after the
enactment of the Decree on July 12, 1976. (Ibid., pp. 33-34)
We however find that the fifth or last issue to be meritorious and the same
deserves Our careful consideration.
In said issue, herein petitioner maintains that to proceed execute the deed of
absolute sale without the go-signal of th Probate Court is to be recreant to his
sworn duty as administrator, as well as to render void his actuations done
without the permission of the Probate Court.
This contention is correct and is impressed with merit. Inasmuch as the owner-
seller of the property was already deceased and there were proceedings in the

Page 116 of 206
Probate Court, it was incumbent for the Probate Court to first give
authorization to administrator of the estate to deliver titles of lots which had
previously been sold. The decedent after all, might be considered the alter ego
of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation. The private complainant
had been duly instructs by the accused herein to file the proper petition or
motion wit the Probate Court for delivery of said title but said complainant for
one reason or another, disregarded said instructions. If at anybody should be
blamed, it should be private complainant herself for her failure to obtain the
needed authorization fro the court. Indeed, questions of title to any property
apparent still belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed upon in the
Probate Court, with consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third
persons such as the herein private complainant. In fact, third persons may
even intervene in the testate or intestate proceedings to protect their interest
[See Cunanan vs. Amparo, 45 O.G. (No. 9), 3796]. Just as ordinary claimant
against the estate of the deceased are duty bound to present claim before the
Probate Court so was private complainant herein required to file her claim for
redress in said Probate Court. This is so because in the ascertainment of
claims against the estate of the decedent, the Probate Court must weigh the
extent of the liability of the estate when compared vis-a-vis it solvency. We
uphold petitioner's contention therefore that if he had proceeded to
immediately cause the delivery of the title of private complainant herein, he
could have been held liable for a blatant disregard of the jurisdiction and
function of the Probate Court. Truly, he was caught between the horns of a
dilemma which was not of his own making. We therefore see no criminal intent
whatsoever on his part and accordingly the judgment of the appellate court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs de officio.
If the probate proceedings referred to in this case are still going on, the proper
remedy of the private complainant herein is to file before said Probate Court
her claim for the delivery of the title of the lot she has purchased. If on the
other hand, said probate proceedings are already closed and terminated, the
Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation through its present President
or General Manager is hereby ordered to cause the delivery of said title to Ms.
Dimabuyu, within the shortest possible time, as soon as all the requirements
therefore have been complied with. We are giving this remedy to prevent Ms.
Dimabuyu from being prejudiced.
SO ORDERED.

Page 117 of 206
[14] G.R. No. L-16553 November 29, 1961
LEON DE JESUS, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.EUSEBIA DE

JESUS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Probate courts empowered to approve stipulations

recognizing co-ownership of property held in trust by the deceased.—There being no
controversy between the former administratrix and the defendants that the latter and
the deceased “M.J.” own the lot under litigation in common and that it was registered
in the deceased’s name only in trust for all the co-owners, the probate court could
approve, as it did approve, the agreement wherein the parties expressly recognized
their common ownership of the property in question and the trust character of the
exclusive title held by the deceased over the same.
Descent and administration; Executors and administrators; Property held in
trust; Probate court empowered to deed property held in trust to persons for whose
benefit it was so held.—Where the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust
for another persons, the law permits the probate court to authorize the executor or
administrator to deed such property to the person or persons for whose use and benefit
it was so held (Sec. 9, Rule 90, Rules of Court).
Same; Same; Same; Effect of lack of notice to interested parties.—The Rules of
Court (Sec. 8, Rule 90) make it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other
interested persons of the application for approval of any conveyance of property held
in trust by the deceased, and where no such notice is given, the order authorizing the
conveyance, as well as the conveyance itself, is completely void (Estate of Gamboa
vs. Floranza, 12 Phil. 191; Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718; Gabriel vs. Encarnacion, L-
6736, May 4, 1954; Boñaga vs. Soler, L-15717, June 30, 1961).
Same; Same; Parents not legal representatives of their children before
effectivity of new Civil Code.—Before the promulgation of the Civil Code of the
Philippines in 1948, parents as such were not the legal representatives of their children
and could not dispose of their property without judicial authorization (Palet vs.
Aldecoa & Co., 15 Phil. 232; Siman vs. Leus, 37 Phil. 969; Rosario vs. Manila
Railroad Co., 22 Phil. 140).
Same; Same; Administrator not estopped from questioning acts of predecessor.
—If an administrator is not estopped from questioning his own acts, a fortiori, his
successor can not be estopped to question the acts of his predecessor that are not
conformable to law (Boñaga vs. Soler, supra).
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan
dismissing the complaint in its civil case No. 2563.

Page 118 of 206
In the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Melecio
de Jesus (Sp. Proc. No. 1960 of the court below), the widow Ines Alejandrino,
administratrix, filed on March 10, 1948 an inventory of the estate, including
therein Lot No. 931 of the Cadastral Survey of Hermosa, Bataan, containing
an area of 155.9334 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1044 in the name of the deceased.
Subsequently, on May 22, 1948, Eusebia de Jesus, the deceased's sister,

filed a verified claim against the estate for the amount of P7,585.84. This claim
was never heard. Instead, the administratrix Ines Alejandrino, claimant
Eusebia de Jesus, and the heirs of Cirilo de Jesus, another brother also
deceased, entered, on May 24, 1948, into a Stipulation of Facts wherein
administratrix Alejandrino recognized that Eusebia de Jesus and Cirilo de
Jesus are co-owners with the deceased Melecio de Jesus of Lot No. 931, and
that said parcel was registered in the sole name of the deceased only in trust
for all the co-owners. On the same day, administratrix Ines Alejandrino and
claimant Eusebia de Jesus entered into another agreement called
"Supplementary Stipulation of Facts" wherein the latter agreed to waive and
renounce her money claim for P7,585.84 against the estate upon the approval
and becoming final of the aforementioned Stipulation of Facts. Both
agreements were, on the very day of their execution, presented to the court for
approval, on the ground that they "will conserve the family filiation and
attachment and will forestall any litigation between them"; and on the day
following, May 25, 1948, the probate court entered an order approving both
agreements.
Years later, in July, 1955, Ines Alejandrino was replaced by her son Leon de
Jesus in the administration of the estate of Melecio de Jesus. As such
administrator, and joining as plaintiff his mother, Ines Alejandrino, former
administratrix, Leon de Jesus filed on October 11, 1958 in the lower court the
present action (Civil Case No. 2563), seeking to annul the stipulations entered
by the former administratrix Ines Alejandrino with the defendants Eusebia de
Jesus and the heirs of Cirilo de Jesus on May 24, 1948, on the theory that
they are null and void for lack jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to act
on them, as well as for lack of the requisite notices to all the interested parties,
specifically the heirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus. Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint, claiming res judicataand prescription, and on
December 16, 1958, the trial court sustained the motion and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint. From this order, the plaintiffs appealed to this
Court.
The principal issue here is whether or not the stipulations in question are void
and ineffective, either for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to
act on them, or for lack of notice of their approval to the heirs of the deceased.

Page 119 of 206
On the question of jurisdiction, we think the probate court had jurisdiction to
act on and approve of the stipulations in question, not only as an incident to its
power to exclude any property from the inventory of the estate of the
deceased, but under section 9, Rule 90, Rules of Court, which permits the
probate court, whenever the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust
for another person, to authorize the executor or administrator to deed such
property to the person or persons for whose use and benefit it was so held.
There being no controversy between the former administratrix and the
defendants that the latter and the deceased Melecio de Jesus own the lot in
question in common and that it was registered in the deceased's name only in
trust for all the co-owners, there was no need to file a separate action to an
ordinary court to establish the common ownership of the parties over said
property; and the probate court could approve, as it did approve, the
agreement wherein the parties expressly recognized their common ownership
of the property in question and the trust character of the exclusive title held by
the deceased over the same, especially since the parties themselves state
that such agreement was entered into in order to forestall future litigation
between them and to foster family relations, and in addition, the defendant
Eusebia de Jesus had agreed, in consideration of the court's approval of said
agreement, to waive a money claim against the estate, so that court approval
of said agreement would really redound to the benefit of the estate and the
heirs.
Section 9, Rule 90, however, provides that authority can be given by the
probate court to the administrator to convey property held in trust by the
deceased to the beneficiaries of the trust only "after notice given as required
in the last preceding section"; i.e., that. "no such conveyance shall be
authorized until notice of the application for that purpose has been given
personally or by mail to all persons interested, and such further notice has
been given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper" (sec. 8,
Rule 90). This rule makes it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and
other interested persons of the application for approval of any conveyance of
property held in trust by the deceased, and where no such notice is given, the
order authorizing the conveyance, as well as the conveyance itself, is
completely void. 1 Here, plaintiffs claim that no such notice was given the
heirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus of the petition for the approval of the
stipulations in question, and it is quite probable that the claim is true, because
said heirs were all minors when the proceedings in question took place. It
would have been necessary, therefore, to appoint a guardian ad litem for them
before they could be validly served said notice, yet the records here do not
show that such appointment of guardian was obtained. In fact, any such
appointment appears improbable, considering that the stipulations in question
were approved the very next day following their execution and submission for
approval. It must be observed that in 1948, before the promulgation of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, parents as such were not the legal representatives of
Page 120 of 206
their children before the courts and could not dispose of their property without
judicial authorization (Palet vs. Aldecoa & Co., 15 Phil. 232; Siman vs. Leus,
37 Phil. 969; Rosario vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil. 140).
As this question or notice would ultimately decide the validity or invalidity of

the entire proceedings in the probate court leading to the approval of the
contested stipulations, plaintiffs-appellants should be given the opportunity to
prove their claim that no such notice was given them. It proved, the claim
would likewise dispose of the defense of prescription put up by defendants in
their motion to dismiss, for an action to set aside completely void proceedings
is imprescriptible and can not be barred by lapse of time.
As for the ruling of the trial court that the present a administrator Leon de
Jesus is estopped from questioning the agreements voluntarily entered into by
the former administratrix Ines Alejandrino, suffice it to repeat what we said in
the recent case of Boñaga vs. Soler, G.R. No. L-15717, June 30, 1961, that:
a decedent's representative is not estopped to question the validity of

his own void deed purporting to convey land (Chase vs. Cartwright, 22
Am. St. Rep. 207, and cases cited; Mocks v. Olpherts, 25 L. Ed. (U.S.)
735; 21 Am. Jur. 756, s. 667); and if this be true of the administrator
as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not be estopped to
question the acts of his predecessor that are not conformable to law
(cf. Walker vs. Portland Savings Bank, LRA 1915 E, p. 840; 21 Am.
Jur. p. 820, s. 785.).
The appealed order dismissing the complaint is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the court below for answer and trial on the merits. Costs against
defendants-appellees.

Page 121 of 206
[15] G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate; Courts; Jurisdiction; Trial court has

no jurisdiction to entertain an action for partition and recovery of properties
belonging to the estate of a deceased person, while the probate proceedings for the
settlement of said estate are still pending in another branch of the same court.—After
a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner’s contention that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia
Villanueva’s action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of
said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no
orders for the submission and approval of the administratrix’s inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings (p. 31, Record) x x x In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should not
interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in
Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31,
1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of
partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of her mother: “The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the
project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol
v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil.
pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong v.
Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive
period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilla, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through
a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening
of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which
may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.” (Ramos v.
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April
24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107
Phil. 455, 460-461; Italics supplied)
Same; Same; Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem, publication of the
notice of the proceedings is constructive notice to the whole world.—The probate

Page 122 of 206
proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the
petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79,
Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia’s original petition was published
in the “Visayan Tribune” on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh. 4, p. 197, Record).
Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the
settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in “Bagong Kasanag”
(New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The
publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole
world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she
had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same.
Same; Same; Same; Annulment of judgment; Extrinsic fraud; Failure to
disclose to the adverse party, or to the court, matters which will defeat one’s own
claim or defense does not constitute extrinsic fraud that will justify vacation of
judgment.—Celedonia’s allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban
within the third degree on his mother’s side was not false. Moreover, it was made in
good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come
from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban’s nearest surviving relative on his
mother’s side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and
inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia
was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud. “Failure to
disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one’s own claim
or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the
judgment.” (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank
& Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d
1144, 1149)
Wills and Succession; Reserva Troncal; Reserva troncal does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant.—Clearly, the property of the
deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an
ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited
the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third
degree on his mother’s side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or
sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the
reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Evidence; Judicial Admissions; Judicial admissions are conclusive and no
evidence is required to prove the same.—However, inasmuch as Concordia had
agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother,
Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which
she ratified and confirmed in her “Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated
April 3, 1978” which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540: “4. That x x x prior to the
filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia
Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they
have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have
been visiting each other’s house which are not far away for (sic) each other.” (p. 234,
Page 123 of 206
Record; emphasis supplied) she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that
agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree
to place all of Esteban’s estate in the “Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation”
which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well. Her admission may
not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive
and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1;
Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido,
G.R. 70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the
Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia
Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for
partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against

defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into
two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From
both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial,
mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants
shall be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the
'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate

property, including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in
this decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate,
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this
produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation;

P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.,
author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died

Page 124 of 206
a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and
(2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his
deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before
Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his
second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School,
brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of

land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her
mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no
conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child,
Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her
son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were
transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation
to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977
without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do
with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to
place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his
properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their
schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact
was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order
dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding
No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately
preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the
deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late
Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the

Page 125 of 206
filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their
filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house
which are not far away for (sic) each other.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the

proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith
and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding
No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5)
praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared
sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended
petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She
explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of
the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the
decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir,
the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be
facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her
the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to
pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up
the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she
caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July
17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed

a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole
heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81,
Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980
(or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case
No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.

Page 126 of 206
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting
of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia
averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to,
and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA

GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil

Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings
(Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl.

Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in

favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side
from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had
agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said
agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention
that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No.
2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the
same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of
the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the
estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings,

Page 127 of 206
puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from
his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA
266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia
as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of
the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed
the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent
portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss

Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the
record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these
proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any
opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein
Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban
Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978,
it was established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any
known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the
herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him
and with whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as

the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on
February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this

estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court

of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the
order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself
(Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the
deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when
the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals
for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed
more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26
of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the
probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate.

Page 128 of 206
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43
SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of
partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only

after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project
of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution,
has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is
entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the
testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a
just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and
independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and
is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70
Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent
is exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can
not properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil.
364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v.

Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol
v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson,
89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from
bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better
practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through
an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge
which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed

Page 129 of 206
and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v.
Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082;
Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455,
460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the
special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed
that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a
Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in
the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the
deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his
wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this
Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir
of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which
it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been
closed and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the
project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant
case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had
lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have
opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of
justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207
setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on
the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-
heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the
estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for
these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by

extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud
was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It
was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was
alleged for the first time.

Page 130 of 206
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or
conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the
controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents
a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or
one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself,
but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so
that there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if
through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was
induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an
available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment
was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in
court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such
judgment may be availed of.
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral

fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any
fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a
case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses,
whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly
his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud,
therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
(Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling
Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318,
323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following
reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be

filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and
Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary
proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus
paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late
Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort,
the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate
the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other
obligations, and to do everything else required by law, and thereafter,
secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff, [although
Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their
agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.]

Page 131 of 206
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings.
She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came
exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with
Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time

and place of hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3,
Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the
hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan
Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record).
Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977
for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in
"Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977
(pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings
was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived
of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as
constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate court in
its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five
months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly
published as required by law, despite which the present movant only
came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her
alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a
petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate

court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities
are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban
within the third degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was
made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of
Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest
surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would
have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she

Page 132 of 206
stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state
did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would

defeat one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will
justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young
v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v.
Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's

estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of
Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing
her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased
was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative
within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of
the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant

any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous
title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged
to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—

the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from
his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the

reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to
the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by

gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other

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ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by
Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his
mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of
his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9
brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from
his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,

ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews
or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003
and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,

illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor

children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or

preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives

of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line,
each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without
distinction of line or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2)
share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—

Page 134 of 206
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the
deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and
confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3,
1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner

Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation,
besides they have closely known each other due to their
filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each
other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not
waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of
Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which
Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial
admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the
agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National
Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug.
31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146
SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161
SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who,

significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have done so
by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her
husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the
trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia,
but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all,
but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation"
was established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of

scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of
Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar
each to study at West Visayas State College, and the
Page 135 of 206
University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in
Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St.

Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving student
who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will

promote the advancement and enrichment of the various
fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts.
Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named
after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for
their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the

community to determine community needs and be able to
alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the

proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the
King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana
Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late
Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation
possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs
and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their
equivalents will be offered every February and October, and
Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their
death anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions,

endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever
source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income
thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof
as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as
may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the
Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease,

mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise,
invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real
and personal property of every kind and description or any
interest herein.

Page 136 of 206
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable
or proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes
herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear
conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation,
including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes
concerned upon the corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of
like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3)

of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986,
one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from
WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the
other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for
being the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso

Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the
Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot
Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez,

who would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis
Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The
Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist
Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students
who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives
yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban
Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S.

Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise
contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives,
amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the

Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia
has honored hers.

Page 137 of 206
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is
declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his
estate. However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-
heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed
to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the
petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be
entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of
Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes
set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall
submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the
deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.

Page 138 of 206
[16] G.R. No. 213192
TERESA R. IGNACIO, Petitioner vs.RAMON REYES, FLORENCIO REYES,

JR., ROSARIO R. DU and CARMELITA R. PASTOR, Respondents
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; As a rule, a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is valid only when the question involved
is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial functions.—As a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when
there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. In this case, the
propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether
the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature.
Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; “Interlocutory Orders” and “Final
Orders,” Distinguished.—This Court has distinguished the interlocutory and final
orders, as follows: A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in
the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance,
of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’
next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the
execution of the judgment once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, “final and executory.” x x x x x x x x x Conversely, an order that
does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating
the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
“interlocutory” e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules,
or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing
amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a “final” judgment or
order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not
be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken
from the final judgment rendered in the case.
Same; Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estates; Jurisprudence teaches that
jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited as it relates
only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate
of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of

Page 139 of 206
ownership that arise during the proceedings.—Jurisprudence teaches that jurisdiction
of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited as it relates only to matters
having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to
the estate. Furthermore, the doctrine that “in a special proceeding for the probate of a
will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality” applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case
at bar. Thus: “[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.”
Same; Special Civil Actions; Partition; An action for partition under Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court is typically brought by a person claiming to be the owner of a
specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to
be his co-owners, and is premised on the existence or nonexistence of co-ownership
between the parties.—An action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is
typically brought by a person claiming to be the owner of a specified property against
a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be his co-owners, and is
premised on the existence or nonexistence of co-ownership between the parties. As
discussed in Lim De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 773 (1994), the
determination of the existence of co-ownership is the first stage to accord with the
remedy of judicial partition, thus: The first stage of an action for judicial partition
and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally
proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the
desired partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally
prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order. In the latter case, “the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall
confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties.” In either case, whether the
action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one
and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Page 140 of 206
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresa
R. Ignacio (Teresa) challenging the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March
27, 2014 and June 27, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
annulled and set aside the Orders dated April 13, 2004 and June 14, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 151.
The facts follow:
On July 11, 1967, Angel Reyes (Angel) and Oliva3 R. Arevalo (Oliva) filed
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 151) (intestate court) a Petition4 for Letters of Administration of the
Estate of their father Florencio Reyes, Sr. (Florencio Sr.) who died on June 23,
1967, and enumerated therein the surviving heirs, namely: Oliva, Francisca
Vda. de Justiniani (Francisca), Angel, Amparo R. Avecilla (Amparo), Ramon
Reyes (Ramon), Teresa, Rosario R. Du (Rosario), Jose Reyes (Reyes),
Soledad Reyes (Soledad), Carmelita5 R. Pastor (Carmelita), and Florencio
Reyes, Jr. (Florencio Jr.). On July 15, 1967, the intestate court appointed
Oliva as the special administratrix of the estate of Florencio Sr. (Florencio Sr.
estate), and then as the regular administratrix in an Order dated November 23,
1967.6 Florencio, Jr. replaced Oliva in 1982. Thereafter, Teresa became the
administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate on August 8, 1994. 7
On December 5, 1994, Teresa executed a lease contract over a 398 square

meters (sq. m.) parcel of land located at Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-59201 (Magsaysay
property) in favor of Gonzalo Ong, Virginia Lim, Nino Yu, Francisco Lim and
Simona Go.8 In an Order9 dated July 15, 1996, the intestate court approved
the lease contract upon Teresa's motion dated June 4, 1996.
Likewise, on September 26, 1996, the intestate court allowed Teresa to enter
into a lease contract over the parcel of land located at ·session Road, Baguio
City with a total area of 646 sq. m. covered by TCT No. T-26769 (Session
Road property) to Famous Realty Corporation (FRC).10Thus, on October 29,
1996, Teresa leased the Session Road property to FRC for the period of July
1, 1996 to June 30, 2003, with a monthly rental of ₱135,000.00. 11
Sometime in January 1997, Teresa also leased the properties located at

Loakan Road, Baguio City covered by TCT Nos. T-26770 and T-26772
(Loakan and Military Cut-off properties), in favor of ATC Wonderland, Inc. and,
subsequently, to Gloria de Guzman and Sonshine Pre-School for a period
often years, effective September 1, 1996 to August 31, 2006. 12
On September 25, 2001, herein respondents Ramon, Florencio Jr., Rosario

and Carmelita, and the Heirs of Amparo, Intestate Estate of Soledad, Jose
Page 141 of 206
and Intestate Estate of Angel (plaintiffs) filed before the RTC of Baguio City,
Branch 3 (Baguio RTC), three complaints for partition, annulment of lease
contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against Teresa and the lessees of the subject Baguio
properties.13
The plaintiffs alleged in their Complaints 14 that, with the exception of the
lessees, the parties and the Florencio Sr. estate own one-tenth (1/10) of each
of the Session Road, Loakan and Military Cut-off, and Magsaysay properties.
They claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr. estate is the
sole owner of the properties and leased the same to the other parties without
their conformity. They also asserted in one of their complaints that the
Florencio Sr. estate is different from the Heirs of Florencio Sr. and Heirs of
Salud.
They averred that, as co-owners, they have not received their share in the
monthly rentals of the properties aforementioned due to Teresa's failure to
duly account for the same. Thus, they are asking for the partition of the
properties, for the accounting of all the rentals, income or profits derived, and
deliver the same to the plaintiffs, for the annulment of the lease contracts and
order the lessees to vacate the premises, and for the payment of damages. 15
Thereafter, the Baguio RTC directed and commissioned a team of auditors

with Leticia Clemente as the head accountant to conduct an accounting of the
properties. Based on the Report, 16 Teresa, as administratrix of the Florencio
Sr. estate, had a total cash accountability amounting to Fifteen Million Two
Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand Sixty-Six Pesos and Fifty-One Centavos
(₱15,238,066.51). In an Order17 dated August 27, 2003, the Baguio RTC
manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court
regarding the possible distribution of the subject properties. 18
Subsequently, on January 19, 2004, respondents and the others filed a

motion19 before the intestate court praying for the issuance of an order
allowing the distribution of the heirs' aliquot shares in the co-owned properties'
net income, and the partition of the said properties by the Baguio RTC.
However, the intestate court denied the motion in an Order 20 dated April 13,
2004, a portion of which reads:
x x x This Court cannot allow the Baguio Court to partition the property of the
estate because this Court already has jurisdiction over the matter. In fact, this
Court is wondering why actions for partition are being entertained in other
jurisdictions when such can be readily addressed by this Court as an estate
court.

Page 142 of 206
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the instant motion, the Court hereby
DENIES the same.
SO ORDERED.21
In an Order dated June 14, 2012, the intestate court denied respondents'
motion for reconsideration dated May 12, 2004, thus:
Thus finding no sufficient reasons to reverse and set aside this court's Order
dated April 13, 2004 considering the pendency before this court of the other
incidents involving the Baguio properties including the sale of Session Road
property covered by TCT No. 26769 and even the distribution of the proceeds
of the sale thereof with hearings conducted on the Financial Report (Re:
Proceeds of the Sale of the Property at Session Road in Baguio City), and
recently with the filing of the Proposed Project of Partition/ Amended Proposed
Project of Partition, as such, the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 12,
2004 is DENIED.
The continuation of presentation of evidence for the ·Heirs of Carmelita Clara

Pastor et. (sic) al. re: Removal of Adminstratix/ Motion to Liquidate and
Reimburse Cash Advances is previously set on August 15, 2012 at 1:30 in the
afternoon.
SO ORDERED.22
Thereafter, the respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari

assailing the Orders dated April 13, 2004 and June 14, 2012 of the intestate
court disallowing the partition of the Baguio properties.
In a Decision dated March 27, 2014, the CA granted the petition and annulled
and set aside the assailed Orders of the intestate court. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Orders of the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151, dated April 13, 2004 and June
14, 2012 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' motion to allow
partition and distribution of shares over properties Co-Owned by the Estate
and the Heirs [l]ocated in Baguio City, is GRANTED.
On the other hand, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, before
which court Special Civil Actions Nos. 5055-R, 5056-R, and 5057-R are
pending, is DIRECTED to partition the Baguio Properties among the
registered co-owners thereof.

Page 143 of 206
SO ORDERED.23
Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, Teresa filed before this Court
the instant petition raising the following issues:
I. THERE IS AN APPEAL OR OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND [ADEQUATE]

REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW [AVAILABLE] TO THE
RESPONDENTS.
II. RESPONDENTS ARE, IN EFFECT, ASKING THE TRIAL COURT TO

VIOLATE THE RULES OF COURT.
III. IN LEGAL CONTEMPLATION, THE CHALLENGED ORDERS WERE NOT

ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The Court finds the instant petition without merit.
Teresa argues that there is an appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law available. She maintains that the
intestate court asserted its jurisdiction and authority over the subject
properties and proceeded to conduct hearings to resolve the issues of
accounting, payment of advances, and distribution of assets and the proceeds
of the sale of the estate properties. The Baguio R TC opted to defer and not to
proceed with the cases. Thus, it is logical and proper that the respondents ask
the Baguio RTC to proceed with the case and then appeal the same if
denied.24 Teresa further avers that it is not disputed that the obligations
enumerated in Section 1,25 Rule 90 of the Rules of Court has not yet been fully
paid. Thus, it would be premature for the trial court to allow the advance
distribution of the estate. A partial and premature distribution of the estate may
only be done upon posting of a bond, conditioned upon the full payment of the
obligations, which was not done in the present case.
We note, however, that in her Partial Motion to Dismiss 26 dated July 1, 2016
before this Court, Teresa now agrees with the findings of the CA that the
Magsaysay property is co-owned by the parties, and should not be covered by
the estate proceedings.27
As a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is valid
only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions.28 In this case,
the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on

Page 144 of 206
whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. 29
This Court has distinguished the interlocutory and final orders, as follows:
A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving

nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right~ or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the
task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining
the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to
be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among
others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or
the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of
the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, "final and executory."
x x x x x x x x x
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not
end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that
other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory" e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion
for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or
granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection
of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be
taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. 30
The assailed April 13, 2004 and June 14, 2012 Orders denying respondents'
motion to allow the distribution of the estate's and co-owners' shares in the
subject properties were interlocutory. This is because such denial was not a
final determination of their alleged co-ownership. In fact, the intestate court
merely asserted its jurisdiction over the properties which were allegedly co-
owned with the Florencio Sr. estate.
Jurisprudence teaches that jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is

special and limited as it relates only to matters having to do with the probate of
the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to
the estate.31

Page 145 of 206
Furthermore, the doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will,
the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality" applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding
as in the case at bar.32 Thus:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate

cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said
court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so."33
Corollarily, in the case of Agtarap v. Agtarap, et al. 34 the Court enumerated

the instances when the intestate court may pass upon the issue of ownership,
to wit:
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency

and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.35
From the foregoing, this Court holds that the general rule on the limited
jurisdiction of the RTC as intestate court is applicable in Special Civil Action
Nos. 5.055-R and 5056-R. As to the Magsaysay property in Special Civil
Action No. 5057-R, it is evident from the certificate of title that the rights of
parties other than the heirs of Florencio Sr. will be impaired should the
intestate court decide on the ownership of the property.
We note that respondents presented certificates of title of the properties

registered under their names and the Florencio Sr. estate, and their respective
shares.36 As pronounced in Bolisay v. Judge Alcid:37
Page 146 of 206
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property
covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such
title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. 38
As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until their title is
nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. The co-ownership of the
said properties by virtue of the certificates of title is a common issue in the
complaints for partition filed before the Baguio RTC. Thus, the intestate court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it asserted jurisdiction over the
subject properties since its jurisdiction relates only to matters having to do with
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Any decision that the
intestate court would render on the title of the properties would at best be
merely provisional in character, and would yield to a final determination in a
separate action.
An action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is typically brought
by a person claiming to be the owner of a specified property against a
defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be his co-owners, 39
and is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between
the parties.40 As discussed in Lim De Mesa v. Court of Appeals,41the
determination of the existence of co-ownership is the first stage to accord with
the remedy of judicial partition, thus:
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a
partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired
partition either because a co-ownership does nut exist or a partition is legally
prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that
an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are
able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the
parties." In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or
accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby.

Page 147 of 206
In this regard, the Baguio RTC shirked from its duty when it deferred the trial
to await a request order from the intestate court regarding the possible
distribution. In fact, it has not yet made a definite ruling on the existence of co-
ownership. There was no declaration of entitlement to the desired partition
either because a co-ownership exists or a partition is not legally prohibited. As
this Court is not a trier of facts, it is for the trial court to proceed and determine
once and for all if there is co-ownership and to partition the subject properties
if there is no legal prohibition. It is also best for the Baguio RTC to settle
whether the respondents are claiming ownership over the properties by virtue
of their title adverse to that of their late father and his estate and not by any
right of inheritance.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresa R.

Ignacio is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution; dated March 27,
2014 and June 27, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 127151 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, such that the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 is DIRECTED to RESUME trial
on the merits in Special Civil Action Nos. 5055-R, 5056-R, and 5057-R to
determine the ownership of the subject properties and to partition as co-
owners, if proper.
SO ORDERED.

Page 148 of 206
[17] G.R. No. 198434
HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD AND JULIANA V. NATIVIDAD,

Petitioners, vs.JUANA MAURICIO-NATIVIDAD, and SPOUSES JEAN
NATIVIDAD CRUZ AND JERRY CRUZ, Respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Statute of Frauds; Under the Statute of Frauds, an

agreement to convey real properties shall be unenforceable by action in the absence
of a written note or memorandum thereof and subscribed by the party charged or by
his agent.—Suffice it to say that there is no partial execution of any contract,
whatsoever, because petitioners failed to prove, in the first place, that there was a
verbal agreement that was entered into. Even granting that such an agreement existed,
the CA did not commit any error in ruling that the assignment of the shares of Sergio
in the subject properties in petitioners’ favor as payment of Sergio’s obligation cannot
be enforced if there is no written contract to such effect. Under the Statute of Frauds,
an agreement to convey real properties shall be unenforceable by action in the absence
of a written note or memorandum thereof and subscribed by the party charged or by
his agent. As earlier discussed, the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners,
consisting of respondents’ acknowledgment of Sergio’s loan obligations with DBP as
embodied in the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, as well as the cash voucher
which allegedly represents payment for taxes and transfer of title in petitioners’ name
do not serve as written notes or memoranda of the alleged verbal agreement.
Same; Interest Rates; The Supreme Court (SC) finds no error in the ruling of
the Court of Appeals (CA) that such interest should be computed from June 23, 2001,
the date when petitioners made a written demand for the payment of respondents’
obligation.—As to when the interest on the sum due from respondents should be
reckoned, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that such interest should be
computed from June 23, 2001, the date when petitioners made a written demand for
the payment of respondents’ obligation. There is no merit in petitioners’ contention
that the reckoning date should have been September 23, 1994, the date when
respondents executed the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, because there is
nothing therein to prove that petitioners, at that time, made a demand for
reimbursement.
Same; Same; Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-MB) reduced the “rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the
absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest,” from twelve percent (12%)
to six percent (6%) per annum.—The rate of interest should be modified in view of
the issuance of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-
Monetary Board (BSP-MB). The said Circular reduced the “rate of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in
the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest,” from twelve percent

Page 149 of 206
(12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. The Circular was made effective on July 1,
2013.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1
and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 7, 2011 and
August 25, 2011, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92840. The assailed CA
Decision modified the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75, in Civil Case No. 1637-02-SM, while the CA
Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from an action for specific performance and/or
recovery of sum of money filed against herein respondents by the spouses
Leandro Natividad (Leandro) and Juliana Natividad (Juliana), who are the
predecessors of herein petitioners.
In their Complaint, Leandro and Juliana alleged that sometime in 1974, Sergio
Natividad (Sergio), husband of respondent Juana Mauricio-Natividad (Juana)
and father of respondent Jean Natividad-Cruz (Jean), obtained a loan from the
Development Bank of t.he Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, Sergio
mortgaged two parcels of land, one of which is co-owned and registered in his
name and that of his siblings namely, Leandro, Domingo and Adoracion. This
property is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5980. Sergio's
siblings executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to mortgage the
said property. The other mortgaged parcel of land, covered by OCT No.
10271, was registered in the name of Sergio and Juana. Subsequently, Sergio
died without being able to pay his obligations with DBP. Since the loan was
nearing its maturity and the mortgaged properties were in danger of being
foreclosed, Leandro paid Sergio's loan obligations. Considering that
respondents were unable to reimburse Leandro for the advances he made in
Sergio's favor, respondents agreed that Sergio's share in the lot which he co-
owned with his siblings and the other parcel of land in the name of Sergio and
Juana, shall be assigned in favor of Leandro ahd Juliana. Leandro's and
Sergio's brother, Domingo, was tasked to facilitate the transfer of ownership of
the subject properties in favor of Leandro ·and Juliana. However, Domingo
died without being able to cause such transfer. Subsequently, despite
demands and several follow-ups made by petitioners, respondents failed and
refused to honor their undertaking.
Respondents filed their Answer denying the allegations in the complaint and
raising the following defenses: (1) respondents are not parties to the contract
Page 150 of 206
between Sergio and DBP; (2) there is neither verbal nor written agreement
between petitioners and respondents that the latter shall reimburse whatever
payment was made by the former or their predecessor-in-interest; (3) Jean
was only a minor during the execution of the alleged agreement and is not a
party thereto; (4) that whatever liability or obligation of respondents is already
barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; (5) that the complaint states no
cause of action as respondents are not duty-bound to reimburse whatever
alleged payments were made by petitioners; and (6) there is no contract
between the parties to the effect that respondents are under obligation to
transfer ownership in petitioners' favor as reimbursement for the alleged
payments made by petitioners to DBP.
Respondents waived their right to present evidence arid they merely filed their
memorandum. Also, during pendency" of the trial, Leandro died and was
substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.
On November. 4, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners,

the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Defendants Juana Mauricio [Vda.] de Natividad and Jean

Natividad-Cruz are ordered to effect the transfer of title in
OCT No. 5980 with respect to the undivided share of the late
Sergio Natividad; and in OCT No. 10271 both of the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Rizal in favor of plaintiff Juliana [V
da.] de Natividad and the Heirs of the late Leandro Natividad.
2. Defendants to pay jointly and severally, attorney's fees in

the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); and cost of
suit.
SO ORDERED.3
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, respondents filed an Appeal with the CA.
On February 7, 2011, the CA promulgated its questioned Decision, disposing

as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated

November 4, 2008 is hereby MODIFIED in that defendants-appellants Juana
Mauricio-Natividad and Jean Natividad-Cruz are ordered instead to reimburse
plaintiffs-appellees Juliana Natividad and the heirs of the late Leandro

Page 151 of 206
Natividad the amount of P162,514.88 representing the amount of the loan
obligation paid to the Development Bank of the Philippines, plus legal interest
of 12% per annum computed from June 23, 2001 until finality of the judgment,
the total amount of which shall be to the extent only of defendants-appellants'
successional rights in the mortgaged properties and Juana's conjugal share in
[the] property covered by OCT No. 10271. The award of attorney's fees and
cost of suit are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, while respondents filed

their own Motion for Reconsideration, both of which, however, were denied by
the CA in its assailed Resolution dated August 25, 2011.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS' RULING THAT THE VERBAL AGREEMENT TO
CONVEY THE PROPERTY SHARES OF SERGIO
NATIVIDAD IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS OBLIGATION IS
COVERED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN PARTIALLY EXECUTED, IS
CONTRARY TO'EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
II. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE INTEREST ON
THE UNPAID LOAN .OBLIGATION SHOULD BE IMPOSED
ONLY ON JUNE 23, 2001, DATE OF THE DEMAND FOR
PAYMENT INSTEAD OF SEPTEMBER 23, 1994, WHEN
THE PARTIES VERBALLY AGREED TO CONVEY THEIR
PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF SERGIO
NATIVIDAD.5
Petitioners, insist that there was a verbal agreement between respondents

and Leandro, their predecessor-in-interest, wherein the subject properties
shall be assigned to the latter as reimbursement for the payments he made in
Sergio's favor. To support this contention, petitioners relied heavily on the
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, which was executed by respondents to
prove that there was indeed such an agreement and that such a Settlement is
evidence of the partial execution of the said agreement. The provisions of the
said Settlement are as follows:

Page 152 of 206
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AMONG HEIRS
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, made and entered into by and among:
JUAN M. NATIVIDAD, widow; JEAN N. CRUZ, married to JERRY CRUZ;

JOSELITO M. NATIVIDAD, single, all of legal age, Filipino citizens, and
residents of Malanday, San Mateo, Rizal
WITNESSETH
That the above-named parties, is the legitimate wife and children and sole
heirs of the deceased SERGIO NATIVIDAD, who died in San Mateo, Rizal on
May 31, 1981;
That the said deceased, at the time of his death, left certain real estate
properties located at San Mateo, Rizal, and Montalban, Rizal, more
particularly described as follows:
a. A whole portion of a parcel of land (Plan Psu-295655, L.R.

Case No. Q-29, L.R.C. Record No. N-295___ , situated in the
Barrio of Malanday, Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, and covered by OCT NO.
10271.
b. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of land situated in

Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal, containing an area of 2,742
square meters, covered by OCT No. 10493.
c. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of land situated in

San Jose, Montalban, Rizal, containing an area of 4,775
square meters, and covered by OCT No. ON-403.
d. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of land situated in

Cambal, San Mateo, Rizal, containing an area of 13,456
square meters, and covered by OCT No. 5980.
That no other personal properties are involved in this extrajudicial settlement.

Page 153 of 206
That to the best knowledge and information of the parties hereto, the said
deceased left certain obligations amounting to P175,000.00 representing loan
obligations with the Development Bank of the Philippines.
That a notice of this extrajudicial settlement had been published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in ___________ a newspaper of general
circulation in_______, as certified by the said newspaper hereto attached as
Annex "A";
That the parties hereto being all of legal age and with full civil capacity to
contract, hereby by these presents agree to divide and adjudicate, as they
hereby divide and adjudicate, among themselves the above-described real
estate property in equal shares and interest.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this document on this 2nd
day of September, 1994 in San Mateo, Rizal, Philippines.
x x x6
After a careful reading of the abovequoted Extra judicial Settlement Among

Heirs, the Court agrees with the CA that there is nothing in the said document
which would indicate that respondents agreed to the effect that the subject
properties shall be transferred in the name of Leandro as reimbursement for
his payment of Syrgio's loan obligations with the DBP. On the contrary, the
second to the last paragraph of the said Settlement clearly shows that herein
respondents, as heirs of Sergio, have divided the subject properties
exclusively among themselves.
There is no competent evidence to prove the verbal agreement being claimed

by respondents. Aside from the subject Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs,
the self-serving claims of Leandro on the witness stand, as well as the cash
voucher, 7 which supposedly represented payment of P8,000.00 given to Atty.
Domingo Natividad for the expenses in transferring the title of the subject
properties in Leandro's favor, would hardly count as competent evidence in
the eyes of the law. Respondents' claim of the existence of a verbal
agreement between them, on one hand, and petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest, on the other, remains to be mere allegation. It is an age-old rule in
civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence. 8
In relation to petitioners' contention that the subject verbal agreement actually

existed, they reiterate their contention that the conveyance of the subject
properties in their favor is not covered by the Statute of Frauds because they

Page 154 of 206
claim that respondents' execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs
constitutes partial execution of their alleged agreement.
The Court does not agree.
Suffice it to say that there is no partial execution of any contract, whatsoever,

because petitioners failed to prove, in the first place, that there was a verbal
agreement that was entered into.
Even granting that such an agreement existed, the CA did not commit any en-
or in ruling that the assignment of the shares of Sergio in the subject
properties in petitioners' favor as payment of Sergio's obligation cannot be
enforced if there is no written contract to such effect. Under the Statute of
Frauds9, an agreement to convey real properties shall be unenforceable by
action in the absence of a written note or memorandum thereof and
subscribed by the party charged or by his agent. As earlier discussed, the
pieces of evidence presented by petitioners, consisting of respondents'
acknowledgment of Sergio's loan obligations with DBP as embodied in the
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, as well as the cash voucher which
allegedly represents payment for taxes and transfer of title in petitioners' name
do not serve as written notes or memoranda of the alleged verbal agreement.
The foregoing, notwithstanding, the Court finds it proper to reiterate the CA

ruling that, in any case, since respondents had already acknowledged that
Sergio had, in fact, incurred loan obligations with the DBP, they are liable to
reimburse the amount paid by Leandro for the payment of the said obligation
even if such payment was made without their knowledge or consent.
Article 1236 of the Civil Code clearly provides that:
The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person

who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has
paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of
the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been
beneficial to the debtor. (Emphasis supplied)
Neither can respondents evade liability by arguing that they were not parties to
the contract between Sergio and the DBP. As earlier stated, the fact remains
that, in the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, respondents clearly

Page 155 of 206
acknowledged Sergio's loan obligations with the DBP. Being Sergio's heirs,
they succeed not only to the rights of Sergio but also to his obligations.
The following provisions of the Civil Code are clear on this matter, to wit:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,

rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others either by will or by
operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also
those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, respondents, being heirs of Sergio, are now liable to
settle his transmissible obligations, which include the amount due to
petitioners, prior to the distribution of the remainder of Sergio's estate to them,
in accordance with Section 1, 10 Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
As to when the interest on the sum due from respondents should be reckoned,
the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that such interest should be
computed from June 23, 2001, the date when petitioners made a written
demand for the payment of respondents' obligation. 11 There is no merit in
petitioners' contention that the reckoning date should have been September
23, 1994, the date when respondents executed the Extrajudicial Settlement
Among Heirs, because there is nothing therein to prove that petitioners, at that
time, made a demand for reimbursement.
However, the rate of interest should be modified in view of the issuance of

Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary
Board (BSP-MB). The said Circular reduced the "rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest,"
from twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. The Circular was
made effective on July 1, 2013. Hence, under the modified guidelines in the
imposition of interest, as laid down in the case of Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 12
this Court held that:
xxxx

Page 156 of 206
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the

payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money,
the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated
in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of

money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand
is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run
from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169,
Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which
time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money

becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim
period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x13
The Court explained that:
[F]rom the foregoing, in the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of

interest that would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments
shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per annum - as reflected in the case
Page 157 of 206
of Eastern Shipping Lines and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the
Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its
amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 - but will now be six percent (6%)
per annum effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the
new rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply
only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013, the new rate of six percent (6%)
per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when applicable. 14
Thus, in accordance with the above ruling, the rate of interest on the principal
amount due to petitioners shall be 12% from June 23, 2001, the date when
petitioners made a demand for payment, to June 30, 2013. From July 1, 2013,
the effective date of BSP-MB Circular No. 799, until full satisfaction of the
monetary award, the rate of interest shall be 6%.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals, dated February 7, 2011 and August 25, 2011,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92840 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
by ORDERING respondents to pay petitioners, in addition to the principal
amount of P162,514.88, interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum, computed from June 23, 2001 to June 30, 2013, and six percent
(6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction of the judgment award.
SO ORDERED.

Page 158 of 206
[18] G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth

Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE, Respondents.
Interlocutory Orders; While an interlocutory order is one which does not

dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon.—An
interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v. Republic (523
SCRA 203 [2007]): A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an
interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but
leaves something to be decided upon. (Emphasis supplied.) Additionally, it is only
after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the
interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The
interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is
only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.
Partition; Settlement of Estate; It must be borne in mind that until the estate is
partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such
that no heir may lay claim on a particular property.—In the instant case, Nelia
Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it
ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes
Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or
of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein.
It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an
inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a
particular property. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 526 (1998), we
succinctly ruled: Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by
such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership,
the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each co-
owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall
not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a
division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. Although the
right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has
not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides: Art. 493. Each co-
owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute

Page 159 of 206
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Same; The administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the
heirs upon order of the Court.—The above provision must be viewed in the context
that the subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before
the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the
administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the
Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the
estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and
other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.
Same; Same; Once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the
court, the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court.—
Once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties
included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the
administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the
prior authority of the Court. In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia
Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never
approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the
specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the
May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore,
not subject to an appeal.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the
May 4, 2007 Resolution1 and July 6, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764, entitled Nelia S. Silverio-Dee and Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. (impleaded as necessary party) v. Reinato G. Quilala, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 57, Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr., Edmundo S. Silverio, represented by Nestor Dela Merced II, and
Sheriff Villamor R. Villegas.
The assailed resolution granted private respondent’s prayer for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order against public respondent Judge Quilala.
On the other hand, the assailed decision set aside the Writ of Execution dated
April 17, 2007 and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 while directing
the respondent lower court to give due course to the appeal of herein private
respondent.
Page 160 of 206
The Facts
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the

deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo
Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. The
case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 entitled In Re: Estate of the
Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al.
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 57
(RTC).
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr.
filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the
subject estate. On November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a
comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and
removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.
On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration

of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.
On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order
Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in
the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this
Honorable Court.3
Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order 4 affirming its
Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as
administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005
on June 8, 2005.
On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
June 15, 20055 of the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC in an
Order dated December 12, 2005, which was received by private respondent
on December 22, 2005.

Page 161 of 206
Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005 6 also recalled its
previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over
the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as
the administrator.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October
31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various
properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle
estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. Among the
properties authorized to be sold was the one located at No. 3 Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City.7
Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal

dated January 5, 20068 from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the
Record on Appeal dated January 20, 20069 was filed on January 23, 2006.
Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss
Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution 10 against the appeal of Nelia
Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days
beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order 11 denying the appeal on the
ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC
further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May
31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises of the property
located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of execution was
later issued on April 17, 2007 12 and a Notice to Vacate 13 was issued on April
19, 2007 ordering private respondent to leave the premises of the subject
property within ten (10) days.
Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

(With Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated May 2, 2007 14
with the CA.
On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for
the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of
Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court
applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals15 as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank.16

Page 162 of 206
Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the
petition of private respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED and

GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, the Order, dated April 2, 2007, the writ of
execution, dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate, dated April 19,
2007, are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Further, the court a quo is hereby
directed to give due course to the appeal of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
-A-
The Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the Order
dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to
appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41;
-B-
The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in deliberately failing
to decide that the basis of the occupancy of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee are
fraudulent documents, without any authority from the Intestate Court;
-C-

discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing precipitately
the temporary restraining order (TRO) in its Resolution dated May 4, 2007
(Annex A-1);
-D-

discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Order
dated April 2, 2007, the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice
to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 because the respondent Silverio-Dee’s
occupancy of the Intestate property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park,

Page 163 of 206
Makati City (Annex N of Annex C) will prevent the sale authorized by the
Order dated October 31, 2006 to secure funds for the payment of taxes due
which are now high and rapidly increasing payment of which must not be
enjoined.17
The Court’s Ruling
This petition is meritorious.
The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC Is an Interlocutory Order, Not Subject to
an Appeal
To recapitulate, the relevant facts to the instant issue are as follows:
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-
Dee to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8,
2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order
was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6,
2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record
on Appeal on January 23, 2006.1avvphi1
Thus, in denying due course to the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its
Order dated April 2, 2007, ruled:
Verily, the appeal taken by the movant Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of
this Court dated December 12, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
is misplaced as no appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion for
reconsideration (see Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
in relation to Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court). Furthermore,
assuming that what said movant had appealed is the final Order dated May
31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be given due course as the Record on
Appeal had been filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal (see Section 3
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Nelia Silverio is hereby DENIED due

course.
Let a writ of execution issue to enforce the Order dated May 31, 2005 against
Nelia Silverio-Dee requiring her to vacate the premises at No. 3 Intsia, Forbes
Park, Makati City.

Page 164 of 206
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1)
that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s appeal was against an order denying a motion for
reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s Record on Appeal was filed beyond
the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 41
APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or

final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal

from the Order dated December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for
reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an
order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that
private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and
should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court instead.
The CA, however, ruled that the filing of the Notice of Appeal in this case was
proper saying that the appeal pertained to the earlier Omnibus Order dated
May 31, 2005. The CA, citing Apuyan v. Haldeman, 18 argued that an order
denying a motion for reconsideration may be appealed as such order is the
"final order" which disposes of the case. In that case, we stated:
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., We held, thus:

Page 165 of 206
… [T]his Court finds that the proscription against appealing from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration refers to an interlocutory order, and not
to a final order or judgment. That that was the intention of the above-quoted
rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455 (1971), cited in above-
quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in which this Court held that an
order denying a motion to dismiss an action is interlocutory, hence, not
appealable.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an
interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue
inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal. The
appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order
and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.
The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a

complaint is not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an
end to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein
disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than to execute
the order.
Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration

of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of
dismissal itself.
The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999
Order denying his Omnibus Motion—Motion for Reconsideration should thus
be deemed to refer to the January 17, 1999 Order which declared him non-
suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.
If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for

reconsideration is applied to any order, then there would have been no need
to specifically mention in both above-quoted sections of the Rules "final orders
or judgments" as subject to appeal. In other words, from the entire provisions
of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that what is proscribed is to
appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005
is an interlocutory order.
On this aspect, the CA ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 was
a final order, to wit:

Page 166 of 206
We note that the Order, dated December 12, 2005, is an offshoot of the
Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2005. In the Omnibus Order, the court a quo
ruled that the petitioner, as an heir of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, had no right
to use and occupy the property in question despite authority given to her by
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. when it said, thus:
x x x In the first place, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee cannot occupy the property in

Intsia, Forbes Park, admittedly belonging to the conjugal estate and subject to
their proceedings without authority of the Court. Based on the pretenses of
Nelia Silverio-Dee in her memorandum, it is clear that she would use and
maintain the premises in the concept of a distributee. Under her perception,
Section 1 Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court is violated. x x x
xxxx
For the property at Intsia, Forbes Park cannot be occupied or appropriated by,
nor distributed to Nelia S. Silverio-Dee, since no distribution shall be allowed
until the payment of the obligations mentioned in the aforestated Rule is
made. In fact, the said property may still be sold to pay the taxes and/or other
obligations owned by the estate, which will be difficult to do if she is allowed to
stay in the property.
Moreover, the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-
Dee to occupy the property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even
antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the possession
of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order
from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules
of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the
possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court).
With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal basis
considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of
administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the
new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of
settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.
In the belated Memorandum of Nelia Silverio-Dee, she enclosed a statement

of the expenses she incurred pertaining to the house renovation covering the
period from May 26, 2004 to February 28, 2005 in the total amount of
Php12,434,749.55, which supports this Court’s conclusion that she is already
the final distributee of the property. Repairs of such magnitude require notice,
hearing of the parties and approval of the Court under the Rules. Without

Page 167 of 206
following this process, the acts of Nelia Silverio-Dee are absolutely without
legal sanction.
To our mind, the court a quo’s ruling clearly constitutes a final determination of
the rights of the petitioner as the appealing party. As such, the Omnibus
Order, dated May 31, 2002 (the predecessor of the Order dated December 12,
2002) is a final order; hence, the same may be appealed, for the said matter is
clearly declared by the rules as appealable and the proscription does not
apply.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v.

Republic:20
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an
interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but
leaves something to be decided upon. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the
ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal
of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed
separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.21
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the
RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property
located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the
order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of
the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in
mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to
the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular
property. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, we succinctly ruled:
Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs,
the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by
such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-
ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his
rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The
underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his
Page 168 of 206
co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his
use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a
co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. 22
(Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the
subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings
before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to
the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules
of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the
payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate,
except when authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the
properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not
even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the
estate without the prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she
allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the
probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific
property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the
May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and,
therefore, not subject to an appeal.1avvphi1
Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a

Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of
appeal, the case should have been dismissed.23
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll
the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,

Page 169 of 206
the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has
now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.
Therefore, there is no longer any need to consider the other issues raised in
the petition.
WHEREFORE, the May 4, 2007 Resolution and July 6, 2007 Decision of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thus, the
Decision dated April 2, 2007 of the RTC denying due course to the appeal of
Nelia Silverio-Dee; the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007; and the Notice
to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 are hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Page 170 of 206
[19] G.R. No. 185226 February 11, 2010
CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as administratrix of the estate litigated in the

case below, RAMIRO T. MADARANG, and the heirs of CASIMIRO R.
MADARANG, JR., namely: Estrelita L. Madarang, Consuelo P. Madarang,
Casimiro Madarang IV, and Jane Margaret Madarang-Crabtree,
Petitioners, vs.ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG and VICENTE R. MADARANG,
Respondents.
Civil Law; Land Titles; Jurisdiction; Probate Courts; While a probate court, being of
special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on question of title and ownership, it can,
for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of properties of a decedent,
make a provisional determination of ownership, without prejudice to a final
determination through a separate action in a court of general jurisdiction.—While a
probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on questions of title
and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of
properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination of ownership, without
prejudice to a final determination through a separate action in a court of general
jurisdiction.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on

June 3, 1995, leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value of
₱200,000.00.1 He was survived by his wife Dolores and their five children,
namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon.
In the intestate proceedings filed by the couple’s son Jose which was lodged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was
appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr. 2
Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedent’s

estate. Jose filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots
including Lot 829-B-4-B located in Cebu City which is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 125429.
A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part of
the estate of the decedent. By Order of April 5, 2002, 3 the RTC, noting the
following:

Page 171 of 206
x x x The said properties appear to have been acquired by the spouses after
[their marriage on] December 27, 1931 and during their marriage or coverture.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines (which is the governing
law in this particular case) is very explicit in providing that all properties of the
marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. This
presumption, to the mind of the Court, has not been sufficiently rebutted by the
special administratrix. [Dolores] This presumption applies and holds even if
the land is registered under the wife’s name as long as it was acquired during
marriage (De Guinoo vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. L-5541, June 26, 1955)
or even if the wife purchased the land alone (Flores, et.al. Vs. Escudero, et.al.,
G.R. No. L-5302, March 11, 1953).4 (underscoring supplied),
instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.
Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be
referred to as "oppositors,"5 questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six
lots via motion for reconsideration during the pendency of which motion the
court appointed herein petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her mother
Dolores.
As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been
transferred during the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to submit
their affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support the allegation. Only herein
respondent Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared that one of the
six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of Donation executed
in August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro, Sr. 6
It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the
provisional inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.
The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003, 7 thus modified its April 5, 2002 Order
as follows:
Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be
excluded. The administratrix is directed within sixty (60) days: (1) to submit a
revised inventory in accordance with the Order dated April 5, 2002, as here
modified; and (2) to render an accounting of her administration of the estate of
Casimiro V. Madarang. (underscoring supplied),
Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that since
the title to Lot 829-B-4-B remained registered in the name of his parents, it
should not be excluded from the Inventory; and that the Deed of Donation in
Vicente’s favor was not notarized nor registered with the Register of Deeds.

Page 172 of 206
Jose’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order of February 5,
2003, he filed a Notice of Appeal.
In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Jose claimed that the RTC erred
in excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory as "what the lower court should
have done was to . . . maintain the order including said lot in the inventory of
the estate so Vicente can file an ordinary action where its ownership can be
threshed out."
Jose later filed before the appellate court a "Motion to Withdraw Petition"
which his co-heirs-oppositors-herein petitioners opposed on the ground that,
inter alia, a grant thereof would "end" the administration proceedings. The
appellate court, by Resolution of January 18, 2008, 8 granted the withdrawal on
the ground that it would "not prejudice the rights of the oppositors."
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s grant of Jose’s

Motion to Withdraw Petition was, by Resolution of November 6, 2008, 9 denied
in this wise:
xxxx
In the instant case, the Probate Court found that the parties of the case
interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the
inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have
consented thereto. x x x
xxxx
Moreover, [herein petitioners] in their appeal brief, ha[ve] extensively argued

that . . . Vicente Madarang [to whom the questioned lot was donated] and his
family have been in continuous, actual and physical possession of the donated
lot for over twenty (20) years, even before the execution of the so called
donation inter vivos in 1992. . . . Vicente Madarang has his residential house
thereon and that his ownership over the donated lot has been fully recognized
by the entire Madarang Clan, including all his brothers and sisters, except the
much belated objection by the appellant (Jose), allegedly resorted to as an act
of harassment. 10 (emphasis and underscoring supplied),
thus affirming the RTC order of exclusion of the questioned lot.
Hence, the present petition for review filed by the oppositors-herein

petitioners. Casimiro, Jr. having died during the pendency of the case, he was

Page 173 of 206
substituted by his wife petitioner Estrelita and co-petitioners children
Consuelo, Casimiro IV, and Jane Margaret.
Petitioners contend that since the only issue for consideration by the appellate
court was the merit of Jose’s "Motion to Withdraw Petition," it exceeded its
jurisdiction when it passed upon the merits of Jose’s appeal from the RTC
order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory.
Petitioners’ contention does not lie.
In their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s grant of Jose’s

"Motion to Withdraw Petition," petitioners, oddly denying the existence of a
"petition," raised the issue of the propriety of the RTC Order excluding Lot
829-B-4-B from the Inventory. Their prayer in their Motion clearly states so:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Oppositors-Appellees [petitioners]

respectfully PRAY for this Honorable Court to RECONSIDER its questioned
Resolution and rendering [sic], forthwith, a decision resolving the merits of the
Partial Appeal of petitioner-appellant Jose Madarang.11 (capitalization in the
original; emphasis supplied)
The appellate court did not thus err in passing on the said issue.
More specifically, petitioners question the appellate court’s finding that as the
parties "interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in
the inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have
consented thereto."12
A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there was
no accord among the parties respecting the exclusion of Lot 829-B-4-B.
While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on
questions of title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion
in the inventory of properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination
of ownership, without prejudice to a final determination through a separate
action in a court of general jurisdiction.1avvphil
The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate
court to make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It
bears stress that the question is one of collation or advancement by the
decedent to an heir over which the question of title and ownership can be
passed upon by a probate court.13

Page 174 of 206
As earlier reflected, Vicente’s claim of ownership over Lot 829-B-4-B rests
upon a deed of donation by his father (decedent) and his mother.
Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition.
(underscoring supplied)
in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. – Questions as to

advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on
the person raising the questions and on the heir. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have
been donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente,
should not be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed November 6, 2008

Resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Corazon M.
Gregorio and her co-administratrix Dolores Madarang are DIRECTED to
include Lot 829-B-4-B in the Inventory of the properties of the intestate estate
of Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr.
Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin, the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57, which is DIRECTED to proceed with the
disposition of the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Page 175 of 206
[20] G.R. No. L-15445 April 29, 1961
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED

MERCEDES CANO. FLORANTE C. TIMBOL, administrator-appellee,
vs.JOSE CANO, oppositor-appellant.
Wills; Court of First Instance; Probate jurisdiction; Probate -proceeding.—In

probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants
letters of administration to the party best entitled to any qualified applicant, supervises
and controls all acts of administration, hears and approves claims against the estate of
the deceased, orders payment of lawful debts, authorizes the sale, mortgage or any
encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2) and directs the delivery of the estate to
those entitled thereto. The court acts as a trustee, and, as such trustee, should jealously
guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered, not
dissipated.
Same; Lease; Judicial revocation or modification of lease contract.—If the
probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the
reduction of the subject of the lease. The act of giving the property to a lessee is an act
of administration, also subject to the approval of the court. If the court abuses its
discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its order may be
subject to appeal and may be reversed; but not because the court may make an error
may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control the acts of administration of the
administrator.
Same; When probate court loses jurisdiction over estate under administration.
—The probate court loses jurisdiction over an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Hon.

Arsenio Santos, presiding, dated August 25, 1958, approving petitions of the
administrator Florante C. Timbol dated January 6 and 8, 1958. The order
appealed from authorizes the administrator to increase the area of a
subdivision to be formed out of the lands under administration from 30
hectares to 41.9233 hectares and approves the plan of such increased area.
The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir
her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946,
Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April 13,
1951 Jose Cano, filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also
an uncle of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the agricultural lands
Page 176 of 206
of the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental
of P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the
payment of land taxes and dues to the government. Judge Edilberto Barot,
then presiding the court, approved the motion in an order dated April 27, 1951,
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion of the administrator and his lawyer dated

April 13,1951, is hereby granted under the conditions therein set forth
and the further condition that all previous obligations of the
administration including the previous deficits are assumed by said
administrator, and that the arrangement will continue only as long as,
in the judgment of contageous to the heir, the Court, the same
continues to be advantageous to the heir, Florante C. Timbol. (p. 27,
Rec. on Appeal)
On January 14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the administrator and the
conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the
annual rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the
administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the
agricultural lands into a subdivision.
On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was

approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the
properties of the intestate.
On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of

Jose Cano and on January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modified
ina subsequent one of January 8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that
the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares
to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions
were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give
opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his
objections to the motions. Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of
the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his
tenants of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express
authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his
leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.
The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objections of
Jose Cano, in the order now subject of appeal, which reads:
The said contract of lease is on all forms illegal. Under article 1646 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, — a new provision, — "the persons
disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491, are also
Page 177 of 206
disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned therein," and
under article 1491 (3) o the same Code, executors and administrators
cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate under
administration.
If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only pointed

administrator on June 6, 1957 and the said contract of lease having
been executed on July 9, 1956, the same fall within the prohibition
provided by law. However, Jose C. Cano avers that this Court, in the
instant proceedings, cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid
lease contract, but in its general jurisdiction. There is no need for the
court to declare such contract illegal and, therefore, null and void as
the law so expressly provides.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations the court

hereby grants Florante C. Timbol's petitions date January 6 and 8,
1958, approving the amended plan for sub division, attached thereto,
and overrules Jose C. Cano's motion for reconsideration dated May 9,
same year. (pp. 151-152 Record on Appeal) The above is the subject
of the present appeal.
The above is the subject of the present appeal.
In the first assignment of error appellant claims that the consideration of the
motions of the administrator July 6 and 8, 1958, without due notice to him,
who is lessee is a violation of the Rules of Court. This objection lost its force
when the court, motu proprio set aside it first order of approval and furnished
copy of the motion to appellant and gave him all the opportunity to present his
objections thereto.
In the second and third assignments of error appellant argues that the court
below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his
rights under the lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified only
by a court of general jurisdiction. The above arguments are without merit. In
probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent
(Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled
thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all
acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the
deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec.
14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90,
Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91,
See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee,
should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically
administered, not dissipated. (Tambunting vs. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8152.) .

Page 178 of 206
Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural
lands of the intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with
the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so
may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The
matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also
subject to the approval of the court. Of course, if the court abuses its
discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its
orders may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not
because the court may make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to
control acts of administration of the administrator.
In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the effect of the
reduction of the area under lease would be to deprive the tenants of appellant
of their landholdings. In the first place, the tenants know ought to know that
the lands leased are lands under administration, subject to be sold, divided or
finally delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the administration of
the lands of the intestate. The order appealed from does not have the effect of
immediately depriving them of their landholdings; the order does not state so,
it only states that the lands leased shall be reduced and subdivided. If they
refuse to leave their landholdings, the administrator will certainly proceed as
the law provides. But in the meanwhile, the lessee cannot allege the rights of
his tenants as an excuse for refusing the reduction ordered by the court.
In the fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that his rights as lessee would
be prejudiced because the land leased would be reduced without a
corresponding reduction in the rentals. This would be a matter to be litigate
between the administrator and himself before the probate court. But the fact of
the prejudice alone cannot bar reduction of the land leased, because such
reduction is necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the debts
of the estate under administration.
The sixth assignment of error merits no attention on our part; it is appellant

himself who, as administrator since 1945, has delayed the settlement of the
estate.
In the seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project of
partition had already been approved and had become final, the lower court
has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the
enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision. This assignment of
error needs but a passing mention. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an
estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the
case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been
delivered to the heirs as such heir.

Page 179 of 206
We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on
this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the
declaration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to
the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was
granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the
lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.(See Arts. 1646 and
1491, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the court
below that the lease is null and void, which declaration we hereby affirm, it
would seem proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to
take steps to get back the lands leased from the appellant herein, or so much
thereof as is needed in the course of administration.
The court order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.

Page 180 of 206
[21] G.R. No. 240199
SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO, Petitioners

vs. HEIRS OF RESURRECCION* MARTINEZ FELIX, NAMELY: LUCIANO,
CORAZON AND CONCEPCION, ALL SURNAMED FELIX, RECAREDO P.
HERNANDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF AMANDA H. BURGOS, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Respondents
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Spouses Isidro R. Salitico (Isidro) and
Conrada C. Salitico (Conrada) (collectively referred to as the petitioners Sps.
Salitico), assailing the Decision2 dated October 19, 2017 (assailed Decision)
and Resolution3 dated June 7, 2018 (assailed Resolution) of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Twelfth Division and Special Former Twelfth Division,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 105166.
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
As narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision and based on the records of

the instant case, the essential facts and antecedent proceedings of the case
are as follows:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint 4 for Specific Performance with
Damages (Complaint) filed on February 15, 2011 by the petitioners Sps.
Salitico against the respondents Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix
(Resurreccion); namely: Luciano, Corazon, and Concepcion, all surnamed
Felix (collectively referred to as the respondents heirs); Recaredo P.
Hernandez (Recaredo), in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of
Amanda H. Burgos (Amanda); and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan (RD).
The case was heard before the Regional Trial Comt of Malolos City (RTC),
Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 73-M-2011.
Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land

registered in her name under Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-1908,
located in Bambang, Bulacan (subject property).
By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos5 dated

May 7, 1986 (Huling Habilin), the subject property was inherited by the niece
Page 181 of 206
of Amanda, Resurreccion, as a devisee. The pertinent provision of the Huling
Habilin provides:
Sa aking pamangkin nasi RESURRECCION MARTINEZ-FELIX, 'RESY', ay

aking inaaboy ang apat (4) na parselang lupang palayan na napapaloob sa
mga titulong sumusunod:
x x x x6
Thereafter, Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, executed

a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa7 dated November 10, 1998,
which transferred ownership over the parcel of land in favor of the petitioners
Sps. Salitico. The latter then took physical possession of the subject property.
Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was

undertaken before the RTC, Branch 22 (Probate Court). Respondent
Recaredo was appointed as the executor of the Huling Habilin. The latter then
filed and presented the Huling Habilin before the Probate Court, which
approved it on February 6, 2008. The Probate Court likewise issued a
Certificate of Allowance on January 12, 2009.
On March 9, 2010, the petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter

requiring them to vacate the subject property and surrender possession over it
to the respondents heirs. To protect their interest over the subject property,
the petitioners Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated
March 17, 2009, which was however denied registration by the respondent RD
on November 3, 2009.
In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the
delivery and return in their favor of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908
and the execution of the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale by way of
confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They likewise prayed that OCT P-
1908 be cancelled and a new one be issued in their names. Lastly, they also
demanded payment of attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages, and
reimbursement for litigation expenses.
On February 11, 2013, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for
Summary Judgment,8 which was, however, denied by the RTC in its Order9
dated June 5, 2013. The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for
Reconsideration, which was partially granted by the RTC in its Order dated
September 18, 2013.10 The RTC issued a partial summary judgment in favor
of the petitioners Sps. Salitico, ordering the respondent RD to register the

Page 182 of 206
petitioners' Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated March 17, 2009. The Pre-Trial of
the case was concluded on September 26, 2013. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Ruling of the RTC
On June 6, 2014, the RTC rendered its Decision 11 dismissing the Complaint
for lack of cause of action. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Complaint dated 7 February 2011 is

hereby dismissed for lack of cause of action.
SO ORDERED.12
In its Decision, the RTC found that Resurreccion had indeed validly sold the
subject property which she inherited from Amanda to the petitioners Sps.
Salitico. Nevertheless, the RTC held that the action filed by the petitioners
Sps. Salitico is premature on the ground that it was not shown that the
Probate Court had already fully settled the Estate of Amanda, even as it was
not disputed that the Huling Habilin had already been allowed and certified.
Hence, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for the sole reason that the
petitioners Sps. Salitico's cause of action had supposedly not yet accrued, as
the Estate of Amanda has not yet been fully settled by the Probate Court.
The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied in the RTC's Order dated May 26, 2015.13
Hence, on June 16, 2015, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Notice of
Appeal, which was granted by the RTC on June 18, 2015. The appeal was
given due course by the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the appeal due to the pendency of
the probate proceedings before the Probate Court, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, which states that no will shall pass either real or personal
estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. The CA also cited
Rule 90, Section 1, which states that no distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, allowance
to the widow, and inheritance tax have been made, unless the distributees or
any of them give a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned on the
payment of the said obligations.

Page 183 of 206
The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 9, 2017,14 which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution.
Hence, this appeal via Petition for Review on Certiorari15 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The respondents heirs filed their Comment 16 dated November
9, 2018.
Issue
Stripped to its core, the Court is asked to rule on whether the CA erred in
upholding the RTC's Decision dated June 6, 2014 and Order dated May 26,
2015, which dismissed the petitioners Sps. Salitico's Complaint for Specific
Performance due to lack of cause of action.
The Court's Ruling
The instant Petition is partly meritorious.1âшphi1
It is not disputed that by virtue of the decedent Amanda's will, i.e., Huling
Habilin, Resurreccion inherited the subject property as the designated
devisee. The respondents heirs themselves admit that Resurreccion is a
testamentary heir of Amanda.17
It is likewise not disputed that Resurreccion sold her interest over the subject
property by executing a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa in favor
of the petitioners Sps. Salitico who then proceeded to take physical
possession of the subject property. In fact, in the assailed Decision, the CA
recognized that the RTC itselfhad held that "Resurreccion validly sold to [the
petitioners Sps. Salitico] all her rights in the [subject property] which she
inherited from Amanda H. Burgos as part of her undivided share in the estate
of the latter."18
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of
the inheritance are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Article 777 operates at the very moment of the decedent's death meaning that
the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and,
therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have
acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of
declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution." 19 Thus, there is no legal bar to
an heir disposing of his/her hereditary share immediately after such death. 20
The Court, early on in Teves de Jakosalem v. Rafols, et al., 21 explained that a
sale made by a legal or intestate heir of his share in an inheritance does not
interfere with the administration of the estate.

Page 184 of 206
As applied to the instant case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion
became the absolute owner of the devised subject property, subject to a
resolutory condition that upon settlement of Amanda's Estate, the devise is not
declared inofficious or excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing
Resurreccion from entering into a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps.
Salitico with respect to the former's share or interest over the subject property.
In a contract of sale, the parties' obligations are plain and simple. The law
obliges the vendor to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is
the object of sale to the vendee. 22 Therefore, as a consequence of the valid
contract of sale entered into by the parties, Resurreccion had the obligation to
deliver the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. In fact, it is not
disputed that the physical delivery of the subject property to the petitioners
Sps. Salitico had been done, with the latter immediately entering into
possession of the subject property after the execution of the Bilihang Tuluyan
ng Lupa. Therefore, considering that a valid sale has been entered into in the
instant case, there is no reason for the respondents heirs to withhold from the
petitioners Sps. Salitico the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908. To
reiterate, Resurreccion already sold all of her interest over the subject property
to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Therefore, the respondents heirs have
absolutely no rhyme nor reason to continue possessing the owner's duplicate
copy of OCT P-1908.
Nevertheless, the existence of a valid sale in the instant case does not
necessarily mean that the RD may already be compelled to cancel OCT P-
1908 and issue a new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
According to Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise

known as the Property Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of
properties subject of testate or intestate proceedings, a new certificate of title
in the name of the transferee shall be issued by the Register of Deeds only
upon the submission of a certified copy of the partition and distribution,
together with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or
otherwise making final distribution, supported by evidence of payment of
estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case may be. The said provision
provides:
Section 92. Registration of final distribution of estate. A certified copy of the

partition and distribution, together with the final judgment or order of the court
approving the same or otherwise making final distribution, supported by
evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case may
be, shall be tiled with the Register of Deeds, and upon the presentation of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, new certificates of title shall be issued to

Page 185 of 206
the parties severally entitled thereto in accordance with the approved partition
and distribution.
Further, under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final

distribution from the testate/intestate court and in anticipation of a final
distribution of a portion or the whole of the property, the Register of Deeds
may be compelled to issue the corresponding certificate of title to the
transferee only when the executor/administrator of the estate submits a
certified copy of an order from the court having jurisdiction of the testate or
intestate proceedings directing the executor/administrator to transfer the
property to the transferees. The said provision provides:
Section 91. Transfer in anticipation of final distribution. Whenever the court

having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate proceedings directs the executor
or administrator to take over and transfer to the devisees or heirs, or any of
them, in anticipation of final distribution a portion or the whole of the registered
land to which they might be entitled on final distribution, upon the filing of a
certified copy of such order in the office of the Register of Deeds, the executor
or administrator may cause such transfer to be made upon the register in like
manner as in case of a sale, and upon the presentation of the owner's
duplicate certificate to the Register of Deeds, the devisees or heirs concerned
shall be entitled to the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title.
The aforementioned sections of PD 1529 are in perfect conjunction with Rule

90, Section 123 of the Rules of Court, which states that the actual distribution
of property subject to testate or intestate proceedings, i.e., the issuance of a
new title in the name of the distributee, shall occur only when the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate, have been paid. Only
then can the testate or intestate court assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same. Under Rule 90, Section 1, the testate or intestate
court may also order the distribution of the property pending the final order of
distribution if the distributees give a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of the aforesaid said obligations within such
time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it
is only upon the issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order of
distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution that
the certificate of title covering the subject property may be issued in the name
of the distributees.
In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement
of the Estate of Amanda, the Probate Court had issued an order of final

Page 186 of 206
distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution, both of which the
law deems as requirements before the RD can issue a new certificate of title in
the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
To clarify, this holding does not go against Article 777 of the Civil Code
whatsoever. What the aforesaid Civil Code provision signifies is that there is
no legal bar preventing an heir from disposing his/her hereditary share and
transferring such share to another person, inasmuch as the right thereto is
vested or transmitted to the heir from the moment of the death of the decedent
or testator. The rule, however, does not state that the transferee may already
compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering the specific property
in his/her name.
Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent
provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and
transfer his/her hereditary share to another person, before the transferee may
compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering specific property in
his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in
anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must
first be had.
Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between

Resurreccion and the petitioners Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant
the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 in favor of the latter,
pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order of
final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution from the
Probate Court, the RD cannot be compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908
and issue a new certificate of title in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision

dated October 19, 2017 and Resolution dated June 7, 2018 of the Court of
Appeals Twelfth Division and Former Special Twelfth Division, respectively, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 105166 are PARTIALLY REVERSED. Judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the respondents Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix to
DELIVER the owner's duplicate copy of Owner's Certificate of Title No. P-
1908 to the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
With respect to the petitioners Sps. Salitico's prayer compelling the Register of
Deeds to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title in their favor,
for the reasons stated above, the said prayer is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Page 187 of 206
Page 188 of 206
[22] G.R. No. 174835 March 22, 2010
ANITA REYES-MESUGAS, Petitioner, vs. ALEJANDRO AQUINO REYES,

Respondent.
Judgments; Compromise Agreements; When both parties enter into an

agreement to end a pending litigation and request that a decision be rendered
approving said agreement, such action constitutes an implied waiver of the right to
appeal against the said decision.—A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. Once submitted to the court and stamped with judicial approval, it
becomes more than a mere private contract binding upon the parties; having the
sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the
force and effect of any judgment. Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance
with a compromise agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal from
such judgment. When both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation
and request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, such action
constitutes an implied waiver of the right to appeal against the said decision.
Probate Courts; Jurisdiction; Settled is the rule that a probate court is a
tribunal of limited jurisdiction—it acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never
on the rights to property arising from the contract, and approves contracts entered
into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of
Court.—In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Lourdes. The RTC therefore took cognizance of the case as
a probate court. Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to
property arising from the contract. It approves contracts entered into for and on behalf
of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court. It is apparent
therefore that when the RTC approved the compromise agreement on September 13,
2000, the settlement of the estate proceeding came to an end.
Same; Lis Pendens; Any agreement other than the judicially approved
compromise agreement between the parties is outside the limited jurisdiction of the
probate court; A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not
necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.—A notice of
lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title
of the party who caused it to be recorded. The compromise agreement did not mention
the grant of a right of way to respondent. Any agreement other than the judicially
approved compromise agreement between the parties was outside the limited
jurisdiction of the probate court. Thus, any other agreement entered into by the
petitioner and respondent with regard to a grant of a right of way was not within the
jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a probate court. Therefore, there was no reason for
the RTC not to cancel the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 24475 as respondent had
no right which needed to be protected. Any alleged right arising from the “side

Page 189 of 206
agreement” on the right of way can be fully protected by filing an ordinary action for
specific performance in a court of general jurisdiction.
Same; Same; When the court’s judgment on the settlement of estate decision
was recorded in the Registry of Deeds pursuant to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, the notice of lis pendens inscribed on the affected property was deemed
cancelled by virtue of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.—In line with the
recording of the order for the partition of the estate, paragraph 2, Section 77 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 provides: Section 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendens
—xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx At any time after final judgment in favor of the
defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights
of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a
memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding
section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of
a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating
the manner of disposal thereof. Thus, when the September 13, 2000 decision was
recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal pursuant to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules
of Court, the notice of lis pendens inscribed on TCT No. 24475 was deemed cancelled
by virtue of Section 77 of PD No. 1529.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking to reverse the June 23, 2006
and September 21, 2006 orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC),
Branch 62 denying the petitioner’s motion to cancel a notice of lis pendens.
Petitioner Anita Reyes-Mesugas and respondent Alejandro A. Reyes are the

children of Lourdes Aquino Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes. Lourdes died
intestate, leaving to her heirs, among others, three parcels of land, including a
lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 24475.
On February 3, 2000, respondent filed a petition for settlement of the estate of

Lourdes,3 praying for his appointment as administrator due to alleged
irregularities and fraudulent transactions by the other heirs. Petitioner, her
father Pedro and Arturo, a sibling of the petitioner, opposed the petition.
On August 30, 2000, a compromise agreement 4 was entered into by the

parties whereby the estate of Lourdes was partitioned. A decision 5 dated
September 13, 2000 was rendered by the RTC pursuant to the said
compromise agreement. The compromise agreement with respect to TCT No.
24475 is reproduced below:

Page 190 of 206
5. That the parties hereto hereby agree to recognize, acknowledge
and respect:
5.1. the improvements found on the parcel of land covered

under TCT No. 24475 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
consisting of two lots namely Lot 4-A and Lot 4-B of the new
survey with two (2) residential houses presently occupied and
possessed as owners thereof by Antonio Reyes and Anita
Reyes-Mesugas to constitute part of their shares in the estate
of Lourdes Aquino Reyes;
5.2 further, the improvement consisting of a bakery-store

under lease to a third party. The proceeds thereof shall be
shared by Antonio Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes;
5.3 that the expenses for the partition and titling of the
property between Antonio Reyes and Anita Reyes-Mesugas
shall be equally shared by them.
On December 7, 2004, petitioner filed a motion to cancel lis pendens

annotation for TCT No. 244756 in the RTC in view of the finality of judgment in
the settlement of the estate. Petitioner argued that the settlement of the estate
proceeding had terminated; hence, the annotation of lis pendens could already
be cancelled since it had served its purpose.
Respondent opposed the motion and claimed that the parties, in addition to
the compromise agreement, executed "side agreements" which had yet to be
fulfilled. One such agreement was executed between petitioner 7 and
respondent granting respondent a one-meter right of way on the lot covered
by TCT No. 24475. However, petitioner refused to give the right of way and
threatened to build a concrete structure to prevent access. He argued that,
unless petitioner permitted the inscription of the right of way on the certificate
of title pursuant to their agreement, the notice of lis pendens in TCT No. 24475
must remain.
In its order8 dated January 26, 2006, the RTC denied the motion to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotation for lack of sufficient merit. It found that the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was unnecessary as there were
reasons for maintaining it in view of petitioner's non-compliance with the
alleged right of way agreement between the parties. It stated that:
A careful perusal of the compromise agreement dated September 13, 2000

revealed that one of the properties mentioned is a parcel of land with

Page 191 of 206
improvements consisting [of] two hundred nine (209) square meters situated in
Makati covered under TCT No. 24475 of the Registry of Deeds [of] Rizal in the
name of Pedro N. Reyes married to Lourdes Aquino Reyes and form[s] part of
the notarized right of way agreement on TCT No. 24475, considering that the
movant Anita Reyes is still bound by the right of way agreement, the same
should be complied with before the cancellation of the subject annotation. 9
(Citations omitted)
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. 10 Because the denial of a motion to cancel

the notice of lis pendens annotation was an interlocutory order, the RTC
denied the notice of appeal as it could not be appealed until the judgment on
the main case was rendered.11 A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner but the same was also denied.12
Hence, this petition.
We find for petitioner.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal

concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. 13 Once
submitted to the court and stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more
than a mere private contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of
the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force
and effect of any judgment.14
Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise

agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal from such
judgment.15 When both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending
litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement,
such action constitutes an implied waiver of the right to appeal against the
said decision.16
In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Lourdes. The RTC therefore took cognizance of the
case as a probate court.
Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts
on matters pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to property arising
from the contract.17 It approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the
estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court. 18 It is apparent
therefore that when the RTC approved the compromise agreement on
September 13, 2000, the settlement of the estate proceeding came to an end.

Page 192 of 206
Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not
necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. 19 The
compromise agreement did not mention the grant of a right of way to
respondent. Any agreement other than the judicially approved compromise
agreement between the parties was outside the limited jurisdiction of the
probate court. Thus, any other agreement entered into by the petitioner and
respondent with regard to a grant of a right of way was not within the
jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a probate court. Therefore, there was no
reason for the RTC not to cancel the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 24475
as respondent had no right which needed to be protected. Any alleged right
arising from the "side agreement" on the right of way can be fully protected by
filing an ordinary action for specific performance in a court of general
jurisdiction.1avvphi1
More importantly, the order of the probate court approving the compromise
had the effect of directing the delivery of the residue of the estate of Lourdes
to the persons entitled thereto under the compromise agreement. As such, it
brought to a close the intestate proceedings 20 and the probate court lost
jurisdiction over the case, except only as regards to the compliance and the
fulfillment by the parties of their respective obligations under the compromise
agreement.
Having established that the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Lourdes came to an end upon the RTC’s promulgation of a decision based on
the compromise agreement, Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. - Certified copies of final

orders and judgments of the court relating to the real estate or the partition
thereof shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province where the
property is situated.
In line with the recording of the order for the partition of the estate, paragraph
2, Section 77 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 21 provides:
Section 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendens – xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other

disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the
plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which
a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in
the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled

Page 193 of 206
upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or
proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof. (emphasis
supplied)
Thus, when the September 13, 2000 decision was recorded in the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal pursuant to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, the notice
of lis pendens inscribed on TCT No. 24475 was deemed cancelled by virtue of
Section 77 of PD No. 1529.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional

Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62 dated June 23, 2006 and September 21,
2006 are SET ASIDE. The notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. 24475
is hereby declared CANCELLED pursuant to Section 77 of the PD No. 1529 in
relation to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.

Page 194 of 206
[23] G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND

HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES,
Petitioners, vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
Courts; Probate Proceedings; Jurisdictions; The general rule is that the

jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of will of
deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership
that arise during the proceedings; A well-recognized exception to the rule is the
principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of
ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory.—The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court
either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to
the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or
a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such
situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr.
vs. Court of Appeals, we held: “x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto,
but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.”
Same; Same; Same; When a question arises as to ownership of property alleged
to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to
be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in
the course of an intestate or probate proceedings.—The RTC, acting as an intestate
court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain
a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and
reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some
other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question
cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The
intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which
must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional
trial court. Jurisprudence teaches us that: [A] probate court or one in charge of

Page 195 of 206
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.”
Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; If a property covered by Torrens Title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and
in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is
nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.—Even assuming that the
intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of
the issue of ownership, still respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that
the bulk of Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real
estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of
Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the
properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.
We find this Court’s pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid relevant, thus: “It does not
matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of
ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which
under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the
matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. x x x x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We
hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of
the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x”
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the
people he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains, providing a
fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another
case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the
deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved
one.

Page 196 of 206
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein
petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution 2 dated
January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571. 3 The Appellate Court affirmed the
Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99,
Quezon City denying petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the
estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank
deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate
be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an

opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is
composed of "paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of
administration be issued to her instead. 5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for
her appointment as special administratrix.6
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter
has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory
heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator under the law.7
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that
both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided
to, in the capacity of business partners."8
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son
Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.

Page 197 of 206
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and
Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate. 10 Both were issued
letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila

Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed
against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of

Miguelita’s estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor
children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion 13
praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of
estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the
declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.
Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that
there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory
are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture." 14 Respondent claimed
that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner."
Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate
taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and
distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate
court ratiocinated as follows:
"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the
declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be
premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition
to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the properties
listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal
or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership
between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’"
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution
dated May 7, 1996.

Page 198 of 206
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
seeking to annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated January 17,
1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating that it
(intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing
the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of
ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate
court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in
probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for
these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings.
The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to
inquire into the propriety of private respondent’s claim, is being extremely
cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted
with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:
"I
RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE

COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE

INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE
OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS
OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III

Page 199 of 206
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE
COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING,
FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an
intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving
properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate
or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of
the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to
the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
special and limited jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a

probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its
purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and
provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the

probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon
the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim.
Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration
is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing
upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a
property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show
that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the
inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended
Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not

Page 200 of 206
October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion.
Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real
estate properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate and
realistic pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the

exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to
be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking
exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the

settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His
mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his
appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate
of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge." 19 He
could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did
not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s
inventory.
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate
court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the
inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate
court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties
comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate court went along
with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution 20 dated May 7, 1996,
thus:
"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late
Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a
claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs
could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate
proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s claim. It must be
mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which
she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience,
Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in the estate and
hence, should be given her day in Court."
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set
by the intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of
oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is
true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s)
properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct interest in
the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The

Page 201 of 206
intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of
respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s
estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a

proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelita’s
estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the
accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the
pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction.
Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the
matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long
line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property
alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by
some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,
such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate
proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.21
Jurisprudence teaches us that:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or

intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so."22
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of

general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly
belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a
provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still
respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of
Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real estates
covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of

Page 202 of 206
Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners
of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid23
relevant, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to

support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability
until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which,
of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a

property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness
of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be
considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is
nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when
as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons
named in the title. x x x"
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration

Decree," proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be

altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law."
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present

convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her
testimony, thus:
"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this
sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance with the Chinese
tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we
decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to
our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take
full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame
witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?

Page 203 of 206
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that
right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and
the other half was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any
more the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one

half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among
you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late
husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen…
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po."24
She further testified as follows:
"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks,
investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad,
interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies,
Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how
should these properties be partitioned or what should be done with

Page 204 of 206
these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the
partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land

located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San
Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po
ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin…
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi

kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir." 25
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed
in petitioner’s inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any
document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of
her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk
of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties. 26 Sensing that
such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to
change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business
partners" and that she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in a
joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the
properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had
the absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death, such
properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their
two minor children.28
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish
or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or
considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of
properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby
REVERSED.

Page 205 of 206
SO ORDERED.

Page 206 of 206

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[1] G.R. No.

L-27526 September 12, 1974

ANGELITA G. VDA. DE VALERA, AMANDA G. VALERA, OSCAR G.

Courts; Probate court; Determination by probate court on question regarding

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

Residential land & Improvements. — Covered by Tax Declaration No.

Appraised value — P45,600.00, 1/3 of which is P15,200.00. (p. 5 of

The administratrix, through counsel, has petitioned for an order to pay

WHEREFORE, finding the said motion to be well-founded and meritorious,

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

(Sgd.) ALFONSO P. DONESA J u d g e

Pending resolution before the court are the following motions:

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

Also pending is the examination of persons regarding the properties of the

On January 27, 1966, the court directed the movants seeking a

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

6. That failure to render a satisfactory account as hereby required within 15

Bangued, Abra, this 15th day of April, 1966.

(Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA

On January 5. 1967 Judge Ofilada directed the execution of his aforequoted

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

The Court is aware of attempts to a compromise agreement between the

WHEREFORE, it is hereby directed that:

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

Bangued, Abra, January 4, 1967.

(Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA Judge

Administrators or executors; Code of Civil Procedure; Heirs. — The heir

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

With particular reference to the sum of P4,784.96, which represents the

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

We have studied carefully respondents' memorandum and rejoinder. We have

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

CASIMIRO V. ARKONCEL, JR., in his capacity as the Administrator of the

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Compromise Agreement; Execution; A judgment

The order dated December 13, 1978 reads:

The Compromise Agreement forged between the Intestate of Casimiro

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution issue forthwith.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

Principal sum ..........................P44,438.00

Attorney's fees ..........................11,109.50

Liquidated damages ...................4,443.38

On January 9, 1978, petitioner herein, in his capacity as administrator of the

1. That the Judicial Administrator admits the claim of herein claimant

a) P44,438.00 — representing the outstanding principal balance of the

b) Interest on the outstanding principal balance from the date of

c) Pll,109.50 or 25% of the outstanding principal balance as and for

d) Costs of and expenses in this suit in the amount of P200.00;

2 That the claimant, with the conformity of its counsel, is willing to

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

Acting on the motion, respondent judge issued the questioned order of

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

The sole issue of the case is:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR

... Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, the administrator

The Provincial Sheriff thereafter sold the property at public auction at

The Judicial Administrator voluntarily entered into an amicable settlement with

There is no merit to the petition.

The rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 88- Rule 90)

Conformably, the Judicial Administrator is hereby directed to pay out